1
1. SAN FERNANDO COCA-COLA RANK-AND-FILE UNION
(SACORU), represented by its President, ALFREDO R. MARAÑON,
petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (CCBPI),
respondent.
Facts:
On May 29, 2009, the private respondent company, Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines., Inc. (CCBPI) issued notices of termination to 27 rank-and-file,
regular employees and members of the San Fernando Rank-and-File
Union (SACORU), collectively referred to as "union members", on the ground
of redundancy due to the ceding out of two selling and distribution systems,
the Conventional Route System (CRS) and Mini Bodega System (MB) to
the Market Execution Partners (MEPS'), better known as "Dealership
System". The termination of employment was made effective on June 30,
2009, but the union members were no longer required to report for work as
they were put on leave of absence with pay until the effectivity date of their
termination. The union members were also granted individual separation
packages, which 22 of them accepted, but under protest.
To SACORU, the systems adopted and implemented by CCBPI would result
in the diminution of the union membership amounting to union busting and to
a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provision against
contracting out of services or outsourcing of regular positions; hence, they
filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) on June 3, 2009 on the ground of unfair labor practice, among
others. On June 11, 2009, SACORU conducted a strike vote where a majority
decided on conducting a strike.
On June 23, 2009, the then Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), Marianito D. Roque, assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute by certifying for compulsory arbitration the issues raised in the
notice of strike. Meanwhile, pending hearing of the certified case, SACORU
filed a motion for execution praying that the dismissal of the union members
not be pushed through because it would violate the order of the DOLE
Secretary not to commit any act that would exacerbate the situation. However,
the resolution was ordered deferred and suspended; instead, the issue was
treated as an item to be resolved jointly with the main labor dispute.
CCBPI, for its part, argued that the new business scheme is basically a
management prerogative designed to improve the system of selling and
distributing products. They also contended that there was a need to improve its
distribution system if it wanted to remain viable and competitive in the
business.
The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and declared as
valid the dismissal of the employees due to redundancy. Likewise, the
Union's Motion for Writ of Execution is Denied for lack of merit. SACORU
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA. The CA, however, dismissed the petition and found that the NLRC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion. SACORU moved for reconsideration of
the CA Decision but this was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
a. Whether CCBPI validly implemented its redundancy program.
b. Whether CCBPI's implementation of the redundancy program was an unfair
labor practice.
c. Whether CCBPI should have enjoined the effectivity of the termination of
the employment of the 27 affected union members when the DOLE Secretary
assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute.
Ruling: The petition is partly granted.
a. Yes. The CCBPI's redundancy program is valid. The NLRC ruled that the
termination was due to a scheme that CCBPI adopted and implemented which
was an exercise of management prerogative, and that there was no proof that it
was exercised in a malicious or arbitrary manner. Even if it cause the
termination of some 27 employees, it was not in violation of their right to self-
organization much more in violation of their right to security of tenure
because the essential freedom to manage business remains with management.
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
b. No. The CCBPI did not commit an unfair labor practice. The same
principle of according finality to the factual findings of the NLRC and CA
applies to the determination of whether CCBPI committed an unfair labor
practice. As held in Zambrano v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp., to
prove the existence of unfair labor practice, substantial evidence has to be
presented. Here, the NLRC found that SACORU failed to provide the required
substantial evidence. Thus, the consequent dismissal of 27 regular members of
the complainant's union due to redundancy is not per se an act of unfair labor
practice amounting to union busting. It cannot safely be said that respondent
company acted in bad faith in terminating their services because the
termination was not without a valid reason.
c. The Court rules in favor of SACORU. Under Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over
the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Thus, the Respondent is
directed to pay the 27 employees backwages from July 1, 2009 until March
16, 2010, and to re-compute their separation pay taking into consideration that
the termination of their employment is effective March 16, 2010.
2. Manggawa ng Komunikasyon ng Pilipinas vs. PLDT (2017)
Facts:
On June 27, 2002, the labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa
Pilipinas, which represented the employees of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board. 9 Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas charged
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company with unfair labor practice "for
transferring several employees of its Provisioning Support Division to
Bicutan, Taguig." 
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas accused Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company of the following unfair labor practices:
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit:
1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division. Such
action, together with the consequent redundancy of PSD
employees and the farming out of the jobs to casuals and
contractuals, violates the duty to bargain collectively with MKP in
good faith.
2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before
this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive
plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/ reorganization and
closure of exchanges. Such refusal violates its duty to bargain
collectively with MKP in good faith.
3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary,"
"project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed by
union members, resulting in the decimation of the union
membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to
the concerned employees.
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas filed another notice of strike and
accused Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company of restructuring of its
[Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services December 31, 2002 and its
closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, Lucena,
Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December 31, 2002.
These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of MKP's members
and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit.
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas went on strike.  Subsequently,
Long Distance Telephone Company declared only 323 employees as
redundant as it was able to redeploy 180 of the 503 affected employees to
other positions.
Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT to
the NLRC compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor Code.
 2
All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four
(24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due
to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the striking workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties
are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might
worsen the situation.
National Labor Relations Commission dismissed Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas' charges of unfair labor practices against
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. It held that Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company's redundancy program in 2002 was valid and
did not constitute unfair legal practice. 26 The redundancy program was due to
the decline of subscribers for long distance calls and to fixed line services
produced by technological advances in the communications industry. 27 The
National Labor Relations Commission ruled that the termination of
employment of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's employees
due to redundancy was legal.
Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals, the same court ruled that the National
Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it found that Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's declaration of
redundancy was justified and valid, as the redundancy program was based on
substantial evidence.
Argument of Petitioner: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
failed to submit evidence in support of its declaration of redundancy of the 35
rank-and-file employees in the Provisioning Support Division. 50 It claimed
that "[Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company] only notified [the
Department of Labor and Employment] of the 'closure of traffic operations at
Regional Operator Services affecting three hundred ninety-two (392)
employees and the restructuring of [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operator
Services affecting one hundred eleven (111) employees."
Argument of PLDT: Validity of redundancy of the affected Provisioning
Support Division employees was only raised by Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas for the first time on appeal. It asserts that the real
issue in that case was whether Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
was obligated to transfer the affected Provisioning Support Division
employees, and not whether their redundancies were valid. 58 It further
maintains that the affected Provisioning Support Division personnel were
given the opportunity to apply for another division, yet they chose not to.
Issues:
(1) WoN declaration of redundancy by PLDT was valid. YES
(2) WoN the return-to-work order of the secretary of labor and employment
was rendered moot when the NLRC upheld the validity of the
redundancy program. YES
Ruling:
(1) YES, declaration of redundancy by PLDT was valid.
Redundancy is one of the authorized causes for the termination of
employment provided for in Article 298 76 of the Labor Code, as amended:
Article 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one
(1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
Wiltshire File Co. Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission 77 has
explained that redundancy exists when "the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the
enterprise."78 While a declaration of redundancy is ultimately a management
decision in exercising its business judgment, and the employer is not obligated
to keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day to-day
operations,79 management must not violate the law nor declare redundancy
without sufficient basis. 80
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission 81 listed
down the elements for the valid implementation of a redundancy program:
For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer
must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both
the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant
positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions
are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. 82 (Citations omitted)
To establish good faith, the company must provide substantial proof that the
services of the employees are in excess of what is required of the company,
and that fair and reasonable criteria were used to determine the redundant
positions. 83
3. Allan M. Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union
(MWEU)
GR No. 201595 January 25, 2016
FACTS:
 Mendoza was a member of MWEU, a DOLE-registered labor
organization consisting of rank-and-file employees within Manila
Water Company (MWC) while respondents were MWEU officers.
 In 2007, MWEU through Cometa informed petitioner Mendoza
that the union was not able to fully deduct the increased P200.00
union dues from his salary due to lack of the required check-off
authorization from him. Mendoza was warned that his failure to
pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him.
 The MWEU grievance committee recommended that Mendoza be
suspended for 30 days and was unanimously approved.
 Mendoza filed an appeal but was denied.
 Consequently, MWEU scheduled an election of officers and
Mendoza filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice President but
he was disqualified for not being a member in good standing on
account of his suspension.
 For the third time, Mendoza was charged with non-payment of
union dues and for failure to attend the hearing, he was meted with
the penalty of expulsion from the union, per “unanimous approval”
of the members of the Executive Board. His pleas for an appeal to
the General Membership Assembly were once more unheeded.
 In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new
CBA with MWC, Mendoza joined another union, the Workers
Association for Transparency, Empowerment and Reform, All-
Filipino Workers Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was
elected Union President.
 In seeking recourse to the LA, NLRC and CA, the complaint for
ULP filed by Mendoza against respondents was dismissed on the
ground among others, that the complaint covers intra-union
disputes which the mentioned authorities do not have jurisdiction.
It ruled that petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence on the
violations of the respondents against his right to appeal and self-
organization.
ISSUE:
 3
W/N respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice.
HELD:
Yes. ULP may be committed both by the employer under Art. 248 and by
labor organizations under Art. 249 of the Labor Code. Documentary evidence
is clear that when Mendoza received a letter about his suspension, he
immediately filed a written appeal. However, the Executive Board did not act.
The Court finds that Mendoza was illegally suspended and thereafter
unlawfully expelled from MWE due to respondent’s failure to act on his
written appeal.
Mendoza was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his
right to run for the position of MWEU Vice President, expelled from MWEU
and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these, respondents are
guilty of ULP Under Art. 249 (a) and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s
right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of
his union-membership – which case falls within the jurisdiction of the LA, in
accordance with Art. 213 of the Labor Code.
4. G.R. No. 204693, July 13, 2016
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v. GUAGUA
NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA
NATIONAL COLLEGES NON-TEACHING AND MAINTENANCE
LABOR UNION, Respondents.
FACTS
GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua,
Pampanga. On the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty
Labor Union (GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and
Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU) were the bargaining agents for
GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and maintenance personnel,
respectively.
Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their
Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA
effective June 1, 1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA),3 the economic
provisions of which were renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-
1999;4 (2) CBA effective June 1,1999 to May 31, 2004,5 the economic
provisions of which were renegotiated on July 4, 2002 for years 2002-2004;6
and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2009.7 The aforementioned
CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without distinction.
Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause under
Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance
resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was considered carried
over in the subsequent CBAs.8chanrobleslaw
On April 3, 2009, the Presidents of both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU, wrote
the President of GNC, Atty. Ricardo V. Puno (Atty. Puno), to inform him of
the former's intention to open the negotiation for the renewal of the then
existing CBA which would expire on May 31, 2009.9 Attached to the said
letter was respondents' proposal for the next CBA10 which was received by
GNC on even date.
While GNC asserted in general terms that the parties exchanged proposals and
counter-proposals in the months that followed,15 respondents, on the other
hand, detailed the negotiations that allegedly ensued between the parties,16 to
wit: (1) another meeting was held on June 16, 2009 but since GNC at that time
still did not have any reply/counter-proposal to respondents' proposal, it asked
for three weeks to submit the same; (2) in their July 10, 2009 meeting, GNC
failed to submit its purported counter-proposal; (3) in the meeting of July 31,
2009, Cita Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the school treasurer and a member of the
management panel, discussed with respondents some of the economic items in
respondents' proposal, particularly those relating to longevity pay, birthday
gift, family assistance, medical check-up and clothing allowance; (4) the
parties discussed further on longevity pay and family assistance benefit in the
August 11, 2009 meeting. They also talked about an increase in rice subsidy;
(5) in the August 17, 2009 meeting, Rodriguez stated that based on GNC's
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
Faculty Manual of 2008, longevity pay shall be given according to the number
of years of service and shall be deemed as loyalty pay. The parties then agreed
to an increase of P5.00 in the longevity pay previously being given; (6) in the
following meeting of August 24, 2009, Rodriguez announced the increased
benefits included in the new CBA, to wit: loyalty pay, cash gift, rice subsidy,
birthday gift and clothing allowance. Rodriguez likewise confirmed the grant
of a Union Office at the 3rd floor of Goseco Building in GNC. However,
respondents' demand for an increased signing bonus of P100,000.00 for each
union (previously given at P50,000.00 each union) remained unsettled.
Nevertheless, the parties agreed to further discuss the matter; (7) on
September 23, 2009, respondents submitted to GNC a draft of the CBA
containing all the benefits agreed upon. GNC requested that some revisions be
made thereon; (8) Atty. Sampang called for a meeting on October 9, 2009. In
the said meeting, the parties reviewed all the benefits agreed on. Rodriguez
then stated that the signing of the next CBA may take place the following
meeting; (9) on October 15,2009, respondents submitted to Atty. Sampang the
agreed terms of the CBA which already contained the revisions requested by
GNC and the P100,000.00 signing bonus for each union. The document
according to them was by then ready for signing; (10) respondents made
several follow-ups with both Atty. Sampang and Rodriguez regarding the
signing of the CBA but to no avail; (11) respondents received from Atty:
Sampang, through a letter17 dated December 21, 2009, GNC's counter-
proposal.18 Respondents were surprised since they thought all along that all
matters, except for some details on the signing bonus, were already settled.
Besides, the three-week period previously requested by GNC within which to
submit its counter-proposal had long lapsed; (12) Atty. Sampang requested
respondents to attend a meeting with Atty. Puno on January 5, 2010. Despite
Atty. Puno's presence in the school premises, he did not, however, face
respondents' representatives who waited for him for a considerable length of
time; (13) in view of the foregoing, respondents were constrained to write
Atty. Puno on January 8, 2010.19 They stressed that while they have been
bargaining in good faith, it was otherwise on the part of GNC. Respondents
thus expressed their belief that the parties have already reached an impasse.
They therefore asked GNC to respond to their letter and therein state its stand
as to whether a third party is needed to assist them in threshing out their
differences. As respondents did not get any reply from GNC, they filed on
February 3, 2010 a preventive mediation case with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
Again, the parties differ in their account of what transpired before the NCMB.
In view of the notice of strike, the NCMB called for a conciliation conference
on June 4, 2010 which was later set for continuation on June 9, 2010.
Meanwhile on June 7, 2010, GNC filed with the NCMB its counter-
proposal25cralawred to respondents' purported final CBA draft.
Subsequently during the June 9, 2010 conference, GNC filed a Motion to
Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and
Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.26 It
invoked the "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provision of the parties' existing CBA which was carried
over from their 1994-1999 CBA and the CBAs subsequent thereto. According
to it, the four grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike, i.e., bad
faith bargaining, violation of the duty to bargain, gross violation of the
provisions of the CBA, and gross and blatant diminution of benefits, all come
within the definition of "grievance" under their CBA, hence, not strikeable.
In the afternoon of the same day, respondents conducted their respective
Strike Votes wherein majority voted in favor of a strike.27 They then
informed the NCMB of the strike vote results on June 21,
2010.28chanrobleslaw
Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to Strike Out Notice
of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary
Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement despite the
looming strike of respondents, GNC urged the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.29 It specifically prayed
in its letter of June 24, 2010 that the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
pursuant to Article 263(g)30 of the Labor Code "assume jurisdiction over the
labor dispute between GNC and the Unions, i.e., GNCFLU and
GNCNTMLU[,] in order to enjoin the intended strike x x x and thereafter
 4
direct the parties to submit the dispute to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provisions of the CBA."31chanrobleslaw
In an Order32 dated June 28, 2010, the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
after finding the subject labor dispute as one affecting national interest,
assumed jurisdiction over the case; certified the same to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for immediate compulsory arbitration; and,
accordingly enjoined the intended strike.
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
Anent the merits of the case, the NLRC held that based on the totality of
conduct of GNC, it was guilty of bad faith bargaining and therefore committed
an unfair labor practice. This was on account of GNC's submission of a
counterproposal despite the parties already having reached an agreement
regarding the terms of the CBA. To the NLRC, the belated submission of
GNC's counterproposal was intended to evade the execution of the CBA. With
respect to GNC's alleged withdrawal of employees' benefits, the NLRC ruled
that pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the parties have the duty to
keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of their existing agreement within 60 days prior to the expiration
thereof and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The NLRC,
thus, held that GNC failed to abide by this duty when it discontinued the
release of benefits pending the conclusion of a new CBA. Finally, pursuant to
General Milling Corporation v. Court of Appeals,39 the NLRC deemed it
proper to declare the final draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB as the
parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31,2014.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision44 dated September 26, 2012, the CA did not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC in issuing its assailed orders. Hence,
it denied the Petition for lack of merit. GNC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration45 thereto which, however, was likewise denied in the
Resolution46 dated December 3, 2012.
ISSUES
1. Whether the subject labor dispute should have been ordered submitted
to voluntary arbitration by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
pursuant to the parties' CBA and not certified to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration;
2. Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus violated its
duty to bargain;
3. Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB
was correctly declared to be the parties' CBA for the period June 1,
2009 to May 31, 2014
HELD
The Secretary of Labor and Employment
correctly certified the subject labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out"
policy and to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a
notice of strike in light of the facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, no
lock-out" provision in the CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an] employer
when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage
or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by
law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on unfair labor
practice."48 Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds in their notice
of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily impelled them to file
said notice was their perception of bad faith bargaining and violation of the
duty to bargain collectively by GNC - charges which constitute unfair labor
practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code.49chanrobleslaw
To recall, respondents acted prudently when they filed a preventive mediation
case the first time that GNC refused to acknowledge at the plant level that the
parties already agreed on the terms of their incoming CBA. However, GNC
again rebuffed that the parties had already entered into an agreement when
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
respondents submitted the purported final CBA draft of the parties to the
NCMB. Hence, respondents cannot be faulted into believing that GNC was
bargaining in bad faith and had no genuine intention to comply with its duty to
bargain collectively since it denied arriving at an agreement with respondents
not once but twice. This belief in good faith prompted them to file a notice of
strike. Clearly, respondents' intention was to protest what they perceived to be
acts of unfair labor practice on the part of GNC through the exercise of their
right to strike enshrined in the Constitution and not to circumvent the "no
strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration provision of the CBA.
GNC's alleged commission of unfair labor practice, did not arise from the
interpretation or implementation of the parties' CBA, or neither from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Hence, it does
not fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator
or panel of voluntary arbitrators under the aforementioned Article 261. Be that
as it may, GNC argues that since the grounds cited by respondents in their
notice of strike come within the scope of "grievance" under the grievance
resolution and voluntary arbitration provision of the parties' CBA, the same is
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator. Otherwise stated, since the parties
allegedly agreed to submit a dispute of this kind to their CBA's grievance
resolution procedure which ends in voluntary arbitration, it is the voluntary
arbitrator which has jurisdiction in view of Article 262 of the Labor Code.
In trie absence here of an express stipulation in the CBA that GNC and
respondents agreed to submit cases of unfair labor practice to their grievance
machinery and eventually to voluntary arbitration, jurisdiction over the parties'
dispute does not vest upon the voluntary arbitrator. The reason behind the
ruling in University of San Agustin is therefore not attendant in this case and
so does not find any application here. As it stands, the parties' dispute which
centers on the charge of unfair labor practice is the proper subject of
compulsory arbitration. In fact, GNC itself acknowledged in its June 24, 2010
letter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment that a charge of unfair labor
practice in a notice of strike is ordinarily certified for compulsary arbitration.
As expounded by both the NLRC and the CA, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment's certification for compulsory arbitration of a dispute over which
he/she has assumed jurisdiction is but an exercise of the powers granted to
him/her by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code as amended. "[These] powers x x
x have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State,
aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these
powers, he[/she] is granted 'great breadth of discretion' to find a solution to a
labor dispute."60 The Court therefore cannot subscribe to GNC's contention
since to say that compulsory arbitration may only be resorted to in instances
agreed upon by the parties would limit the power of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment to certify cases that are proper subject of compulsory
arbitration. The great breadth of discretion granted to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment for him/her to find an immediate solution to a labor dispute
would unnecessarily be diminished if such would be the case.
In view of the above discourse, the Court finds that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment correctly certified the parties' dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration.
GNC engaged in bad faith bargaining
and thus violated its duty to bargain.
The duty to bargain collectively is defined under Article 252 of the Labor
Code to, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to
bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other
terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreements and executing a
contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such
duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
"It has been held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his
statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
 5

individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith PACIWU-TUCP questioned the results before the DOLE.
or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts."61 "The effect of an
employer's or a union's actions individually is not the test of good-faith On July 8, 2002, Med-Arbiter Romulo Sumalinog certified SONEDCO
bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a
Workers Free Labor Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
whole x x x"62chanrobleslaw
of URC-SONEDCO. 
Here, the collective conduct of GNC is indicative of its failure to meet its duty
to bargain in good faith. Badges of bad faith attended its actuations both at the PACIWU-TUCP elevated the same issue to the Court of Appeals and
plant and NCMB levels. thereafter this Court, which on July 11, 2007, resolved that the certification
election was valid.
At the plant level, GNC failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of
serving a reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days from receipt of a
proposal,63 a fact which by itself is already an indication of lack of genuine SWOFLU was declared the exclusive bargaining agent of URC-SONEDCO's
interest to bargain.64 rank-and-file employees.
GNC has no genuine intention to comply with its duty to bargain. It merely
went through the motions of negotiations and then entered into an agreement URC-SONEDCO consistently refused to negotiate a new collective
with respondents which turned out to be an empty one since it later denounced bargaining agreement with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, despite
the same by submitting a reply/counter-proposal. Worse, when respondents several demands from SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, allegedly due
tried to clear out matters with the GNC President through their letter of to the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which it signed with PACIWU-
January 8, 2010, GNC did not even bother to respond. TUCP.

Nowhere from the minutes of the meeting can it be deduced that the terms of
On December 31, 2006, the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired
the CBA is still subject to the approval of the GNC President. There is no
clear showing that the purpose of discussing the economic benefits with him is with no new collective bargaining agreement being signed.
to secure his approval thereto. If at all, the purported discussion appears to be
a mere formality since the signing of the CBA was not made dependent to the On August 28, 2007, with no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URC-
result of the discussion with him. As can be seen, the statement that "next time SONEDCO informed the rank-and-file employees that they would be granted
they will be on the signing" is clearly unqualified. Indubitably, indications certain benefits.
lead to the conclusion that the parties already agreed on the terms of the CBA
and it was only the execution thereof that needs to be done.

The over-all conduct of GNC at the plant level, without a doubt, illustrates bad
faith bargaining. And as already stated, this display of bad faith continued
even at the NCMB.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that GNC engaged in bad faith
bargaining and by the same violated its duty to bargain collectively as
mandated by law.
URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of
these-benefits to sign a 2007 and 2008 waiver (2007 waiver), which stated that
"[i]n the event that a subsequent [collective bargaining agreement] is
negotiated between Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining
Agreement] shall only be effective January 1, 2008."

The final CBA draft submitted by On August 20, 2008, a certification election was conducted. SONEDCO
respondents to the NCMB was correctly Workers Free Labor Union won again and proceeded to negotiate a new
imposed by the NLRC as the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which became effective January 1, 2009 to
CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2013 (2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement).
May 31, 2014.

The SWOFLU who refused to sign the 2007

The Court finds nothing wrong in the pronouncement of the NLRC that the
final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB should serve as the
On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who
parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014. More than the fact
that GNC is the erring party in this case, records show that the said draft is refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor
actually the final CBA draft of the parties which incorporates their practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the requirement of a
agreements. Indeed and as held by the NLRC, fairness, equity and social waiver before the release of the wage increase violated their right to self-
justice are best served if the said final CBA draft shall govern their industrial organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action.
relationship.
The Labor Arbiter found that URC-SONEDCO did not commit unfair labor
All told, the Court finds that the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the NLRC
practice.
and denied GNC's Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission sustained27 the Labor

5. SONECDO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) vs. Arbiter's Decision.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
GR No. 220383, October 05, 2016
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion and sustained
NLRC.
Facts:

On May 6, 2002, the respondent and PACIWU-TUCP, the then exclusive

bargaining representative of URC rank-and-file employees, entered into CBA ISSUES:
(2002 CBA) effective January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006.
Whether respondent committed unfair labor practice. YES

Days after the 2002 CBA was signed, a certification election was conducted
RULING:
and the petitioners won as the SEBA.

Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano

 6
Respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice.
An employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it fails in its duty to
bargain in good faith.
When petitioners held a conference on May 26, 2003, respondent refused to
attend. Instead of explaining its non-attendance to the conference or making a
counter-offer, respondent replied on August 15, 2003 acknowledging the
receipt and contents of the July 2003 letter but invoking the 2002 Collective
Bargaining Agreement as an excuse not to answer petitioners' demands to
negotiate. This is contrary to Article 261 of the Labor Code, which requires
the other party to reply within 10 days from receipt of the written demand.
Respondent likewise failed to reply to the collective bargaining agreement
proposal sent by petitioners on August 21, 2007. The September 22, 2007
letter, sent with the agreement proposal, also went unheeded.
Respondent was remiss in its duty when it repeatedly refused negotiations
with petitioners.
Even if we consider respondent's refusal to bargain as merely a mistake made
in good faith, its subsequent acts show an attempt to restrict petitioners'
negotiating power.
6. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ILOCOS
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYESS UNION (IPTEU)
G.R. No. 193798, September 8, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic
corporation duly organized and operating under the Philippine laws. It is
primarily engaged in the beverage business, which includes the manufacture
of carbonated soft drinks. On the other hand, respondent Ilocos Professional
and Technical Employees Union (IPTEU) is a registered independent labor
organization at CCBPI Ilocos Plant in Barangay Catuguing, San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte.
On July 9, 2007, IPTEU filed a verified Petition 6 for certification election
seeking to represent a bargaining unit consisting of approximately twenty-two
(22) rank-and-file professional and technical employees of CCBPI Ilocos
Norte Plant. CCBPI prayed for the denial and dismissal of the petition,
arguing that the Sales Logistics Coordinator and Maintenance Foreman are
supervisory employees, while the eight (8) Financial Analysts, five (5) Quality
Assurance Specialists, Maintenance Manager Secretary, Trade Promotions
and Merchandising Assistant (TPMA), Trade Asset Controller and
Maintenance Coordinator (TACMC), Sales Information Analyst (SIA), Sales
Logistics Assistant, Product Supply Coordinator, Buyer, Inventory Planner,
and Inventory Analyst are confidential employees; 7 hence, ineligible for
inclusion as members of IPTEU.
Convinced that the union members are rank-and-file employees and not
occupying positions that are supervisory or confidential in nature, Mediator-
Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep granted IPTEU’S petition.
In the Pre-election Conference held on September 10, 2007, CCBPI and
IPTEU mutually agreed to conduct the certification election on September 21,
2007. On election day, only sixteen (16) of the twenty-two (22) employees in
the IPTEU list voted. However, no votes were canvassed. CCBPI filed and
registered a Protest questioning the conduct and mechanics of the election and
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
a Challenge to Votes on the ground that the voters are supervisory and
confidential employees.
By agreement, the parties met on September 26, 2007 for the opening and
counting of the challenged votes. On said date, CCBPI filed a motion for
inhibition, which the Mediator-Arbiter verbally denied on the grounds that it
was not verified and would cause undue delay on the proceedings as there are
no other Mediators-Arbiters in the Region. The parties were informed that
their agreement to have the ballots opened could not bind the Mediator-
Arbiter. Instead, they were directed to submit additional evidence that would
aid in the resolution of the challenged votes.
On October 22, 2007, the Mediator-Arbiter denied CCBPI’s challenge to the
16 votes. She found that the voters are rank-and-file employees holding
positions that are not confidential in nature, and who are not, or used to be,
members of Ilocos Monthlies Union (IMU) due to the reclassification of their
positions by CCBPI and have been excluded from the CBA entered into by
IMU and CCBPI from 1997 to 2005. Consequently, the challenged votes were
opened and canvassed. After garnering 14 out of the 16 votes cast, IPTEU was
proclaimed as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
exempt workers in CCBPI Ilocos Norte Plant.
CCBPI elevated the case to the SOLE arguing, among others, that the
Honorable public appellee erred in denying the challenge to the sixteen (16)
actual voters, and subsequently declaring that private aippellee is the sole and
exclusive [bargaining] agent of the rank-and-file exempt employees.
On May 6, 2008, the appeal of CCBPI was denied. The SOLE held that, as
shown by the certification of the IMU President and the CBAs forged between
CCBPI and IMU from 1997 to 2007, the 22 employees sought to be
represented by IPTEU are not part of IMU and are excluded from its CBA
coverage; that even if the 16 challenged voters may have access to
information which are confidential from the business standpoint, the exercise
of their right to self-organization could not be defeated because their common
functions do not show that there exist a confidential relationship within the
realm of labor relations.
CCBPI then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. It reiterated, among
others, that the sixteen (16) voters are not eligible for Union membership
because they are confidential employees occupying confidential positions.
On March 17, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. CCBPI filed a
motion for reconsideration,19 which was also denied in the September 16,
2010 Resolution; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the 16 voters sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining
unit are confidential employees?
HELD:
 The Court held in the negative. It ruled that, such query is a question of fact,
which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules.23 This holds more true in the present case in view of the consistent
findings of the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the CA.
[T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings
by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment,
when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view
of their expertise in their respective fields. Judicial review of labor cases does
not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor
official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over
again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an
appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE
 7
Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar.
The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of
law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. x x x Thus, absent any
showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of
any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be amply
demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.24
The determination of factual issues is vested in the Mediator-Arbiter and the
Department of Labor and Employment. Pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving such controversies unless
the case falls under recognized and well-established exceptions. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.25
In this case, organizational charts, detailed job descriptions, and training
programs were presented by CCBPI before the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE,
and the CA. Despite these, the Mediator-Arbiter ruled that employees who
encounter or handle trade secrets and financial information are not
automatically classified as confidential employees. It was admitted that the
subject employees encounter and handle financial as well as physical
production data and other information which are considered vital and
important from the business operations’ standpoint. Nevertheless, it was
opined that such information is not the kind of information that is relevant to
collective bargaining negotiations and settlement of grievances as would
classify them as confidential employees. The SOLE, which the CA affirmed,
likewise held that the questioned voters do not have access to confidential
labor relations information.
We defer to the findings of fact of the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the
CA. Certainly, access to vital labor information is the imperative
consideration. An employee must assist or act in a confidential capacity and
obtain confidential information relating to labor relations policies. Exposure to
internal business operations of the company is not per se a ground for the
exclusion in the bargaining unit.26
The Court sees no need to belabor the effects of the unresolved notice of
appeal and motion to suspend proceedings filed by CCBPI in September 2007.
Suffice it to say that the substantial merits of the issues raised in said
pleadings are the same as what were already brought to and passed upon by
the Mediator-Arbiter, the SOLE, and the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.  fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution,
7. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS
OWNER, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION vs. LABOR SEC,
et. al. G.R. NO. 172132 July 23, 2014
For: Petition for the cancellation of union registration / Certification Election
Facts:
Respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC) filed a petition for certification election, seeking to represent all the
supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila. The petitioner filed its
opposition, but the opposition was deemed denied when Med-Arbiter
Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for the conduct of the certification
election. The petitioner appealed the order of Med-Arbiter Fernando, but the
appeal was also denied. A pre-election conference was then scheduled.
However, the pre-election conference was suspended until further notice
because of the repeated non-appearance of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. Later,
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the pre-election conference.
The petitioner primarily filed its comment on the list of employees submitted
by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and simultaneously sought the exclusion of some
from the list of employees for occupying either confidential or managerial
positions. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss raising the prolonged lack
of interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue its petition for certification
election. The petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC’s registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual
financial reports and an updated list of members as required by Article 238
and Article 239 of the Labor Code. It filed another motion to seek either the
dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its pending
petition for the cancellation of union registration. However, the DOLE issued
a notice scheduling the certification elections. Dissatisfied, the petitioner
commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari, alleging that the
DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not suspending the certification
election proceedings. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The certification election proceeded as
scheduled, and NUWHRAINHHMSC obtained the majority vote of the
bargaining unit. The petitioner filed a protest (with motion to defer the
certification of the election results and the winner), insisting on the
illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.
Issue:
Should the petition for the cancellation of union registration based on mixed
membership of supervisors and managers in a labor union, and the non-
submission of reportorial requirements to the DOLE justify the suspension of
the proceedings for the certification elections or even the denial of the petition
for the certification election?
Ruling:
No. Under the long established rule, too, the filing of the petition for the
cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration should not bar the
conduct of the certification election. In that respect, only a final order for the
cancellation of the registration would have prevented NUWHRAINHHMSC
from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a legitimate labor
union, including the right to the petition for the certification election. This rule
is now enshrined in Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9481.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions
for cancellation of union registration, lest they be accused of interfering with
union activities. In resolving the petition, consideration must be taken of the
i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear
in mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the
concomitant right and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of
registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization.
For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor
Code.
R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides
for reportorial requirements that failure to comply with the requirements shall
not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the
erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any
appropriate penalty.
Presently, then, the mixed membership does not result in the illegitimacy of
the registered labor union unless the same was done through
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud according to Article 239 of the
Labor Code.
 8
8. ERGONOMIC SYSTEMS PHILIPPINES v. ENAJE ET AL.
GR No. 195163, Dec 13, 2017
RELEVANT FACTS:
Respondents were union officers and members of Ergonomic System
Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions (union of EPSI).
 
The union, although affiliated with Workers Alliance Trade Unions-Trade
Union Congress of the Philippines (Federation), was not independently
registered.
Oct 29, 1999: The union entered into a CBA with petitioner ESPI, which was
valid for 5 years until 2004.
2001: Before the expiration of the CBA, the union officers (respondents)
secured its independent registration with the DOLE Regional Officer.
 
However, the officers were later charged before the Federation and
investigated for participating in other union’s seminars and activities using
union leaves without the knowledge and consent of the Federation and ESPI.
They were also charged for initiating and conspiring in the disaffiliation
before the freedom period.
 
2002: Federation rendered a decision finding the respondent union officers
guilty of disloyalty and expelled from the Federation.
 
The Federation also recommended the termination of their employment by
invoking provisions of their CBA.
 
ESPI then issued the officers letters of termination, which some refused to
receive. ESPI nonetheless submitted its list of dismissed employees to DOLE.
 
On the same day, the union filed a motion to strike with the NCMB.
  
From Feb 21 to Feb 23 2002, the union staged a series of noise barrage and
“slow down” activities.
 
Meanwhile, 40 union members refused to submit their Daily Production
Reports (DPRs) and 28members abandoned their work and held a picket line
outside the premises. 10 members failed to report to work without official
leave.
Subsequently, for refusal to submit DPRs and for abandonment, respondents-
union members were issued letters of termination.
2003: respondents, composed of the union officers and terminated members,
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against ESPI.
 
LA’s Ruling: Local union was the real party in interest and the Federation
was merely an agent in the CBA; thus, the union officers and members who
caused the implied disaffiliation did not violate the union security clause.
Consequently, their dismissal was unwarranted. There was also no ground for
the dismissal of the union members because the refusal to submit DPRs and
failure to report for work were meant to protest the dismissal of their officers,
not to sever employer-employee relationship. Neither ESPI nor
the respondents were at fault for they were merely protecting their respective
interests. In sum, the LA ordered all the respondents to return to work but
without back wages.
 
NLRC: Affirmed the ruling of the LA. Since there was no disloyalty to
the union, but only disaffiliation from the Federation which was a mere agent
in the CBA, the cause for the respondents' dismissal was non-existent.
The CA Ruling: In its decision, dated 21 September 2010, the CA affirmed
with modification the NLRC ruling. It held that ESPI and the respondents
acted in good faith when the former dismissed the latter and when the latter, in
sum, staged a strike without complying with the legal requirements. The CA,
however, pronounced that the concept of separation pay as an alternative to
reinstatement holds true only in cases wherein there is illegal dismissal, a fact
which does not exist in this case.
ISSUE:
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
1. Whether the federation may invoke the union security clause in demanding
the respondents' dismissal;
2. Whether the strike conducted by the respondents complied with the legal
requirements;
3. Whether the respondents' dismissal from employment was valid.
RULING:
Only the local union may invoke the union security clause in the CBA. The
controversy between ESPI and the respondents originated from the
Federation's act of expelling the union officers and demanding their dismissal
from ESPI. Thus, to arrive at a proper resolution of this case, one question to
be answered is whether the Federation may invoke the union security clause in
the CBA.
There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the
union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment.
There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union
members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit,
or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be
defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his
employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or
certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and,
for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a
union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
Before an employer terminates an employee pursuant to the union security
clause, it needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. In this case, the
primordial requisite, i.e., the union is requesting the enforcement of the union
security provision in the CBA, is clearly lacking. Under the Labor Code, a
chartered local union acquires legal personality through the charter certificate
issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the
Regional Office.
The COMPANY shall terminate the services of any concerned employee
when so requested by the UNION for any of the following reasons:
a. Voluntary Resignation from the Union during the term of this Agreement or
any extension thereof;
b. Non-payment of membership fee, regular monthly dues, mutual aid benefit
and other assessments submitted by the UNION to the COMPANY;
c. Violation of the UNION Constitution and Bylaws. The UNION shall
furnish the COMPANY a copy of their Constitution and Bylaws and any
amendment thereafter.
d. Joining of another Union whose interest is adverse to the UNION,
AWATU, during the lifetime of this Agreement.
e. Other acts which are inimical to the interests of the UNION and AWATU.
[25]
A perusal of the CBA shows that the local union, not the Federation, was
recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its
workers and employees in all matters concerning wages, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment. Consequently, only the union may
invoke the union security clause in case any of its members commits a
violation thereof. Even assuming that the union officers were disloyal to the
Federation and committed acts inimical to its interest, such circumstance did
not give the Federation the prerogative to demand the union officers' dismissal
pursuant to the union security clause which, in the first place, only the union
may rightfully invoke. Certainly, it does not give the Federation the privilege
to act independently of the local union. At most, what the Federation could do
 9
is to refuse to recognize the local union as its affiliate and revoke the charter
certificate it issued to the latter.
A strike is deemed illegal for failure to take a strike vote and to submit a
report thereon to the NCMB.
Article 278[30] of the Labor Code,valid strike:
(a) a notice of strike be filed with the NCMB 30 days before the intended date
thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose; and
(c) a notice be given to the NCMB of the results of the voting at least seven
days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory, and the
union's failure to comply renders the strike illegal.
The union filed a notice of strike on 20 February 2002.[32] The strike
commenced on 21 February 2002.[33] The strike vote was taken on 2 April
2002[34] and the report thereon was submitted to the NCMB on 4 April 2002.
[35] Indeed, the first requisite or the cooling-off period need not be observed
when the ground relied upon for the conduct of strike is union-busting.
[36] Nevertheless, the second and third requirements are still mandatory. In
this case, it is apparent that the union conducted a strike without seeking a
strike vote and without submitting a report thereon to the DOLE. Thus, the
strike which commenced on 21 February 2002 was illegal.
Art. 279. Prohibited activities. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
9. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. vs PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR
ASSOCIATION (PILA)
G.R. No. 170830 : August 11, 2010
FACTS: PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches.
Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly
authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCO's daily-paid workers.
When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on
December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The
negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a
Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock. 7 days later, the
union conducted a strike vote; majority voted for a strike. On April 21, 1995,
PILA staged a strike.
On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) thereafter NLRC issued an
ex-parte TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20) days, or until June 5, 1995.
PHIMCO then sent a letter to the 36 union members, directing them to explain
why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during
the strike. Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, those union members were
informed of their dismissal.
PILA then filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with
the NLRC.
On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary ordered all the striking
employees except those who were handed termination papers to return to
work. The Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept the striking employees, under
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. On the same day,
PILA ended its strike.
On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal
with the NLRC claiming that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from
the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCO's operations.
Respondents countered that they complied with all the legal requirements for
the staging of the strike; they put up no barricade, and conducted their strike
peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.
LA MAYOR decided and found the strike illegal; the respondents committed
prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from
PHIMCO's premises and preventing the non-striking employees from
reporting for work. Aggrieved filed with NLRC
THE NLRC decided and set aside LA Mayor's decision. The NLRC did not
give weight to PHIMCO's evidence, and relied instead on the respondents'
evidence showing that the union conducted a peaceful moving picket.
CA dismissed PHIMCO's petition for certiorari. The CA noted that the NLRC
findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCO's evidence failed to
show that the picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the
points of entry to and exit from the company premises, were supported by
substantial evidence.
PHIMCO came to us through the present petition after the CA denied
PHIMCO's motion for reconsideration.
Hence this case.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid strike
RULING: NO. Under Article 263 of the Labor Code, the following are the
requisites for a valid strike:
(a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or
15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
(c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory, and the union's failure to comply renders
the strike illegal. The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the
parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of
the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to
give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural
requirements; a strike notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was
reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was filed with the
DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April
25, 1995.
However, despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with
the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal.
The means become illegal when they come within the prohibitions under
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently
from the NLRC and the CA, we find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene
and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case as both the
NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately
 10
incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably
had not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing
that respondent PILA officers and members undertook as part of their strike
activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from PHIMCO's
premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from
entering the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
To STRIKE is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The work stoppage may
be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the
company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing
focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public
of what is happening in the company struck against. A PICKET simply
means to march to and from the employer's premises, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual
stoppage of work grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected
picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises. That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by
actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively
blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
In the present case, while the picket was moving, the movement was in
circles, very close to the gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder
formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers
and vehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by actual blocking
benches and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive
and quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the
operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the
participating workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking
employees from access to and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the
strike caused the company operations considerable damage.
10. LINO A. FERNANDEZ, JR., Petitioner, v. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY (MERALCO), Respondent.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 226002, June 25, 2018
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Fernandez was an employee of respondent Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) from October 3, 1978 until his termination on
September 14, 2000 for allegedly participating in an illegal strike. As a result,
he filed a case for illegal dismissal. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the
Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 95923,
declared that Fernandez was illegally dismissed.
The CA ruling was sustained in Our Resolution dated January 16, 2008. With
the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the judgment became final and
executory on May 26, 2008.
During the execution proceedings, both parties filed several motions regarding
the inclusions to, and computation of, the monetary awards due to Fernandez.
ISSUE:
Whether Fernandez should be reinstated.
RULING: YES
In the present case, the NLRC Rules of Procedure must be liberally applied so
as to prevent injustice and grave or irreparable damage or injury to an illegally
dismissed employee. The matter should be remanded to the NLRC for
determination of the inclusions to, and the computation of, the monetary
awards due to Fernandez.
Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee
is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. The award of separation pay
is a mere exception to the rule. It is made an alternative relief in lieu of
reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a) when reinstatement can no
longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because
of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer's
interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not
serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced
by the workers' continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer
and employee.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is
no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the
employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the
other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of strained relations should not be used recklessly or
applied loosely nor be based on impression alone. It cannot be applied
indiscriminately since every labor dispute almost invariably results in
"strained relations;" otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is engendered between the parties as a result of their
disagreement. Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact. It must be
adequately supported by substantial evidence showing that the relationship
between the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary
consequence of the judicial controversy.
Reinstatement cannot be barred especially when the employee has not
indicated an aversion to returning to work, or does not occupy a position of
trust and confidence in, or has no say in the operation of the employer's
business.
Here, Fernandez's intent and willingness to be reinstated to his former position
is evident as early as July 10, 2008 when he filed his Comment with Motion
for Re-computation of Monetary Award. He reiterated this on December 17,
2008 in his Urgent Motion to require MERALCO to reinstate him and on
January 21, 2009 in his Comment/Opposition to MERALCO's motion to
declare full satisfaction of his monetary awards.
On January 13, 2009, or about three months before Fernandez reached the
retirement age of 60 years old in April 2009, MERALCO filed a Motion to
Declare Full Satisfaction of Complainant's Monetary Awards Granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
To stress, strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose
positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their
employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. Here, the
confidential relationship between Fernandez, as a supervisory employee, and
MERALCO has not been established. For lack of evidence on record, it
appears that his designation as a Leadman was not a sensitive position as
would require complete trust and confidence, and where personal ill will
would foreclose his reinstatement.
Backwages shall include the whole amount of salaries, plus all other benefits
and bonuses, and general increases, to which Fernandez would have been
normally entitled had he not been illegally dismissed. Unless there is/are valid
ground/s for the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
Fernandez's backwages should be computed from the date when he was
illegally dismissed on September 14, 2000, until his retirement in April 2009.
In addition, subject to proof of entitlement, Fernandez must receive the
retirement benefits he should have received if he was not illegally
dismissed. Even if he receives a separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he is
not precluded to obtain retirement benefits because both are not mutually
exclusive.
 11

Abas | Banggat | Bontuyan | Domingo | Gonzales | Guinto | Said | Serrano