ccc







 
Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and
private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. (Housing Authority of
Cherokee National of Oklahoma vs. Langley, Okl., 555 P.2d 1025, 1028)
The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert, either
temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public
exigency and for the public good. Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives
a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner directed by the Constitution and the laws
of the State, whenever the public interest requires it. (Blackƞs law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 523)
The term Ơexpropriationơ is practically synonymous with the term Ơeminent domain.ơ (Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co. vs. Violet Trapping Co., La. App. 200 So.2d. 428, 433)
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case
an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. (Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1) It is only
where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee,
that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over
the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of
the people is the supreme law. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989])




 
Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. (Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142
[1990]). The power of eminent domain is lodged primarily in the national legislature, but its exercise may
validly delegated to other government entities and even to quasi-public corporations serving essential
public needs or operating public utilities. The utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the
public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location
selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are questions which are
essentially political and which are to be exclusively determined by the legislature, and are usually not
subject to judicial review.
The following exercise the power of expropriation:

1. The Congress

2. The President of the Philippines
3. The various local legislative bodies
4. Certain public corporations
5. Quasi-public corporations (Example, quasi-public corporation: PEZA)

Section 23 (Eminent Domain) of Presidential Decree 66, provides that:

For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any property for the establishment of export processing zones,
or of low-cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the protection of
watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs, wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses
and other terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and
power to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation proceedings. Should the
authority elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by
and in the name of the Authority and it may proceed in the manner provided for by law.
!!! Case(s)

15. C





C
C







!" " #
16.  $


C %



&'(
)CR
'(
!" *#

C
C % 


 
Art. III, Sec. 9
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. (Bensley vs.
Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306, and cases cited 73 Am. Dec., 576)
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It
is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution.
The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public
use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would
otherwise be without limit. (Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus [40 Phil. 550]). The constitutional restraints
are public use and just compensation.

+%$
 
$% 
$%


The destruction of the property does not come under the right of eminent domain, but under the right of
necessity, of self-preservation. The right of necessity arises under the laws of society or society itself. It is
the right of self-defense, of self-preservation, whether applied to persons or to property. It is a private
right vested in every individual, and with which the right of the state or state necessity has nothing to do
(American Print Works vs. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590). Destruction from necessity may be validly
undertaken even by private individuals. Such is not allowed in the case of eminent domain. Further,
destruction from necessity cannot require the conversion of the property taken to public use, nor is there
any need for the payment of compensation.

,-.

 
 
Anything that can come under the dominion of man is subject to expropriation. This include real and
personal, tangible and intangible properties. Even property already devoted to public use is still subject to
expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of
authority to delegate. The only exceptions to this rule are money and choses in action. Expropriation of
money is futile inasmuch as payment of just compensation is also money. A chose in action is essentially
conjectural as to its validity and its value.
A chose in action is the right of proceeding in a court of law to procure payment of sum of money, or
right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of money by action (Gregory vs. Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363
S.W.2d 539, 540); or is the right to receive or recover a debt, demand, or damages on a cause of action
ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty (Moran vs. Adkerson, 168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44, 45)
Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. Real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.
Property subject of expropriation must be by its nature or condition wholesome, as it is intended to be
devoted to a public use.
!!! Case(s)

17. R

/0
&'
)CR
'&
!" ' #

1

 
 
)%

1$
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of
the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property. (Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of
Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000])
See R%
'*


R%

C %
!!! Case(s)

18.

+

)

R 2%

3


 
4R
"(( '
5%
&
&

4
0
6+
 

$
) 
Common. A physical dispossession of the owner, as when he is ousted from his land or relieved of his
personal property, and is thus deprived of all beneficial use and enjoyment of his property.
Legal. To take is to lay hold of, to gain or receive in possession, to seize, to deprive one of the use or
possession of, or to assume ownership (Blackƞs Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 1453). There is taking of
property when government action directly interferes with or substantially disturbs the ownerƞs use and
enjoyment of the property (Brothers vs. US., C.A.Or., 594 F.2d 740, 741). To constitute a Ơtaking,ơ within
constitutional limitation, it is not essential that there be physical seizure or appropriation, and any actual
or material interference with private property rights constitutes a taking (Board of Comƞrs of Lake County
vs. Mentor Lagoons Inc., Com.Pl., 6 Ohio Msc. 126, 216 N.E.2d 643, 646). Also, taking of property is
affected if application of zoning law denies property owner of economically viable use of his land, which
can consist of preventing best use of land or extinguishing fundamental attribute of ownership (Vari-Build
Inc. vs. Reno, D.C.Nev., 596 F. Supp. 673, 679).
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393)
1. Taking under police power and power of eminent domain distinguished
Taking under police power and taking under the power of eminent domain, however, should be
distinguished. The power being exercised was eminent domain when the property involved was
wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished
for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. (City of Baguio v.
NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144)
A. Taking under police power
If an owner is deprived of his property outright under the Stateƞs police power, the property is generally
not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner
of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from
dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The
property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make
any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious Ɯ as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions Ɯ the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again
be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
B. Taking under the power of eminent domain
ƠTakingơ under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. (Penn. vs. Carolina Virginia Coastal
Corporation, 57 SE 2d 817)
In the context of the Stateƞs inherent power of eminent domain, there is a Ơtakingơ when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. (U.S. v.
Causby, 382 U.S. 256, cited in Municipality of La Carlota v. NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164.) There is a Ơtakingơ in
this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more
permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof (Republic v. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336
[1974]). For ownership, after all, Ơis nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and
enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value
by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense.ơ (Municipality of La
Carlota v. NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164)
2. Stages
The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, Ơof
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.ơ The second phase of the eminent domain action
is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.ơ This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
(Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584 [1989]) It is only upon the completion of these
two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just
compensation that title over the property passes to the government. (Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). Therefore, until the action
for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated
remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an
owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to
acquire it through expropriation.
2%

1. The expropriator must enter a private property.

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
!!! Case(s)

19. R%-

C

7(
)CR
'
!" *#
20. C
4 

8%9 
C



"&&
)CR
*7
!" (#

V
 

:
1. In General
Easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It
would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. (United
States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946])
2. Local Government Units
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the
restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation
would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116). A
regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is
a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also
Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114). Specifically, while property may be
regulated in the interest of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. (People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958])
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be said
to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property
may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in
the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks
the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the
public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property
under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs.
Woolhiser (1933) 352 111. 212, 185 N.E. 827)
!!! Case(s)

21. R%-

1
.
$

"
 
!" 7(#
22. r
  

4%9
" 
)CR
"
!" "#
23. Ë )

C
%-
&(
Ë )
&7'
!" '#

ï




 


1. Urban Land Reform
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and
housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10
of which specifically provide as follows:
Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. Ɯ Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
 a. Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
b. Alienable lands of the public domain;
c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
d. Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and
f. Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands.
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. Ɯ The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned
property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to
the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by
the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase:
Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first
refusal.
!!! Case(s)

24. 1

c
 


C
&(
)CR
*"'
!" (#
25. 


3

R

C




4 R
r
"&"
1-%

"
&
26. C


$
% +

1
 
4 R
r
"*"7&
5
%

& 
&"

3
%-
%
Over many years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly attempted to define comprehensively
the concept of a public use and to formulate a universal test. They have found here as elsewhere that to
formulate anything ultimate, even though it were possible, would, in an inevitably changing world, be
unwise if not futile. (Matter of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 1 NE 2d 153)
Public Use, as traditionally understood, means any use directly available to the general public as a matter
of right and not merely of forbearance or accommodation. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition,
74)
Public Use is Ơthe constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For
condemnation purposes, Ɲpublic useƞ is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is
not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities
for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or
many members of public, a Ɲpublic advantageƞ or Ɲpublic benefitƞ accrues sufficient to constitute a public
use.ơ (Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.)
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in
virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular
individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be
personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is
sufficient. (Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186). The term
may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It
may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a
particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience. A Ɲpublic useƞ for which land may be taken defies absolute
definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing
conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by
an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. (Katz v. Brandon, 156
Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586.)
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The
constitution in at least two cases determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)
!!! Case(s)

27. 3

5%


$ 


R
"&7
)CR
&&
!" (#
28. )%% +

4% 
"7
)CR
'"
!" (*#
29.  

C


)%

C
&&&
)CR
"*
!" #
30. http://lawnotes.berneguerrero.com/constitutional-law-ii-book-2005-manosca-vs-court-
of-appeals-gr-106440-29-january-1996/ơ>Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412
(1996)
31. 


59

;
4 R
r
"*&(7
5
%

"'
&"

c
4%
r
In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate
purpose of the condemnation. The term Ơnecessaryơ, in this connection, does not mean absolutely
indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and
future needs of the enterprise. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, 50 Phil 832, 837-838 [1927]).
The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is
well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions
exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute
their own views for those of the representatives of the people. In the absence of some constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. (City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349 [1919])
!!! Case(s)

32. %




%


cC
"7
33.
34.
35.
36. *
)CR
'
!" ((#
37. 
<


%

"
)CR
''
!" (#
38. R%-


<
4 R
(*7"
1-%

"&
" 
 39. c

C 
&
)CR
&*&
!" 7#
40. r3

3

c$
4% $ 
4 R
r
"7""
5%
" 
&

5
5%
C 
 
V$
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered. (Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-
59603, 29 April 1987])
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasques, 32 Phil. 286). It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the takerƞs gain but the ownerƞs loss. (Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66
Phil. 467) The word Ơjustơ is used to intensify the meaning of the word Ơcompensationơ to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample
(City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208).
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered Ơjustơ for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss. (Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001])
!!! Case(s)

37. 
-



,  
4 R
r
"''&
5%
&(
&"
38. R

cC


 
4 R
r
*""*'


&"
" 
39. C

C-%

) %
$
 
4 R
r
"&
*"


*
&&

V




5%
= 

A. In General
The determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. (Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay
[GR L-59603, 29 April 1987])
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time
and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within
which their report shall be submitted to the court. (Section 5, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or
purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the
business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits
assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of
his property so taken. (Section 6, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Still, according to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissionersƞ report. It may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise
of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This
Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad
Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
_. Local Government Units
Section 19, Republic Act 7160. Eminent Domain. ƛ A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That,
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
!!! Case(s)

40. ;

%


"
)CR
7
!" (*#



$
A. When
Where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property subject thereof, the
just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of
Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposits with
the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as provisionally ascertained by the court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings. There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency
takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit. In these instances, the just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. (Ansaldo
vs. Tantuico [GR 50147, 3 August 1990])
When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should
be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should
be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with
or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69,
Section 3, directing that compensation Ɲbe determined as of the date of the filing of the complaintƞ would
never be operative. (Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 1 SCRA 957 [1961])
B. Why
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may
have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the
property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the
time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., ơjust not only to
the individual whose property is taken,ơ Ơbut to the public, which is to pay for it.ơ (Republic v. Lara, 50
O.G. 5778 [1954])
!!! Case(s)

41. 
$

0
% 
4 R
7"*
%+%

" 
42. rC

C
&7
)CR
7**
!" '#




 
›. Manner
1. Traditional
›
hough i
may be said
ha
Ơwhere
he S

e i
se f is
he expropri
, i
is n
necessy f i

 mke 
depsi
up i
s
kig pssessi f
he ceme ppe
y, s Ɲ
he cmpes
 s  pub c chge,

he g f
h f
he pub c s p ege f 
s pyme
,  
he esuces f
x
 my be emp ye
 sg
he mu
.ƞơ (Lews, Lw f Eme
Dm, 3 E
, pp. 1166-1167);
he me
h f
expp
 p
e  Ph ppe jusc
 s such s
 ff bs u
e essuce
h
 pece f
 c be f y  evcb y
ke fm  uw g we u
 cmpes
 s p. (Vsy
Refg C. v. Cmus  Pees, 40 Ph . 550) Fu
he,
he Ru es pve
h
Ơup
he f g f
he
cmp 
 
y
me
heef
e  f
e ue 
ce

he efe
,
he p 
ff sh hve
he
gh


ke  e
e up
he pssess f
he e ppe
y v ve f he eps
s w
h
he u
hze
gveme
eps
y  mu
equv e


he ssesse v ue f
he ppe
y f pupses f

x

 be he  by such bk subjec


he es f
he cu
. Such eps
sh be  mey,
u ess  eu
heef
he cu
u
hzes
he eps
f  ce
fc
e f eps
f  gveme
bk f

he Repub c f
he Ph ppes pyb e  em

he u
hze gveme
eps
y. If pes
ppe
y s v ve, 
s v ue sh be pvs y sce
e 
he mu

 be eps
e sh be
pmp
y fxe by
he cu
. xxxơ (Sec
 2, Ru e 67, 1997 Ru es f Cv Pceue)
2. Rev u
y
Sec
 16(e) f
he C›RP Lw pves
h
ƠUp ecep
by
he we f
he cespg
pyme
,  cse f ejec
   espse fm
he we, up
he eps
w
h  ccessb e
bk esg
e by
he D›R f
he cmpes
  csh   LBP bs  ccce w
h
hs ›c
,
he
D›R sh
ke mme
e pssess f
he   sh eques

he ppe Regs
e f Dees
 ssue
 Tsfe Ce
fc
e f T
e (TCT) 
he me f
he Repub c f
he Ph ppes. The D›R sh

heef
e pcee w
h
he es
bu
 f
he 

he qu fe beefces.ơ (›ssc
 f Sm
Lwes 
he Ph ppes Ic. vs. Sece
y f ›g Refm [GR 78741, 14 Ju y 1989])
B. Meum
1. T

The fume
 u e  expp
 m

es s
h

he we f
he ppe
y expp
e s e

e

 jus
cmpes
, whch shu  be e
he me  ess, wheeve 
s pssb e
 mke
he
ssessme
,
h
he mey equv e
f s ppe
y. Jus
cmpes
 hs  wys bee ues


 be
he jus
 cmp e
e equv e
f
he ss whch
he we f
he
hg expp
e hs
 suffe
by es f
he expp
. (M  R  C. v. Ve squez, 32 Ph . 286)
Jus
cmpes
 mes
he equv e
f
he v ue f
he ppe
y 

he
me f 
s
kg. ›y
hg
bey
h
s me,  y
hg sh
f
h
s ess,
h jus
cmpes
. I
mes  f  fu
equv e
f
he ss sus
e, whch s
he mesue f
he em
y, 
wh
eve g wu  ccue


he expp
g e

y. The mke
v ue f
he 
ke s
he jus
cmpes

 whch
he
we f ceme ppe
y s e

e,
he mke
v ue beg
h
sum f mey whch  pes
esus, bu

cmpe e
 buy,   we, w g, bu

cmpe e
 se , wu  gee  s 
pce
 be gve  eceve f such ppe
y. (J.M. Tuz C. v. L Teue ›ms

, 31
SCR› 413)
The meum f pyme
f cmpes
 s ey mey  csh. The cem c
cmpe
he
we
 ccep
y
hg bu
mey,  c
he we cmpe  eque
he cem
 py hm 
y 
he bss
h
he v ue f
he ppe
y  mey 

he
me  
he me pescbe by
he
Cs

u
 
he s

u
es. Whe
he pwe f eme
m s es
e
,
hee mus
be 
s
 meum f pyme
, bg up b
h p
es, 
he w hs fxe
h
s
 s mey
 csh. (M v. C
y f Phex, 18 p 2 273.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable
and constant standard of compensation. (Sacremento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 pp.
979, 980.)
ƠJust compensationơ for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must
be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature
to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. (City of Waterbury
v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Comƞrs, 39 N.J.L. 665;
Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal
266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10 Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.)
2. Revolutionary
The records of the Constitutional Commission do not provide any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to Ơfine tuneơ
the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should Ơleave it to
Congressơ to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required
from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as Ơprogressive compensationơ and ƠState-subsidized
compensationơ were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation
for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.)
The expropriation in Comprehensive Agrarian Reform affects all private agricultural lands whenever found
and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners.
This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of
this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with
the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Such a program will involve not mere
millions of pesos but hundreds of billions of pesos, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. Since there is nothing in the
records either that militates against the assumptions the Court is making of the general sentiments and
intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the
light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator, the Court declared that
the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. The invalidation of Section 18 will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmerƞs hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not the intention of the Constitution.
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. Ɯ The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such
amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

1. Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

a. For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned
Ɯ Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
b. For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares Ɯ Thirty
percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
c. For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below Ɯ Thirty-five percent (35%) cash,
the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
 2. Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,
physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the
PARC;
3. Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
4. LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
a. Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%)
of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance
until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to
forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;
b. Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner,
his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for
any of the following:
i. Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including
assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed
by government financial institutions in the same province or region
where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
ii. Acquisition of shares of stock of government owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
iii. Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
iv. Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
v. Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the
use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments;
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
vi. Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
vii. Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospital; and
viii. Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

!!! Case(s)

43.  

)

/
$ 

R
"*7
)CR

!" ( #
44. R

C
&
)CR
"
!" 7#

Ä



=

 

In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away
with capriciously or for no reason at all. (Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) vs. Pineda [GR 59791, 13
February 1992])
!!! Case(s)

45. 


$

&'
)CR
" '
!" &#
 46. rC

3 
4 R
r
"& (
-
& 
" (

/+
c


 


C
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that ƠIf the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is 6% per annum.ơ Central Bank Circular 416 does not apply as it only applies to loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits. (National Power Corporation vs. Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992])
!!! Case(s)

47. rC

+

&(
)CR
7&
!" &#
48. R%-

)

c
C  
4 R
"*7'
&
5%
&




ï  
1. Issue  w
 p


A w
 exe
 my be 

ed by  

he lg by
he gveme
  ml


ex

 e
 m d
b

e d  de

mde by
he gveme

he m

eqvle


he 

ed vle 
he e
y

bje

 ex
. U mle w
h
he
e
eqeme

,
he 

e 
he w
 

 beme
m

el. (Bglg-  v. Bll, GR
139927 d 139936, 22 Nvembe 2000.)
I

me
ve
h
be e  
 

 


ed by
he C
 ex
 eedg

,
he
ll g eq

e
m

be me
: (1) Thee m

be  Cml
 ex

 e
 m d 

b

e; (2) A v
l de
em
  j

me

 
he e
e

gh

 be
ex
ed m

be mde by
he
l 

he b

 jdl (
leg
l
ve  exe
ve)
d
e
; d (3) The de

eqeme
de Se
 2, Rle 67 m

be mled 
h. (Ig v.
Gee [GR L-49088, 29 My 1987])
2. Remedy  
y 

lg vld
y  
 


A e

  eve ld 
hve bee e

ed
 
mh 

he de 
he
l 
g
g 

 

 
meely 
el
y m hh  el ld be
ke. Rle 45, §1 
he 1997
Rle
 Cvl Pede le
ly
 l jdgme

 de

he C
 Ael
,
he
Sdgby, d
he Regl Tl C
. A e

  e
 

he

ble emedy  ve 
Rle 65, §1 hh vde
ƠWhe y
bl, bd   e exe
g jdl  q
-jdl


h

ed 
h
  exe

 

 h
j
d
,  
h gve b
e  d
e

m
g
 lk  exe

 j
d
, d
hee 
 el,  y l,
eedy, d deq
e
emedy 
he dy 
e  l ,  e
 ggeved
heeby my le  ve ed e

 
he
e 
, llegg
he 


h e

y d yg
h
jdgme
be edeed llg 
md yg
he eedg

h
bl, bd   e, d g
g
h de
l ele

l
d j

e my eqe.ơ
!!! C
e(
)

49. C





,

)
 
4 R
r
"&
5%
&
&"

<
 

 

Ë
/
$$



$
%

 
Art. XII, Sec. 18
Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the
State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
Art. XIII, Sec. 9
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable
cost, decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Property held by a municipal corporation in its private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted control of
the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property against its will, except by the
exercise of eminent domain with payment of full compensation.ơ (McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd
Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).
In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The people of a compact community
usually require certain conveniences which cannot be furnished without a franchise from the State and
which are either unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a system of sewers, or parks and open spaces,
or which on account of the expenses it would be financially impossible to supply except where the
population is reasonably dense, such as water or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized
to exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is clothed with the capacities of a private corporation
and may claim its rights and immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities of
such a corporation, even as against third parties. (19 R.C.L. p. 698)
!!! Case(s)

50. C


+%

r



"'

""
!" 7 #
51. ;
-
+

$
r 

C

;
-
+

&&
)CR
"