REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. O.G.

HOLDINGS
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189290
NOVEMBER 29, 2017
MARTIRES, J.

FACTS: EMB-Region 7 issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

to the Panglao Island Nature Resort Corporation for the beach resort project
owned and operated by O.G. Holdings. On 28 April 2005, EMB-Region 7 again
sent O.G. Holdings a Notice of Violation with respect to ECC Condition No. 2.2.
On 4 July 2006, EMB-Region 7's Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Division recommended the suspension of the ECC issued to the Panglao Island
Nature Resort Corporation. Acting on EIA Division's recommendation, EMB-
Region 7 suspended the subject ECC in an order. In a letter dated 14 July
2006, O.G. Holdings moved for reconsideration. It pleaded that the suspension
of the ECC would hinder its application with the PRA, as it required an existing
ECC for the special registration of the man-made island. The plea prompted the
Bohol staff of EMB-Region 7 to visit the project site on 30 August 2006. The
staff reported that there were no reclamation activities at the site. However,
local fisherfolk reported to the bureau that a guardhouse was being built at the
resort, and that its foundation was already finished. The fisherfolk also
reported that O.G. Holdings was cordoning seawater at the project site. On 18
January 2007, EMB-Region 7 investigated these reports, during which O.G.
Holdings manifested that it would no longer proceed with the construction of
the guardhouse but that its cordoning activities would continue in order to
maintain the security of resort guests, following instructions from the
Department of Tourism. On 7 February 2007, again, EMB Region 7 issued the
second suspensive order. This time, the order included as among the beach
resort project's violations the construction of a guardhouse within the
foreshore area. O.G. Holdings no longer moved for the reconsideration of this
second order. Instead, it filed a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA. The CA found merit in the prayer for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA reversibly erred in granting O.G. Holdings'

Petition for Certiorari.

RULING: The CA erred in granting O.G. Holdings' petition when there was a
failure to move for reconsideration before seeking certiorari. A motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. This well-established rule is intended to afford the public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. O.G. Holdings no
longer moved for the reconsideration of the 7 February 2007 order. To assail
the order, it instead filed posthaste a petition for certiorari with the appellate
court. Petitioners EMB-Region 7 and its then Officer-in-Charge Arranguez were
thus deprived of the opportunity to rectify or, at the least, address the errors of
jurisdiction that O.G. Holdings imputed against them before the CA.
While there are well-recognized exceptions to the rule, none is said to be
present here. For one thing, O.G. Holdings did not specifically plead any of
them in its petition for certiorari. It pleaded before the appellate court that it
would be "futile" to move for the reconsideration.

The CA erred in granting O.G. Holdings' petition when they had failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking certiorari. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must
first be made with the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution
of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts for review. If a remedy within the administrative
machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide a controversy, a party should first exhaust such
remedy before going to court. This doctrine closely echoes the reason behind
the rule providing that before resort to the special civil action of certiorari is
allowed, a motion for reconsideration should first be filed with the public
respondent concerned. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is obliged
pursuant to comity and convenience which in tum impel courts to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with. O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine.
Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject ECC,
made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, which was prevailing at
the time of the suspensive orders. O.G. Holdings thus had the opportunity to
file an administrative appeal on the suspension of the beach resort project's
ECC. The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies.

The CA erred in making factual findings in a certiorari proceeding.

Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, which is limited to the
issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. Yet to argue grave abuse of
discretion, O.G. Holdings presented the appellate court with factual matters
that do not appear, at least on record, to have been shared or even passed
upon by EMB Region-7. The CA erred in this case in making factual findings in
a certiorari proceeding-even if O.G. Holdings had alleged a misappreciation of
facts on the part of EMB-Region 7. As a rule, misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere
fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion.
Parenthetically, O.G. Holdings should have elevated its factual issues on
administrative appeal to the sound discretion of the DENR, the government
body entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and
technical training and knowledge.
 BERNARDO ZAMORA v. EMMANUEL QUINAN, JR, et. al.
G.R. No. 216139
NOVEMBER 29, 2017
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner, on June 19 2006, filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of

Title of Real Properties fraudulently obtained with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-32448. Pending the
resolution of petitioner's complaint, he commenced another action before the
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, on November 4, 2008, for the Annulment of
Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9, which was dismissed based on
technicalities in a Resolution dated April 22, 2009. Then, again, on June 5,
2009, petitioner commenced another civil action before the CA for the
Annulment of Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9, and docketed as
CA G.R. SP. No. 04278. On September 1, 2010, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
19 dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-32448 on the ground of forum shopping.
Thereafter, the respondents filed with the CA a motion to dismiss CA G.R. SP.
No. 04278 claiming that petitioner has resorted to forum shopping, which was
granted by the CA in its Resolution dated July 31, 2014. According to the CA,
petitioner committed forum shopping because there is identity of causes of
action, parties and reliefs sought in the action filed by him for reconveyance of
real properties instituted before the RTC and the petition for annulment of
judgment instituted before the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA should have relaxed the procedural rules so as
to give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

RULING: The SC finds no merit in the petition. Forum shopping is committed

by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same
or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or
increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. The
general rule is that compliance with the certificate of forum shopping is
separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping
itself. Forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of both initiatory
pleadings without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel or party concerned.

Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in

several ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).

A comparison of the reliefs sought by petitioner in the reconveyance case

and the annulment of judgment case under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
confirms that they are substantially similar on two points: (1) revocation and
cancellation of the new certificate of titles granted in the name of herein
respondents and (2) the recovery or consolidation of title in petitioner's favor. In
other words, the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for are being founded on
the same facts. The identity of the two cases filed is such that a favorable
judgment rendered in the lower court for the case of reconveyance will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration of this Court.

There is a clear violation of the rules on forum-shopping, as this Court is

being asked to grant substantially similar reliefs as those that may also be
granted by the court a quo while the case was still pending with the latter. In
the process, this creates a possibility of creating two separate and conflicting
decisions. Thus, the CA did not commit an error in outrightly dismissing
petitioner's petition. It must be remembered that the acts of a party or his
counsel, clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be
ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions
against the lawyer.
 GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. ANIANA LAWAS SON
G.R. No. 221815
NOVEMBER 29, 2017
REYES, JR, J.

FACTS: Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a

parcel of land located in Barrio Magay, Municipality of Compostela, Province of
Cebu. The latter derived his title over the property from a successful grant of a
Free Patent), which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-
37324. On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an
action for reconveyance and damages against Glynna Foronda-Crystal
(petitioner) alleging that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the lawful
owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the
same from a certain Eleno T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum of
P200,000.00. On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) venue is improperly laid, (3) action
has prescribed, and, (4) lack of cause of action. A week thereafter, the RTC
issued an Order dated April 20, 1999, which dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. . The RTC asserted that the "market value of the subject property
per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B, Complaint) is P2,830.00" and thus,
jurisdiction over the case lies with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-
Compostela, Cebu. RTC following herein respondent's motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on
the following ratiocination: (1) Paragraph III of the Complaint stated that the
property was worth P200,000.00; (2) the Court has "judicial knowledge that
under the BIR zonal valuation, the property located at Magay, Compostela,
Cebu carries the value that may summed (sic) up to more than P20,000.00 for
the property with an area of 1,570 square meters"; and (3) the "tax declaration,
sometimes being undervalued, is not controlling." Hence, trial ensued. The RTC
rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. The respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed
value of the subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an
allegation of its market value amounting to P200,000.00.  In the course of the
trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in
the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked
jurisdiction. Settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value
in the complaint. The complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed
value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed
because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be
identified. However, a liberal interpretation of this law would necessitate an
examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the
complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex
"B," which naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A
perusal thereof would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00. On
this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction
over the case.
 JOLO’S KIDDIE CART v. EVELYN CABALLA and ANTHONY BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 230682
NOVEMBER 29, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal,

underpayment of salaries/wages and 13 th month pay, non-payment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, and separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees filed by
Evelyn A. Caballa (Caballa), Anthony M. Bautista (Bautista; collectively,
respondents), and one Jocelyn S. Colisao (Colisao) against petitioners before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondents and Colisao
alleged that petitioners hired them as staff members in the latter's business.
The LA dismissed the case insofar as Colisao is concerned for failure to
prosecute. However, the LA ruled in favor of respondents. NLRC modified the
LA ruling, finding no illegal dismissal nor abandonment of work. Dissatisfied,
petitioners directly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, without moving
for reconsideration before the NLRC. CA denied the petition due to petitioners'
failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to the filing of
a petition for certiorari before the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the petition

for certiorari before it due to petitioners' non-filing of a prior motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC.

RULING: The CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it

based on the aforesaid technical ground, as petitioners were justified in
pursuing a direct recourse to the CA even without first moving for
reconsideration before the NLRC. As a rule, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition
for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is that "the law intends to
afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and
mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be
had." Notably, however, there are several recognized exceptions to the rule, one
of which is when the order is a patent nullity. A simple counterchecking of the
NLRC's computation with the LA ruling readily reveals that: (a) the amounts of
P109,870.80 and P112,294.00 clearly pertain to the awards of backwages,
which were already deleted in the NLRC ruling; (b) the amounts of P75,156.12
and P74,480.12 pertain to the awards of wage differential; and (c) the amount
of P10,608.00 which pertain to the awards of 13 th month pay for both
respondents, were no longer reflected in the NLRC computation. While this is
obviously just an oversight on the part of the NLRC, it is not without any
implications as such oversight resulted in an unwarranted increase in the
monetary awards due to respondents. Clearly, such an increase is a patent
nullity as it is bereft of any factual and/or legal basis.
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL COMPANY
DEVELOPMENT
G.R. No. 213039
NOVEMBER 27, 2017
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: In the early sixties, NDC had in its disposal a ten (10)-hectare property
located along Pureza St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. The estate was popularly known
as the NDC Compound and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 92885,
110301 and 145470. On September 7, 1977, NDC entered into a contract of
lease with GHRC over a portion of the property. Later, a second contract of
lease covering additional portions of the property was executed between NDC
and GHRC where the latter was also given the option to purchase the leased
area on the property. On August 12, 1988, before the expiration of the ten-year
period under the second contract of lease, GHRC informed NDC of its desire to
renew the contract and thereafter exercise the option to purchase the leased
areas. NDC, however, gave no reply thereon. Later, GHRC discovered that NDC
was trying to dispose of the property in favor of a third party. Thus, on October
21, 1988, GHRC filed with the trial court, a complaint for specific performance
and damages against NDC, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2238.
Meanwhile, on January 6, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Memorandum Order No. 214, ordering the transfer of the whole NDC
Compound to the National Government, which in turn would convey the said
property in favor of PUP at acquisition cost. The order of conveyance of the
10.31-hectare property would automatically result in the cancellation of NDCs
total obligation in favor of the National Government.
On November 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision sustaining GHRC's right
to purchase the leased areas on the subject lot. NDC and PUP interposed their
respective appeals before the appellate court. On June 25, 2008, the appellate
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 84399, rendered judgment affirming in toto the
decision of the RTC. On May 23, 2011, PUP filed a Manifestation claiming that
instead of NDC, it was entitled to the purchase price of the leased premises.
RTC ruled in favour of PUP. the RTC asserted that its modification was in
accordance to this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 183612 and 184260. It explained
that upon verification with the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered by
the NDC and the Republic of the Philippines, it appeared that there are indeed
properties of NDC which were not transferred to the National Government,
among which are the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 197748 and
197798 because at the time of the execution of the MOA, said properties were
subject of a pending court litigation. Aggrieved, before the appellate court, PUP
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure invoking grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC for issuing the Order dated September 5,
2011 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012.
On February 19, 2014, the appellate court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in its finding that the RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order dated
September 5, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012.

RULING: Yes. Records reveal that PUP failed to substantiate its imputation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The appellate court's decision
affirmed the RTC's finding that because the leased subject properties were
under litigation at the time of the implementation of Memorandum Order No.
214, the ownership thereof was never transferred to the National Government,
thus, it necessarily follows that the same were never conveyed to PUP.
We, thus, conclude that the appellate court correctly found that no grave abuse
of discretion attended the RTC's issuance of the February 2, 2012 resolution as
the same merely clarified what was seemingly confusing in the November 25,
2004 decision of the RTC.
PUP failed in its duty to demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of
discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. We, thus, find that the appellate court
correctly found that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the February 2, 2012 Order as the same lacks the arbitrariness that
characterizes excess of jurisdiction.
 SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (DECEASED) SURVIVED AND ASSUMED BY
HIS HEIRS v. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES AND MARIANO BOBILLES
G.R. No. 208614
NOVEMBER 27, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment
of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria)
and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in
Piedad's favor and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery.
Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on September
15, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial
court ruling. On July 12, 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying
that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished
Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Toledo City. Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied the motion.
Judge Altubar opined that since more than 12 years had passed since the
Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory, the
execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival of judgment,
not a mere motion. Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to
institute the case on Piedad's behalf.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality

to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad; and 2) whether or not the motion
to revive judgment was timely filed.

RULING: 1) Yes. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's

rightful heirs not only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. Rule 3,
Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in
interest in a civil action:

Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 16 then provides for the process of substitution of parties when
the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the
claim.

2) Yes. When the delay in filing a motion or action for execution could not be
attributed to the prevailing party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be resorted to where a literal and strict adherence will most
likely result in miscarriage of justice. Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides the two (2) ways of executing a final and executory
judgment:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and

executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

In the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the
Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12 years and 1
day had already elapsed when the instant motion was filed on November 2,
2010. There may be instances that execution may still pursue despite the lapse
of ten years from finality of judgment but it should be a result of a well-justified
action for revival of judgment, not a mere motion. This Court, in a long line of
cases, has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if
prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor
for his or her benefit or advantage. It is not disputed that the deed of absolute
sale between Piedad and respondents was declared null and void for being a
forgery, and that the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became
final and executory as early as November 1, 1998. However, due to
respondents' schemes and maneuvers, they managed for many years to prevent
Piedad and his heirs from enjoying what had already been decreed to be
rightfully theirs, leading to an empty victory and petitioners' continued struggle
for their rights.
Considering that the Regional Trial Court May 15, 2012 Order dismissing
petitioners' motion for revival was utterly devoid of legal or factual basis, it is
clear that it was attended by grave abuse of discretion for being issued
capriciously and with a gross misapprehension of the facts.
 JOHN DENNIS CHUA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 135248
NOVEMBER 22, 2017
MARTIRES, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. The cases were raffled to Branch 58, then presided by Judge Elvira DC
Castro (Judge Castro). On 16 September 2004, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
In a decision, dated 15 April 2009, signed by Judge Santos as the pairing
judge, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P200,000.00 for each count. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the RTC assailing Judge Santos' authority to render the decision. In an
Order, dated 15 June 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC in an Order, dated 28 December 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy to question the MTC
decision.

RULING: No. Appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to question the MeTC
decision. At the outset, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought
to assail the MeTC decision. 

First, it has been consistently held that where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be entertained -
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits,
final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to
the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion
in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari
because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of
appeal.

Second, even if a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner

failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As
a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it
by way of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
 YOLANDA VILLANUEVA-ONG v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
G.R. No. 212904
NOVEMBER 22, 2017
TIJAM, J.

FACTS: On December 4, 2012, Juan Ponce Enrile (respondent) filed a civil

Complaint for damages against Yolanda Villanueva-Ong (petitioner) for libel
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. On January 17, 2013,
petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. The respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss ) which argued that petitioner's counterclaims are
actually permissive, and hence should have complied with the requirements of
an initiatory pleading, specifically the payment of docket fees and certification
against forum shopping. Respondent prayed for dismissal of petitioner's
counterclaims for her failure to comply with such requirements.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s counterclaims are compulsory in nature.

RULING: Yes. Counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim
must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the
nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or
even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons
over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred
if not set up in the same action.

A counterclaim is permtsstve if it does not arise out of or is not

necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It
is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.

Jurisprudence has laid down tests in order to determine the nature of a

counterclaim, to wit:

(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants'
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants'
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.

In this case, the complaint filed by respondent for damages arose from
the alleged malicious publication written by petitioner, hence central to the
resolution of the case is petitioner's malice, or specifically that the libelous
statement must be shown to have been written or published with the
knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false
or not.
Meanwhile, petitioner's counterclaim presupposes bad faith or malice on the
part of respondent in instituting the complaint for damages. In the allegations
supporting her counterclaims, it was alleged that respondent's complaint was
filed merely to harass or humiliate her.
Such allegations are founded on the theory of malicious prosecution.
Traditionally, the term malicious prosecution has been associated with
unfounded criminal actions, jurisprudence has also recognized malicious
prosecution to include baseless civil suits intended to vex and humiliate the
defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.

A counterclaim purely for damages and attorneys fees by reason of the

unfounded suit filed by the respondent, has long been settled as falling under
the classification of compulsory counterclaim and it must be pleaded in the
same action, otherwise, it is barred. In this case, the counterclaims, set up by
petitioner arises from the filing of respondent's complaint. "The counterclaim is
so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding
independently." We find that the evidence supporting respondent's cause that
malice attended in the publication of the article would necessarily negate
petitioner's counterclaim for damages premised on the malicious and baseless
suit filed by respondent.
 FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R.No. 213525
NOVEMBER 21, 2017
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: The Court issued a resolution on January 27, 2015 denying the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds, namely: (a)
failure to comply with the rule on proof of service; (b) late filing; (c) failure to file
a verified declaration under the Efficient Use of Paper Rule; and (d) failure to
prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Audit
(COA). In the same resolution, however, the Court required the petitioner and
its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court for using in the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 1, 2014 harsh and disrespectful language
towards the Court; and further required Atty. Fortaleza to explain why he
should not be disbarred. The petitioner has filed its so-called Manifestation
with Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration, attaching
therewith its Second Motion for Reconsideration. It has contended in
the Second Motion for Reconsideration that the final order referred to
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals applied to the 30-day period mentioned in
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as to make such period be reckoned
from notice of the denial by the COA of its Motion for Reconsideration; and that
the reckoning of the 30-day period ought to be from July 14, 2014, the date
when it received the denial by the COA of its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration should be

denied.

RULING: Yes. Second Motion for Reconsideration, being a prohibited motion,

should be denied.

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not

entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule
can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en bane upon
a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second
motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to
be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.

The showing of exceptional merit to justify the acceptance of the

petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration was not made herein. Hence, we
deny the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
 For sure, the petitioner's non-compliance with the rule on proof of service
and the petitioner's unjustified reliance on the Fresh Period Rule as the basis
to extend the period for filing of the special civil actions for certiorari under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court were already enough ground to dismiss the
petition for certiorari. We need not remind that the Fresh Period Rule applies
only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings filed
under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45, and Rule 122.

Hence, liberality could not be extended to the petitioner. According

to Ginete v. Court of Appeals, only matters of life, liberty, honor or property
may warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character.
That is not the situation of the petitioner herein. It is also true that other
justifications may be considered, like: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. But, again, the
petitioner has not shown the attendance of any of such justifications for
excepting its petition for certiorari from the stricture of timeliness of filing.
 UNITED INTERIOR MANGGAHAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. HON.
DE LUNA
G.R. No. 216788
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Sometime in early 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint  for
Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with Damages against respondents Spouses
Edilberto Villon and Helen Pe-Villon (Sps. Villon), now represented by their
heirs Emee Pe-Villon, Emmanuel Pe-Villon, Elsie Villon-Cabrera, Elma Villon-
Austria, and Ellen Ferrero (respondents). After petitioner rested its case, Sps.
Villon filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence which the RTC eventually granted in an Order.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied in an

Order dated May 6, 2014. Consequently, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. For
their part, Sps. Villon filed an Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Notice of Appeal
and Issue Certificate of Finality. On September 19, 2014, the RTC
ordered petitioner's Notice of Appeal expunged from the records "for lack of
authority from [its] Board of Directors to initiate the appeal," pursuant to
Section 12 of RA 9904. It, however, found that "[petitioner] has paid the appeal
fee within the reglementary period."

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in expunging
petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the records of the case.

RULING: Yes. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, "[i]n appeals by

notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection
of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties." In fact, under Section 13 of the same Rules, the trial court, prior
to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, may, motu
propio or on motion, order the dismissal of the appeal on the grounds specified
therein. In other words, the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not
automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for
purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction, "before the expiration of the
period to appeal of the other parties." Thus, contrary to petitioner's position,
the RTC has yet to lose its jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice of
Appeal as respondents' period to appeal had not yet expired by then.
 This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it expunged from the records petitioner's Notice of
Appeal for "lack of authority from its Board of Directors to initiate the
appeal." Under the Rules, an appeal from cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be made to the Court of Appeals by
"filing a notice of appeal [(or record of appeal in cases required by law)] with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party." The appeal shall be taken, with the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees paid, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a board resolution

authorizing the representative to initiate the appeal is not required for the
purpose of filing a notice of appeal. This is because a notice of appeal is not a
pleading, initiatory or otherwise, that, when required by the law or the
rules, must contain, among others, a verification and certification against
forum shopping to be signed by the party or his/her representative, and, in the
case of a representative, proof of his/her authority to file the action, i.e., power
of attorney or secretary's certificate with copy of the board resolution. Besides,
if only to put to rest any doubts anent respondents' objection against Calilung's
authority to represent petitioner in the case, the latter in fact submitted, with
its motion for reconsideration, a copy of Board Resolution No. 01, Series of
2013 to this effect. Thus, when the RTC in this case expunged petitioner's
Notice of Appeal for lack of authority from petitioner's Board of Directors to
initiate the appeal, it not only effectively expanded the procedural requirements
for initiating an appeal; more than anything, it effectively deprived petitioner of
further recourse to the higher courts by asking for the submission of
documents which neither the law nor the Rules and jurisprudence require.
 DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY v. GINA BUTLER
G.R. No. 219408
NOVEMBER 8, 2017
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS: Donald Francis Gaffney filed a Complaint against Gina V. Butler for
sum of money. Private respondent alleged that sometime between the years
2006 to 2007, petitioner and her husband Anthony Richard Butler approached
and invited private respondent to invest in ActiveFun Corporation
("ActiveFun"), an entity engaged in the construction, operation and
management of children's play and party facilities. Petitioner was the President
of ActiveFun while her husband was its Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer.
Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard
Butler under the original Complaint, private respondent filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or
the heirs of the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional party-
defendant], allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse. He
alleged that petitioner required him, as a pre-condition for the payment of the
balance, to execute a separate handwritten acknowledgment of the said
payment. Petitioner opposed the motion primarily on the ground that "only
natural or juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action."

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his

surviving spouse Gina, could be named as additional defendant in the present
case.

RULING: No. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be made a defendant in a case. Neither a dead person nor his estate
may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have
such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to
substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a
decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an
estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend
the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to
sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action. There can be no doubt
that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a
civil action because lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal
personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the
present ordinary civil suit for collection. The complaint against him should be
dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action or for failure to state a cause of action because a complaint cannot
possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil
action.

BERNICE JOAN TI v. MANUEL DIÑO

G.R. No. 219260
NOVEMBER 6, 2017
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: City Prosecutor on February 19, 2008, issued a Resolution

recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner and a certain
Julieta Fernandez (Fernandez) for falsification of public documents, to which
the petitioner and Fernandez filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
resolution. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) allowed the reinvestigation of
the case and, thereafter, the first ruling of the City Prosecutor was reversed
and set aside. Thus, a Motion to Withdraw Information was filed before the
MeTC which was granted by the latter in an Order dated June 24, 2008.
Subsequently, respondent, through a private prosecutor, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MeTC's Order dated June 24, 2008 and, on November
14, 2008, the MeTC issued an Order granting the same motion for
reconsideration and, thus, finding probable cause to indict petitioner and
Fernandez for the crime charged. On March 8, 2010, the RTC rendered a
decision and ruled that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reviving and reinstating the
criminal case against petitioner and Fernandez on the basis of respondent's
motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor without the
concurrence or conformity of the public prosecutor. Respondent, thereafter,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 5, 2010, with the contention that
the RTC erred in its resolution because the private prosecutor had the right to
file a motion for reconsideration even without the conformity or concurrence of
the public prosecutor.

On May 20, 2011, the RTC disapproved respondent's Notice of Appeal for
not having been perfected within the fifteen-day reglementary period, and thus,
no order was made to transfer the records of the case to the CA.
Respondent, therefore, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
assailing the Order of the RTC. Respondent contended that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
respondent's motion to transmit the records of the case to the CA despite the
filing of the notice of appeal on time.

ISSUE: Whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, the provisions of
the Rules of Court be interpreted liberally.

RULING: Yes. It is indisputable that petitioner was not able to receive

respondent's notice of hearing on time. According to respondent, a notice of
hearing was sent to petitioner through registered mail. However, petitioner was
only able to receive the said notice three days after the scheduled hearing. The
Rules of Court mandates that every written motion required to be heard and
the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing.
In this case, respondent failed to ensure the receipt by the petitioner of the
notice of hearing at least three days before the date of such hearing. The
sending of a registered mail can hardly be an assurance that such notice will
fall under the hands of the other party on time. Under the circumstances of the
case, respondent should have personally served the notice of hearing since the
offices of the respondent and petitioner's counsels are both located in the
National Capital Region.

A close reading of the provisions of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of

Court clearly shows that the directive to ensure that the receipt by the other
party .of the notice of hearing at least three (3) days before the date of the said
hearing is for the party who filed the motion. Nowhere in the said rule does it
state that the court is obligated to determine whether a copy of the motion had,
indeed, been served on the opposing party. The court is not required by the
rules to reset the hearing in case the other party fails to attend the hearing on
the motion. In fact, what the rules allow is for the court to set the hearing on
shorter notice for good cause and not to delay or reset the hearing. The fault,
therefore, is with the respondent and not with the RTC. It was the respondent
who resorted to a mode of service other than personal service and, thus, he
should have been the one who ensured that such notice was received by the
petitioner. Under the Rules, whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception.