A. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT service of summons invalid.
service of summons invalid. That she was of sufficient age and discretion is
Interlink Movie Houses Inc., v. CA (G.R. No. 203298, January 17,
2018)
(Albuero)
Prudential Bank v. Magdamit Jr. (G.R. No. 183795, November 12,
2014)
(Bulan)
FACTS: A case of unlawful detainer filed by petitioner Prudential Bank, now
Bank of the Philippine Islands (petitioner), in its capacity as administrator of
the Estate of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel (Estate). It is based on the ground
of respondents’ failure to pay rentals and refusal to vacate the subject
property, which is allegedly part of the Estate located at 1164 Interior, Julio
Nakpil St., Paco, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118317
of the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Petitioner impleaded Amador A. Magdamit, Jr. (Magdamit, Jr.), as
respondent.
Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of Special
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss arguing that: (1) petitioner was not duly
authorized to institute the complaint, (2) he was not the occupant of the
subject property but instead, his parents, as grantees or awardees of Juliana
Diez Vda. De Gabriel, and (3) the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person because the summons was served at his former address at 1164
Interior Julio Nakpil St., Paco, Manila.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out this pleading on the ground that it is
prohibited. Petitioner then filed an Amended Complaint, this time,
impleading both Magdamit, Jr. and Amador Magdamit, Sr. (Magdamit, Sr.).
MeTC: denied defendants MTD. The summons issued in this case was
served, albeit substituted nevertheless valid. It is of no consequence that
defendant is also presently residing in Bacoor, Cavite. It appears that he
knew the person on whom summons was served. Simply put, the
requirement of due process has been satisfied.
Father and son filed their answers separately – argued that the MeTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the summons was not
properly served as the summons was received by Madel Magalona, who is
not authorized to receive summons being a mere housemaid of Magdamit,
Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie Cabug.
MeTC after trial ruled in favor of the petitioner -- "[t]he fact that the
person who received the summons was a 13-year old girl does not make the
shown by the fact that she was intelligent enough to immediately bring to
the attention of defendant Atty. Amador Magdamit, Jr. the summons and
copy of the complaint she received."
RTC set aside the decision of the MeTC and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents – amending
the original complaint to implead Magdamit, Sr. to cure a defect in the
complaint and introduce a non-existing cause of action, which petitioner did
not possess at the outset, and to confer jurisdiction upon the court that
never acquired jurisdiction in the first place renders the complaint
dismissible.
CA found that the MeTC did notacquire jurisdiction over the
persons of respondents.
ISSUE: whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the respondents.
HELD: Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil
case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the absence or when
the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered
against him is null and void.
In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of
summons. However, because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service and personal service of summons is preferred over
substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to
substituted service of summons. 
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we have succinctly discussed a valid resort
to substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is
resorted to, the parties must:
(a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons
within a reasonable time;
- For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant;
- The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made
to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return.
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in
charge of the office or regular place of business of the defendant.
- A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of
full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion"
isdefined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may
be presupposed."
The service of summons failed to comply with the rule laid down in
Manotoc.
(a) in case of Magdamit, Sr. - The Return merely expressed a general
statement that because the Sheriff failed to reach Magdamit, Sr., he elected
substituted service of summons. The Return failed to state the impossibility
to serve summons within a reasonable time. And the further defect in the
service was that the summons was served on a person not of sufficient
discretion, an incompetent person, Madel Magalona, a housemaid of
Magdamit Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie Cabug.
(b) in case of Magdamit, Jr. - The summons was served at 1163 Int., J.
Nakpil St., Paco, Manila, Magdamit, Jr.’s former residence when at the time,
Magdamit, Jr. was residing at 0369 Jupiter St., Progressive Village 20 and
21, Molino I, Bacoor, Cavite. Worse, the Return did not make mention of any
attempt to serve the summons at the actual residence of Magdamit, Jr. 
The readily acceptable conclusion in this case is that the process
server at once resorted to substituted service of summons without
exerting enough effort to personally serve summons on
respondents. In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere
general statements that efforts at personal service were made. Not
having specified the details of the attendant circumstances or of
the efforts exerted to serve the summons, there was a failure to
comply strictly with all the requirements of substituted service, and
as a result the service of summons is rendered ineffective.
Filing an Answer does not amount to voluntary appearance
- Despite lack of valid service of summons, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s
voluntary appearance. However, such is not the case at bar. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents are not deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by virtue of filing an Answer or other
appropriate responsive pleadings and by participating in the case.
Lastly, a party who makes a special appearance in court, challenging the
jurisdiction of said court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. It should not be construed as voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.
B. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No 201821, September 19, 2018)
(Gabriel)
FACTS: The Republic commenced a civil case against Malabanan and
Greenthumb, the registered owners of various parcels of land covered by
certificates of title derived from TCT No. T-24268. The Republic alleged that,
TCT No. T-24268 had emanated from OCT No. 0-17421, which was
purportedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 589383 in L.R.A. Record No.
50573; that upon verification, the Land Registration Authority could not find
any copy of the judgment rendered in LRC Record No. 50573; and that the
tract of land covered by TCT No. T-24268, being within the unclassified
public forest, remained part of the public domain that pertained to the State
and could not be the subject of disposition or registration.
In response, Malabanan moved to dismiss the case by arguing that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the action because it sought the annulment of the
judgment and the decree issued in LRC Record No. 50573, the jurisdiction
over which pertained to the CA. The Republic opposed the motion insisting
that its complaint did not ask the RTC to annul a judgment because the
judgment did not exist to begin with.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss stating as follows:
As pointed out by the movants, the nullification of OCT No. 0-17421 and all
its derivative titles would involve the nullification of the judgment of the
Land Registration Court which decreed the issuance of the title over the
property. Therefore, the applicable provision of law is Sec. 9 (2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial
Courts.
>> After the Republic filed its notice of appeal, the petitioner moved that
the RTC deny due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that the
mode of appeal adopted was improper because the issue of jurisdiction,
being a question of law, was directly cognizable by the Supreme Court on
appeal by petition for review on certiorari. The RTC denied due course to the
Republic's notice of appeal, and dismissed the appeal.
>> The Republic then assailed the order in the CA and insists that it "cannot
be precluded from availing the remedy of an action for reversion in order to
revert lands of the public domain, such as the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. 0-17421 which was improperly titled in the name of private person to its
patrimony." and over which the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction.
It claims that the DENR found that the land covered by TCT No. 24268 is
within the unclassified public forest of Batangas thereby making the subject
property not capable of private ownership nor of disposition, or registration.
CA granted the appeal, Order of the RTC is SET ASIDE and the case
is consequently REMANDED to the RTC. It explained:
Where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public
domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law
to file an original action for reversion, an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land to the government pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, and over which action, no doubt, the RTC exercise exclusive
jurisdiction.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the order of the RTC
and directing it to proceed with the trial on the merits of the case
RULING: SC denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA
The basic rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
determined from the allegations in the complaint, the law in force at the
time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
averred. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is not affected by the pleas or
the theories set up by the defendant in the answer or motion to dismiss;
otherwise, jurisdiction becomes dependent almost entirely upon the whims
of the defendant.
The complaint alleged that: (a) TCT No. T-24268 had emanated from OCT
No. 0-17421 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas pursuant to Decree No.
589383, issued in L.R.C. Record No. 50573; (b) copy of the decision in
L.R.C. Record No. 50573 could not be found in the files of the Land
Registration Authority; (c) the land described in TCT No. T-24268 was within
the unclassified public forest of Batangas.
The complaint sought as reliefs the cancellation of OCT No. 0-17421, and
the reversion to the Republic of the tract of land therein covered on the
grounds that there had been no decision of the Land Registration Court
authorizing its issuance, and that the land covered by TCT No. 24268 was
within the unclassified public forest of Batangas.
In the present case, the material averments, as well as the character of the
relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint, show that the complaint of
the Republic was not seeking the annulment of the judgment issued in
L.R.C. Record No. 50573. The RTC may properly take cognizance of
reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC
acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and
reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and
where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
In a reversion suit, we should emphasize, the attack is directed not against
the judgment ordering the issuance of title, but against the title that is being
sought to be cancelled either because the judgment was not validly
rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully reflect the land referred to in
the judgment, or because no judgment was rendered at all.
First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications (G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018)
(Mendoza)
Facts:
 June 19, 2002, First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40M loan,
which was secured by a real estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of
land.
 The loan agreement was later amended: loan amount increased to
P51.2M, and further increased to P100M.
 January 2, 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Real Estate Mortgage. It claimed that it sent First Sarmiento several
demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal
amount and accrued interest.
 December 27, 2011, First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage with the RTC. However, complaint
was not accepted in the absence of the mortgaged properties' tax
declarations, which would be used to assess the docket fees.
 December 29, 2011, RTC ruled that First Sarmiento's action for
annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
 Same day, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM
as the highest bidder.
 January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage and its amendments, with prayer for the issuance of
TRO and preliminary injunction. It paid a filing fee of P5,545.00. First
Sarmiento claimed that it never received the loan proceeds of P100M.
 That same day, RTC issued ex-parte TRO for 72 hours, enjoining the
registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds.
 On January 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court and Sheriff issued a certificate
of sale to PBCOM.
 In its Opposition (Re: Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order), PBCOM asserted that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for annulment of
mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been
based on the fair market value of the mortgaged properties.
 On April 3, 2012, RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
 MR denied. Petition for Review (Rule 45), direct recourse to SC.
Issue: WON the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint
for annulment of real estate mortgage. (YES)
Ruling:
Petitioner contends that its Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
has a subject incapable of pecuniary estimation because it was not intended
to recover ownership or possession of the mortgaged properties sold to
respondent during the auction sale. It insists that it had ownership and
possession of the mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint; hence, it
never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of their ownership or
possession.
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a
case" brought before it for resolution.
Courts exercise the powers conferred on them with binding effect if they
acquire jurisdiction over:
(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case;
(b) the thing or the res;
(c) the parties; and
(d) the remedy.”
Jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case is the
court's authority to hear and determine cases within a general class where
the proceedings in question belong. This power is conferred by law and
cannot be acquired through stipulation, agreement between the parties, or
implied waiver due to the silence of a party.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with Congress given the plenary
power, for cases not enumerated in Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts.
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides Regional
Trial Courts with exclusive, original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."
Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter
of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought must first be established.
Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Cruz stated that the jurisdiction of a tribunal
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined
by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
such reliefs.
However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim is only a
consequence of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla likewise stressed that if the primary cause of
action is based on a claim of ownership or a claim of legal right to control,
possess, dispose, or enjoy such property, the action is a real action involving
title to real property.
A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces SC that petitioner never
prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the auction
sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them. Rather,
it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it
entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the
proceeds of the P100M loan agreement.
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing
Corporation stated that an action for cancellation of mortgage has a subject
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is not disputed that even if the Complaint were filed a few days after the
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at auction to respondent as
the highest bidder, the certificate of sale was only issued to respondent after
the Complaint was filed.
In the case at bar, the Ex-Officio Sheriff was restrained from registering the
certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds and the certificate of sale was
only issued to respondent after the Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage was filed. Therefore, even if the properties had already been
foreclosed when the Complaint was filed, their ownership and possession
remained with petitioner since the certificate of sale was not registered with
the Registry of Deeds. This supports petitioner's claim that it never asked for
the reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the mortgaged
properties when it filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed ownership and
possession over them.
Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of
court, upon the direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage.
Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case were a real action
and the correct docket fees were not paid by petitioner, the case should not
have been dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket fees should
have been made a lien on the judgment award. The records attest that in
filing its complaint, petitioner readily paid the docket fees assessed by the
clerk of court; hence, there was no evidence of bad faith or intention to
defraud the government that would have rightfully merited the dismissal of
the Complaint.
SC reaffirms that the nature of an action is determined by the principal relief
sought in the complaint, irrespective of the other causes of actions that may
also crop up as a consequence of the principal relief prayed for.
Petition GRANTED. The case is ordered REMANDED to RTC for continued
trial on First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc.'s Complaint for annulment of
real estate mortgage and its amendments.
Republic v. Gallo (G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018)
(Rinon)
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the
Republic of the Philippines' appeal from the Regional Trial Court December
7, 2010 Order4 granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo)
Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.
FACTS:
***Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always
been female. For her, in her petition before the Regional Trial Court, her
Certificate of Live Birth contained errors, which should be corrected. For her,
she was not changing the name that was given to her; she was merely
correcting its entry.
***Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela in
Special Proc. No. 2155 for the correction of her name from "Michael" to
"Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule
108of the Rules of Court.
***In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano";
her mother and father's middle name; and her parent's marriage date, May
23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
***As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's
certification, official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth
certificate, and parents' marriage certificate.
RTC DECISION:
The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted
the petition. It lent credence to the documents Gallo presented and found
that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous."It concluded
that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and
applied Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
***The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the
applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions
for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with the
jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition
and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael
Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating
the cause of the change of name.
CA DECISION:
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision,
denied the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal. It found that
Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the
corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous. It further
clarified that Rule 108 is limited to the implementation of Article 412 of the
Civil Code and that the proceedings which stem from it can "either be
summary, if the correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it]
affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality . . . which are deemed
substantial corrections."
***However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
believes otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to change the name that she was
given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
RULING:
This Court rules in favor of Gallo.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available
before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned
must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's
cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must
be complied with prior to filing a case in court.
 However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the court's
jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly
stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non compliance
with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time,
this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the
case and try it.  as the school’s President, there being no basis in law and in fact,
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a
controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its
proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its
sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to
the competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance.
Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be
waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction
is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-
compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to
dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.
Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue
of non-compliance was raised only as an afterthought at the final stage of
appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so.
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with
these two (2) doctrines was only raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to
invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from
invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29,
2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358
is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED.
Punongbayan v. Punongbayan (G.R. No. 194214, January 10,
2018)
(Santos)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion was the corporate
secretary and assistant treasurer of St. Peter's College of Iligan
City.
 On 26 July 1999, acting on the advice of her counsel, she wrote a
letter to private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan stating that
the latter knowingly committed acts of falsification when she acted
and told the bank that her signature is essentially required in
disbursements above P5,000.00. Her inordinate desire to poke into
the school's finances could be the by-product of an erroneous
advice from some defrocked members of the committee.
Otherwise, there would have been need to calibrate amounts in the
checks vis-a-vis the signatories thereto.
 Insulted, Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion.
 On 25 October 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
issued a resolution approving the filing of a case for libel against
Visitacion.
RTC RULING: Visitacion is guilty of Libel
The trial court disregarded Visitacion's defense of good faith finding
that her act of writing the disputed letter was motivated by hostility or
malice. It opined that if it was true that Visitacion merely wanted to
safeguard the corporation funds, her resort to an uncivil and confrontational
manner was unwarranted. The RTC highlighted that the letter belittled,
disparaged, and willfully hurt Punongbayan's sensibilities.
She was condemned to suffer a straight prison term of 1 year
(since there’s no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances plus adjudged to
pay 3M (moral damage) and the cost of the suit.
Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary injunction before
the CA.
CA RULING: Dismissed Visitacion's petition.
CA posited that the promulgation of the judgment despite Visitacion's
absence was proper. It explained that under Rule 120, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, trial in absentia is permitted should the accused fail to
appear during the date of promulgation despite due notice. The CA noted
that Visitacion was notified of the scheduled promulgation through her
previous counsel and was in fact able to file a motion to defer promulgation
of judgment. Further, the appellate court pointed out that the sheriff visited
Visitacion at her house on several occasions but she was conveniently not
around during those times. Thus, it believed that her excuse for her absence
was specious.
In addition, the CA expounded that Visitacion should have filed an
appeal and not a petition for certiorari. The appellate court opined that it
should have been through an appeal where she could have raised the issues
in the present petition for certiorari. It noted that at the time Visitacion filed
her petition, the period to file an appeal had yet to expire. Thus, the CA
elucidated that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for
dismissal of the petition for certiorari because it is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.
Visitacion moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in not treating the certiorari as an appeal
RULING: YES!
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the
special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if
one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave
abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not
interchangeable admits exceptions:
 when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
 when the broader interest of justice so requires;
 when the writs issued are null and void; or
 when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.
While a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari is warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding
was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object. 
Issues raised for the first time on appeal; exceptions
The Office of the Solicitor General  (OSG) argues that Visitacion
merely raised the issue of the correctness of the penalties and liabilities
imposed in her supplemental motion for reconsideration before the CA. It
bewails that in her petition for certiorari, she merely questioned the
propriety of the denial of her motion to inhibit before the RTC; the exclusion
of some of her exhibits; and the alleged lack of personal service of the
notice of the promulgation of judgment. Thus, the OSG laments that the
issues put forth in Visitacion's petition for review before the Court were
raised for the first time on appeal.
It is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not
be entertained because to do so would be anathema to the rudiments of
fairness and due process. Nonetheless, there are also exceptions to the said
rule. In Del Rosario v. Bonga, the Court explained that there are instances
that issues raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained, viz:
Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question
may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the
issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by
the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may
also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain
error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are
jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised
present a matter of public policy.
PROVISIONS RELATED
Article 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.  — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means.  — A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or
any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
Article 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in
the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, or of the city
or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same
court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided,
furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts: And, provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases
of written defamations, the civil and /or criminal actions which have been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamations as
provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal
of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance
of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended
by R.A. 1289, R.A. 4363).
Foronda v. Son (G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017)
(Albuero)
Padlan v. Dinglasan (G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013)
(Bulan)
FACTS: Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of
land. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a
conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said
property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the
owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then
subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-
O, under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan
(Felicisimo).
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and
her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers.
Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later caused the
issuance of TCT No. 134932 for the subject property under her name. A few
months later Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for ₱4,000.00.
Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the
name of petitioner.
Respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K,
but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before
the RTC of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 137466. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through
her mother, Anita Padlan.
Respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be
allowed to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner, through counsel, filed an
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner claimed that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not validly served
upon her person, but only by means of substituted service through her
mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been residing in Japan after
she married a Japanese national and only comes to the Philippines for a
brief vacation once every two years.
RTC: denied petitioner’s MTD and declared her in default.
CA: rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently,
the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered
the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the
petitioner, and the revival of respondents’ own title.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only
did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner. CA
issued a Resolution denying the motion.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE.
HELD: In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action,
an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over
it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.
Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first
level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In
the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the
value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in
the amount of ₱4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would
show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents’ counsel informed the court that they will present the tax
declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet
obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not
present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to
real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged
in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only ₱4,000.00, the
MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is declared NULL and VOID.
Yu v. Yu (G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016)
(Gabriel)
FACTS: Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Yu were married, had
four children and maintained their conjugal home at Horizon Condominium.
However, Viveca left the conjugal home and filed a Petition for Legal
Separation for repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct against
her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. She prayed
for permanent custody over the children, support, and the dissolution and
distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at approximately
P5,000,000.00.law
Philip denied the accusations against him and countered that since she
abandoned the family home, taking their four children away, she was not
entitled to support. She was, likewise, unqualified to become the
administrator of their conjugal funds, which had outstanding obligations.
Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage due to Viveca's psychological incapacity.
Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage revealing that he no longer had the desire to have his marriage
declared void. Despite Viveca's fervent opposition, RTC granted the motion.
RTC dismissed the Petition for Legal Separation in the following
wise:Cha
The Court finds that the parties are in pari delicto warranting a denial of this
petition.
Notwithstanding the foregoing Court's findings, the same becomes moot
with the declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties, on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of petitioner, Viveca Yu. Since the marriage
of the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore, no legal basis to
issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage has
already been declared of no force and effect.
>> Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC
nullifying her marriage with Philip, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment before the CA. According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person
did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons.
CA granted Viveca's petition ruling as follows:
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal
status of private respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. This is so
because the term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the
relations between husband and wife.
With this premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was
justified in resorting to Summons by publication. Petitioner is a nonresident
defendant who left the Philippines with her children and has now been living
in the United States of America. The court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case given that as adumbrated, in a proceeding in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res.
However, private respondent knew that petitioner left the conjugal home on
account of their marital difficulties. She temporarily resided at her parent's
house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong but during the pendency of the Legal
Separation case, she lived in Quezon City. This much was revealed by
private respondent himself in the Amended Answer with Counterclaim filed
in the Legal Separation suit. This knowledge notwithstanding, private
respondent declared before the court a quo that the "last known address" of
petitioner was still her conjugal abode at Horizon Condominium, while
private respondent knew that it was well-nigh impossible for petitioner to
receive Summons and other court notices at their former conjugal home,
still, he supplied the aforesaid address.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that private respondent moved for
the dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of marriage in the Legal
Separation case in 2007 as he had by then had the sinister motive of filing
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the court a quo.
Private respondent knew that if he breathed a word on the filing and
pendency of the latter Petition, petitioner would vigorously resist it as
revealed by her tenacious opposition in the proceedings before the RTC-
Pasig.
>> Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the
Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired
jurisdiction when Summons was duly served on Viveca by publication.
RULING: Petition is denied. Resolution of the CA affirmed.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person. As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant
who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however,
enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over
the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential.Said section provides:
Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is
not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial
service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and
order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address ,
also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects his personal
status, Viveca was already residing in the United States of America. Thus,
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a
non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. The Court finds,
however, that such service of summons on their conjugal home address
cannot be deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even
tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's
judgment.
Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as
Viveca's "last known address," well within the true meaning and intent of the
rules. But as borne by the records of the instant case, not only is he
mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his claims of good faith. It is
undisputed that the parties herein are also parties in a Legal Separation
case. There was, in said case, a disclosure of their basic personal
information, which customarily includes their respective local addresses,
wherein they may be served with court papers. In fact, as pointed out by
the appellate court, Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal
home and moved to a different local address for purposes of the pendency
of the Legal Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his Amended
Answer with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the conjugal abode” Thus,
Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had
already intentionally abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the
addresses that Viveca resided at, their conjugal home in Horizon
Condominium is her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be
considered as the address she is least likely to be found considering the
circumstances in which she left the same. Note that from the very beginning
of the Legal Separation case in 1994, all the way up until the promulgation
by the Pasig RTC of its decision thereon in 2009, there is no showing that
Viveca had ever received any document in relation to said case, nor is there
any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to Viveca, at the
conjugal address. There is, therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in
good faith, that said address is in truth and in fact Viveca's "last known
address" at which she may receive summons. His contention that the rules
require the defendant's "last known address" to be of a permanent, and not
of a temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.
Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in
litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests.
When defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in,
and even be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme
employed by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of
their due process rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily
suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights
cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the
same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. This Court,
therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment
issued without proper service of summons.
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation (G.R. No.
194751, November 26, 2014)
(Mendoza)
Facts:
 Case originated from separate complaints filed by Romasan
Development Corp. with the RTC in July 7, 1998, for nullification of free
patent and original certificates of title. One of the defendants is
petitioner Aurora De Pedro.
 Romasan Corp. alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and
possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City.
 Romasan Corp., through its representative, Mr. Ko, discovered
sometime in November 1996 that De Pedro put up fences on a portion
of its Antipolo property.
 Mr. Ko confronted De Pedro regarding her acts, but she was able to
show title and documents evidencing her ownership.
 Upon checking with the CENRO-DENR, it was discovered by Romasan
Corp. that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of the
property to the defendants.
 Romasan Corp. further alleged in its separate complaints that the
government could not legally issue the free patents because at the time
of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to
private individuals. OCT was already issued as early as August 30, 1937.
 Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed because,
according to the messenger, there is no person in the said given
address.
 On August 17, 1998, the RTC granted motion to serve summons and
the complaint by publication.
 On July 15, 1999, Romasan Corp. moved to declare all defendants in its
complaints, including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their
answers, and to be allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC
granted the motions on August 19, 1999.
 On January 7, 2000, the RTC issued an order declaring as nullity the
titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s
complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro. Each defendant
was also ordered to pay damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
 On March 30, 2000, filed before the RTC a motion for new trial, alleging
that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000 decision on
March 16, 2000.
 De Pedro argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person because of improper and defective service of summons.
 On September 30, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying De Pedro’s
motion for new trial. It ruled that the motion for new trial was filed
beyond the 15-day period within which the motion may be filed,
therefore, the decision had become final and executory. CA denied
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
De Pedro argues that Romasan Corp.’s prayer for attorney’s fees,
appearance fees, exemplary damages, and costs of suit sought to establish
personal obligations upon petitioner in favor of respondent. Hence, the case
was an action in personam, which required personal service upon her for the
court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. In this case, the Regional
Trial Court allowed service of summons by publication instead of ordering
that summons be served by substituted service. Improper service of
summons rendered the trial court decision null and void. It means that the
court could not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they
acquire jurisdiction over:
(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case;
(b) the thing or the res;
(c) the parties; and
(d) the remedy.
Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action —
whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly.
Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because they
seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person.
Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and
quasi in rem actions. Actions in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against
the person based on his or her personal liability.
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the
whole world. Quasi in rem actions are actions involving the status of a
property over which a party has interest. Quasi in rem actions are not
binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular
parties.
However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the
parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is required.
Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be
notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as
guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny persons their
due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within
their jurisdiction.
Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is
imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a
defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment
of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case
with authority and competence.
Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons.
Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or
respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or
respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or
her.
If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal
service of summons shall be effected upon its president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel
wherever he or she may be found.
Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of
summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious
attempts to serve summons through personal service.
Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for
justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served
within reasonable time.
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown
owner or if his or her whereabouts are "unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry. It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to
serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the
defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.
If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the
proceedings, it is generally construed as sufficient service of summons.
In this case, summons was served by publication.
A sheriff’s return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance if it
contains:
(1) the details of the circumstances surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to
serve the summons personally upon the defendants or
respondents; and
(2) the particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons
within reasonable time. It does not enjoy the presumption of
regularity if the return was merely pro forma.
Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of
summons impossible renders service of summons and the return ineffective.
In that case, no substituted service or service by publication can be valid.
For the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious
efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that
said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return.
To reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made
on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence
of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot
be availed of.
In this case, the sheriff’s return states:
“1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the
messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given
address.”
This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons
personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the
post office messenger stated that there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the
service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate
petitioner’s whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the
return that personal service was rendered impossible under the
circumstances or that service could no longer be made within reasonable
time.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve
the summons personally upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s
previous rulings that personal service is the preferred mode of service, and
that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to effect
personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No
substituted service or service by publication will be allowed based on such
defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation
of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional
defect. The case would have been dismissible had petitioner learned about
the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would
have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper
subject of an action for annulment of judgment.
Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial.
Instead of filing an action for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a
motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground under Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court
Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person. She did not allege that fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights. Neither did she allege
that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the trial
court decision. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a
petition for certiorari, insisting that her motion for new trial should have
been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for
new trial. We cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for
this denial because, indeed, lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a
new trial.
What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of
respondent’s action for annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a
motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari. At that time,
petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly
notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction
could have already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment.
Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition
for certiorari instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was
deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title.
The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioner’s failure
to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her
cause. We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process.
Petition is DENIED.