Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Reciprocal influences in future thinking between Europe and the USA

Philippe Durance ⁎
Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) Paris, LIPSOR, 2 rue Conté — 75003, Paris, France

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: La prospective is generally considered to have grown after WWII in developed countries with
Received 19 March 2010 two main centers, France and the United States of America. In France, the development of
Received in revised form 10 June 2010 prospective does constitute an important point in contemporary history. Stemming from an
Accepted 15 June 2010
idea from philosopher Gaston Berger near the end of the 1950s, a spirit arose accompanied by a
practice spread in the central administration (government) and in major French corporations.
Keywords: The objective of this article is not to claim any French originality in thinking about the future.
Forecasting Instead, the following pages show how an original approach blending reflection on the future
Prospective
and present action took shape and the relationship that developed involving current practices
Foresight
on the other side of the Atlantic, mainly the USA, with the help of a few intermediaries.
France
USA © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. The French version: Prospective

Prospective came about in the mid-fifties when Gaston Berger made it a formal movement based on a review of the decision-
making process1. As of 1955, Berger would begin arguing in favor of a formal consideration of the future in decision-making. In fact
he outlined a new method that combined knowledge and power, endpoints and means, by giving people the possibility to
transform their vision of the future into action, their dreams into projects. After Berger's death in 1960, his philosophy was
preserved by a hardcore group well positioned in France's socio-economic and political infrastructure. His followers would work to
spread the basic principles and apply them to prepare some main choices for the future.

1.1. The idea of a science of the ‘Man of the Future’

The 1950s remained tainted by the barbaric acts committed during World War II. While relations became more international
and more complex, France entered a period of unheard-of growth. Berger's techniques shook up many approaches and, for many
intellectuals of that time, scientific discoveries created just as many, if not more, problems than they solved. In these
circumstances, time passing faster became part of experience, the normal law of change in the world. In this respect, “the Future is
ahead of [its] ideas” [1]2. [Note 1,2]. The situations in which Man finds himself thus seem to always be new. The consequences of
decisions will be seen in a completely different world from the one in which those decisions were made.

⁎ Tel.: + 33 6 32 33 62 70.
E-mail address: philippe.durance@cnam.fr.
1
Gaston Berger (1896–1960) was a French philosopher who worked as a CEO, then philosopher professor and lastly top-level civil servant. A disciple of the
philosophy of action of Maurice Blondel, Berger helped introduce Husserl in France. He also played an important role in Franco–American cultural relations. At the
request of the minister of foreign affairs, Gaston Berger gave lectures in many American universities (Columbia, Princeton, Harvard, Buffalo, UCLA, etc.). There he
presented the main trends in contemporary French philosophy. In the early 1950s, he would become the secretary-general of the Franco–American Fulbright
commission. He died suddenly as a result of a car accident in November 1960. Among the four children left to mourn was a son who would become the
internationally renowned choreographer, Maurice Béjart.
2
The bibliographic references refer to the original French texts. If there is an English translation, it is mentioned either in the text or bibliography.

0040-1625/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2010.06.006
1470 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475

For Berger, the classic methods no longer hold in this context. Essentially based on experience; that is to say the past, these
methods allow neither governing, nor managing, nor administrating. Gaston Berger, the philosopher, questioned neither the
meaning nor value of history but rather its use in preparing to make decisions. Actually, history and prospective have a lot in
common for they look at potential facts: the past is gone, the future is not yet. [2] The past must serve to root out the unchangeable,
heavy trends, which are useful in building hypotheses or operational rules, in other words, useful for action but not models whose
simple application would substitute for analysis and focused thinking. These retrospective attitudes are no longer adapted. It is not
possible to live off one's experiences (aquis). Anticipating using the past as a basis, even in its most scientific form (extrapolation)
means determining what will happen if the studied event remains frozen in time thus timeless.
Gaston Berger's criticism targets public decision-making directly. As a high-ranking civil servant within the French education
ministry, Berger observed that the means to be used are too often sought before the goals are set. Of course reality certainly
dictates the opposite: establish the goals and then decide on the appropriate means. Berger found that in practice the distinction
between goals and means was not easy to make. Want, can and know remain in a chiaroscuro state that stalls decisions. Without a
doubt, the ends give way to the means that the decision-maker has available at any given time and which represent the least
painful solution. Man may thus give up a better condition, considered utopian, because the means required have not yet been
discovered [3].
As a philosopher, Berger believed that the science of the ‘Man of the Future’, or a ‘futurist anthropology’, would serve to help
human aspirations come to the fore by studying the different situations in which humankind might find itself in the future. This
‘mission’ would be entrusted to specialists who come from various fields and can show how things tend to evolve. It would be a
matter of bringing together those who can determine what is desirable with those who can determine what is possible. The idea of
picturing possible worlds in broad strokes would not only enlighten judgment but also inform it early enough so that a decision
would be efficient. We can see that from the outset, Gaston Berger gave prospective a normative objective.

1.2. The prospective spirit

From 1958 on, Gaston Berger would formalize some of the major principles of his approach. Work by members of the
international center that he founded in 1957 would provide and become the core. Starting from the principle that a theory has less
power than an example, and that the formalization of a method is the fruit of reflection on practices, Berger and the co-founders of
the Centre would constantly generate and carry out studies on concrete topics, e.g., the consequences of new technologies (atomic
energy for peaceful use, cybernetics, astronomy, aeronautics). There were geopolitical issues, too, e.g., the West and the rest of the
world, the relationship between progress and society. Members travelled abroad to conferences considered important to suggest
how to think about the future using this new stance that was the prospective attitude. The reports or papers delivered would
involve many people from various fields, e.g., researchers, university students, high-ranking civil servants, and leading corporate
executives. Teams were formed that brought together complementary specialists.
The position towards the future preached by Berger [1] relies upon six basic virtues. The first, being calm, which is necessary for
one to step back and maintain self-control. Imagination, the second, opens the door to innovation and lends the innovator a
different, original, way of looking at things. The third is a team spirit. Team spirit is indispensable if action is to be efficient just like
enthusiasm, which propels that same action and makes people capable of creating. Courage is also essential in order to get off the
beaten track, innovate, be entrepreneurial and accept the inherent risks. Lastly, some sensitivity; i.e., to be aware of mankind's
future, a society must put man first. To do so, culture must play a key role. Culture allows us to grasp the thinking of the Other. It
also provides the possibility for us to understand before judging. Through its different forms, culture shows how people can take
charge of their own fate.
Beyond the qualities required to face this new world that is the future, Berger develops the basis of a prospective attitude. This
attitude would make it possible to grasp the future, thus opening up all possibilities and enabling us to prepare various courses of
action.
At a time when causes generate effects at constantly greater speeds, it is no longer possible to stop to consider the immediate
effects of action already begun. Berger's prospective (forerunner to foresight) sought to study the distant future. This distant
horizon is not an obstacle because it does not try to predict or look at events as much as at situations. The prospective approach
does not need to date its results and may thus reach a high level of certainty. In fact it is easier to point out a general trend than the
date and intensity of a given event. This approach does not oppose short-term prediction which is indispensable, as the two
approaches complement each other. Actually, pinpointing situations far off in time means going beyond overly specialized
approaches and bringing together competent people so that from the clash of personal views there arises a shared vision based on
complementarities. Actually, prospective must avoid using analytical procedures based on habit or routine in order to provide in-
depth analysis that will enable one to understand human motivation and behavior. The principle: see far, see wide and analyze
deeply makes Gaston Berger's prospective a synthesizing activity with the means to be all encompassing. In fact, interdependence
is one of the most restricting things that prospective has to integrate. One must envisage the consequences of acts and see
how those consequences relate to what is happening in other fields. Sometimes these fragmentary truths are just as dangerous as
errors [2].
Gaston Berger adds two more necessary features to the prospective attitude. The first is risk-taking. For him, risk-taking is a
major component which is possible because it leads to the long-term horizon of foresight (prospective) thus authorizing some
boldness. This runs contrary to short-term forecasting which leads to immediate decisions which imply an irreversible
commitment hence tremendous caution. It is always possible to modify any foreseen actions to adapt to new circumstances.
 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475 1471

Moreover, the risk-taking attitude is necessary in an increasingly unpredictable world. One must innovate. Indeed, an important
component of risk is inciting change. Berger's second necessary element involves the endpoint of foresight (prospective) which
enables us to determine not only what can happen but what people would like to have happened. The second dimension opens the
door to the real construction of the future. Of course, Gaston Berger believed that the important thing is to foresee what would
happen if people did nothing to change the current course of action (status quo). In this way, prospective frees us from fatalism [2]
and sparks action. Berger encourages us to consider the fact that in all circumstances people are part of the goal and goals lie at the
heart of their taking action.

1.3. From spirit to method

Between 1959 and 1960, the main characteristics of this attitude had been presented and the first studies had begun. At this
point, Gaston Berger was assisted in his thinking by a few members of the CIP (International Center of Prospective), notably Pierre
Massé [3], who was commissioner for the Plan [4]. Berger and Massé strove to specify certain conditions of action in foresight by
establishing a series of pragmatic rules.
Given that the future belongs to what we call will or will power, prospective must have as its goal efficient action. This is not a
case of building a theory of action but rather a science of practice which, although more than a simple application of scientific
methods to human problems, must constitute a real change in perspective. The goal is not to observe the future based on the
present but rather to observe the present based on the future. This twist requires us to choose a future from among the
innumerable possibilities offered. It once again and thus puts forth the problem of action as goal. Reflecting on the means at hand
cannot be separated from the exact knowledge of the possible means. Prospective enables us to keep the ends, means and reality of
current situations in a permanent state of confrontation.[2] The need to connect the exploratory and normative is thus explicitly
stated.
What concrete steps do we need to take? In order to both serve others and be efficient, Berger's approach sought to 1) draw out
the general and deep meaning of observed facts; 2) draft plans and programs; 3) issue immediately applicable recommendations;
4) show ideas in action; and 5) set possible goals that must be achieved. This foresight must also tilt against what is often called
‘received wisdom’[4] and prevent wasting time on false problems or outdated questions. In other words, avoid the constant
questioning of the rules of the action undertaken and the goals of the institutions. [5] All this requires more than logic. It requires
imagination, or what Berger called ‘that flexibility of spirit’ which refuses to be fenced in; thinks nothing is ever reached fully and
believes everything may be questioned again at any time” [4,6].
Every organization faces an environment whose behavior is random. Each strategy put in place by a company may correspond
to a certain number of possible futures. Prospective serves to highlight the possible futures and evaluate the relevant qualitative or
quantitative aspects. In the case where the more realistic futures include unfavorable elements, prospective must seek out active
strategies which eliminate or reduce those elements [6].
The approach to the future when practising prospective does present one major difficulty: several timelines “run together
without becoming confused” [6]. However, even if the rhythms are different, they are lived simultaneously by people who
live together and face the same future. The interdependence of activities with different timeframes requires making a choice;
i.e., an accepted specific horizon. Defining the horizon responds to another need. Problems covered during the strategy-
building process are not limited to the future. In order to make use of them, these strategies must be operational. A horizon is
thus essential. That horizon must extend substantially the period of the problem studied, the term, so as to reduce the
influence of the arbitrary (inevitable in using a long-term horizon) on the strategy of that period and eventually on any
current decision.
The sheer essence of the prospective approach relies upon the ability to see behind the obvious; i.e., to see the factors that
really generate change. Above all, one must avoid stopping at the stability hypothesis, which is often no more than “an avowal of
ignorance and weakness, a shrinking from the in-depth analysis or the responsibility of choice” [6]. As a result, one must
question the validity of permanence, of which the postulate may often be contradicted in several ways. First, there is the
contradiction of consequences, either by inverting the influence of the factors on the long term, by the virtues of adversity and
the risks of facility and, especially, by the will of human beings to change. It is not enough to simply suppose such reversals. If
pragmatic, one must absolutely predetermine the time and importance of the reversal. To do so, careful observation must be
used so as to corroborate intuition and reason through the seed events which although currently miniscule are immense in
potential consequences.

2. Some reciprocal influences

From 1955 to 1960, Gaston Berger and the members of the CIP laid the conceptual foundations of a method which has spread
over the past fifty-odd years throughout organizations. This method has highlighted the need to separate the exploratory from the
normative; the importance of weak signals; the role of the imagination; the difficulty in considering different timeframes, to name
a few examples. The premature death of Gaston Berger in 1960 prevented a teaching project from taking shape. Berger had been
preparing the ground for prospective courses with the help of historian Fernand Braudel, who had brought on board the École
pratique des hautes études (EPHE), a prestigious institution of higher education. Fortunately there were enough ‘militants for the
future’ around Berger for the practice of prospective to continue.
1472 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475

2.1. Jérôme Monod and regional planning

In 1962, Pierre Massé organized an important project within the Plan. The topic: the future of France for the year 1985 in view
of the Fifth Plan, known as the V Plan (1966–1970). The overarching goal was to enable both rapid industrial growth and social
progress. The findings would conclude that foresight or prospective cells should be created in all administrations, institutions,
professional, economical, social and union organizations. The idea was that society would learn about prospective and mobility and
then change. Further to this recommendation, prospective would take root in French administration.
In 1963, the trend would continue as the French Government created the Datar, an organization in charge of regional
development. Prospective would then play a major role within the Datar. Under the direction of Jérôme Monod [5], methodological
terms and, in terms of public action, a more systematic structure would be added to the practice of prospective.
In 1968, the Datar organized the first conference on prospective and regional development. This event was original in that it
served as a common reference for all future-oriented reflection, for the various regions and their organization, with 2020 as a
horizon. The Datar conference also marked the first real confrontation between prospective and regional planning in France. The
conference had an international scope with several participants from abroad, notably from the USA [6]. In fact, some of the annals
of the conference were translated into English. The organizers sponsored the creation of an introductory report, published
alongside the annals with a view to providing a methodological primer for reflection in prospective [7].
This report was based on the work of Erich Jantsch [8] and presents a set of tools used in forecasting. The techniques presented
were the Delphi, developed notably by Olaf Helmer at the RAND Corporation, and scenario drafting, used by Herman Kahn, (RAND
then the Hudson Institute) and applied by European and American oil companies [7]. Herman Kahn came to Paris to present his
work in 1967. The scenario technique employed by Herman Kahn also became the focus of a presentation of key principles in a text
published in France in 1968, a few months after the American launching.
After this conference, Jérôme Monod would set up an ambitious program and encourage new directions in the practice of
prospective by opening up to both the social sciences and international cooperation. Monod traveled a great deal, notably to the
United States. During these trips, he made a pilgrimage to the landmarks of North American prospective (foresight) and met
various personalities including Daniel Bell, Hermann Kahn, and Hasan Ozbekhan [10]. He also got a good feel for the public practice
of prospective abroad. Writings of Bell and Ozbekhan would later be published in the Datar journal. Always on the look out for new
methods, Jérôme Monod commissioned a study by the Hudson Institute in 1970. This prospective study was carried out using
overviews of France [11] which would lead to a real polemic.
An important methodological endeavor in scenario building would also begin. The first regional planning scenarios were
created in 1968. Three exploratory contrasted scenarios with 2000 as their horizon were drafted, each one setting out possible
directions to take in development [8]. In each case, there was an image of a society in a geographic location and in a given future
plus the routes linking the current state of society to that described by the image. [12] The scenarios were created by three
different working groups using two complementary procedures: the first, exploratory; i.e., moving from present to future through
dynamic factors; the second, retrospective; i.e., starting from the future and moving back to the present while deducing the
evolutionary factors. These three would then serve to build one tendential scenario within the prospective schema for France with
the year 2000 as a horizon, known commonly as the ‘scenario of the unacceptable’.
From that point on, the method was certainly well defined. Scenario building revolves around the following three elements:
1) the basis, or a descriptive state of the initial situation of the system under study, its laws, typical evolution trends (even those
now only embryonic or ‘seedlings’); 2) a path which traces the overall evolution of the system and may include blockages or
crossroads that offer several different possibilities; 3) an end image stemming from that evolution [13]. On a national scale, this
study immediately led some local actors to want similar reports done on smaller geographic scales, thus opening up the way for
prospective practices in various regions of the country. In 1972, the whole experience was presented to the international
community in an article published in the journal Futures [14].
In 1975, Datar asked a futures research group at the University of Quebec to carry out a study designed to analyze ‘the scenario
method given the prospective theory and with the help of its various applications, past and present [15]. This research group had
help from Hasan Ozbekhan, who was then the group's technical advisor. The Canadian team focused its study on three concepts
which played a driving role in the development of this method and represent three rather different schools of thought, specifically
those of Hermann Kahn, Hasan Ozbekhan and the Datar. The study revealed how the Datar had contributed considerably to
progress in scenario methodology and suggested some possible improvements. One such improvement was morphological
analysis as proposed by Fritz Zwicky in 1962 [16]. Others were the crossed-impact matrices developed by Theodore J. Gordon and
Olaf Helmer in the very early 1970s, and systemic analysis.

2.2. André F. Cournand and the thinking of Gaston Berger

In the early 1970s, André F. Cournand, a Nobel-prize winner (medicine) and professor at Columbia University, joined forces
with Maurice Levy, professor at the Sorbonne and colleague of Berger, to publish an English translation of the main philosophical
works from the CIP entitled Shaping the Future [17]. This edition would involve several translators at Yale and Columbia. The
project was supported by Robert K. Merton (Columbia) [9] and Oskar Morgenstern, then professor at New York University wrote
the preface. The book is dedicated to the memory of Adolf A. Berle, a great admirer of Berger and his philosophy and a former
foreign affairs minister under Franklin D. Roosevelt.
 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475 1473

In the introduction, Cournand and Levy observe how the attitude toward the future had evolved considerably from 1955 to
1970 and that prospective had strongly influenced economic, scientific, social and cultural activities through its link to planning.
Yet, they do note that the approach, just like Berger himself, is almost completely unknown in the USA, even though it would seem
to correspond to the countries' mutual concerns. Cournand and Levy are convinced that Berger's prospective could yield two
fundamental components to the Americans: a philosophical reflection plus the operational means to develop a broad and positive
vision of the future, to make decisions and take action.
This was not the first time that Cournand strove to make Berger's ideas known in the United States. In his autobiography,
Cournand wrote: “Persuaded of the need to introduce prospective thinking and methods into this country, particularly as they
relate to conceptualization and planning of education, I became a missionary on its behalf in the United States” [18]. Cournand
became influenced by Gaston Berger during his time at the CIP from 1958 on and in some projects while on visits in France. [5] In
1963, a colloquium on prospective, sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, was held at the Institute for Advanced Studies at
Princeton, chaired by Robert J. Oppenheimer. The colloquium was precipitated by discussions in the early 1960s among Edouard
Morot-Sir, then French cultural attaché and close acquaintance of Berger, André Cournand, and Adolf Berle, then chairman of the
Twentieth Century Fund. The purpose of the colloquium was to introduce the ideas of Gaston Berger to the United States by
bringing together members of the Centre international de prospective (CIP), (N.B. Pierre Massé was also present) and leading
Americans in government or other positions of planning and decision-making.
At Columbia, Cournand took part in activities at the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs. There he would apply
prospective to the problematic of medical training. His work there became an article published in the journal Futures (1971) in
which he presented Berger's philosophy and methods [19]. The following year, with the publication of Shaping the Future, the
journal printed an article by Pierre Massé which laid out the elements of the prospective attitude as set out by Berger himself in
1958 [20].

2.3. Bertrand de Jouvenel and the art of conjecture

Bertrand de Jouvenel became formally interested in the future in the early 1960s. His interest lay in the rather special field of
politics. In 1961 a ‘Futuribles Committee’ was struck and brought together several specialists, thanks to the support of the Ford
Foundation. Their goal was to ponder the future of institutional structures in Europe over the next ten years. In 1963, the
committee members included Eugene V. Rostow (Yale); Edward Shils (University of Chicago) and Waldemar A. Nielsen (African–
American Institute, NY). In 1965, Daniel Bell came on board as a consultant.
For Jouvenel, the idea was to establish an ‘art of political conjecture’ and not a forecasting method “because the word forecast
means that we see ahead of time, as if it were already. This way of speaking implies a prefabricated future, all the more doubtful
since it is a field in which human will is more effective”. [21] Surprisingly, Jouvenel carefully avoids the word prospective. He prefers
to speak of conjecture and uses the term futurible which he borrowed from the Spanish theologian Molina. Futurible designates
“the different possible futures according to different ways of acting”. [11] When Jouvenel wrote his reference work, L'art de la
conjecture, published in France in 1964, the scope had grown so that it was to “encourage or stimulate efforts in social forecasting
and especially political forecasting [because convinced that] the social sciences must look toward the future [..] as Gaston Berger has
pleaded so effectively in France” [22, p 8].
The studies produced by the Futuribles Committee were published in document published by the National Council of French
Employers (now called the MEDEF) on the economic situation. Published first in 1963 in French, the main texts were also brought
out in English in 1965. Within the framework of the same Committee, Jouvenel regularly organized international lectures
on forecast methods. The third was held at Yale in 1964, and attended by several European and American academics, including
Daniel Bell.
In 1967, after Ford Foundation financing of the Committee was discontinued, the Futuribles international association was
founded with the help of public funding, and especially help from the Datar. Pierre Massé became the association's first president.
The same year, Bertrand de Jouvenel and Jérôme Monod joined the board of directors of the CIP. Primarily through Jouvenel's
efforts, the Datar opened up onto the international stage, and Jérôme Monod and his team were able to meet a number of eminent
figures in the American forecast field [10]. At the same time, Jouvenel helped organize the first international conference on
research on the future held in Norway. This conference would lead to the 1973 founding of the World Futures Studies Federation.
Besides Bertrand de Jouvenel, who would become the first president, there were several French among the founders. In 1972, the
general assembly of the CIP decided to dissolve and bring its resources to the Futuribles association.

2.4. Pierre Wack and the scenario method

Pierre Wack remains an important reference regarding scenarios in the English-speaking business world. His two articles
published in the Harvard Business Review [23,24] are frequently quoted, especially by those interested in using scenarios as a way
to take into account possible developments in an organization's environment and the impact that they may have on management's
representations, hence strategies. The method presented was built up over several years by Pierre Wack and his team at the oil
company Royal Dutch Shell in the early 1970s.
In the mid-sixties, Shell set up a system called Unified Planning Machinery (UPM). This system was designed to supply detailed
planning for Shell's overall activities. The horizon was set at six years, found too short very quickly given the nature of projects in
the oil sector. Shell decided to embark on an experiment, an exploration using the year 2000 as its horizon. We should remember
1474 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475

that this decision came at a time when Herman Kahn's first book describing his scenario method setting 2000 as a horizon was also
published. [9] Shell asked several branches of the company to participate in an exercise with a 15-year horizon. Pierre Wack was
then working in the French offices and did know something of Kahn's studies as his remark shows: “we were familiar with the late
Herman Kahn's scenario approach and were intrigued by its possibilities for corporate planning” [23]. The results of this second
effort shed great doubt on the UPM system which was seen as too mechanical. In 1971, “Shell […] decided to try scenario planning
as a potentially better Framework for thinking about the future than forecasts – which were […] perceived as a dangerous
substitute for real thinking in times of uncertainty and potential discontinuity” [23]. Four exploratory scenarios were drafted using
the scenarios method and most notably the mangers were able to change their view of the world around them. Significant because,
as Wack notes, « in a turbulent business environment, […] highly relevant information goes unnoticed because, being locked into
one way of looking, suggested by Kahn in order to generate as many pictures of the world (1976) as possible, including one ‘no
surprise’ version [25].
Given his long experience in the corporate milieu, Pierre Wack highlighted two basic features of scenarios that are of interest to
companies. The first feature is actually also a necessary condition for scenarios to be pertinent; i.e., the identification of
predetermined elements (« those events that have already occurred (or that almost certainly will occur) but whose consequences
have not yet unfolded » [23]) and major uncertainties. The second is the impact of scenarios on an organization, more particularly,
on the managers in that a scenario enables them to change their world view, as mentioned above. Moreover, “scenarios give
managers something very precious: the ability to reperceive reality”. For Wack, this last part remains vital because the
reperception of reality and the discovery of strategic openings that follow the breaking of the manager's assumptions are […] the
essence of entrepreneurship. Scenario planning aims to rediscover the original entrepreneurial power of foresight in contexts of
change, complexity, and uncertainty”. [24]. When confronting a turbulent environment, Wack suggests the use of a specific tool,
the macroscope, “not to see bigger, larger or more distant, but to look at things that are too large, too complex to observe with
normal tools” [26]; “the macroscope is the tool that makes you see what is bound to happen once it has been set in motion, due
to systemic relationships” [27].
Although it is never stated, Wack was referring to a tool developed in the early 1970 s by fellow Frenchman Joël de Rosnay
who was seeking then a new approach to deal with complexity. His words sound comforting almost: « Microscope, telescope:
these words evoke the great scientific penetrations of the infinitely small and the infinitely great […] Today we are confronted
with another infinite: the infinitely complex […] We need, then, a new instrument […] I shall call this instrument the macroscope
[…] It is not used to make things larger or smaller but to observe what is at once too great, too slow, and too complex for our
eyes » [28].

3. Conclusion

Starting with some original thinking begun in the 1950s by the philosopher Gaston Berger, the French practice of prospective
was enriched by several American influences which can still be perceived today.[5] Nevertheless, despite several bridges and
efforts, the influence of the French school on the Americans seems fairly minor. This is not the case in other parts of the world,
however, as seen especially in South America [6]. The limited influence may be explained by the creation of think-tanks, both
civilian and military, in the United States right after WWII. For these groups, e.g., the RAND Corporation and Stanford Research
Institute, anticipation (TRA) was a large part of their work and they tended to formalize specific approaches quite early on. The
influences shared by France and the USA have taken many and varied paths of which only a few have been mapped here. There are
surely many others buried in folds of memories. Of course, history is never been written definitively and, as for the future, it
remains largely to be constructed.

References

[1] G. Berger, L'accélération de l'histoire et ses conséquences, (1957), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la Prospective. Textes
fondamentaux de la prospective française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and presented by Philippe Durance.
[2] G. Berger, L'attitude prospective, (1959), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la Prospective. Textes fondamentaux de la prospective
française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and presented by Philippe Durance;
Trad, The prospective attitude, in: André Cournand, Maurice Lévy (Eds.), Shaping the Future. Gaston Berger and the Concept of Prospective, Gordon and
Breach, New York, 1972.
[3] G. Berger, Le problème des choix: facteurs politiques et facteurs techniques, (1958), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la
Prospective. Textes fondamentaux de la prospective française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and presented by Philippe Durance.
[4] J. de Bourbon-Busset, Au rond-point de l'avenir, (1959), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la Prospective. Textes fondamentaux de
la prospective française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and commented by Philippe Durance.
[5] G. Berger, L'idée d'avenir, (1960), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la Prospective. Textes fondamentaux de la prospective
française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and presented by Philippe Durance.
[6] P. Massé, Prévision et prospective, (1959), Gaston Berger, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Pierre Massé, De la Prospective. Textes fondamentaux de la prospective
française, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Texts collected and presented by Philippe Durance;
Trad, Forescasting and Prospective, in: André Cournand, Maurice Lévy (Eds.), Shaping the Future. Gaston Berger and the Concept of Prospective, Gordon and
Breach, New York, 1972.
[7] Collège des techniques avancées et de l'aménagement du territoire, 1er colloque international sur l'aménagement du territoire et les techniques avancées,
Datar, collection, Travaux et Recherches de Prospective, La Documentation française, Paris, 1968.
[8] E. Jantsch, Technological Forecasting in Perspective, a Framework for Technological Forecasting, Its Techniques and Organization, OECD, Paris, 1967.
[9] H. Kahn, Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, Macmillan, New York, 1967 Trad. L'an 2000, R.
Laffont, Paris, 1968.
 P. Durance / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 1469–1475 1475

[10] P. Durance, Stéphane Cordobes, Attitudes prospectives, Éléments d'une histoire de la prospective en France après 1945, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007 Collection
Prospective.
[11] Hudson Institute, Survols de la France, Datar, collection “Travaux et Recherches de Prospective”, La Documentation française, Paris, 1972.
[12] J.-C. Bluet, Josée Zémor, et al., Scénarios d'aménagement du territoire. Essais méthodologiques, Datar, collection, Travaux et Recherches de Prospective, La
Documentation française, Paris, 1971.
[13] OTAM, Une image de la France en l'an 2000. Scénario de l'inacceptable, Datar, collection, Travaux et Recherches de Prospective, La Documentation française,
Paris, 1971.
[14] J. Durand, A new method for constructing scenarios, Futures 4 (4) (1972).
[15] P.-A. Julien, Pierre Lamonde, Daniel Latouche, La méthode des scénarios: une réflexion sur la démarche et la théorie de la prospective, Datar, collection,
Travaux et Recherches de Prospective, La Documentation française, Paris, 1975.
[16] F. Zwicky, Morphology of propulsive power, Society for Morphological Research, California Institute of Technology, 1962; Discovery, Invention, Research
through the Morphological Approach, Macmillan, New York, 1969.
[17] A. Cournand, Maurice Lévy (Eds.), Shaping the future. Gaston Berger and the Concept of Prospective, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1972.
[18] A. Cournand, Michael Meyer, From Roots to Late Budding: The Intellectual Adventures of a Medical Scientist, Gardner Press, 1986.
[19] A. Cournand, «Prospective philosophy and methods » : some reflections on their preliminary application to medical education, Futures 3 (4) (1971).
[20] P. Massé, Attitudes towards the future and their influence on the present, Futures 4 (1) (1972).
[21] B. de Jouvenel, L'art de la conjecture politique, La Table Ronde, Sépal, 1962.
[22] B. de Jouvenel, L'art de la conjecture, Éditions du Rocher, 1964, 2ème édition, 1972 Sédéis;
Tran, The Art of Conjecture, Basic Books, 1967 New York.
[23] P. Wack, Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead, Harvard Business Review, September–October, 1985.
[24] P. Wack, Scenarios: shooting the rapids, Harvard Business Review, November–December, 1985.
[25] A. Kleiner, The age of heretics, Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change, Currency Doubleday, New York, 1996.
[26] G. Burt, George Wright, ‘Seeing’ for organisational foresight, Futures 38 (2006).
[27] G. Burt, Pre-determined elements in the business environment: Reflecting on the legacy of Pierre Wack, Futures 38 (2006).
[28] J. de Rosnay, Le Macroscope. Vers une vision globale, Seuil, Tran. The Macroscope: A New World Scientific System, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975
1979.

Philippe Durance holds a doctorate in management science. He is an associate professor at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) in Paris and researcher at
the LIPSOR. He also directs the Prospective collection at the publishing house L'Harmattan (Paris).