Hacienda Luisita V Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council
[G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the
Constitution is unequivocal: the farmers and regular
farmworkers have a right to own directly or
collectively the lands they till.
The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution:
direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to
individual farmers is the most commonly used method by
DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the
alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by
individual farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes
collective ownership by farmers. No language can be
found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or
prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from
being the legal entity through which collective ownership
can be exercised.
Emergency Recit: The SC en banc voted 11-0
dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with
modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC for brevity) revoking Hacienda
Luisita Inc.  (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP) and placing the subject land in HL under
compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government.
Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are
operative facts that occurred in the premises. The SC
thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by
application of the operative fact principle, give the 5296
qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or choose actual land distribution.
Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a
meeting regarding the effects of their choice and
therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice. The
parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the SC’s decision
FACTS:
 In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda
Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the
sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned
and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group.The
Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in
obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank.
 Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in
favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of
the sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising
the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-
corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should
there be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the
Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply
with this condition
 In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is
a program aimed at redistributing public and private
agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who
are landless.
 One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda
Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-
industrial-residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the
Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO),
which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco
Sr., Group.
 Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed
an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender
the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be
distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda
Luisita to the MAR.
 In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the
government’s case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of
FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
 Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer
or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the
stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of
TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition by the farmers.
 After conducting a follow-up referendum and
revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led
by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved
the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-
12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
 From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have
extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such
claim was subsequently contested by two groups
representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI
Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR
asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or
revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they
haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that
HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t
really improved contrary to the promise and
rationale of the SDOA.
 The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to
the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and
the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the
recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of
Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of
Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition
scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP
of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered
by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition
scheme under the CARP law.
 These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via
Rule 65.
 On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for
the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP
compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of
outright agricultural land transfer.
 For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with
the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in
Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N  Is the operative fact doctrine available in
this case? (yes)
2. W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock
Distribution Plan or SDP. (YES)
3. W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA
6657 (NO)
4. W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the
Constitution’s concept of agrarian reform (YES)
HELD: MR of PARC is Partially lifted
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
 The Court maintained its stance that the operative
fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions
made by the President or the administrative agencies
that have the force and effect of laws.  ownership of agricultural land by individual
 Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that
must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation
of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of
HLI.   The word collective is defined as indicating a
 The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs
because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option
to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
SECOND ISSUE
 Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by
DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock
distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to
PARC. It may be that RA 6657 or other executive
issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an
approved SDP, but such power or authority is
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of
necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed.
 Following this doctrine, the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval
of the plan.
THIRD ISSUE
 No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged
the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the
earliest possible opportunity. It should have been
raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC
approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a
reasonable time thereafter.
 Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not
the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis
mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or
not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the
original positions of the groups representing the
interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the
non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the
the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be
resolved without delving into the constitutionality of
RA 6657.
 Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon
the constitutionality of acts of the executive or
legislative departments have not been met in this
case.
FOURTH ISSUE
 Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the
Constitution is unequivocal: the farmers and regular
farmworkers have a right to own directly or
collectively the lands they till.
 The basic law allows two (2) modes of land
distribution: direct and indirect ownership. Direct
transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly
used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect
transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land is the alternative to direct
farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective
ownership by farmers. No language can be found in
the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits
corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being
the legal entity through which collective ownership
can be exercised.
number of persons or things considered as
constituting one group or aggregate, while
collectively is defined as in a collective sense or
manner; in a mass or body.  By using the word
collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect
ownership of land and not just outright agricultural
land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that
land reform may become successful even if it is
done through the medium of juridical entities
composed of farmers.
 The stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31
of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as
instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article
XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for
the landless appears to be the dominant theme of
that policy, the Court emphasized that Sec. 4,
Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does
not constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform
law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership
by farmers and no other, or else the enactment
suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the
intention were otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have worded said section in a
manner mandatory in character
Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR
G. R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petition for prohibition and
mandamus questioning the validity of certain provisions
of the IPRA. As per petitioners, the IPRA violates the
Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
because the law gives the IPs the right to utilize minerals
and natural resources located in the properties awarded to
them. The SC dismissed the petition because of a 7-7
vote (procedural) but the ratio contains the separate
opinions of the justices.
FACTS:
 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought
this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
 OSG’s comment: IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
 Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private
lands found within said areas, it violates the rights
of private landowners.
 In addition, petitioners question the provisions of
the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
 Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII,
Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office
of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination. They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution.
 After due deliberation on the petition, the members
of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to
dismiss the petition, Seven (7) other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. 
ISSUE(S): As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7)
and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan
 The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands
and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional. The
regalian theory however does not negate the native
title to land held in private ownership since time
immemorial, The Carino ruing institutionalized the
recognition of the existence of native title to land or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time
immemorial and independent of any grant from the
Spanish crown as an exception to the Regalian
theory.
 While embodying the theory of jura regalia, the
1935 constitution is too clear for any misunderstand
which
 declares that all agricultural, timber , mineral lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal
,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the state. And Nowhere does it
state that certain lands which are “absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence”
including those which are not part of the public
dominion shall thereafter be owned by the state. The
provision should be interpreted in favor of
preservation rather than impairment or
extinguishment of vested rights.
 The mere fact that sec 3 defines ancestral domains
to include the natural resources found therein does
not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the indigenous
peoples. Sec 5 cannot be construed as a source of
ownership rights of indigenous people over the
natural resources simply because it recognizes
ancestral domains as their private but community
property.
 The IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over
natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Sec 7
merely
 recognizes the right to claim ownership over lands
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
by
 indigenous peoples sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing ground and all improvement
made by them at any time within the domains.
 What is evident is that the IPRA protects the
indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in to the
natural resources
 found within their ancestral domains, including the
preservation of the ecological balance therein and
the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will
not be unduly displaced when state approved
activities involving the natural resources located
therein are under taken.
Separate Opinion of J. Panganiban
 Consistent with the social justice principle of giving
more in law to those who have less in life Congress
in its wisdom may grant preferences and
prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and
sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the
Constitution must be respected. I personally believe
in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed
and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them
to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I
cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual
inequality of access to the nation’s wealth or to
stamp the Court’s imprimatur on a law that offends
and degrades the repository of the very authority of
this Court—the Constitution of the Philippines.
 RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples,
admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was
primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy
enshrined in our Constitution to “recognize and
promote the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity
 and development.” Though laudable and well-
meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that
run directly afoul of our fundamental law from
which it claims origin and authority. More
specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b),
8 and other related provisions contravene the
Regalian Doctrine—the basic foundation of the
State’s property regime.
 The concerted effort to malign the Regalian
Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail.
Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural
resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the
Filipino people. As the protector of the
Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to
uphold the tenets of that Constitution—not to dilute,
circumvent or create exceptions to them
 But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional
power of full controlin favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as
natural resources found within their territories are
concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage the
natural resources, benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and the utilization
thereof. And they may exercise such right without
any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so
only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution,
the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize
natural resources must also be limited to such
period. In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to
negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources, a right vested by
the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through
IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority
group the State’s power of ownership and full
control over a substantial part of the national
patrimony, in contravention of our most
fundamental law.
Separate Opinion of J. Puno
 The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian
Theory
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been
theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE;they have
lived there even before the Spanish colonization.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre ‐conquest rights
to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputable presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian
Doctrine:
... Oh Cho vs Director of Lands:
This exception would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial
3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private
Ownership
Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.
‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the
view that ancestral domains and all resources found
therein shall serve as the material bases of their
cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally
holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to
all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights.
4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural
Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by
the IPs *The IPs claims are limited to lands, bodies
of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/I
Ps, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;* IPRA did not mention that the IPs
also own all the other natural resources found within the
ancestral domains.
Juan G. Frivaldo vs COMELEC and Raul R. Lee
[G.R. No. 120295; June 28, 1996]
Raul R. Lee vs COMELEC and Juan G. Frivaldo
[G.R. No. 123755; June 28, 1996]
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
 Under Sec. 39 of the LGC, "an elective local official
must be:
o a citizen of the Philippines;
o a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where
he intends to be elected;
o a resident therein for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the
election;
o able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
o In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor . . . must be at least be 23 years
of age on election day.
 Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June
30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) began -- he
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to
hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted.
The law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship. The
citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be possessed by
an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which
he has been elected.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Frivaldo, who was twice
disqualified because he was a US citizen, got the highest
number of votes in the 1995 governorship elections. He
now claims to have repatriated. BUT HE DID SO
AFTER FILING HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
(took oath of allegiance under PD 752 at 2 pm, June 30,
1995). The main issue is whether FRIVALDO A RP
CITIZEN IF HE REPATRIATED AFTER FILING OF
COC. The Court said yes. The law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship (vs. residence and age). Frivaldo's repatriation
RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF FILING OF HIS
APPLICATION ON AUGUST 17, 1994.
FACTS:
Lee vs COMELEC and Frivaldo
 On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the
COMELEC praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified
from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy
be canceled.
 Second Division of the COMELEC: Granted the
petition.
 The MR filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon
until after elections. So, his candidacy continued
and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. The COMELEC en banc soon affirmed
the Resolution of the Second Division.
 The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed
the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate
of Votes dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing
the following votes obtained by the candidates for
the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
o Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
o Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
o Raul R. Lee 53,304
o Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
 Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
 COMELEC en banc: Directed "the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for
the purpose of proclaiming Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon
on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30pm of
June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
 Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a new petition
(SPC 95-317), praying for the annulment of
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2pm, he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines
after "his petition for repatriation under PD 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in Sept. 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of
the COMELEC) . . . was released and received by
Frivaldo on June 30 at 5:30pm, there was no more
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo)
as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs  Comelec, the
Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said
position of governor.
 COMELEC First Division: Held that Lee, "not
having garnered the highest number of votes," was
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the
highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions
of PD 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor
of Sorsogon."
 Lee filed an MR, which was denied by the
COMELEC en banc. On Feb. 26, 1996, the present
petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a TRO,
this Court issued on Feb. 27, 1996 a Resolution
which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this
petition."
Frivaldo vs COMELEC and Lee
 The facts of this case are essentially the same as
those above. However, Frivaldo assails the above-
mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that
under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue said
Resolutions because they were not rendered "within
the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than 15
days before the election."
“Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.”
 Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure
of the COMELEC to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of 15 days prior to
the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional
defect which renders the said Resolutions null and
void.
 By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the
position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from
the parties and required them thereafter to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo is valid and
legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to
hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. WON Frivaldo's "judicially declared"
disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected
to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering
that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. WON the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the
election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. WON the COMELEC exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship
of Sorsogon, considering that they were not
rendered within the period referred to in Sec. 78 of
 the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than 15
days before the elections"?
HELD:
1. Yes; he is qualified; his repatriation took retroactive
effect from the date of his application.
2. No.
3. Yes.
4. No.
5. Moot.
RATIO:
First Issue: Frivaldo’s Repatriation [Most Important
Issue]
 The LGC of 199 expressly requires Philippine
citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor,
vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
 Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship;
in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (RA 7160).
 Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
104654 and during the oral argument in this case
that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act
of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this
Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.
 Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo
was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000
votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Lee. Twice,
he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus
twice disqualified from holding and discharging his
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time,
with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the COMELEC to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under PD.
725, with no less than the SolGen himself, who was
the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel the COMELEC, arguing
the validity of his cause (in addition to his able
private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took
his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said
Decree at 2pm on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have
been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at 8:30pm on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of
votes in the elections and since at that time, he
already reacquired his citizenship.
 En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's
repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
 First, Lee tells us that PD 725 had "been effectively
repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon
Aquino exercising legislative powers under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential
Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy which the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment
of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution",
adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,
1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of PD 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within
your functional area of responsibility as defined
under LOI No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended."
 This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by
any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a
law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725.
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a
repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on
the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically
and/or impliedly state that PD 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal
effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other
hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that
the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".
 The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot
even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not
every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an
exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could
be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the
former President did not repeal PD 725 but left it to
the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the
 matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she
should have unequivocally said so instead of
referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she
carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms
that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit
unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
 Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital
irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in
just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which
"prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacañang Palace on Aug. 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the SolGen. However, the
Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8,
1995, when presumably the said Committee started
processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the
Committee required. Under these circumstances, it
could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in
the processing of his application.
 Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution
of the Special Committee on Naturalization was
intended solely for the personal interest of
respondent," the SolGen explained during the oral
argument on Mar. 19, 1996 that such allegation is
simply baseless as there were many others who
applied and were considered for repatriation, a list
of whom was submitted by him to this Court,
through a Manifestation filed on Apr. 3, 1996.
 On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are
convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of
legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact
that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not
a ground to conclude that such proceedings were
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under PD 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
In fact, PD 725 itself requires very little of an
applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since,
unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-
time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and
faithfully served his country and his province prior
to his naturalization in the United States -- a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace --
and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time
in returning to his country of birth to offer once
more his talent and services to his people.
 So too, the fact that 10 other persons, as certified to
by the SolGen, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence
of favoritism vehemently posited by Lee. At any
rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the
Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of
the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
 Third, Lee further contends that assuming the
assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2pm of June 30, 1995
whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the LGC "must exist on the date of his election, if
not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing
our decision in G.R. 104654 which held that "both
the LGC and the Constitution require that only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public
office." Obviously, however, this was a
mere obiter as the only issue in said case was
whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not
-- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the
Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the
issue of when an aspirant for public office should be
a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.
 Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n
elective local official must be:
o a citizen of the Philippines;
o a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
o a resident therein for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
o able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
o In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor . . . must be at least 23 years of age
on election day.
 From the above, it will be noted that the law does
not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least 1 year's
residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least 23 years of age on
election day).
 Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a
unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his
term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed
his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the
term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
 construction, it should be noted that Sec. 39 of the
LGC speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should
such qualification be required at the time of election
or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence --
should thus be possessed when the "elective [or
elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this
case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's
ruling in Vasquez vs  Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is
to ensure that our people and country do not end up
being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying
to the time of proclamation of the elected official
and at the start of his term.
 But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one
raised during the oral argument to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the
time the candidate (or for that matter the elected
official) registered as a voter. After all, Sec. 39,
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also
specifies as another item of qualification, that he be
a "registered voter". And, under the law a "voter"
must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at
the time of such registration.
 The answer to this problem again lies in discerning
the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election consistent with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not have made
citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even
if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It
also stands to reason that the voter requirement
was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for
nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends
to be elected." It should be emphasized that the
LGC requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual
voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In
other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official
is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern
-- and not anywhere else.
 Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly
emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by
judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his
precinct on May 8, 1995."
 So too, during the oral argument, his counsel
steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has
voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in
1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed his eligibility as
a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he
voted in all the previous elections including on May
8, 1995."
 It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in
the province where he intended to be elected.
 There is yet another reason why the prime issue
of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Sec.
253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the
opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision
of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
contest before the COMELEC an incumbent's
ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
LGC. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed
of "within 10 days after proclamation" of the
winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such
time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the
very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30pm, June
30, 1995), Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in
the afternoon of the same day, then he should have
been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had
already cured his previous "judicially-declared"
alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.
 But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we
also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on Aug. 17, 1994.
 It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, “laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when
the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature
or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
 A reading of PD 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
Thus, in its preamble, PD 725 expressly recognizes
the plight of "many Filipino women who had lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens"
and who could not, under the existing law (CA 63,
as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the
death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefitted
by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing
"a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to
Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, PD 725 granted
a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire
Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to PD 725.
 On the other hand, said statute also provided a new
remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of
PD 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of PD 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
 The SolGen argues:
o By their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive since they are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws and curb certain evils.
o In this case, PD 725 was enacted to cure
the defect in the existing naturalization
law, specifically CA 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate
only upon the death of their husbands, and
natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship by naturalization and other
causes faced the difficulty of undergoing
the rigid procedures of CA 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.
o PD 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus
its provisions are considered essentially
remedial and curative.
 In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
retroactive operation. "A retrospective operation is
given to a statute or amendment where the intent
that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the
terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the
statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons,
events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as
it has been held that citizenship is a political and
civil right equally as important as the freedom of
speech, liberty of abode, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and other
guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore
the legislative intent to give retrospective operation
to PD 725 must be given the fullest effect possible.
"It has been said that a remedial statute must be so
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose
for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to
those in the future, then it will be so applied
although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or
violate some constitutional guaranty." This is all the
more true of PD 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of
repatriation granted therein.
 At this point, a valid question may be raised: How
can the retroactivity of PD 725 benefit Frivaldo
considering that said law was enacted on June 5,
1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship
much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on Aug 17, 1994?
 While it is true that the law was already in effect at
the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (PD 725)
which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to
the date of his application therefor, Aug. 17, 1994.
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
was the intent of the legislative authority that the
law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into
being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is
to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and
should be made to take effect as of date of his
application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing
in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious
would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will
result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
 Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever
defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
 Another argument for retroactivity to the date of
filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If PD 725 were not to be given
retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then
the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes
outside their control. This should not be. In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is to be presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail.
 And as experience will show, the Special
Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short
spans of time after the same were filed. The fact that
such interregna were relatively insignificant
minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only
where a person's repatriation has the effect of
wiping out a liability of his to the government
arising in connection with or as a result of his being
an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is
not present in the instant case.
 And it is but right and just that the mandate of the
people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail.
Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or
iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as
 having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on Aug. 17, 1994. This being so, all
questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation
(June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8,
1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy
(Mar. 20, 1995) would become moot.
 Based on the foregoing, any question regarding
Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as
having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of Aug. 17, 1994, his
previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.
 It is not disputed that on Jan. 20, 1983 Frivaldo
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the LGC would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote
that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship."
Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing
Disqualification?
 NO! Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status
with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose.
Third Issue: COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the
Petition in SPC 95-317
 YES! COMELEC has ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
all elective . . . provincial . . . officials."
Fourth Issue: Was Lee’s Proclamation Valid?
 NO! The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of
the sovereign will
Fifth Issue: Is Sec. 78 of the Election Code
Mandatory?
 Issue is now moot and academic; deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the
COMELEC.
Epilogue:
 In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in
the LGC is to be possessed by an elective official at
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold PD 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid
and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial
or curative nature of the law granting him a new
right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was
stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the
vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the
start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,
since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
Aug. 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are
precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the
citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability
or disqualification to run for and hold public office.
And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the COMELEC’s authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
 The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every
possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference
to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility
of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues
in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge
a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking,
Lee has miserably failed.
 In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically
easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of
his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
his failure to show his citizenship at the time he
registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the
COMELEC that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for
any elective local position." But the real essence of
justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
 approximating venerability in Philippine political
life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship
only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At
this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At
the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic
every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in
spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality,
of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe
old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost
on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser
mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his
favor. And in the final analysis, over and above
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by
a leader of their overwhelming choice.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Dissenting Opinion: Davide, Jr., J.
 In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's
memorandum dated Mar. 27, 1987 should be
viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by
Lee) of PD 725. But whether it decrees a suspension
or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because
the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law.
 The existence and subsistence of PD 725 were
recognized in the first Frivaldo case;  viz., "under
CA 63 as amended by CA 473 and PD 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . .
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered
voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring
him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects
there may have been in his registration as a voter for
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and
1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.
 Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's
holding that, given the unique factual circumstances
of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive
effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our
holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and
even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly
involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992
elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status -- not in
1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
 Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation,
saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment
is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since
our courts are charged only with the duty of
determining who Philippine nationals are, we cannot
rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a
State determines ONLY those who are its own
citizens -- not who are the citizens of other
countries. The issue here is: the COMELEC made
a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and
such finding has not been shown by Lee to be
arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case
law, such finding is binding and final.
 The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who
lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all 3
previous elections, should be declared winner
because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known". First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such
knowledge can be true post facto only of the last
two previous elections. Third, even the COMELEC
and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995
elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
 Mr. Justice Davide submits that Sec. 39 of the LGC
refers to the qualifications of elective local
officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials,
and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a)
of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by
Election Day at the latest. We see it differently. Sec.
39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply
to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of
differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the
paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that
the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
Election Day or prior thereto, it would have
specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in
pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates
for governor, mayor, etc.
 Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of
retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically
provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold
however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is
deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
Concurring Opinion: Puno, J.
 The sovereignty of our people is the primary
postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason,
it appears as the first in our declaration of principles
and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of
our fundamental law proclaims that "the Philippines
is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." The same principle served as
the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. It
is one of the few principles whose truth has been
cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Sec. 4,
Art. IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of
the Federal government to guarantee to every state a
"republican form of government." With
understandable fervor, the American authorities
imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our
1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino
framers.
 Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA
revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-
oriented. Thus, Sec. 4 of Art. II provides as a state
policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to
serve and protect the people." Sec. 1, Art. XI also
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all
times be accountable to the people . . ." Secs. 15 and
1 of Art. XIII define the role and rights of people's
organizations. Sec. 5(2) of Art. XVI mandates that
"the state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and
nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect
for people's rights in the performance of their duty."
And Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides that "amendments
to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All
these provisions and more are intended to breathe
more life to the sovereignty of our people.
 To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a
kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,
the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern. Former Dean Vicente Sinco states that an
essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This
means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has
the power to determine exclusively its legal
competence. Its powers are original, not
derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at
any given time." Citing Barker, he adds that a more
amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final
power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues."
The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same
thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo
vs Hopkins, where it held that ". . . sovereignty
itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts."
 I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice
Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it
need not always be exercised by the people together,
all the time. For this reason, the Constitution and
our laws provide when the entire electorate or only
some of them can elect those who make our laws
and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire
electorate votes for our senators but only our district
electorates vote for our congressmen, only our
provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for
our city councilors, and only our municipal
electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire
electorate votes for our President and Vice-President
but only our provincial electorates vote for our
governors, only our city electorates vote for our
mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes
of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the
people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that
said sovereignty has been fragmented.
 It is my respectful submission that the issue in the
case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon
should be given the right to defy the law by
allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather,
the issue is: whether the will of the voters of
Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor
ought to be given a decisive value considering
the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate
ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The
uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and
abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the
United States, there are 2 principal schools of
thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a
candidate must possess the qualifications for office
at the time of his election. The other ventures the
view that the candidate should satisfy the
qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of
the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision
that has squarely resolved this difficult question of
law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
adhered to the second school of thought while Mr.
Justice Davide dissents.
 I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in
interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my
opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that
Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot
allow him to sit as governor without transgressing
the law. I do not concede this assumption for as
stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by
this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not
see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the
people by according more weight to the votes of the
people of Sorsogon.
 Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of
Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them
"because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty."
With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In
his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a
crime, a violation of Art. 134 of the RPC, an offense
against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at
bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people
of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo
as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of
candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for
governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all
steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a
 candidate should possess the qualification of
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable
then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the
case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of
our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which
is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history.
For 3 times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of
Sorsogon. For 2 times, he was disqualified on the ground
of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as
their governor despite his disqualification. The people
never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they
gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave
him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a
margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the
overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In
election cases, we should strive to align the will of the
legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to
reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the
eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an
enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty
and is the ultimate source of established authority." The
choice of the governed on who shall be their governor
merits the highest consideration by all agencies of
government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people
is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also
politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people
succeed.
QUA CHEE GAN v. THE DEPORTATION BOARD
9 SCRA 27 (1963)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The state has the right to
exclude aliens in its territory. The President of the
Philippines is given the discretion to deport aliens who
are considered “undesirable”. The President’s authority
to deport aliens include the power to arrest, but only
when there is already a deportation order.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners are aliens who were
charged with having purchased US dollars without the
necessary license from the Central Bank. Following the
filing of said deportation charges, the Deportation Board
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners, claiming
that as an authorized agent of the President, it has
jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to
order their arrest. Petitioners question the power of the
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary
power to investigate, on the ground that such power is
vested in the Legislature. SC held that the President has
the power to deport aliens; that this includes the power to
arrest, but ONLY when there is already a deportation
order; and that this was validly delegated to the
Deportation Board. Hence, Executive Order No. 398,
series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said
aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of
arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is
declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to
such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
FACTS:
 Petitioners Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy
alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian,
Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King
were charged:
o with having purchased U.S. dollars in the
total sum of $130,000.00, without the
necessary license from the Central Bank
of the Philippines, and of having
clandestinely remitted the same to
Hongkong and
o with having attempted to bribe officers of
the Philippine and United States
Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief
of the Intelligence Division of the Central
Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI,
U.S. Air Force) in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized
purchase of U.S. dollars.
 Following the filing of said deportation charges, a
warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by
the presiding member of the Deportation Board.
 Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and
cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners were
provisionally set at liberty.
 Petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss the
charges presented against them in the Deportation
Board for the reason, among others, that the same
do not constitute legal ground for deportation of
aliens from this country, and that said Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain such charges.
 This motion to dismiss having been denied by the
Board, petitioners filed in this Court a petition for
habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition
was given due course, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
 At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a
bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining
the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners,
pending final termination of the habeas corpus
and/or prohibition proceedings.
 The Deportation Board then filed its answer to the
original petition, saying as an authorized agent of
the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges
filed, and the authority to order their arrest.
 Trial Court (denied the petition for habeas corpus
and/or prohibition):
o upheld the validity of the delegation by
the president to the Deportation Board of
his power to conduct investigations for the
purpose of determining whether the stay
of an alien in this country would be
injurious to the security, welfare and
interest of the State, and
o sustained the power of the deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release
pending investigation of charges against
him, on the theory that the power to arrest
and fix the amount of the bond of the
arrested alien is essential to and
complement the power to deport aliens
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
 Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present
appeal.
 Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary
power to investigate, on the ground that such power
is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is
claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised,
there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the President has the power to deport aliens
and whether such power is validly delegated to the
Deportation Board. –YES.
WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to
order the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT only when
there is already an ORDER OF DEPORTATION.
RATIO:
1. Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the
Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect
the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous
determination by the Board of Commissioners, such
power was not intended to be delimited to the
Immigration Commissioner. Sec. 69 of the
Administrative Code, although not expressly
conferring such power, lays down the procedure for
such deportation proceedings for the President.
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien
may be effected in 2 ways:
a. By order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and
b. By the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.
While it may really be contended that the Sec 69 did
not expressly confer on the President the authority
to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant
to the Commissioner of Immigration under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down
the procedure to be observed should there be
deportation proceedings, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President can
deport an alien-which provision was expressly
declared exempted from the repealing effect of the
Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the
recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the
legislature of the existence of such power in the
Executive. And the exercise of this power by the
chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in
several decisions.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's
power of investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the
President) or his authorized agent." By virtue of
Executive Order No. 33, President Quezon created
the Deportation Board primarily to receive
complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable,
to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and
regulations therein provided, and make the
corresponding recommendation. Since then, the
Deportation Board has been conducting the
investigation as the authorized agent of the
President.
2. Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien
charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond
with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to
secure their appearance. However, the same did not
authorize the arrest of the alien pending
investigation.
It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized
motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by
the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the
warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and
to hold him under detention during the investigation
unless he files a bond for his provisional release in
such amount and under such conditions as may be
prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, upon whose authority the President's power to
deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the
exercise of the power to arrest.
Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in
his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the
Constitution: “...no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce...”
Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the
requirement — "to be determined by the judge" —
to any public officer who may be authorized by the
Legislature to make such determination, and
thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.
Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is
necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation is valid only when there is already an
order of deportation. However, during the
investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be
arrested. It is enough that a bond be required to
insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in EO69
Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon
the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens
and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the
temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
The order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the
bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed
cancelled.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Batugas
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The court acknowledges that the main objective of
extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife
is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members.
it is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of
the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests
in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Emergency Recit : Azucena Batugas filed for a petition
for judicial Naturalization with the RTC. The OSG tried
to dismiss the petiion alleging that she was not engage in
a lucrative profession. The RTC denied the OSG. The
RTC then set the hearing wherein because of the OSG’s
non appearance despite notice, Azucena was able to
present her evidence ex-parte. RTC granted her petition.
On appeal with the CA, the OSG asserted that the ex-
parte presentation of evidence violates the mandate of
tCA 473 which mandates that the hearing should be
public. The CA held that the OSG is the only one
authorized to represent the people in this case and that
it’s the notice to them was enough to comply with the
mandate. SC held the same.
FACTS:
RTC PROCEEDINGS
 On Dec 2, 2002, Azucena Batugas(Azucena) filed a
petition for Naturalization before the RTC
 She alleges in her petition that she believes in the
principles underlying the PH Constitution and that
she:
 Has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during her stay in the
PH as well as in her relations with the Govt and
with the community she was living in
 That she has mingled socially w./ Filipinos and
has a sincere desire to learn and embrace their
customs, traditions and ideals
 And that she has all the qualifications
required under Sec 2 of CA 473 and none of
the disqualifications enumerated in Sec 4
 That she is not opposed to organized Govt nor
affiliated to those who are.
 That she is not defending/teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence for the
success and predominance of men’s ideas
 That she is neither a polygamist
 that the nation of which she is a subject of is
not at war w/ PH
 That she intents in good faith to become a
citizen of the PH and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance to any foreign entity,
particularly to China;
 That she will reside continuous ly in the PH
from the time of the filing of her petition up to
her naturalization
 After all the jurisdictional requirements set by the
CA 473 had been complied with, the OSG filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. RTC
denied this motion
 At the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s
evidence, neither the OSG nor the office of the
Provincial prosecutor appeared, thus Azucena’s
evidence was received ex-parte, and during the ex
parte hearing, no representative from the OSG
appeared despite notice.
 Azucena’s personal circumstances
 Born in Malangas Zamboanga del sur on Sep
28, 1941 to Chinese parents
 Never departed the PH since birth
 Resided in Malanga from 1941-1942,
Margosatubig 1942-1968, Bogo city for
9months, Ipil 1969-1972, Talisayayan 1972-
1976 and in Margosatubig up to the filing the
petition
 Can speak: English, Tagalog, Visatyan and
Chavacano
 Studied in Margosatubig Central Elementary
School, Margosatubig Academy, and Ateneo
de Zamboanga. She graduated with the degree
in BS education and then precticed at the Pax
HS for 5yrs. Marian Academy for 2 yrs and in
Talisayan HS for 2 yrs.
 In 1968 at the age of 26, she married Santiago
Batuigas, a natural born Fil Citizen, and hide 5
children.
 After her stint at the talisayan HS, she and her
husband engaged in the retail business of on
millinh/distributing rice corn anc copra. As
proof of their Income, Azucena submitted their
joint annual tax returns, the Business name and
permits issued to them(Azucena’s General
Merchandising),
 To prove that she has no criminal record,
Azucena submitted PNP, NBI clearances.
 The RTC found Azucena supported her allegations
in her petition, among these are:
 Her lack of derogatory record
 Her support for an organized Govt
 That she is in perfect health
 That she has mingled with Filipinos since birth
and can speak their language
 That she has never had any transgressiong and
has been a law abiding citizen
 That she has complied with her obligations to
the Govt involving her business
 That the business and real properties she and
Santiago own provide sufficient income for her
and her family.
 RTC granted her petition, finding that the petitioner
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the
Naturalization Law
 In its omnibus motion, the OSG argued that the ex-
parte presentation of evidence violates the law as it
mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.
 The RTC rejected this and held that the public
has been fully apprised of the proceedings and
was free to intervene and that the OSG and its
delegate the Provincial Prosecutor which can
represent the public, thus, when the OSG was
furnished with a copy of the notice there was
already compliance with the requirement of a
public hearing.
CA APPEAL
 OSG contends that Azucena failed to comply with
the income requirement of CA 473, that Azucena is
not allowed under the Retail Trade Law to engage in
retail trade thus cannot meet the income
requirement. And even if she is permitted, her
 business is not a lucrative one within the letter of the
law. The OSG also disputes Azucena’s claim that
she owns real property because aliens are precluded
from owning lands.
 The OSG furthers that the ex-parte hearing is
not a public hearing because ex-parte hearings
are done without the public in attendance. OSG
claims that the State was denied its day in
court.
 Azucena countered that although she is a teacher,
she had to quit to help in their retail business and
they were to send all their children to school. She
contends that the definition of lucrative
trade/income should not be strictly applied to her,
being the wife following Filipino tradition, she
should not be treated like male applicants for
naturalization.
 Azucena denied that her hearing was not made
public, as the hearing before the clerk of court
was conducted in the court’s session hall. And
that the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its
day in court as notices have always been sent
to it.
 The CA dismissed the appeal, and found that
Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her
family with reasonable comfort with the prevailing
standard of living and consistent with the demands
of human dignity.
 The CA held that the RTC had complied with
the mandate of the law requiring notice to the
OSG and rthe provincial Prosecutor of its
scheduled.
ISSUE(S): W/N Azucena has all the qualifications to
become a naturalized Filipino citizen?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
 Under present laws, an alien may acquire PH
citizenship through either judicial
naturalization(CA473) or administrative
naturalization (RA 9139) A third option, called
derivative naturalization, is available to alien
women to Filipino is found under Sec 15. Of CA
473
 "Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
 Under the provision, foreign women who are
married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it
is neither necessary for them to prove that
they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage
nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization
 Moy Ya Lim Tao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration: “We now hold, all previous
decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section”
 Procedure for an alien wife to formalize Filipino
citizenship:
 The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she
is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended
 Upon the filing of said petition, which should
be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino
husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized
Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition
 Records show that Azucena, before, applied to the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) by reason of her marriage to a
Filipino Citizen, the CID granted her application.
But, the ministry of justice set aside such ruling as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
husband is a Filipino citizen as only their marriage
certificate was present to establish his citizenship.
 Thus, Azucena was constrained to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization thru CA 473.
There is nothing that prevents her from seeking
PH citizenship though regular naturalization
proceedings. The choice of what option to take
is with the applicant.
 In this case, Azucena has chosen to file for
judicial naturalization under CA 473,
 The fact that her application for derivative
naturalization was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial
naturalization.
 It is to be remembered that her application at
the CID was denied not because she was
found to be disqualified, but because her
husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even
if the denial was based on other grounds, it
is proper, in a judicial naturalization
proceeding, for the courts to determine
whether there are in fact grounds to deny
her of Philippine citizenship based on
regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
 Records show that Santiago’s Filipino Citizenship
has been adequately proven.
 Under judicial proceedings, Santiago submitted
his Birth certificate indicating that he and his
parents are Filipinos and he also submitted his
vote’s registration, land titles an business
registrations. And he has always comported
himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact
 that should have enable Azucena to avail of
Derivative naturalization.
 However, the case is a petition for judicial
naturalization not based on derivative
naturalization. The lower court heard the
petition and received evidence of Azucena’s
qualification and absence of disqualifications
to acquire PH citizenship this was affirmed by
the CA. The SC will not disturb the findings of
the lower court which had the opportunity to
hear the petition.
 The OSG assertion that Azucena does not have
lucrative income and that the proceeding in the
lower court was not in the nature of a public
hearing.
 The OSG had the opportunity to contest the
qualifications of Azucena during the initial
hearing, however the OSG or the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing.
This prompted the lower court to order the ex-
parte presentation of evidence, the OSG was
also notified of the proceeding, but despite
notice, it again failed to appear.
 The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA
and was denied for the reasons stated in its
Decision. We find no reason to disturb the
findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should
this issue further delay the grant of Philippine
citizenship to a woman who was born and lived
all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all
her life to the care of her Filipino family. She
has more than demonstrated, under judicial
scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine
citizen.
 On the second issue, we also affirm the
findings of the CA that since the government
who has an interest in, and the only one who
can contest, the citizenship of a person, was
duly notified through the OSG and the
Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings
have complied with the public hearing
requirement under CA 473.
 No. 4 sec. 2 of CA 473, provides as qualification
that: He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation.
 Azucena is a teacher by profession and only
quit her teaching job to assume her role as a
joint provider with her husband to support her
family.
 Together, they were able to raise all 5 children,
provided them with education and have all
become professionals and responsible citizens.
 Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband
and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a
professional and can resume teaching at
anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and
this is more than sufficient guarantee that she
will not be a charge to the only country she has
known since birth.
 The court acknowledges that the main objective of
extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife
is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of
the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests
in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez et al v. Michael Alfio
Pennisi
[G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In this case, respondent,
prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino
citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country
because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the
Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the Court of
Appeals and before this Court showed his intention to
prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the
error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation
from the country. He was precisely questioning the
DOJ’s revocation of his certificate of recognition and his
summary deportation by the BI. Thus, the Court ruled
that respondent’s deportation did not render the present
case moot.
Emergency Recit: In 1999, Mick Pennisi petitioned for
recognition as Filipino citizen. BI agreed, ayaw pa ni
DOJ nung una, but eventually agreed. Thereafter, he was
drafted in the PBA, where he played. In 2003, some
Senate committees recommended the deportation of
several Fil-foreign PBA players, including Pennisi, and a
review of all orders of recognition. Pennisi was included
since the verification of the authenticity of the documents
he submitted 4 years earlier revealed highly suspicious
circumstances as alleged by a Brgy. Captain and a Brgy.
Treasurer. DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisi’s
recognition; later on the BI directed the deportation of
Pennisi. CA sided with Pennisi. SC affirmed CA and said
the case was not rendered moot and academic; see
doctrine
FACTS:
 Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975
in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an
Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos,
allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999,
respondent filed a petition for recognition as
Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration.
Respondent submitted the following documents
before the BI:
1. Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Quintos, and a certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14
August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M.
Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan,
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
2. Certified true copy of the certificate of
marriage of respondent’s parents dated 9
 January 1971, indicating the Philippines as
Quintos’ birthplace;
3. Certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian
certificate of registration of alien, indicating
her nationality as Filipino;
4. Certified true copy of respondent’s birth
certificate stating that he was born on 13 March
1975 and indicating the Philippines as his
mother’s birthplace; and
5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July
1999 of the Australian Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating
that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been
granted Australian citizenship.
 On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner
Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting
respondent’s petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen. In a 2nd Indorsement dated 28 February
2000, the DOJ Secretary disapproved the order.
However, upon respondent’s submission of
additional documents, BI Commissioner Rufus B.
Rodriguez granted the order as per Recognition
Order No. 206679 dated 3 March 2000. In a 2nd
Indorsement dated 8 March 2000, the DOJ
affirmed Recognition Order No. 206679,
superseding the Feb 28 2nd Indorsement.
 Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for
the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the
Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).
 On 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on
Games, Amusement and Sports and on
Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted
Committee Report No. 256 recommending, among
other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary
deportation proceedings against several Filipino-
foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2)
the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of
all orders of recognition. Respondent was included
in the list on the basis of the following findings of
the Senate Committees:
o F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to
present before the BI and the committees,
the documents required in granting
recognition of Philippine citizenship,
particularly the birth certificate of his
Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos;
o However, a verification on the
authenticity of the above documents
reveals highly suspicious
circumstances.
o His alleged mother and other relatives,
specifically the parents of the former,
namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina
G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his
application for recognition of
Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not
known and have never existed in
Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija.
o According to the affidavits executed by
Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman
and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P.
Peralta of the abovementioned place,
there are no Quintoses or Tomedas
that have lived or have resided in the
said barangay.
o Both barangay officials further
claimed that even in their census or
master list of voters, the family names
of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist.
o His mother’s certificate of birth in the
civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija was issued on the basis of an
application for late registration, which
is ten (10) years after the date of birth.
 [So may nangyaring investigation] On 18 October
2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking
respondent’s certificate of recognition and
directing the BI to begin summary deportation
proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-
foreign PBA players.
 On 20 October 2004, respondent and Davonn Harp,
another Filipino-foreign PBA player, filed a
petition for prohibition with an application for
TRO and PI with the RTC of Pasig to enjoin the
DOJ and BI from instituting summary deportation
proceedings against them.
 During the hearing, OSG manifested that
respondent would not be subjected to summary
deportation and that he would be given an
opportunity to present evidence of his Filipino
citizenship in a full-blown trial on the merits.
However, in a Summary Deportation Order dated
26 October 2004, the BI directed the deportation of
several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including
respondent. RTC granted the withdrawal of the
petition by Pennisi and Harp, who filed a petition
for review with an application for TRO and PI with
the CA.
 CA: Granted the petition and set aside DOJ
resolution and Deportation Order; ruled that
respondent’s citizenship was previously recognized
by the BI and DOJ and it was only after 4 years
that the BI and DOJ reversed themselves in view of
the finding in the Committee Report; ruled that
apart from the affidavits of the Brgy. Captain and
Brgy. Treasurer regarding the highly suspicious
circumstances, no other evidence was presented to
prove that Quintos was not a Filipino citizen or that
her birth certificate was false or fraudulently
obtained; ruled that respondent’s documentary
evidence before the BI and DOJ have more
probative value and must prevail over the
allegations of Soliman and Peralta.
 In their Memorandum, petitioners allege that
respondent’s petition was filed out of time.
Petitioners further allege that respondent’s
voluntary departure from the Philippines had
rendered the petition moot. Finally, petitioners
allege that the cancellation of respondent’s
certificate of recognition as a Filipino citizen and
the issuance of the deportation order against him
are valid.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition had been rendered moot because
respondent already left the country.
Whether Pennisi’s certificate of recognition attained
finality.
HELD:
No.
No.
Petition denied; CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
 Petitioners cited Lewin v. The Deportation Board
where the Court ruled:
x x x. Even if the deportation case is to proceed
and even if this Court will decide this appeal
on the merits, there would be no practical value
or effect of such action upon Lewin, because
he has already left the country. Consequently,
the issues involved herein have become moot
and academic.
 However, the Court agreed with respondent that the
factual circumstances in Lewin are different from
Pennisi’s case. In Lewin, petitioner was an alien
who entered the country as a temporary visitor, to
stay for only 50 days. He prolonged his stay by
securing several extensions. Before his last
extension expired, he voluntarily left the country,
upon filing a bond, without any assurance from the
Deportation Board that he would be admitted to the
country upon his return. The Court found that he did
not return to the country, and at the time he was
living in another country. The Court ruled that
Lewin’s voluntary departure from the country, his
long absence, and his status when he entered the
country as a temporary visitor rendered academic
the question of his deportation as an undesirable
alien.
 In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation,
was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested
his intent to return to the country because his
Filipino wife and children are residing in the
Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the
Court of Appeals and before this Court showed his
intention to prove his Filipino lineage and
citizenship, as well as the error committed by
petitioners in causing his deportation from the
country. He was precisely questioning the DOJ’s
revocation of his certificate of recognition and his
summary deportation by the BI. Therefore, the
Court ruled that respondent’s deportation did
not render the present case moot.
 The Court agreed with petitioners that the issuance
of certificate of recognition to respondent has not
attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled
that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own
and can be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party; the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof; and the finding or
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing
the findings of the BI. Judicial review is permitted if
the courts believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the
claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should be recognized and the
courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the
administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and
reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to
sustain the rulings.
Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong
[G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The courts must always be
mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with
the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of
proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of law. Bare assertions
are not sufficient.
Emergency Recit: Ong filed a Petition for
Naturalization. Among the qualifications under Sec. 2,
par. 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law is that the
person must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. Ong alleged that he is
a businessman earning 150,000 since 1989, presenting
his tax declarations and testimonies of character
witnesses. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic
contended that the trial court erred in granting the
petition for Ong’s failure to prove that he possesses a
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as
required. The SC agreed with the republic.
FACTS:
 On Nov. 26, 1996, Kerry Lao Ong, 38 years old,
filed a Petition for Naturalization under
Commonwealth Act No. 473.
 Ong alleged in his petition the requirements under
the law such as age, residence, ability to speak and
write in any principal Philippine language,
enrollment of his minor children of school age in
school recognized by the Office of Private
Education, and profession as a
“businessman/business manager” since 1989,
earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax
returns for the years 1994 to 1997.
 After presenting Carvajal Sepulveda as his character
witnesses, the trial court granted the Petition, ruling
that “by the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced, the following facts had been established: x
x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business
manager engaged in lawful trade and business since
1989 from which he derives an average annual
income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos.
 On appeal to the CA, the Republic faulted the trial
court for granting Ong’s petition despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law. CA dismissed the appeal.
 Republic: Contrary to the trial courts finding,
respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he
is a businessman/business manager earning an
average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His
income tax returns belie the value of his income.
Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the
 nature of his profession or trade, which is the source
of his income. Considering that he has four minor
children (all attending exclusive private schools), he
has declared no other property and/or bank deposits,
and he has not declared owning a family home, his
alleged income cannot be considered lucrative.
Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained
that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not
possess a definite and existing business or trade.
ISSUE: Whether Ong has proved that he has some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in
accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law
HELD: No.
RATIO:
 The courts must always be mindful that
naturalization proceedings are imbued with the
highest public interest. Naturalization laws
should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed
in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the
applicant to show full and complete compliance
with the requirements of law.
 In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around
respondent Ong’s compliance with the qualification
found in Section 2(4) of the Revised Naturalization
Law, which provides: Fourth. He must own real
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
 Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation” means “not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over
his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
one’s becoming the object of charity or a public
charge.” His income should permit “him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization.”
 It has been held that in determining the existence
of a lucrative income, the courts should consider
only the applicant's income; his or her spouse’s
income should not be included in the assessment.
The spouses additional income is immaterial "for
under the law the petitioner should be the one to
possess some known lucrative trade, profession
or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has
consistently held that the applicant's
qualifications must be determined as of the time
of the filing of his petition.
 The Court finds the appellate court’s decision
erroneous. First, it should not have included the
spouse’s income in its assessment of Ong’s lucrative
income. Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ong’s
expenses vis-à-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not
own real property; (b) that his proven average gross
annual income around the time of his application,
which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the
education of his four minor children; and (c) that
Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive
private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not
explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ong’s
income had an appreciable margin over his known
expenses.
 The applicant provided no documentary evidence,
like business permits, registration, official receipts,
or other business records to demonstrate his
proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead,
Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
possession of “some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation.” Bare, general
assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that
is required of an applicant for naturalization.
A review of the decisions involving petitions for
naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire
records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public
interest that it has been differently categorized and given
special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial
contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does
not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the
government another opportunity to present new evidence.
A decision or order granting citizenship will not even
constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the
ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the
matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x
involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings,
the present proceeding may be considered adequate for
the purpose of determining the correctness or
incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and
extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no
need to present new evidence. A careful review of the
extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has
not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for
naturalization.
Republic v. Li Ching Chung:
[G.R. No. 197450; March 20, 2013]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A Naturalization
Proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has
been differently categorized and given special treatment.
x x x Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a
petition for naturalization does not preclude the
reopening of that case and giving the government another
opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order
granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata
to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent
judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization
already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally
or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues
even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained
on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this
Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed
decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in
their pleadings, the present proceeding may be
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light
of the law and extant jurisprudence.
Emergency Recit: Respondent, a chinese national, filed
a petition for naturalization before the RTC. Along with
his application, he submitted his arguments (see facts)
and other material documents as support and two other
witnesses that will prove his character. Respondent filed
a motion for early setting so that he can acquire real
estate properties. OSG opposed his motion stating that
such motion is a violation of RA 530. RTC and CA
denied the OSG’s opposition. OSG argued further that
the petition for naturalization was filed to it less than 1
year from the time of the declaration of intent was
mandatory, thus, fatal to Respondent’s application. SC
agreed with the OSG and reversed the CA and RTC’s
decision. That mo petition for naturalization may be filed
and heard and hence no decree may be issued granting it
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, before the expiration of one year from and
after the date of the filing of a verified declaration of his
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines
is MANDATORY
FACTS:
 On August 22, 2007, Respondent, otherwise known
as “Bernabe Luna Li” or “Stephen Lee Keng”, a
Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention
to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the
OSG.
 On March 12, 2008 or almost 7 months after filing
his declaration of intention, respondent filed his
Petition for Naturalization before the RTC.
 Respondent alleged that: i. he was born on
November 29, 1963 in Fujian Province, People’s
Republic of China, which granted the same privilege
of naturalization to Filipinos; ii. That he came to the
Philippines on March 15, 1988 via PAL landing at
the NAIA; ii. That on November 19, 1989, he
married Cindy Sze Mei Ngar, a British national,
with whom he had 4 children, all born in Manila; iv.
That he had been continuously and permanently
residing in the country since his arrival and is
currently a resident of Manila with prior residence
in Malabon; v. that he could speak and write in
English and Tagalog; vi. That he was entitled to the
benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 473 reducing to 5 years the requirement under
Section 2 of ten years of continuous residence,
because he knew English and Filipino having
obtained his education from St. Stephen’s High
School of Manila; vii. And that he had successfully
established a trading general merchandise business
operating under the name of "VS Marketing
Corporation." He also submitted material
documents in support of his application.
 As an entrepreneur, he derives income more than
sufficient to be able to buy a condominium unit and
vehicles, send his children to private schools and
adequately provide for his family.
 Respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting
praying that the hearing be moved from April 3,
2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire real estate
properties. The OSG filed its Opposition arguing
that the said motion for early setting was a "clear
violation of Section 1, RA 530, which provides
that hearing on the petition should be held not
earlier than six (6) months from the date of last
publication of the notice."
 The opposition was already late as the RTC, in its
Order, denied respondent’s motion and decreed that
since the last publication in the newspaper of
general circulation was on June 13, 2008, the
earliest setting could only be scheduled 6 months
later or on December 15, 2008.
 OSG filed a MTD but RTC denied it.
 Respondent testified and presented 2 witnesses,
Emelita V. Roleda and Gaudencio Abalayan
Manimtim, who personally knew him since 1984
and 1998, respectively, to vouch that he was a
person of good moral character and had conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his period of residency in the country.
 On June 3, 2009, RTC granted respondent’s
application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen.
 On June 30, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision. The CA held that, although the petition for
naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the
time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this
defect was not fatal.
 The CA further stated that "the Republic
participated in every stage of the proceedings below.
It was accorded due process which it vigorously
exercised from beginning to end. Whatever
procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint
the proceedings, let alone the Republic’s meaningful
exercise of its right to due process."
 Moreover, the CA noted that the OSG did not in any
way question respondent’s qualifications and his
lack of disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of
this country. Indeed, the CA was convinced that
respondent was truly deserving of this privilege.
 Hence, this petition to the SC.
 The appeal is predicated on the fact that the petition
for naturalization was filed (26 October 1950)
before the lapse of one year from and after the filing
of a verified declaration of his bona fide intention to
become a citizen (4 April 1950), in violation of
Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended.
ISSUE(S): Whether the RTC and CA erred when it
granted Respondent’s Petition for Naturalization.
HELD: Yes. Respondent failed to prove full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for
naturalization must be denied without prejudice to his
right to re-file his application.
RATIO:
I. General Rule:
 The law is explicit that the declaration of
intention must be filed one year prior to the filing
of the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go
Bon Lee likewise decreed that substantial
compliance with the requirement is inadequate. the
Court wrote:
 “The language of the law on the matter being
express and explicit, it is beyond the province
of the courts to take into account questions of
expediency, good faith and other similar
reasons in the construction of its provisions.”
 Were we to accept the view of the lower court on
this matter, there would be no good reason why a
petition for naturalization cannot be filed one week
after or simultaneously with the filing of the
required declaration of intention as long as the
hearing is delayed to a date after the expiration of
the period of one year. The ruling of the lower court
amounts, in our opinion, to a substantial change in
the law, something which courts cannot do, their
duty being to apply the law and not tamper with it.
Exception:
 The only exception to the mandatory filing of a
declaration of intention is specifically stated in
Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:
“Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement
to make a declaration of intention. – Persons
born in the Philippines and have received their
primary and secondary education in public
schools or those recognized by the Government
and not limited to any race or nationality, and
those who have resided continuously in the
Philippines for a period of thirty years or more
before filing their application, may be
naturalized without having to make a
declaration of intention upon complying with
the other requirements of this Act.
 To such requirements shall be added that which
establishes that the applicant has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or
nationality. The same shall be understood applicable
with respect to the widow and minor children of an
alien who has declared his intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is
actually naturalized.”
 Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the
category of such exempt individuals that would
excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one
year prior to the filing of a petition for
naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding,
respondent’s premature filing of his petition for
naturalization before the expiration of the one-year
period is fatal.
 No petition for naturalization may be filed and
heard and hence no decree may be issued
granting it under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before
the expiration of one year from and after the
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines is MANDATORY
 The position of the Government is well taken,
because no petition for naturalization may be
filed and heard and hence no decree may be
issued granting it under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before
the expiration of one year from and after the
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines. This is mandatory. Failure to raise
in the lower court the question of non-
compliance therewith does not preclude the
Government from raising it on appeal.
 Nevertheless, after the one-year period, the
applicant may renew his petition for naturalization
and the evidence already taken or heard may be
offered anew without the necessity of bringing to
court the witnesses who had testified. And the
Government may introduce evidence in support of
its position.
 The decree granting the petition for naturalization is
set aside, without costs.
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with
the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a
foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere
matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the
State; the applicant does not possess any natural,
inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to
Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has,
to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is
that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire
such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory
conditions and requirements. The absence of one
jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this
necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the
naturalization process.
Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 198742; Aug. 10, 2012]
Emergency Recit: Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. She became a naturalized Australian citizen in
1984 as she married an Australian. But in 2005, she filed
an application to re-acquire PH citizenship. In 2006, she
filed an unsworn declaration of renunciation of her
foreign citizenship and later ran for an elective office in
the 2007 (For mayor but lost) and 2010 (For vice-mayor
and she won). But respondents filed this case alleging she
is disqualified because she is a dual citizen and she failed
to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her
foreign citizenship. The RTC, COMELEC, and the
Supreme Court, ruled in respondents’ favor. Petitioner is
disqualified for having an unsworn declaration of
renunciation.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon is a natural-
born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
parents on Aug. 8, 1944. On Dec. 13, 1984, she
became a naturalized Australian owing marriage to
a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
 On Dec. 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3
of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003." Her application was approved and she took
her oath of allegiance to the Republic of PH on Dec.
5, 2005.
 On Sept. 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Dep’t of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated Sept. 27, 2006,
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
 citizen. She then ran for Mayor in her hometown in
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. But she lost
her bid.
 Petitioner again ran during the May 10, 2010
elections for Vice-Mayor and she got the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13,
2010. But respondent Robelito Picar, Wilma
Pagaduan, and Luis Bautista, all registered voters of
Caba, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC.
They sought petitioner’s disqualification from
holding her elective post as she is a dual citizen and
she failed to execute a “personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath” as imposed by Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225.
 But the petitioner denied being a dual citizen and
argued that since Sept. 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of
her Australian citizenship.
 On Oct. 22, 2010, RTC ruled that the petitioner’s
failure to comply with Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office.
As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the
personal declaration of renunciation she filed in
Australia was not under oath. The law clearly
mandates that the document containing the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before any public officer authorized to administer
oath. COMELEC affirms.
 Petitioner alleges COMELEC committed
GADALEJ. She argues that:
a. Since she ceased to be an Australian
citizen on Sept. 27, 2006, she no longer
held dual citizenship and was only a
Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship"
imposed by Sec. 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to
dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her;
b. A sworn renunciation is a mere formal
and not a mandatory requirement. She
even cites portions of the Journal of the
House of Reps dated June 2 to 5, 2003
containing the sponsorship speech for
House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor
of R.A. No. 9225. She claims that
respondents are estopped from
questioning her eligibility since they
failed to do so when she filed certificates
of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010
elections; and
She disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a)
take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal
instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second
Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings;
and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s
judgment.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the COMELEC en banc may resolve
merits of an appeal after ruling on its
reinstatement;
2. WON the COMELEC en banc may order the
execution of a judgment rendered by a RTC in
an election case;
3. WON respondents are barred from questioning
the qualifications of petitioner; and
4. For purposes of determining petitioner’s
eligibility, WON the “sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship” in Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225
is a mere pro-forma requirement.
HELD: 1. YES; 2. YES; 3. NO; 4. NO.
RATIO:
1. COMELEC en banc may resolve merits of an appeal
after ruling on its reinstatement:
a. The Court ruled that the power to decide
motions for reconsideration in election cases is
given unto the COMELEC en banc by Sec. 3,
Article 9-C of the Constitution. This is
complemented by another provision in Sec.
5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure;
b. Thus, there’s nothing to prevent COMELEC
from directly adjudicating the substantive
merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to
the division that initially dismissed it. There’s
no GADALEJ on the COMELEC en banc’s
part when it proceeded to decide the
substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal
after ruling for its reinstatement.
2. COMELEC en banc has the power to order
discretionary execution of judgment:
a. There’s no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s
authority to order discretionary execution of
judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court is expressly
sanctioned by Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Sec. 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution
pending appeal may be issued by an appellate
court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction;
b. The Court even said in Batul vs. Bayron that
judgments in election cases which may be
executed pending appeal includes those
decided by trial courts and those rendered by
the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
3. Respondents are not estopped from questioning
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public office:
a. The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications
were not questioned when she filed
certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010
elections cannot operate as an estoppel to
the petition for quo warranto before the
RTC. Under the B.P. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code), there are 2 instances where a petition
questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his
certificate of candidacy was filed can be
raised:
i. Before election, pursuant to
Sec. 78 of B.P. 881; and
 ii. After election, pursuant to Sec.
253 of B.P. 881.
b. Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to
disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the 25-day period prescribed by
Sec. 78 for whatever reasons, the elections
laws do not leave him completely helpless as
he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within 10 days from
the proclamation of the results of the election,
as provided under Sec. 253;
c. Both remedies were available to respondents
and their failure to utilize Sec. 78 cannot stop
them should they opt to file a quo warranto
petition under Sec. 253.
4. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship as per Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225:
a. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic. Sec. 3 provides for the oath and
Sec. 5 provides for the civil and political rights
and liabilities for those who have retained or
have re-acquired PH citizenship under R.A.
9225;
b. In petitioner’s case, she validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on Dec. 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On
Sept. 18, 2006, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia
but such was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath;
c. This is why petitioner argues that such sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship
requirements in Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement in conformity
with the intent of the Legislature;
d. The Court ruled that Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 is
free from any ambiguity. The case of Lopez vs.
COMELEC dictates that the form of the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of the law who
is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship;
e. The same doctrine was reached in Jacot vs.
Dal where it was ruled that Filipinos re-
acquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 must explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish
to run for elective posts in the Philippines.
Thus, the law categorically requires persons
seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized
to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy;
f. Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who
reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the PH, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in PH elections;
g. The intent of Congress was not only for Pinoys
reacquiring or retaining their PH citizenship
under R.A. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance
to the Republic but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in PH. To qualify as a candidate,
Filipinos must only have one citizenship, PH
citizenship;
h. Petitioner also argues that the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be
deemed a formal requirement only with respect
to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a
natural-born Filipino so as to override the
effect of the principle that natural-born citizens
need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship. But never was it mentioned or even
alluded to that, as petitioner wants the Court to
believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship and thereafter run for public office
has the option of executing an unsworn
affidavit of renunciation;
i. The Court ruled that Sec. 5 of R.A. 9225 was
intended to complement Sec. 18 of Art. 9 of the
Constitution on public officer’s primary
accountability of allegiance and loyalty. An
oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a
swearing to God or a revered person or thing,
that one’s statement is true or that one will be
bound to a promise. The person making the
oath implicitly invites punishment if the
statement is untrue or the promise is broken.
The legal effect of an oath is to subject the
person to penalties for perjury if the testimony
is false. To hold the oath to be a mere pro
forma requirement is to say that it is only for
ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporary
allegiance from government officers when the
Constitution and the legislature clearly demand
otherwise;
j. Petitioner argues that the Australian
Citizenship of 1948, under which she’s already
deemed to have lost her Australian citizenship,
is entitled to judicial notice. But she didn’t
allege and prove it in court. Hence, not entitled
to judicial notice.
MAQUILING V COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a
candidate.
Emergency Recit: Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, he lost his Filipino citizenship due to
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the USA. He
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 and took the Oath
of Allegiance to the RP. He again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the RP and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte. However, after his renunciation. He
continued to use his US passport. Issue is WON Arnado
is qualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of his US passport after his renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. The court ruled in the negative. (see
doctrine)
FACTS:
 Respondent Arnado (Arnado) is a natural born
Filipino citizen. However, he lost his Filipino
citizenship due to his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the USA.
 He applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before
the Consulate General of the PH in San Francisco,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP on
July 10, 2008. On the same day, Order of Approval
of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.
 April 3, 2009 – Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
 November 30, 2009 – Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
 April 28, 2010 – Respondent Balua (Balua), another
mayor candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in connection with the May 10, 2010 local
and national elections.
Balua’s Contention: Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated April 23, 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further
bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
travel record dated December 3, 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
shows that Arnado left the country on April 14, 2009 and
returned on June 25, 2009, and again departed on July
29, 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on November
24, 2009. He also presented a certification from the BIR
dated April 23, 2010, certifying that the name “Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco” appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
April 21, 2010.
 April 30, 2010 – COMELC (1st division) issued an
order requiring Arnado to personally file his answer
and memorandum within 3 days from receipt
thereof.
 Arnado failed to file his answer. Balua moved
to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
 Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor.
 It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
filed his verified answer.
COMELEC (1st Division): WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado
is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.
COMELEC (En Banc): Reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
ISSUE(S): WON Arnado is qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport after
renouncing his foreign citizenship.
HELD: YES. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
RATIO:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship;
it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
 Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his
foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
 The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
 civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
 Mercado v. Manzano already hinted at this situation
when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith
that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against anyone who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
 While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run
for a local elective position.
 When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April
2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America."
 We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such
act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
 This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
 Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by
which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
 By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position.
 In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days,
or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on
which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
 This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.
 The citizenship requirement for elective public
office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
 We agree with the pronouncement of the
COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." This does
not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did.
 It was after complying with the requirements that he
performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public
office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
 The purpose of the Local Government Code in
disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we
were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign
citizen, to hold any public office.
 Arnado justifies the continued use of his US
passport with the explanation that he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on
18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able
to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.
 Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine
passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing
his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport.
In the same way that the use of his foreign passport
does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not
undo his earlier use of his US passport.
 Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant
duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment
 to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no
other.
 We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US
passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only
from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a
candidate.
 The ballot cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before
one even becomes a candidate. When a person
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon
and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
We might as well write off our election laws if the
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of
who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
 The first requirement that may fall when an
unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the
LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of
local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC
that sets out what should be stated in a COC.
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or
deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data
wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk
falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that
an election victory will cure any defect that their
COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)
 What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual
from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to
delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
 It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the
sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is
not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is
made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.
 With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then
becomes the winner in the election as he obtained
the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.
 We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
 Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
 Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate
are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
 As in any contest, elections are governed by rules
that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.
 The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
 That the disqualified candidate has already been
proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based
on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.
 The disqualifying circumstance surrounding
Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does
not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
 With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification
prior to the elections because he filed his answer to
the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
 To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate
the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
 Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.
In Re: Petition to Re-acquire Privilege to Practice Law,
Epifanio Muneses)
[A.M. No.2112, July 24, 2012]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A Filipino lawyer who re-
acquires citizenship remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar but must apply for a license or permit to
engage in law practice.
Emergency Recit: The petitioner alleged that he became
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice
law when he became a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September
15, 2006,he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003”
by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington,
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and
if granted, to resume the practice of law.
FACTS:
 On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying
that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
 Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but
lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or
the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of
law
 In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007,
the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who
requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek
medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July
14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking
his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned
to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.
ISSUE(S): Whether he should be re-admitted or not.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney
Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to
the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a
date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
appropriate fees
RATIO:
 In pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the
Court for the practice of law, the OBC required, and
in compliance thereof, petitioner submitted the
following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of
Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-
Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as
well as his updated payment of annual
membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year
2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE
for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of
Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-
MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to
his compliance with the MCLE.
 The OBC further required the petitioner to update
his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied
with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
 The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.  However, as stated in
Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
 petition moot and academic. The broader and
Nicolas- Lewis v. COMELEC transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the
497 SCRA 649 petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate
and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however,
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners are dual- citizens remains unresolved.
who re-acquired Filipino citizenship as per RA 9225.
They were not allowed to exercise absentee voting ISSUE(S): WON petitioners and others who might have
because as per Macalintal v. COMELEC, they failed to meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
comply with the residency requirement. SC held that the citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee
essence of absentee voting is to give non-residents the voter under R.A. 9189. (YES no need to establish
opportunity to vote. Thus, it is against its spirit if residency)
residency shall be considered as pre-requisite to voting.
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself RATIO:
admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition  After what appears to be a successful application for
Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy
FACTS: political rights, specifically, the right of suffrage,
 Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225  Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent
(Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5
2003) which accords to such applicants the right of (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote,
suffrage. as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
 Long before the May 2004 national and local requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
elections, petitioners sought registration and Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing
certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the
advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of
States that they have yet no right to vote in such the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residency in the Philippines for a certain period,
residence requirement prescribed by the and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident
Constitution.  absentee voting rights.
 Prodded for clarification by There is no provision in the dual citizenship law—
petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually establish
ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC on the residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
response: contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its
presumption of constitutionality, Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
it is the Commission's position absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
that those who have availed of overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
the law cannot exercise the right enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
of suffrage given under the who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
OAVL for the reason that the ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
OAVL was not enacted for vote.
them. Hence, as Filipinos who
have merely re-acquired their
citizenship on 18 September
2003 at the earliest, and as law
and jurisprudence now stand,
they are considered regular
voters who have to meet the
requirements of residency,
among others under Section 1,
Article 5 of the Constitution.
 Faced with the prospect of not being
able to vote in the May 2004 elections
owing to the COMELEC's refusal to
include them in the National Registry of
Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-
Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
 COMELEC’s comment: denial of
petition; petitioners were not able to
register let alone vote in said elections.
OSG’s Manifestation: all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right
of suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the