MACARAEG, LOVELY MAE T.

2C

AUGUST 2017 CASES (CIVIL PROCEDURE)

MULTINATIONAL VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., RAMON

MAGBOO, JIMMY DEL MUNDO, CARLOS RAPAY, and DR. JOSEFINA
TIOPIANCO vs. ARNEL ARNEL M. GACUTAN, RAFAEL TEYLAN, EDMUND T.
HERNANDEZ, DANILO ARANETA, MIGUEL DAVID, JOLIE R. PELAYO,
BOBBY D. YUTADCO, DANIEL TENORIO, MICHAEL KHO, and DANILO
CAMBEL
G.R. No. 188307
August 2, 2017
Carpio, J

FACTS: Respondents, as then officers and members of the Board of Directors

(BOD) of petitioner Multinational Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(MVHAI), approved a resolution setting the annual election of the members of
the BOD on 23 January 2005 and the guidelines on proxy voting, among
others. Petitioner Jimmy del Mundo sought injunctive relief from the HLURB-
NCRFO because of the alleged lack of transparency in the issuance of proxy
forms and the alleged burning of election records to supposedly prevent
verification of the previous elections. On the same day, the HLURB-NCRFO
granted the application and issued a restraining order. In turn, the Committee
on Election (Comelec) of petitioner MVHAI, which was constituted by
respondent, issued a resolution postponing the village poll to prevent
disenfranchising the voters who wanted to vote by proxy. Majority of the
qualified members of petitioner MVHAI allegedly ignored the resolution of the
Comelec and constituted a new Comelec to supervise the election. The village
poll proceeded as scheduled and based on the results, petitioners garnered the
highest number of votes. Insisting that petitioners were not authorized under
the association by-laws to call an election, respondents refused to relinquish
their posts and declared themselves as hold-over directors until elections were
properly held.

Petitioners then filed an election contest praying that their election be

affirmed and that respondents be permanently enjoined from acting as hold-
over directors of petitioner MVHAI. The complaint was dismissed and nullified
the 2005 election. The HLURRB-Board of Commissioners (Boc) reversed the
decision. OP set aside the decision and reinstated the earlier decision of the
HLURB-NCRFO. The OP issued a Resolution declaring its Decision final and
executory. The HLURB-BoC, instead of resolving petitioners' pending motion
seeking to restrain the implementation of the Order dated 16 August 2006 and
respondents' Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Immediately Recall and/or Annul the
Order dated 31 August 2006, sought for clarification from the OP on whom the
Decision dated 16 May 2006 will be implemented against - whether the 2005 or
2006 BOD of petitioner MVHAI. On 2 April 2007, the OP issued a Clarificatory
Resolution in response to the request of the HLURB-BoC.1 The CA granted
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and nullified all elections conducted during
the pendency of the case.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reverse error in

reconsidering the dismissal of and reinstating the Petition for Certiorari
notwithstanding that the OP Clarificatory Resolution and Resolution dated 18
June 2007 sought to be nullified already became final and executory when
respondents failed to timely appeal.

2. Whether the OP Clarificatory Resolution and Resolution dated 18 June

2007 violates the doctrine of immutability when it modified the Decision dated
10 March 2005 of the HLURB-NCRFO

RULING: 1. NO. Certiorari is the proper remedy for assailing an order that
allegedly modified a final decision. As a rule, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the OP may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified
petition for review within 15 days from notice. However, where the petition
alleges grave abuse of discretion as when the assailed resolution substantially
modifies a decision that already became final and executory, what is involved is
an error of jurisdiction that is reviewable by certiorari, and no longer an error
of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43.

2. NO. The OP Clarificatory Resolution and Resolution were valid and did not
violate the doctrine of immutability of final and executory judgment. First, the
OP Clarificatory Resolution did not modify but merely clarified the ambiguity in
the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 10 March 2005 of the HLURB-
NCRFO. Indeed, when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. However, where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a
mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such
an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.
paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the OP Clarificatory Resolution is
simply a reiteration of the earlier order of the HLURBNCRFO directing
petitioners "to peacefully and orderly relinquish their office and position to the
former members of the Board of Directors of MVHAI and leave its clubhouse
and turn-over [sic] the custody thereof to the Board of Directors, and submit a
written accounting of moneys received and disbursed from the moment they
took over on February 4, 2005 as well as inventory the items therein. The
omission of the exact same directive of the HLURB-NCRFO in the dispositive
portion of the OP Clarificatory Resolution is not tantamount to its deletion as
to constitute an amendment of a final and executory judgment. Similarly, the
OP Clarificatory Resolution did not amend in any way the order to call an
election contained in the Decision dated 10 March 2005 of the HLURB-NCRFO.
If at all, the former merely set a 30-day timeline within which to hold an
election. Other than that, the OP Clarificatory Resolution did not order
anything new.

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN et al vs.

SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO AND ELSA CLARITO
G.R. NO. 211966
August 7, 1017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS: Wenceslao and Lydia acquired a parcel of land located at Barangay

Cogon, Roxas City. Respondents allegedly asked for permission to construct a
residential house on a portion at the subject property. Respondent Jonathan,
as a distant relative, was allowed subject to do so with the condition that
respondent will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his
own use. Petitioners decided to sell portions of the property which was then
still being occupied by respondents. Petitioners sent respondents a Demand
Letter to vacate the subject property. The respondents, however, refused to
heed such demand.

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against

respondents before the MTCC. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior
barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition for the
filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas
City. In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents argued that prior
barangay conciliation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed
with, considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in favor
of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.

The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to

remove the structures they erected on the subject property and to vacate the
same. The RTC denied the appeal of the respondents. It held that the lack of
barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was
not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order. Respondents filed a Petition for
Review. The CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint,
albeit without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang
Pambarangay. It pointed out that majority of petitioners actually resided in
Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the two non-residents of Roxas City already
executed an SP A in favor of Josephine, whom they authorized, among others,
to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents. Since respondents also
reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within
the ambit of the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section
412 of the LGC is mandatory in this case despite the fact that not all real
parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality

RULING: NO. Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a
conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman of the Pangkat as a pre-
condition to the filing of a complaint in court. The LGC further provides that
“the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputed,” subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law. One such
exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amiable settlement by an appropriate lupon. Thus, parties who do not actually
reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not required
to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of a
complaint in court. In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express
statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to
the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said
requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-
plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest” as
defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged
that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside reside Roxas
City. Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn resided
resided in Brgy. De la Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction
over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not
a precondition to its filing in court. Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out,
the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on appeal
because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order. In effect, the non-inclusion
of this issue in the Pre-Trial Order barred its consideration during the trial.
This is but consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the delimitation
of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA

G.R. No. 190004
August 8, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS: Dalauta was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Butuan

City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
which Dalauta received. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered
P192, 782. 59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such
valiation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to
determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject property. The
PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP. Dalauta filed a petition for
determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. It held that
DAR and LBR are directed to pay to Dalauta and the Members of the Board
Commissioners. LBP filed a motion for reconsidered and was denied by the
SAC. The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case, citing
LBP v. Wycoco16 and LBP v. Suntay.17 It reiterated that the SAC had original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the
case despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.

RULING: YES. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to

hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
only by the Constitution or the law. The courts, as well as administrative
bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions, have their respective jurisdiction as
may be granted by law. In connection with the courts' jurisdiction vis-a-vis
jurisdiction of administrative bodies, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction takes
into play.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not,
resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.

The SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.

ADTEL, INC. and/or REYNALDO T. CASAS vs. MARIJOY A. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 189942
August 9,2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS: Maryjoy Valdez (Maryjoy) is the purchasing and logistics supervisor of

Adtel, Inc. Adtel then entered into a dealership agreement with Maryjoy’s
husband, Angel Valdez (Mr. Valdez), to distribute Adtel’s wideband VHF-UHF
television antennas. The agreement was initially for 12 months and it was
extended for another 3 months. On February 3, 2006, Mr. Valdez filed against
Adtel a case for specific performance and damages for the execution of the
agreement; and a criminal complaint for libel against the chairman and officers
of the Adtel. On May 22, 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum directing
respondent to show cause in writing why she should not be terminated for
conflict of interest and breach of trust and confidence. She was placed under
preventive suspension thereafter. On May 29, 2006, Adtel terminated
respondent from the company.

Hence, respondent filed an illegal dismissal case against it alleging that

she did not violate any company rule or policy, neither was she guilty of fraud
nor willful breach of trust.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed the
decision for failure to substantially prove the act attributable to serve a just
cause.

Adtel filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. On the last
day for filing a petition for certiorari, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time.
Fifteen days after filing, Adtel filed its petition for certiorari with the CA, which
the CA dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in denying the

petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and in dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the sole basis of technicality

RULING: NO. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration must be
made not later than 60 days from the notice of the denial of the motion. While
the rule was to be strictly observed, the exception to it wherein said period may
be extended is during exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or
compelling reasons. Adtel’s motion for extension was grounded on the
counsel’s heavy volume of work.

As stated, there should be an effort on the part of party invoking liberality to

advance a reasonable explanation for his or her failure to comply. Absent a
more compelling reason, the CA did not commit a reversible error in dismissing
the petition.

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION represented by

its President, JANET C. LEY v. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO
G.R. NO. 222711
August 23, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damges against respondent Marvin Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business
under the name and style “Lola Taha Lalo Pata Palenge at Paluto sa Seaside.”
The petitioner alleged that it leased a parcel of land from PNCC. Petitioner
subleased a portion thereof to respondent for a term of 10 years. Respondent
allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period of August 2011 to December
2011 amounting to P8, 828, 025.4 and despite the demands, they still refused
to settle their obligations, hence the complaint.

In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, respondent pointed out that the
venue was improperly laid pursuant to a stipulation in the lease contract which
provided that “all actions or cases filed in connection with this case shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all other.”

In its Comment/Opposition to respondent’s affirmative defense of improper

venue, petitioner argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a
stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. This is
because such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts,
of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are within its exclusive original
jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer.

The Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the

complaint on the ground of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the lease
contract between petitioner and respondent is void insofar as it limits the filing
of cases with the RTC of Pasay City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction
over the case is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts. However, with respect to
the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation validly limits the
venue to the RTC of Pasay City. Since petitioner's complaint is one for
collection of sum of money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay City.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was
improperly laid.

RULING: NO. Valenzuela-RTC did not err in ruling that the venue was
improperly laid. The law provides that the venue for personal actions shall – as
a general rule – lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or
the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties
may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a
certain exclusive venue.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner’s action was one for collection of
sums of money in an amount that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases
involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and
that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC’s
exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the
contractual stipulation and filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City.
Hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue,
without prejudice, however, to its refilling in the proper court.

ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL vs. INAKI LARRAZABAL

G.R. NO. 199107
August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal

Enterprises) owned 3 parcels of land in Ormoc City. These three (3) parcels
were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree
No. 27, as amended by Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme,
Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to
farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners included. Larrazabal Enterprises filed its
Action for Recovery of these parcels against the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It assailed the cancellation of its
transfer certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new titles to
petitioners. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the
expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just compensation
requirement under Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended. Thus, it prayed for
the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners' transfer
certificates of title.

In their Answer, petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation.

They presented certifications issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Landbank) that the amounts of P80,359.37 and P95,691.49 had been
deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal Enterprises.

In his October 15, 1999 Decision, Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M.

Diloy (Regional Adjudicator Diloy) noted that there was nothing in the records
to show that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels. Hence, he
ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to
ownership of the lots. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB. In its September 16,
2008 Decision, the DARAB reversed the Decision of Regional Adjudicator Diloy.
Larrazabal Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. DARAB reversed its
own decision and granted the motion. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review
before the CA. The CA dismissed their Petition for the following errors: First
was an inconsistency between the listing of petitioners’ names in their prior
Motion for Extension of Time and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the
accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping were laden
with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the non-inclusion
of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent
Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners’
counsel’s failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his
payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Thus, this Petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal was justified by the
errors noted by the Court of Appeals.

RULING: NO. The dismissal was not justified by the errors. Procedural rules
“are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.” They provide a system for
forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute
settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the interests of the party.
Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a “policy of liberal
construction.”

Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the
fullest opportunity to properly ventilate and argue his or her case, “free from
the constraints of technicalities.” 34 Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that justice is better
served.

In this case, the Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the
opportunity to exhaustively ventilate and argue their case. Rather than
dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been
impelled by the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better
consideration of the intricate issues of the application of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and just compensation. The
reversal of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an
indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they
should be ignored on mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion
dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.

MARIO MAGAT, SR., ET AL. vs. TANTRADE CORPORATION AND PABLO S.

BORJA, JR.
G.R. No. 205483
August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS: Respondent Tantrade Corporation (Tantrade) filed a Complaint for

Collection of a Sum of Money with Damages against the original defendant,
Julian Magat (Magat), for unpaid purchases of construction materials. Julian
denied making any such purchases for herself. She claimed that it was her
contractor, Borja, who purchased such supplied from Tantrade, pursuant to
their Owner-Contractor Agreement.

The Municipal Trial Court found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade P305,833.10
plus interest. It ruled that purchase orders signed by Juliana indicated that
she bound herself to pay Tantrade for the purchased materials. Juliana
appealed before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC affiremed in toto.

Petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review under Rule 42 in the Court of Appeals. In its assailed Resolution, the
CA denied the First Motion for Extension. It faulted petitioners for
"procrastination" as they filed a motion for extension a day before the end of
the reglementary period. Two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day
extension that petitioners originally prayed for in the First Motion for
Extension, petitioners filed their Second Urgent Motion for Extension of Time
(Second Motion for Extension). They had not yet received a copy of the assailed
Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution by this time. They sought another
15-day extension, or until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for Review.
Petitioners' counsel explained that petitioners remained hard-pressed with
their finances. It was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners received a copy of
the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution. On July 11, 2011, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They explained that the "distance between
Tagbilaran City and Cebu City, the length of time to prepare the main petition
and the certified copies of pleadings and other court records, and the lack of
money to finance the filing of a Petition for Review" hindered them from
immediately filing their appeal. Not impressed with petitioners' reasons, the
Court of Appeals issued its assailed January 15, 201330 Resolution, denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in

denying the extension sought by the petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.

RULING: YES. The CA committed a reversible error. The last two sentences of
Section 1 of the Rule 42 of the Rules on Civil Procedure set that motions for
extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule42 permits a second
extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be
“for the most compelling reason.”

This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds that
warrant the extensions prayed for. They should not be faulted for maximizing
the period that Rule 42 allows. Petitioners can neither be faulted for the receipt
by the ponente’s office of the Rollo on May 24, 2011. Their Second Motion for
Extension was filed two days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It
was filed, not only within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for seeking
the second extension of Rule 42, Section 1. Petitioners were simultaneously
afflicted with the tragedy of death and constrained by their mean; these were
compelling reasons warranting a solicitous stance towards them. In sum, the
technical requirements of Rule 42 were satisfied.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO,

Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RICHARD Y. HUANG AND CARMEN G. HUANG,
AND STEPHEN G. HUANG, Respondents
G.R. No. 197654
August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS: Stephen Huang (Stephen) and his parents, Spouses Richard Y. Huang
and Carmen G. Huang, filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against Mercury Drug Corporation. Mercury Drug was the registered owner of a
six-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an accident with
Stephen’s car on the night of December 20, 1996. As a result of the tragic
incident, Stephen suffered serious spinal cord injuries. He is now a paraplegic.
RTC held Mercury Drug liable, and the CA affirmed the same.

As a result of garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of

Richard Y. Huang a Manager’s Check in the amount of P40,434,062.00.
Afterwards, Stephen and his parents filed a Satisfaction of Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court.

On December 18, 2008, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the execution of the
judgment despite clerical errors in the computation of life care cost and loss of
earning capacity.

In its January 20, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for
Certiorari holding that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The Court of Appeals found that "the perceived error in the
computation of the award and its correction" entailed a substantial amendment
of the judgment sought to be enforced. Under the doctrine on immutability of
judgments, courts are precluded from altering or modifying a final and
executory judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of immutability of judgments.
RULING: NO. A judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. It can neither be modified nor distributed by the courts in any
manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct the perceived
errors of fact or law. Parties cannot circumvent this principle by assailing the
execution of the judgment. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This doctrine admits the following exceptions:

 The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that

no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment
once the latter had become final.
 The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence
of a final and executor judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the
judgment never attains finality, as in the case of void judgments.
 The happening of a supervening event is likewise a ground to set aside or
amend a final and executory judgment.

In this case, the petitioner asserts that the case falls in the first exception. This
Court notes that the amendments sought by petitioners affect the very
substance of the controversy. While it appears on the surface of the Petition
that they merely seek the clarification of the judgment, a careful review of the
petitioners’ assertions and judgments reveal their true intention of appealing
the merits of the case. This cannot be done without violating the doctrine of
immutability of judgments. A correction pertaining to the substance of the
controversy is not a clerical error.

WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO, ET AL. vs. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, DANTE ABANDO AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 230696
August 30, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS: The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and
Monetary Claims filed by the petitioners against private respondent Makati
Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor Arbiter.

In their complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of
MDC and were illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to
another contractor, Asiapro Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that repeated re-employment does not make a project
employee a regular employee. NLRC Fourth Division affirmed in toto the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners failed to
attach the pertinent records of the case. The CA, likewise dismissed the case
on the ground that the petition is non-compliant with Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court. The. CA stated that: 1)the public respondent's assailed 31 May
2016 Decision and 26 July 2016 Resolution are mere photocopies of purported
certified true copies thereof; 2) the allegation as to material dates is incomplete;
3) the Labor Arbiter's Decision, the Petitioner's Appeal Memorandum and
Motion for Reconsideration which are all referred to in the petition are not
attached thereto; and 4) other relevant pleadings and/or documents necessary
to aid the Court in ascertaining the facts of the case upon which the assailed
31 May 2016 Decision is based are not attached to the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was justified in dismissing the petition for not
complying with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court

RULING: YES. The CA was justified. The law provides that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Based on the foregoing rules, we rule that the CA was justified in initially
dismissing the petition based on the petitioners’ failure to attach to the petition
the certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC, as
well as other portions of the records of the case. As noted by the CA, only
photocopies, not the certified true copies, of the NLRC decision and resolution
complained of were attached; neither were the pleadings and other papers filed
before the labor arbiter and the NLRC appended. Absent such required
documents. The CA correctly opined that it would have no basis to determine
whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding the petitioners as
project employees and that their termination was not illegal.

CE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. ARANETA CENTER

G.R. No. 192725
August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS: CENON was a construction contractor, which, for more than 25 years,
had been doing business with respondent ACI, the developer of Araneta Center,
Cubao, Quezon City. In June 2002, ACI sent invitations to different
construction companies, including CENON, for them to bid on a project
identified as “Package #4” a part of its redevelopment plan for Araneta Center
Complex. The project would eventually be the Gateway Mall.

The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal October 25, 2006 Decision awarded a total sum of
P217,428,155.75 in favor of petitioner CE Construction Corporation (CENON).
This sum represented adjustments in unit costs plus interest, variance in take-
out costs, change orders, time extensions, attendance fees, contractor-supplied
equipment, and cost of arbitration. This amount was net of the countervailing
awards in favor of respondent Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI), for defective and
incomplete works, permits, licenses and other advances. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision modified the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal Decision by awarding a
net amount of P82,758,358.80 in favor of CENON. The CA Amended Decision
adjusted this amount to P93,896,335.72

ISSUE: Whether or not the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s award is competent and is
well within its jurisdiction in this case.

RULING: YES. This Court commenced its discussion by underscoring that

arbitration primarily serves the need of expeditious dispute resolution. This
interest takes on an even greater urgency in the context of construction
projects and the national interest so intimately tied with them. ACI’s have so
bogged down its contractor. Nearing 13 years after the Gateway Mall’s
completion, its contractor has yet to be fully and properly compensated. The
delays have virtually bastardized the hopes at expeditious and effective dispute
resolution which are supposedly the hallmarks of arbitration proceedings.

The CIAC was created with the specific purpose of an “early and expeditious
settlement of disputes” cognizant of the exceptional role of construction to “the
furtherance of national development goals.”

The CIAC does not only serve the interest of speedy dispute resolution, it also
facilitates authoritative dispute resolution. Its authority proceeds not only from
juridical legitimacy but equally from technical expertise. The creation of a
special adjudicatory body for construction disputes presupposes distinctive
and nuanced competence on matters that re conceded to be outside the innate
expertise of regular courts and adjudicatory bodies concerned with other
specialized fields. The CIAC has the state’s confidence concerning the entire
technical expanse of construction, defined in jurisprudence as “referring to all
on-site works on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through
completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation of
components and equipment.”

Jurisprudence has characterized the CIAC as a quasi-judicial, administrative

agency equipped with technical proficiency that enables it to efficiently and
promptly resolve conflicts. Consistent with CIAC’s technical expertise is the
primacy and deference accorded to its decisions.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RAMON AND

ANNABELLE SABADO, Respondents
G.R. No. 224204
August 30, 2017
 Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: HTPMI and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell whereby

HTPMI agreed to sell a real property located at Antipolo City to respondents. In
consideration thereof, respondents paid HTPMI the total amount of
P869,400.00, consisting of a P174,400.00 down payment and the balance of
P695,000.00 payable in 120 equal monthly installments. The parties further
agreed that respondents’ failure to pay any amount within the stipulated period
of time shall mean the forfeiture of the down payment and any other payments
made in connection thereto, as well as the cancellation and rescission of the
Contract to Sell in accordance with law.

Petitioner, through a Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act, cancelled or

rescinded respondents’ Contract to Sell due to the latter’s failure to pay their
outstanding obligations thereunder. Consequently, petitioner demanded that
respondents vacate the subject property, but to no avail. Hence, a Complaint
was filed for ejectment or unlawful detainer against respondents before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo City. Respondents argued that
petitioner is not the real party in interest to institute such complaint, since
ownership over the subject property remained with HTPMI.

The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, petitioner was
subrogated to the rights of HTPMI under the Contract to Sell and, hence, is a
real party in interest entitled to institute the instant suit against respondents
for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell. The RTC
affirmed the MTCC’s ruling in toto.

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling in this case, and accordingly;
(a) remanded the case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b)
directed the MTCC to proceed with the trial of the case with dispatch. Initially,
it upheld petitioner's right as real party in interest to file the instant suit as
HTPMI's assignee. However, since legal title to the subject property was
retained by HTPMI pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of Assignment, the
latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an indispensable party which
should have been impleaded as a plaintiff thereon and without which no final
determination can be had in the present case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable

party to petitioner’s ejectment suit against respondent and, thus, must be
impleaded therein.

RULING: NO. The CA erred in ruling that HTPMI is an indispensable party. The
law provides, Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all
indispensable parties should be joined in a suit. Relatedly, an indispensable
party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot
be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience.

In this case, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an indispensable party to

the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondents. Under the Deed of
Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights to petitioner under the Contract to Sell.
By this assignment, the Assignee hereby acquires all rights of the assignor
under the Contract to Sell and under the law, including the right to endorse
any and all terms and conditions of the Contract to Sell and the right to collect
the amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the property.