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Civil Procedure – Rule 16: Motion to

Aquino v Quiazon
120 Dismiss
G.R. No. 201248 March 11, 2015 MENDOZA, J. Mond
Petitioners: Respondents:
LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON,
ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG, JOSE B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B.
YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT QUIAZON
AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN,
CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT
FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO
NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND
AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON
Recit Ready Summary

Petitioners received various demand letters from the Quiazons, claiming ownership over the subject
property and demanding that they vacate the the questioned lot. Upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds
of San Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of the
Quiazons.

Petitioners filed a complaint against the Quiazons for Annulment and Quieting of Title. They alleged that
they were the heirs of Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired the lot in question situated
in Magalang, Pampanga by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

The Quiazons answered that petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action" because
their deed of sale was spurious. They asserted that the sale could not prevail over the results of the Land
Registration Case, among the oppositors of which were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.

The RTC set a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses. However, the petitioners manifested that
they were opting to submit the incident for resolution without presenting evidence. They argued that the
alleged lack of cause of action due to the spurious deed of sale was a matter of evidence which might
only be resolved in a full-blown trial.

The RTC later dismissed the complaint. It ruled that under Section 21 in relation to Section 62, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense in the answer might be had at the
discretion of the court. The CA upheld the RTC ruling.

Issue: Can the trial court consider other evidence aside from the averments in the complaint in
determining the sufficiency of the cause of action? – NO

The SC first pointed out that “failure to state a cause of action" is not the same as "lack of cause of
action". The difference is as follows:
a) The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the insufficiency
of factual basis for the action.
b) Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause
may be raised any time.

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SECTION 2. Hearing of Motion. — At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the
questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time.
Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence
of the party presenting the same. (n)
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SECTION 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds
for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the
discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

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c) Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal
for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

The ground of "lack of cause of action," is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16,
and hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6. Thus RTC
made an error when it ruled that the preliminary hearing for the affirmative defense of “lack of cause of
action” is allowed.

Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from the decisions of both the
trial court and the CA that respondents’ defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually treated as a
"failure to state a cause of action”. This was apparent from their reliance on Section 6 of Rule 16, which
pertains to grounds of a motion to dismiss raised as affirmative defenses. In determining the merits of
the ground of “failure to state a cause of action” only the statements in the complaint may properly be
considered and it is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings
to determine their existence.

In this case, the SC held that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. In order that an action
for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and b) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. It is readily apparent from the complaint
that petitioners alleged that (1) they had an interest over the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale;
and that (2) the title of respondents was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable (check fact no. 3
below).

The SC thus remanded the case to the RTC.

Facts + Procedural History

1. On December 16, 2005, a complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before
the RTC by the petitioners against the Quiazons (respondents). They alleged that they
were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house
and lot situated in Magalang, Pampanga by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894.
2. They also allege that since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a hundred years,
constructing houses and paying real estate taxes on the property;
3. The complaint also alleged that:
a. sometime in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the Quiazons,
claiming ownership over the subject property and demanding that they vacate the
same;
b. upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they
confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of the Quiazons;
c. the said title is in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, the existence
of which is pre-judicial to the ownership and possession of plaintiffs who are the
true owners and actual possessors of the above described real property.
d. That equity demands that the said title be surrendered by defendants and
cancelled as it is a cloud upon the legal or equitable title to or interest of plaintiffs
over the subject property.
4. The Quiazons answered and asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject
land; that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut,
and that petitioners had been occupying the property by mere tolerance.
5. The Quiazons argued that:
a. The petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action" because
their deed of sale was spurious and could not prevail over the results of the Land

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Registration Case, of which, among the oppositors were the predecessors-in-
interest of petitioners.
b. The action was barred by prescription and that petitioners were guilty of laches,
and even if it was not barred, a title registered under the Torrens system could not
be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession, or by prescription.
c. The action was barred by res judicata and violated the prohibition against forum
shopping, considering that petitioners had earlier filed a similar case for quieting
of title against respondents.
6. Based on the above arguments, the petitioners argued that:
a. Anent the alleged lack of cause of action due to the spurious deed of sale, this
contention was a matter of evidence which might only be resolved in a full-blown
trial. They added that the settled rule was that to determine the sufficiency of
the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be
considered, and that the allegations in their complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action.
b. An action to quiet title did not prescribe if the plaintiffs were in possession of the
property in question
c. Regarding the argument on res judicata, petitioners explained that they were not
the same plaintiffs in the registration case and that the case was dismissed without
prejudice.
7. RTC set a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses. During such hearing,
respondents presented multiple evidence, but petitioners on the other hand manifested
that they were opting to submit the incident for resolution without presenting evidence,
relying on their position that only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered
8. Subsequently, RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that although the deed of sale
presented by the petitioners was never challenged, it was nevertheless unenforceable by
virtue of the decision in the registration proceedings. Anent petitioners’ argument that only
the complaint may be considered in determining the sufficiency of the cause of action, the
RTC ruled that under Section 2 in relation to Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense in the answer might be had at the
discretion of the court, during which the parties could present their arguments and their
evidence.
9. CA upheld the RTC decision. It held that under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the trial court might consider other evidence aside from the averments in the complaint in
determining the sufficiency of the cause of action.
Point of Contention

Petitioners aver that it is a settled rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action, only facts
alleged in the complaint shall be considered
Issues Ruling
1. Can the trial court consider other evidence aside from the 1. No.
averments in the complaint in determining the sufficiency of the
cause of action?
Rationale
1. The trial court may consider other evidence aside from the averments in the complaint if
the ground is “failure to state a cause of action”, but not when the ground is "lack of
cause of action".

The ground of “failure to state a cause of action." has been frequently confused with the ground
of "lack of cause of action". The difference is as follows:
1. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the
insufficiency of factual basis for the action.
2. Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack
of cause may be raised any time.

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3. Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action.
Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved
on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

The ground of "lack of cause of action," is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16, and hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to
Section 6. On this point alone, the trial court clearly erred in receiving evidence on the ground of
"lack of cause of action" during the preliminary hearing.

Nonetheless, the ground was effectively a "failure to state a cause of action”.

Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from the decisions of
both the trial court and the CA that respondents’ defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually
treated as a "failure to state a cause of action”. This was apparent from their reliance on Section
6 of Rule 16, which pertains to grounds of a motion to dismiss raised as affirmative defenses.

The complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.

The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against
the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made
in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In determining
the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be
considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary
hearings to determine their existence.

In the case at bench, petitioners’ cause of action relates to an action to quiet title. In order that
an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur:
1. the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and
2. the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy

It is readily apparent from the complaint that petitioners alleged that (1) they had an interest over
the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale; and that (2) the title of respondents was invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable. (check fact no. 3 above). Hypothetically admitting these
allegations as true, as is required in determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of
action, petitioners may be granted their claim. Clearly, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action

General Rule and Exceptions

The general rule is that allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to
the face of the complaint. Exceptions to this rule are:
1. There is no hypothetical admission of:
a) the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice;
b) allegations that are legally impossible;
c) facts inadmissible in evidence; and
d) facts which appear, by record or document included in the pleadings, to be
unfounded.
2. Inquiry is not confined to the complaint if culled:
a. from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties;
b. from documentary evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts
sufficient to defeat the claim; or
c. from evidence admitted in the course of hearings related to the case

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The CA in this case erroneously relied on exception 2(c), when it ruled that under Section 6 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is the trial court’s discretion to receive and consider other
evidence aside from the allegations in the complaint in resolving a party’s affirmative defense.

It should be noted again that respondents allegation that "[p]laintiffs have no valid, legal and
sufficient cause of action against the defendants it is not "lack or absence of cause of action"
that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16, but rather, that "the complaint
states no cause of action. An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of
action as against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after the
conduct of the trial on the merits.

The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised
in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held, however, that
such a hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action.

(I think the point is: When the ground is “failure to state cause of action”, a preliminary hearing
on that matter is not allowed since it must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged
in the complaint. When ground is “lack of cause of action”, a preliminary hearing is also not
allowed since it poses a question of fact that should be resolved after the conduct of the trial on
the merits and such ground is not among those mentioned in Rule 16)

Other issues

Although neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res
judicata, it appears that this case could not have been dismissed on these grounds. First, an
action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property, which is
the situation prevailing in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been
dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.

Disposition

Petition granted. CA decision is reversed. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court.

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