Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v.

Cabiles1
G.R. No. 170139
Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.2
G.R. No. 175689

NANCY S. MONTINOLA vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

G. R. No. 198656 September 8, 20143

FACTS:

The deletion of the award of attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages is the subject of this petition.
Montinola was employed as a flight attendant of Philippine Airlines since 1996. On January 29, 2008, Montinola
and other flight crew members were subjected to custom searches in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Items from the
airline were recovered by from the flight crew by the custom officials. PAL conducted an investigation. Montinola
was among those implicated because she was mentioned in Graham’s e-mail. On February 22, 2008, PAL
through SAVP for Cabin Services Sub-department Sylvia C. Hermosisima found Montinola Guilty of 11 violations
of the company’s code of discipline and government regulation. She was meted with suspension for 1 year
without pay.

Montinola brought the matter before the Labor Arbiter. The LA found her suspension illegal. The NLRC and CA
affirmed the said decision. However, CA deleted the moral and exemplary damages and the attorney’s fees
stating that not every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. Moral damages
are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by bad faith, fraud or
constituted an act oppressive to labor or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. And in the case at bar, there is no showing that PAL was moved by any will or motive in suspending the
respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to damages.

HELD:
The nature of damages is defined under our Civil Code. Article 2220 states that “willful injury to property may be
a legal ground for awarding of moral damages if the court should find that under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due.

This act of PAL is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. PAL was willing to deprive Montinola of
wages she would have earned during the year of her suspension even if there was no substantial evidence that
she was involved in the pilferage. Moral damages are, thus, appropriate.

AM-PHIL FOOD CONCEPTS, INC.,vs.PAOLO JESUS T. PADILLA,.

G.R. No. 188753, October 1, 20144
Facts: RESPONDENT Paolo Jesus T. Padilla was hired on April 1, 2002 as a marketing associate by petitioner
Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. Sometime in the first week of March 2004, Padilla was among three employees
who were informed that the petitioner would be implementing a retrenchment program on account of serious
and adverse business conditions.

1Aldrin "EA" de Guzman

2Aldrin "EA" de Guzman
3Mapoy, Rodrigo III
4Del Mundo, Romualdo
On July 28, 2004, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for back wages, damages, and attorney’s
fees.Padilla questioned Am-Phil’s choice to retrench him. He noted that Am-Phil had six (6) contractual
employees, while he was a regular employee who had a good evaluation record. He pointed out that Am-Phil
was actually then still hiring new employees. He also noted that Am-Phil's sales have not been lower relative to
the previous year. In response, Am-Phil's three (3) officers gave him two options: (1) be retrenched with
severance pay or (2) be transferred as a waiter in Am-Phil’s restaurant, a move that entailed his demotion.
Padilla was paid a separation pay of P26,245.38 and on April 20, 2004, executed a quitclaim and release in favor
of petitioner.
Issue: 1) Whether or not Padilla was validly dismissed.
2) Whether or not the quitclaim executed by Padilla was valid and binding.
Held: 1) No, Padilla was not validly dismissed. Am-Phil failed to establish compliance with the requisites for a
valid retrenchment. The outlined are the requirements for a valid retrenchment, each of which must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence, as follows:
(1) that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already
incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
(2) that the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
(3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least ½
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
(4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its
interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and
(5) that the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would
be retained among the employees, such as status (i.e., whether they are temporary, casual, regular or
managerial employees), efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
Here, Am-Phil’s 2001 to 2004 audited financial statements, the sole proof upon which Am-Phil relies on to
establish its claim that it suffered business losses, have been deemed unworthy of consideration. These audited
financial statements were mere annexes to the motion for leave to admit supplemental rejoinder which Labor
Arbiter Chuanico validly disregarded. No credible explanation was offered as to why these statements were not
presented when the evidence-in-chief was being considered by the labor arbiter. It follows that there is no clear
and convincing evidence to sustain the substantive ground on which the supposed validity of Padilla’s
retrenchment rests. Moreover, it is admitted that Am-Phil did not serve a written notice to the Department of
Labor and Employment one (1) month before the intended date of Padilla’s retrenchment, as required by Article
283 of the Labor Code.
2) No, the quitclaim executed by Padilla was not valid and binding. Considering that the ground for
retrenchment availed of by petitioners was not sufficiently and convincingly established, the retrenchment is
hereby declared illegal and of no effect. The quitclaims executed by retrenched employees in favor of petitioners
were therefore not voluntarily entered into by them. Their consent was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud.
The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous
employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees
from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The
acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The amounts already received by the retrenched
employees as consideration for signing the quitclaims should, however, be deducted from their respective
monetary awards.
 JOEL B. MONANA v. MEC GLOBAL SHIPMANAGEMENT
GR No. 196122, Nov 12, 20145

Ultimate Facts:
This labor case involves a seafarer's claim for disability benefits. It involves an application of Section 20(B) of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA contract). The POEA
contract states that for an illness to be compensable, (1) it must be work-related and (2) it must have existed
during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.

Joel B. Monana (Monana) filed this petition for review in relation to his disability benefits claim for hypertension.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Monana and granted US$60,000.00 as disability benefits. The National Labor
Relations Commission vacated the Labor Arbiter's decision, but granted US$3,000.00 as financial assistance.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the National Labor Relations Commission and dismissed Monana's petition.
Monana now seeks to reinstate the Labor Arbiter's judgment.

On September 5, 2006, MEC Global Ship Management and Manning Corporation and its foreign principal, HD
Herm Davelsberg GMBH, employed Monana as an ordinary seafarer for a six-month duration on board M/V
Bellavia. Monana boarded on September 11, 2006 and performed his tasks that "included cleaning, chipping,
painting, and assisting in deck work."

On January 22, 2007, Monana felt dizzy with blurring of vision and body weakness associated with slurred
speech and numbness of the right side of the face. The ship doctor prescribed oral anti-hypertensive
medication. Monana was airlifted to Honolulu Medical Center the next day where he was treated and diagnosed
to have suffered a stroke. He then transferred to a rehabilitation hospital where he underwent physical therapy
for two days.

On January 31, 2007, Monana was repatriated to the Philippines and referred to Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador
(Dr. Ong-Salvador), the company-designated physician. He was first confined at the University of Sto. Tomas
hospital, then he continued his physical therapy and treatment with company-designated doctors in Iloilo.

On February 19, 2007, Dr. Ong-Salvador wrote respondents a reply to a medical query, stating that "patient's
condition is regarded as non-work related, as the disease is mainly of a heredofamilial etiology that is enhanced
by a number of modifiable and non-modifiable risk factors

On March 3, 2007, Monana was referred to neurologist Dr. Generoso D. Licup, who found that Monana "still
experience[d] occasional heaviness and clumsiness of the right upper and lower extremities especially during
strenuous and prolonged activities."

On July 18, 2007, Monana was referred to cardiologist Dr. Glenn A. Mana-ay (Dr. Mana-ay), who also diagnosed
him with S/P Stroke secondary to Acute Ischemic Infarct, Left Periventicular Parietal Lobe and Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease. Dr. Mana-ay reported that Monana's blood pressure was controlled, and he had minimal
weakness on the right side of the body. Monana's condition steadily improved.

On August 23, 2007, Monana sought a second opinion with cardiologist Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) from
the Philippine Heart Center. Dr. Vicaldo declared that Monana's illness was work-related/-aggravated, and that
Monana was unfit to resume work as a seafarer in any capacity.
Consequently, Monana claimed disability and illness allowance. Respondents refused, prompting Monana to file
a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch.

The Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated May 30, 2008, ruled in favor of Monana and ordered respondents to pay

5Corpuz, Onofre Y
US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent as disability benefits:

The National Labor Relations Commission, in its resolution dated January 30, 2009, vacated the Labor Arbiter's
decision and instead ordered respondents to grant financial assistance of US$3,000.00 or its peso equivalent:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the Decision dated 30 May 2008 is
ordered VACATED and SET ASIDE.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated February 26, 2010, agreed with the National Labor Relations
Commission and dismissed Monana's petition. It likewise denied reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that hypertension is a compensable illness, and there was a causal relation between his work
and his illness.

Pursuant to Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA contract, the right to secure a third doctor's opinion is optional.
Petitioner submits that the findings of independent cardiologist Dr. Vicaldo deserves more credence than those
of company-designated physician Dr. Ong-Salvador, who is neither a cardiologist nor a neurologist. Petitioner
alleged that Dr. Ong-Salvador signed the report as a medical coordinator, and that she is a dermatologist.

Relevant Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Joel B. Monana is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Doctrinal Ruling:

No. Both the National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to prove
compliance with the conditions under Section 32 of the POEA contract, thus, failing to show a causal connection
between his illness and his work. The National Labor Relations Commission discussed as follows:

The main issue that would determine complainant-appellee's entitlement to permanent disability is whether his
illness is work-related or not. We rule in the negative. For one, complainant-appellee failed to discharge the
burden of proving the conditions set forth in Section 32-A particularly, that his work as ordinary seaman involved
the risks of having a stroke; that complainant-appellee's hypertension was contracted as a result of his exposure
to his work; that the disease was contracted within the period of exposure and such other factors necessary to
contract it and that there was no notorious negligence on complainant-appellee's part. For another and on the
contrary, complainant-appellee admitted that he had a family history of hypertension and that he smoked about
one pack a day for thirty (30) years. Further, complainant-appellee also failed to prove that his hypertension
can be classified as primary or essential; that he has suffered impairments in his vital organs; and that he failed
to submit documents to substantiate his claim for compensability. Furthermore, we find that despite the non-
work relatedness of the illness of complainant-appellee, respondents-appellants in good faith exerted efforts and
caused complainant-appellee's treatment in a foreign country, shouldered his repatriation expenses and caused
his examinations and treatment for more than eight (8) months shouldering the expenses therein.
Under the circumstances, respondents-appellants is not liable for the disability benefits of complainant-appellee
considering that his illness of hypertension was not proven by substantial evidence to be work-related.

STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENAAND CARLOS WANG,, v.VICTOR T. GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO
SIAREZ,.
G.R. No.190486 : November 26, 2014 6
FACTS:
Respondents, who were hired as painters/carpenters by petitioner company, filed a labor complaint for illegal
dismissal and nonpayment of wages and benefits. The alleged that they were dismissed by the owners for filing
a complaint for money claims. Later on, they were not allowed to work. Petitioners on the other hand claimed
that respondents were required to explain their absences for the month of May, but they refused.
The LA ruled in favor of respondents. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA found that petitioner failed to show any valid cause for the termination of respondents. Thus, it reversed

6Velasco, Jose Leozar L.

the NLRC ruling. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed
HELD: Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.
Labor Law the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal negates the allegation of abandonment
Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work
rests on the employer. Long standing is the rule that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negates the
allegation of abandonment. Human experience dictates that no employee in his right mind would go through the
trouble of filing a case unless the employer had indeed terminated the services of the employee.
In this case, petitioner failed to pinpoint the overt acts of respondents that show they had abandoned their
work. There was a mere allegation that she was "forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to report
back to work for a considerable length of time" but no evidence to prove the intent to abandon work.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to do so.
Labor Law terminating the employment of workers simply because they asserted their legal rights
by filing a complaint violates their right to security of tenure
In the position paper of Elena (owner of company), it was stated that Stanley Fine was forced to declare them
dismissed due to their failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing
of an unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants.
Labor Law notice of dismissal
Assuming that the statement, "filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is not an admission against interest, still,
the Court of Appeals did not err in reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision. Elena admittedthat no notices of
dismissal were issued.
In cases of termination of employment, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to
be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of
Labor and Employment. A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
Elena presented photocopies of the memoranda to prove that notices to explain were sent to respondents.
These photocopies were not considered by the Labor Arbiter, on the ground that they had no probative value.

FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC.,, v. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU,.

G.R. No. 204944-45 : December 3, 20147

FACTS:
In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") as a news
correspondent/producer. Arlenes employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was
successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal.Sometime in January 2009,
Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, the Chief of News
Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed Arlene "that the company will have a problem renewing her contract"
since it would be difficult for her to perform her job.
After several verbal and written communications,Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract where it was
stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration. The contract also provided that the
parties release each other from liabilities and responsibilities under the employment contract. In consideration
thereof, Arlene acknowledged receipt of the total amount of US$18,050.00 representing her monthly salary from
March 2009 to May 2009, year-end bonus, mid-year bonus, and separation pay.However, Arlene affixed her
signature on the nonrenewal contract with the initials "U.P." for "under protest."
The day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
She alleged that she was forced to sign the nonrenewal contract when Fuji came to know of her illness and that
Fuji withheld her salaries and other benefits for March and April 2009 when she refused to sign.

7Velasco, Jose Leozar L.

The LA dismissed the complaint applying the four-fold test, the Labor Arbiter held that Arlene was not Fujis
employee but an independent contractor. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA Decision. It held that Arlene was
a regular employee with respect to the activities for which she was employed since she continuously rendered
services that were deemed necessary and desirable to Fujis business. On further appeal, the CA affirmed the
NLRC decision. Fuji filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between Arlene and Fuji
HELD: Yes.
Labor Law four-fold test in determining the existence of employer-employee relationship
In this case, there is no question that Arlene rendered services to Fuji. However, Fuji alleges that Arlene was an
independent contractor, while Arlene alleges that she was a regular employee. To resolve this issue, we
ascertain whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Fuji and Arlene. If Arlene was a regular
employee, we then determine whether she was illegally dismissed.
In complaints for illegal dismissal, the burden of proof is on the employee to prove the fact of dismissal.Once
the employee establishes the fact of dismissal, supported by substantial evidence, the burden of proof shifts to
the employer to show that there was a just or authorized cause for the dismissal and that due process was
observed.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it relied on the ruling in Dumpit-Murillo and affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding that Arlene was a regular employee. Arlene was hired by Fuji as a
news producer, but there was no showing that she was hired because of unique skills that would distinguish her
from ordinary employees. Neither was there any showing that she had a celebrity status. Her monthly salary
amounting to US$1,900.00 appears to be a substantial sum, especially if compared to her salary when she was
still connected with GMA.Indeed, wages may indicate whether one is an independent contractor. Wages may
also indicate that an employee is able to bargain with the employer for better pay. However, wages should not
be the conclusive factor in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.
Fuji had the power to dismiss Arlene, as provided for in paragraph 5 of her professional employment contract.
Her contract also indicated that Fuji had control over her work because she was required to work for eight (8)
hours from Monday to Friday, although on flexible time. On the power to control, Arlene alleged that Fuji gave
her instructions on what to report. Even the mode of transportation in carrying out her functions was controlled
by Fuji.
Labor Law - employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the
parties say it should be
Having established that an employer-employee relationship existed between Fuji and Arlene, the next questions
for resolution are the following: Did the Court of Appeals correctly affirm the National Labor Relations
Commission that Arlene had become a regular employee? Was the nature of Arlenes work necessary and
desirable for Fujis usual course of business?
In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. However, there may be a situation where an employees work is necessary
but is not always desirable in the usual course of business of the employer.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission that the successive
renewals of Arlenes contract indicated the necessity and desirability of her work in the usual course of Fujis
business. Because of this, Arlene had become a regular employee with the right to security of tenure. Arlenes
contract indicating a fixed term did not automatically mean that she could never be a regular employee. This is
precisely what Article 280 seeks to avoid. The ruling in Brent remains as the exception rather than the general
rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal
HELD: Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.
Labor Law just and authorized causes for dismissal and the observance of due process
As a regular employee, Arlene was entitled to security of tenure and could be dismissed only for just or
authorized causes and after the observance of due process. The expiration of Arlenes contract does not negate
the finding of illegal dismissal by Fuji. The manner by which Fuji informed Arlene that her contract would no
longer be renewed is tantamount to constructive dismissal. To make matters worse, Arlene was asked to sign a
letter of resignation prepared by Fuji. The existence of a fixed-term contract should not mean that there can be
no illegal dismissal. Due process must still be observed in the pre-termination of fixed-term contracts of
employment.
Disease as a ground for termination is recognized under Article 284 of the Labor Code. An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been foun d to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees.
For dismissal under Article 284 to be valid, two requirements must be complied with: (1) the employees disease
cannot be cured within six (6) months and his "continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
health as well as to the health of his co-employees"; and (2) certification issued by a competent public health
authority that even with proper medical treatment, the disease cannot be cured within six (6) months.The
burden of proving compliance with these requisites is on the employer.Noncompliance leads to the conclusion
that the dismissal was illegal.
There is no evidence showing that Arlene was accorded due process. After informing her employer of her lung
cancer, she was not given the chance to present medical certificates. Fuji immediately concluded that Arlene
could no longer perform her duties because of chemotherapy. It did not ask her how her condition would affect
her work. Neither did it suggest for her to take a leave, even though she was entitled to sick leaves. Worse, it
did not present any certificate from a competent public health authority. What Fuji did was to inform her that
her contract would no longer be renewed, and when she did not agree, her salary was withheld. Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly upheld the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission that for failure of Fuji to
comply with due process, Arlene was illegally dismissed.
Labor Law instances where an illegally dismissed employee may be granted separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, on the ground that
the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal may have seriously strained relations between the parties. The CA
however modified by awarding reinstatement. The Court of Appeals modification of the National Labor Relations
Commissions decision was proper because the law itself provides that illegally dismissed employees are entitled
to reinstatement, backwages including allowances, and all other benefits.
The Court of Appeals reversed this and ordered reinstatement on the ground that separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is allowed only in several instances such as (1) when the employer has ceased operations; (2)
when the employees position is no longer available; (3) strained relations; and (4) a substantial period has
lapsed from date of filing to date of finality.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that strained relations are a question of fact that must be supported by
evidence. No evidence was presented by Fuji to prove that reinstatement was no longer feasible. Fuji did not
allege that it ceased operations or that Arlenes position was no longer available. Nothing in the records shows
that Arlenes reinstatement would cause an atmosphere of antagonism in the workplace. Arlene filed her
complaint in 2009. Five (5) years are not yet a substantial period to bar reinstatement.

PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC), Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB), Department of
Labor and Employment, RAMON T. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC
WORKERS' UNION (PWU), ELEODORO V. LIPIO, and EMERLITO C. IGNACIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168612 December 10, 20148

FACTS:
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation "engaged in the manufacture and repairs of
high voltage transformers. Among its rank-and-file employees were Eleodoro V. Lipio (Lipio) and Emerlito C.
Ignacio, Sr. (Ignacio, Sr.), former members of the PHILEC Workers’ Union (PWU). PWU is a legitimate labor
organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees.
From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were governed by collective
bargaining agreements providing for the following step increases in an employee’s basic salary in case of
promotion.
On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining agreements already expired, PHILEC selected
Lipio for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII to Foreman I under Pay Grade B. PHILEC served Lipio

8Velasco, Jose Leozar L.

a memorandum, instructing him to undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on August 25,
1997. PHILEC undertook to pay Lipio training allowance as provided in the memorandum:
This will confirm your selection and that you will undergo training for the position of Foreman I (PG B) of the
Tank Finishing Section, Distribution Transformer Manufacturing and Repair effective August 25, 1997.
You will be trained as a Foreman I, and shall receive the following training allowance until you have completed
the training/observation period which shall not exceed four (4) months.
First Month ----- 350.00
Second month ----- 815.00
Third month ----- 815.00
Fourth month ----- 815.00
Please be guided accordingly.
Ignacio, Sr., then DT-Assembler with Pay Grade VII,11 was likewise selected for training for the position of
Foreman I. On August 21, 1997, PHILEC served Ignacio, Sr. a memorandum, instructing him to undergo training
with the following schedule of allowance:
This will confirm your selection and that you will undergo training for the position of Foreman I (PG B) of the
Assembly Section, Distribution Transformer Manufacturing and Repair effective
August 25, 1997.
You will be trained as a Foreman I,and shall receive the following training allowance until you have completed
the training/observation period which shall not exceed four (4) months.
First Month ----- 255.00
Second month ----- 605.00
Third month ----- 1,070.00
Fourth month ----- 1,070.00
Please be guided accordingly.
On September 17, 1997, PHILEC and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, effective
retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999. Under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement, a rank-and-file employee promoted shall be entitled to the following step
increases in his or her basic salary:
Section 4. STEP INCREASES. [Philippine Electric Corporation] shall adopt the following step increases on the
basic salary in case of promotion effective June 1, 1997. Such increases shall be based on the scale below or
upon the minimum of the new pay grade to which the employee is promoted, whichever is higher:
Pay Grade Step Increase
I - II ₱80.00
II - III ₱105.00
III - IV ₱136.00
IV - V ₱175.00
V - VI ₱224.00
VI - VII ₱285.00
VII - VIII ₱361.00
VIII - IX ₱456.00
IX - X ₱575.00
To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or observation and shall receive training
allowance as provided in Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement:

To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or observation and shall receive training
allowance as provided in Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement:
Section 1. JOB POSTING AND BIDDING:
....
(f) Allowance for employees under Training or Observation shall be on a graduated basis as follows:
For the first month of training, the allowance should be equivalent to one step increase of the next higher grade.
Every month thereafter the corresponding increase shall be equivalent to the next higher grade until the
allowance for the grade applied for is attained.
As an example, if a Grade I employee qualifies for a Grade III position, he will receive the training allowance for
Grade I to Grade II for the first month. On the second month, he will receive the training allowance for Grade I
to Grade II plus the allowance for Grade II to Grade III. He will then continue to receive this amount until he
finishes his training or observation period.
Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio,Sr. did
not conform to Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement, PWU submitted the
grievance to the grievance machinery.
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. Thus, on December 21, 1998, the parties filed a
submission agreement20 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, submitting the following its issues
to voluntary arbitration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final and executory.
2. Whether or not employee respondents must be paid according the new CBA.

HELD
1. Yes. We note that PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
ofCourt against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision.69
This was not the proper remedy.
Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’
decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the Court of Appeals. Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3 of
the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Scope.
This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department
of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.
....
Sec. 3. Where to appeal.
An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (Emphasis
supplied).

2. Yes. The insurmountable procedural issue notwithstanding, the case will also fail on its merits. Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez correctly awarded both Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. training allowances based on the amounts and
formula provided in the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.
A collective bargaining agreement is "a contract executed upon the request of either the employer or the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement." A collective bargaining agreement being a
contract, its provisions "constitute the law between the parties" and must be complied with in good faith.
PHILEC, as employer, and PWU, as the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees,
entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which the parties agreed to make effective from June 1, 1997 to
May 31, 1999. Being the law between the parties, the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement must
govern PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees within the agreed period.
Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were rank-and-file employees when PHILEC selected them for training for the position of
Foreman I beginning August 25, 1997. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were selected for training during the effectivity of
the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, Lipio’s and Ignacio, Sr.’s training
allowance must be computed based on Article X, Section 4 and ArticleIX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement.
 Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, et. al., GR No. 168406;
January 14, 2015 9

FACTS: Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit. While, respondents were former
officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

The union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain.
Afterwards, the company formally responded to the demands of the union when it submitted the first part of its
economic counter-proposal then the second part.
Meanwhile, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
In response to the company’s counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved proposal, but the
company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on the ground of a CBA
bargaining deadlock.
The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal.
The company further prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated
from the service.3
The labor arbiter4 declared the strike “procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal.” NLRC affirmed. However, CA
set aside the rulings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: WON the strike staged by respondents was legal

HELD: In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved
issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-
proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair
labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve
the dispute amicably.1avvphi1
Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as
not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.
(emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-
proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal.
To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved
futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by
submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it
by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the
expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

The Implementing Rules use the words “as far as practicable.” In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of
the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to
produce the company’s counter-proposal which it did not have. One cannot give what one does not have.
Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the
union filed a notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible.

9Fiedacan, Bernalyn
 G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP VS. RICARDO AMBOS, et.al
G.R. No. 174184 January 28, 201510

FACTS:
G.J.T. Rebuilders is a single proprietorship owned by the Spouses Godofredo and Juliana Trillana (Trillana
spouses). It was engaged in steel works and metal fabrication, employing Ricardo Ambos (Ricardo), Russell
Ambos (Russell), and Benjamin Putian (Benjamin) as machinists.

G.J.T. Rebuilders rented space in the Far East Asia (FEA) Building in Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, which
served as the site of its machine shop. On September 8, 1996, a fire partially destroyed the FEA Building.

Due to the damage sustained by the building, its owner notified its tenants to vacate their rented units by the
end of September 1996 "to avoid any unforeseen accidents which may arise due to the damage."

Despite the building owner's notice to vacate, G.J.T. Rebuilders continued its business in the condemned
building. When the building owner finally refused to accommodate it, G.J.T. Rebuilders left its rented space and
closed the machine shop on December 15, 1997. It then filed an Affidavit of Closure before the Department of
Labor and Employment on February 16, 1998 and a sworn application to retire its business operations before
the Mandaluyong City Treasurer's Office on February 25, 1998.

Having lost their employment without receiving separation pay, Ricardo, Russell, and Benjamin filed a Complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to separation pay.
HELD:
To prove serious business losses, employers must present in evidence financial statements showing the net
losses suffered by the business within a sufficient period of time. Generally, it cannot be based on a single
financial statement showing losses. Absent this proof, employers closing their businesses must pay the
dismissed employees separation pay equivalent to one-month pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher.
G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to prove that it closed its machine shop due to serious business losses. Moreover, it
failed to comply with Article 283 of the Labor Code on the notice requirement. Therefore, petitioners must pay
respondents Ricardo Ambos, Russell Ambos, and Benjamin Putian separation pay and nominal damages.

EMER MILAN, et al., v. NLRC, SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG
G.R. No. 202961 February 04, 201511
Facts:
Emer Milan, Randy Makasangkay e.al,herein petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc.’s (Solid Mills)
employees. They are represented by the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective
bargaining agent. s Solid Mills’ employees, petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a
property owned by Solid Mills. According to Solid Mills, this was “[o]ut of liberality and for the convenience of its
employees . . . [and] on the condition that the employees . . . would vacate the premises anytime the Company
deems fit.

10Adonis, Katrina Mae

11Organista, Thelma A.
In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003, Solid Mills would cease its
operations due to serious business losses. NAFLU recognized Solid Mills’ closure due to serious business losses
in the memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003. The memorandum of agreement provided for
Solid Mills’ grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and
13th month pay to the employees. Pertinent portions of the agreement provide:
WHEREAS, in view of such irreversible financial losses, the COMPANY will cease its operations on October
10, 2003;chanrobleslaw

WHEREAS, all employees of the COMPANY on account of irreversible financial losses, will be dismissed
from employment effective October 10, 2003;chanrobleslaw

In view thereof, the parties (both Union and the company) agreed with the pertinent matters as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That the UNION acknowledges that under Article 283 of the Labor Code, separation pay is granted to
employees who are dismissed due to closures or cessation of operations NOT DUE to serious business
losses.
2. That employees ARE NOT granted separation benefits under the law but agreed to grant financial
assistance less accountabilities to Members of the Union based on length of Service to be computed as
follows: (Italics in this paragraph supplied)

Number of days - 12.625 for every year of service

3. In view of the above, the members of the UNION will receive such financial assistance on an equal
monthly installments basis based on the following schedule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First Check due on January 5, 2004 and every 5th of the month thereafter until December 5,
2004.
4. The COMPANY commits to pay any accrued benefits the Union members are entitled to, specifically
those arising from sick and vacation leave benefits and 13th month pay, less accountabilities based on
the following schedule:

One Time Cash Payment to be distributed anywhere from. . . .

They were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim before their vacation and
sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay would be released. Employees who signed the
memorandum of agreement were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the
constructed houses inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits and separation pay.
Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay before
vacating the company’s property.

Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation pay, accrued
sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners. According to the Labor Arbiter, Solid Mills illegally withheld
petitioners’ benefits and separation pay.
Issue:
Whether or not payment of the monetary claims of petitioners should be held in pending without the virtue of a
clearance prescribed by law before vacating Solid Mills premises.

Ruling:

Yes.The Court agreed with the National Labor Relations Commission’s deletion of interest since it found that
Solid Mills’ act of withholding payment of benefits and separation pay was proper. Petitioners’ terminal benefits
and pay were withheld because of petitioners’ failure to vacate Solid Mills’ property.

Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a standard procedure among
employers, whether public or private. Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real or
personal, belonging to the employer but are in the possession of the separated employee, are returned to the
employer before the employee’s departure.
As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. The Labor Code provides:
Art. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages
by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker’s consent.

The Labor Code also prohibits the elimination or diminution of benefits. Thus:
Art. 100. Prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits. Nothing in this Book shall be
construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the
time of promulgation of this Code.

However, our law supports the employers’ institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages. As
an exception to the general rule that wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished, the Labor
Code provides:
Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any
deduction from the wages of his employees, except:

1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense
the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;

2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the
employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and

3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. (Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due.
Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer.

The return of the property’s possession became an obligation or liability on the part of the employees when the
employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus, respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold petitioners’
wages and benefits because of this existing debt or liability.
The law does not sanction a situation where employees who do not even assert any claim over the employer’s
property are allowed to take all the benefits out of their employment while they simultaneously withhold
possession of their employer’s property for no rightful reason.

PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC. v. CELSO E. FUENTES

G.R. No. 169303 February 11, 201512
Facts:
Celso E. Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in November 1999. At the time
of Fuentes' employment, Protective assigned him to Picop Resources, Inc. He was posted to a security
checkpoint designated as Post 33 in Upper New Visayas, Agusan del Sur.
On July 20, 2000, a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took five (5) M-16 rifles, three (3) carbine
rifles, and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, all with live ammunition and magazines. Agency-issued uniforms
and personal items were also taken. These armed persons inflicted violence upon Fuentes and the other security
guards present at Post 33, namely: Francisco Dalacan, Rolando Gualberto Lindo, Jr. (Lindo, Jr.), Cempron
(Cempron), and Wilson Maravilles.7 Francisco Dalacan was employed by Protective, while the others were
employed by Meshim Security Agency.
On the same day of the incident, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the Philippine
National Police in Trento, Agusan del Sur. When asked by the police, Fuentes reported that he and the other
security guards assigned to Post 33 were accosted at gunpoint by the New People's Army.9

12Organista, Thelma A.
After its initial investigation, the Philippine National Police found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired and
acted in consort with the New People's Army. This was based on the two (2) affidavits executed by Lindo, Jr.
and Cempron, who were both present in the July 20, 2000 raid. In their affidavits, Lindo, Jr. and Cempron
stated that Fuentes should be prosecuted for criminal acts done on July 20, 2000.

On July 24, 2000, the Philippine National Police, through Senior Police Officer IV Benjamin Corda, Jr., filed the
Complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes, a certain Mario Cabatlao, and others. This was
filed before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Trento-Sta. Josefa-Veruela in Trento, Agusan del Sur. The
Complaint stated that Fuentes was a "cohort of the NPA in the raid[.
On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave and damages against
[Protective], Picop [Resources, Inc.], Ernie S. Dolina and Wilfredo Fuentes before [the National Labor Relations
Commission] Regional Arbitration Branch XIII in Butuan City."
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is abandonment of work in this case
2. Whether or not the computation of backwages of detained employees should be
counted from the date of the resolution of the Prosecutor after dismissing the case
against Fuentes
3. Whether or not procedural due process is complied with if no notice is sent to
employee due to lack of knowledge of his whereabouts

Ruling:
1. Abandonment constitutes just cause for dismissal because the “law in protecting the rights of the
labourer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.” The employer cannot be
compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly
fundamental task of reporting to work.
In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission , this court discussed the concept of abandonment:
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of
neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees
has [sic] no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof
that it was deliberate and unjustified. (Citations omitted)
The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer.90 Thus, it is
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. First, petitioner must provide
evidence that respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable reason. Second, petitioner must prove
respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever his ties with petitioner as his employer.
The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer. Thus. It is
incumbent upon Protective to prove the (2) elements of abandonment . First, Protective must provide evidence
that Fuentes failed to work for a unjustifiable reason.Second, Protective must prove Fuentes’ overt acts showing
a clear intention to sever his ties with Protective as his employer.
The court found no abandonment in this case. Fuentes’ failure to return to work was justified because of his
detention and its adverse effects. Thus, intervening period when Fuentes failed to report for work, from Fuentes’
prison release to the time re actually reported to work, was justified. Since there was a justifiable reason for
Fuentes’ absence, the first element of abandonment was not established. Fuentes’ act of reporting for work after
being cleared of the charges against him showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer. He
attempted to return to work after the dismissal of the complaint so that Protective would have not have any
justifiable reason to deny his request to resume his employment.
2. Applying the doctrine of “no work no pay” the computation of backwages should only begin from the
date of filling of the complaint. In Republic v. Pacheo: If there is no work performed by the employee
there can be no wage or pay, unless of course the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was
illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. The "No work, no pay" principle contemplates a "no work"
situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves. It would be unjust if petitioner were
ordered to pay respondent for the period of time that respondent could not and did not work.
 In this case, the date of Protective refusal to allow Fuentes’ return to work was not established in the
findings of fact of the Labor Tribunals and the Court of Appeals. Protective alleged that the filling of the
Complaint took place six (6) months after the alleged date that Fuentes request to return to work was refused.
The date when the incident took place was not specified.

3. Fuentes’ right to procedural due process was not observed. The employer must always observe the
employee's right to due process. In Agabon:

Procedurally ... if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee
two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating
the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss. . . .

Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid
and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442,
as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by
Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. . . .

Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal,
civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules
protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.141 (Citation
omitted)

In this case, petitioner violated respondent's right to procedural due process. The two-notice requirement was
not followed. Petitioner sought to excuse itself by claiming that there was no address where the proper notice
could have been served. However, petitioner admitted before the Court of Appeals that "respondent's last
known address was given to the investigating court by Police Inspector Escartin.]"142

There was no attempt from petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the address contained in its
employment records. Respondent was replaced without being given an opportunity to explain his absence.

Zenaida Paz vs. Northern Tobacco Redrying, Inc. and/or Angelo Ang
GR No. 19954, February 18, 201513

FACTS:
The Northern Tobacco Redrying Co.,Inc. (NTRCI), a flue-curing and redrying of tobacco leaves business,
employs approximately 100 employees with seasonal workers “tasked to sort, process, and store and tansport
tobacco leaves during the tobacco season.

NTRCI hired Zenaida Paz sometime in 1974 as a seasonal sorter, paid P185.00 daily and was regulary rehired
since then. She signed a seasonal job contract and a pro-forma application letter prepared by NTRCI in order to
qualify for the next season.

Paz reached the age of 63 and was informed by NTRCI that she was considered retired under the company
policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive P12,000.00 as retirement pay.

13Rombo, Penn Angelo R.

Paz, together with to other complainants, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. She amended her complaint into
Compalint for Payment of Retirement Benefits, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees for her 29 years of service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Paz can be considered illegally dismissed from service.

HELD:
No. NTRCI failed to prove a valid company retirement policy, yet it required its workers to retire after they had
reached the age of 60. If there is no agreement between the parties that an employee can be retired at an
earlier date, the provision of Article 287 (now Article 302) shall apply. Paz’s amendment of her complaint was
not fatal to her cause of action for illegal dismissal. If the intent to retire is not clearly established or if it is
involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge. Paz never abandoned her argument of illegal dismissal despite the
amendment. This is an implied lack of intent to retire until she reached the age of 65. Thus, she should be
considered as illegally dismissed.

“Retirement is a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
whereby the latter, after reahing a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employement with the former”

CELSO F. PASCUAL, SR. AND SERAFIN TERENCIO, Petitioners, v. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, JOSE ANTONIO
R. LEE, ATTY. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR., AND NESTOR P. TINIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 201514
FACTS:
Petitioners Celso F. Pascual, Sr. (Pascual) and Serafin Terencio (Terencio) were appointed by the former Board
of Directors of Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative (CCDC) to act as the cooperative's General
Manager and Collection Manager, respectively, from start of operations until they reach the compulsory age of
retirement of 65.

Despite their retirement on January 9, 1997 and on March 2003, Pascual continued to serve as General Manager
and Terencio as Collection Manager of CCDC.

On August 13, 2005, the Board of Directors of CCDC passed Resolution Nos. 05-08-127 and 05-08-128,
terminating Pascual's and Terencio's services and declaring that they should serve only until September 30,
2005 and October 15, 2005, respectively. Despite the lapse of these periods given, Pascual and Terencio refused
to vacate their positions.

On November 29, 2005, CCDC and Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr., the newly appointed General Manager, filed a
Complaint for Injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.

On December 7, 2005, Pascual and Terencio filed a Motion to Dismiss with prayer to defer all proceedings. They
questioned the Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction because the case allegedly involves a labor dispute in the guise
of an injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is one of illegal dismissal of an employee which is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter or of the National Labor Relations Commission, not the trial court.

HELD:

14Malinao, Pete
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' ruling that the case involves an intra-cooperative
dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. There is evidently no employment relationship
between the parties.
In Tabang v. NLRC, it provides that an office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer
is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and
generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the
corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
Here, petitioners were officers of respondent CCDC. They were appointed directly by the former Board
of Directors according to the by-laws of respondent CCDC, and their salaries were likewise set by the same
Board. Petitioners do not refute this fact. Their termination or removal is clearly an intra-cooperative matter. It
involves a dispute within the cooperative between two officers on one hand and the Board of Directors on the
other.

RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioner, v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A. MOISES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 215568, August 03, 201515

FACTS:
Petitioner, Richard Rivera (Rivera) was employed by the respondent, Genesis Transport Service (Genesis) as a
bus conductor. Hearing of case based on account of discrepancy in the amount that Rivera declared on bus
ticket receipts on the amount of P198.00 was set and despite of the latter’s explanation that it was an honest
mistake, which he was unable to correct because the bus encountered mechanical problems, Rivera’s service
were terminated. The Labor Arbiter ruled against the complaint filed for illegal dismissal by Rivera and gave
credence to the respondents appreciation of the gravity of Rivera’s acts which constitute serious misconduct and
fraud and wilful breach of trust. The ruling of Labor Arbiter was sustained by the NLRC and Court of Appelas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the termination of employment of petitioner was under just cause for termination under the
Labor Code.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favour of the petitioner. Article 282 (a) (c) of the Labor Code provides that an Employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following just causes (a) Serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by
the employee of lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (c) Fraud or wilful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.
Jurisprudence provides that serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the following requisites must be present: (a)
it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. And for termination of service of employee
certain requisites must be complied with; (a) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and
confidence and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.
In this case, the Court ruled that there are several ways to manifest the severity that suffices to qualify
petitioner’s alleged misconduct or breach of trust as so grave that terminating his employment is warranted. It
may be through the sheer amount mishandled. It may be through frequency of acts. It may be through other
attendant circumstances, such as attempts to destroy or conceal records and other evidence of a motive to
undermine the business of an employer. Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket
issued by petitioner can hardly be use to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has

15Malinao, Pete
acted in a manner that runs afoul of his employer’s trust. Petitioner cannot be taken to have engaged in a series
of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer.

ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITO MALTOS v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO

G.R. No 172720, September 14, 2015.16

Facts:

On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land located in San
Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo
Maltos. After the death of Borromeo his heirs filed a complaint for nullity of title and reconveyance of title
arguing that the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period.

On the other hand, Eliseo Maltos filed answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in
purchasing the property they relied on Eusebio Borromeo title. Further, since the sale was made during the five-
year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party to institute reversion
proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of an agricultural land by a free patent during the five-year prohibitory period will result
to its automatic reversion as part of the public domain.

Ruling:

No. Section 101 of the Public land Act is applicable since title already vested in Eusebio Borromeo’s name. Both
the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period.
Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property in favor of the state. However, the court cannot declare
reversion of the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by section 101 that an action for
reversion must be filed by the office of the Solicitor General.

The general rule is that the reversion of lands to state is not automatic and the Office of the Solicitor general is
the proper party to file an action for reversion.

JOVITA S. MANALO, PETITIONER, VS. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA AND MR.
EDWIN BERNAL, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 185058 November 09, 2015 17
Facts: Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the Accountancy Department of Ateneo
de Naga University's College of Commerce. Manalo was also a part-time Manager of the Ateneo de Naga Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative) before it was evicted from holding office inside campus in 1999. In her
Position Paper, Manalo recounted that during her stint as Cooperative Manager, she came into conflict with
Bernal, Dean of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Commerce. Bernal supposedly charged Manalo with
various offenses as regards the management of the Cooperative before the Cooperative's Board of Directors.
The Board of Directors dismissed Manalo on the basis of these charges. However, on November 30, 1999,
Manalo's dismissal was recalled by the Cooperative's General Assembly. Acting on the charges against Manalo,
Fr. Tabora constituted a Grievance Committee. The Grievance Committee later found Manalo guilty and
recommended her dismissal. As recounted in the Comment filed by respondents before this court, Manalo's

16Richard Ganalon
17Whiteside, Jose Mari
offenses were: "fraud in issuance of official receipts, collection of cash without documented remittance to the
cooperative, use of inappropriate forms of documents cash receipts, 16 instances of bouncing checks issued by
the cooperative . . . fraud in the issuance of an official receipt, unauthorized cash advances.

Acting on the Grievance Committee's recommendation as the University President had the "final say on the
matter," Fr. Tabora instead opted to transfer Manalo to teach Economics in the Department of Social Sciences of
Ateneo de Naga University's College of Arts and Science. Alleging that her transfer constituted constructive
dismissal, Manalo filed a Complaint on April 3, 2000.

In his December 13, 2000 Decision, Labor Arbiter Quiñones ruled that petitioner Jovita S. Manalo (Manalo) was
constructively dismissed. He ordered that Manalo be reinstated to her former position that the applicable
increases to her salary and benefits be effected, and that attorney's fees be paid to her. However, Labor Arbiter
Quiñones denied Manalo's prayer for moral and exemplary damages. Labor Arbiter Quiñones' Decision was
sustained by the National Labor Relations Commission Second Division in its March 26, 2002 Resolution. In its
August 30, 2002 Resolution, the National Labor Relations Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
respondents Ateneo de Naga University, Fr. Joel Tabora, S.J. (Fr. Tabora) and Edwin P. Bernal (Bernal). In its
assailed April 30, 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of Labor Arbiter
Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations Commission and dismissed Manalo's Complaint. In its assailed
October 7, 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Manalo's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals was in error for entertaining alternative findings to those made by
Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor Relations Commission; and
2. Whether the shift in petitioner Jovita S. Manalo's teaching load from mainly Accountancy subjects to
Economics subjects constituted constructive dismissal.

Ruling:
1. No. Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor Relations Commission are grossly mistaken. They
divorced petitioner's manifest breach of the ethical standards binding accountancy professionals from
petitioner's role as an educator of prospective accounting professionals. Petitioner's role as an educator
made it imperative for her to impart her profession's values and ideals to her students, not least of all by
her own example. Because she had failed in this, respondents were well in a position to seek to prevent
one whom they considered to have engaged in unethical and unprofessional behavior from pursuing her
didactic engagement with their students. As such, Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor
Relations Commission committed such gross errors as amounting to an evasion of their positive duty to
render judgment after only a meticulous consideration of the circumstances of a case.

2. No. Respondents aptly note that the offenses petitioner committed show "clear transgressions of the
Code of Ethics of Accountants, which rendered petitioner disqualified to teach Accounting.”

Constructive dismissal arises "when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee." In such cases, the impossibility,
unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse
but to terminate his or her employment. However, it is not necessary for an employee to actually resign or
abandon his or her employment in order for an employer to be adjudged as having constructively dismissed an
employee.

The Court fails to see how petitioner can avoid the conclusion that these indiscretions do not reflect her fitness
as an educator for the accountancy profession and her employment with respondent Ateneo de Naga University.
These acts run afoul of the first and most basic of the fundamental ethical principles of the accountancy
profession: integrity. Her having sanctioned unauthorized advances demonstrates a violation of the second
fundamental ethical principle: objectivity. Even assuming that these acts do not evince a premeditated scheme,
they nevertheless manifest that petitioner failed to act diligently, that is, competently and with due care. The
totality of the indiscretions imputed to petitioner reflects negatively on the accountancy profession and indicates
anything but professional behavior.
Worse, these acts indicate that petitioner failed to demonstrate to students and to live by her own example the
ideals of the accountancy profession. Even if we were to assume that petitioner remained an exemplar of
technical proficiency, she failed to educate in respect of the values that are integral to the training that she was
supposed to impart to future professional accountants. We again emphasize that practicing a profession and
educating a profession are not only technical or operational matters; they are as much a matter of ethics.

If at all, petitioner should be grateful to her employer that she was only transferred and her employment was
not completely terminated. At the heart of the issue of constructive dismissal is the matter of whether the
employer's actions are warranted. Here, we find ample basis not only for the precautionary measures actually
taken on petitioner, but even for other heavier penalties that could have been imposed on her. It is true that
petitioner may have been inconvenienced by the mandated transfer, but, to reiterate, not every inconvenience,
disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal.
With the backdrop of petitioner's professional indiscretions, respondent Ateneo de Naga University, through its
President, respondent Fr. Tabora, validly exercised a management prerogative.

In any case, we fail to appreciate petitioner's contention that her transfer to the Economics Department entailed
an assignment to something in which she was not competent or qualified. As underscored by Labor Arbiter
Quinones, "[petitioner] was both a major of accounting and economics, and she was a magna cum laude to
boot. Petitioner similarly admits to having previously taught Economics subjects, even as she emphasizes that
her concentration and the bulk of her teaching load remained to be Accountancy subjects.

Neither does her lack of a Master's Degree in Economics automatically render her unqualified. The 1992 Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools, which was in effect during the material incidents of this case, did not
absolutely prevent non-holders of master's degrees from teaching in undergraduate programs. The same is true
of the present Manual of Regulation for Private Higher Education. Ultimately, there were more than ample
reasons for taking precautionary measures against petitioner. Respondent Ateneo de Naga University could not
be said to have acted in an arbitrary, unjustified, or unwarranted manner in preventing petitioner from teaching
Accountancy subjects. Having failed to prove this crucial element of what amounts to constructive dismissal,
petitioner's Complaint against respondents was rightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

No. 153. MELANIE E. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. RPN-9/RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 192947, December 09, 201518

Facts: De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, damages, and attorney's
fees against respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several RPN-9 officers, namely: President
Cerge Remonde; News and Current Affairs Manager Rodolfo Lacuna; and Human Resources Manager Lourdes
Angeles. On May 12, 2004, Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala rendered the Decision, finding De Ocampo to
have been illegally dismissed. RPN-9 was ordered to pay her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full
backwages. In its Decision dated February 28, 2006, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the May
12, 2004 Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala. In the Resolution dated April 28, 2006, RPN-9's Motion
for Reconsideration was denied. RPN-9 then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The CA issued a temporary restraining order preventing the National
Labor Relations Commission from enforcing its ruling for a period of 60 days. The sixty-day period lapsed
without a writ of preliminary injunction being subsequently issued by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the
ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala, as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission, became
final and executory on May 27, 2006. Entry of Judgment was issued on July 19, 2006. De Ocampo then filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. In the Order dated October 30, 2006, the National Labor Relations
Commission granted De Ocampo's Motion. Conformably, a Writ of Execution20 was issued on May 7, 2007. This

18Whiteside, Jose Mari

Writ directed the Deputy Sheriff to collect from RPN-9 the total amount of P410,826.85. The full satisfaction of
the original award notwithstanding, De Ocampo filed a Motion to Recompute the Monetary Award with Motion to
Issue Alias Writ of Execution on September 11, 2007. In the Motion, De Ocampo sought the increase of the
monetary award given her. Manansala denied De Ocampo's Motion to Recompute the Monetary Award with
Motion to Issue Alias Writ of Execution on the ground that the May 12, 2004 Decision fixing the amounts of the
monetary award due to De Ocampo had become final and executory. NLRC sustained Manansala’s Decision and
denied MR filed by De Ocampo. The CA dismissed De Ocampo's Petition for Certiorari and sustained the
September 30, 2008 Decision and December 15, 2008 Resolution of the NLRC. In its assailed July 8, 2010
Resolution, the CA denied De Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether petitioner Melanie De Ocampo may still seek a recomputation of and an increase in the
monetary award given her.

Ruling: No. It is basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes
final and executory;"[n]othing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality, "the controversy is
settled and the matter is laid to rest." Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect
"even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court
of the land." Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment
that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose, is null and void.

This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law." Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any contrary posturing renders justice
inutile and reduces to futility the winning party's capacity to benefit from a resolution of the case.

VICTOR S. LIMLINGAN AND EMMANUEL A. LEYCO, Petitioners, v. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF

MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 220481, February 17, 201619
Facts: A Complaint for "illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, deprivation of medical benefits, life
insurance and other benefits, damages and attorney's fees"6 was filed by Victor S. Limlingan (Limlingan) and
Emmanuel A. Leyco (Leyco) against Asian Institute of Management (AIM).
In the Decision8 dated February 26, 2008, Labor Arbiter Napoleon M. Menese declared that Limlingan and
Leyco's suspension was illegal and ordered AIM to pay the salaries and benefits withheld during the suspension,
as well as 10% of the amount for attorney's fees.
AIM claims that the award of attorney's fees was removed from the Labor Arbiter's Decision when the National
Labor Relations Commission promulgated its Decision dated July 4, 2008 modifying the award of the Labor
Arbiter.64 There was also no award of attorney's fees in the Court of Appeals' May 4, 2010 Decision. "[N]owhere
in the said Decisions can be found any award of attorney's fees. Indeed, '[a]n award of attorney's fees without
justification is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture'
In assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, AIM argues that "to allow the inclusion of such . . . award would be
to disregard the rule on strict adherence to and the immutability of judgment.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date the Court of Appeals' May 4, 2010 Decision in CA-G.R. No. 106714 became final until its full satisfaction.
Ruling: That Limlingan and Leyco are entitled to the payment of health insurance premiums is not contested.
As to the amount due to Leyco, all three tribunals — the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and the Court of Appeals — found that Leyco had sufficiently proven that he was entitled to
P44,725.32.
We cannot accept AIM's arguments. The legal interest imposed is but a consequence of AIM's participation in
prolonging the proceedings between the parties:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

19Hermogeno, Armand
That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a consequence that it cannot avoid as it is
the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter's decision
It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable.

MARICEL S. NONAY, Petitioner, v. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN LINES AND
CYNTHIA MENDOZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 20675820

FACTS:
From July 16, 2008 to May 15, 2009, Nonay worked on board the M/S Braemer as Casino Attendant/Senior
Casino Attendant. Nonay was re-hired by Bahia Shipping as Casino Attendant on June 8, 2009 for a period of
nine (9) months.
When she boarded the M/S Braemer, August 1, 2009, she was assigned to work "as an Assistant Accountant
(Night Auditor) until January 20, 2010." On January 21, 2010, she was assigned to work as Senior Casino
Attendant.
Around the middle of February 2010, Nonay experienced profuse and consistent bleeding, extreme dizziness and
difficulty in breathing. Nonay's bleeding intensified. She was later advised by the ship's physician to rest.
However, her condition did not improve so she went to a clinic in Barbados. A transvaginal ultrasound conducted
on Nonay revealed that she had two ovarian cysts. She returned to the ship and was assigned to perform light
duties.
On March 20, 2010, Nonay was medically repatriated. Bahia Shipping referred her to the company-designated
physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center in Manila. On March 22, 2010, Nonay was placed under the care of
an obstetrician-gynecologist, also a company-designated physician. The obstetrician-gynecologist diagnosed
Nonay with Abnormal Uterine Bleeding Secondary to an Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma. Nonay underwent
endometrial dilatation and curettage as part of her treatment.
Nonay was not declared fit to work by the end of the 120-day period from March 20, 2010, the date of her
repatriation, but she was declared fit to resume sea duties within the 240-day period.
On September 8, 2010, she filed a Complaint for payment of disability benefit, medical expenses, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. She sought to claim permanent disability benefits based on the
collective bargaining agreement she signed.
The LA ruled in favor of Nonay. Bahia Shipping appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the LA's Decision.
Bahia Shipping moved for reconsideration which was denied.
The CA found that Nonay failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her allegation that her illness is work-
related.
Nonay moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Nonay is entitled to permanent disability benefits?
HELD: No.

Nonay's Norwegian CBA provides that a Seafarer who suffers injury as a result of an accident from any cause
whatsoever whilst in the employment of the Owner/Company and whose ability to work is reduced as a result
thereof, shall in addition to his sick pay, be entitled to compensation. Nonay alleges that she experienced
profuse and consistent bleeding felt extreme dizziness and had difficulty in breathing but she never alleged any
accident that resulted to her illness. Thus, the provision in her CBA is not applicable.
Considering that she was hired in 2009, the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract applies. The 2000 POEA
Standard Employment Contract defines work-related illness as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions set therein satisfied.
Adenomyoma is not included in the list of occupational diseases under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract; however, Section 20(B)(4) provides that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are
disputably presumed as work related."
To grant petitioner's claim for disability benefits, the following requisites must be present: (1) he suffered an
illness; (2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the

20Santiago, Jun Jun E.

procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease[s] or
that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated
under Section 3 2-A for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be
compensable.
In this case, however, petitioner was unable to present substantial evidence to show the relation between her
work and the illness she contracted. Neither does the record show whether petitioner's adenomyoma was pre-
existing. She also failed to fulfill the requisites of Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC for her illness to be
compensable.
Petitioner argues that her illness is the result of her constantly walking upward and downward on board the
vessel carrying loads and that she acquired her illness on board respondents' vessel during the term of her
employment contract with respondents as Casino Attendant. However, petitioner did not discuss the duties of a
Casino Attendant. She also failed to show the causation between walking, carrying heavy loads, and
adenomyoma. Petitioner merely asserts that since her illness developed while she was on board the vessel, it
was work-related. The court has no means to determine whether petitioner's illness is work-related or work-
aggravated since petitioner did not describe the nature of her employment as Casino Attendant.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. ISAGANI DAWAL, LORNA CONCEPCION, AND BONIFACIO
SINOBAGO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 173952

ISAGANI DAWAL, LORNA CONCEPCION, AND BONIFACIO SINOBAGO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., AVELINO L. ZAPANTA, AND CESAR
B. LAMBERTE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173921, February 24, 201621
LEONEN, J.:
Case Law: Labor law
FACTS: On September 1, 2000, PAL severed the employment of Isagani Dawal (Dawal), Lorna Concepcion
(Concepcion), and Bonifacio Sinobago (Sinobago). Dawal served as Chief Storekeeper, Concepcion as Master
Avionics Mechanic A, and Sinobago as Aircraft Master "A" Mechanic. Until their dismissal from work, they were
regular rank-and-file employees of PAL and "bona fide members "of the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA).

In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis devalued the peso against the dollar. PAL claims that this strained its financial
resources. It counts its losses to P750 million in December 1997 alone.

On July 20, 2000, PAL issued a Notice of Separation to all the affected employees, containing either of the
following letters: (1) offer of new employment from Lufthansa, should it choose to hire the affected employees;
or (2) PAL's offer of employment for a lower rank or job grade and for a lesser salary, should Lufthansa not
choose to hire the affected employees.

PALEA and Dawal, et al. filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint dated January 31, 2001 for unfair labor
practices and illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of the employment of Isagani Dawal, Lorna Concepcion, and Bonifacio
Sinobago was due to an authorized cause, and could be justified as redundancy or retrenchment.

HELD:
No. Granted that PAL suffered serious and actual business losses, it must still show that the retrenchment was
reasonably necessary to effectively prevent the actual or imminent losses. While it can be argued that
undergoing corporation rehabilitation evinces its substantial business losses, PAL must still prove all the other
elements for a valid retrenchment. Stated otherwise, the retrenchment must not only be "reasonably necessary"

21Santiago, Jun Jun E.

to avert serious business losses; it must also be made in good faith and without ill motive.

In F.F. Marine Corporation v. The Second Division National Labor Relations Commission :
Even assuming that the corporation has actually incurred losses by reason of the Asian economic crisis, the
retrenchment is not perfectly justified as there was no showing that the retrenchment was the last recourse
resorted to by petitioners. Although petitioners allege in their petition before this Court that they had
undertaken cost-cutting measures before they resorted to retrenchment, their contention does not inspire belief
for the evidence shows that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals is bereft of
any allegation of prior resort to cost-cutting measures other than retrenchment.
Here, there is no showing that PAL "resorted to less drastic and less permanent cost-cutting measures “prior to
the so-called retrenchment. In 1998, PAL already retrenched about 5,000 employees. Two years later, it again
turned to cutting off its employees' livelihood.

PAL has not shown proof that retrenchment was indeed the remedy of last resort, and that it sought for
retrenchment only after it had pursued all viable options to no avail.

Likewise, PAL has "failed to explain how the rehiring of the affected employees in the spin-off could possibly
alleviate PAL's financial difficulty.

For there to be a valid retrenchment, the employer must exercise its management prerogative "in good faith for
the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE,

Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NACUSIP/BISUDECO
CHAPTER/GEORGE EMATA, DOMINGO REBANCOS, NELSON BERINA, ROBERTO TIRAO, AMADO
VILLOTE, AND BIENVENIDO FELINA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174747, March 09, 201622
Facts:
Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's loans to
the government through Asset Privatization Trust. Asset Privatization Trust was a government entity created
under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986 for the purpose of conserving, provisionally managing, and
disposing of assets that have been identified for privatization or disposition. NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter is the
exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, a
corporation engaged in milling and producing sugar. Since the 1980s, Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation had been incurring heavy losses. It obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine
National Bank, secured by its assets and properties.
Due to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's continued failure to pay its loan obligations, Asset
Privatization Trust filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
mortgaged properties. There being no other qualified bidder, Asset Privatization Trust was issued a certificate of
sale upon payment of P1,725,063,044.00
NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter and Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement to be in effect until December 15, 1996. Asset Privatization Trust and Philippine Sugar
Corporation were also joined as parties.
Sometime in 1992, the Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government properties
for privatization, decided to sell the assets and properties of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation on
September 1, 1992. The employment of Bicolandia Sugar Development terminated their services would be
terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP/BISUDECO Chapter received the Notice under protest.
Issue:
Whether Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's closure could be considered serious business losses that
would exempt petitioner from payment of separation benefits.
Ruling:

22MYRA BUMADILLA
When Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
loan to petitioner in 1987, it merely transferred its rights and interests over Bicolandia's outstanding loan
obligations. The transfer was not for the purpose of continuing Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
business. Petitioner was not liable for the Union's claims for labor standard benefits its acquisition was to
conserve the assets in order to prepare it for privatization. On the contrary asset Privatization Trust's Board of
Trustees issued the Resolution dated September 23, 1992 authorizing the payment of separation pay and other
benefits to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's employees in the event of its privatization.
When petitioner's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution dated September 23, 1992, it acknowledged
its contractual obligation to be liable for benefits arising from an employer-employee relationship even though,
as a mere conservator of assets, it was not supposed to be liable. Petition denied.

NAPOLEON S. RONQUILLO, JR., EDNA G. RAÑA, ROMEO REFRUTO, PONCIANO T. ANTEGRO, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, EDITA S. BUENO, MARIANO T. CUENCO, AND
DIANA M. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172593, April 20, 201623
Facts:
National Electrification Administration (NEA) was established as a government agency and later became a public
corporation under Presidential Decree No. 269. Petitioners Napoleon S. Ronquillo, Jr., Edna G. Raña, Romeo
Refruto, Ponciano T. Antegro, and 151 others (Ronquillo, Jr., et al.) are former employees of NEA. Before July 1,
1989, NEA paid its employees their COLA, which was equivalent to 40% of their basic pay, in addition to their
basic pay and other allowances.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, became the new salary standardization law applicable to all government officials and employees. Republic
Act No. 6758 provides that, as a general rule, all allowances are already included in the new standardized salary
rates. Thus, NEA discontinued paying the COLA of its employees from July 1, 1989.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758, the Department of Budget and Management issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 dated February 15,1989 which states that allowance given on top of basic salary shall be
discontinued without qualification otherwise, payment of these allowances constitutes an "illegal disbursement
of public funds."
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, which took effect on November 1, 1989, was challenged before this
Court. In De Jesus v. Commission on Audit this Court struck down Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
because it lacked publication and the employees were not given the opportunity to be heard.
In 2001,29 Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
of 2001 (EPIRA), national government employees who would be displaced or separated from services due to the
restructuring of the power industry are entitled to separation pay. These affected employees would be
considered legally terminated.
The reorganization of NEA affected the employment of Ronquillo, Jr. et al.
Ronquillo, Jr., et al. were given separation pay, the total amount of which excludes the balance of their COLA.
They demand to give back pay for their COLA but was refused.
Issue:
Petitioners argue that respondents' denial of their claim is violative of the rule against non-diminution of pay.
Ruling:
There is no diminution of pay when an existing benefit is substituted in exchange for one of equal or better
value. As we have extensively discussed, Republic Act No. 6758 has already included the COLA in the
standardized salary rates of government officers and employees. The back payment of the COLA to petitioners
amounts to double compensation. Unless otherwise provided by law, government employees cannot be paid an
extra remuneration for the same office that already has a fixed compensation. COLA is deemed already
incorporated in the standardized salary rates of government employees under the general rule of integration.

23Bumadilla, Myra
 THE PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL v. UNOCAL PHILIPPINES
GR No. 190187, September 28, 2016 24

Facts:
Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees Union is a legitimate labor union that stands as the bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of Unocal Philippines.
On April 4, 2005, Unocal Corporation executed an Agreement and Plan of Merger (Merger Agreement) with
Chevron Texaco Corporation (Chevron) and Blue Merger Sub, Inc. (Blue Merger).
Under the Merger Agreement, Unocal Corporation merged with Blue Merger, and Blue Merger became the
surviving corporation. Chevron then became the parent corporation of the merged corporations. After the
merger, Blue Merger, as the surviving corporation, changed its name to Unocal Corporation.
On January 31, 2006, Unocal Philippines executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Union.
However, on October 20, 2006, the Union wrote Unocal Philippines asking for the separation benefits provided
for under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. According to the Union, the Merger Agreement of Unocal
Corporation, Blue Merger, and Chevron resulted in the closure and cessation of operations of Unocal Philippines
and the implied dismissal of its employees.
Unocal Philippines refused the Union's request and asserted that the employee-members were not terminated
and that the merger did not result in its closure or the cessation of its operations.
Issues:
Whether the Merger Agreement executed by Unocal Corporation, Blue Merger, and Chevron resulted in the
termination of the employment of petitioner's members.
Ruling:
We find that, whether or not respondent is a party to the Merger Agreement, there is no implied dismissal of its
employees as a consequence of the merger.
A merger is a consolidation of two or more corporations, which results in one or more corporations being
absorbed into one surviving corporation. The separate existence of the absorbed corporation ceases, and the
surviving corporation "retains its identity and takes over the rights, privileges, franchises, properties, claims,
liabilities and obligations of the absorbed corporation(s)."
If respondent is a subsidiary of Unocal California, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Unocal Corporation, then the
merger of Unocal Corporation with Blue Merger and Chevron does not affect respondent or any of its
employees. Respondent has a separate and distinct personality from its parent corporation.
Nonetheless, if respondent is indeed a party to the merger, the merger still does not result in the dismissal of its
employees.
The effects of a merger are provided under Section 80 of the Corporation Code
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank has
ruled that the surviving corporation automatically assumes the employment contracts of the absorbed
corporation, such that the absorbed corporation's employees become part of the manpower complement of the
surviving corporation. It is more in keeping with the dictates of social justice and the State policy of according
full protection to labor to deem employment contracts as automatically assumed by the surviving corporation in
a merger, even in the absence of an express stipulation in the articles of merger or the merger plan.
This Court ruled that the surviving corporation automatically assumes the employment contracts of the absorbed
corporation. The absorbed corporation's employees are not impliedly dismissed, but become part of the
manpower complement of the surviving corporation.
The merger of Unocal Corporation with Blue Merger and Chevron does not result in an implied termination of
the employment of petitioner's members. Assuming respondent is a party to the merger, its employment
contracts are deemed to subsist and continue by "the combined operation of the Corporation Code and the
Labor Code under the backdrop of the labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner insists that this is contrary to its freedom to contract, considering its members did not enter into
employment contracts with the surviving corporation. However, petitioner is not precluded from leaving the
surviving corporation. Although the absorbed employees are retained as employees of the merged corporation,
the employer retains the right to terminate their employment for a just or authorized cause. Likewise, the
employees are not precluded from severing their employment through resignation or retirement. The freedom to
contract and the prohibition against involuntary servitude is still, thus, preserved in this sense.

24Ebora, Monette
Hence, assuming respondent is a party to the merger, the merger still does not operate to effect a termination
of the employment of respondent's employees. Should they be unhappy with the surviving corporation, the
employees may retire or resign from employment.
Given these considerations, we rule that petitioner is not entitled to the separation benefits it claims from
respondent.
Separation benefits are not granted to petitioner by law in case of voluntary resignation, or by any contract it
entered into with respondent.
Merger is not one of the circumstances where the employees may claim separation pay. The only instances
where separation pay may be awarded to petitioner are: (a) reduction in workforce as a result of redundancy;
(b) retrenchment or installation of labor-saving devices; or (c) closure and cessation of operations.
In this case, there is no dismissal of the employees on account of the merger. Petitioner does not deny that
respondent actually continued its normal course of operations after the merger, and that its members, as
employees, resumed their work with their tenure, salaries, wages, and other benefits intact. Petitioner was even
able to execute with respondent, after the merger, the Collective Bargaining Agreement from which it anchors
its claims.
Principles:
The merger of a corporation with another does not operate to dismiss the employees of the corporation
absorbed by the surviving corporation. This is in keeping with the nature and effects of a merger as provided
under law and the constitutional policy protecting the rights of labor. The employment of the absorbed
employees subsists. Necessarily, these absorbed employees are not entitled to separation pay on account of
such merger in the absence of any other ground for its award.

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION vs. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION,

SUGAR- DIVISION- SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO)
G.R. No. 220383, October 5, 2016 25
FACTS: On May 6, 2002, Universal Robina Corporation Sugar Division- Southern Negros Development
Corporation (URC- SONEDCO) and Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-
TUCP), then the exclusive bargaining representative of URC- SONEDCO’s rank- and- file employees, entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement) effective January 1, 2002 to
December 31, 2006. Under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, rank- and- file employees were entitled
to wage increase of P14.00/ day for 2002 and p12.00/ day for the succeeding years until 2006.
On May 17, 2002, days after the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed, a certification
election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won and replaced PACIWU- TUCP as the exclusive
bargaining representative.
On August 28, 2007, with no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URC- SONEDCO informed the
rank- and- file employees that they would be granted the following economic benefits.
URC- SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these benefits to sign an
acknowledgement receipt/ waiver (2007 waiver), which stated that “ in the event that a subsequent collective
bargaining agreement is negotiated between Management and Union, the new CBA shall only be effective
January 1, 2008.
ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent committed an Unfair Labor Practice?
RULING: The Lower Courts however erred in ruling that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice, the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the totality of respondent’s
acts, which showed that it violated its duty to bargain collectively. This constitutes unfair labor practice under
Article 259 (g) of the Labor Code.
The wording of the waiver shows a clear attempt to limit petitioner’s bargaining power by making them
waive the negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the collective bargaining agreement that would be
entered into would only be effective the year following the 2008 waiver, respondent limited when the collective
bargaining agreement could be deemed effective. In other words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any
benefits they might have received under a collective bargaining agreement in exchange for the company-
granted benefits.
The Supreme Court finds respondent Universal Robina Corporation, Sugar Division- Southern Negros
Development Corporation is GUILTY of Unfair Labor Practice and is ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the

25Quirante, Evelyn
wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and 2008; and to pay SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union moral
damages in the amount of P100, 000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P 200,000.00
DOCTRINE: An employer who refuses to bargain with the union and tries to restrict its bargaining power is
guilty of unfair labor practice. In determining whether an employer has not bargained in good faith, the totality
of all the acts of the employer at the time of negotiations must be taken into account.

CRISTINA BARSOLO, Petitioner,vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent.

G.R. No. 18795026

Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was employed as a seaman by
various companies from 1988 to 2002. From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel served as a Riding
Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela) Vela was his last
employer before he died in 2006
After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis.When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report
listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death.
Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security System. The Social Security System, on June
27, 2007, denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an employer-employee relationship at the
time of Manuel's death and that "[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cristina is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband

HELD:
Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during the
performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's employment caused the
disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment.
Due to the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence must be presented in order to attribute the
cause of death to Manuel's work. In the absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this
Court cannot assume that the illness that caused Manuel's death was acquired during his employment with Vela.

LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner vs

PARK N RIDE INC./VICEST (PHILS) INC./GRAND LEISURE CORP./SPS. VICENTE & ESTELITA B.
JAVIER, Respondents

26Limos, Ray Ferdinand

 G.R. No. 222980 January 18, 2017 27

FACTS:
 Rodriguez filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave pay
and 13th month pay, including claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against
Park N Ride, Vicest Phils., Grand Leisure, and the Javier Spouses.

 Lourdes Rodriguez alleged that she was employed at Sps. Vicnte and Estelita Javier’s several companies,
such as Park N Ride, Vicest Phils, and Grand Leisure. Aside from being an employee to Spouses’
companies, she also manages the households concerns of the Spouses.

 Rodriguez claims that toward the end of her employment, Estelita was always unreasonable and hot-
headed, and would belittle and embarrass her in the presence of co-workers.

 Thus, Rodriguez eventually submitted a letter expressing her gripes at the Sps. Javier to which the latter
construed and accepted as the former’s resignation.

 In their Position Paper, Sps. Javier stated that they hired and trusted Rodriguez with both their
businesses and personal affairs, and this made her more senior than any of her colleagues at work.

 However, Rodriguez was allegedly emotionally sensitive and prone to occasional "tampo" when she
would be reprimanded or cited for tasks unaccomplished. She would then be absent after such
reprimands and would eventually return after a few days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is constructively dismissed and is entitled to full service incentive, leave pay and
damages.

RULING:

The petition is partially granted.

Respondents are ordered to pay Rodriguez the following:

1) Service incentive leave pay for the years 1984 to 2009;

2) 13th month pay differential for the years 2006 to 2008;
3) Proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2009; and
4) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the wages awarded.

All amounts awarded shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum, from the date of finality of this
Decision, until fully paid.

As to whether petitioner is constructively dismissed, the Court finds that there is constructive dismissal only
when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. It exists where
there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer.

The affidavits of petitioner's former co-workers were mere narrations of petitioner's various duties. Far from
showing the alleged harsh treatment that petitioner suffered, the affidavits rather reveal the full trust and
confidence reposed by respondents on petitioner. Petitioner was entrusted with respondents' assets, the care
and safeguarding of their house during their trips abroad, custody of company files and papers, and delicate
matters such as the release, deposit, and withdrawals of checks from their personal accounts as well as

27Leron, Wilma C.
accounts of their companies. Indeed, it was alleged that petitioner was treated by the respondents as part of
the family.

Petitioner's unequivocal intent to relinquish her position was manifest when she submitted her letters of
resignation. The resignation letters dated May 1, 2008 and March 25, 2009 contained words of gratitude, which
could hardly come from an employee forced to resign. These letters were reinforced by petitioner's very own act
of not reporting for work despite respondents' directive.

MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS, Petitioner

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY INCORPORATED, Respondent
G.R. No. 190389 April 19, 2017
x-----------------------x

MANGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY INCORPORATED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 19039028

FACTS:

An employer's declaration of redundancy becomes a valid and authorized cause for dismissal when the employer
proves by substantial evidence that the services of an employee are more than what is reasonably demanded by
the requirements of the business enterprise.

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorarifi led by Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas assailing
the Court of Appeals' Decision dated August 28, 2008 and Resolution dated November 24, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94365 and CA-G.R. SP No. 98975. CA-G.R. SP No. 94365 upheld the October 28, 2005 and January 31, 2006
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Certified Case No. 000232-03 (NLRC NCR NS
11-405-02 & 11-412-02). In turn, CA-G.R. SP No. 98975 upheld the Secretary of Labor and Employment's
August 11, 2006 Resolution and March 16, 2007 Order.

On June 27, 2002, the labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, which represented the
employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas charged Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of its Provisioning Support Division to
Bicutan, Taguig.

Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas maintains that Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company failed
to submit evidence in support of its declaration of redundancy of the 35 rank-and-file employees in the
Provisioning Support Division. It claimed that "[Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company] only notified [the
Department of Labor and Employment] of the 'closure of traffic operations at Regional Operator Services
affecting three hundred ninety-two (392) employees and the restructuring of [Greater Metropolitan Manila]
Operator Services affecting one hundred eleven (111) employees. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas
asserts that there was no notice given regarding the closure of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's
Provisioning Support Division, and the termination of employment due to redundancy of the affected rank-and-
file employees. It points out that the justifications for the redundancy put forth by Philippine Long Distance

28Siaotong-Cervantes, Salome Bernadette A.

Telephone Company "only pertained to the affected operator services positions and not the affected
[Provisioning Support Division] positions.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company's 2002 redundancy program.
2. Whether the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was rendered moot when
the National Labor Relations Commission upheld the validity of the redundancy program.

HELD:

(1) A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited only to
questions of law.[67] In labor cases, a Rule 45 petition "can prosper only if the Court of Appeals ... fails to
correctly determine whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion."

A court or tribunal is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously acts or whimsically
exercises judgment to be "equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Furthermore, the abuse of discretion must be so
flagrant to amount to a refusal to perform a duty or to act as provided by law.

(2)Redundancy is one of the authorized causes for the termination of employment provided for in Article 298 of
the Labor Code, as amended:

Article 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. -The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,
the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (112) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

Garcia upholds the prevailing doctrine that even if a Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is reversed on
appeal, the employer is obligated "to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period
of appeal until reversal by the higher court."

There is no order of reinstatement from a Labor Arbiter in the case at bar, instead, what is at issue is the return-
to-work order from the Secretary of Labor and Employment. An order of reinstatement is different from a
return-to-work order.

The award of reinstatement, including backwages, is awarded by a Labor Arbiter to an illegally dismissed
employee pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code.

If actual reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee becomes entitled to separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

On the other hand, a return-to-work order is issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment when he or she
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry that is considered indispensable to the national interest.
Article 278(g) of the Labor Code provides that the assumption and certification of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall automatically enjoin the intended or impending strike. When a strike has already taken place
at the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute, all striking
employees shall immediately return to work. Moreover, the employer shall immediately resume operations, and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
Return-to-work and reinstatement orders are both immediately executory; however, a return-to-work order is
interlocutory in nature, and is merely meant to maintain status quo while the main issue is being threshed out in
the proper forum. In contrast, an order of reinstatement is a judgment on the merits handed down by the Labor
Arbiter pursuant to the original and exclusive jurisdiction provided for under Article 224(a) of the Labor Code.
Clearly, Garcia is not applicable in the case at bar, and there is no basis to reinstate the employees who were
terminated as a result of redundancy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' August 28, 2008
Decision and November 24, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 94365 and CA-G.R. SP No. 98975 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. is DIRECTED to pay
the workers affected by its 2002 redundancy program and who had been employed for more than fifteen (15)
years prior to their dismissal, the balance of the separation pay due them or a sum equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of their basic monthly pay for every year of service with Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, Inc.

A legal interest of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision
until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Yolando T. Bravo Vs Urios College

G.R. No. 198066 June 7, 201729

FACTS:

Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher6 in 1988 by Urios College, now called Father Satumino Urios
lJniversity. In addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller.
Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-academic employees for
school year 2001-2002." "unnder the proposed ranking system, the position of Comptroller was classified as an
office [h]ead while the position of Vice President for Finance was classified as middle management." Bravo
further suggested that since he assumed the duties of Comptroller and Vice-President for Finance, his salary
scale should be upgraded. The committee allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations.
Bravo was then directed to arrange a salary adjustment schedule for the new ranking system. Later, Bravo
obtained his employee ranking slip which showed his evaluation score and the change of his rank "from office
head to middle manager-level IV." The change, however, was merely superimposed. In October 2004, Urios
College organized a committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002 caused
salary distortions among several employees There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo
and of two (2) other employees. The committee recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively
charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code. On July 25, 2005,
Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services43 for serious misconduct and loss of trust
and confidence. pon receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause;

whether petitioner was deprived of procedural due process.

RULING:

29Rico, Markus
First Issue: Dismissal from employment was valid

First, the employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence.

There are two (2) types of positions in which trust and confidence are reposed by the employer, namely,
managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees. Managerial employees are considered to occupy
positions of trust and confidence because they are "entrusted with confidential and delicate matters." On the
other hand, fiduciary rank-and-file employees refer to those employees, who, "in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of [the employer's] money or property."
Examples of fiduciary rank-and-file employees are "cashiers, auditors, property custodians," selling tellers, and
sales managers. It must be emphasized, however, that the nature and scope of work and not the job title or
designation determine whether an employee holds a position of trust and confidence.

The second condition that must be satisfied is the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and confidence.
This means that "the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence."
Otherwise, employees will be left at the mercy of their employers.

Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition, there was no reason for the Comptroller's Office to undertake
the preparation of its own summary table because this was a function that exclusively pertained to the Human
Resources Department. Petitioner offered no explanation about the Comptroller's Office's deviation from
company procedure and the discrepancies in the computation of other employees' salaries. Petitioner's position
made him accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's established procedures.
It was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis of command responsibility.

Second Issue

Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address the charges against him or her
satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the employer must serve a notice informing the employee of his or her dismissal from employment.
In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in terminating petitioner's
employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal.
The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by submitting a written explanation.
Respondent even informed petitioner that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a
thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the
investigation committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination
containing respondent’s final decision.

Madridejos v. NYK-FIL Ship Management Inc.,

G.R. No. 204262, June 7, 201730
Ultimate Facts:
The petitioner in this case was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. On March
25, 2010, Madridejos signed an employment contract for a period of 10 momths with NYK-FIL as a Demi Chef
for the vessel Crystal Symphony/Serenity." On April 10, 2010, Madridejos commenced to work aboard the
vessel. Two (2) weeks after, or on April 28, 2010, he claimed that he suddenly slipped on a metal stairway and
fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal pipe. He was brought to the ship doctor and was diagnosed
to have a sebaceous cyst to the right of the umbilicus. The next day, Madridejos was treated at Spire
Southampton Hospital in Hampshire, England. Under a local anesthesia, his cyst was removed, and the lesion
was closed with three (3) stitches. After two (2) months, or on Jul y 5, 2010, NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos'
services through its foreign principal. Madridejos insisted that he did not finish his employment contract with
NYK-FIL due to his unwanted health condition. He further claims that the pre-termination of his employment
contract is not of his fault thus, he demanded from NYK-FIL payment of his disability benefit. July 6, 2010 when
petitioner arrived in Manila. Allegedly, he repoted to NYK-FIL for a medical referral to the company doctor. To

30Cruz, Aldrin Jr.

no avail, the latter refuses to give any referral letter as his illness was not work-related. Due to his alleged very
slow healing process, the four (4) months of medical coverage included in his employment contract with NYK-
FIL expired. However, he still continued his medication as advised by Dr. Espafio.
Madridejos argued that NYK-FIL ignored his repeated demands. He was then prompted to file a complaint for
disability benefits, payment of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees against NYK-FIL before the
Labor Arbiter. NYK-FIL denied that Madridejos was repatriated due to his sebaceous cyst. It asserted that this
was not the reason since the cyst had been excised completely during his operation at Spire Southampton
Hospital. Moreover, Madridejos even resumed his job for the next two months without any complaint or report
of recurrence. NYK-FIL also insisted that Madridejos was not entitled to any disability claim since there was
allegedly no disability to address. Madridejos only underwent an excision under a local anesthesia, which did
not, in any way, render him incapable to return to his previous work as a seafarer. NYK-FIL surmised that
Madridejos merely filed a complaint as an afterthought or an act of retribution due to the early termination of
his employment contract. NYK-FIL purportedly terminated Madridejos services properly pursuant to Item 7 of
their employment agreement. NYK-FIL concluded that Madridejos' illness was not work-related since there was
no reasonable correlation between his cyst and his functions as a Demi Chef. A cyst is merely caused by blocked
sebaceous glands, swollen hair follicles, and excessive testosterone production.
Relevant Issue:
Whether or not Madridejos entitled to receive disability benefits
Doctrinal Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Madridejos cannot claim disability benefits since he was not medically repatriated.
The employment of seafarers and its incidents are governed by the contracts they sign every time they are hired
or re-hired. These contracts have the force of law between the parties as long as their stipulations are not
contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy. Given that he submitted himself with the terms of his
contract, NYK-FIL may validly terminate his services pursuant to their agreed terms.
Record shows that there is no sign that Madridejos was having issues following his operation, indicating that
everything was well after the procedure. Even assuming that he was medically repatriated, he still cannot claim
for disability benefits since his sebaceous cyst was not work-related.
A sebaceous cyst is not included under Section 32 or 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
Standard Employment Contract. However, the guidelines expressly provide that those illnesses not listed in
Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related.
Similarly, for an illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole
and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is enough that there is a reasonable linkage between
the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have
contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have
had.
Madridejos has failed to prove that the development of cyst was due to the nature of his job as a Demi Chef.
For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot presuppose that it is work-related.

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) I RENATO YUDE, MARIANITO REGINO,
MANUEL YUMAGUE, FRANCISCO DACUDAG, RUDY ABABAO, DOMINIC SORNITO, SERGIO
CAJUYONG, ROMULO LABONETE, GENEROSO GRANADA, EMILIO AGUS, ARNOLD CAYAO, BEN
 GENEVE, I VICTOR MAQUE, RICARDO GOMEZ, RODOLFO GAWAN, JIMMY SULLIVAN, FEDERICO
SUMUGAT, JR., ROMULO AVENTURA, JR., JURRY MAGALLANES, HERNAN EPISTOLA, JR., ROBERTO
BELARTE, EDMON MONTALVO, TEODORO MAGUAD, DOMINGO TABABA, MAXIMO SALE, CYRUS
DIONILLO, LEONARDO JUNSAY, JR., DANILO SAMILLION, MARIANITO BOCATEJA, JUANITO
GEBUSION, RICARDO MAYO, RAUL ALIMON, ARNEL ARNAIZ, REBENCY BASOY, JIMMY VICTORIO
BERNALDE, RICARDO BOCOL, JR., JOB CALAMBA, WOLFRANDO CALAMBA, RODOLFO CASISID, JR.,
EDGARDO DELA PENA, ALLAN DIONILLO, EDMUNDO EBIDO, JOSE ELEPTICO, JR., MARCELINO
FLORES, HERNANDO FUENTEBILLA SAUL HITALIA, JOSELITO JAGODILLA, NONITO JAYME, ADJIE
JUANILLO, JEROLD JUD ILLA, EDILBERTO NACIONAL, SANDY NAVALES, FELIPE NICOLASORA,
JOSE PAMALO-AN, ISMAEL PEREZ, JR., ERNESTO RANDO, JR., PHILIP REPULLO, VICENTE RUIZ,
JR., JOHN SUMUGAT, CARLO SUSANA, ROMEO TALAPIERO, JR., FERNANDO TRIENTA, FINDY
VILLACRUZ, JOEL VILLANUEVA, and JERRY MONTELIBANO, Petitioners
vs.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, SUGAR DIVISION-SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (SONEDCO), Respondents
G.R. No. 220383 31

FACTS:
In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO offered, among other
benefits, a ₱l6.00/day wage increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to sign a
waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent Collective Bargaining Agreement is negotiated between
Management and Union, the new Collective Bargaining Agreement shall only be effective on January 1, 2008."
Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union
refused to sign. URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended an additional ₱l6.00/day
wage increase to employees who would agree that any Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated for that year
would only be effective on January 1, 2009. Several members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union again
refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they did not receive the wage increase which already amounted to a
total of ₱32.00/day, beginning 2009.
On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008
waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the requirement of
a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted interference to the employees' right to self-
organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action. They asked that they be granted a ₱l6.00/day wage
increase for 2007 and an additional ₱l6.00/day wage increase for 2008. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union
also demanded a continuing wage increase of ₱32.00/day "from January 1, 2009 onwards."
Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found URC-SONEDCO not guilty of
unfair labor practice. Nonetheless, they ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same benefits their co-
workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's claim for the 2009 wage
increase was denied. Since a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect by 2009, this Collective
Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship between the management and the union. The Court of Appeals
ruled: As there was no provision in the existing CBA regarding wage increase of ₱16.00 per day, the National
Labor Relations Commission was correct in ruling that it cannot further impose private respondents to pay
petitioners the subject wage increase for the year 2009 and onwards.

ISSUES
Whether or not URC-SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor practice
Whether or not the grant of the ₱32.00/day wage increase is an additional benefit outside the Collective
Bargaining Agreement of 2009

HELD:
The Court held that the respondent Universal Robina Corporation Sugar Division - Southern Negros
Development Corporation is GUILTY of unfair labor practice and is ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the

31Percival B. Ortiz
wage increase of Pl 6.00 for the years 2007 and 2008; and to pay SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union moral
damages in the amount of ₱l00, 000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00.
Furthermore the wage increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the waivers. When the affiants
waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with a ₱32.00/day wage increase that continues to this day. The
respondent company granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to waive their collective bargaining
rights. This Court has declared this an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the
petitioners the wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule otherwise will
perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the consequences of the unfair labor practice must be
addressed.
The grant of the ₱32.00/day wage increase is NOT an additional benefit outside the Collective Bargaining
Agreement of 2000 by granting this increase to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against
them, which was a result of respondent's unfair labor practice.

GRIEG PHILIPPINES, INC., GRIEG SHIPPING GROUP AS, and/or MANUEL F. ORTIZ, Petitioners
vs.
MICHAEL JOHN M. GONZALES, Respondent
G.R. No. 228296, July 26, 201732
Facts
Gonzales was first hired by Grieg, a shipping agent, sometime in 2010. On April 20, 2013, Gonzales was
deployed to the general cargo vessel Star Florida after he was re-hired for a nine (9)-month contract. This was
his third contract with Grieg.
Gonzales' employment contract was covered by the Associated Marine Officers' and Seaman's Union of the
Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement. Before being deployed, Gonzales underwent Pre-Employment
Medical Examination and was certified to be fit for sea duty.
In August 2013, while aboard Star Florida, Gonzales was advised to take paracetamol and to rest after he
experienced "shortness of breath, pain in his left leg, fatigue, fever and headaches." A week later, Gonzales
sought medical attention in South Korea after he experienced the same symptoms. With his medical tests
showing normal results, he was given medications and sent back to work in Star Florida.
The following month, his past symptoms returned with the added symptom of black tarry stools. Gonzales was
confined in a hospital in Indonesia where he was initially diagnosed with "pancytopenia suspect a plastic
anemia." Gonzales was declared unfit for sea duty and was repatriated. He disembarked on October 8, 2013.
Gonzales was admitted at the Metropolitan Medical Center after his medical repatriation. The company
physicians diagnosed him with acute promyelocytic leukemia. They opined that Gonzales' leukemia was not
work-related; although, for humanitarian reasons, Grieg continued to pay for his treatment.
Grieg claimed that Gonzales suddenly stopped consulting the company physicians. Gonzales denied this,
countering that he informed Grieg that he would be unable to attend the scheduled appointment on April 28,
2014 because he was still raising money to travel from his hometown to Manila.
Gonzales claimed that his request to reschedule his appointment was granted, and thus, was surprised with the
notification that Grieg had discontinued his treatment.
Gonzales sought a second opinion from an independent physician, Dr. Emmanuel Trinidad, who certified that his
leukemia was work-related.
Issue
Whether or not Gonzales’s leukemia is work related.
Held
Note that even if we are to disregard the opinion of Gonzales' own physician, this Court rules that petitioners
miserably failed to dispute the medical finding that Gonzales' leukemia is not hereditary, as his tests reveal no
apparent chromosome abnormality. This undeniable circumstance, taken together with Gonzales' testimony, plus
the fact that he was declared fit for sea duty prior to boarding the vessel for two (2) consecutive employment
contracts with the same company, all the more bolster the conclusion that the conditions set forth in Section 32-
A regarding the work-relatedness of his leukemia are present in this case. (Citations omitted)
As we have stated in Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation:

32Araneta, Fidel
A petition for review is limited to questions of law. This court does not "re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that
has expertise in its specialized field." This court has held that "factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are generally conclusive on this court." (Citations omitted)
This Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines represented by OSG V Cortez et. al

GR NO. 187257 and 187778, August 8, 201733

FACTS:

NECU and NEW filed a petition for mandamus praying that NAPOCOR be ordered to release the Cost of
Living Allowances (COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) allegedly withheld from July 1, 1989 to March 19,
1999. NECU AND NEWU believed that they were among the government employees whose COLA and AA were
not factually integrated into their basic salary upon the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758.In their 16,500
Workers' Solicitous Motion for Reconsideration, respondents NECU and NEWU insist that law, jurisprudence, and
evidence support their contention that their COLA and AA were deducted from their salaries from July 1,1989 to
March 19, 1999. In particular, they distinguish NAPOCOR workers into three (3) categories. The first category
includes workers already employed when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect and whose COLA and AA were
integrated into their basic salaries only up to 1993. The second category covers those hired after Republic Act
No. 6758 took effect and whose COLA and AA were allegedly deducted from 1989 to 1999. The third category
consists of employees hired after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7648 and whose COLA and AA were
allegedly deducted from 1994 to 1999.

ISSUE:
WON NAPOCOR shall release the COLA and AA?

RULING:

Republic Act No. 6758 remained effective during the period of ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Thus,
the COLA and AA of NAPOCOR officers and employees were integrated into the standardized salaries effective
July 1, 1989 pursuant to Section12 of Republic Act No. 6758, which provides: Section 12. Consolidation of
Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances;
clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such
other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.

Hence, respondents NECU’s and NEWU’s COLA and AA were integrated into their basic salary by virtue
of RA NO 6758.Section 12 has never been ineffective or rendered unconstitutional. Thus, allowances not
covered by exceptions to section 12 are presumed to have been integrated into the basic standardized pay. The
receipt of a transition allowance is not proof that only those who are hired before July 1 1989 received their
COLA and AA. The transition allowance was only given to comply with the non-dimunition clause of law. It was
never meant as an additional compensation.

PEDRO C. PEREA, PETITIONER, VS. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., AUGUSTEA

ATLANTICA SRL/ITALY, AND CAPTAIN ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO, RESPONDENTS.

33 Alejandro
 G.R. No. 206178, August 09, 201734

FACTS
In 2009, Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg under its principal Augustea. Perea was hired
as a fitter for 9 months with a monthly salary of USD698. In 2010, Perea had difficulty breathing while repairing
a pipe. He did not feel any better after resting and taking medications so he asked to be repatriated. A few days
later, he was welding and encountered an accident causing his fingers to grow numb. He was attended to in
SEMA Hospital in Turkey and was diagnosed to be suffering from Cubital Tunnel Syndrome. He was soon
repatriated to the Philippines.

In July 2010, Dr. Hao Quan declared that the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined that his
estimated length of treatment is 3-4 months. In September 2010, Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of
his sick leave pay, permanent disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.

In October 2010, Perea consulted Dr. Pascual who diagnosed him with Uncontrolled Hypertension and Coronary
Artery Disease, which would render him unfit to work as a seafarer. Labor Arbiter dismissed Perea’s complaint
for lack of merit. LA ruled that Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) could not apply to Perea;s claim for
disability benefits because the CBA had already lapsed. LA further emphasized that ELburg followed the POEA
contract when it paid Perea’s wages during the time he was indisposed while on board the vessel. LA also
underscored that after Perea’s repatriation, he was subjected to a series of medical tests and procedures
including CT scan and coronary angiogram, all at Elburg’s expense. Between the findings of Dr. Hao-Quan and
Dr. Pascual, the LA gave more weight to the findings of the company-designated physicians who concluded that
Perea was not suffering from coronary disease disease.

Perea appealed the LA decision. NLRC affirmed the LA. On appeal, CA sustained the NLRC ruling.

ISSUES
Whether Perea is fit to work.

DOCTRINAL RULING
No. The physician who has personal knowledge of a seafarer's actual medical condition after closely monitoring
and regularly treating that seafarer is more credible than another physician who only saw such seafarer once.

ANTONIO B. MANANSALA, PETITIONER, VS. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC./MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO. LTD./CYPRUS, AND/OR EILEEN MORALES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 208314, August 23, 201735

FACTS
In 2010, Mansansala’s services were engaged by Marlow for him to serve as “fitter” on board the vessel M/V
Seaboxer. Before boarding, he underwent Pre Employment Medical Exam. He did not declare any illness and
was declared fit for sea duty and was employed. A month later, Manansala suffered a stroke then he was
repatriated.

Manansala was confined at De Los Santos Medical Center for a few days. He repeatedly denied that he had past
history of diabetes and hypertension. In September 2010, doctor issued Grade 10 disability rating. Manansala
then filed a complaint against the respondents for total and permanent disability benefits.

34 Montes
35 Montes
Labor Arbiter ruled against Manansala, arguing that he was suffering from pre-existing rather than work-related
ailments. Therefore, he was not entitled to disability benefits. NLRC affirmed. In CA, NLRC is affirmed.

ISSUES
Whether Manansala is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits occasioned by work-related illnesses.

DOCTRINAL RULING
No. Court finds Manansala to have knowlingly and fraudulently misrepresented himself as not afflicted with
hypertension or diabetes.

As laypersons, seafarers cannot be expected to make completely accurate accounts of their state of health.
Unaware of the nuances of medical conditions, they may, in good faith, make statements that tum out to be
false. These honest mistakes do not negate compensability for disability arising from pre-existing illnesses
shown to be aggravated by their working conditions. However, when a seafarer's proper knowledge of pre-
existing conditions and intent to deceive an employer are established, compensability is negated.

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. Cynthia De Jesus

G.R. No. 203943, August 30, 201736

FACTS:
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Bernardine De Jesus as an Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise
ship Regal Princess. Based on the contract of employment that he signed, Bernardine was to receive a basic
monthly wage of US$388.00 for a period of 10 months.
Bernardine boarded Regal Princess and he eventually disembarked 10 months later, or on January 16,
2007, after his contract of employment ended. He was soon diagnosed with Aortic Aneurysm and on March 15,
2007, he had a coronary angiography. On March 21, 2007, he underwent a Left Axillofemoral Bypass. He died
on March 26, 2007. Cynthia De Jesus, Bernardine's widow, filed a complaint against Magsaysay for payment of
death benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter granted
Cynthia's complaint and directed Magsaysay to pay her claims for death benefits, additional benefits, burial
expenses, and attorney's fees. It ruled that it was highly improbable that Bernardine developed a cardio-vascular
disease which would lead to his death merely two months after his repatriation. Cynthia sufficiently established
that her husband suffered chest pains while he was still aboard the Regal Princess. She claimed that he had
reported his condition but he was not provided with medical attention. Furthermore, he had also asked for
medical attention upon his repatriation, but his request was once again denied.
The NLRC denied Magsaysay's appeal finding that Bernardine's cardio-vascular disease was work-
related. It also noted that while the general rule in compensability of death is that a seafarer's death must have
occurred during the term of the employment contract, an exception to this rule is when a seafarer contracted an
illness while under the contract and this illness caused his death. In such case, even if the seaman died after the
term of the contract, his beneficiaries are entitled to death compensation and benefits. It also pointed out that
the failure to undergo a post employment medical examination within three days from repatriation leads to the
forfeiture of medical benefits and sickness allowance, not death benefits. Magsaysay filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA and paid Cynthia P3,370,514.40 as conditional satisfaction of the judgment award against it and
without prejudice to its Petition for Certiorari pending before the CA. In light of the conditional settlement
between the parties, the LA considered the case closed and terminated but without prejudice to Magsaysay's
pending petition before the CA. CA dismissed the petition for being moot and academic and denied Magsaysay's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari asserting that the CA erred in dismissing their
Petition on the ground that the payment of the judgment award rendered the petition moot arid academic
because the payment made to respondent was without prejudice to the then pending petition before CA. It
further argued that the labor tribunals committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding death benefits to
Cynthia and her three minor children considering that Bernardine's death was not compensable under the POEA-
SEC and that respondent failed to prove her claims of compensability with substantial evidence.

36 Sampang
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the payment of money judgment has rendered the Petition for Certorari before the CA
moot and academic; and

b. Whether or not the award of death benefits was issued with grave abuse of discretion
RULING:

a.

In the instant case, the parties entered into a compromise agreement when they executed a Conditional
Satisfaction of Judgment Award.
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Parties freely enter
into a compromise agreement, making it a judgment on the merits of the case with the effect of res judicata
upon them.
While the general rule is that a valid compromise agreement has the power to render a pending case
moot and academic, being a contract, the parties may opt to modify the legal effects of their compromise
agreement to prevent the pending case from becoming moot.

In the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award, respondent acknowledged receiving the sum of
P3,370,514.40 from petitioners as conditional payment of the judgment award. Both parties agreed that the
payment of the judgment award was without prejudice to the pending certiorari proceedings before the CA and
was only made to prevent the imminent execution being undertaken by respondent and the NLRC. Finally, in the
event the judgment award of the labor tribunals is reversed by the CA or by the SC, respondent agreed to return
whatever she would have received back to petitioners and in the same vein, if the CA or the SC affirms the
decisions of the labor tribunals, petitioners shall pay respondent the balance of the judgment award without
need of demand. Respondent, for herself and for her three minor children with Bernardine, then signed a
Receipt of Payment where she reiterated the undertakings she took in the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment
Award. However, in the Affidavit of Heirship, respondent was prohibited from seeking further redress against
petitioners, making the compromise agreement ultimately prejudicial to respondent. This prohibition on the part
of respondent to pursue any of the available legal remedies should the CA or the SC reverse the judgment
award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action in another country puts the seafarer's
beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage. Thus, the CA did not err in treating the conditional settlement as an
amicable settlement, effectively rendering the Petition for Certiorari moot and academic.
b.

Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC requires that for a seafarer to be entitled to death benefits, he must
have suffered a work-related death during the term of his contract. However, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC
acknowledges the possibility of "compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the employment
contract on account of a work-related illness" as long as the following conditions are met:

a. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

b. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
c. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to
contract it;
d. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

A cardio-vascular disease may be considered occupational under Section 32-A (11) if any of the
established conditions are met:
a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must e proof that an
acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
b. The train of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed
within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
 c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs
and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs
persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Both labor tribunals found that Bernardine first experienced chest pains while he was still onboard the
cruise ship, i.e., during the term of his employment contract. It was likewise established that while Bernardine
requested medical attention when he started to feel ill and upon his repatriation, his requests were repeatedly
ignored. It was evident that the illness which caused Seaman de Jesus' death occurred during the term of his
employment contract, though it may not have fully manifested at once. The fact that the seaman's work
exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather also helped trigger the onset of his disease. There
is therefore a reasonable connection between the conditions of employment and work actually performed by the
deceased seafarer and his illness.

SHARPE SEA PERSONNEL, INC. et al VS. MACARIO MABUNAY, JR.

G.R. No. 206113; November 6, 2017 37

FACTS:

The respondent Macario Mabunay, Jr. was hired by Sharpe Sea as an oiler for M/V Larisa. Unfortunately, only a
day following April 14, 2009, he slipped and hit his back on the purifier while he was cleaning in the area. He
informed his officer, a certain 2nd Engineer Castro of the accident and his condition, but he was directed
continue with his assigned duties. Despite the persistent pain in his back and numbness in his legs, Mabunay
continued working from April 16, 2009 to April 18, 2009, until Chief Engineer De Leon allowed him to have a
medical checkup when the ship docked in Nanjing, China, where he was declared unfit to work by his attending
physician.

On April 29, 2009, Mabunay was medically repatriated to Manila. The following day, he reported to Sharpe
Sea's company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz for medical check up and he was advised to be admitted and
confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital. On August 14, 2009, after it was noted that he was not responding to
physical therapy, Dr. Cruz recommended him for a discectomy or surgery. After he was discharged from the
hospital, he filed a complaint against Sharpe Sea, et al for the payment of his medical expenses, total disability
benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in Mabunay's favor and directed Sharpe Sea,
Inc. to pay him permanent and total disability benefits amounting to US$60,000.00 plus 10% attorney’s fees.

Both parties filed their respective appeals to the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s decision
with modification by deleting the award of attorney’s fees, moral damages and claims for reimbursement for
medical expenses. Then both parties filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC.
On November 29, 2011, the NLRC modified its decision by reducing the award of US$60,000.00 it earlier
granted to Mabunay, to US$16,795.00, corresponding to a Grade 8 disability rating. The NLRC also pointed out
that while Dr. Cruz's medical report might not have been presented before the Labor Arbiter, it was not disputed
that Mabunay was under the care of Dr. Cruz from the time he was medically repatriated.
Mabunay was not satisfied with the decision of the NLRC, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the aforesaid Decision of the NLRC, in which the appellate court partially granted his petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Mabunay was entitled to attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages since
Sharpe Sea acted with bad faith in belatedly submitting a Grade 8 disability rating, to include claim for actual
expenses in the form of transportation expenses, magnetic resonance imaging, and doctor's fees since they
were adequately supported with receipts.
Sharpe Sea felt dissatisfied with CA’s decision, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied, hence this
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

37Venasquez
Whether or not there is sufficient basis for the award of damages and attorney's fees.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA with modification favoring the respondent. It held that
there is sufficient basis to award damages and attorney’s fees to the respondent. The respondent justifies his
claim for damages by the inhuman treatment he received aboard M/V Larisa, where he was made to continue
working even after he reported his accident and the excruciating pain in his back.
Petitioners Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. and Monte Carlo Shipping, Inc. were ordered to pay Macario Mabunay, Jr.
the amount of US$60,000.00 as permanent and total disability benefits plus ten percent (10%) thereof as
attorney's fees, to include P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P36,500.00 as
reimbursement of transportation expenses, and P7,300.00 as reimbursement of MRI expenses.
Petitioners failed to convince the Supreme Court, hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari was
denied.

DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. AND NARCISO T. DELA MERCED, Petitioners, v. ROSALIO A. LERON,.
G.R. No. 20428838

FACTS:

The respondent, Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. (Demex), a domestic corporation
engaged in manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export. Narciso T. Dela Merced was
Demex's president.

Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis and his services were contracted through job orders. He worked from
Monday to Saturday. Leron received his wages at the end of every week but he never received standard benefits
such as 13th month pay, service incentive leave, rest day pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay.

In June 2006, Leron was dismissed by Demex because he was accused of instigating a campaign to remove the
company's foreman. Then Leron filed a complaint against Demex for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of
Quezon City, but it was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.

Leron then refiled his complaint before the Labor Arbiter of San Fernando City, Pampanga and again, the
complaint was dismissed for reason that Leron's termination from employment was valid. After that, he
appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission and the latter affirmed the Decision of Labor Arbiter
but awarded Leron P5,000.00 as nominal damages for Demex's non-compliance with procedural due process.
The NLRC declared that Leron's absence was a valid ground to terminate him from employment. Leron moved
for reconsideration but his motion was also denied.

Then the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court assailing the Resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The Court of Appeals ruled that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it declared that Leron abandoned his work. Accordingly, there was no clear intention on the part
of Leron to sever the employer-employee relationship because he filed an illegal dismissal case immediately
after he was dismissed. The assailed Resolution of the NLRC was reversed and set aside. The petitioner
(Demex) was ordered to pay Leron accrued backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the
strained relations between the parties.

The petitioner filed an MR but its motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, it filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

38Venasquez
Whether or not the respondent Leron was validly dismissed from employment by petitioners Demex and Narciso
Dela Merced on the ground of abandonment of work.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment since the
petitioners failed to clearly establish that he abandoned his work. The petitioners/employer have the burden of
proving that an employee's dismissal from service was for a just or authorized cause.

Petitioners also failed to comply with procedural due process, particularly the twin-notice rule. Valid termination
requires the employer to send an initial notice to the employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for
dismissal and directing the submission of a written explanation answering the charges. After considering the
employee's answer, the employer must give another notice informing the employee of the employer's findings
and reason for termination. Hence, this Court denies the petition and affirms CA’s finding that the respondent
was illegally dismissed by his employer, Demex.

MACARIO S. PADILLA vs AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC.

G.R. No. 210080, November 22, 201739
FACTS:
On September 1, 1986, Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc. (Airborne) as a security
guard. Padilla allegedly rendered continuous service until June 15, 2009, when he was relieved from his post
and was advised to wait for his re-assignment order. On July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from
Airborne directing him to report for assignment and deployment. He called Airborne's office but was told that he
had no assignment yet. On September 9, 2009, he received another letter from Airborne asking him to report to
its office. On September 22, 2009, he personally reported to the office to inquire on the status of his
deployment. He was told that Airborne was having a hard time finding an assignment for him since he was
already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised by Airborne's personnel to resign, but he refused.
In December 2009, when he reported to the office to collect his 13th month pay, he was again persuaded to
hand in his resignation letter. Still not having been deployed or re-assigned, on February 23, 2010, Padilla filed
his Complaint for illegal dismissal, impleading Airborne and its president, respondent Catalina Solis (Solis).
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padilla’s Complaint. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed into the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission
and of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment with respondent, having been
placed on floating status apparently on the basis of his age.

HELD:

The practice of placing security guards on "floating status" or "temporary off-detail" is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. Jurisprudence has settled that the period of temporary off-detail must not exceed six
(6) months. Beyond this, a security guard's floating status shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal.

Therefore, a security guard's employer must give a new assignment to the employee within six (6) months. This
assignment must be to a specific or particular client. "A general return-to-work order does not suffice.":

A holistic analysis of the Court's disposition in JLFP Investigation reveals that: [1] an employer must assign the
security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be
considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular
client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice.

39Rodriguez
As a further defense, respondents add that it was petitioner who abandoned his work.
For an employee to be considered to have abandoned his work, two (2) requisites must concur.

First, the employee must have failed to report for work or have been absent without a valid or justifiable reason.

Second, the employee must have had a "clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship."This Court
has emphasized that "the second element is the more determinative factor."
This second element, too, must be "manifested by some overt acts."
Petitioner's conduct belies any intent to abandon his work. To the contrary, it demonstrates how he took every
effort to retain his employment. Right after he received the first letter dated July 27, 2009, he called Airborne's
head office, only to be told that he had no assignment yet. Upon being informed by his wife of a subsequent
letter dated September 9, 2009, he replied in the following manner:

Equally belying petitioner's intent to abandon his work is his immediate filing of a Complaint for illegal dismissal
on February 23, 2010. This was only eight (8) month after he was placed on floating status. As similarly noted in
Tatel v. JLFP Investigation Security Agency:

Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, this Court is unable to conclude that petitioner
abandoned his work. Rather, this Court finds that he was placed on floating status for more than six (6) months.
Thus, he was constructively dismissed.

The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to petitioner,
which must be paid without delay, and for the execution of this judgment.

UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER vs. CESARIO BERNADAS, represented by Leonila Bernadas
G.R. No. 209468, December 13, 2017 40

Facts:

In 1986, Cesario started working as an orderly in United Doctors Medical Center's (UDMC) housekeeping
department and then promoted as a utility man. UDMC and its rank-and-file employees (RFE) had a CBA in
which RFE were entitled to optional retirement benefits. Under the optional retirement policy, an employee who
has rendered at least 20 years of service is entitled to optionally retire. The optional retirement pay is equal to a
retiree's salary for 11 days per year of service. In addition to the retirement plan, employees are also provided
insurance, with UDMC paying the premiums. The employees' family members would be the beneficiaries of the
insurance.

In 2009, Cesario died from a "freak accident" while working in a doctor's residence. He was 53 years old. Leonila
Bernadas, representing her deceased husband, filed a Complaint for payment of retirement benefits, damages,
and attorney's fees with the NLRC. Leonila and her son also claimed and were able to receive insurance
proceeds of P180,000.00 under the CBA. Labor Arbiter dismissed Leonila's complaint for reason that the benefits
being optional, Cesario should have applied for optional retirement benefits during his lifetime. There having no
application, Cesario’s beneficiaries were not entitled to claim his optional retirement benefits. On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision. It found that the optional retirement plan was never presented in this case,
casting a doubt on whether or not the plan required an application for optional retirement benefits before an
employee could become entitled to them. UDMC filed an MR but was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

40 Planada-Agbay, Anna Angela M.

Petitioner argues that respondent Cesario's beneficiaries do not have legal capacity to apply for Cesario's
optional retirement benefits since respondent himself never applied for it in his lifetime. Even assuming
respondent Cesario was already qualified to apply for optional retirement 3 years prior to his death, he never
did. Petitioner likewise argues “double compensation and unjust enrichment" if the optional retirement benefits
would be granted on top of the life insurance benefits that they have already received. Leonila counters that had
her husband died "under normal circumstances," he would have applied for optional retirement benefits. That
Cesario was unable to apply before his death "is a procedural technicality" that should be set aside so that "full
protection to labor" is afforded and "the ends of social and compassionate justice" are met.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Cesario Bernadas is entitled to receive his optional retirement benefits despite his
untimely death?

2. Whether or not Leonila Bernadas as her husband's representative, may claim his optional retirement
benefits?

Rulling:

1. Yes. retirement plans, while initially humanitarian in nature, now concomitantly serve to secure loyalty
and efficiency on the part of employees, and to increase continuity of service and decrease the labor
turnover, by giving to the employees some assurance of security as they approach and reach the age at
which earning ability and earnings are materially impaired or at an end.

The grant of insurance proceeds will not necessarily bar the grant of retirement benefits. Insurance proceeds
are in the concept of an indemnity while retirement benefits are conditioned on age and length of service. These
are 2 separate and distinct benefits that an employer may provide to its employees.

There are 3 types of retirement plans available to employees.

1. Compulsory and contributory - This is embodied in Republic Act No. 8282 for those in the private sector
and Republic Act No. 8291 for those in the government. These laws require a mandatory contribution
from the employer as well as the employee, which shall become a pension fund for the employee upon
retirement.

2. Retirement plan is by agreement between the employer and the employee - This is usually embodied in
the CBA between them.

3. Voluntarily given by the employer - This may be given expressly as in an announced company policy or
impliedly as in a failure to contest the employee's claim for retirement benefits.

The 2nd and 3rd types of retirement plans voluntary. They may not even require the employee to contribute to
a pension fund. However, these types of retirement plans are not meant to be a replacement to the compulsory
retirement plan in addition to that provided by law.

This case involves the second type of retirement plan or that which is provided under employer and employees'
CBA. The terms and conditions of a CBA "constitute the law between the parties," but this CBA does not provide
for the terms and conditions of the "present policy on optional retirement.

It is settled that doubts must be resolved in favor of labor. Retirement laws should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should
be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, retirement encompasses
even the concept of death. The Court has considered death as a form of disability retirement as "there is no
more permanent or total physical disability than death." Compulsory retirement and death both involve events
beyond the employee's control.
In this case, Cesario was qualified because he has been employed for 23 years. While the choice to retire before
the compulsory age of retirement was within Cesario's control, his death foreclosed the possibility of him making
that choice. Moreover, Petitioner's optional retirement plan is premised on length of service, not upon reaching a
certain age, as it rewards loyalty and continued service by granting an employee an earlier age to claim his or
her retirement benefits.

An employee who has already qualified for optional retirement but dies before the option to retire could be
exercised is entitled to his or her optional retirement benefits, which may be claimed by the qualified employee's
beneficiaries on his or her behalf.

2. Yes. Retirement benefits are the property interests of the retiree and his or her beneficiaries. The CBA
does not prohibit the employee's beneficiaries from claiming retirement benefits if the retiree dies before
the proceeds could be released. Even compulsory retirement plans provide mechanisms for a retiree's
beneficiaries to claim any pension due to the retiree. Thus, Leonila, being the surviving spouse of
respondent Cesario, is entitled to claim the optional retirement benefits on his behalf.

CHARLIE HUBILLA, et al. v. HSY MARKETING LTD., CO., et al.

G.R. No. 207354; January 10, 2018 41

Doctrine: Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by
substantial evidence. Nonetheless, these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. When the
evidence of the employer and the employee are in equipoise, doubts are resolved in favor of labor.

FACTS:

The respondents HSY Marketing Ltd., et. al. is engaged in manufacturing and selling goods under the brand
“Novo Jeans”. The employees claimed that they were illegally dismissed. Consequently, the case was referred to
the DOLE for amicable settlement, but no settlement was reached. Petitioner Charlie Hubilla filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against respondent HSY Marketing Ltd. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA decision and found that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the LA decision.

Petitioner contended that the CA cannot review the factual findings of the NLRC. Respondent contended
otherwise.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals may, in a petition for certiorari, review and re-assess the factual
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
HELD:

1. Yes. When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise, doubt is resolved in favor of the employee. This is
in line with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor. Petitioners allege that they were
illegally dismissed from service when they were prevented from entering their work premises a day after
airing their grievance in a radio show. On the other hand, respondents deny this allegation and state
that petitioners were never dismissed from employment but abandoned their jobs. No substantial proof
was presented by the respondent. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to
prove that the employee was dismissed for a valid cause and that the employee was afforded due
process prior to the dismissal.

41 Planada-Agbay. Anna Angela M.

2.Yes. Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts when the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is “the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” This
does not mean that the Court of Appeals is conclusively bound by the findings of the NLRC. If the findings are
arrived at arbitrarily, without resort to any substantial evidence, the National Labor Relations Commission is
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion.

NLRC findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of
the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. The Court of Appeals can then grant a petition
for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, has made a factual finding that is not
supported by substantial evidence. In the determination of whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion, the Court of Appeals may re-examine facts and re-assess the evidence. However, its findings may still
be subject to review by this Court.

This Court notes that in cases when the Court of Appeals acts as an appellate court, it is still a trier of facts.
Questions of fact may still be raised by the parties. If the parties raise pure questions of law, they may directly
file with this Court.

Moreover, contradictory factual findings between the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals do not automatically justify this Court’s review of the factual findings. They merely present a prima facie
basis to pursue the action before this Court.

The need to review the Court of Appeals’ factual findings must still be pleaded, proved, and substantiated by the
party alleging their inaccuracy. This Court likewise retains its full discretion to review the factual findings.

Pascua vs. Bank Wise, Inc.,

853 SCRA 446, G.R. No. 191460, G.R. No. 191464 January 31, 2018 42
Facts:
Pascua was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing on July 1, 2002.
On September 29, 2004, Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for
the purchase of Bankwise’s entire outstanding capital stock. On January 12, 2005, Philippine Veterans Bank
allegedly assumed full control and management of Bankwise. Philippine Veterans Bank allegedly elected new
members of the Board of Directors and appointed a new set of officers, including the President and Chief
Operating Officer.
On February 3, 2005, Pascua was informed by Roberto A. Buhain (Buhain), President of Bankwise, that as part
of the merger or trade-off agreement with Philippine Veterans Bank, he should tender his resignation. Buhain
assured Pascua that he would be paid all his money claims during this transition. Instead of tendering his
resignation, Pascua wrote a letter dated February 7, 2005, wherein he pleaded, among others, that he stay in
office until the end of the year.
Seeing as Pascua had yet to submit his resignation, Vicente Campa (Campa), a director of Bankwise, told him
that it was imperative that he submit his resignation and assured his continued service with Philippine Veterans
Bank. Based on Campa’s assurance, Pascua tendered his resignation on February 22, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not Pascua was constructively dismissed.
Ruling:
The employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the employee was dismissed for a just or
authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned, the employer still has the burden of
proving that the resignation was voluntary. It is constructive dismissal when resignation “was made under
compulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employee’s act of handing in

42Militante
his [or her] resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him [or her] no alternative but to resign.”
“Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate
oneself from employment.” In order to prove that resignation is voluntary, “the acts of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his
or her employment.”
Labor is a constitutionally protected social class due to the perceived inequality between capital and labor.
Article 1700 of the Civil Code states: Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. The presumption is that
the employer and the employee are on unequal footing so the State has the responsibility to protect the
employee. This presumption, however, must be taken on a case-to-case basis. In situations where special
qualifications are required for employment, such as a Master’s degree or experience as a corporate executive,
prospective employees are at a better position to bargain or make demands from the employer. Employees with
special qualifications would be on equal footing with their employers, and thus, would need a lesser degree of
protection from the State than an ordinary rank-and-file worker.
Pascua’s resignation letter, however, was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was premised on his
subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his employers. In
this instance, Pascua is not considered to have been constructively dismissed. Pascua’s third letter likewise
indicates that he has already accepted the consequences of his voluntary resignation but that it would be
subject to the payment of severance pay. However, his claim for severance pay cannot be granted. An employee
who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to separation pay unless it was previously stipulated in the employment
contract or has become established company policy or practice. There is nothing in Pascua’s Contract of
Employment that states that he would be receiving any monetary compensation if he resigns. He has also not
shown that the payment of separation pay upon resignation is an established policy or practice of Bankwise
since his third letter indicated that he was unaware of any such policy.

Philippine Span Asia Carriers Corp. (formerly Sulpicio Lines, Inc.) vs. Pelayo
G.R. No. 212003; February 28, 201843

FACTS:

Pelayo was employed by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. as an accounting clerk at its Davao City Branch Office. As
accounting clerk, her main duties were to receive statements and billings for processing of payments, prepare
vouchers and checks for the approval and signature of the branch manager, and release checks for payment.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. discovered uncovered several anomalous transactions in its Davao City Branch Office which
pertains to check issuances by altering original amount with the signatories of Branch Manager TIRSO TAN and
Cashier FELY SOBIACO. Sulpicio Lines also found several discrepancies in disbursement of vouchers and other
financial anomalies. Sulpicio Lines Cebu Based Management Team went to Davao to investigate. Pelayo was
interviewed by the Cebu Team as "she was the one who personally prepared the cash vouchers and checks for
approval by Tan and Sobiaco. A follow-up investigation was made in the main Office in Cebu City. In the midst
of a panel interview during investigation, Pelayo walked out claiming she was being coerced to admit complicity
with Tan and Sobiaco. Later, Pelayo returned to Davao City where she was admitted to a hospital because of
nervous breakdown. She eventually filed for leave of absence and ultimately stopped reporting for work.

Sulpicio Lines served a memorandum dated March 15, 2010, requiring her to submit a written explanation
concerning the bank anomalies found in the Davao branch. Pelayo was preventively suspended for 30 days.
Sulpicio sought the assistance of the NBI to asked Pelayo to appear before the bank investigation. Instead of
responding to Sulpicio’s request, Pelayo filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Sulpicio Lines.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. denied liability asserting that Pelayo was merely asked to come to Cebu to shed light on the
discovered anomalies and was only asked to cooperate in prosecuting Tan and Sobiaco.

43Burden
Labor Arbiter Merceditas C. Larida decided the case in favor of Pelayo faulting the Sulpicio Lines for harassing
Pelayo when her participation in the uncovered anomalies was "far-fetched.” On petitioner’s appeal, NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter citing that the matter of disciplining employees was a management
prerogative and that complainant's involvement in the investigation did not necessarily amount to harassment.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a constructive dismissal.

HELD:

No. There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign
from such employment. It exists where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer. We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is
"whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment
under the circumstances.

The Court found no objective proof demonstrating that Pelayo’s interviewers were hostile, distrusting, and
censorious, or that the interview was a mere pretext to pin her down. These are just bare allegations of the
respondent. Respondent's recollection is riddled with impressions, unsupported by independently verifiable facts.
These impressions are subjective products of nuanced perception, personal interpretation, and ingrained belief
that cannot be appreciated as evidencing "the truth respecting a matter of fact.” Respondent's subsequent
hospitalization does not prove harassment or coercion to make an admission either.

Employees cannot tie employers' hands, incapacitating them, and preemptively defeating investigations with
laments of how the travails of their involvement in such investigations translates to their employers' fabrication
of an inhospitable employment atmosphere so that an employee is left with no recourse but to resign.

Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding
of constructive dismissal. It is an employer's right to investigate acts of wrongdoing by employees. Employees
involved in such investigations cannot ipso facto claim that employers are out to get them. Their involvement in
investigations will naturally entail some inconvenience, stress, and difficulty. However, even if they might be
burdened - and, in some cases, rather heavily so - it does not necessarily mean that an employer has embarked
on their constructive dismissal.

Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc.

G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 201844

FACTS:

Ebuenga, chief cook, was hired by Southfield Agencies, Inc. (Southfield) aboard respondent Wilhemsen Ship
Management Holding Ltd.'s (Wilhemsen) vessel, MTV Super Adventure. He boarded the said vessel on
December 19, 2010. About two (2) months into his engagement, Ebuenga wrote a letter to Southfield,
Wilhemsen, and Captain Sonny Valencia (Capt. Valencia) (collectively, respondents), asking that he be
repatriated as soon as possible "to attend to a family problem." he was repatriated on March 5, 2011. Without
consulting Southfield's designated physician, Ebuenga had himself checked at St. Luke's Medical Center where
he underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The test revealed that he was afflicted with "Multilevel Disk
Desiccation, from C2-C3 to C6-C7."He was advised to undergo physical therapy. Consequently, Ebuenga went
back to his hometown in Bogtong, Legaspi City to undergo physical therapy sessions. Thereafter, he consulted

44 Burden
Dr. Misael Jonathan A. Ticman, who issued a Disability Report, finding him to be permanently disabled and no
longer fit to work as a seafarer.

Ebuenga filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits. In his Position Paper, he disavowed voluntarily
seeking repatriation on account of a family concern. He claimed instead that upon embarkation, a crew member
died from overfatigue. He reported this death to the International Transport Workers Federation, which took no
action. Incensed at Ebuenga's actions, the captain of the vessel, Capt. Jonathan B. Lecias, Sr. (Capt. Lecias),
coerced him to sign a letter seeking immediate repatriation. Ebuenga also claimed to have reported to Capt.
Lecias that he was suffering intense back pain but the latter refused to entertain this because of the animosity
between them. He added that upon repatriation, he sought medical assistance from the company-designated
physician, but was refused. Thus, he was forced to seek treatment on his own.

In her October 12, 2011 Decision, Labor Arbiter Savari dismissed Ebuenga's complaint. Labor Arbiter Savari
explained that Ebuenga failed to prove that he had suffered an illness or injury while on board the M/V Super
Adventure. She added that Ebuenga may no longer claim disability benefits for failing to undergo a post-
employment medical examination with the company-designated physician. Later, Ebuega’s appeal was denied by
NLRC. On April 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission. It also denied Ebuenga's Motion for Reconsideration in its July 26, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this Petition. He contends that he could not have forfeited his claims as respondents refused to have the
company-designated physician examine him. He also insists on his version of events: that he came in conflict
with Capt. Lecias over the death of a co-worker, was forced to sign a letter recounting a family emergency, and
was denied assistance by Capt. Lecias when he fell ill while on board the M/V Super Adventure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Ebuenga is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

HELD:

No. Under 20 (b) of the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) established the procedures for
assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates seafarers to see a company-designated physician for a post-
employment medical examination, which must be done within three (3) working days from their arrival. Failure
to comply shall result in the forfeiture for the right to claim disability benefits. According to the Supreme Court
utter failure to substantiates the version of events of petitioner, no award of disability benefits is availing as
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his affliction was work-related. For compensation of disability under
Section 20 (b) of the 2000 POAE-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) that the illness or injury must be work-
related, and (2) that the work-related illness or injury must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s
employment contact.

La Consolacion College of Manila v. Pascua,

G.R. No. 214744, March 14, 2018 45

FACTS:

On January 10, 2000, Pascua's services as school physician were engaged by La Consolacion. She started
working part-time before serving full-time from 2008. On September 29, 2011, Pascua was handed an Inter-
Office Memo from Manalili, La Consolacion's Human Resources Division Director, inviting her to a meeting
concerning her "working condition. The meeting was set the following day, September 30, 2011, at the office of
La Consolacion's President, Sr. Mora. In that meeting, Pascua was handed a termination of employment letter,
explaining the reasons for and the terms of her dismissal, including payment of separation pay. Not satisfied,
Pascua wrote to Sr. Mora, pointing out that the part-time school physician should have been considered for
dismissal first. She also noted that rather than dismissing her outright, La Consolacion could have asked her to
revert to part-time status instead. Thus, La Consolacion College of Manila through, Sr. Mora replied to Pascua's

45 Burden
letter and answered to her quires as a matter of courtesy. She explained that Pascua in particular was
retrenched because her position, the highest paid in the health services division, was dispensable. In the letter,
Sr. Mora stated that since the purpose of the downsizing was to reduced payroll costs, the employees with
highest rates of pay would be the first to be retrenched, if their services could be dispensed with. For this
reason, you were the employee terminated.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the reason cited for Dr. Pascua’s retrenchment that she had the highest rate of pay justified her
dismissal.

HELD:

Yes. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and back wages. Thus, the Court has ordered the reinstatement of the
employee without back wages considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a
penalty; and (2) the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. Likewise, the Court is convinced
that petitioner's guilt was substantially established. Furthermore, the Court upholds Labor Arbiter’s order for
respondent to be reinstated, but modifies the amount of back wages and to be employed on a part-time basis
from the effective date of her wrongful termination and is entitled to back wages corresponding to such status
and period.

RENANTE B. REMOTICADO v.
TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING CORP. AND ROMMEL M. ALIGNAY
G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 201846

DOCTRINE: There can be no case for illegal termination of employment when there was no termination by the
employer. While, in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show just cause for
termination of employment, such a burden arises only if the complaining employee has shown, by substantial
evidence, the fact of termination by the employer.
FACTS:
Remoticado's services were engaged by Typical Construction as a helper/laborer in its construction projects,
lastly at Jedic Project at First Industrial Park in Batangas. In the statements of witnesses, they recalled that on
December 6, 2010, Remoticado was absent without an official leave until December 20, 2010 and after that, he
informed the HR manager that he is resigning. The following day he was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He
protested, for a "separation pay computed at two (2) months for his services for two (2) years. Remoticado
resolved to sign and affix his thumb marks on a Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng Karapatan at Kawalan ng Paghahabol ,
a waiver and quitclaim. Remoticado filed an illegal dismissal complaint but was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter
citing that he voluntarily resigned. He appealed the decision but the NLRC denied the same. Finally, he filed the
present Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner voluntarily resigned or his employment was illegally terminated
HELD:
Petitioner has voluntarily resigned. It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to
prove that termination of employment was for a just cause. Logic dictates, however, that the complaining
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of termination by the employer. There can be no
illegal termination when there was no termination: Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that
the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from
service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
Petitioner did not disavow the waiver and quitclaim. It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and
releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In certain cases, however,

46 Cabrera
the Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employer is able to prove the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on
the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the
contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. v. Michael E. Jara

G.R. No. 204307, June 06, 201847

Failure of the company-designated physician to render a final and definitive assessment of a seafarer's condition
within the 240-day extended period transforms the seafarer's temporary and total disability to permanent and
total disability.

Facts:

Jara was hired by Orient Hope, on behalf of its foreign principal, Zeo Marine, as engine cadet on board M/V
Orchid Sun. The employment contract was for duration of 10 months with a basic monthly salary of US$230.00.
On its way to Oman, M/V Orchid Sun sank off Muscat on July 12, 2007, during which Jara sustained leg injuries.
He was treated at Khoula Hospital in Oman and thereafter repatriated and admitted on August 3, 2007 at the
Metropolitan Hospital in Manila. Jara was diagnosed to have suffered from "fracture, shaft of left ulna and left
fibula." On August 28, 2007 and January 9, 2008, he underwent knee operations. He did not return to the
company-designated doctor after his check up on March 17, 2008. Meanwhile, on March 6, 2008, Jara filed a
complaint with the Labor Arbiter, insisting that he was entitled to total permanent disability benefits amounting
to US$60,000.00. On May 29, 2008, Assistant Medical Coordinator Dr. Mylene Cruz Balbon of the Marine Medical
Services of Metropolitan Medical Center issued a letter, stating that based on his last follow-up, his suggested
disability grading is Grade 11 – stretching leg or ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint.

Labor Arbiter Daniel J. Cajilig found Jara entitled to compensation equivalent to Grade 11 disability. He solely
relied on the assessment of the company-designated physician. He found no evidence or other medical report
on record to dispute the company designated physician's determination and to support Jara's claim. The
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's award. Jara filed a Motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the NLRC. Insisting that he was entitled to permanent disability compensation, Jara
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its August 15,
2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that Jara was "entitled to permanent disability benefits because the
assessment of the company-designated physician that he was suffering from a grade '11' disability was issued
after nine (9) months or more than 120 days from the time he was medically repatriated.”

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Jara is entitled to permanent and total disability compensation considering that there
was a Grade 11 disability grading given by the company-designated physician.

Held:

The prevailing rule is that a seafarer's mere inability to perform his or her usual work after 120 days does not
automatically lead to entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits because the 120-day period for
treatment and medical evaluation by a company-designated physician may be extended to a maximum of 240
days. However, there must be a sufficient justification to extend the medical treatment from 120 days to 240

47 Pura
days. In other words, the 240-day extended period remains to be an exception, and as such, must be clearly
shown to be warranted under the circumstances of the case before it can be applied.

The case of Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp. stressed that for a company-designated physician to avail of the
extended 240-day period, he or she must perform some complete and definite medical assessment to show that
the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days, but not to exceed 240 days. In such case, the
temporary total disability period is extended to a maximum of 240 days. Without sufficient justification for the
extension of the treatment period, a seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and
total.

This Court summarized the following guidelines to be observed when a seafarer claims permanent and total
disability benefits:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability
grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without
any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative),
then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden
to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240
days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Accordingly, in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc., this Court declared that a partial and permanent
disability could, by legal contemplation, become total and permanent when a company-designated physician
fails to arrive at a definite assessment within the 120- or 240-day periods prescribed under Article 198 [192](c)
(1) of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation, implementing Book IV, Title II of the
Labor Code.

ABUDA v. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS

G.R. No. 200712, July 04, 201848

FACTS:

The workers of L. Natividad Poultry Farms filed complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, overtime
pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, and
moral and exemplary damages" against it and its owner, Juliana Natividad, and manager, Merlinda Natividad.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint due to lack of employer-employee relationship between the workers
and L. Natividad. He ruled that San Mateo General Services, Wilfredo Broñola, and Rodolfo Del Remedios were
the real employers as they were the ones who employed the workers, not L. Natividad. On appeal, the NLRC
found that the workers were hired as maintenance personnel by San Mateo and Del Remedios on pakyaw basis
to perform specific services for L. Natividad. The CA however modified the NLRC’s decision and ruled that San
Mateo and Del Remedios were labor-only contractors, and as such, they must be considered as L. Natividad's
agents. However, the CA upheld the NLRC’s finding that the maintenance personnel were only hired on a
pakyaw basis to perform necessary repairs or construction within the farm as the need arose. In this petition,
petitioners claim that as maintenance personnel assigned to respondent L. Natividad's farms and sales outlets,

48Orivida
they performed functions that were necessary and desirable to L. Natividad's usual business. They assert that
they have been continuously employed by L. Natividad for a period ranging from more than 1 year to 17 years.

In their Comment, respondents claim to be engaged in the business of livestock and poultry production. They
also aver to have engaged San Mateo's services to clean-up the poultry farm, and to repair and maintain their
chicken pens. Respondents likewise state that they engaged petitioner Del Remedios to provide carpentry
services. They assert that petitioners who claim to be maintenance personnel were actually carpenters or
masons deployed by petitioner Del Remedios for his own account. Respondents further assert that carpentry
and masonry cannot be considered as necessary or desirable in their business of livestock and poultry
production. They point out that petitioners, through petitioner Del Remedios, were only occasionally deployed as
needed to repair and maintain their farm and sales outlets as needed.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners as maintenance personnel in L. Natividad Poultry Farms can be considered as regular
employees.

RULING:

Yes. A regular employee is an employee who is: (1) engaged to perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, unless the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking
or where the work is seasonal and for the duration of a season; or (2) has rendered at least 1 year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity for which he is employed and his
employment continues as long as such activity exists.

De Leon v. NLRC instructs that "the primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer." The connection is determined by considering the nature of the work
performed vis-a-vis the entirety of the business or trade. Likewise, if an employee has been on the job for at
least one year, even if the performance of the job is intermittent, the repeated and continuous need for the
employee's services is sufficient evidence of the indispensability of his or her services to the employer's
business.

A careful review of petitioners' activity as maintenance personnel and of the entirety of respondents' business
shows that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to respondents' business of poultry
and livestock production.

As maintenance personnel, petitioners performed "repair works and maintenance services such as fixing
livestock and poultry houses and facilities as well as doing construction activities within the premises of L.
Natividad's farms and other sales outlets for an uninterrupted period of 3 to 17 years." At first glance it may
appear that maintenance personnel are not necessary to a poultry and livestock business. However, in this case,
respondents kept several farms, offices, and sales outlets, meaning that they had animal houses and other
related structures necessary to their business that needed constant repair and maintenance. While petitioners
may have been paid on pakyaw or task basis, their mode of compensation did not preclude them from being
regular employees. Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance personnel, enjoyed security of
tenure and the termination of their services without just cause entitles them to reinstatement and full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits.

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE

 G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 201849

FACTS:

To ensure road safety and address the risk-taking behavior of bus drivers as its declared objective, the LTFRB
issued Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 requiring "all Public Utility Bus (PUB) operators to secure Labor
Standards Compliance Certificates" under pain of revocation of their existing certificates of public convenience or
denial of an application for a new certificate. Later, the DOLE issued Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating
on the part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation system referred to in the LTFRB MC No. 2012-001.
DOLE D.O. No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for computing the fixed and the performance-based
component of a public utility bus driver's or conductor's wage. Following the issuance of the D.O. 118-12, Atty.
Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf of the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Integrated Metro
Manila Bus Operators Association, Inter City Bus Operators Association, the City of San Jose Del Monte Bus
Operators Association, and Pro-Bus, wrote to then Secretary of Labor and Employment Rosalinda Dimapilis-
Baldoz, requesting to defer the implementation of D.O. No. 118-12. The request, however, was not acted upon.

Meanwhile, in compliance with D.O. No. 118-12, the National Wages and Productivity Commission issued NWPC
Guidelines No. 1 to serve as Operational Guidelines on Department Order No. 118-12. NWPC Guidelines No. 1
suggested formulae for computing the fixed-based and the performance-based components of a bus driver's or
conductor's wage. On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition with Urgent Request for
Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, impleading the
DOLE and the LTFRB as respondents. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Department Order No. 118-12
and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, arguing that these issuances violate petitioners' rights to non-
impairment of obligation of contracts, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws. Particularly with
respect to Department Order No. 118-12, its provisions on the payment of part-fixed-part-performance base
wage allegedly impair petitioners' obligations under their existing collective bargaining agreements where they
agreed with their bus drivers and conductors on a commission or boundary basis. Respondents counter that
petitioners have no legal standing to file the present Petition considering that Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are directed against bus operators, not against associations of bus
operators such as petitioners.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001 deprive public utility bus operators of their right to due process of law.

2. Whether or not the DOLE Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001 impair public utility bus operators' right to non-impairment of obligation of contracts.

RULING:

1. No. It is undisputed that the DOLE created a Technical Working Group that conducted several meetings
and consultations with interested sectors before promulgating Department Order No. 118-12. Among
those invited were bus drivers, conductors, and operators with whom officials of the DOLE conducted
focused group discussions. The conduct of these discussions more than complied with the requirements
of procedural due process. D.O. No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are reasonable
and are valid police power issuances. The pressing need for D.O. No. 118-12 is obvious considering
petitioners' admission that the payment schemes prior to the Order's promulgation consisted of the
"payment by results," the "commission basis," or the boundary system. These payment schemes do not
guarantee the payment of minimum wages to bus drivers and conductors. There is also no mention of
payment of social welfare benefits to bus drivers and conductors under these payment schemes which
have allegedly been in effect since "time immemorial."

49Orivida
There can be no meaningful implementation of D.O. No. 118-12 if violating it has no consequence. As such, the
LTFRB was not unreasonable when it required bus operators to comply with the part-fixed-part-performance-
based payment scheme under pain of revocation of their certificates of public convenience. The LTFRB has
required applicants or current holders of franchises to comply with labor standards as regards their employees,
and bus operators must be reminded that certificates of public convenience are not property. Certificates of
public convenience are franchises always subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation. Additional requirements
may be added for their issuance, and there can be no violation of due process when a franchise is cancelled for
non-compliance with the new requirement. An equally important reason for the issuance of Department Order
No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 is to ensure "road safety" by eliminating the "risk-taking
behaviors" of bus drivers and conductors. This Court, in Hernandez v. Dolor, observed that the boundary system
"place[s] the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers—reckless because the measure of
their earnings depends largely upon the number of trips they make and, hence, the speed at which they drive."
In sum, Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are in the nature of social
legislations to enhance the economic status of bus drivers and conductors, and to promote the general welfare
of the riding public. They are reasonable and are not violative of due process.

2. No. Here, petitioners claim that Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001
violate bus operators' right to non-impairment of obligation of contracts because these issuances force
them to abandon their "time-honored" employment contracts or arrangements with their drivers and
conductors. Further, these issuances violate the terms of the franchise of bus operators by imposing
additional requirements after the franchise has been validly issued. Petitioners' arguments deserve scant
consideration. For one, the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual as provided in
Article 1700 of the Civil Code. By statutory declaration, labor contracts are impressed with public interest
and, therefore, must yield to the common good. Labor contracts are subject to special laws on wages,
working conditions, hours of labor, and similar subjects. In other words, labor contracts are subject to
the police power of the State.

As previously discussed on the part on due process, Department Order No. 118-12 was issued to grant bus
drivers and conductors minimum wages and social welfare benefits. Further, petitioners repeatedly admitted
that in paying their bus drivers and conductors, they employ the boundary system or commission basis,
payment schemes which cause drivers to drive recklessly. Not only does Department Order No. 118-12 aim to
uplift the economic status of bus drivers and conductors; it also promotes road and traffic safety.

MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE, INC. vs. MICHAEL PADERES ATRAJE

G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 201850

FACTS:

On February 11, 2014, Atraje entered into a Contract of Employment with Mol Ship to work on board the vessel
Carnation Ace as Second Cook. Atraje boarded the vessel on February 28, 2014. On March 4, 2014, Atraje
slipped and fell while holding a casserole containing water and sliced vegetables. His head hit the stainless
disposer and the floor. He had seizure and lost his consciousness for about five (5) hours. When the vessel
reached Singapore on March 8, 2014, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital, where he was diagnosed
to have suffered Epileptic Seizure with post-fit neurological deficit. He was declared unfit to work and
recommended to be repatriated. Atraje arrived in the Philippines and was referred to Shiphealth, Inc. for further
medical evaluation and treatment. Shiphealth declare that "the current symptoms of weakness and spasticity of
the left upper and lower extremities could be secondary to the (Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament).
Surgery was contemplated or, as an alternative, physical therapy for an indefinite period of time. The company-
designated physicians further stated that the cervical Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament may be pre-

50Orivida
 existing. However, slight trauma to the neck may cause symptoms which may qualify it as work-aggravated.
Atraje continued to suffer from shoulder and neck pain, and had difficulty in using his upper extremities. He
complained of tenderness on the paracervical area and was not restored to his pre-injury health status. He
consulted an independent specialist, Dr. Magtira, who issued on June 19, 2014 a Medical Report, which stated
that Atraje was permanently unfit in any capacity to resume his sea duties as a seaman. Atraje was referred to
Ygeia Medical Center, Inc. for second opinion. Dr. Lourdes A. Quetulio the Medical Director of Ygeia Medical
Center, stated that Atraje's illnesses are not work-related.

Atraje sought payment of disability benefits from Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship, invoking Article 28 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between All Japan Seamen's Union/Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's
Union of the Philippines, and Mol Ship, represented by Magsaysay Mol. This Agreement is otherwise known as
the IBF JSU/AMOSUP-IMMAJ CBA. However, Atraje's demands proved futile. Thus, he filed a Complaint against
Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's
fees.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

2. Whether non-referral to a third doctor will prejudice respondent's claim.

RULING:

1. YES. To be compensable, reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is sufficient.
“Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings.” This Court agrees with the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and the Court of Appeals that
respondent’s illnesses are work-related. Neither did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators’ award of permanent total disability benefits.

In Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., this Court summarized the rules regarding the duty of the company-
designated physician in issuing a final medical assessment, as follows:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification, then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the
burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days,
then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Here, the company-designated physicians clearly breached their duty to provide a definite assessment of
respondent’s condition. While the records show that reports were regularly issued to update respondent’s
medical condition, the particular treatment administered, and the medicines prescribed to him, they were
correspondences between the company-designated physicians and petitioners only. There was no indication that
respondent was furnished these reports.

Moreover, there was no declaration from the company-designated doctors about his fitness to return to work,
while his own physician advised him to refrain from undergoing strenuous activities. This Court has held that
permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness but the inability to do substantially all
material acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and
without material injury or danger to life. In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is
compensated but the incapacity to work. Respondent’s inability to perform his customary sea duties, coupled
with the company-designated physicians’ abdication of their primary duty to declare his fitness or unfitness to
work within the prescribed period, transforms his disability to permanent and total by operation of law.
 2. NO. Under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, "If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties." The assessment refers to the
declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability, as can be gleaned from the first paragraph of
Section 20 (A) (3). It presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with a valid, final,
and definite assessment on the seafarer's fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-
or 240-day period. In this case, the third doctor-referral provision does not apply because there is no
definite disability assessment from the company-designated physicians.

Respondent was kept in the dark about his medical condition. It is the height of unfairness, bordering on bad
faith, for petitioners to demand from respondent compliance with the third doctor rule when they and their
designated physicians, in the first place, did not fulfill their obligations under the law and the POEA-SEC. Given
the company-designated physicians' inaction or failure to disclose respondent's medical progress, the extent of
his illnesses, and their effect on his fitness or disability, respondent was justified in seeking the medical
expertise of the physician of his choice.

Petitioners were adamant in their position that respondent's disabling medical conditions are not work-related.
The third doctor rule covers only conflicting medical findings on the fitness to work or degree of disability. It
does not cover the determination of whether the disability is work-related or not. There is nothing in the POEA-
SEC which mandates that the opinion of the company-designated physician regarding work-relation should
prevail or that the determination of such relation be submitted to a third physician.

Bernardo B. Pacios, et al., vs. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan and Sister Valeriana Baerts, ICM.
GR No. 229579, November 14, 201851

FACTS:

Tahanang Walang Hagdanan is a private organization engaged in the business of producing and marketing
various handicrafts, utilizing employees who are mostly physically disabled, without one or both limbs. Sister
Valeriana Baerts (Baerts) is a nun who recruited Bernardo B. Pacios, Marilou T. Abedes, Alexis L. Elinon,
Armando V. Abedes, Gina P. Ariate, Vivencia N. Buela, Hermenigildo E. Cansino, Ernesto Davis, Alfredo G.
Delmonte, Jr., Roberto F. Esber, Adelaida S. Gabriel, Ines S. Genetiano, Ismael M. Ibo, Jr., Ronie C. Leal, Jaime
S. Mejia, Marcelino P. Penoliar, Carlos D. Oledan, Rodelio A. Osinta, Virgilio M. Torres, Antonio A. Viñas,
Jennette C. Viñas, Eric P. Andres, and Armando M. De Guzman (collectively, the workers) to work for Tahanang
Walang Hagdanan. They were among the regular employees who were persons with disability of Tahanang
Walang Hagdanan for years, until they were dismissed on June 11, 2012.

Sometime in 2013, the workers filed an "amended complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, non-
payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave, separation pay, retirement benefits, with claims for moral
damages, exemplary damages[,] and attorney's fees"5 against Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap
Sheltered Home for Disabled People, Inc. (Pangarap), Venus Amoncio (Amoncio), and Baerts. This was docketed
as NLRC-NCR Case No. 07-10328-12.

On October 24, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the workers, and ordered that Tahanang
Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts pay them P16,629,163.63.

51Larosa
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts appealed the Labor Arbiter's October 24, 2013
Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission. This appeal was dismissed for non-perfection because
the cash bond for the appeal was insufficient, amounting to only P40,000.00. Thus, Tahanang Walang
Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 and posted a surety bond
amounting to P1,622,916.37. The National Labor Relations Commission denied this motion, finding that
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts' initial P40,000.00 cash bond did not toll the
running of the 10-day period to appeal.

Thus, Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 136907.

In its April 27, 2015 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission February
25, 2014 Resolution. It reinstated the appeal of Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts in
the interest of substantial justice, finding that the cash bond of P40,000.00 and the supersedes bond of
P1,622,916.37 were sufficient and reasonable to perfect the appeal.
This was later affirmed in a minute resolution issued by this Court in G.R. No. 220666, and an omnibus motion
for clarification and reconsideration was subsequently denied.

In the meantime, before the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution on March 30, 2015 to implement the Labor Arbiter's
October 24, 2013 Decision awarding P16,629,163.63 to the workers.14 Thus, the cash bond in the amount of
P40,000.00 was released to them. Thereafter, they filed a Motion to Release the Supersedeas Bond. However,
Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, Pangarap, Amoncio, and Baerts opposed this because of the Court of Appeals
April 27, 2015 Decision reinstating their appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission.

On May 22, 2015, the Labor Arbiter issued a Resolution suspending the resolution of the workers' Motion to
Release the Supersedeas Bond, as well as all subsequent motions seeking its immediate release.

On June 2, 2015, the workers filed a petition before the National Labor Relations Commission, assailing the
refusal of the Labor Arbiter to order the release of the supersedeas bond. The National Labor Relations
Commission, however, did not order the release of the money collected.

Thus, the workers filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
142199.

The Petition for Mandamus was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 22, 2016 Decision. It cited as basis the
2011 National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule XI, Section 17, as amended in its En Banc
Resolution No. 011-12.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the suspension of the execution proceedings in NLRC
NCR Case No. 07-10328-12

DOCTRINAL RULING:

YES.

This Court notes that the basis used by the Court of Appeals to affirm the suspension of the execution was
incomplete. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Rule XI, Section 17 of the National Labor Relations
Commission Rules "explicitly mandates the suspension of the execution proceedings in case of total or partial
reversal of judgment by the Court of Appeals." It held that because its April 27, 2015 Decision reversed the
National Labor Relations Commission February 25, 2014 Resolution, suspension of the execution was mandated
under the rules. However, the Court of Appeals failed to note that under the Rules, the execution proceedings
should be suspended only "insofar as the reversal is concerned." This omission leads to an incorrect reading of
the rule and suggests that any reversal on appeal leads to the automatic suspension of execution of the
appealed decision. When used as basis for suspending execution, the rule requires an extra step, namely, the
determination of what part of the execution is affected by the reversal. The more relevant rule in this case is
Rule XI, Section 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules, which provides:

Section 3. Effect of Perfection of Appeal on Execution. — The perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of
the decision of the Labor Arbiter except execution for reinstatement pending appeal.

Under this provision, the perfection of an appeal stays the execution of a Labor Arbiter's decision. Thus, for
clarity, the Court of Appeals should have explained that because its April 27, 2015 Decision deemed
respondents' appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission as reinstated, the execution of the Labor
Arbiter's October 24, 2013 Decision was stayed under Rule XI, Section 3 of the National Labor Relations
Commission Rules of Procedure.

However, despite the applicability of Rule XI, Section 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules to the
factual circumstances before the Court of Appeals as of its assailed July 22, 2016 Decision and January 23, 2017
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 142199, the Petition must be granted.

This Court finds that the principles allowing execution pending appeal invoked in Aris are equally applicable here
as petitioners are poor employees, deprived of their only source of livelihood for years and reduced to begging
on the streets. In view of their dire straits and since the National Labor Relations Commission has already ruled
twice on the case in a way that supports the release of the supersedeas bond, it is proper to continue with
execution proceedings in this case despite a pending motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
July 22, 2016 Decision and January 23, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 142199 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The National Labor Relations Commission's cashier is DIRECTED to RELEASE to petitioners the amount
deposited by respondents as supersedeas bond. The Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to immediately CONTINUE the
execution proceedings in the case before him, and to ensure the speedy implementation of this Decision.

GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MS. JUDITH JOCELYN
MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
GOVERNANCE COMMISSION FOR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
UNDER THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT), MR. EMMANUEL L. BENITEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE GSIS FAMILY BANK), AND ATTY. GERALDINE MARIE BERBERABE-MARTINEZ
(IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE GSIS FAMILY
BANK),G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 201952

Officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters are covered
by the Labor Code, not the Civil Service Law. However, non-chartered government-owned or controlled
corporations are limited by law in negotiating economic terms with their employees. This is because the law has
provided the Compensation and Position Classification System, which applies to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, chartered or non-chartered.

FACTS;

52 sampani
 1. Some bank employees also filed their own Complaints before the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. They aimed to compel GSIS Family
Bank to abide by the provisions of their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.
2. On January 30, 2014, petitioner GSIS Union filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, asserting
that GSIS Family Bank is a private bank; thus, it is not covered by the provisions of Republic Act No.
10149. Petitioner contends that GSIS Family Bank does not perform functions for public needs since
it was created "by private individuals in their own private capacities pursuant to the provisions of the
Corporation Code, to advance their own private, personal[,] and economic or financial and business
needs or interests.
3. Petitioner argues that despite the Government Service Insurance System owning the majority of
GSIS Family Bank's shares of stock, the bank did not automatically fall within the ambit of Republic
Act No. 10149.] Further, the law's enactment did not automatically convert it into a government-
owned or controlled corporation or a government financial institution.
4. Petitioner cites Phil. National Oil Company-Energy Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Leogardo, which stated that
the employees of the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation, a
government-owned or controlled corporation incorporated under the Corporation Code, remained
subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
5. Petitioner stresses that as a private corporation established under the Corporation Code, GSIS
Family Bank and its employees are covered by the applicable provisions of the Labor Code, not the
Civil Service Law. Thus, the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and GSIS Family
Bank cannot be impaired by Republic Act No. 10149.

ISSUE;
Whether or not, the Officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations without
original charters are covered by the Labor Code, or the Civil Service Law?

HELD;
In disposing of the petition, this Court noted that for purposes of coverage under the Civil Service Rules,
it was only government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters that were covered:
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Thus,
RELATED LAWS;
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. "
In turn, the 1973 Constitution provided:
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations."
In National Housing Corporation vs. Juco (L-64313, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172), we laid down the
doctrine that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by
special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil
Service Law and not by the Labor Code.
However, the above doctrine has been supplanted by the present Constitution, which provides:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." (Article IX-
B, Section 2 [1])
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and negotiations is guaranteed by the
Constitution under Article XIII, Section 3:
SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The right to self-organization is not limited to private employees and encompasses all workers in both
the public and private sectors, as shown by the clear declaration in Article IX(B), Section 2(5) that "the
right to self organization shall not be denied to government employees." Article III, Section 8 of the Bill
of Rights likewise states, "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged."
While the right to self-organization is absolute, the right of government employees to collective
bargaining and negotiation is subject to limitations.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law.

In PCSO v. Chairperson Pulido-Tan, et al., the Commission on Audit disallowed the monthly cost of living
allowance being received by Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office's officials and employees.

This Court held that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office's charter does not allow its Board
complete liberty to set the salaries and benefits of its officials and employees. This Court emphasized
that as a government-owned and controlled corporation, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is
covered by the compensation and position standards issued by the Department of Budget and
Management and applicable laws.

Republic Act No. 10149 defines a non-chartered government-owned or controlled corporation as a

government-owned or controlled corporation that was organized and is operating under the Corporation
Code. It does not differentiate between chartered and non-chartered government-owned or controlled
corporations; hence, its provisions apply equally to both:

Furthermore, Republic Act No. 10149 directed the Governance Commission to develop a Compensation
and Position Classification System, to be submitted for the President's approval, which shall apply to all
officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether chartered or non-
chartered.

On March 22, 2016, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 203, which approved the
compensation and classification standards and the Index of Occupational Services Framework developed
and submitted by the Governance Commission.

When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in

government-owned or controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated that while
it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their employers, "the
Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or controlled corporations], whether Chartered or
Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their
[collective bargaining agreements]

Thus, considering the existing law at the time, GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted for refusing to
enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with petitioner as it lacked the authority to negotiate
economic terms with its employees. Unless directly challenged in the appropriate case and with a proper
actual controversy, the constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 10149, as it applies to fully
government-owned and controlled non-chartered corporations, prevail.
 OSCAR PARINGIT VS GLOBAL GATEWAY CREWING SERVICES, INC, MID-SOUTH SHIP AND
CREW MANAGEMENT, INC AND OR CAPTAIN SIMEON FLORES
GR NO. 217123, February 6, 201953

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Paringit entered into a six (6) month employment contract with Mid-South Ship and
Crew management Inc, representing Seaworld Marine Services, he was employed as Chief Mate of the
Panaman vessel Tsavliris Hellas.

Prior to his deployment, Paringit underwent a pre-employment medical examination, where he disclosed the he
had high blood pressure. Still, he was declared fit for duty. A few months later, paringit began to feel constantly
fatigued and stressed. He also noticed blood in his feces.

When the vessel was docked at the port of Las Palmas, Spain, Paringit was rushed to the intensive care unit of
Clinica Perpetuo Socorro, where he umderwent blood transfusion. Paringit was later on discharged from the
intensive care unit with a diagnosis of Decompensated cardiac insuficciency. Severe anemia. Renal dysfunction.
He was transferred to a regular room for further treatment and monitoring and was discharged from the
hospital. He was soon medically repatriated and arrived in Manila.

Paringit was admitted to the YGEIA Medical Center for evaluation and management. He Again underwent blood
transfusion and was palced on medication. Paringit, was discharged from the hospital with a working diagnosis.
The company-designated physician, prescribed Paringit’s medication snd advised him to return to the hospital
for his check-up. After his check up, Dr. Quetulio advised paringit to continue his prescribed medication and
referred him to a valvular heart specialist for further management.

Paringit consulted a valvolar heart specialist at the Philippine Heart Center who advised him to have a repeat 2D
echocardiogram and coronary angiography. Dr. Quetulio noted that parigit was a candidte for open-heart
surgery. She also advised him to continue his medication while waiting for his employer’s go signal on his
recommended procedures.Paringit underwent 2D echocardiogram, which showed that he had a severe valvular
problem.

Paringit was still waiting for his employer’s decision on his open-heart surgery.Dr Quetulio noted that paringit
hesitated to undergo the recommended open-heart surgery and wanted to undergo a herbal treatment instead.
After evaluating Paringit and reviewing the results of his laboratory examinations, Dr. Donato-Tan concluded
that with his heart condition, he would need regular medication, further laboratory procedures and periodic
check up with a cardiologist to prevent any aggravation of his illness. She declared him to be permatently
disabled and unfit for duty as a seaman.

Paringit filed a complaint for medical expenses and other money claims against Global Gateway Crewing
Services, Inc, Mid South Ship & Crew Management Inc, Seaworld Marine Services and Captain Simeon Flores
President of Global Gateway.

Dr. Quetulio informed Global Gateway that paringit seemed hesitant to undergo the recommended operation
and instead opted for herbal treatment. She also stated that Paringit’s heart condition was pre-existing, not
work-related.

Issues:
1. Whether or not compensability shall be determined solely by the nature of work
2. Whether or not the filing of the complaint prior to issuance of disability assessment is premature when
the company refused to respond to seafarer’s request for open heart surgery as recommended by the
physician.

53Roberto Lause
Ruling: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract defines a work
related illness as any sickness as a result of an occupational dicease listed under Section 32-A of this contract
set therein satisfied.

Paringit took medication to normalize his highblood pressure, but the working conditions and mandatory diet
aboard the vessel made it difficult and nearly impossible for him to maintain a healty lifestyle. He stressed that
he and the other seafarers were served mostly high fat, high-cholesterol and low fiber food aboard the vessel.

The SC likewise adhered to the factual finding of the LA that the Paringit, despite being hypertensive, was
declared fit to work in his pre-employment medical examination. Moreover, the poor food choices in his
workplace led or contributed to his heart decease. Paringit was declared fit to work prior to embarkation, hence,
there is no other conclusion than that he developed or his illness were triggered or aggravated on board and his
working condition precipatated his unknown illness hence, his deceases which are congestive heart failure,
hypertensive cardiovascular disease are work related or aggravated because the fats and chemicals in frozen
and preserved meats congested hid arteries. His stress caused peptic ulcer to him, Clearly, his illness are work
related aggravated.

MANUEL G. ACOSTA v. MATIERE SAS

GR No. 232870, Jun 03, 2019 54

In redundancy, an employer must show that it applied fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions
have to be declared redundant. Otherwise, it will be held liable for illegally dismissing the employee affected by
the redundancy.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the April 7, 2017 Decision and July 12, 2017
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140108.The Court of Appeals upheld the January 30, 2015
Decision and February 27, 2015 Resolutionof the National Labor Relations Commission, which had reversed and
set aside the Labor Arbiter's August 18, 2014 Decision holding petitioner Manuel G. Acosta's (Acosta) dismissal
illegal.

Matiere SAS is a French company "engaged m the fabrication, supply[,] and delivery of unibridges and
flyovers[.]

On October 29, 2008, Matiere SAS and the Department of Public Works and Highways executed a contract for
the construction of flyovers and bridges. On March 19, 2009, Matiere SAS also entered into a contract with the
Department of Agrarian Reform to construct bridges for better access to agricultural lands.

On November 1, 2009, Matiere SAS, represented by its resident manager Philippe Gouvary (Gouvary), executed
a Consulting Agreement with Acosta. Per the agreement, Matiere SAS engaged Acosta as its technical consultant
for 12 months, with a monthly salary of P70,000.00. Upon the Consulting Agreement's expiration, Matiere SAS
hired Acosta as its technical assistant with the same P70,000.00 monthly salary.

Under the Employment Agreement dated November 1, 2010, Acosta was tasked to:
1. Prepare reports regarding WCI [Woodfields Consultants, Inc.] consultants.
2. Be the intermediary between the CAD operators in WCI and the management in the office.
3. Attend coordination meetings with consultant.
4. Evaluate billings.
5. Follow the SIT and prepare reports.
6. Prepare various reports as required by the resident manager.
7. Site visits.

54 Rimando
On December 14, 2011, Matiere SAS wrote Acosta a letter, increasing his salary from P70,000.00 to P76,000.00,
effective January 1, 2012. On the same day, Matiere SAS wrote Acosta another letter,giving him a bonus of
P30,000.00 for his good performance in the second half of 2011.

On June 27, 2013, Matiere SAS sent Acosta a letterwith the subject, " Ending of the employment agreement[.]"
It read:
We have to inform you that your employment contract within the company MATIERE/EIFFAGE will end July 31,
2013.

This decision is due to the cessation of our delivery operations and the diminution of our activities. We cannot
find any reinstatement at the office. Nevertheless[,] we would like to thank you for your cooperation since the
01, November 2009.

You are authorized not to report at the office starting July 1, 2013.

Regarding the calculation of your separation pay, we will signify you the amount as soon as possible.
In a June 26, 2013 letter, Matiere SAS informed the Department of Labor and Employment that because its last
shipment had been delivered, it would have to terminate the employment of its five (5) workers: Wilson G.
Comia (Wilson), Richard E. Comia (Richard), Alexander M. Menor (Menor), Alvin P. Roselim (Roselim), and
Acosta. Matiere SAS stated that Wilson, Richard, and Menor were all based in Subic, while Roselim was based in
Cagayan de Oro. All four (4) of them were "assigned to the stripping operations[.]" Meanwhile, Acosta, who was
based in the office, was "primarily in charge [of] the monitoring of shipments."

On June 28, 2013, Matiere SAS filed before the Department of Labor and Employment: (1) an Establishment
Employment Report,citing redundancy and the completion of delivery of supplies as its reasons for dismissing its
employees; and (2) a List of Affected Workers by Displacements/Flexible Work Arrangements,enumerating the
five (5) dismissed employees. The employment termination was made effective on July 31, 2013.

On July 23, 2013, Acosta filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a Complaint for illegal dismissal
against Matiere SAS and Gouvary.

Mediation conferences were conducted but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. Thus, they were required
to submit their respective pleadings.

While the case was pending, Matiere SAS and Gouvary, through their counsel, wrote Acosta a letterdated July
29, 2013, offering him a separation pay of P322,998.60. Acosta, however, refused the offer.

In her August 18, 2014 Decision, Labor Arbiter Vivian Magsino Gonzalez found Acosta's dismissal illegal. She
held that Matiere SAS and Gouvary failed to prove the factual bases for the reduction of its workforce. She
pointed out that while Matiere SAS submitted a Certificate of Completion from the Department of Public Works
and Highways to support its claim of project completion, it submitted no such certificate from the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

Moreover, the Labor Arbiter noted that Matiere SAS failed to submit any redundancy plan. It also failed to
provide "fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are redundant and how the selection of
employees to be dismissed was made." The Labor Arbiter pointed out:
[I]f there are employees who should be affected by the reduction of workforce due to completion of deliveries,
the field engineers in-charge of deliveries in the projects, and who supervised the stripping works/removing the
unibridges parts from the container vans, may be the first ones to go. These field engineers, however, are
undisputedly retained by respondents.

. . . While Alvin Roselim is a forklift operator, [Wilson, Richard, and Menor] are helpers who work under the
supervision of field engineers. The latter were the ones in charge of deliveries and respondents may have had
reasons to terminate them on [the] ground of redundancy. As a Technical Assistant whose duties include
monitoring of projects until completion, there is no substantial basis why complainant was also affected by
respondents' redundancy plan.
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision read:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, complainant is hereby found to have been illegally dismissed. Respondent
Matiere SAS is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay with backwages totaling Php241,793.62,
inclusive of attorney's fees.

Other claims are dismissed for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission. Praying that
the award be modified to P1,846,389.44, Acosta argued in his Partial Memorandum of Appealthat the
computation of the Labor Arbiter's award should be based on his monthly salary before his employment
termination, which was P78,280.00.Meanwhile, in their Memorandum of Appeal, Matiere SAS and Gouvary
contended that Acosta's employment termination was valid and that they implemented the redundancy based on
fair and reasonable criteria.

In its January 30, 2015 Decision,the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
It found that Matiere SAS and Gouvary proved that there was a significant decrease in the volume of their
business when they presented before the National Labor Relations Commission a Certificate of Completion from
the Department of Agrarian Reform. It noted that the completion of the government contracts would render
unnecessary the services offered by Acosta, whose "main function was to monitor the delivery of materials . . .
from France to the Philippines."

The National Labor Relations Commission found that Acosta and the four (4) other employees were similarly
situated, noting that even if Acosta had a higher position, their tasks were all related to the shipment of
materials. Moreover, since Acosta's dismissal was not done with ill motive or in bad faith, Matiere SAS and
Gouvary's decision should be respected "as a valid exercise of a management prerogative.

The dispositive portion of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents Matiere SAS and Philippe Gouvary is GRANTED
and the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 18, 2014 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the instant complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Partial Appeal of complainant-appellant Manuel G. Acosta is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Acosta moved for reconsideration. He submitted a certification from Woodfields Consultants, Inc. and a
certification from the Department of Public Works and Highways to support his claim that his task was not
limited to monitoring shipments. He also alleged that Matiere SAS hired a certain Charlie Desamito as his
replacement.

In its February 27, 2015 Resolution,the National Labor Relations Commission partially granted Acosta's Motion.
It amended the dispositive portion of its January 30, 2015 Decision to include the payment of Acosta's
separation pay:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, complainant's motion for reconsideration is partially granted and the
dispositive portion of Our decision dated January 30, 2015 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents [Matiere] SAS and Philippe Gouvary is
GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 18, 2014 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Respondent-appellants are, however, ordered to pay complainant-appellant Manuel G. Acosta separation pay as
provided by law.

The Partial Appeal of complainant-appellant Manuel G. Acosta is DENIED. "

SO ORDERED.(Emphasis in the original)
Thus, Acosta filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
In its April 7, 2017 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied Acosta's Petition. It held that Matiere SAS and
Gouvary were able to establish that Acosta's position became redundant upon the completion of its contracts
with the Department of Public Works and Highways and the Department of Agrarian Reform. It added:
Even assuming that Acosta's functions included reporting and coordination, he completely failed to show that
these particular functions were not incidental only to the supply and delivery of the bridges. Acosta does not
dispute the completion of the shipments for the covered projects. Neither did he ever dispute that the DPWH
and the DAR projects were Matiere's only activities locally. It follows clearly that with the completion of the
shipments, Acosta's role became unnecessary. Despite the continuation of installation and erection of the
bridges, Acosta cannot pretend any involvement in such activities. His task was indubitably office- and table-
bound and not field work.
Acosta moved for reconsideration, but his Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 12, 2017
Resolution.

Hence, Acosta filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari against Matiere SAS and Gouvary. Maintaining that the
declaration of redundancy of his position was not based on fair and reasonable criteria, petitioner pointed out
that he, the most senior engineer, was dismissed while the other engineers remained.

As to the certifications from the Department of Public Works and Highways and the Department of Agrarian
Reform, petitioner states that the completeness of delivery merely pertained to one (1) of his tasks as technical
assistant. Thus, he claims that it was wrong to dismiss him based only on these certifications:
The supply contract of the Respondents could not have ended up upon completion of delivery. The supply
contract satisfies only the delivery of the Supply of Bridging Material. The design, technical supervision during
the erection, installation and commissioning were still ongoing and to be completed in 2016. Petitioner checks
on the designs of the Design Consultants, coordinate[s] with them, evaluate[s] their billings. Such activities were
still ongoing when the Petitioner was terminated.

It is important to note that contracts of the Respondents they entered with the DPWH and DAR comprise of the
following:
1. Supply of Bridging Materials.
2. Supply of Goods for the design, manufacture and delivery of modular steel unibridges.
3. Supply of Technical Advise / Services and Materials.
4. As well as variable services within the maximum provision for installation and commissioning of the
Bridges.
Beyond completeness of the delivery of bridging materials to the projects, other aspects of the contracts have to
be accomplished. The actual approved accomplishment for the design of DAR Bridges alone as of June 2013 was
only 16%, or 68 out of 418 bridges. Petitioner then was still doing the checking, coordinating with the
consultants and certifying billings of Woodfields Consultants, Inc[.] and Design Sciences, Inc. He could have
continued doing his assign[ed] tasks if not for his untimely and unjustified termination.Citation omitted)
In their Comment,respondents insist that they sufficiently established that petitioner's position was already
redundant.They cite the certifications from the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Public
Works and Highways to prove that "there was a significant diminution in the volume of materials
business."Claiming that the completion of the shipments rendered petitioner's position irrelevant, they argue
that he failed to prove that his other tasks were not merely incidental to his main function. Thus, they were left
with no choice but to legally dismiss him.

Respondents further argue that they did not dismiss petitioner in bad faith, contending that they complied with
labor law requirements in terminating his employment. They point out that he was given a notice of termination
with computation of his separation pay, and that the Department of Labor and Employment was also notified.
Lastly, respondents claim that petitioner did not deny that the shipments for their projects were already
completed. Neither did he dispute that respondent Matiere SAS' projects in the Philippines were only those with
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Public Works and Highways.[72]

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Manuel G. Acosta was validly dismissed
from employment on the ground of redundancy.
Redundancy is recognized as one (1) of the authorized causes for dismissing an employee under the Labor
Code. Article 298 of the Labor Code provides:
ARTICLE 298. [283] Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel . - The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,
the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Wiltshire File Company, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , this Court explained:
[R]edundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what
is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant
where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors,
such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service
activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has no legal obligation to keep
in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business. (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
The requirements for a valid redundancy program were laid down in Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission:
For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following
requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at
least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant and accordingly abolished
Assuming that respondents can declare some positions redundant due to the alleged decrease in volume of their
business, they still had to comply with the above-cited requisites. This, they failed to do.

Respondents complied with the first and second requisites. There is no contention that they notified both
petitioner and the Department of Labor and Employment at least a month before the planned redundancy.

Petitioner also received a computation of his separation pay corresponding to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service with additional payment for economic assistance.

However, as to the third and fourth requisites, this Court held that "[t]o establish good faith, the company must
provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required of the company,
and that fair and reasonable criteria were used to determine the redundant positions."

Here, respondents' only basis for declaring petitioner's position redundant was that his function, which was to
monitor the delivery of supplies, became unnecessary upon completion of the shipments. However, upon careful
scrutiny, this Court finds that the Employment Agreement itself contradicts respondents' allegation. Its pertinent
provisions read:
Dear Mr Acosta:

In connection with your position as Technical Assistant, please be informed that you are subject to the
following terms and condition:
1. . . . .
2. The Employee shall be employed in the capacity of Technical Assistant, the current duties and
responsibilities of which are set out in Schedule "A" annexed hereto and forming part of this agreement.
These duties and responsibilities may be amended from time to time in the sole discretion of the
 Employer, subject to formal notification of same being provided to the Employee.(Emphasis in the
original)
Under Schedule "A," petitioner's job description listed his tasks as a technical assistant:
1. Prepare reports regarding WCI [Woodfields Consultants, Inc.] consultants.
2. Be the intermediary between the CAD operators in WCI and the management in the office.
3. Attend coordination meetings with consultant.
4. Evaluate billings.
5. Follow the SIT and prepare reports.
6. Prepare various reports as required by the resident manager.
7. Site visits.
There was no mention of monitoring shipments as part of petitioner's tasks. If his work pertains mainly to the
delivery of supplies, it should have been specifically stated in his job description. Respondents did not even
present any evidence to support their claim or to contradict petitioner's documentary evidence. There was,
hence:, no basis for respondents to consider his position irrelevant when the shipments had been completed.

Likewise, respondents failed to show that they used fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions
should be declared redundant.

In Panlilio v. National Labor Relations Commission ,this Court held that fair and reasonable criteria may take into
account the preferred status, efficiency, and seniority of employees to be dismissed due to redundancy. Yet,
respondents never showed that they used any of these in choosing petitioner as among the employees affected
by redundancy.

Although he was among the five (5) employees dismissed, petitioner cannot be similarly situated with the other
employees. Roselim was a forklift operator, while Richard, Wilson, and Menor were helpers assigned to field
engineers. The four (4) employees work directly with the delivery of supplies. On the other hand, as already
discussed, petitioner's duty is not limited to the monitoring of deliveries. Accordingly, this Court declares
petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The April 7, 2017 Decision and July 12, 2017
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Matiere SAS is ordered to pay
petitioner Manuel G. Acosta the following:
1. full backwages and other benefits, both based on petitioner's last monthly salary, computed from the
date his employment was illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
2. separation pay based on petitioner's last monthly salary, computed from the date he commenced
employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year; and
3. attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.
The total judgment award shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to petitioner,
which must be paid without delay, and for the immediate execution of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 JULITA M. ALDOVINO v. GOLD
GR No. 200811, Jun 19, 201955

The clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" as reinstated in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 is unconstitutional, and has no force and effect of law. It violates due
process as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision and January
26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that Julita M. Aldovino (Aldovino), Joan
B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De Jesus (De Jesus), and Laila V.
Orpilla were all illegally dismissed from service.

Aldovino and her co-applicants applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development
Services, Inc. (Gold and Green Manpower), a local manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International
Development Company, Ltd. (Sage International).

Eventually, they were hired as sewers for Dipper Semi-Conductor Company, Ltd. (Dipper Semi-Conductor), a
Taiwan-based company. Their respective employment contracts provided an eight (8)-hour working day, a fixed
monthly salary, and entitlement to overtime pay, among others.

Before they could be deployed for work, Gold and Green Manpower required each applicant to pay a P72,000.00
placement fee. But since the applicants were unable to produce the amount on their own, Gold and Green
Manpower referred them to E-Cash Paylite and Financing, Inc. (E-Cash Paylite), where they loaned their
placement fees.

Once Aldovino and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan, Gold and Green Manpower took all their travel documents,
including their passports. They were then made to sign another contract that provides that they would be paid
on a piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary.

During their employment, Aldovino and her co-workers toiled from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. for six (6) days a
week. At times, they were forced to work on Sundays without any overtime premium.[9] Because they were
paid on a piece-rate basis, they received less than the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract.
When Aldovino and her co-workers inquired, Dipper Semi-Conductor refused to disclose the schedule of
payment on a piece-rate basis. Eventually, they defaulted on their loan obligations with E-Cash Paylite.

On January 19, 2009, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local court in Taiwan a
Complaint against their employers, Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage International.

On March 26, 2009, the parties met before the Bureau of Labor Affairs for a dialogue. There, Dipper Semi-
Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to the Philippines as it was no longer interested in
their services. They were then made to immediately pack their belongings, after which they were dropped off at
a train station in Taipei. After a few hours, a friend brought them to the Manila Economic and Cultural Office,
where they stayed for a week. They were then transferred to Hope Shelter, where they remained for four (4)
months while the case was pending.

Eventually, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement,[13] which read:

1. Event:
1. Reconciliation Part:

This issue is pertaining to the labor Case No. 86 of 2009 at Ban Qiao District Court, wherein Party A is
asking for the payment of salary, etc. from party B. This was caused by the differences in interpreting
the basic salary and the method in calculation of piece work salary. Both parties is hereby reach (sic) a
reconciliation.

55 Rimando
 2. Compensation Part:

With regard to the damages and fees incurred in the process of this controversy, Party B shall
voluntarily give monetary compensation to Party A.
2. Amount of Payment:
1. Amount of Reconciliation: NT$500,000.00
2. Amount of Compensation: On top of the fees incurred by Party A during the period Party A left the
company of Party B and waiting for going back to their home country, including board and lodging,
livelihood cost, the loss of Recruitment Agency's commission borne by Party A, airplane ticket, etc. Party
B shall pay another compensation of NT$1 Million.
3. Aside from this, Party A can't ask for compensation of any kind, and all the civil cases involved shall be
cancelled.
3. Mode of Payment
1. When this case reach (sic) reconciliation, Party B will pay to the appointed lawyer of Party A an amount
of NT$500,000 in cash in one transaction. This will be witness (sic) by the Philippine Labor Center.
2. Both parties will present the following civil and criminal case requests and affidavit of waiver to the
related agencies, lawyers of both will change the documents, and Party B will secure a RECEIPT AND
RELEASE/QUITCLAIM (as in attachment A) signed by TORZAR SIONY TARROZA, after which, Party B will
pay to the appointed lawyer of Party A an amount of NT$1 Million in cash in one transaction. This will be
witness (sic) by the Philippine Labor Center.
.

6. After the effectivity of this reconciliation agreement, Party A shall withdraw the case from the civil court of the
Taiwan Banqiao Local court, Party A shall bear the cost of civil proceeding.

7. After the effectivity of this reconciliation agreement, Party A shall give up all other rights of compensation.
They shall not ask for any compensation based on any other causes.
Based on the Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Release.On July 28, 2009, all of them returned to the Philippines.They eventually filed before the
Labor Arbiter a case for illegal termination, underpayment of salaries, human trafficking, illegal signing of
papers,and other money claims such as overtime pay, return of placement fees, and moral and exemplary
damages.

In its April 8, 2010 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for illegal dismissal but ordered Gold and
Green Manpower and Sage International to pay each of the workers P20,000.00 as financial assistance.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission, in its July 29, 2010 Decision, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
Decision. It found that Aldovino and her co-workers were not illegally dismissed and that they voluntarily
returned to the Philippines. Moreover, the Compromise Agreement barred any further claims arising from their
employment.

Additionally, the National Labor Relations Commission deleted the award of financial assistance for lack of
factual and legal bases.

Aldovino and her co-workers moved for reconsideration, but their Motion was denied for lack of merit in the
National Labor Relations Commission August 31, 2010 ResolutionHence, they filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari.

In its September 29,2011 Decision,the Court of Appeals reversed the labor tribunals' rulings. It not only ruled
that Aldovino and her co-workers had been illegally dismissed from service, but also declared that the
Compromise Agreement did not bar them from filing an illegal dismissal case.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered Gold and Green Manpower and Sage International to pay the workers
their salaries "for the unexpired portion of their contract in accordance with Section 7 of [Republic Act No.]
10022[27] and pursuant to Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. ,"mong others. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29,2010 and Order
dated August 31, 2010 of the NLRC in NLRC LAC (OFW-L) 05-000409-10, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International
Development Co., Ltd. are hereby ordered to reimburse petitioners their placement fee with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, and to pay the salaries of petitioners for the unexpired portion of their respective
employment contracts or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

SO ORDERED.[29]
Aldovino and her co-workers moved for partial reconsideration,praying that the three (3)-month cap stated in
the Decision's dispositive portion be annulled, pursuant to Serrano.[31] However, their Motion was denied in the
Court of Appeals' January 26, 2012 Resolution.

Thus, Aldovino and her co-workers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On June 15, 2012, respondents filed their Comment,[34] to which petitioners filed a Reply on September 5,
2016.[35]

Petitioners again question the three (3)-month salary cap stated in the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision. Citing Serrano, they assert that the three (3)-month cap in Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as reenacted in Republic Act No. 10022, has
already been declared unconstitutional.

Petitioners thus assert that they are entitled to the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.

On the other hand, respondents question the legality of the monetary damages awarded to petitioners. They
assert that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the parities' Compromise Agreement, pointing out that the
labor tribunals had already rendered it valid.The agreement, they further argue, released them from liability on
petitioners' other claims.

The chief issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas,
Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla are entitled to the
payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contract. Subsumed under this is the
issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022, which reinstated the three (3)-month cap, has the
force and effect of law.

To pass upon this issue, this Court must resolve the following:

First, whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against respondents Gold and Green
Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company, Ltd.,
and Alberto C. Alvina; and

Second, whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the reimbursement of
their placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Petition is meritorious.

It must be noted that this case is governed by Philippine laws. Both the Constitutionand the Labor Code
guarantee the security of tenure. It is not stripped off when Filipinos work in a different jurisdiction.We follow
the lex loci contractus principle, which means that the law of the place where the contract is executed governs
the contract.

In Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in
this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the
Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor
apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum's public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than
contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of
workers. . . .

. . . .

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and
by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage
illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.
Indeed, because petitioners' employment contracts were executed in the Philippines, Philippine laws govern
them. Respondents, then, must answer and be held liable under our laws.

Respondents claim that the Compromise Agreement barred petitioners from holding them liable for claims. This
is outright erroneous.

Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon for being contrary to public policy.
This is based on the recognition that employers and employees do not stand on equal footing.

In Land and Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo:

We have heretofore explained that the reason why quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public
policy, and why they are held to be ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights, is
the fact that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove
the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of a job, he had to face the
harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of
adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed
it. They are deemed not [to] have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.

Along this line, we have more trenchantly declared that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the
employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practices of the employer. The
basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore,
null and void. The acceptance of termination does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for
unfair labor practice acts.[47] (Emphasis in the original)
Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they are legally
entitled.[48] They are "ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel."[49] The law does not recognize agreements
that result in compensation less than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from
subsequently claiming benefits to which they are legally entitled.

In Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. v. Padilla, this Court held that quitclaims do not negate charges for illegal
dismissal:
The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous
employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees
from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The
acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The amounts already received by the retrenched
employees as consideration for signing the quitclaims should, however, be deducted from their respective
monetary awards.[52]
Here, the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement to terminate the case for underpayment of wages,
which petitioners had previously filed against respondents in Taiwan. The object and foundation of the
Compromise Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries and overtime premiums to which petitioners were
legally entitled. Hence, it should not be construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute other
legitimate claims they may have against respondents.

Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement, which stipulates that petitioners "shall give up other rights of
compensation . . . [and] shall not ask for any compensation based on any other causes cannot bar petitioners
from filing this case and from being indemnified should respondents be adjudged liable. Blanket waivers
exonerating employers from liability on the claims of their employees are ineffective.

Besides, at the time the parties' Compromise Agreement was executed, respondents had just terminated
petitioners from employment. Petitioners, therefore, had no other choice but to accede to the terms and
conditions of the agreement to recover the difference in their salaries and overtime pay. With no means of
livelihood, they signed the Compromise Agreement out of dire necessity.

II

Respondents further justify the dismissal by arguing that petitioners voluntarily severed their employment when
they signed the Compromise Agreement.

This argument is also untenable.

Under the Labor Code, employers may only terminate employment for a just or authorized cause and after
complying with procedural due process requirements. Articles 297 and 300 of the Labor Code enumerate the
causes of employment termination either by employers or employees:
ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
(a)
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
(c)
authorized representative;
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
(d)
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

ARTICLE 300. [285] Termination by employee. — (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the
employee-employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.
The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages.

An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the employer for any
(b)
of the following just causes:
1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee;
2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative;
3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the
employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and
4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing.
In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were validly dismissed rests on the employers.
Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is illegal.[55]

A review of the records here shows that the termination of petitioners' employment was effected merely
because respondents no longer wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just cause for dismissal under
the Labor Code. Employment contracts cannot be terminated on a whim.

Moreover, petitioners did not voluntarily sever their employment when they signed the Compromise Agreement,
which, again, cannot be used to justify a dismissal.

Furthermore, petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with substantive and
procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply with the
two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard.[56] Here, petitioners
were only verbally dismissed, without any notice given or having been informed of any just cause for their
dismissal.

This Court cannot rest easy on respondents' insistence that petitioners voluntarily terminated their employment.
Contrary to their assertion, petitioners were left with no choice but to accept the Compromise Agreement and to
go back to the Philippines.

After accumulating a huge amount of debt to work abroad, petitioners were burdened to continue working for
respondents that they were constrained to sign the piece-rate-based contract upon arriving in Taiwan. As a
result, they were paid less than if they were paid on a monthly basis and, worse, they were deprived of their
overtime premium. Petitioners inevitably defaulted on their loan obligations. To make matters worse, they were
terminated from employment on a whim and were left homeless.

One can only imagine how all these compounded a heavy burden upon petitioners. Overseas Filipino workers
venture out into unfamiliar lands in the hope of providing a better future for their families. They endure years of
being away from their loved ones while bearing a life of toil abroad. Our laws afford protection to our workers,
whether employed locally or abroad. It is this Court's bounden duty to uphold these laws and dispense justice
for petitioners. With their right to substantive and procedural due process denied, it is clear that petitioners were
illegally dismissed from service.

As a consequence of the illegal dismissal, petitioners are also entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. In Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines :
Moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or fraud or
constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public
policy. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are recoverable when the dismissal was done in a wanton,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Petitioners have sufficiently shown how bad faith attended respondents' actions. They were made to sign a new
employment contract on a piece-rate basis, which violates the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act.
Under that contract, petitioners were underpaid and deprived of their overtime premium.

Moreover, petitioners' employment contracts were unilaterally terminated. After their meeting before the Bureau
of Labor, respondents told petitioners that they were no longer employed. As the Court of Appeals noted,
respondents did not refute petitioners' narration that they were immediately escorted back to the factory,
ordered to pack their possessions, and were left at a train station.[59] Petitioners were forced to stay in shelters
for months without any means of livelihood. Worse, they were deprived of due process when they were
terminated without any notice or opportunity to be heard.

Being deprived of their hard-earned salaries and, eventually, of their employment, caused petitioners mental
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety. The award of moral damages is but appropriate.

Consequently, the award of exemplary damages is necessary to deter future employers from committing the
same acts.

Additionally, petitioners are also entitled to the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

. . . .

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid,
just and demandable claim;
. . . .

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers[.]
The award of attorney's fees is proper because: (1) exemplary damages is also awarded; (2) respondents acted
in gross bad faith in refusing to pay petitioners their hard-earned salaries in form of overtime premiums; and (3)
this case is also a complaint for recovery of wages.

In addition, we further sustain the Court of Appeals' ruling in having ordered the reimbursement of petitioners'
placement fees. As they were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause, petitioners are entitled to the
full reimbursement of their placement fees with interest at 12% per annum in accordance with Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022.

III

In Serrano, this Court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" under Section 10[61] of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection and substantive due process clauses.

Later, however, this clause was kept when the law was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7
of the new law mirrors the same clause:
SECTION 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Consistent with this mandate, the
NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment
and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers
and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this
section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less .

In case of a final and executory judgment against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically
disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment Program and
from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgment award.

Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of cases provided under this section shall subject the
responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall
be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;

(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or

(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.

Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such
official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the
provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles , this Court was confronted with the question of the
constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022. Reiterating our finding in Serrano, we ruled
that "limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both
a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution."[63] In striking down the clause,
we ruled:
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of protection
afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivized by the reinstated clause to enter
into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers' rights.
Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose
rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job
overseas for the longer contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left
with claims that are less than what others in the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore,
creates a situation where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to
the violator.
This case should be no different from Serrano and Sameer.

A statute declared unconstitutional "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."[65] Incorporating a similarly worded provision in a
subsequent legislation does not cure its unconstitutionality. Without any discemable change in the circumstances
warranting a reversal, this Court will not hesitate to strike down the same provision.

As such, we reiterate our ruling in Sameer that the reinstated clause in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 has
no force and effect of law. It is unconstitutional.

Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of salaries based on the actual unexpired portion of their
employment contracts. The award of petitioners' salaries, in relation to the three (3)-month cap, must be
modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 116953 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondents Gold and Green Manpower Management
and Development Services, Inc., Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and Alberto C. Alvina are
ORDERED to pay petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L.
Guinto, Revilla S. De Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla the following:
(a) the amount equivalent to their salary for the unexpired portion of their employment contract;

(b) the amount equivalent to their placement fee with an interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum;

(c) moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each;

(d) exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each;

(e) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective monetary awards; and
 legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum of the total monetary awards, except for the
(f) reimbursement of placement fee, which has an interest of 12% per annum, computed from the
finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

Claret School of Quezon City v. Sinday

G.R.No. 226358 November 19, 201956
Doctrine: This Court recognized that this is not a hard and fast rule. Judicial review in labor cases may also
resolve questions of facts "when the factual findings and conclusion of the labor tribunals are contradictory or
inconsistent with those of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Sinday narrated that she was hired for different positions for three years in the School fro. April 2010. Sinday
claimed that Fr. Manubag, the institution director of Claretech, signed a letter stating that she is considered as a
regular employee under the non-teaching or non-academic school employees. However, in May 2013, Claret
asked Sinday to sign a Probationary Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15,
2013. When the contract expired, she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of the
change in school administration. Sinday filed her Complaint, claiming that she had been a regular employee as
she performed various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of Claret.On the
other hand, Claret denied Sinday's claims averring that she was merely a part-time fixed-term contractual
employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its longtime driver. It also argued that
Sinday was well aware of her fixed-term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which
showed her employment's duration.
The Labor Arbiter found that Sinday was illegally dismissed. Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Sinday moved for reconsideration. the National Labor
Relations Commission denied her Motion. Aggrieved, Sinday filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission and found that
Sinday was illegally dismissed. Claret moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was denied. Claret filed before
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This Court required respondent to comment on the Petition.
In its comment Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent's employment
had a fixed term, there being "no day certain agreed upon.” It points to the Memorandum of Agreement signed
by respondent, which clearly indicate the period of her employment. For petitioner, it is apparent that he
employment was for a day certain. Petitioner says that it only accommodated respondent, despite being a mere
high school graduate, because she was the wife of their driver and the parent of their scholars.
In any case, petitioner maintains that respondent is validly dismissed for just cause considering the she was
found stealing relief goods. It claims that this was a serious breach of trust and confidence it had given
respondent, and a serious misconduct which reflects on her moral character. In her Comment, respondent
argues that the Petition is procedurally infirm because it presents questions of facts, which may not be resolved
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Issue:
Whether or not questions of fact may be resolved in this Petition.
Held:
Yes. In Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, this Court extensively explained the procedural parameters in a
petition for review for labor cases.As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, in a petition for review of a Court of Appeals'
certiorari decision in a labor case, this Court only resolves whether the Court of Appeals "correctly determined
the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the National Labor Relations Commission decision before
it, not on the basis of whether the National Labor Relations Commission decision on the merits of the case was
correct”:When a decision of the Court of Appeals under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by way of a
petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be decided upon. As held in Meaaralco Industrial v.
National Labor Relations Commission: This Court is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the rule that the

56GUTIERREZ,VINCENTJAVE
jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely
devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension
of facts. Besides, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court. When there is variance in the findings
of the labor tribunals, as in this case, it becomes imperative that we re-examine the facts to arrive at
the correct conclusion.