02 PEOPLE v. TUBONGBANUA (Saldua) 1.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
Aug. 31, 2006 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Art. 11: Self-Defense
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
FACTS:
SUMMARY: Elberto was charged in an amended information of the crime of
murder. On 12 Feb. 2001 at 6PM, Elberto killed his employer Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho
with a kitchen knife at the latter’s condo. unit. Prosecution witnesses testified that
on the day prior to the crime, Elberto confided to Marian Aquino (the legal sec. of
the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle where Atty. Evelyn worked) that he was holding
grudges againt Atty. Evelyn such as being given spoiled food, his meals being
measured, he worked long hours, and served many bosses; that he could no longer
take the way Atty. Evelyn was treating him. Later, he said "nadedemonyo na ako"
and that he would finish Atty. Evelyn. He would hit her at the back, very deep, and
he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go to the province, his
territory, where he could not be followed. Elberto also told Atty. Joel Baguio (an
associate at the law firm) that he was holding grudges against Atty. Evelyn such as
she scolded Elberto for being late, and being called a thief, a killer, an ex-convict,
and other bad names. That on the day of the killing itself, Elberto told Atty. Baguio
not to get too close, as Atty. Baguio might get involved in what was going to
happen. For his part, Elberto insists his innocence and claimed self-defense. ISSUE:
WON Elberto’s claim of self-defense should be given credence? = NO. Elements of
self-defense are not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Elberto is guilty of murder.
Elberto must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-
defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing
evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1)
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self defense. Elberto’s version of the stabbing incident
does not inspire belief. His version that it was Atty. Evelyn who attacked him is
uncorroborated and improbable. Elberto’s alleged use of reasonable means to repel
the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on Atty. Evelyn which demonstrate a determined effort to kill her and not
just defend oneself. Atty. Evelyn suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed
to her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted
while she was parrying the blows coming from Elberto. In fact, Elberto testified that
Atty. Eveleyn was running away from him, but he still pursued her and inflicted the
fatal wounds. Moreover, Elberto’s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of
reporting the incident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed
innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self defense.
DOCTRINE: One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing.
Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the
justifying circumstance. 1. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following
elements of self defense must be established:
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self
defense.
1. Elberto Tubongbanua (Elberto) was charged with the crime of murder in an
amended information that alleged:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill
and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the
different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby
inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly
caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of
Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due
to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
2. In this case, Elberto was employed as a family driver by the victim, Atty.
Evelyn Sua-Kho (Evelyn) since 1998. Evelyn worked as the managing
partner of the lawfirm, Lawyer’s Advocate Circle in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. As the driver, Elberto was initially paid PHP 6,000 per
month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay whichi
he received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Evelyn’s
family.
3. On the day of the incident (12 Feb 2001), at around 6PM, Elberto drove
Atty. Evelyn to her cono. unit in Anapolis, Greenhills. After handing Atty.
Evelyn’s bag to Marissa Hiso (the housemaid), Elberto proceeed to the
kitchen where he drank a glass of water. At this time, Atty. Evelyn’s 3-year
old daughter, Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang were also in the condo.
4. After talking and playing w/ her daughter, Atty. Evelyn emerged from the
bedroom to talk with Elberto.
5. Shortly thereafter, Marissa heard Atty. Evelyn screaming, and then she saw
Elberto stabbing Atty. Evelyn with the kitchen knife. Marissa tried to stop
Elberto by shouting “Kuya Bert!”, but Elberto continued to stab Atty.
Evelyn.
6. Nelie also heard Atty. Evelyn’s screams, and locked herself and Issa in the
master’s bedroom. When Nelie peeped outside, she saw Marissa, and Nelie
signaled her to go downstairs for help. Marissa did so, and sought help from
the security guard. Meanwhlie, Nelie called Atty. Evelyn’s father,
Marcelino, and husband, Daniel using the bedroom phone.
 7. When Atty. Evelyn’s father arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in
front of the condo. unit. When 3 entered, they saw the bloodied and the
unmoving body of Atty. Evelyn sprawled on the floor.
8. Atty. Evelyn’s father brought her to the hospital where the doctors tried to
revive her, but failed. Meanwhile, Elberto fled using Atty. Evelyn’s car. He
was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his
home province.
9. Upon examination of the Atty. Evelyn’s body, Dr. Edgardo Vida found that
she suffered 18 stab wounds, 3 incise wounds, and other minor injuries. The
stab wounds on her chest was considered fatal bec. they affected both lungs,
the main blood vessel of the heart, and the hear itself. There were also 4
stab wounds on the heart, 1 stab wound on the right lung, and 4 on the left
lung. Accdg. to Dr. Vida, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp
single-bladed object and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm,
right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted while Atty. Evelyn tried to
parry the blows.
Testimony of Marian Aquino, the legal secretary of the Lawyer’s Advocate
Circle
10. Marian Aquino testified that prior to the killing, Elberto confided to Marian
that he was holding grudges againt Atty. Evelyn such as being given spoiled
food, his meals being measured, he worked long hours, and served many
bosses.
11. That the day before the incident (11 Feb.), Elberto spent the day at Marian’s
boarding house where Elberto told her that he could no longer take the way
Atty. Evelyn was treating him. Later, he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and
that he would finish Atty. Evelyn. He would hit her at the back, very deep,
and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go to the
province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Testimony of Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle
12. That before the killing, Elberto told Atty. Baguio that he was holding
grudges against Atty. Evelyn such as she scolded Elberto for being late, and
being called a thief, a killer, an ex-convict, and other bad names.
13. That on the day of the killing itself, Elberto told Atty. Baguio not to get too
close, as Atty. Baguio might get involved in what was going to happen.
Version of the accused, Elberto Tagbanua; Defense of Self-Defense
1. That Atty. Evelyn did not want her husband to know that she had been
taking trips w/ a company guest, Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and
Daranak Falls in Tanay.
2. That Atty. Evelyn warned Elberto that something bad would happen to him
her husband would find out.
3. That on the evening of the incident, Atty. Evelyn urged Elberto to go to her
father’s house, because her husband, Daniel would be arriving. That Elberto
and she got into an argument about Phillip Robinson; and during that
argument, Atty. Evelyn got a knife and stabbed Elberto; and that Elberto
was able to wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Evelyn 3 or
4 times.
4. That after stabbing her, he was shocked, and left the place using Atty.
Evelyn’s car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the
police.
Lower Court’s decisions:
1. RTC = Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder (Art. 248,
RPC) – penalty of death by lethat injection. Accessory penalties: actual,
moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums
of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He
is also ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the
victim's life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum
from this date until fully paid.
2. CA = Affirmed w/ modification: The awards of temperate and nominal
damages are hereby DELETED.
• Aggravating circumstances: 1) Dwelling; 2) Insult to rank, age,
and sex of the victim = disallowed bec. these prejudice the rights
of the accused as they were included as amendments to the
information after presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
3. Case automatically transmitted to SC on automatic review.
4. Elberto insisted on his theory of self-defense, and prayed for his acquittal.
ISSUE/s:
1. (Main Issue) WON Elberto’s claim of self-defense should be given
credence? = NO. Elements of self-defense are not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Elberto is guilty of murder.
2. WON the qualifying circumstances of Evident Premeditation was present?
= YES. Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio
testified as to Elberto’s state of mind and predisposition to avenge the
alleged maltreatment by the victim, and on Elberto’s ill-plans against his
employer the day prior to the crime.
3. WON the qualifying circumstance of Taking Advantage of Superior
Strength, was present? = YES. Elberto killed Atty. Evelyn by overpowering
her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times, despite her
attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act
without employing physical superiority over the victim.
4. WON the qualifying circumstances of Dwelling was present? = YES. No
dispute that Atty. Evelyn was killed in her home. Elberto could have killed
her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home.
 5. WON the qualifying circumstance of Treachery was present? = NO. No
proof on how the attack started. Thus, where there are no particulars known
as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which
resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by
treachery.
6. WON the qualifying circumstance of Insult/Disregard of the respect due to
the victim’s age, sex or rank was present? = NO. Not convincingly shown
that Elberto deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to
rank, age, or sex of Atty. Evelyn. The motive for the murder was his grudge
against the victim, and not because she was a lawyer and his employer.
Neither did Elberto took into consideration the age of Atty. Eveleyn, and
the fact that she is a woman when he killed her.
7. WON the qualifying circumstances of Dwelling, and Insult/Disregard of the
respect due to the victim’s age, sex or rank should be allowed as
amendments to the information? = YES. the insertion of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment.
These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original
information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely
affect any substantial right of Elberto.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01366, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by evident
premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of
superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable
penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The
appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from this date until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
On Self-Defense (Main Issue)
1. One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing.
Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove
the justifying circumstance.
2. Thus, Elberto must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and
convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be
established:
(1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self defense.
3. Elberto’s version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His
version that it was Atty. Evelyn who attacked him is uncorroborated and
improbable. Elberto’s alleged use of reasonable means to repel the
aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on Atty. Evelyn which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the
her and not just defend oneself.
4. Atty. Evelyn suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest,
heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while
she was parrying the blows coming from Elberto. In fact, Elberto testified
that Atty. Eveleyn was running away from him, but he still pursued her and
inflicted the fatal wounds.1
5. Moreover, Elberto’s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting
the incident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence
but highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self defense.
On the Absence of the Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery
1. Art. 14(16), RPC, Treachery is defined as:
The deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of
a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise.
2. Two Conditions must concur:
A. Employment of means of execution w/c would ensure the
safety of the offender from defensive & retaliatory acts of
the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend
herself; and
1 Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and
that was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir.
 B. The means, method, and manner of the execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offeder.
3. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself
4. In this case, there is no proof on how the attack started. Thus, where there
are no particulars known as to the manner in which the aggression was
made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and
developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the
killing was perpetrated by treachery.
On the Presence of the Qualifying Circumstances of 1) Evident Premeditation;
and 2) Taking Advantage of Superior Strength.
Evident Premeditation
1. Must be established by clear and positive evidence i.e. proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Essence of Premeditation: The execution of the act was preceded by cool
thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
3. Elements that must concur:
(1) The time when the accused decided to commit the crime
(2) An overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and
(3) Sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution, to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
4. In this case, Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel
Baguio testified as to Elberto’s state of mind and predisposition to
avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified
on Elberto’s ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime.
5. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely
testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit.
Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime.
Taking Advantage of Superior Strength
1. Elberto killed Atty. Evelyn by overpowering her and driving the murder
weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows.
He could not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical
superiority over the victim.
2. In People v. Espina, SC have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself.
On the allowance of the aggraving circumstances of 1) Dwelling; and 2)
Insult/Disregard of the Respect Due to Rank, Age or Sex.
1. Note that Dwelling was found to be present; and Insult of the Respect Due
to Rank, Age, or Sex was found to be absent.
A. Dwelling – No dispute that Atty. Evelyn was killed in her home.
Elberto could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the
crime at her home.
B. Insult/Disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex of the victim –
Not convincingly shown that Elberto deliberately intended to offend or
disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Evelyn. The
motive for the murder was his grudge against the victim, and not
because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did Elberto took
into consideration the age of Atty. Eveleyn, and the fact that she is a
woman when he killed her.
2. Art. 14, Rule 11, ROC: an amendment after the plea of the accused is
allowed only as to matters of form, provided 1) leave of court is obtained,
and 2) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
3. TEST WON AN AMENDMENT IS ONLY OF FORM & ACCUSED
IS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY:
A. WON a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made;
B. WON any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other.
If YES, for both, then the amendment is one of form, not of substance.
4. In this case, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is
clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not
have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the
charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
Elberto.
5. Besides, Elberto never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without
any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived.
 03 PEOPLE v. NARVAEZ (Saldua)
April 20, 1983 | Makasiar, J. | Art 11 & Unlawful Aggression against property rights
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Mamerto Narvaez
SUMMARY: At about 2:30 p.m. on 22 Aug. 1968, Mamerto who was taking a nap
after working on his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of
his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found
that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with
a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and
Fleischer was commanding his laborers. If the fencing would continue, Mamerto
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So
Mamerto addressed the group (and also addressing Rubia who was his compadre),
saying: “Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk
it over - what is good”. 1. However, Mamerto apparently lost his equilibrium and
he got his gun out and shot Davis, hitting him. As Davis went down, Rubia ran
towards the jeep w/c was parked on the highway, and since Mamerto knows that
there is a gun in the jeep, Mamerto fired at Rubia, also hittin him. Both Davis and
Rubia died as a result of the shooting. It appears, however, that this incident is
intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between 1) Fleischer and Co., Inc.
(of w/c, Davis was the Secretary-Treasurer, and Rubia was the Asst. Manager); and
2) the land settlers of Cotobato (among whom was Mamerto). [See Fact Nos. 12-13,
15-17] ISSUE is WON Mamerto can claim self-defense to exempt him from crim.
Liability? = NO. Special mitigating circumstance only of incomplete defense. Crime
committed is Homicide on 2 counts. 1st & 3rd element of self-defense are present.
Aggression against property rights is considered unlawful aggression as
contemplated in the RPC. There was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer
was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed
aggression, not on the person of Mamerto, but on his property rights. Following
Arts. 536 & 539 of the Civil Code, Davis Fleischer & Rubia had no right to destroy
or cause damage to Mamerto’s house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway
while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault
on Mamerto’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated
by law.
DOCTRINE: There is no question that there was aggression on the part of the
victims: Fleiseher was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing.
This was indeed aggression, not on the person of Mamerto, but on his property
rights. The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph I of Article
11, Revised Penal Code. When Mamerto fired his shotgun from his window, killing
his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. WE find, however,
that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of
fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was
only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for
the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation
at all.
FACTS:
1. Mamerto Narvaez was convicted in the lower courts of the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Facts on the Killing itself:
1. On 22 Aug. 1968, about 2:30PM, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar
Ibañez was with the 2 deceased, Davis Fleischer (Davis) and Flaviano
Rubia (Rubia). They were fencing the land of George Fleischer (father of
Davis F.). The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda
owned by George Fleischer in Maitum, South Cotobato.
2. At the place of fening is the house and rice drier of appellant, Mamerto
Narvaez (Mamerto). At the time the fencing happened, Mamerto was taking
a rest. But he was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was
being chiselled. He arose, and then he saw the fencing that was going on,
with one of the laborers chiselling the wall of his house using a crowbar
while Rubia was nailing the barbed wire, and Davis was commanding his
laborers.
3. If the fencing would continue, Mamerto would be prevented from getting
into his house and the bodega of his ricemill.
4. So Mamerto addressed the group (and also addressing Rubia who was his
compadre), saying: “Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if
possible we will talk it over - what is good”.
5. However, Mamerto apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun out
and shot Davis, hitting him. As Davis went down, Rubia ran towards the
jeep w/c was parked on the highway, and since Mamerto knows that there is
a gun in the jeep, Mamerto fired at Rubia, also hittin him. Both Davis and
Rubia died as a result of the shooting.
6. It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out
legal battle between 1) Fleischer and Co., Inc. (of w/c, Davis was the
Secretary-Treasurer, and Rubia was the Asst. Manager); and 2) the land
settlers of Cotobato (among whom was Mamerto).
Antecedent Facts:
7. Mamerto Narvaez was among those from northern & central Luzon who
went to Mindanao in 1937, and settled in Maitum, South Cotobato.
Mamerto established his residence there, built his house, and cultivated the
area. He was also one of those people who petitioned then Pres. Manuel L.
Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and
Kalaogn Plantation (2,000 ha. In total) for distribution among the settlers.
8. Shortly after, Fleischer and Co., Inc. headed by George W. Fleischer, an
American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed Sales Application No. 21983
 on June 3, 1987 over the same area formerly belonging to and later
abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company w/c covered 1,017 ha.
9. Meanwhile, subdivision (mentioned in Fact #6) was ordered. A public land
surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 although the survey report was not
submitted until 1946 bec. of WWII. Accdg. to the survey, only 300 ha.
(identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26, and 38) were set aside for the Sales
Application filed by Fleischer and Co., Inc., while the rest were subdivided
into sublots of 5-6 ha. w/c were to be distributed among the land settlers.
10. The 300 ha. Set aisde for the sales application of Fleischer and Co., Inc.,
wre declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for public
auction at the public auction held on Aug. 14, 1948, Fleischer and Co., Inc.,
was the only bidder (for the amt. of PHP 6,000), but the corresponding
award in its favor was held in abeyance due to protests from the settlers.
11. So an invesetigator was sent by the Dir. of Lands in the person of Atty. Jose
T. Gozon. Atty. Gozon came back after 10 days w/ an amicable settlement
signed by the rep. of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later
repudiated by the settlers, but the Dir. of Lands approved it and ordered the
formal award of the subject land to Fleischer and Co., Inc. The settlers
appealed to the Sec. of Agriculture & Natural Resources who affirmed the
decision in favor of Fleischer and Co., Inc.
12. On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 (Civil Case 1) for
the purpose of annulling the order of the Sec. of Agri. & Natural Resources
(w/c awarded the contested land to Fleischer and Co., Inc.). But the settlers
lost because of the amicable settlement w/c they had repudiated due to
threats & intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, and fraudulent
machinations on the part of Fleischer and Co., Inc. The settlers appealed it
to the CA, but CA just affirmed the decision of the CFI.
13. As a result, CFI issued an order w/c ousted the settlers from the land w/c
they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was
Mamerto Narvaez, who voluntarily dismanted his house to avoid trouble
(w/c was built in 1947 costing PHP 20,000) and transferred to his other
house w/c he built in 1962 near the highway.
14. The 2nd house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. The ground
floor has a store operated by Mrs. Talens who was also renting a portion of
it. Mamerto also has a store w/c he transferred to his 2 nd house. He also had
a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house, and a concrete
pavement bet. the rice mill and the house, w/c was used for drying grains &
copra.
15. On Nov. 14 1966, Civil Case No. 755 (Civil Case 2) was filed byJose V.
Gamboa et al. on behalf of the settlers (among whom was Mamerto) for the
purpose of obtaining an injunction/annulment of the order of award to
Fleischer & Co., Inc. w/ prayer for preliminary injunction.
16. During the pendency of Civil Case 2, Mamerto entered into a Contract of
Lease on Feb. 21, 1967 w/ Fleischer and Co., Inc. whereby he agreed to
lease an area of approx.. 100-140 sqm. of Lot No. 38 from Fleischer and
Co., Inc. for a monthly consideration of PHP 16.00.
17. Accdg. to Mamerto, he signed the contract, although the ownership of the
land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of
ownership could be decided. However, Mamerto never paid the agreed
rental (although he alleged that the milling job they did for Rubia was
considered payment), so Davis Fleischer wrote him a letter dated June 25,
1968 w/c terminated the lease contract, since he has not paid 6 months
rental despite demand, and demanded that Mamerto remove his house,
ricemill, bodega & water pitcher pumps from the land w/in 6 months (or
Dec. 21, 1966), and that failure to remove them w/in that peiord, Fleischer
and Co., Inc. will immediately demolish them.
18. On Aug. 21, 1968, Davis & Rubia together w/ other laboreres of Fleischer
and Co., Inc. started to fence Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the
property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the
concrete drier of Mamerto, thereby cutting diagonally across its center),
with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house.
19. When finished, the fence would have the effect of shutting off the
accessibility to Mamerto’s house and rice mill from the highway, since the
door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on
that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of
barbed wire to the posts.
20. Mamerto surrendered to the police after that, bringing with him the shotgun,
and claming he shot 2 persons.
21. Mamerto is claiming before the SC that he acted in defense of his person
and of his rights, so he should be exempt from crim. Liability.
ISSUE/s:
1. (Main Issue) WON Mamerto can claim self-defense to exempt him from
crim. Liability? = NO. Special mitigating circumstance only of incomplete
defense. Crime committed is Homicide on 2 counts. 1st & 3rd element of
self-defense are present. Aggression against property rights is considered
unlawful aggression as contemplated in the RPC.
2. WON aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present? = NO.
There is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims
nor that Mamerto premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated
act. Evident premeditation is further negated by Mamerto pleading with the
victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over
just before the shooting.
3. WON mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present? = YES He
immediately surrendered to the police.
4. WON mitigating circumstance of passion & obfuscation is present? = YES.
Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where Mamerto had 30 years
 earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes
of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the
hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded - all these
could be too much for any man — he should be credited with this
mitigating circumstance.
RULING: Wherefore, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of only two (2)
homicides, mitigated by the privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense as
well as by two (2) generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation,
without any aggravating circumstance, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, to indemnify each group of heirs of davis
fleischer and of flaviano rubia in the sum of four thousand (p4,000.00) pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment and without any award for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years now since
his voluntary surrender on august 22, 1968, his immediate release is hereby ordered. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Art. 11, par. 1, RPC. Requisites of Self-Defense that must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
2. The aggression referred to by mamerto is the angry utterance by Davis
Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", w/c was
in answer to Mamerto’s request addressed to his compadre Rubia, when he
said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti".
3. Mamerto’s utterance/reaction as due to his having been awakened to see the
wall of his house being chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the
Davis Fleischer & Rubia were on the ground doing the fencing and
Mamerto was up in his house looking out of his window. According to
Mamerto, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my
senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I
shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer".
4. As for the shooting of Rubia, Mamerto said that: “When I shot Davis
Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr.
Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia
ran toward s the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and
thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him".
5. Statements in Ratio Nos. 3 & 4 were never controverted by the prosecution.
Prosecution, however, claimed that Fleischer & Rubia were in lawful
exercise of their rights of ownership over the subject land when they did the
fencing that sealed off Mamerto’s access to the highway.
Unlawful Aggression on the part of Fleischer & Rubia against the property
rights of Mamerto – 1st element of Self-Defense present
Aggression
6. 5 persons, consisting of Davis & Rubio, and their three laborers, were doing
the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house, The fence they
were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed
strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools
which could be lethal weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo
cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets.
7. When Mamerto woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first
reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being
done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will
be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore
appealed to his compadre Rubia to stop what they were doing and to talk
things over with him. But Davis Fleischer answered angrily with "gademit"
and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
8. The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of
the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house
and rice mill — which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress.
9. Thus, there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was
ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was
indeed aggression, not on the person of Mamerto, but on his property
rights.
Property Rights
1. While Art. 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to
enclose/fence his land, at the time of the incident on Aug. 22, 1968, Civil
Case 2 (See Fact No. 15) was still pending in CFI Cotobato. Thus, the
parties could not have known that Civil Case 2 would be dismissed over a
year after the incident.
• Civil Case 2 was dismissed on Jan. 23, 1970 on ground of res
judicata due to the dismissal in 1965 of Civil Case 1 (w/c was filed
in 1950 [see Fact No. 12]) bet. the same parties w/c Fleischer &
Co., Inc. won by virtue of the amicable settlement signed by the
settlers inspite of its repudiation by the latter; that such 1970
dismissal of Civil Case 2 also carried the dismissal of the
supplemental petition filed by the Rep. of the Philippines on Nov.
28, 1968 for the purpose of annulling the sales patent & cancelling
the corresponding cert. of title issued to Fleischer & Co., Inc.
2. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that Mamerto was indeed hoping for a
favorable judgment in Civil Case 2. His execution of the lease contract was
just to avoid trouble.
3. In any case, Davis Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 within
which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful
 enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of
his house and closing Mamerto’s entrance and exit to the highway.
4. Following Arts. 536 & 5392 of the Civil Code, Davis Fleischer & Rubia
had no right to destroy or cause damage to Mamerto’s house, nor to
close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them
to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on Mamerto’s
property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated
by law.
Unlawful Aggression against Property Rights
1. In this case, there was an actual physical invasion of Mamerto’s property
w/c he had the right to resist pursuant to Art. 429, Civil Code. 3
Reasonableness of the means employed – 2nd element not present
1. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two
victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself – 3rd
element present
1. There was no provocation at all on Mamerto’s part, since he was asleep at
first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their
laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things
over with him was no provocation at all.
Evident premeditation not present
1. Testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, resident of Maitum, South
Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company (only evidence presented
to prove treachery) is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of evident
premeditation.
2. The obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of Davis
Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
3. Since in this case, there was no direct evidence of the planning or
preparation to kill the victims nor that Mamerto premeditated the killing,
and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the
presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
2 Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
3 Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.
4. Evident premeditation is further negated by Mamerto pleading with the
victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over
just before the shooting.
Other mitigating circumstances present
Voluntary Surrender
1. Mamerto surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.
Passion & Obfuscation
1. Mamerto awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the
highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his
house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing
down for lack of access to the highway.
2. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was
dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must
have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason
causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his
rights.
3. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where Mamerto had 30 years
earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes
of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the
hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded - all these
could be too much for any man — he should be credited with this
mitigating circumstance.
DISSENTING:
Abad-Santos, J
1. I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful
aggression on persons, not property.
Gutierrez, Jr., J
1. An attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable element
where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically defended is only
property.
2. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life.
3. Defense of property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form
of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of
property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions
for murder or homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one getting
the property on the person defending it.
4. In this case, absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less
made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit,
 proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant
to the pela of self-defense.
5. That the crime is homicide but without any privileged mitigating
circumstance.
 04 TY v. PEOPLE (Saldua)
Sept. 27, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Art. 11, par. 4: Avoidanace of a greater evil/injury
PETITIONER: Vicky C. Ty
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Vicky C. Ty (Ty) was found guilty by the lower courts for 7 counts
of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). She issued 7 postdated checks as
payment for the hospital bills of her mother and sister at the Manila Doctor’s
Hospital. However, the checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds with
“Account Closed” advice. The Hospital then demanded payment, but it went
unheeded so they filed 7 crim. Informations against Ty. For her defense, Ty claimed
that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury”. ISSUE is WON TY issued the
checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury as to exempt her from criminal liability? = NO.
SC held that under the circumstances, neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a
greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
To warrant her exemption from criminal liability on the ground of defense of
uncontrollable fear, the ff. requisites must concur: (1) Existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) The fear must be real & imminent; and (3) The fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. To warrant an exemption
from criminal liability on the ground of avoidance of a greater evil/injury, the ff.
requisities must concur: (1) That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2)
That the injury feared be greater that the one done to avoid it; and (3) That there be
no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. In the 1st case, any fear
(i.e. that she was compelled to issue the checks for fear that her mother's health
might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her
mother might commit suicide) harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. It is just
speculative fear, and not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. The fear Ty
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to
make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital's threats
or demands. In the 2nd case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage
of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had
the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to
secure her obligation. Moreover, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought
about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills, and so there was willful
inaction on Ty’s part.
DOCTRINE:
Uncontrollable fear of a greater injury – It must appear that the threat that caused
the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one's life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should
not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must
show, therefore, that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
Avoidance of a greater evil/injury – The evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.
FACTS:
1. Vicky C. Ty (Ty) was found guilty by the lower courts for 7 counts of
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
2. Ty’s mother, Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctor’s
Hsospital (Hospital) from 30 Oct. 1990 – 4 June 1992. As the patient’s
daughter, Ty signed “Acknowledgement of Responsibility of Payment” in
the Contract of Admission dated 30 Oct. 1990. As of 4 June 1992, the
Statement of Account shows a total liability of PHP 657,182.40.
3. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua was also confied at the hospital from 13 June 1991 –
2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amt. of PHP 418,410.55. So total
amt. of liability of the 2 patients to the hospital is PHP 1,075,592.95.
4. ON 5 June 1992 Ty executd a promissory note where she assumed payment
of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she
drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital.
5. The 7 checks, each covering the amt. of PHP 30,000 were all deposited on
their due dates, but they were all dishonored by the drawee bank, and
returned unpaid to the Hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the
“Account Closed” advice.
6. So the Hospital sent demand letters to Ty. As the demand letters went
unheeded, the Hospital filed 7 informations subject of this case.
Ty’s Defense
7. That she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a graeter
injury”.
8. She claimed that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom she alleged was inhumanely & hrashly treated by the
hospital, and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.
9. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as air-
condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences
such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother's
food and refusal to change the latter's gown and bedsheets, and that the
hospital was suspending medical treatment of her mother.
10. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother's mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her
mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled
 to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the
checks to effect her mother's immediate discharge.
11. RTC = found Ty guilty of 7 counts of violation of BP 22, and sentencing
her to a prison term.
12. CA = ffirmed w/ modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and
instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of PHP 60,000 equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.
13. Ty went up to SC alleging the same claims she raised in the CA:
(1) That she issued the checks “under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury”.
(2) That the RTC erred in finding her guilty when evidence
showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the
issuance of the checks.
(3) Payee hospital had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in
the account.
ISSUE/s:
1. (Main Issue) WON TY issued the checks under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
injury as to exempt her from criminal liability? = NO.
2. WON there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the
checks? = NO.
3. WON Payee hospital had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the
account as to remove her criminal liability? = NO. Payee’s knowledge or
lack thereof is immaterial in a violation of BP22.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is
ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject
of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance
with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant,
Manila Doctors' Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00)
representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1st Issue:
1. SC held that under the circumstances, neither uncontrollable fear nor
avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced
checks.
Uncontrollable fear of a greater injury (Art. 12, par. 6):
1. To warrant her exemption from criminal liability on the ground of defense
of uncontrollable fear, the ff. requisites must concur:
(1) Existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) The fear must be real & imminent;
(3) The fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
2. It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or
limb.
3. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show,
therefore, that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must
be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
4. In this case, any fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. It is just
speculative fear, and not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
5. Note that Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks — a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could
be discharged — for fear that her mother's health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide.
6. First, there was no showing that the mother's illness was so life-threatening
such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical
treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Second,
it is not the law's intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less Ty’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide.
7. Thus, the fear Ty invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive
her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospital's threats or demands.
8. Further, it was not true that she was left with no choice but to commit a
crime, as she claims. By her very own words, Ty admitted that the collateral
or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be
in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if she really was coerced to
open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
9. Ty had sufficient knowedlge that the issuance of checks without funds may
result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised
her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks "because the
moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem."
Avoidance of a greater evil or injury (Art. 11, par. 4):
1. To warrant an exemption from criminal liability, the ff. requisities must
concur:
(1) That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) That the injury feared be greater that the one done to avoid it;
(3) That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
 2. The greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.
3. In this case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated.
If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.
4. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other
forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty's
own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills, and so there was willful
inaction on Ty’s part.
2nd Issue:
1. It is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.
2. Sec. 24, NIL creates a presumption that every party to an instrument
acquired the same for a consideration or for value. In alleging otherwise, Ty
has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration. She
must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption. But Ty
failed to discharge her burden of proof.
3. Valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in
favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
4. In this case, Ty's mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities
of the hospital. For the care given to her relatives, Ty had a legitimate
obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by
force of her signature on her mother's Contract of Admission
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she
executed in favor of the hospital.
5. Ty’s claim that that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her
personal obligation because she was not the patient is of no matter. the case
of Bridges v. Vann, et al. SC has held that it is no defense to an action on a
promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration which
was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a
benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the
promisee, at the instance of the promissor.
6. At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to
its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely
guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation. Sec. 2 of BP 22 itself
creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.4
4
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
3rd Issue:
1. The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the
drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential
element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof
is inconsequential.
Just in case Sir asks:
Deletion of penalty of imprisonment by the CA
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000, adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals and Lim v. People authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. But
Administrative Circular 13-2001 clarified Administrative Circular 12-
2000 stating that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not
to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
2. Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of
a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
3. Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
4. Thus:
(1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22;
(2) Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
Sshould only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment.
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.