Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta warrant.

A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering

tops.
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE
union office and after the police conducted an investigation of
MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed
vs. before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the
BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, trial court.
and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, violation of constitutional rights.
stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the
hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of
men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was
the Civil Code, allows so.
sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door
of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was
trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting damages: x x x x
Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed
Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside,
Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already
objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego
conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988,
petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts
them to obtain one. and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34
and 35.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality.

Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional DECISION: Denied.
right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the
award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For
respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or

indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case,
petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who
orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for
actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual
respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent
provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of
the Civil Code which provides:

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE
MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet
(6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage
of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

ISSUES:
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to
property Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
FACTS: Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of
the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom
of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based
or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to
property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for
the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes
upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do
so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and
non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost
deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right
may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
 Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin
is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence
the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal
opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech Political speech
refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to
public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
 Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected
by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does
not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
 With religion looked upon with benevolence and not
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may
take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere
in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS
MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY
OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan
(DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry,
Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on
propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that
the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local
zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified
as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully
operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of
mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos
Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that
petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land.
Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s
permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued
to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of
mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City
denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that
they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer
and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan
City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus
Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during
the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order
allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but
was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds
that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC
allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of
mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC
to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of
Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was
enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993.
However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a
mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion
papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from
prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing
the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial
land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the
property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several
certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial
area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the
classification of property as commercial without objections
raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local
government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying
the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but
petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer
to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are
irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the
grounds that the state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by
mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not
be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may
not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . .
., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity
or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts
are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of
the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State
immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence
other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan
City government had previously erred when it certified that the
property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any
evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001
certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion
that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous
recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the
previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government
that the property was commercially zoned unless they had
evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who
issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus
evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require
petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the
DAR showing that the property was converted from prime
agricultural land to commercial land.”
Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly
tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that
appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty.
Such statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial
of the renewal applications on the ground that property is
commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to
remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s
voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press
freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED
and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners’
zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to petitioners.

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No.

168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the

“Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped
mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those
who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing
its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody.
Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and
the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent
NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of
such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 State.
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary
with the Supreme Court.
and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint
that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the
press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that
Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
the press statements were made by respondents while in the
of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of
exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a
respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of
speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of
Constitution?
an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal
order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti- act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
G.R. No. 181613
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the 25 November 2009
clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all
(motion for reconsideration)
kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom
of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present Facts:
danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the
COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty
candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in
election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of
Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election
Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning,
since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system
for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not
officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in
premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court
En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should,
thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said
–
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed
Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate”
even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to
the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as
amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign
period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become
unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of
the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only
for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words,
election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of
the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse
but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law,
and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the
Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436,
as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon
the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the
start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned
in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails
freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as
the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic
principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an
act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is
no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that
partisan political activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before
the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed
Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the
ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of
the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended
to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files
his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still
not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to
expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A.
8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period.
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated
election system would be disqualified or penalized for any
partisan political act done before the start of the campaign
period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on
the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision
is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the
entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-
contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the
constitutionality of the said provision.

Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio

Vote: 9-5
Gonzales vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-27833, April 18,
1969 27 SCRA 835 (1969)
Facts: Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled
Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22,
1967, a proceeding that should have been started in the of Court
of First Instance but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in
view of the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional
issue raised. Petitioners challenged the validity of two new
sections now included in the Revised Election Code, under
Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on
June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political
activity. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and
the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of
Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,
1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political
leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim that “the enforcement
of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice
[their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their
freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or
societies for purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed under the
Philippine Constitution,” and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible
of any limitation.
Held: Yes, Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court
spoke of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction.
“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’ before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is
the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision “a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be public established.”
The “dangerous tendency” rule and explained “If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of

substantive evil is present? The evil apprehended is so imminent
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” The
apprehended evil must be “relatively serious.” For “[prohibition]
of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it
would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively
trivial harm to society.”

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified

by the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a
right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear
seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present
refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent
and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but
very likely inevitable.