0822 Human Rights DIGESTS

VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN
https://www.micvillamayor.com/villavicencio-v-lukban/
39 PHIL 778
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One hundred
and seventy women were deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The
women were received as laborers in a banana plantation. Some of the women were able to
escape and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to
Davao

HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish
official transgressors. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus are to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they must
have the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and
to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be easily
evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the
writ of habeas corpus.

Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

http://lawschoolnoob.blogspot.com/2018/10/case-digest-marcos-v-manglapus-gr-no.html
October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668

Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners

Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to
allow the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the
Philippines. The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and
welfare. 

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal,
fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former
President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:
"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such
time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall
otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains. 
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is
tantamount to dictatorship.

HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated
in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under
the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution,
in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance
with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to
Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an express
grant of power.

Manotoc v CA

http://remediallawnotes.blogspot.com/2017/08/manotoc-vs-court-of-appeals-digest.html

● A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.

● The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right. The Constitution

provides: "The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court xxx." The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on
bail constitutes such lawful order. 
Facts: 

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain
time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee
for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner
of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was
issued by the Commissioner.

Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa
against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to
leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was
denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of
the latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders,
as well as the communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The
same was denied; hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been
admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent
him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issues: 

1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.

2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute

Held: 

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if
the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section
5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.

The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.  (Ricardo Manotoc vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
http://digestingcases.blogspot.com/2015/06/laguna-lake-development-authority-vs-ca.html
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No.
4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter
is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law
is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

http://aspiringlawyer.blogspot.com/2013/10/case-digest-gr-no-174689-october-22-
2007.html
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From
then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex
from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic
of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law
which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other
matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of

Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It
appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To
further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that
she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
 was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor
that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

Ormoc Sugar company v Treasurer of Ormoc City

https://amoradinfinitum.wordpress.com/2017/02/05/ormoc-sugar-co-v-treasurer-of-ormoc-
city-1968-equal-protection-clause/
G.R. No. L-23794, 22 SCRA 603, February 17, 1968
Doctrine: For a classification to be valid, it should be applicable to future conditions as
well.

Facts:
1. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passedOrdinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
“on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States
of America and other foreign countries.”
2. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on
March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

3. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complain tagainst the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
4. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within
defendant city’s power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not
violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause. 
 Held:
 Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection
clause.
 The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those
of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable
classification.
 The ordinace taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city
of Ormoc.
 To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

http://angelcapacio.blogspot.com/2009/02/simon-vs-comm-on-human-rights-gr-no.html

Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994

Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating
"demolition case" on vendors of North EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a
fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls,
sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the
same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law),
political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment
and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can
only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.

https://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/oposa-vs-factoran/

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083.     224 SCRA 792     July 30, 1993

OPOSA et al, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice
of plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of
the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr.
precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the
judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is
of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of
an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision
Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed
by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits
and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any
other form of privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.

https://lex-scepticus.blogspot.com/2014/04/case-digest-ebralinag-vs-division.html
Case Digest: Ebralinag vs The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu GR No
95770 95887
By ResIpsaLoquitor - April 25, 2014
Ebralinag, et al. vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
GR Nos. 95770 and 95887                                                     March 1, 1993

Facts:
The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were
expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and Department
Order No. 8 of the DepEd.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything
except God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1
John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo).
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control
Issue:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or
singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.

Ruling:

No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out
of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right
to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs.
Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the
free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that
offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has
a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

https://allinanutshelll.wordpress.com/2012/12/06/digest-calalang-vs-williams/

Digest: Calalang vs Williams

By nutshellgirl ¶ Posted in Digest, Digest: Labor
Standards, General ¶ Tagged digest, labor, social justice ¶ Leave a comment

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice                   
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:
 
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend
to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of 
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence

among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
https://mylinecordial.wordpress.com/2016/08/22/decs-vs-san-diego-g-r-no-89572/
DECS and Dir. of Educational Measurement vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and Judge
Dizon-Capulong
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying
to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to
take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of
the police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.
RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those
who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. The
regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public. This regulation includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving the country’s objective of
“upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of
medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen
has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirement.

The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if
some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.