D.

 DEFENSES  OF  THE  COMMON  CARRIER  

(Full-­‐Text  Cases)  [b]  Carriage  of  Passengers  

BACARRO  v  CASTANO  

Appeal  taken  by  petitioners  from  a  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  affirming  that  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  
Misamis  Occidental,  the  dispositive  portion  of  which  reads:  

WHEREFORE,  judgment  is  hereby  rendered,  ordering  the  defendants  to  jointly  and  severally  pay  to  
the   plaintiff   the   sum   of   (1)   P973.10   for   medical   treatment   and   hospitalization;   (2)   P840.20   for   loss  
of  salary  during  treatment;  and  (3)  P2,000.00  for  partial  permanent  deformity,  with  costs  against  
the  defendants.  

The  facts  are  set  forth  in  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  from  which  We  quote:  

...  In  the  afternoon  of  April  1,  1960,  he  (appellee)  boarded  the  said  jeep  as  a  paying  passenger  at  
Oroquieta  bound  for  Jimenez,  Misamis  Occidental.  It  was  then  fined  to  capacity,  with  twelve  (12)  
passengers  in  all.  'The  jeep  was  running  quite  fast  and  the  jeep  while  approaching  the  (Sumasap)  
bridge  there  was  a  cargo  truck  which  blew  its  horn  for  a  right  of  way.  The  jeep  gave  way  but  did  not  
change  speed.  ...  When  the  jeep  gave  way  it  turned  to  the  right  and  continued  running  with  the  
same  speed.  In  so  doing  ...the  driver  was  not  able  to  return  the  jeep  to  the  proper  place  ...  instead,  
it  ran  obliquely  towards  the  canal;  that  is  why,  we  fell  to  the  ditch.  ...  When  the  jeep  was  running  in  
the  side  of  the  road  for  few  meters,  naturally,  the  jeep  was  already  inclined  and  two  passengers  
beside   me   were   the   ones   who   pushed   me.   I   was   pushed   by   the   two   passengers   beside   me;   that   is  
why,  when  I  was  clinging,  my  leg  and  half  of  my  body  were  outside  the  jeep  when  it  reached  the  
canal.  ...  My  right  leg  was  sandwiched  by  the  body  of  the  jeep  and  the  right  side  of  the  ditch.  ...  My  
right  leg  was  broken.'  He  was  rushed  to  the  Saint  Mary's  Hospital  where  he  stayed  for  about  two  (2)  
months.   'My   right   leg   is   now   shorter   by   one   and   one-­‐half   inches   causing   me   to   use   specially   made  
shoes.  ...  I  could  not  squat  for  a  long  time;  I  could  not  kneel  for  a  long  time;  and  I  could  not  even  sit  
for  a  long  time  because  I  will  suffer  cramp.  ...  With  my  three  fingers  I  am  still  uneasy  with  my  three  
fingers  in  my  right  hand.  There  is  a  feeling  of  numbness  with  my  three  fingers  even  right  now.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

From   appellee's   version   just   set   out,   it   appears   that   after   he   boarded   the   jeep   in   question   at  
Oroquieta,  it  was  driven  by  defendant  Montefalcon  at  around  forty  (40)  kilometers  per  hour  bound  
for   Jimenez;   that   while   approaching   Sumasap   Bridge   at   the   said   speed,   a   cargo   truck   coming   from  
behind  blew  its  horn  to  signal  its  intention  to  overtake  the  jeep;  that  the  latter,  without  changing  its  
speed,  gave  way  by  swerving  to  the  right,  such  that  both  vehicles  ran  side  by  side  for  a  distance  of  
around  twenty  (20)  meters,  and  that  thereafter  as  the  jeep  was  left  behind,  its  driver  was  unable  to  
return   it   to   its   former   lane   and   instead   it   obliquely   or   diagonally   ran   down   an   inclined   terrain  
towards   the   right   until   it   fell   into   a   ditch   pinning   down   and   crushing   appellee's   right   leg   in   the  
process.  

Throwing  the  blame  for  this  accident  on  the  driver  of  the  cargo  truck,  appellants,  in  turn,  state  the  
facts  to  be  as  follows:  

In  the  afternoon  of  April  1,  1960,  plaintiff  Gerundio  Castaño  boarded  the  said  jeepney  at  Oroquieta  
bound  for  Jimenez,  Misamis  occidental.  While  said  jeepney  was  negotiating  the  upgrade  approach  
of   the   Sumasap   Bridge   at   Jimenez,   Misamis   Occidental   and   at   a   distance   of   about   44   meters  
 therefrom,  a  cargo  truck,  owned  and  operated  by  a  certain  Te  Tiong  alias  Chinggim,  then  driven  by  
Nicostrato  Digal,  a  person  not  duly  licensed  to  drive  motor  vehicles,  overtook  the  jeepney  so  closely  
that  in  the  process  of  overtaking  sideswiped  the  jeepney,  hitting  the  reserve  tire  placed  at  the  left  
side  of  the  jeepney  with  the  hinge  or  bolt  of  the  siding  of  the  cargo  truck,  causing  the  jeepney  to  
swerve   from   its   course   and   after   running   14   meters   from   the   road   it   finally   fell   into   the   canal.   The  
right  side  of  the  jeep  fell  on  the  right  leg  of  the  plaintiff-­‐appellee,  crushing  said  leg  against  the  ditch  
resulting  in  the  injury  to  plaintiff-­‐appellee  consisting  of  a  broken  right  thigh.  

and  take  the  following  stand:  'The  main  defense  of  defendants  appellants  is  anchored  on  the  fact  
that  the  jeepney  was  sideswiped  by  the  overtaking  cargo  truck'  (Appellants'  Brief,  pp.  3-­‐4,  7).  

It   must   be   admitted,   out   of   candor,   that   there   is   evidence   of   the   sideswiping   relied   upon   by  
appellants.  ....  

This   appeal   by   certiorari   to   review   the   decision   of   respondent   Court   of   Appeals   asserts   that   the   latter   decided  
questions  of  substance  which  are  contrary  to  law  and  the  approved  decisions  of  this  Court.  Petitioners  alleged  that  
respondent   Court   of   Appeals   erred   (1)   in   finding   contributory   negligence   on   the   part   of   jeepney   driver   appellant  
Montefalcon  for  having  raced  with  the  overtaking  cargo  truck  to  the  bridge  instead  of  slackening  its  speed,  when  the  
person  solely  responsible  for  the  sideswiping  is  the  unlicensed  driver  of  the  overtaking  cargo  truck;  (2)  in  finding  the  
jeepney   driver   not   to   have   exercised   extraordinary   diligence,   human   care,   foresight   and   utmost.   diligence   of   very  
cautious  persons,  when  the  diligence  required  pursuant  to  Article  1763  of  the  New  Civil  Code  is  only  that  of  a  good  
father   of   a   family   since   the   injuries   were   caused   by   the   negligence   of   a   stranger;   and   (3)   in   not   considering   that  
appellants  were  freed  from  any  liability  since  the  accident  was  due  to  fortuitous  event  -­‐  the  sideswiping  of  the  jeepney  
by  the  overtaking  cargo  truck.  

We  are  not  persuaded.  The  fact  is,  petitioner-­‐driver  Montefalcon  did  not  slacken  his  speed  but  instead  continued  to  
run  the  jeep  at  about  forty  (40)  kilometers  per  hour  even  at  the  time  the  overtaking  cargo  truck  was  running  side  by  
side  for  about  twenty  (20)  meters  and  at  which  time  he  even  shouted  to  the  driver  of  the  truck.  Hereunder  is  the  
testimony  of  private  respondent  Gerundio  B.  Castaño  on  this  point:  

Q  At  that  time  when  you  rode  that  jeep  on  your  way  to  Jimenez,  you  said  that  the  
jeep  was  running  quite  fast  for  a  jeep,  is  that  correct?  

A  Yes,  sir.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  When  you  said  that  it  is  quite  fast  for  a  jeep,  do  you  mean  to  tell  this  Court  that  
the  speed  of  that  jeep  could  not  be  made  by  that  particular  jeepney?  

A  It  can  be  made  but  it  will  not  be  very  safe  for  that  kind  of  transportation  to  run  
that  kind  of  speed.  

Q  What  was  the  speed  of  that  jeep  in  terms  of  miles  or  kilometers  per  hour?  

A  About  40  kilometers  or  about  that  time  during  that  trip  per  hour.  

Q  And  you  said  also  that  there  was  a  cargo  truck  that  was  behind  the  jeep,  is  that  
correct,  while  you  were  already  approaching  the  Sumasap  bridge?  

A  Yes.  
xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  How  about  the  speed  of  that  truck  as  the  jeep  you  were  riding  was  approaching  
the  Sumasap  bridge?  What  was  the  speed  of  that  truck,  fast  or  not  fast?  

A  Naturally,  the  truck  when  it  asks  for  a  clearance  that  he  will  overtake  it  will  run  
fast.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  Now  comparing  the  speed  that  you  mentioned  that  the  jeep  was  negotiating  in  
that  place  and  the  cargo  truck,  which  ran  faster-­‐the  jeep  or  the  cargo  truck?  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

A  Naturally,  the  truck  was  a  little  bit  faster  because  he  was  able  to  overtake.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  Now,  how  far  more  or  less  was  the  jeep  from  the  bridge  when  the  truck  was  
about  to  or  in  the  process  of  overtaking  the  jeep  you  were  riding?  

A  When  the  truck  was  asking  for  a  clearance  it  was  yet  about  less  than  100  meters  
from  the  bridge  when  he  was  asking  for  a  clearance  to  overtake.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  Do  you  remember  the  distance  when  the  truck  and  the  jeep  were  already  side  
by  side  as  they  approach  the  bridge  in  relation  to  the  bridge?  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

A  They  were  about  fifty  meters  ...  from  fifty  to  thirty  meters  when  they  were  side  
by  side  from  the  bridge.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q   ....   You   said   before   that   the   jeep   and   the   truck   were   running   side   by   side   for   a  
few  meters,  is  that  correct?  

A  Yes,  sir.  

Q  I  am  asking  you  now,  how  long  were  they  running  side  by  side-­‐the  jeep  and  the  
cargo  truck?  

A  About  20  meters,  they  were  running  side  by  side.  

Q  And  after  running  side  by  side  for  20  meters,  the  jeep  and  its  passengers  went  
to  the  canal?  
 A  Yes.  

Q  You  said  on  direct  examinaton  that  when  the  jeep  (should  be  truck)  was  blowing  
its   horn   and   asking   for   a   way,   you   said   that   the   jeep   gave   way   and   turned   to   the  
right  and  did  not  recover  its  position  and  the  jeep  fell  into  the  ditch,  is  that  what  
you  said  before?  

A  The  jeep  did  not  recover.  It  was  not  able  to  return  to  the  center  of  the  road.  It  
was  running  outside  until  it  reached  the  canal,  running  diagonally.  

Q  When  the  jeep  gave  way  to  the  cargo  truck,  the  jeep  was  at  the  right  side  of  the  
road?  

A  Already  on  the  right  side  of  the  road.  

Q  And  this  jeep  was  running  steadily  at  the  right  side  of  the  road.  

A  Yes,  sir.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  When  the  jeep  gave  way  to  the  cargo  truck  and  it  kept  its  path  to  the  right,  it  
was  still  able  to  maintain  that  path  to  the  right  for  about  twenty  meters  and  while  
the  jeep  and  the  cargo  truck  were  running  side  by  side?  

A  Yes.  

Q  When  the  truck  and  the  jeep  were  already  running  side  by  side  and  after  having  
run  twenty  meters  side  by  side,  do  you  know  why  the  jeep  careened  to  the  ditch  
or  to  the  canal?  

A  I  do  not  know  why  but  I  know  it  slowly  got  to  the  canal  but  I  do  not  know  why  it  
goes  there.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  You  said  when  the  jeep  was  about  to  be  lodged  in  the  canal,  you  stated  that  the  
jeep  was  running  upright,  is  that  a  fact?  

A  Yes.  

Q  So  that  the  terrain  was  more  or  less  level  because  the  jeep  was  already  running  
upright,  is  that  not  correct?  

A  The  jeep  was  running  on  its  wheels  but  it  is  running  on  the  side,  the  side  was  
inclining  until  it  reached  the  ditch.  

Q   You   mean   to   tell   the   Court   that   from   the   entire   of   the   fifteen   meters   distance  
from   the   side   of   the   road   up   to   the   place   where   the   jeep   was   finally   lodged   that  
place  is  inclining  towards  the  right?  
 A  When  the  jeep  left  the  road  it  was  already  inclining  because  it  was  running  part  
side  of  the  road  which  is  inclining.  (Transcript  of  March  25  and  26,  1963).  

Thus,  had  Montefalcon  slackened  the  speed  of  the  jeep  at  the  time  the  truck  was  overtaking  it,  instead  of  running  
side  by  side  with  the  cargo  truck,  there  would  have  been  no  contact  and  accident.  He  should  have  foreseen  that  at  
the  speed  he  was  running,  the  vehicles  were  getting  nearer  the  bridge  and  as  the  road  was  getting  narrower  the  truck  
would  be  to  close  to  the  jeep  and  would  eventually  sideswiped  it.  Otherwise  stated,  he  should  have  slackened  his  jeep  
when  he  swerved  it  to  the  right  to  give  way  to  the  truck  because  the  two  vehicles  could  not  cross  the  bridge  at  the  
same  time.  

The  second  assigned  error  is  centered  on  the  alleged  failure  on  the  part  of  the  jeepney  driver  to  exercise  extraordinary  
diligence,  human  care,  foresight  and  utmost  diligence  of  a  very  cautious  person,  when  the  diligence  required  pursuant  
to  Article  1763  of  the  Civil  Code  is  only  that  of  a  good  father  of  a  family.  Petitioners  contend  that  the  proximate  cause  
of  the  accident  was  the  negligence  of  the  driver  of  the  truck.  However,  the  fact  is,  there  was  a  contract  of  carriage  
between   the   private   respondent   and   the   herein   petitioners   in   which   case   the   Court   of   Appeals   correctly   applied  
Articles  1733,  1755  and  1766  of  the  Civil  Code  which  require  the  exercise  of  extraordinary  diligence  on  the  part  of  
petitioner  Montefalcon.  

Art.  1733.  Common  carriers,  from  the  nature  of  their  business  and  for  reasons  of  public  policy,  are  
bound   to   observe   extraordinary   diligence   in   the   vigilance   over   the   goods   and   for   the   safety   of   the  
passengers  transported  by  them,  according  to  all  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  

Art.   1755.   A   common   carrier   is   bound   to   carry   the   Passengers   safely   as   far   as   human   care   and  
foresight  can  provide,  using  the  utmost  diligence  of  very  cautious  persons,  with  a  due  regard  for  all  
the  circumstances.  

Art.   1766.   In   all   matters   not   regulated   by   this   Code,   the   rights   and   obligations   of   common   carriers  
shall  be  governed  by  the  Code  of  Commerce  and  by  special  laws.  

Indeed,  the  hazards  of  modern  transportation  demand  extraordinary  diligence.  A  common  carrier  is  vested  with  public  
interest.  Under  the  new  Civil  Code,  instead  of  being  required  to  exercise  mere  ordinary  diligence  a  common  carrier  is  
exhorted  to  carry  the  passengers  safely  as  far  as  human  care  and  foresight  can  provide  "using  the  utmost  diligence  of  
very   cautious   persons."   (Article   1755).   Once   a   passenger   in   the   course   of   travel   is   injured,   or   does   not   reach   his  
destination  safely,  the  carrier  and  driver  are  presumed  to  be  at  fault.  

The  third  assigned  error  of  the  petitioners  would  find  fault  upon  respondent  court  in  not  freeing  petitioners  from  any  
liability,  since  the  accident  was  due  to  a  fortuitous  event.  But,  We  repeat  that  the  alleged  fortuitous  event  in  this  case  
-­‐  the  sideswiping  of  the  jeepney  by  the  cargo  truck,  was  something  which  could  have  been  avoided  considering  the  
narrowness   of   the   Sumasap   Bridge   which   was   not   wide   enough   to   admit   two   vehicles.   As   found   by   the   Court   of  
Appeals,  Montefalcon  contributed  to  the  occurrence  of  the  mishap.  

WHEREFORE,  the  decision  of  the  respondent  Court  of  Appeals,  dated  September  30,1971,  is  hereby  AFFIRMED.  With  
costs.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BACHELOR  EXPRESS  v  CA  
 

This  is  a  petition  for  review  of  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  which  reversed  and  set  aside  the  order  of  the  
Regional  Trial  Court,  Branch  I,  Butuan  City  dismissing  the  private  respondents'  complaint  for  collection  of  "a  sum  of  
money"  and  finding  the  petitioners  solidarily  liable  for  damages  in  the  total  amount  of  One  Hundred  Twenty  Thousand  
Pesos   (P120,000.00).   The   petitioners   also   question   the   appellate   court's   resolution   denying   a   motion   for  
reconsideration.  

On  August  1,  1980,  Bus  No.  800  owned  by  Bachelor  Express,  Inc.  and  driven  by  Cresencio  Rivera  was  the  situs  of  a  
stampede  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  passengers  Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut.  

The   evidence   shows   that   the   bus   came   from   Davao   City   on   its   way   to   Cagayan   de   Oro   City   passing   Butuan   City;   that  
while  at  Tabon-­‐Tabon,  Butuan  City,  the  bus  picked  up  a  passenger;  that  about  fifteen  (15)  minutes  later,  a  passenger  
at  the  rear  portion  suddenly  stabbed  a  PC  soldier  which  caused  commotion  and  panic  among  the  passengers;  that  
when  the  bus  stopped,  passengers  Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut  were  found  lying  down  the  road,  the  former  
already  dead  as  a  result  of  head  injuries  and  the  latter  also  suffering  from  severe  injuries  which  caused  her  death  later.  
The  passenger  assailant  alighted  from  the  bus  and  ran  toward  the  bushes  but  was  killed  by  the  police.  Thereafter,  the  
heirs  of  Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut,  private  respondents  herein  (Ricardo  Beter  and  Sergia  Beter  are  the  
parents  of  Ornominio  while  Teofilo  Rautraut  and  Zoetera  [should  be  Zotera]  Rautraut  are  the  parents  of  Narcisa)  filed  
a  complaint  for  "sum  of  money"  against  Bachelor  Express,  Inc.  its  alleged  owner  Samson  Yasay  and  the  driver  Rivera.  

In   their   answer,   the   petitioners   denied   liability   for   the   death   of   Ornominio   Beter   and   Narcisa   Rautraut.   They   alleged  
that  ...  the  driver  was  able  to  transport  his  passengers  safely  to  their  respective  places  of  destination  except  Ornominio  
Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut  who  jumped  off  the  bus  without  the  knowledge  and  consent,  much  less,  the  fault  of  the  
driver   and   conductor   and   the   defendants   in   this   case;   the   defendant   corporation   had   exercised   due   diligence   in   the  
choice   of   its   employees   to   avoid   as   much   as   possible   accidents;   the   incident   on   August   1,   1980   was   not   a   traffic  
accident   or   vehicular   accident;   it   was   an   incident   or   event   very   much   beyond   the   control   of   the   defendants;  
defendants  were  not  parties  to  the  incident  complained  of  as  it  was  an  act  of  a  third  party  who  is  not  in  any  way  
connected  with  the  defendants  and  of  which  the  latter  have  no  control  and  supervision;  ..."  (Rollo,  pp.  112-­‐113).i•t•c-­‐
aüsl  

After  due  trial,  the  trial  court  issued  an  order  dated  August  8,  1985  dismissing  the  complaint.  

Upon  appeal  however,  the  trial  court's  decision  was  reversed  and  set  aside.  The  dispositive  portion  of  the  decision  of  
the  Court  of  Appeals  states:  

WHEREFORE,  the  Decision  appealed  from  is  REVERSED  and  SET  ASIDE  and  a  new  one  entered  finding  
the  appellees  jointly  and  solidarily  liable  to  pay  the  plaintiffs-­‐appellants  the  following  amounts:  

1)  To  the  heirs  of  Ornominio  Beter,  the  amount  of  Seventy  Five  Thousand  Pesos  (P75,000.00)  in  loss  
of  earnings  and  support,  moral  damages,  straight  death  indemnity  and  attorney's  fees;  and,  

2)   To   the   heirs   of   Narcisa   Rautraut,   the   amount   of   Forty   Five   Thousand   Pesos   (P45,000.00)   for  
straight  death  indemnity,  moral  damages  and  attorney's  fees.  Costs  against  appellees.  (Rollo,  pp.  
71-­‐72)  

The  petitioners  now  pose  the  following  questions  

 What  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  whole  incident?  Why  were  the  passengers  on  board  the  bus  
panicked   (sic)   and   why   were   they   shoving   one   another?   Why   did   Narcisa   Rautraut   and   Ornominio  
Beter  jump  off  from  the  running  bus?  

The  petitioners  opine  that  answers  to  these  questions  are  material  to  arrive  at  "a  fair,  just  and  equitable  judgment."  
(Rollo,  p.  5)  They  claim  that  the  assailed  decision  is  based  on  a  misapprehension  of  facts  and  its  conclusion  is  grounded  
on  speculation,  surmises  or  conjectures.  

As  regards  the  proximate  cause  of  the  death  of  Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut,  the  petitioners  maintain  that  
it  was  the  act  of  the  passenger  who  ran  amuck  and  stabbed  another  passenger  of  the  bus.  They  contend  that  the  
stabbing   incident   triggered   off   the   commotion   and   panic   among   the   passengers   who   pushed   one   another   and  
that  presumably  out  of  fear  and  moved  by  that  human  instinct  of  self-­‐preservation  Beter  and  Rautraut  jumped  off  the  
bus  while  the  bus  was  still  running  resulting  in  their  untimely  death."  (Rollo,  p.  6)  Under  these  circumstances,  the  
petitioners   asseverate   that   they   were   not   negligent   in   the   performance   of   their   duties   and   that   the   incident   was  
completely  and  absolutely  attributable  to  a  third  person,  the  passenger  who  ran  amuck,  for  without  his  criminal  act,  
Beter  and  Rautraut  could  not  have  been  subjected  to  fear  and  shock  which  compelled  them  to  jump  off  the  running  
bus.  They  argue  that  they  should  not  be  made  liable  for  damages  arising  from  acts  of  third  persons  over  whom  they  
have  no  control  or  supervision.  

Furthermore,  the  petitioners  maintain  that  the  driver  of  the  bus,  before,  during  and  after  the  incident  was  driving  
cautiously  giving  due  regard  to  traffic  rules,  laws  and  regulations.  The  petitioners  also  argue  that  they  are  not  insurers  
of  their  passengers  as  ruled  by  the  trial  court.  

The  liability,  if  any,  of  the  petitioners  is  anchored  on  culpa  contractual  or  breach  of  contract  of  carriage.  The  applicable  
provisions  of  law  under  the  New  Civil  Code  are  as  follows:  

ART.   1732.   Common   carriers   are   persons,   corporations,   firms   or   associations   engaged   in   the  
business   of   carrying   or   transporting   passengers   or   goods   or   both   by   land,   water,   or   air,   for  
compensation,  offering  their  services  to  the  public.  

ART.  1733.  Common  carriers,  from  the  nature  of  their  business  and  for  reasons  of  public  policy,  are  
bound   to   observe   extraordinary   diligence   in   the   vigilance   over   the   goods   and   for   the   safety   of   the  
passengers  transported  by  them,  according  to  all  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

ART.   1755.   A   common   carrier   is   bound   to   carry   the   passengers   safely   as   far   as   human   care   and  
foresight  can  provide,  using  the  utmost  diligence  of  very  cautious  persons,  with  a  due  regard  for  all  
the  circumstances.  

ART.  1756.  In  case  of  death  of  or  injuries  to  passengers,  common  carriers  are  presumed  to  have  
been   at   fault   or   to   have   acted   negligently,   unless   they   prove   that   they   observed   extraordinary  
diligence  as  prescribed  in  Articles  1733  and  1755.  

There   is   no   question   that   Bachelor   Express,   Inc.   is   a   common   carrier.   Hence,   from   the   nature   of   its   business   and   for  
reasons  of  public  policy  Bachelor  Express,  Inc.  is  bound  to  carry  its  passengers  safely  as  far  as  human  care  and  foresight  
can  provide  using  the  utmost  diligence  of  very  cautious  persons,  with  a  due  regard  for  all  the  circumstances.  

In  the  case  at  bar,  Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut  were  passengers  of  a  bus  belonging  to  petitioner  Bachelor  
Express,  Inc.  and,  while  passengers  of  the  bus,  suffered  injuries  which  caused  their  death.  Consequently,  pursuant  to  
Article  1756  of  the  Civil  Code,  petitioner  Bachelor  Express,  Inc.  is  presumed  to  have  acted  negligently  unless  it  can  
prove  that  it  had  observed  extraordinary  diligence  in  accordance  with  Articles  1733  and  1755  of  the  New  Civil  Code.  

Bachelor  Express,  Inc.  denies  liability  for  the  death  of  Beter  and  Rautraut  on  its  posture  that  the  death  of  the  said  
passengers  was  caused  by  a  third  person  who  was  beyond  its  control  and  supervision.  In  effect,  the  petitioner,  in  order  
to  overcome  the  presumption  of  fault  or  negligence  under  the  law,  states  that  the  vehicular  incident  resulting  in  the  
death  of  passengers  Beter  and  Rautraut  was  caused  by  force  majeure  or  caso  fortuito  over  which  the  common  carrier  
did  not  have  any  control.  

Article  1174  of  the  present  Civil  Code  states:  

Except  in  cases  expressly  specified  by  law,  or  when  it  is  otherwise  declared  by  stipulations,  or  when  
the  nature  of  the  obligation  requires  the  assumption  of  risk,  no  person  shall  be  responsible  for  those  
events  which  could  not  be  foreseen,  or  which  though  foreseen,  were  inevitable.  

The  above-­‐mentioned  provision  was  substantially  copied  from  Article  1105  of  the  old  Civil  Code  which  states"  

No   one   shall   be   liable   for   events   which   could   not   be   foreseen   or   which,   even   if   foreseen,   were  
inevitable,  with  the  exception  of  the  cases  in  which  the  law  expressly  provides  otherwise  and  those  
in  which  the  obligation  itself  imposes  liability.  

In  the  case  of  Lasam  v.  Smith  (45  Phil.  657  [1924]),  we  defined  "events"  which  cannot  be  foreseen  and  which,  having  
been  foreseen,  are  inevitable  in  the  following  manner:  

...   The   Spanish   authorities   regard   the   language   employed   as   an   effort   to   define   the   term   'caso  
fortuito'  and  hold  that  the  two  expressions  are  synonymous.  (Manresa  Comentarios  al  Codigo  Civil  
Español,  vol.  8,  pp.  88  et  seq.;  Scaevola,  Codigo  Civil,  vol.  19,  pp.  526  et  seq.)  

The  antecedent  to  Article  1105  is  found  in  Law  II,  Title  33,  Partida  7,  which  defines  caso  fortuito  as  
'occasion  que  acaese  por  aventura  de  que  non  se  puede  ante  ver.  E  son  estos,  derrivamientos  de  
casas  e  fuego  que  enciende  a  so  ora,  e  quebrantamiento  de  navio,  fuerca  de  ladrones'  (An  event  
that  takes  place  by  incident  and  could  not  have  been  foreseen.  Examples  of  this  are  destruction  of  
houses,  unexpected  fire,  shipwreck,  violence  of  robbers  ...)  

Escriche  defines  caso  fortuito  as  an  unexpected  event  or  act  of  God  which  could  neither  be  foreseen  
nor   resisted,   such   as   floods,   torrents,   shipwrecks,   conflagrations,   lightning,   compulsion,  
insurrections,  destruction  of  buildings  by  unforeseen  accidents  and  other  occurrences  of  a  similar  
nature.  

In  discussing  and  analyzing  the  term  caso  fortuito  the  Enciclopedia  Juridica  Española  says:  'In  a  legal  
sense   and,   consequently,   also   in   relation   to   contracts,   a   caso   fortuito   presents   the   following  
essential   characteristics:   (1)   The   cause   of   the   unforeseen   and   unexpected   occurrence,   or   of   the  
failure  of  the  debtor  to  comply  with  his  obligation,  must  be  independent  of  the  human  will.  (2)  It  
must  be  impossible  to  foresee  the  event  which  constitutes  the  caso  fortuito,  or  if  it  can  be  foreseen,  
it   must   be   impossible   to   avoid.   (3)   The   occurrence   must   be   such   as   to   render   it   impossible   for   the  
debtor  to  fulfill  his  obligation  in  a  normal  manner.  And  (4)  the  obligor  (debtor)  must  be  free  from  
any  participation  in  the  aggravation  of  the  injury  resulting  to  the  creditor.  (5)  Enciclopedia  Juridica  
Española,  309)  

As   will   be   seen,   these   authorities   agree   that   some   extraordinary   circumstance   independent   of   the  
will  of  the  obligor  or  of  his  employees,  is  an  essential  element  of  a  caso  fortuito.  ...  
The  running  amuck  of  the  passenger  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  incident  as  it  triggered  off  a  commotion  and  
panic  among  the  passengers  such  that  the  passengers  started  running  to  the  sole  exit  shoving  each  other  resulting  in  
the  falling  off  the  bus  by  passengers  Beter  and  Rautraut  causing  them  fatal  injuries.  The  sudden  act  of  the  passenger  
who  stabbed  another  passenger  in  the  bus  is  within  the  context  of  force  majeure.  

However,  in  order  that  a  common  carrier  may  be  absolved  from  liability  in  case  of  force  majeure,  it  is  not  enough  that  
the  accident  was  caused  by  force  majeure.  The  common  carrier  must  still  prove  that  it  was  not  negligent  in  causing  
the  injuries  resulting  from  such  accident.  Thus,  as  early  as  1912,  we  ruled:  

From  all  the  foregoing,  it  is  concluded  that  the  defendant  is  not  liable  for  the  loss  and  damage  of  
the  goods  shipped  on  the  lorcha  Pilar  by  the  Chinaman,  Ong  Bien  Sip,  inasmuch  as  such  loss  and  
damage  were  the  result  of  a  fortuitous  event  or  force  majeure,  and  there  was  no  negligence  or  lack  
of   care   and   diligence   on   the   part   of   the   defendant   company   or   its   agents.   (Tan   Chiong   Sian   v.  
Inchausti  &  Co.,  22  Phil.  152  [1912];  Emphasis  supplied).  

This  principle  was  reiterated  in  a  more  recent  case,  Batangas  Laguna  Tayabas  Co.  v.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court  (167  
SCRA  379  [1988]),  wherein  we  ruled:  

...  [F]or  their  defense  of  force  majeure  or  act  of  God  to  prosper  the  accident  must  be  due  to  natural  
causes  and  exclusively  without  human  intervention.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Therefore,   the   next   question   to   be   determined   is   whether   or   not   the   petitioner's   common   carrier   observed  
extraordinary  diligence  to  safeguard  the  lives  of  its  passengers.  

In  this  regard  the  trial  court  and  the  appellate  court  arrived  at  conflicting  factual  findings.  

The  trial  court  found  the  following  facts:  

The   parties   presented   conflicting   evidence   as   to   how   the   two   deceased   Narcisa   Rautruat   and  
Ornominio  Beter  met  their  deaths.  

However,   from   the   evidence   adduced   by   the   plaintiffs,   the   Court   could   not   see   why   the   two  
deceased  could  have  fallen  off  the  bus  when  their  own  witnesses  testified  that  when  the  commotion  
ensued  inside  the  bus,  the  passengers  pushed  and  shoved  each  other  towards  the  door  apparently  
in   order   to   get   off   from   the   bus   through   the  door.   But   the   passengers   also   could   not   pass   through  
the  door  because  according  to  the  evidence  the  door  was  locked.  

On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  is  inclined  to  give  credence  to  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  defendants  
that  when  the  commotion  ensued  inside  the  bus,  the  two  deceased  panicked  and,  in  state  of  shock  
and  fear,  they  jumped  off  from  the  bus  by  passing  through  the  window.  

It  is  the  prevailing  rule  and  settled  jurisprudence  that  transportation  companies  are  not  insurers  of  
their  passengers.  The  evidence  on  record  does  not  show  that  defendants'  personnel  were  negligent  
in   their   duties.   The   defendants'   personnel   have   every   right   to   accept   passengers   absent   any  
manifestation   of   violence   or   drunkenness.   If   and   when   such   passengers   harm   other   passengers  
without  the  knowledge  of  the  transportation  company's  personnel,  the  latter  should  not  be  faulted.  
(Rollo,  pp.  46-­‐47)  

A  thorough  examination  of  the  records,  however,  show  that  there  are  material  facts  ignored  by  the  trial  court  which  
were  discussed  by  the  appellate  court  to  arrive  at  a  different  conclusion.  These  circumstances  show  that  the  petitioner  
common  carrier  was  negligent  in  the  provision  of  safety  precautions  so  that  its  passengers  may  be  transported  safely  
to  their  destinations.  The  appellate  court  states:  

A   critical   eye   must   be   accorded   the   lower   court's   conclusions   of   fact   in   its   tersely   written   ratio  
decidendi.  The  lower  court  concluded  that  the  door  of  the  bus  was  closed;  secondly,  the  passengers,  
specifically  the  two  deceased,  jumped  out  of  the  window.  The  lower  court  therefore  concluded  that  
the   defendant   common   carrier   is   not   liable   for   the   death   of   the   said   passengers   which   it   implicitly  
attributed  to  the  unforeseen  acts  of  the  unidentified  passenger  who  went  amuck.  

There  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  support  the  conclusion  that  the  solitary  door  of  the  bus  was  locked  
as   to   prevent   the   passengers   from   passing   through.   Leonila   Cullano,   testifying   for   the   defense,  
clearly  stated  that  the  conductor  opened  the  door  when  the  passengers  were  shouting  that  the  bus  
stop  while  they  were  in  a  state  of  panic.  Sergia  Beter  categorically  stated  that  she  actually  saw  her  
son  fall  from  the  bus  as  the  door  was  forced  open  by  the  force  of  the  onrushing  passengers.  

Pedro   Collango,   on   the   other   hand,   testified   that   he   shut   the   door   after   the   last   passenger   had  
boarded  the  bus.  But  he  had  quite  conveniently  neglected  to  say  that  when  the  passengers  had  
panicked,  he  himself  panicked  and  had  gone  to  open  the  door.  Portions  of  the  testimony  of  Leonila  
Cullano,  quoted  below,  are  illuminating:  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  When  you  said  the  conductor  opened  the  door,  the  door  at  the  front  or  rear  portion  of  the  bus?  

A  Front  door.  

Q  And  these  two  persons  whom  you  said  alighted,  where  did  they  pass,  the  fron(t)  door  or  rear  
door?  

A  Front  door.  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

(Tsn.,  p.  4,  Aug.  8,  1984)  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  What  happened  after  there  was  a  commotion  at  the  rear  portion  of  the  bus?  

A  When  the  commotion  occurred,  I  stood  up  and  I  noticed  that  there  was  a  passenger  who  was  
sounded   (sic).   The   conductor   panicked   because   the   passengers   were   shouting   'stop,   stop'.   The  
conductor  opened  the  bus.'  

(Tsn.  p.  3,  August  8,  1984).  

Accordingly,   there   is   no   reason   to   believe   that   the   deceased   passengers   jumped   from   the   window  
when  it  was  entirely  possible  for  them  to  have  alighted  through  the  door.  The  lower  court's  reliance  
on   the   testimony   of   Pedro   Collango,   as   the   conductor   and   employee   of   the   common   carrier,   is  
unjustified,  in  the  light  of  the  clear  testimony  of  Leonila  Cullano  as  the  sole  uninterested  eyewitness  
of  the  entire  episode.  Instead  we  find  Pedro  Collango's  testimony  to  be  infused  by  bias  and  fraught  
with   inconsistencies,   if   not   notably   unreliable   for   lack   of   veracity.   On   direct   examination,   he  
testified:  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

Q  So  what  happened  to  the  passengers  inside  your  bus?  

A  Some  of  the  passengers  jumped  out  of  the  window.  

COURT:  

Q  While  the  bus  was  in  motion?  

A  Yes,  your  Honor,  but  the  speed  was  slow  because  we  have  just  picked  up  a  passenger.  

Atty.  Gambe:  

Q  You  said  that  at  the  time  of  the  incident  the  bus  was  running  slow  because  you  have  just  picked  
up  a  passenger.  Can  you  estimate  what  was  your  speed  at  that  time?  

Atty.  Calo:  

No  basis,  your  Honor,  he  is  neither  a  driver  nor  a  conductor.  

COURT:  

Let  the  witness  answer.  Estimate  only,  the  conductor  experienced.  

Witness:  

Not  less  than  30  to  40  miles.  

COURT:  

Kilometers  or  miles?  

A  Miles.  

Atty.  Gambe:  

Q  That  is  only  your  estimate  by  your  experience?  

A  Yes,  sir,  estimate.  

(Tsn.,  pp.  4-­‐5,  Oct.  17,  1983).  

At   such   speed   of   not   less   than   30   to   40   miles   ...,   or   about   48   to   65   kilometers   per   hour,   the   speed  
of  the  bus  could  scarcely  be  considered  slow  considering  that  according  to  Collango  himself,  the  bus  
 had  just  come  from  a  full  stop  after  picking  a  passenger  (Tsn,  p.  4,  Id.)  and  that  the  bus  was  still  on  
its  second  or  third  gear  (Tsn.,  p.  12,  Id.).  

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  the  negligence  of  the  common  carrier,  through  its  employees,  consisted  
of   the   lack   of   extraordinary   diligence   required   of   common   carriers,   in   exercising   vigilance   and  
utmost  care  of  the  safety  of  its  passengers,  exemplified  by  the  driver's  belated  stop  and  the  reckless  
opening   of   the   doors   of   the   bus   while   the   same   was   travelling   at   an   appreciably   fast   speed.   At   the  
same  time,  the  common  carrier  itself  acknowledged,  through  its  administrative  officer,  Benjamin  
Granada,  that  the  bus  was  commissioned  to  travel  and  take  on  passengers  and  the  public  at  large,  
while  equipped  with  only  a  solitary  door  for  a  bus  its  size  and  loading  capacity,  in  contravention  of  
rules   and   regulations   provided   for   under   the   Land   Transportation   and   Traffic   Code   (RA   4136   as  
amended.)  (Rollo,  pp.  23-­‐26)  

Considering  the  factual  findings  of  the  Court  of  Appeals-­‐the  bus  driver  did  not  immediately  stop  the  bus  at  the  height  
of   the   commotion;   the   bus   was   speeding   from   a   full   stop;   the   victims   fell   from   the   bus   door   when   it   was   opened   or  
gave  way  while  the  bus  was  still  running;  the  conductor  panicked  and  blew  his  whistle  after  people  had  already  fallen  
off  the  bus;  and  the  bus  was  not  properly  equipped  with  doors  in  accordance  with  law-­‐it  is  clear  that  the  petitioners  
have  failed  to  overcome  the  presumption  of  fault  and  negligence  found  in  the  law  governing  common  carriers.  

The  petitioners'  argument  that  the  petitioners  "are  not  insurers  of  their  passengers"  deserves  no  merit  in  view  of  the  
failure  of  the  petitioners  to  prove  that  the  deaths  of  the  two  passengers  were  exclusively  due  to  force  majeure  and  
not   to   the   failure   of   the   petitioners   to   observe   extraordinary   diligence   in  transporting   safely   the   passengers   to   their  
destinations  as  warranted  by  law.  (See  Batangas  Laguna  Tayabas  Co.  v.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court,  supra).  

The  petitioners  also  contend  that  the  private  respondents  failed  to  show  to  the  court  that  they  are  the  parents  of  
Ornominio  Beter  and  Narcisa  Rautraut  respectively  and  therefore  have  no  legal  personality  to  sue  the  petitioners.  This  
argument  deserves  scant  consideration.  We  find  this  argument  a  belated  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  petitioners  to  
avoid  liability  for  the  deaths  of  Beter  and  Rautraut.  The  private  respondents  were  Identified  as  the  parents  of  the  
victims   by   witnesses   during   the   trial   and   the   trial   court   recognized   them   as   such.   The   trial   court   dismissed   the  
complaint  solely  on  the  ground  that  the  petitioners  were  not  negligent.  

Finally,  the  amount  of  damages  awarded  to  the  heirs  of  Beter  and  Rautraut  by  the  appellate  court  is  supported  by  the  
evidence.  The  appellate  court  stated:  

Ornominio  Beter  was  32  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  his  death,  single,  in  good  health  and  rendering  
support   and   service   to   his   mother.   As   far   as   Narcisa   Rautraut   is   concerned,   the   only   evidence  
adduced  is  to  the  effect  that  at  her  death,  she  was  23  years  of  age,  in  good  health  and  without  
visible  means  of  support.  

In   accordance   with   Art.   1764   in   conjunction   with   Art.   2206   of   the   Civil   Code,   and   established  
jurisprudence,  several  factors  may  be  considered  in  determining  the  award  of  damages,  namely:  1)  
life  expectancy  (considering  the  state  of  health  of  the  deceased  and  the  mortality  tables  are  deemed  
conclusive)  and  loss  of  earning  capacity;  (2)  pecuniary  loss,  loss  of  support  and  service;  and  (3)  moral  
and  mental  suffering  (Alcantara,  et  al.  v.  Surro,  et  al.,  93  Phil.  470).  

In  the  case  of  People  v.  Daniel  (No.  L-­‐66551,  April  25,  1985,  136  SCRA  92,  at  page  104),  the  High  
Tribunal,  reiterating  the  rule  in  Villa  Rey  Transit,  Inc.  v.  Court  of  Appeals  (31  SCRA  511),  stated  that  
the  amount  of  loss  of  earring  capacity  is  based  mainly  on  two  factors,  namely,  (1)  the  number  of  
years  on  the  basis  of  which  the  damages  shall  be  computed;  and  (2)  the  rate  at  which  the  losses  
sustained  by  the  heirs  should  be  fixed.  
 As  the  formula  adopted  in  the  case  of  Davila  v.  Philippine  Air  Lines,  49  SCRA  497,  at  the  age  of  30  
one's   normal  life   expectancy  is  33-­‐1/3  years  based  on  the  American  Expectancy  Table  of  Mortality  
(2/3  x  80-­‐32).i•t•c-­‐aüsl  By  taking  into  account  the  pace  and  nature  of  the  life  of  a  carpenter,  it  is  
reasonable   to   make   allowances   for   these   circumstances   and   reduce   the   life   expectancy   of   the  
deceased  Ornominio  Beter  to  25  years  (People  v.  Daniel,  supra).  To  fix  the  rate  of  losses  it  must  be  
noted  that  Art.  2206  refers  to  gross  earnings  less  necessary  living  expenses  of  the  deceased,  in  other  
words,  only  net  earnings  are  to  be  considered  (People  v.  Daniel,  supra;  Villa  Rey  Transit,  Inc.  v.  Court  
of  Appeals,  supra).  

Applying   the   foregoing   rules   with   respect   to   Ornominio   Beter,   it   is   both   just   and   reasonable,  
considering  his  social  standing  and  position,  to  fix  the  deductible,  living  and  incidental  expenses  at  
the   sum   of   Four   Hundred   Pesos   (P400.00)   a   month,   or   Four   Thousand   Eight   Hundred   Pesos  
(P4,800.00)  annually.  As  to  his  income,  considering  the  irregular  nature  of  the  work  of  a  daily  wage  
carpenter   which   is   seasonal,   it   is   safe   to   assume   that   he   shall   have   work   for   twenty   (20)   days   a  
month  at  Twenty  Five  Pesos  (P150,000.00)  for  twenty  five  years.  Deducting  therefrom  his  necessary  
expenses,  his  heirs  would  be  entitled  to  Thirty  Thousand  Pesos  (P30,000.00)  representing  loss  of  
support   and   service   (P150,000.00   less   P120,000.00).   In   addition,   his   heirs   are   entitled   to   Thirty  
Thousand  Pesos  (P30,000.00)  as  straight  death  indemnity  pursuant  to  Article  2206  (People  v.  Daniel,  
supra).  For  damages  for  their  moral  and  mental  anguish,  his  heirs  are  entitled  to  the  reasonable  
sum  of  P10,000.00  as  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  against  moral  damages  in  case  of  breach  of  
contract  rule  Art.  2200  (Necesito  v.  Paras,  104  Phil.  75).  As  attorney's  fees,  Beter's  heirs  are  entitled  
to   P5,000.00.   All   in   all,   the   plaintiff-­‐appellants   Ricardo   and   Sergia   Beter   as   heirs   of   their   son  
Ornominio  are  entitled  to  an  indemnity  of  Seventy  Five  Thousand  Pesos  (P75,000.00).  

In   the   case   of   Narcisa   Rautraut,   her   heirs   are   entitled   to   a   straight   death   indemnity   of   Thirty  
Thousand  Pesos  (P30,000.00),  to  moral  damages  in  the  amount  of  Ten  Thousand  Pesos  (P10,000.00)  
and  Five  Thousand  Pesos  (P5,000.00)  as  attorney's  fees,  or  a  total  of  Forty  Five  Thousand  Pesos  
(P45,000.00)  as  total  indemnity  for  her  death  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  that  she  had  visible  
means  of  support.  (Rollo,  pp.  30-­‐31)  

WHEREFORE,  the  instant  petition  is  DISMISSED.  The  questioned  decision  dated  May  19,  1988  and  the  resolution  dated  
August  1,  1988  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  are  AFFIRMED.  

SO  ORDERED.  

 
 SILVERIO  v  MENDOZA  

Petitioners,  the  driver  of  the  passenger  bus  responsible  for  the  injuries  sustained  by  respondent  for  which  he  was  duly  
prosecuted   and   thereafter   convicted   for   serious,   less   serious,   and   slight   physical   injuries,   and   the   bus   firm,   the  
Philippine  Rabbit  Bus  Lines,  seek  the  reversal  of  a  Court  of  Appeals  decision  of  December  14,  1964  and  a  resolution  of  
March  31,  1965,  holding  them  liable   both  for   compensatory   and   exemplary   damages   as   well   as   attorney's   fees.  It   is  
the  contention  of  petitioners  that  errors  of  law  were  committed  when,  in  the  aforesaid  decision,  it  was  held  that  there  
was  an  implied  contract  of  carriage  between  the  petitioner  bus  firm  and  respondents,  the  breach  of  which  was  the  
occasion  for  their  liability  for  compensatory  and  exemplary  damages  as  well  as  attorneys  fees.  

The  facts  as  found  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  follow:  "In  the  evening  of  February  22,  1954,  between  9:00  and  9:30  o'clock,  
a   passenger   bus   No.   141   of   the   Philippine   Rabbit   Bus   Lines,   bearing   Plate   No.   TPU-­‐708   which   was   then   driven   by  
Silverio  Marchan  fell  into  a  ditch  somewhere  in  Barrio  Malanday,  Polo,  Bulacan,  while  travelling  on  its  way  to  Manila;  
as  a  result  of  which  plaintiffs-­‐appellees  Arsenio  Mendoza,  his  wife  and  child,  [respondents  in  this  proceeding],  who  
were  then  inside  the  bus  as  passengers  were  thrown  out  to  the  ground  resulting  in  their  multiple  injuries.  Plaintiff  
Arsenio   Mendoza   suffered   the   most   serious   injuries   which   damaged   his   vertebrae   causing   the   paralysis   of   his   lower  
extremities  which  up  to  the  time  when  this  case  was  tried  he  continued  to  suffer.  The  physician  who  attended  and  
treated  plaintiff  Arsenio  Mendoza  opined  that  he  may  never  walk  again.  Consequently  the  driver  of  said  bus  Silverio  
Marchan   [now   petitioner]   was   prosecuted   for   serious,   less   serious   and   slight   physical   injuries   through   reckless  
imprudence   before   the   Justice   of   the   Peace   Court   of   Polo   Bulacan,   and   thereafter   convicted   as   charged   on   June   29,  
1956   ...,   which   judgment   of   conviction   was   subsequently   affirmed   by   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   same   province   ...  
In  this  present  action  before  us,  plaintiffs-­‐appellees  Arsenio  Mendoza,  his  wife  and  child  sought  to  recover  damages  
against  defendant-­‐appellant  Arsenio  Marchan,  then  the  driver  of  bus  No.  141  of  the  Philippine  Rabbit  Bus  Lines,  and  
from   defendants-­‐appellants   Bienvenido   P.   Buan   and   Natividad   Paras   in   their   capacity   as   administrator   and  
administratix,  respectively  of  the  estate  of  the  late  Florencio  P.  Buan,  doing  business  under  the  style  name  of  the  
Philippine  Rabbit  Bus  Lines,  predicated  not  only  on  a  breach  of  contract  of  carriage  for  failure  of  defendants  operator  
as  well  as  the  defendant  driver  to  safely  convey  them  to  their  destination,  but  also  on  account  of  a  criminal  negligence  
1
on  the  part  of  defendant  Silverio  Marchan  resulting  to  plaintiff-­‐appellee's  multiple  physical  damages."  

The  Court  of  Appeals  in  the  decision  under  review  found  that  there  was  a  preponderance  of  evidence  to  the  effect  
that  while  respondents  Arsenio  Mendoza,  his  wife,  Leonarda  Ilaya,  and  child,  Zenaida  Mendoza  "were  waiting  for  a  
passenger  bus  on  January  22,  1954  at  about  9:00  in  the  evening  at  Malanday,  they  boarded  defendants-­‐appellants'  
bus   bearing   No.   141   of   the   Philippine   Rabbit   Bus   Lines   with   Plate   No.   TPU-­‐708   bound   for   Manila.   And   they   were  
treated  as  passengers  thereto,  for  they  paid  their  corresponding  fares.  As  they  travelled  along  the  highway  bound  for  
Manila,  said  bus  was  traveling  at  a  high  rate  of  speed  without  due  regard  to  the  safety  of  the  passengers.  So  much  so  
that   one   of   the   passengers   had   to   call   the   attention   of   Silverio   Marchan   who   was   then   at   the   steering   wheel   of   said  
bus   to   lessen   the   speed   or   to   slow   down,   but   then   defendant   Silverio   Marchan   did   not   heed   the   request   of   said  
passenger;  neither  did  he  slacken  his  speed.  On  the  contrary,  defendant  Silverio  Marchan  even  increased  his  speed  
while  approaching  a  six-­‐by-­‐six  truck  which  was  then  parked  ahead,  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  passing  the  said  
parked  truck  and  to  avoid  collision  with  the  incoming  vehicle  from  the  opposite  direction.  But,  when  appellant  Silverio  
Marchan  veered  his  truck  to  resume  position  over  the  right  lane,  the  rear  tires  of  said  truck  skidded  because  of  his  
high  rate  of  speed,  thereby  causing  said  truck  to  fall  into  a  ditch.  Substantially,  the  happening  of  the  accident'  resulting  
to  the  multiple  injuries  of  plaintiffs-­‐appellees,  was  explained  by  defendant  Silverio  Marchan  who  declared  that  while  
he  was  driving  his  bus  from  Barrio  Malanday  bound  towards  Manila  on  a  road  test,  he  suddenly  noticed  an  oncoming  
vehicle.  He  thus  shifted  his  light  from  dim  to  bright.  Just  then,  he  noticed  a  six-­‐by-­‐six  truck  parked  on  the  right  lane  of  
the  road  where  he  was  driving.  Confronted  with  such  situation  that  if  he  would  apply  his  brake  he  would  bump  his  
bus  against  the  parked  truck  he  then  increased  his  speed  with  the  view  of  passing  the  said  parked  truck,  and  thereafter  
he   veered   to   negotiate   for   the   proper   position   on   the   right   lane,   but   in   so   doing   he   swerved   to   the   right   in   order   to  
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avoid  collision  from  the  oncoming  vehicle  the  rear  portion  of  the  bus  skidded  and  fell  into  the  ditch."  

Hence  the  finding  of  negligence  in  the  decision  under  review.  Thus:  "From  the  facts  as  established  preponderantly  by  
the  plaintiff  and  substantially  corroborated  by  the  defendant  Silverio  Marchan,  it  is  clear  that  the  cause  of  the  accident  
was  the  gross  negligence  of  the  defendant  Silverio  Marchan  who  when  driving  his  vehicle  on  the  night  in  question  was  
expected  to  have  employed  the  highest  degree  of  care;  and  should  have  been  assiduously  prudent  in  handling  his  
vehicle  to  insure  the  safety  of  his  passengers.  There  is  no  reason  why  he  could  not  have  stopped  his  vehicle  when  
noticing  a  parked  truck  ahead  of  him  if  he  was  not  driving  at  a  high  speed.  His  admission  to  the  effect  that  if  he  would  
apply  his  brake  he  would  bump  or  hit  the  parked  truck  ahead  of  him,  since  there  was  no  time  for  him  to  stop  the  bus  
he   was   driving,   is   a   patent   indication   that   he   was   travelling   at   a   high   rate   of   speed   without   taking   the   necessary  
precaution   under   the   circumstance,   considering   that   it   was   then   nighttime.   It   is   our   considered   view   that   under   the  
situation  as  pictured  before  us  by  the  driver  of  said  bus,  he  should  not  have  increased  his  speed  and  by-­‐passed  the  
parked  truck  obviously  with  the  view  of  preventing  a  collision  with  the  incoming  vehicle.  Any  prudent  person  placed  
under  the  situation  of  the  appellant  would  not  have  assumed  the  risk  as  what  appellant  did.  The  most  natural  reaction  
that  could  be  expected  from  one  under  the  circumstance  was  for  him  to  have  slackened  and  reduced  his  speed.  But  
this   was   not   done   simply   because   defendant-­‐appellant   could   not   possibly   do   so   under   the   circumstance   because   he  
was  then  travelling  at  a  high  rate  of  speed.  In  fact,  he  had  increased  his  speed  in  order  to  avoid  ramming  the  parked  
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truck  without,  however,  taking  the  necessary  precaution  to  insure  the  safety  of  his  passengers."  

On  the  above  facts,  the  Court  of  Appeals,  in  its  decision  of  December  14,  1964,  affirmed  the  amount  of  P40,000.00  
awarded   by   the   court   below   as   compensatory   damages   modifying   the   appealed   lower   court   decision   by   holding  
petitioners  to  pay  the  amount  of  P30,000.00  as  exemplary  damages  and  sustaining  the  award  of  attorney's  fees  in  the  
amount  of  P5,000.00.  Then  came  the  resolution  of  March  31,  1965  by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  where  the  motion  for  
reconsideration  of  petitioners  was  denied  for  lack  of  merit.  

In  their  brief  as  petitioners,  the  first  error  assigned  is  the  alleged  absence  of  an  implied  contract  of  carriage  by  the  
petitioner   bus   firm  and  respondent.   On   this   point,  it  was  the  holding  of  the  Court  of  Appeals:  "Since  it  is  undisputed  
by   the   evidence   on   record   that   appellant   Silverio   Marchan   was   then   at   the   steering   wheel   of   the   vehicle   of   the  
defendant  transportation  company  at  that  moment,  the  riding  public  is  not  expected  to  inquire  from  time  to  time  
before  they  board  the  passenger  bus  whether  or  not  the  driver  who  is  at  the  steering  wheel  of  said  bus  was  authorized  
to  drive  said  vehicle  or  that  said  driver  is  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority  and  observing  the  existing  rules  and  
regulations  required  of  him  by  the  management.  To  hold  otherwise  would  in  effect  render  the  aforequoted  provision  
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of  law  (Article  1759)  ineffective."  It  is  clear  from  the  above  Civil  Code  provision  that  common  carriers  cannot  escape  
liability  "for  the  death  of  or  injuries  to  passengers  through  the  negligence  and  willful  acts  of  the  former's  employees,  
although   such   employees   may   have   acted   beyond   the   scope   of   their   authority   or   in   violation   of   the  
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orders..."    From  Vda.  de  Medina  v.  Cresencia,  where  this  Court,  through  Justice  J.B.L.  Reyes,  stressed  the  "direct  and  
immediate"  liability  of  the  carrier  under  the  above  legal  provision,  "not  merely  subsidiary  or  secondary,"  to  Maranan  
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v.  Perez,  a  1967  decision,  the  invariable  holding  has  been  the  responsibility  for  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage  on  
the  part  of  the  carrier.  According  to  the  facts  as  above  disclosed,  which  this  Court  cannot  disturb,  the  applicability  of  
Article  1759  is  indisputable.  Hence,  the  total  absence  of  merit  of  the  first  assignment  of  error.  

The  next  two  errors  assigned  would  dispute  the  holding  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  imposing  liability  in  the  respective  
amounts  of  P40,000.00  for  compensatory  damages  and  P30,000.00  for  exemplary  damages.  Again,  such  assignments  
of  error  cannot  be  looked  upon  with  favor.  What  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  deserves  not  reprobation  but  approval  by  
this  Court.  

As  to  why  the  amount  in  compensatory  damages  should  be  fixed  in  the  sum  of  P40,000.00  is  explained  in  the  appealed  
decision   thus:   "Likewise,   it   is   our   considered   view   that   the   amount   of   P40,000.00   awarded   by   the   court   below   as  
compensatory  damages  is  quite  reasonable  and  fair,  considering  that  plaintiff  Arsenio  Mendoza  had  suffered  paralysis  
on  the  lower  extremities,  which  will  incapacitate  him  to  engage  in  his  customary  occupation  throughout  the  remaining  
years  of  his  life,  especially  so  if  we  take  into  account  that  plaintiff  Arsenio  Mendoza  was  only  26  years  old  when  he  
met  an  accident  on  January  22,  1954;  and  taking  the  average  span  of  life  of  a  Filipino,  he  may  be  expected  to  live  for  
30   years   more;   and   bearing   in   mind   the   earning   capacity   of   Arsenio   Mendoza   who   before   the   happening   of   this  
accident  derived  an  income  of  almost  P100.00  a  month  from  the  business  of  his  father-­‐in-­‐law  as  Assistant  Supervisor  
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of  the  small  [fairs]  and  his  income  of  P100.00  a  month  which  he  derived  as  a  professional  boxer."  Considering  that  
respondent  Arsenio  Mendoza  was  only  in  his  middle  twenties  when,  thru  the  negligence  of  petitioners,  he  lost  the  
use  of  his  limbs,  being  condemned  for  the  remainder  of  his  life  to  be  a  paralytic,  in  effect  leading  a  maimed,  well-­‐nigh  
useless   existence,   the   fixing   of   such   liability   in   the   amount   of   P40,000.00   as   compensatory   damages   was   well   within  
the  discretion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.  1äwphï1.ñët  

As  to  the  finding  of  liability  for  exemplary  damages,  the  Court  of  Appeals,  in  its  resolution  of  March  31,  1965,  stated  
the   following:   "We   now   come   to   the   imposition   of   exemplary   damages   upon   defendants-­‐appellants'   carrier.   It   is  
argued  that  this  Court  is  without  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  this  exemplary  damages  since  there  was  no  allegation  nor  
prayer,   nor  proof,  nor   counterclaim   of   error   for  the  same  by  the  appellees.   It   is   to   be   observed   however,   that   in   the  
complaint,  plaintiffs  "prayed  for  such  other  and  further  relief  as  this  Court  may  deem  just  and  equitable."  Now,  since  
the   body   of   the   complaint   sought   to   recover   damages   against   the   defendant-­‐carrier   wherein   plaintiffs   prayed   for  
indemnification  for  the  damages  they  suffered  as  a  result  of  the  negligence  of  said  Silverio  Marchan  who  is  appellant's  
employee;   and   since   exemplary   damages   is   intimately   connected   with   general   damages,   plaintiffs   may   not   be  
expected  to  single  out  by  express  term  the  kind  of  damages  they  are  trying  to  recover  against  the  defendant's  carrier.  
Suffice  it  to  state  that  when  plaintiffs  prayed  in  their  complaint  for  such  other  relief  and  remedies  that  may  be  availed  
of  under  the  premises,  in  effect,  therefore,  the  court  is  called  upon  the  exercise  and  use  its  discretion  whether  the  
imposition   of   punitive   or   exemplary   damages   even   though   not   expressly   prayed   or   pleaded   in   the   plaintiffs'  
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complaint."  

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In  support  of  the  above  view,  Singson  v.  Aragon  was  cited  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.    As  was  there  held  by  this  Court:  
"From  the  above  legal  provisions  it  appears  that  exemplary  damages  may  be  imposed  by  way  of  example  or  correction  
only  in  addition,  among  others,  to  compensatory  damages,  but  that  they  cannot  be  recovered  as  a  matter  of  right,  
their  determination  depending  upon  the  discretion  of  the  court.  It  further  appears  that  the  amount  of  exemplary  
damages   need   not   be   proved,   because   its   determination   depends   upon   the   amount   of   compensatory   damages   that  
may  be  awarded  to  the  claimant.  If  the  amount  of  exemplary  damages  need  not  be  proved,  it  need  not  also  be  alleged,  
and   the   reason   is   obvious   because   it   is   merely   incidental   or   dependent   upon   what   the   court   may   award   as  
compensatory   damages.   Unless   and   until   this   premise   is   determined   and   established,   what   may   be   claimed   as  
exemplary  damages  would  amount  to  a  mere  surmise  or  speculation.  It  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence  that  the  
amount  of  exemplary  damages  need  not  be  pleaded  in  the  complaint  because  the  same  cannot  be  predetermined.  
One  can  merely  ask  that  it  be  determined  by  the  court  if  in  the  use  of  its  discretion  the  same  is  warranted  by  the  
evidence,  and  this  is  just  what  appellee  has  done.".  

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Such  a  principle  has  been  repeatedly  upheld.    In  Corpuz  v.  Cuaderno,    this  Court,  again  through  Justice  J.B.L.  Reyes,  
made  clear  that  the  amount  "lies  within  the  province  of  the  court  a  quo,  ..."  It  must  be  admitted,  of  course,  that  where  
it   could   be   shown   that   a   tribunal   acted   "with   vindictiveness   or   wantonness   and   not   in   the   exercise   of   honest  
judgment,"  then  there  is  room  for  the  interposition  of  the  corrective  power  of  this  Tribunal.  

No   such   reproach   can   be   hurled   at   the   decision   and   resolution   now   under   review.   No   such   indictment   would   be  
justified.  As  noted  earlier,  both  the  second  and  the  third  assignments  of  error  are  devoid  of  merit.  

Nor  is  there  any  occasion  to  consider  further  the  fourth  assigned  error,  petitioner  being  dissatisfied  with  the  award  of  
P5,000.00   as   attorney's   fees   to   respondents.   On   its   face,   such   an   assignment   of   an   alleged   error   is   conspicuously  
futile.  1äwphï1.ñët  

The  judgment,  however,  must  be  modified  in  accordance  with  the  ruling  of  this  Court  in  Soberano  v.  Manila  Railroad  
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Co.    Respondents  are  entitled  to  interest  for  the  amount  of  compensatory  damages  from  the  date  of  the  decision  of  
the  lower  court  and  legal  interest  on  the  exemplary  damages  from  the  date  of  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.  

WHEREFORE,   as   thus   modified,   the   decision   is   affirmed,   petitioners   being   liable   for   the   sum   of   P40,000.00   in   the  
concept  of  compensatory  damages  with  interest  at  the  legal  rate  from  and  after  January  26,  1960,  and  the  sum  of  
P30,000.00  as  exemplary  damages  with  interest  at  the  legal  rate  from  and  after  December  14,  1964,  as  well  as  for  the  
sum  of  P5,000.00  as  attorney's  fees,  likewise  earning  a  legal  rate  of  interest  from  and  after  January  26,  1960.  Costs  
against  petitioners.  
 MARANA  v  PEREZ  

Rogelio  Corachea,  on  October  18,  1960,  was  a  passenger  in  a  taxicab  owned  and  operated  by  Pascual  Perez  when  he  
was  stabbed  and  killed  by  the  driver,  Simeon  Valenzuela.  

Valenzuela  was  prosecuted  for  homicide  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Batangas.  Found  guilty,  he  was  sentenced  to  
suffer  imprisonment  and  to  indemnify  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  in  the  sum  of  P6,000.  Appeal  from  said  conviction  
was  taken  to  the  Court  of  Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët  

On  December  6  1961,  while  appeal  was  pending  in  the  Court  of  Appeals,  Antonia  Maranan,  Rogelio's  mother,  filed  an  
action  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Batangas  to  recover  damages  from  Perez  and  Valenzuela  for  the  death  of  her  
son.  Defendants  asserted  that  the  deceased  was  killed  in  self-­‐defense,  since  he  first  assaulted  the  driver  by  stabbing  
him  from  behind.  Defendant  Perez  further  claimed  that  the  death  was  a  caso  fortuito  for  which  the  carrier  was  not  
liable.  

The  court  a  quo,  after  trial,  found  for  the  plaintiff  and  awarded  her  P3,000  as  damages  against  defendant  Perez.  The  
claim  against  defendant  Valenzuela  was  dismissed.  From  this  ruling,  both  plaintiff  and  defendant  Perez  appealed  to  
this  Court,  the  former  asking  for  more  damages  and  the  latter  insisting  on  non-­‐liability.  Subsequently,  the  Court  of  
Appeals  affirmed  the  judgment  of  conviction  earlier  mentioned,  during  the  pendency  of  the  herein  appeal,  and  on  
May  19,  1964,  final  judgment  was  entered  therein.  (Rollo,  p.  33).  

Defendant-­‐appellant   relies   solely   on   the   ruling   enunciated   in   Gillaco   v.   Manila   Railroad   Co.,   97   Phil.   884,   that   the  
carrier   is   under   no   absolute   liability   for   assaults   of   its   employees   upon   the   passengers.   The   attendant   facts   and  
controlling  law  of  that  case  and  the  one  at  bar  are  very  different  however.  In  the  Gillaco  case,  the  passenger  was  killed  
outside  the  scope  and  the  course  of  duty  of  the  guilty  employee.  As  this  Court  there  found:  

x   x   x   when   the   crime   took   place,   the   guard   Devesa   had   no   duties   to   discharge   in   connection   with   the  
transportation  of  the  deceased  from  Calamba  to  Manila.  The  stipulation  of  facts  is  clear  that  when  Devesa  
shot  and  killed  Gillaco,  Devesa  was  assigned  to  guard  the  Manila-­‐San  Fernando  (La  Union)  trains,  and  he  was  
at  Paco  Station  awaiting  transportation  to  Tutuban,  the  starting  point  of  the  train  that  he  was  engaged  to  
guard.  In  fact,  his  tour  of  duty  was  to  start  at  9:00  two  hours  after  the  commission  of  the  crime.  Devesa  was  
therefore  under  no  obligation  to  safeguard  the  passengers  of  the  Calamba-­‐Manila  train,  where  the  deceased  
was  riding;  and  the  killing  of  Gillaco  was  not  done  in  line  of  duty.  The  position  of  Devesa  at  the  time  was  that  
of   another   would   be   passenger,   a   stranger   also   awaiting   transportation,   and   not   that   of   an   employee  
assigned  to  discharge  any  of  the  duties  that  the  Railroad  had  assumed  by  its  contract  with  the  deceased.  As  
a   result,   Devesa's   assault   can   not   be   deemed   in   law   a   breach   of   Gillaco's   contract   of   transportation   by   a  
servant  or  employee  of  the  carrier.  .  .  .  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Now  here,  the  killing  was  perpetrated  by  the  driver  of  the  very  cab  transporting  the  passenger,  in  whose  hands  the  
carrier  had  entrusted  the  duty  of  executing  the  contract  of  carriage.  In  other  words,  unlike  the  Gillaco  case,  the  killing  
of  the  passenger  here  took  place  in  the  course  of  duty  of  the  guilty  employee  and  when  the  employee  was  acting  
within  the  scope  of  his  duties.  

Moreover,  the  Gillaco  case  was  decided  under  the  provisions  of  the  Civil  Code  of  1889  which,  unlike  the  present  Civil  
Code,  did  not  impose  upon  common  carriers  absolute  liability  for  the  safety  of  passengers  against  wilful  assaults  or  
negligent  acts  committed  by  their  employees.  The  death  of  the  passenger  in  the  Gillaco  case  was  truly  a  fortuitous  
event  which  exempted  the  carrier  from  liability.  It  is  true  that  Art.  1105  of  the  old  Civil  Code  on  fortuitous  events  has  
been   substantially   reproduced   in   Art.   1174   of   the   Civil   Code   of   the   Philippines   but   both   articles   clearly   remove   from  
their   exempting   effect   the   case   where   the   law   expressly   provides   for   liability   in   spite   of   the   occurrence   of   force  
majeure.  And  herein  significantly  lies  the  statutory  difference  between  the  old  and  present  Civil  Codes,  in  the  backdrop  
of  the  factual  situation  before  Us,  which  further  accounts  for  a  different  result  in  the  Gillaco  case.  Unlike  the  old  Civil  
Code,   the   new   Civil   Code   of   the   Philippines   expressly   makes   the   common   carrier   liable   for   intentional   assaults  
committed  by  its  employees  upon  its  passengers,  by  the  wording  of  Art.  1759  which  categorically  states  that  

Common   carriers   are   liable   for   the   death   of   or   injuries   to   passengers   through   the   negligence   or   willful   acts  
of  the  former's  employees,  although  such  employees  may  have  acted  beyond  the  scope  of  their  authority  or  
in  violation  of  the  orders  of  the  common  carriers.  

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The   Civil   Code   provisions   on   the   subject   of   Common   Carriers   are   new   and   were   taken   from   Anglo-­‐American  
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Law.  There,  the  basis  of  the  carrier's  liability  for  assaults  on  passengers  committed  by  its  drivers  rests  either  on  (1)  
the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  or  (2)  the  principle  that  it  is  the  carrier's  implied  duty  to  transport  the  passenger  
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safely.  

Under  the  first,  which  is  the  minority  view,  the  carrier  is  liable  only  when  the  act  of  the  employee  is  within  the  scope  
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of  his  authority  and  duty.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  act  be  within  the  course  of  employment  only.  

Under  the  second  view,  upheld  by  the  majority  and  also  by  the  later  cases,  it  is  enough  that  the  assault  happens  within  
the  course  of  the  employee's  duty.  It  is  no  defense  for  the  carrier  that  the  act  was  done  in  excess   of   authority   or   in  
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disobedience  of  the  carrier's  orders.  The  carrier's  liability  here  is  absolute  in  the  sense  that  it  practically  secures  the  
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passengers  from  assaults  committed  by  its  own  employees.  

As  can  be  gleaned  from  Art.  1759,  the  Civil  Code  of  the  Philippines  evidently  follows  the  rule  based  on  the  second  
view.  At  least  three  very  cogent  reasons  underlie  this  rule.  As  explained  in  Texas  Midland  R.R.  v.  Monroe,  110  Tex.  97,  
216  S.W.  388,  389-­‐390,  and  Haver  v.  Central  Railroad  Co.,  43  LRA  84,  85:  (1)  the  special  undertaking  of  the  carrier  
requires  that  it  furnish  its  passenger  that  full  measure  of  protection  afforded  by  the  exercise  of  the  high  degree  of  
care  prescribed  by  the  law,  inter  alia  from  violence  and  insults  at  the  hands  of  strangers  and  other  passengers,  but  
above  all,  from  the  acts  of  the  carrier's  own  servants  charged  with  the  passenger's  safety;  (2)  said  liability  of  the  carrier  
for   the   servant's   violation   of   duty   to   passengers,   is   the   result   of   the   formers   confiding   in   the   servant's   hands   the  
performance   of   his   contract   to   safely   transport   the   passenger,   delegating   therewith   the   duty   of   protecting   the  
passenger  with  the  utmost  care  prescribed  by  law;  and  (3)  as  between  the  carrier  and  the  passenger,  the  former  must  
bear   the   risk   of   wrongful   acts   or   negligence   of   the   carrier's   employees   against   passengers,   since   it,   and   not   the  
passengers,  has  power  to  select  and  remove  them.  

Accordingly,   it   is   the   carrier's   strict   obligation   to   select   its   drivers   and   similar   employees  with   due   regard   not   only   to  
their  technical  competence  and  physical  ability,  but  also,  no  less  important,  to  their  total  personality,  including  their  
patterns  of  behavior,  moral  fibers,  and  social  attitude.  

Applying  this  stringent  norm  to  the  facts  in  this  case,  therefore,  the  lower  court  rightly  adjudged  the  defendant  carrier  
liable  pursuant  to  Art.  1759  of  the  Civil  Code.  The  dismissal  of  the  claim  against  the  defendant  driver  was  also  correct.  
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Plaintiff's  action  was  predicated  on  breach  of  contract  of  carriage  and  the  cab  driver  was  not  a  party  thereto.  His  civil  
liability  is  covered  in  the  criminal  case  wherein  he  was  convicted  by  final  judgment.  

In   connection   with   the   award   of   damages,   the   court   a   quo   granted   only   P3,000   to   plaintiff-­‐appellant.   This   is   the  
minimum  compensatory  damages  amount  recoverable  under  Art.  1764  in  connection  with  Art.  2206  of  the  Civil  Code  
when  a  breach  of  contract  results  in  the  passenger's  death.  As  has  been  the  policy  followed  by  this  Court,  this  minimal  
award  should  be  increased  to  P6,000.  As  to  other  alleged  actual  damages,  the  lower  court's  finding  that  plaintiff's  
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evidence  thereon  was  not  convincing,  should  not  be  disturbed.  Still,  Arts.  2206  and  1764  award  moral  damages  in  
addition  to  compensatory  damages,  to  the  parents  of  the  passenger  killed  to  compensate  for  the  mental  anguish  they  
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suffered.  A  claim  therefor,  having  been  properly  made,  it  becomes  the  court's  duty  to  award  moral  damages.  Plaintiff  
demands  P5,000  as  moral  damages;  however,  in  the  circumstances,  We  consider  P3,000  moral  damages,  in  addition  
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to  the  P6,000  damages  afore-­‐stated,  as  sufficient.  Interest  upon  such  damages  are  also  due  to  plaintiff-­‐appellant.    
Wherefore,  with  the  modification  increasing  the  award  of  actual  damages  in  plaintiff's  favor  to  P6,000,  plus  P3,000.00  
moral  damages,  with  legal  interest  on  both  from  the  filing  of  the  complaint  on  December  6,  1961  until  the  whole  
amount  is  paid,  the  judgment  appealed  from  is  affirmed  in  all  other  respects.  No  costs.  So  ordered.