14 People Vs Gutierrez PDF

8/23/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 036
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gutierrez
Nos. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.MARIO J.

GUTIERREZ. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
CAMILO PILOTIN,FRANCISCO PIANO,DELFIN
PIANO,PEDRO PATAO,VINCENT CRISOLOGO,CAMILO
PIANO,CAMILO PATAO,PEDRING PIANO,ISIDRO PUGAL,
ANTONIO TABULDO,LORENZO PERALTA,VENANCIO
PACLEB,ANTONIO PIANO,FERMIN PUGAL,CARLITO
PUGAL,
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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 173

FLORPIANO,ERNING A BAÑ O and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN

DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Secretary of Justice has no

power to assign cases to be heard.—The present laws do not confer upon
the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific
cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of
executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the
Executive and the Judiciary, and while not directly depriving the courts of
their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the
accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result
in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic
Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating
the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere
indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to
the circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274
evidence any such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No.
258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001741a549a3b455c0cd7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/33
Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III
thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases
pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle,
chance here operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular
cases should be apportioned to either tribunal.
Criminal Procedure; Venue; Place where action is to be instituted.—It
is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil.
149, 150, that the purpose of the rule (Rule 110, Sec. 14 [a]) was not to
compel the defendants to move to and appear in a different court from that
of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another
place. Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the
prosecution, it is but logical that the court should have power to decide
where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine
the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and
impartial justice. Thus, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is
to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose
for which courts have been established.
Same; Same; Accused, not prejudiced by transfer of trial to another
place.—Accused cannot complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the
prosecution's witnesses can feel free to
174
reveal what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a

conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to be
heard, the prosecution will always be obligated to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor
of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case before a
proper arbiter; for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence in a verdict
that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.
Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Judicial power of the Supreme
Court; Power of the court to transfer trial of cases.— The Constitution has
vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial
power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably
necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every
quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institu tion of
government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322). One of these incidental
and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from
one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the

imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a
miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in
England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth
century. That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine
courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American
pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on June
11, 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed of a majority of
able American Lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of
the common law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of the
Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory courts,
possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to
another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest
of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to
believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case
would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of
justice.
PETITION for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction

to annul and set aside an order of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. Gutierrez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 175

General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and

Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza & Adaza for respondent Erning Abaño.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent
Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary

injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to
annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20
July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance,
entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to
effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases

aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in
Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons
descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of
Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the
afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same
municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses
and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After
investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several
state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to
collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First
Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-
V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the
seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other
unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses,
knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain
persons named in the filed informa-
176

tions in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur
(Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent
Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared
before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice
issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino
Añover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a
special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days
thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued
Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal
Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No.
5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274"
of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge
for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court,
invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling
attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of
the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either
San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and

personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously
opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge
declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more
expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the
accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed
transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the
Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same
should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us
for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion
and praying this Court
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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 177

to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the
respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to
authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San
Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in
view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to
transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and
likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge
Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further
orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer
upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should
hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of
administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the
time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and
while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it
would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil
party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a
result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The
creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts
for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of
First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit
the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.

Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any
such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258,
Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by
Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 8 of Part
III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of
cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be
effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to
178

either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226,

issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon
by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges
Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et
al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District,
reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of
imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge
Gutierrez, therefore in construing: Administrative Order No. 226 as
permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders
heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider
Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of
Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon
the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage
of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where
they felt their lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed
by the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses,
reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and
48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard
outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from tension and
terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be
considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed
participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora
Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still
unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent
Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province,
being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of
Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are
themselves the complainants in
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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 179

the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts
will be made to silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive
branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during
the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if armed
security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no
guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the
affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary
reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970
no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said
province, of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that
the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario
Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported
by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused
Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's
supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the
complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given
evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the
imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside
of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be
given a fair chance to present its side of tne case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site
can not be made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal
procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is
amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is
committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil.
376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a
Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-
defined territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons
charged with one offense committed outside of that limited territory,
and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of
Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense
180

was committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took

place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs.
Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by
accused respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to
move to and appear in a different court from that of the province
where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by
that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the
court should have power to decide where the balance of convenience
or inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of
the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to
proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty
to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial
process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of
Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and
impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted
that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied
upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions
wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of
the law would become the highest injustice—"summum jus, summa
in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the
trial to a site where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal
what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a
conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to
be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly
lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay
its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for
lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither
challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced
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VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 181

by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves

impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested
the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such
judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice The
courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve
and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective
institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of
transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank
in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the
courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in
Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann.
Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759,
said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back as
it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C.J. 507, the question was fully
discussed and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of
the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
"There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and

prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in the proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take
the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an
indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been
exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases,
where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice
of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of
our own court... The general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of
doubt."
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of

justice, exercised through writs of certiorari,
182

has, according to the weight of authority,

1
passed to the State
Supreme Courts of the American Union. In Cochecho R. Co. vs.
Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to
transfer the place of holding trials—
"became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the
independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only has the
practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised
by the Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by force of express
statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same."
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine

courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the
American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law,
Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then
composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar
with the institutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court
stated:
"And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports,

numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules,
principles and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning
and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since
they passed under American sovereignty."
"Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the
establishment of Civil Government under American sovereignty, was the
enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, 'An Act providing for the
organization of courts in the Philippine Islands.' This Act in express terms
abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets
out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the
new courts and their judges. The majority of the members of the body which
enacted it were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed,
and indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible
without some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and
_______________
1 56 Am. Jur. (Venue), pages 47-48, 50. For an exhaustive review of precedents, see Crocker
vs. Justices of the Superior Courts, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cas. 1067; Barry vs. Truax, 99 NW
769, 65 LRA, 762.
183
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 183

the United States. Its manifest purpose and object was to replace the old
judicial system, with its incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish
sources, with a new system modeled in all its essential characteristics upon
the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore,
that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held
to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system."
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to

believe that the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the
Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the
inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts
under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of
cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by
providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general
authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the
exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua case as
essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if not
expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when
so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential and
possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words
of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
"The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is
based are not less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the
countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an
examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a
failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would
materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for
which it was established." (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific
pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by
our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the
law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No.
5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of its
existence:
"SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within
their respective districts: Provided, however,
184

that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the
offense was committed. And provided further, that when the interest of
justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be
heard in a neighboring province within the district..." (Italics supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by

the filing of the criminal case in question with the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were
committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the
trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than
jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be

subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the
respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and
weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent
court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have
the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the
exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and
the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V
should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in
Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would
have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be
authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances
so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge
other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would
remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way
influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo
family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by
this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil.
523, where We said:
"...The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the
court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in
other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court
to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties
before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not
185
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 185

to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give it
effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can
be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of
the court's power by technicalities that that part of its authority
effective for justice between the parties is many times in
inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective
in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes
on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete
and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Italics
and paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal
Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to
transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power
vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts,
possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are
serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair
and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate
reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V
and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth
and justice.
186

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and

mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is sustained in so
far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the
Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory;
nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of discretion and
set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos.
47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and said
respondent Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the
two criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the
prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the
earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit
Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their
appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court
for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the
same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be
replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from
finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., took no part.
Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief
separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs and adds a separate opinion.
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on official leave.
CONCURRING OPINIONS
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders

crystal-clear why the decision reached by this Court should be what
it is. It is a manifestation of the
187
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 187

jurist's art at its most exemplary. It belies the belief not infrequently
given utterance that hard cases make bad law. The problem before us
is unique and unprecedented as far as our previous decisions go. It
calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences and far-flung
in its implications. Fortunately for the administration of justice
according to law, there is the recognition of power vested in this
Court, in the past perhaps only imperfectly discerned but
nonetheless in existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do
so. This is one such occasion. Even without resort then to precedents
coming from jurisdictions after which our judicial system was
patterned, the same result would have been reached. For only thus,
to paraphrase Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of
the judicial process assert themselves.
The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for assent,
which I readily yield. Nor does it seem inappropriate if it be stressed
that the conclusion reached by the Court is solidly buttressed not
only in law as history but likewise in law as logic and as social
control. Hence this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will
afford me the opportunity to give expression to the view that the
Constitution and the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of
1934-1935 point unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the
sole body vested with judicial power by the fundamental law itself is
not devoid of supervisory authority over inferior courts. Necessarily
the prerogative to transfer the venae of criminal prosecutions
whenever there is a persuasive showing that there would be a failure
of justice is therein included. On such an assumption, I do not feel
called upon to inquire into any asserted authority, even if
denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the Executive, the
Secretary of Justice, over the lower courts. For my belief gets
stronger with the years that it would be difficult to assert that such a
competence, even as thus Iimited, is warranted under a Constitution
based on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily
committed to the principle of judicial independence.
1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial power to
this Court and to such inferior courts as may be
188

1
established by law. Thus is conferred the authority to decide cases
through the ascertainment of facts and the application
2
of the law,
involving many a time its interpretation. It connotes, in the
language of the decision, "the imperative of securing a fair and3
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. * * *."
Where, as this did develop in this case, there is more than a
probability of an impasse with the witnesses for the prosecution
displaying the utmost reluctance to testify if the trial would be held
in Vigan, entailing the risk that there be, again in 4the language of the
opinion, "a mockery of the judicial process." It would appear
undeniable, and we have so held today, that this Court is not to be
denied the necessary competence to set matters right. It is not to fold
its hands as if in helpless submission to a binding decree of
Providence but must meet the problem squarely, possessed of power
adequate to cope with such an exigency. In the same way that the
two other coordinate departments, the Executive and Congress,
being constitutional organs, can rely on the 5
fundamental law to
justify the exercise of certain prerogatives, so may this Court, the
only constitutional court, exercise supervision over all other judicial
agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately termed by the
Constitution as inferior courts.
There would be a void in the framework of government thus
established if there is no official body of a higher rank that can take
the necessary steps to avoid a frustration of the exercise of judicial
power. It is my firm conviction that neither the Presidency nor
Congress can rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus,
then the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a myth. Such an
ap-
_______________
1 According to the Constitution: "The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." Art. VIII,
Sec. 1.
2 Cf. City of Baguio v. de Leon, L-24756, Oct. 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 938; Vera v.
Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351; Pecson Jose v. Santos, L-25510, Oct.
30, 1970.
3 Opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, p. 5, Editor's Note: p. 180 this volume).
4 Ibid.
5 Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
(1939); Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
189
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 189

proach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion that the so

called administrative supervision exercised by the Secretary of
Justice is, to put it at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as
to its constitutionality.
There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this case as
is so aptly demonstrated in the opinion of the Court. What appears to
me undisputed is that where the question partakes of a judicial
character, only this Court can perform that function and trace its
source to the Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from
the reproach that a situation is left unprovided for. What is more, it
assures the utmost respect for the principle that like the other two
coordinate and co-equal branches, this Court 6is likewise the recipient
of power conferred by the Constitution itself.
2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical
jurisprudence of law as logic. If the matter be viewed from the
approach found congenial by sociological jurists, law as one of the
most effective forms of social control, the same conclusion appears
to be inescapable. This is to examine legal institutions in terms of
how they function. It certainly would be a blot on the administration
of justice if by the reluctance of witnesses to testify, based on what
they consider to be a feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the
circumstances as having no basis in reason, no trial could be had of a
criminal case. It is a matter of great public interest that crime should
not go unpunished. Of course, it is equally important that the rights
of whoever is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an
impasse is likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom of a
breakdown in the orderly legal processes, the loss of public
confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable. That is an
eventuality which at all pains must be avoided. The only question is
how. If the legal doctrine and principles, which under the system of
legal norms followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do

not
_______________
6 Cf. Debates in the Constitutional Convention with Delegate Jose P. Laurel

explaining his draft proposal as found in V Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention, pp. 724-731; 911-928.
190

recognize such a competence in this Court, then for some all may
well be lost.
It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not entirely
without basis, that the two other branches of the government cannot
escape political considerations, to assume that either Congress or the
Executive can be trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would
it do to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts, unless
whatever is decided by them is subject to correction and review by
the only constitutional court, certainly vested with the needed
supervisory authority. It would thus appear, if a breakdown in the
legal system is to be averted, that the power of this Court is
undeniable. There would seem to be no other way to avoid a serious
disruption in the legal order.
The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a full
concurrence with what has been so persuasively and ably put forth
in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.
December 5, 1970
BARREDO, J., concurring:
The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the unerring logic of

the resolution of the various facets of this case evidence in the main
opinion written by our erudite colleague Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
could not but impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the
members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best evidence of my
full concurrence therein by merely signing the same without this
separate opinion. I feel, however, that the impact of this decision is
of such transcendental importance to the administration of justice in
this country, particularly now when some sectors of our people make
no secret of lingering doubts as to the fairness and impartiality by
judicial actuations and decisions, that my duty as a member of this
highest tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of my
vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon me, since none of
my brethren seems to be minded to do it, to project more

emphatically certain rele-
191
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 191

vant matters, the significance of which should go hand in hand with

the resolution of the case itself.
I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full satisfaction
that overwhelms me now, because I consider this decision as
probably the first one of national importance, in a long time, that
will receive universal and unqualified approval throughout the
length and breath of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our
constitutional government as a whole and for the judiciary in
particular a rich harvest of regained trust and confidence in the
administration of justice. This decision is a great leap forward. We
are shaking away from a long standing jurisprudential rule; We are
casting aside technical procedural roadblocks; We are here and now
proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the Constitution,
of Our power and authority to "insure to (our people) and their
posterity, the blessings of independence under a regime of justice"
(Preamble of the Constitution) by holding that the "judicial power . .
. vested in ................. (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries with
it the power to lay down procedures that will effectively and fully
guarantee, as far as it is humanly possible to do so, that substantial
justice shall not be defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and
what is most important today, as I view it, is that this is one decision
the essence of which spells simple justice that will be plainly
understood by the common man. In the clearest terms, this Court
holds in effect in this decision that inspite of the traditional rule that
a person charged with an offense may not be tried in a province
outside of the one in which the alleged offense or any essential
ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of the
corresponding trial court, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to
see to it that when the demands of justice require it, the venue is
moved to another province wherein the circumstantial environment
will insure a full disclosure of all material facts essential in the
pursuit of truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not
understand why the Supreme Court in whom the totality of judicial
power is vested by the Constitution would not have the authority and
the right, nay the duty, to prevent a trial from being
192
held in a place where it would be nothing more than a farce and an

empty show, the final chapter of which may have already been
prewritten, even independently of the honesty and integrity of the
presiding judge, because of external factors and forces that impede
the witnesses from making a free and fearless exposition of what
they know. I am exceedingly happy that by this decision, the
common man will understand that neither the Constitution nor this
Court will ever be found wanting in what is needed to render justice
in its truest sense.
Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal issues
raised by the parties in their pleadings. The problem revolves around
the power of the Secretary of the Department of Justice vis-a-vis the
operation of the Circuit Criminal Courts created by Republic Act
5179. The People contends that by Administrative Order 258 and
271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order No. 226, Series of
1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued pursuant allegedly to
Republic Act 5179, (presumably Section 8 thereof) the transfer of
the criminal cases herein involved, Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and
48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District is legally justifiable.
On the other hand, the defense submits that under the uniformly
announced doctrine of this Court regarding the jurisdictional nature
of the venue of criminal cases and principally because to give effect
to the administrative orders aforementioned would be impairing the
independence of the judiciary, the accused in aforesaid cases must be
tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by the Court of First Instance in which, it
is a fact, the case was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day
Administrative Order No. 221 of the Secretary of Justice authorizing
Judge Lino Añover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold sessions in
Vigan beginning July 1, 1970 was issued.
It is my considered view that the less said about the intervention
of the Department of Justice with the Circuit Criminal Courts by the
issuance of Administrative Orders 258 and 274, Series of 1968 and
worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the better, for I
find ab-
193
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 193

solutely no legal authority for the issuance of said Orders. The first
two purportedly direct and instruct the judges of the various judicial
districts of the Philippines as to how to apportion among themselves,
together with the corresponding circuit criminal court judges, the
cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly
that the distribution of the powers of government by the Constitution

places, even in its broadest sense, everything that judges have to do
that might in one way or another affect or be related to the ultimate
disposition of the controversies and cases to be tried by them,
including the distribution of the cases to be tried by them, entirely
and exclusively with the judges themselves by common agreement
among them, and so I hold that whatever be the import of Section 8
of Republic Act 5179 providing that "for administrative purposes,
the Circuit Criminal Courts shall be under the supervision of the
Department of Justice," the same cannot be considered as
contemplating any intervention of the Secretary of Justice in the
distribution of cases among judges. That the common impression
and long standing practice on the matter are otherwise, cannot alter
what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.
I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal Courts
are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First
Instance in their respective districts with the limited concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of, try and decide only those cases
enumerated in Section 1 of the Act. This is readily implied from
Section 3 of the Act which says:
"SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the
judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of
criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases
cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act."
It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted Republic Act

5179, it was conscious1 of the existing doctrinal rule laid down by
this Court, in Cunanan that in
_______________
1 26 Phil. 376.
194

criminal cases, venue is equivalent to territorial jurisdiction and

precisely because of this consciousness and the knowledge that the
nature of the crimes placed within the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Criminal Courts is such that their successful prosecution might be
impaired or obstructed by the doctrinal rule aforementioned that in
Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that as a rule,
"cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of
the offense (sic) was committed" but "when the interest of justice so
demands, with the prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may
be heard in a neighboring province of the district."
It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4
contemplate only those cases already in the Circuit Criminal Court.
That may be so, but my view is that by the said provisions, Congress
has precisely opened the door for the regular courts trying cases of
the nature enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit
criminal court in instances like the present wherein it appears quite
evident that to maintain Vigan as the venue of the trials in question
will defeat the ends of justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just
another branch of the Court of First Instance, and once it is in the
former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied. Moving of cases
from one branch of a Court of First Instance to another branch
thereof is neither new nor unusual when the judges concerned are
agreed that such a step would best promote the interests of justice. In
the light of this practice, commendable in its motivation, why cannot
the transfer be made from the Court of First Instance to circuit
criminal court? Indeed, this should not be treated as merely a matter
of discretion; judges should feel bound to act accordingly, as a
matter of duty, hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is
ground for certiorari or mandamus. In this connection, however, I
must hasten to advert, that the interested parties should be duly
heard on the matter and, in accordance with the spirit, if not the
letter of the law, approval of the Supreme Court be secured.
Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it clear that
the rule invoked by the defense to the effect that venue
195
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 195

in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character has no foundation in

any act of the legislature. There can be no question that jurisdiction
is conferred only by law and that it is only venue that may be fixed
by the Rules of Court because jurisdiction is substantive and venue
is merely procedural. The rule the defense invokes is found only in a
decision of this Court rendered way back in 1913. In Cunanan,
supra, this Court held: "The jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to
certain well-defined territory. They cannot take jurisdiction of
persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed
outside of that limited territory."
As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support of the
ruling. The reason is simple. There is no such law. In other words,
whatever force such invoked ruling may have is no more than that of
a construction given by this Court. I dare say that when a previous
construction by this Court runs counter to fundamental principles
now separating the rule making power of the courts from the
legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction, it is best to
lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional boundaries of our
prerogatives when they are plain and the contrary cannot be implied.
And since it was this Court that made the construction, there is
nothing to stop Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch as
Section 14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not
legislated upon by Congress as a jurisdictional matter, Our power to
change the same is unquestionable. I, therefore, reiterate my
concurrence in the resolution of this point in the main opinion.
Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in not yielding to the suggested transfer of the cases in
question to the circuit criminal court. Court trials and proceedings
mean nothing unless the pronouncement and decisions of the courts
merit the faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people in
general. To the common man specially, the imperatives of justice
administered by our courts are: (1) judges who can be trusted and (2)
procedures that insulate the proceedings from all factors that may
taint the ultimate
196

outcome of litigations with doubt and skepticism. To my mind, it is

not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of
acting in good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance
attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of
trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in this case, We
are not expressing any distrust as to the impartiality of respondent
judge; it should be clearly understood, however, that it is possible
for his decision to be unfair not because he has made it so, but
because under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before
him leaves him no other alternative.
May I say as I close that what is most striking in this decision is
that it is a unanimous one, in spite of the fact that at first blush it
appeared that there were formidable adverse precedents on our way.
After long and careful deliberation and after viewing all its angles,
factual and legal, when the time for voting came, there was no
hesitation in the assent that all of us gave to the rationalizations and
conclusions contained in the scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice
Reyes and the dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and
in absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated by the
peculiary circumstances and personages involved in this case ever
influence any of Us, as such things, indeed, never will.
Writs granted.
ANNOTATION
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
General principle.—It is a well settled principle of criminal

jurisprudence that every offender against the law must be prosecuted
for his crime in the jurisdiction wherein it was committed, and
Section 14(a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Court, is
declaratory of that principle. It provides that: "In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipa-
197
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 197

lity or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of

the essential ingredients thereof took place." This principle is
fundamental (Hernandez v. Albano, L-19272, Jan. 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 95). Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the
territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless
to try the case. For, the rule is that one cannot be held to answer for
any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was
committed (People v. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665). Accordingly, a
District Judge for Occidental Mindoro was restrained from holding
session at Oriental Mindoro for the purpose of trying a case of
malversation of public funds alleged in the information to have been
committed in Occidental Mindoro (Beltran v. Ramos, etc., 96 Phil.
149). Likewise, where the accused was charged with violation of
Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, for
buying imported cigarettes in Zamboanga knowing them to have
been illegally imported, but the evidence during the trial shows that
the said illegal purchase was made in Sulu, it was held that the case
should be tried in Sulu, and not in Zamboanga (People v. Dipay, L-
8380, Nov. 29, 1955, 51 O.G. 6224).
Although the provision of Section 14(a) of Rule 110 refers to the
place of trial, the same provision may also apply to the place of
preliminary investigation. It was held, therefore, that a provincial
fiscal or a duly appointed special counsel has the power and
authority to conduct preliminary investigation only of crimes
committed within their territorial jurisdiction (Tadeo v. Provincial
Fiscal of Pangasinan, et al., L-16474, Jan. 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 235).
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants—as such—
may not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines
of, say, Camarines Norte. This proposition offers no area for debate.
Because, said prosecuting officers would then be overreaching the
territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in the process step on the

shoes of those who, by statute, are empowered and obligated to
perform that task. They cannot unlawfully encroach upon the powers
and prerogatives of the fiscals of the province aforesaid (Hernandez
v. Albano, supra).
198

For the same reason, a municipal or city court may hold a

preliminary investigation only within the territorial boundaries of the
municipality or city where the offense was committed (Ragpala v.
Justice of the Peace of Tugod, L-15395, Aug. 31, 1960, 61 O.G.
392).
A preliminary investigation need not, however, be conducted by
the fiscal in the provincial capital where his office is located. He
may conduct such investigation in any of the municipality of the
province of his jurisdiction. On this point, the Court of Appeals
held: "While it is the usual practice for the fiscal to conduct his
investigation in the provincial capital where his office is located, this
is a matter of more convenience for the fiscal. Indeed, the fiscal need
not give any reason for choosing to conduct his investigation at the
very place where the crime was committed. Aside from the
advantage of securing the attendance of witnesses, it will also
considerably reduce the expenses of the latter (People v. Advincula,
CA-G.R. No. 00276-CR, May 14, 1964). Cf. also Santos, Jr., etc. v.
Flores, et al., L-18251-52, L-18256 & L-18260, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1136.
Reason for the general rule.—The purpose of the fundamental
principle stated is not to compel the defendant to move to, and
appear in, a different court from that of the province or municipality
where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place. In other words, the operation of the general principle
would, in effect, prevent the possibility of harassment of a person
accused and saves him from the trouble and expenses of attending
hearings somewhere else (Duran, et al. v. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; Beltran
v. Ramos, etc., supra; Hasim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
Nature of the principle.—The elements of the jurisdiction of trial
courts over the subject matter in a criminal case are: (a) the nature of
the offense and/or the penalty attached thereto; and (b) the fact that
the offense has been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. The non-concurrence of either of these two elements may
be challenged by an accused at any stage of the pro-
199
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 199

ceedings—-in the court below or on appeal. Failing in any one of

them, a judgment of conviction is null and void (Manila Railroad
Co. v. Attorney-General, et al., 20 Phil. 523; U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil.
90; People v. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; People v. Amongo, CA-G.R.
No. 15231-R, Aug. 6, 1959).
While venue in a civil case can be waived or be the subject of an
agreement (Rep. Act No. 1171, Secs. 3 and 4), venue of a criminal
action cannot be waived or be stipulated upon because it is an
element of jurisdiction. It is then fundamental in criminal actions to
specify in the complaint or information the place where the crime or
any of the necessary ingredient thereof had been committed (Secs. 9,
14[a], Revised Rules of Court).
Exceptions to the rule:
The preceding rule (Sec. 14[a], Rule 110) is subject to certain

recognized exceptions, namely: (a) continuing offenses, (b) piracy,
(c) extra-territorial offenses contemplated in Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, (d) criminal and civil actions arising from written
defamation, and (e) where the application of the general principle
would result in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual
facts of the case because the witnesses from the place where the
crime was committed will not be at liberty to reveal what they know
about the case.
a. Continuous crimes.—The notion or concept of a continuous
crime has its origin in the judicial fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society
(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist, there
should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of
time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity
of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the
same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim (People v. Zapata, et al., 88 Phil. 691). Offenses are
continuing or transitory upon the theory that there is a new
commission, continuance or repetition of the offense wherever the
defen-
200

dant may be found. Such offenses may be tried by the court of any
jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found. In such a case, the
complaint or information should allege that the offense was

committed within the jurisdiction of the court and not at the place
where it was originally committed (U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376).
It was held that where a crime was committed partly in one
province and partly in another, that is to say, where some acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation, occur in one province and some in another, said
crime is triable in either province (U.S. v. Santiago, 27 Phil. 411).
However, this means that to make the offense triable in more than
one province the acts perpetrated in any one of them must be
impelled by the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid.). The same
principle applies to a situation where a crime was committed inside
a house partly erected in one province or city and partly within
another. In a case like this, there can be but one prosecution for the
crime committed in said house. For the house is one sole piece. A
prosecution cannot be done by halves. The dividing line between
two adjoining provinces or cities is not to be given its geometrical
definition. In such a posture, the accused could be prosecuted in
either province or city (22 C.J.S. 268-269; Stone v. People, 204 P.
897; People v. Amongo, CA-G.R. No. 15231-R, Aug. 6, 1959).
In People v. De Guzman (L-9629, March 29, 1957), the money
misappropriated was delivered to the accused in Alcala, Pangasinan.
Said amount was received at the FACOMA office in Cabanatuan
City, for delivery to the accused who went ahead to Alcala,
Pangasinan, for the purchase of carabaos for the FACOMA
Association. The accused had to account for the said sum in
Cabanatuan City. It was there held that the estafa committed, being a
continuing offense, can be prosecuted either in Pangasinan or
Cabanatuan. The ruling here reaffirmed the earlier decision in
People v. Tolentino (69 Phil. 715) that: "The crimes of estafa can be
prosecuted in the court under whose jurisdiction they are committed,
they are being committed, or continued to be committed, and where
the accused of said
201
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 201

crime is under obligation to account for what he had received and

which he had misappropriated."
Similarly, where the information alleged that the accused had his
office at Cagayan, that he was a traveling sales agent of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office in Manila, charged with
selling tickets entrusted to him for sale in his district, with the
obligation of turning over the proceeds of the sale of said tickets to
the Sweepstakes Office in Manila, and that he fraudulently
misappropriated the amount of P3,960.95, the unaccounted balance
of the proceeds of the tickets, it was held that these allegations are
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of First Instance of
Manila to the exclusion of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan (People v. Angco, L-9550, Feb. 28, 1958).
The aforementioned rulings do not apply, however, to adultery,
bigamy, and theft cases.
It was the holding in People v. Zapata (88 Phil. 688) that adultery
is not a continuing offense since, said crime being perpetrated in
every sexual intercourse and the culprits need not commit another or
other adulterous acts to consummate it, there cannot, in the several
acts of intercourse, a unity of criminal intent and purpose (28 SCRA
677).
In a bigamy case, where the first marriage took place in Iloilo,
while the second marriage was contracted in Davao, it was held that:
"The place where the first marriage was celebrated is immaterial to
the criminal act, intent, and responsibility of the accused. What is
essential is that the first marriage be not legally terminated, actually
or by legal presumption, when the subsequent wedlock takes place;
and it is upon the celebration of that subsequent marriage that
bigamy is committed, not before. The continued existence of the
first marriage is without definite locus. Hence, in the prosecution of
that offense, the Court of First Instance for Davao (not Iloilo) has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the crime charged" (Ganchero v.
Bellosillo, et al., L-26340, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 673).
202

Likewise, in a theft case where a car was stolen from its parking
place in Manila, the fact that said car was later found and recovered
in Rizal is not an essential ingredient of the crime but a mere
circumstance which would add nothing to the nature of the offense
or to its consummation. Hence, this circumstance cannot be made
determinative of the jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal
action (Duran, et al. vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476).
Generally, the offense of theft is committed by taking, without
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things, a
personal property belonging to another without the latter's consent
and with intent of gain. It is immaterial that the thief should, after
committing the offense, keep the property in his possession,
consumes it if it is perishable or give it to another person, and,
therefore, the witness or witnesses who may testify to the stealing by
the accused must necessarily be those who reside or were found at
the place from where the property was taken (Duran, et al. v. Tan,
supra).
b. Piracy.—Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but

against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no
territorial limits (People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19).
c. Extra-territorial offenses.—A crime is essentially territorial,
and is the creature of the law which defines or prohibits it; it is an
offense against the sovereignty, and can be taken notice of and
punished only by the sovereignty offended. Accordingly, the general
rule is that the laws of a country do not take effect beyond its
territorial limits, because it has neither the interest nor the power to
enforce its will (16 C.J. 73, cited in Francisco, Revised Penal Code,
Bk. I, 2nd Ed., pp. 21-22). The applicability of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code outside of Philippine territorial limits is
provided for in Article 2 thereof and in Section 14 (b, c & d), Rule
110, of the Revised Rules of Court.
203
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 203

By the Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines

and the United States, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. Whether a given case which by the treaty comes within
the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine
authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or
say (People vs. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534).
d. Criminal and civil actions for written defamation.—The old
rule was that: a criminal prosecution for libel may be instituted in
any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or
circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v.
Borja, 43 Phil. 618). This rule was, in effect, modified by Republic
Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965 (Cf. Laquian v. Baltazar,
et al., 31 SCRA 552).
Republic Act No. 4363 pertinently provides:
"The criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in
case one of the offended parties is a private individual the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action
shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice
versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or
civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall
not apply to cases of written
204

defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations

as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or
city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the
city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted
in accordance with the provisions of this article." (Amending Article
360, Revised Penal Code.)
Purpose of the amendment.—Under the former law (Art. 360,
Rev. Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1289), an alleged
offender can be easily subjected to hardships, inconveniences, and
harassments because the criminal complaint for written defamation
may be filed in a very remote place as long as there is proper venue.
The old law is wholly responsible for many out-of-town suits. The
amendatory act seeks to minimize or limit the filing of outof-town
suits by providing that the complaint may be filed only in the proper
court of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published. The amendatory act also seeks to provide the venue
for the complaint in cases of written defamations where one of the
offended parties is a public officer (Explanatory Note of H.B. No.
17057; Report of the Committee on Revision of Laws, CRPT No.
6823, 5th C.R.P. re H. 17057; Congressional Record of Debates and
Discussions on H. 17057).
Does "libel by radio" fall within the legal import of the term
"written defamation"? A grave doubt is cast upon the meaning and
import of the term "written defamation" as used in Republic Act No.
4363 and in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. One view holds
and contends that the term "written defamation" is confined to libel
by newspapers, magazines, letters, etc., or libel by print. This view

excludes libel by radio. Upon the other hand, another school of
thought argues for the inclusion of the term "libel by radio" within
the meaning and import of the term "written defamation." The latter
view is anchored on the following considerations and observations:
First. The terms "defamation in writing" and "similar means" (of
defamation in writing), as used in Articles 355 and 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, are both in-
205
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 205

cluded in the statutory definition of the term "libel" in Article 353 of

the same Code.
"Strictly speaking, therefore, the term 'libel' means 'written defamation'"

(Francisco, Rev. Penal Code, Vol. II, pp. 1524, 1528).
Second. The term "written defamation," as used in the penultimate

paragraph (original) of Article 360 (which provides for the venue in
criminal and civil actions thereof), is qualified and followed by the
phrase "as provided in this chapter"; meaning, Chapter I, Title XIII,
of the Revised Penal Code. Said Chapter I covers the subject of
"libel." The phrase "written defamation, as provided in this chapter,"
used in said Article 360, Id., may mean, therefore, the
comprehensive concept of libel in Article 353 and the forms of libel
in Article 355 of the same Code—which articles both fall in Chapter
I, Title XIII, of the Revised Penal Code.
The said phrase "written defamation, as provided in this chapter,"
as used originally in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, was re-
enacted in its amendatory Republic Act No. 1289 and the same
phrase was repeated and re-enacted in Republic Act No. 4363
(Laquian v. Baltazar, supra). This is another indication which
supports the view that the term "written defamation" includes "libel
by radio," as "libel by radio" falls within the compass of the legal
precept of "similar means" (of defamation in writing).
Third. The Revised Penal Code (Article 355) provides for a
single and similar penalty for both "defamation in writing" and
"similar means" (of defamation in writing). These terms "defamation
in writing" and "similar means" (of defamation in writing), as
originally provided in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, were
preserved by, and remain unaltered in, the amendatory Republic
Acts Nos. 1289 and 4363. The inclusion of the terms "defamation in
writing" and "similar means" (of defamation in writing), like radio,
in one single statutory definition (Art. 353) and the provision (Art.
355) providing for a single and similar penalty therefor, further

sustain the
206

proposition that "libel by radio" falls within the legal import of the
term "defamation in writing" or "written defamation."
Fourth. Our Supreme Court in People v. Santiago (L-17663, May
30, 1962) has construed the import of the term "radio" as used in
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Said the Supreme Court in
the Santiago case, supra:
"x x x 'Radio' as used in Article 355 should be considered in relation to the

terms with which it is associated . . . writing, printing, engraving, etc. ... all
of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a
means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty than that
prescribed for oral defamation."
This Santiago ruling is significant because the Supreme Court

therein hinted that "libel by radio" is within the meaning of the term
"defamation in writing" or "written defamation." Furthermore, the
adoption by the Supreme Court of the maxim "Noscitur a Sociis"
(which means the meaning of a word may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of the words associated with it), in that
Santiago case, supra, bars and precludes the application here of the
maxim "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius."
To remove the obscurity in the provisions of Republic Act No.
4363 and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as above pointed
out, it is suggested that said laws be amended by expressly including
therein the term "libel by radio." After all the trend of authorities
supports the proposition that there is a close analogy between "libel
by print" and "libel by radio."
''I conceive there is a close analogy between such a situation and the
publication in a newspaper of a libel. The publisher prints the libel on paper
and broadcasts it to the reading world. The owner of the radio station 'prints
the libel on a different medium just as wide or even more widely read." (
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., Dec. 7, 1934, 8 F. Supp. pp. 889-890).
"Radio makes available to the defamer a simultaneous audience far
greater than that reached by the most permanent of writings. The distinction
of permanence between radio and
207
VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 207
newspaper dissemination seems comparatively irrelevant considered from

the standpoint of ultimate distribution of the defamatory material."
(Donnelly, Defamation by Radio, a Reconsideration, 34 Iowa Law Review
12, pp. 17-18; Also Void, Defamation by Radio, 19 Can. B. Rev. 353).
"When the speaker over the radio speaks, it is the voice which carries his
words to millions ... To them his words are still unrecorded. Even here the
words, eagerly awaited with radio acquisitiveness, may leave a record as
permanent as if the eye had seen the printed page..." (Seelman on the Law of
Libel & Slander, p. 3).
"If considerations of principle are to control, there is no valid reason why
the same consequences should not attach to publication through the medium
of the radio broadcasting as flow from publication through the medium of
writing." (Justice Fuld in Hartland v. Winchill, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. 2d
30).
—JUDGE DOMINGO O. LUCENARIO
Notes.—Transfer of case from one court to another.—It is to be

noted that in the foregoing case the Circuit Criminal Court to which
the case was proposed to be transferred has territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the trial was proposed to be held. It is to be
noted as well that the offense committed is one falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and the Circuit
Criminal Court. The foregoing ruling is not so much an exception to
the rule on venue in criminal cases as to the following well-
established rule, of which curiously no mention or reference is made
in the decision or in the concurring opinions, to wit:
"The rule is that when two or more courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, the first to validly acquire it takes it to the exclusion of
the other or the rest (Valdez vs. Lucero, 42 O.G. No. 11, 2835;
People vs. Livara, 94 Phil. 771; Lumpay vs. Moscoso, L-14723, May
27, 1959).
"While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where
there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon,
is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, x x x the moment the
choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such
choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is
filed
208

Commissioner of Customs vs. Alikpala
with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court
acquires jurisdiction over the defendant; from which time the right
and power of the court to try the accused attaches" (Alimajen vs.
Valera, L-13722, Feb. 29, 1960).
_______________
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8/23/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 036

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nos. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.MARIO J.

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 173

FLORPIANO,ERNING A BAÑ O and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Secretary of Justice has no

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gutierrez

reveal what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a

one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the

PETITION for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 175

General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary

effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 177

the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226,

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 179

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 181

by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves

"There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and

This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

has, according to the weight of authority,

That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine

"And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports,

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 183

While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by

jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 185

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 187

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1 According to the Constitution: "The judicial power shall be vested in one

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 189

proach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion that the so

legal norms followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do

6 Cf. Debates in the Constitutional Convention with Delegate Jose P. Laurel

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BARREDO, J., concurring:

The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the unerring logic of

my brethren seems to be minded to do it, to project more

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 191

vant matters, the significance of which should go hand in hand with

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gutierrez

held in a place where it would be nothing more than a farce and an

VOL. 36, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 193