1. Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, Alexander Aguirre, Hector AUTHOR: The Taliño.

Villanueva, Cielito Habito, Robert Barbers, Carmencita NOTES: No longer included the discussion on the right to
Reodica, Cesar Sarino, Renato Valencia, Tomas P. Africa, Head privacy and the legal standing of the petitioner as provided for
of the National Computer Center and Chairman of the in Parts 1 and 3-4 of the ratio in the full-text. The ratio was
Commission on Audit divided into 4 parts. Part 2 of the ratio discusses the topic for
[G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998] tonight’s session.
TOPIC: Session 3 – Executive Branch
PONENTE: Puno, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power
to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
Emergency Recit: No need. Short facts!
FACTS:
 Dec. 12, 1996 - A.O. No. 308 was issued by Pres. FVR, otherwise known as the “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System.”
 Jan. 22-23, 1997 - A.O. No. 308 was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation.
 Jan. 24, 1997 – Sen. Blas F. Ople filed the instant petition against respondents, then Exec. Sec. Ruben Torres and the heads
of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308.
 Apr. 8, 1997 - the SC issued a TRO enjoining its implementation.
 Sen. Ople filed with the SC a case for the nullification of A.O. No. 308 and contends that:
o the establishment of a national computerized identification reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of
A.O. No. 308 by Pres. FVR is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress;
o the appropriation of public funds by Pres. FVR for the implementation of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation
of the exclusive right of Congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure.
o the implementation of A.O. No. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the bill of rights
enshrined in the constitution. 
 Respondents counter-argue that:
o the instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review;
o A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the President without encroaching on the
legislative powers of Congress;
o the funds necessary for the implementation of the identification reference system may be sourced from the budgets of
the concerned agencies;
o A.O. No. 308 protects an individual's interest in privacy.
ISSUE(S): WON A.O. No. 308 is a law and not merely an administrative order, and was beyond the powers of the President to
issue, such power being lodged with Congress.

HELD: Yiz. Hence, null and void!

RATIO:
 Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
 Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The
blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to
execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
 The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
 While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
1
 Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
 As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
 Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:
“Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.”
 An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy.
 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is
a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance." and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people."  The Code is
divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of
Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V
on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure.
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the
executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules
on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel
and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government.
 It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering
by government, the choice of policies, etc. A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative
order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.
 Nor is it correct to argue that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection,
and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no
one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising
his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty
cannot stand.
 As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation
must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." 

02 FORTICH v. CORONA AUTHOR: TAN

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998] Notes: The case discusses the doctrine of res judicata. Nothing
TOPIC: Session 4; Executive Branch in the ratio expressly discusses any topic related to the
PONENTE: MARTINEZ, J. executive branch. However, upon checking Atty. Loanzon’s
reviewer, it shows that the topic of the case is the Concept of
Qualified Political Agency. The doctrine below is copied from
said reviewer. (I can’t reconcile the topic with the doctrine. 🤷‍)

2
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In striking down, the action of the President, the Court invoking a jurisprudence, held: “Since the decisions
of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer
be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within
the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.”
EMERGENCY RECIT:  Strikers went on protest concerning the decision of the Office of the President issued through the executive
secretary Ruben Torres which approved the conversion of a 144 hectare of agricultural land to an agro-industrial (institutional)
area. That event led to the issuance of the so-called “win-win” resolution made by the Office of the President through then
Deputy Executive Secretary, Renato Corona, which substantially modified its earlier decision after it had become final and
executory. The said resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44
hectares and has ordered that the remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed to the qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Issue: WoN
res judicata applies. SC: Yes. 
FACTS:
 The Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,
designating certain areas along BukidnonSayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon AgroIndustrial Zones where the subject
property is situated.
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or reclassifying 144 hectares of land
[owned by Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners] from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
 The Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance.
 Accordingly, an application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya on behalf of NQSRMDC.
 However, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No.
6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro -
industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries. MR was denied.
 Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of
the property.
 Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
 In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP
Case No. 96C6424 reversing the DAR Secretary’s decision and approved the conversion of the one hundred forty four (144)-
hectare land from agricultural to agro industrial/institutional area.
 DAR filed an MR, which was denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. The decision became final and executory.
 DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration.
 Meanwhile, in protest of the OP Decision, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City. The strike commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders
and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers cause.
 This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to resolve the 2 nd MR by
issuing the socalled WinWin Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and
executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agroindustrial area only to the extent of forty-
four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
 Hence, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the SC, urging it to annul and set
aside the Win-win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform
from implementing the said Resolution.
ISSUE(S): WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect. –
NO.
RATIO:
 When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re -
open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis
of the assailed WinWin Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Original Decision. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Original Decision to lapse into finality . Thus, the act of the

3
 Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
 In striking down, the action of the President, the Court invoking a jurisprudence, held: “Since the decisions of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be
reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.”
 The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates
such principle must immediately be struck down.

3. HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the
Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by
SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY
MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as
Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P.
PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C.
SANTOS, MR.VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR. NAPOLEON G.
INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members of
Nueva Ecija,
G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998
TOPIC: Executive Branch
PONENTE: PUNO, J
AUTHOR: LAURETA(Used and edited by Valera)
NOTES:
Pls check LGC Sec 60-61, 63 – won’t put em here na para
“short” lang to
A.O. No. 23:
Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints,
duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the
preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The
President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall
hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating
Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the
Department of the Interior and Local Government for the
purpose.

The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the

service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Pursuant to A.O. No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through
the Executive Secretary.
 The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of
general supervision over local governments. (Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)
 The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with
discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires
 The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority.
What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
 An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.   These rights are essentially part of
procedural due process.  The local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
(2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness
and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code 70 and in A.O. No. 23. 
FACTS:
4
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997
charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. 
 Alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall, angrily kicked the door and chairs
in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms
who encircled the area. 
 Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by
petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's
acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan; that fortunately, that they opposed the loan because the
province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70M incurred without prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 That the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety. 
 Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of
Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province, by PNB.
 The letter-complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez, two (2) employees
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who witnessed the incident. 

President Ramos acted on the complaint by writing on its margin the following:

To: SILG (Robert Barbers) info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:
1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force, intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12
Sep at the Session Hall.
2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 
3. BREAK NOT the PEACE.

Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and attached to
the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his]
verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support
thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt."
 Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents
to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to
maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would
adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
 The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint.
Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. He asked for
extension 4 times (looking for counsel, Christmastime, busy with duties etc).
 Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an
order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered
to present their evidence ex-parte. Upon MR, he was again given the chance to file his Answer.
 Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present their evidence ex-
parte on July 15, 1997. The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss."
Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and
that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint.
 Upon recommendation of Sec Barbers, Exec Sec Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner
under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension
and the order of default. Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued. On August 20, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez
issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" and "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration." In the same order, he
required the parties to submit their position papers within an inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
 Petitioner claims that while he was at his district office in the town of Munoz, he received a phone call from Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member Jose del Mundo.Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party, informed him that Vice-
Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who were in petitioner's party because they
refused to place on the agenda the ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province Petitioner repaired to the
provincial capitol to advise his party-mates on their problem and at the same time attend to his official functions. Upon
arrival, he went to the Session Hall and asked the members present where Vice-Governor Tinio was. However, without
waiting for their reply, he left the Hall and proceeded to his office
 Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
5
 caused alarm to the employees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security
escorts whenever he reported for work. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez
was false.
 On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner prayed that a formal
investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of
Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija
 CA dismissed.
ISSUE(S): W/N Disciplinary proceedings were proper? No.

HELD: Resolution of Exec Sec null and void.

RATIO:
What are the laws that govern?
1. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled
"Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of
Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila."   In all
matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.
 Section 60 (pls check) of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office.
 An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A
complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. (Sec 61 LGC, pls check)
 In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was
therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to
conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents
and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private respondents later realized
these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the
Office of the President.
 SC: The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to
prove petitioner's claim.
 The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint. Verification is
a formal, not jurisdictional requisite.

2. DILG Sec has jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the
Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
 Pursuant to A.O. No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through
the Executive Secretary.
 The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of
general supervision over local governments. (Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)
 The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with
discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires
 The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority.
What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
 The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency.
 Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 of A.O. No. 23 provide: When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining
Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from notice.
 Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should
have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the
Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal.
6
3. In his third assigned error, petitioner also claims that the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss. He
alleges that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and therefore the DILG Secretary should have
considered it and given him time to file his answer.

It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23.
Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested for extension
of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search for competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And, thrice, his
requests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsidered and petitioners was given additional time to file answer. After
all the requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss!

In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his
preventive suspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the Local Government
Code.
 Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with.
In failing to file answer, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of
petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the
witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him.

4. The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the
Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not
give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.
 Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of
position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No.
23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.
No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only
after formal investigation and hearing.
 The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive
officials. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring
position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to
those elected.
 An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.   These rights are essentially part of
procedural due process.  The local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
(2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness
and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code 70 and in A.O. No. 23. 
 When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected.
Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension
and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly
dictates their imposition.

(4) De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council [JBC] AUTHOR: VARGAS

[G.R. No.191002 ; March 17, 2010] NOTES: Long and chunky case. Focus on issue #3. You can ask
TOPIC: Executive Department; Appointing power of the me anywhere u see me for clarifications 
PResident
PONENTE: Lord BERSAMIN
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary, as reasoned out by the SC [check ratio]
FACTS:
 The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
 The JBC, in its en banc meeting, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
 Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the 5 most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Carpio; Corona; Carpio-Morales; Velasco, Jr.; and Nachura
 However, the last 2 declined their nomination
 Petitioners, oppositors, intervenors, and the OSG raised a lot of legal dilemmas, but the SC simplified them [check issue]
7
Relevant Laws
Sec. 15, Art. VII, Consti – 2 months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4, Art. VIII, Consti - Any vacancy [in the SC] shall be filled w/in 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Art. VIII, Consti – The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
ISSUE(S):
1] Do petitioners have locus standi YES
2] Is there an actual justiciable controversy YES
3] MAIN POINT – Does Sec. 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section
9, Article VIII of the Constitution? NO
4] May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President? NO

HELD: YES YES NO NO

RATIO:
1] Petitioners sue either as citizens or taxpayers.
The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the
issues affect everyone [including the petitioners], regardless of one’s personal interest in life, b/c they concern  that great doubt
about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also
others who may serve in the Judiciary
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the
matter involved has transcendental importance

2] The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission
of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through  mandamus to submit the short list to
the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the
incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that the
incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the
Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so
prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial
determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly
proscribed by the Constitution.

3] In Valenzuela, a 1998 SC case, the SC En Banc already interpreted that the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments –
NOW THE SC REVERSES VALENZUELA
First - The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution
- Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department
o The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Secs. 14, 15 and 16 of the Article
- Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department
o Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices
o Sec. 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill
the vacancy w/in 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy
- Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so
- The Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
- The 90-day limitation fixed in Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Sec. 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
couched in stronger negative language
Second – Sec 15, Art VII was purposed to prevent “midnight appointments” and also appointments presumed made for the
purpose of influencing the Presidential election
- the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department
8
 - The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, b/c their establishment of the JBC
and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary
Third – Of the 23 secs. in Art. VII, three (Secs. 14, 15, and 16) concern the appointing powers of the President
- Sec. 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting President, and
evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department
- Sec. 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – it
does not include appointments to the judiciary
- Secs. 14, 15, and 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The
fact that Secs. 14 and 16 refer only to appointments w/in the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately
situated Sec. 15 b/w Secs. 14 and 16, if they intended Sec. 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Art. VIII, most likely w/in Sec. 4 (1) thereof.
Fifth – To hold that Sec. 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring
the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments
- Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency
in a presidential election
- The wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is
itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority
- In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial
independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010
Sixth – The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still
be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Sec. 4(1), Article VIII remaining
- The argument is flawed
- Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall
on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of
the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period
of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is
that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109
days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to
comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned,
nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period,
or vice versa. They never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the
lower courts

4] We find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The
actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to
submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno

05 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG AUTHOR: ACIDO

& SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION v. JOSE O. VERA, Judge NOTES: Relevant issue only (ang haba ng case)
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU Also, complex crime of estafa committed through falsification
UNJIENG of commercial documents yung crime niya, just in case itanong.
[G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937] It’s in defendant’s other case.
TOPIC: Executive Branch
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different
from each other, both in origin and in nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of
the executive power.
Emergency Recit: Cu Unjieng was convicted and sentenced to prison. Almost a year after the judgment became final, he applied
9
for probation under Act No. 4221 (the Probation Act). The Fiscal and HSBC opposed this, alleging the Act’s unconstitutionality.
While the respondent Judge denied the petition for probation, there was a lot of delay (through many MRs and motions to
intervene) in actually putting Cu Unjieng in prison; hence, People and HSBC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to stop
the probation proceedings in the CFI. Among other attacks on the Probation Act’s constitutionality, HSBC contended that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to
grant pardons and reprieves. SC held it is not (Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional for other reasons); see doctrine.
FACTS:
 Petitioners People and HSBC are the plaintiff and offended party, with respondent Cu Unjieng as defendant, in the criminal
case “People v. Cu Unjieng”. Respondent Judge Vera is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal
case.
 The Information was filed with the CFI of Manila on October 15, 1931. On January 8, 1934, CFI rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4y2mos of prision
correccional to 8y of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to HSBC. On appeal, SC modified the
sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5y6mo of prision correccional  to 7y6mo27d of prision mayor, but affirmed the
judgment in all other respects… (marami pang nangyari)… Final judgment was eventually entered on December 17, 1935 . On
November 24, 1936, SC denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion
for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
 On November 27, 1936, Cu Unjieng applied for probation under Act No. 4221 (Probation Act) of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Among others, he stated that that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record, and that he would observe good conduct in the future. 
 CFI referred his application to the Insular Probation Office, which recommended denial of the same. CFI Judge Vera set the
petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
 On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, and the private prosecution (HSBC) opposed Cu Unjieng’s application for
probation. HSBC alleged that Act No. 4221 violates the equal protection clause; and Act No. 4221 is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.
 CFI Judge Vera: Promulgated a resolution with the finding that Cu Unjieng is innocent of his crime, but denying his petition
for probation (labo)
 After many MRs, the Fiscal filed a motion for issuance of order of execution in order to commit Cu Unjieng to jail. But there
were many delays (MRs, motions for intervention, etc.). Eventually, petitioners People and HSBC filed an action for certiorari
and prohibition to prohibit the CFI from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for
probation, so that Cu Unjieng may be committed to prison.
 HSBC contends that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive
power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves.
ISSUE: Whether Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive

HELD: No. Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional, not for the reason above, but because it is an undue delegation of legislative authority
and violates the equal protection clause. Writ of prohibition granted.
RATIO:
 Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval
of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power
to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures".
 Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United
States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised
"after conviction".
 Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act? The Philippine
Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the
punishment of any and all penal offenses. But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness
of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the Probation Act.
 The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the
conditions of probation are faithfully observed. If this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict
with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of
New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts
as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and
conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do."
 Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other,
10
 both in origin and in nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the
executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but
the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man,
and gives him a new credit and capacity. 
 In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He
is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not
terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be
definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have
been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer
has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal
custody — subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-
fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally
imposed upon him.
 Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State is relied
upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature
upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that
case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms
conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between
suspension of sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other.
o That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled
by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of
sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an
indefinite time. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of
punishment, for a commutation is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
 We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in
respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been
enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest
and imprisonment.

06 Eufemio Tesoro v. The Director of Prisons AUTHOR: Castro

[G.R. No. L-46437. May 23, 1939] NOTES:
TOPIC: Executive Branch
PONENTE: Moran, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Tesoro, who was convicted of falsification of a public document, was granted a parole subject to certain
conditions. The condition relevant in this case is that “he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner”. Tesoro was being charged with Adultery by his brother in law, Jose. The President, invoking sec. 64 (i) of the Admin
Code, ordered the arrest and reincarceration of Tesoro by revoking his parole. Tesoro challenges the power of the President to
grant and revoke parole. The SC ruled that the President has such power.
FACTS:
 Oct. 10, 1934: Eufemio Tesoro was convicted of Falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 2 to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days, which was to expire on Oct. 28, 1937.
 Nov. 14, 1935: Gov. General Frank Murphy granted Tesoro a Parole, which he accepted subject to these conditions:
o He will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first obtaining the consent of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence (BIS);
o He will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner; and
o He will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the BIS, during the first year, once a month,
and thereafter, once every three months. Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.
 Dec. 3, 1937: Tesoro was charged with Adultery for having illicit relations with Concordia Dairo, wife of his brother in law,
Jose Nagar. The information was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant.

11
 Feb. 1938: Nagar filed a complaint with the BIS, and alleging the same facts supporting the crime of Adultery, charged Tesoro
with violation of the conditions of his parole. In his letter, Tesoro denied the charge.
 Parole Officer Figalang, who was assigned to investigate the case, recommended the arrest and reincarceration of Tesoro to
the President of the Philippines.
 Feb. 19, 1938: The President, relying on the authority conferred upon him by sec. 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, ordered
the arrest of Tesoro for violating the condition that he will not commit any other crime (adultery). Tesoro shall serve the
unexpired portion of his maximum sentence.
 Tesoro was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons.
 Tesoro sued for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. Hence, this appeal.
 Tesoro’s contentions: a) Sec. 64 (i) of the Admin. Code, in so far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant
and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by par. 6, sec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, as the latter omitted to
specify such power in connection with the powers granted to the President; b) BIS has no legal authority to investigate his
conduct and recommend the revocation of his parole; c) Conviction is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as
having violated his conditional parole.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to grant and revoke parole

HELD: Yes
RATIO:
 Section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole, gives the Governor-General
the following powers and duties: “To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon
parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who,
in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.”
 Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows: “The President shall have the
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except
in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose.
He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.”
 The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of the power
of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial of such to the President, the effect would be to discharge
unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief
Executive. That such effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.
 By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a month during the first year
of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under
the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of
the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was
acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the
conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of
inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of
any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the President
chose to entrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a government agency created precisely for
the concern of persons released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.
 Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an
orderly manner." It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary
in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code,
the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
 Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole. He claims that, according to
the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter part of September 1937," as found by the President,
but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant
case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to
place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
 Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after October 28, 1937, when his maximum
penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's
contention that, upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires, and,
therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to no conditions contained in his parole. In other words, he holds the view
12
 that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. We do not subscribe
to this contention.
 In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said: “When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same
state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs.
Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the
convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his
release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served
on the original sentence.“ This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole.
 The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the duration of the penalty he has yet to serve
after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 provided that a convict released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its conditions,
shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has ever been granted him, the time between the parole and
the subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his subsequent
confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code, and section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision.
Act No. 4103, section 8, provides that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon re-
arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present case, as the petitioner was paroled not under the
provision thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no statutory provision squarely
governing the case with respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In the absence of
such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole that "should any of the
conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect ," it is evident that the petitioner
herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.

7. Cresencio TOLENTINO vs Cesario CATOY COQUIA

G.R. No. L-2503; December 10, 1948 NOTES
TOPIC: Pardon and Amnesty
PONENTE: TUASON, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner was a Hukbalahap found guilty of the crime of illegal assembly held in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs by
the CFI of Batangas on May 11, 1948.
 Proclamation No. 76 was issued on June 21, granting amnesty under certain conditions to leaders and members of the
Hukbalahap and the PKM organizations.
 Within the 20-day period for surrender imposed as a condition by the amnesty, petitioner, already serving sentence, sent the
President a petition for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on this petition and the
petitioner came to court with the present application.
 However, Judge Juan Enriquez was of the opinion that "the petitioner is clearly covered by the amnesty proclamation" but
refused to grant the writ because "he (petitioner) has failed to follow the procedure outlined by the implementing circulars
(of the Secretary of Justice) so that he may avail of the benefits thereof . Circular No. 27-A "vests the release of such prisoners
on the Committee on the Implementation of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 in Manila, instead of the President." He gives
to understand that only this committee is authorized to order the discharge of convicted Hukbalahaps under the
proclamation.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the grant of writ and entitled for his release.

HELD: YES
RATIO:
 If the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of this proclamation and he is unable to obtain his release through executive
channels, it devolves on the courts to protect his rights. This is a fundamental right which cannot be left to the decision of
executive officers. The implementation committee was not the creation of the proclamation nor was it even mentioned in
this document. The committee was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as an instrumentality to facilitate, not to hinder or
obstruct, the carrying out of the provisions of the amnesty.
 The law officer of the Government bases his opposition to the petition under consideration on a different ground — that the
petitioner did not present any arm. He thus raises only a question of fact, and fact was the only question which the
respondent argued at the hearings before this Court.

 There is a record of the Court of First Instance a certificate drawn in the form prescribed in the Secretary of Justice's circulars
and signed by the Commanding Officer of the Constabulary in Batangas, stating that on July 10, petitioner presented himself
with a Remington .45 caliber pistol and ammunition. However, the Provincial Fiscal stated that it was not seen by him when
the case was tried. Nevertheless, that the fiscal did not see the certificate is no authority for the allegation that it was not
13
 there. It is to be kept in mind that no oral evidence was introduced, the case having been submitted for decision on the
pleadings and their annexes. The provincial fiscal's insinuation that the gun was surrendered by another Hukbalahap has
nothing to support it than his belief. Belief, suspicion and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and
legality which attaches to the certificate in question.
 Some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahap already undergoing
sentence upon the date of its promulgation. The Secretary of Justice's implementing circulars are predicated on the
assumption that the proclamation is all-inclusive. It makes no exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed
"in favor of the leaders and members of the association known as Hukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid."
No compelling reason is apparent for excluding Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object, which is "to forgive, and
forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc.," as a "just and wise measure of the Government."

Amnesty v Pardon
 Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Mr. Justice Field in Knote vs. United States,
24 Law. ed., 442, 443, said that "the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal
importance." It seems to be generally conceded in the United States that the word "'pardon' includes amnesty." (State vs.
Eby, 71 S. W., 61.) This being so, the rules for interpreting pardon and amnesty ought not to vary. Now then, according to a
well-recognized doctrine, pardon is construed "most strictly against the state." "Where general words are used, their natural
meaning is not to be restricted by other words unless the intention to do so is clear and manifest." (46 C. J., 1192.)

8 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez AUTHOR: PJ

[G.R. No. L-1278; January 21, 1949] NOTES:
TOPIC: Executive Branch
PONENTE: Feria, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Admission of guilt is not necessary in amnesty.
Emergency Recit: Jimenez and Barrioquinto applied for amnesty but the Amnesty Commission refused to process such since they
refuse to admit to the crime charged. They claim that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to
them. Thus, they filed a special action for mandamus in the SC to compel the commission to act and decide whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. The SC ruled that admission of guilt is not necessary in amnesty, and that
pardon and amnesty are different.
FACTS:
 Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war.
 The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment.
 Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which
grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. He decided to submit his case to the
Guerrilla Amnesty Comission.
 Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well.
 However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two
accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. They claim that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE(S): WON admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty—

HELD: NO, such admission is not a condition precedent for amnesty. The respondents are ordered to immediately proceed to hear
and decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez.
RATIO:
 Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he
is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the
nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.

Pardon Amnesty
14
 Granted by the President and as such, it’s a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof
Granted to one after conviction
Looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason, it does not “nor work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from
payment of civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (RPC36)
Granted by the President by Proclamation with the
concurrence of Congress, and it’s a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice
Granted to classes of persons/communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction
Looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense

 In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the
amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the
benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for
the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms
of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions
created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming
within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Perfecto, J., concurring:
 To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following elements are
essential: First, that he is charged or may be charged with ab offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, except those
against chastity or for purely personal motives; second, that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy; and third, that it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where the
offense was committed was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.

Tuason, J., dissenting:

 It is impossible for a court or commission to verify the presence of the essential conditions which should entitle the applicants
to exemption from punishment, when the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a crime. In the nature of
things, only the accused and his witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the enemy; that the killing was
perpetrated in furtherance of the resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in the commission of the
murder, etc., etc. These, or some of these, are matters of belief and intention which only the accused and his witnesses could
explain.
 As a matter of procedure, certiorari or mandamus, whatever the present proceeding may be, does not lie because there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The decision of the Commission has not closed the avenue for the
petitioners to invoke the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation before the courts. I invite attention to the provision of the
proclamation which I have quoted. In the case of Jimenez, he could ask for a new trial, as he in effect would have the
Commission grant him; and in the case of Barrioquinto he could set up the proclamation in his plea when his trial comes up.

09 Cristobal v. Labrador: AUTHOR: Mendoza

[G.R. No.47491: December 7,1940] NOTES:
TOPIC: Executive Branch; Pardon
PONENTE: Laurel
15
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides: "(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and 'with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
 It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it
is entrusted. An absolute pardon no
 t only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
FACTS:
 This is a Petition for a writ of certiorari sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos (Santos) to remain in the list of registered
voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Rizal.
 CFI found Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of Estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the
accessories provided by law. On appeal, the court confirmed the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, he was confined in the
provincial jail of from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his civil liability, the
same was condoned by the complainants.
 Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon and was seated as the municipal
president of that municipality from 1934-1937.
 The Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly, section. 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent
from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." In view of this provision, the
respondent forthwith applied to the President for an absolute pardon.
 Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive granted the said petition, restoring the
respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility."
 Petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11
of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No.
357.
 The Court denied Cristobal’s Petition. Hence, this petition to the SC.
 Cristobal: the pardon granted by the President to the Santos, did not restore the said respondent to the full enjoyment of his
political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the
pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the
respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
ISSUE(S): Whether the pardon granted to Santos by the President restored his full civil and political rights.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

RATIO:
 It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief
Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action.
 In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
 Finally, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is
absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.

10. Pelobello vs. Palatino AUTHOR: Ocampo. Miguel Angelo c.

G.R. No. L-48100. June 20, 1941. NOTES:
TOPIC: Executive
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In bold letters in Ratio.
16
Emergency Recit: Petitioner was contesting respondent’s proclamation as municipal mayor because the latter was disqualified by
reason of his conviction of a crime with imprisonment as penalty. But the Court ruled that the President pardoned respondent.
FACTS:
 Petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, filed this quo warranto petition in the CFI Tayabas against the respondent-appellee,
Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. This case is pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 167, in relation with Sec. 94(a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).
 It was alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado contra la
autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, was
disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been
removed by plenary pardon.
 Fact of conviction was admitted and so is the election and respondent-appellee’s proclamation as municipal mayor. It is also
admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915, and it has
been proven that on Dec. 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute
pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
ISSUE(S): WON the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under Sec.
94(a) of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office
(sec. 4, Election Code).

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
 The Supreme Court adopted the ruling in Cristobal vs. Labrador (G.R. No. 47941. Dec. 7, 1940) where it was ruled that subject
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of
the consequences of conviction.
 While it can be argued that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, the Court rules that in
the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of
relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
 Here, it is admitted:
a. That the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago;
b. That he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915;
c. That thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period
1918 to 1921;
d. That respondent was elected municipal president of that municipality 3 times in succession (1922-1931); and
e. That respondent was finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December 1940.
 Hence, under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to
assume the position in deference to the popular will, and the pardon was extended on the date mentioned above and before
the date fixed in Sec. 4 of the Election Code for assuming office.
 The Court rules that it cannot defeat the wholesome purpose, by a restrictive judicial interpretation, of the constitutional
grant to the Chief Executive.
DISSENTING OPINION: Horrilleno, M.
 It was in Spanish.
 But he said that the case of Cristobal vs. Labrador was not applicable because in that case, the main respondent who
obtained pardon conditional long before the elections in which he registered as an elector and presented himself as a
candidate for a municipal position., Teofilo Santos, when registering as elector, had already regained his civil and political
rights; was no longer incapacitated to vote, according to Art. 94 of the Electoral Code.
 Here, when respondent-appellee registered as an elector, he did not possess the conditions required by the Electoral
Code. As it is admitted that he was convicted of the crime of attack against the authority and its agents, by virtue of a firm
and definitive sentence in 1912, and that, although it obtained pardon of the then PH Governor General in 1915, such pardon
was conditional, and in the one it was not expressly its civil and political rights.
 It is evident that, under Art. 94 of the Electoral Code, respondent could not legally be elector in the elections of Dec. 10, 1940
because the absolution granted by his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, was on Dec. 25, 1940, which is 15 days
after the elections, and after having been proclaimed as the elected candidate for mayor of his municipality.  This is another
fact that is present here and not from Cristobal vs. Labrador. Thus, respondent-appellee was not qualified to be elected
mayor of his municipality (Article 2174, Revised Administrative Code).

17
11. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AUTHOR: PABRUA
WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, NOTES:
wife of Wilfredo Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R.
TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID
PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA
G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
TOPIC: Executive branch
PONENTE: HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of
the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the
power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered. 
FACTS:
 In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Torres pray for his immediate
release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's
right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a GADALEJ
 Before 1979: Wilfredo was convicted on two counts of estafa. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000
 April 18, 1979: a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that Wilfredo
would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines
 Wilfredo accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
 May 21, 1986: The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional
pardon granted to Wilfredo because Wilfredo had been charged with 20 counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition.
 September 8, 1986: The President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres.
 October 10, 1986: Minister of Justice Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment Wilfredo.
 Wilfredo was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. He impugned
the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment
ISSUE(S): WON the order of the President with respect to the arrest and recommitment of Wilfredo is proper - YES
RATIO:
 A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted
criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one.
By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms
and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to
order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this
exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon
rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on
conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 

12 AMPATUAN V HON. PUNO AUTHOR: PAGCALIWAGAN

G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011 Notes:
TOPIC: Executive Branch
PONENTE: Abad, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
 Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat
and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that,
since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire
18
 ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners challenges the constitutionality of the issuances of President Arroyo alleging that it violates the
principle of local autonomy and that there is no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, the deployment of troops and
taking over of ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of her emergency powers. Issue is WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. Court ruled
in the negative (see doctrine)
FACTS:
 After the massacre of 57 men and women (including some news reporters), President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946
 Proclamation placed the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato under a state of emergency
 She directed AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in said places
 3 days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order 273
 It transferred supervision of the ARMM from Office of the President to the DILG
 Then issued AO 273-A – amending AO 273 by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM to DILG
 Petitioners filed this petition for prohibition claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,
alleging that:
 The issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s
powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy.
 The president gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the
ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
 Also, there is no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency. The deployment of troops and taking over of ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Thus, the issuances are unconstitutional. DILG
Secretary, AFP, and PNP must be enjoined from implementing them.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the issuances violate the principle of local autonomy.
2. WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

HELD: NO. NO.

RATIO:

 First Issue: (Just in Case)

 The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is
anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of
the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.
 But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.  After law enforcement agents
took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Article VII, Section 12 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional
Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the
administration or operations of the ARMM.
 
Second Issue:
 Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and
PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
 The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did
not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
 The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.
“SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x
x”
 
 While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power,  it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
19
 Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:
“If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.
 
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.”
 
 Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of
the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
 But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for
the President’s decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:
 
“The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of
Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective
positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.
 
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the
Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the
Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from
the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
 
xxxx
 
The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons,
equipped with about two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been accounted
for. x x x
 
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with
about two hundred (200) firearms. x x x
 
Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel
who support them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.
 
What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially
in light of intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).
 
One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show
support and sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute between the
said RAG and the Ampatuan family.
 
xxxx
 
On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three
million pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said
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 faction is a force to reckon with because the group is well capable of launching a series of violent activities to
divert the attention of the people and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x
 
In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-
based faction has the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372)
firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three
hundred (300) firearms and was reported to be moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu
clan in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.”
 
 In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two
clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out
the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened
the peace and security in the affected places.
 Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of
emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still
a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still
necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite
the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
 Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must
respect the President’s actions.

13 Arthur Lim et al v. Executive Secretary AUTHOR: PARAS

GR No. 131445, April 11, 2002 NOTES:
TOPIC: Executive Department
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Article VII, Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the “Balikatan 021” exercises and pray for the prohibition of the deployment of
US troops in Basilan and Mindanao. Petitioners allege that the Balikatan is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
between the Philippines and the US. They claim that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack
by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Also, they claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not
authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the “Balikatan 021” is constitutional

HELD: YES
RATIO:
 The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in “activities”, the exact meaning of which is left
undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is that the US personnel “must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.” Under this guidance, the VFA gives
legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 021″ – a mutual anti-terrorism
advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat
related activities – as opposed to combat itself – such as the one subject of the instant petition are indeed authorized.

14. Harvey V. Defensor-Santiago AUTHOR: REYES

TOPIC: Executive department Notes:
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper
for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority
of the sovereign power.
 It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the

21
 public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
 Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted
in the interests of the State.
Emergency Recit: Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months close
surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension
17 opted for self deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by another offense, working without a valid
working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation proceedings. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual
act. There were also posters and other literatures advertising the child prostitution. Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code. SC
said (see doctrine FOR THE EXECUTIVE RULING and Ratio for the specific ruling on criminal procedure)
FACTS:
 American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch
citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences.
 The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with
two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and
16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now.
 Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were
also found.
 Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
 Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration
Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID denied.
 Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a self-deportation” and praying that he be
“provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the
country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-
petitioners had already filed the present petition.
 Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the
Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply
was filed by the Solicitor General.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained
petitioner pending determination of the existence of a probable cause

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
 The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to
all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
 One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable
cause.
 The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored.
 The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
 But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens.
 That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
 Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked.
 Under those circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia"
defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children.
 The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement of probable cause, to
be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.”
 What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair
22
 hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
 The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
 Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper
for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority
of the sovereign power.
 It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
 Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted
in the interests of the State.

15. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF AUTHOR: STEPH

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, vs. JUNG KEUN PARK @ NOTES:
JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHUNG KEUN PARK
[G.R. No. 159835;  January 21, 2010]
TOPIC:
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In deportation proceedings, there is no violation of due process when the alien is excluded where the
charge is overstaying or expiration of his passport, including the cancellation of passport. Full blown hearing is not required.
Emergency Recit:
FACTS:
 Respondent Jung Keun Park (Park) is a national of the Republic of Korea who came to the Phil. with his family in the early
1990s to invest in various businesses in the country.
 the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received a letter from Gyung Taek Cha, Consul/Police Attaché of the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila, requesting the BID’s assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he was
purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Korean Police.
 The letter also stated that Park’s Korean Passport had been cancelled on March 8, 2000 and no other passport had been
issued to him since. Acting on this July 6, 2000 letter, the BID officials arrested Park and deported him to Korea.
 Park returned to the Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City from Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita Ferry 2. Believing that
Park re-entered the country without a valid passport, the BID again arrested Park and, through a Charge Sheet, indicted him
for violating Section 37(a)(7) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended
 On the very same date that Park was indicted, the BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Park after finding
that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act. Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be deported, imposed upon him
administrative fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist.
 To secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed a Petition for Bail with the BID, stating that he had already
paid the administrative fines and fees imposed on him in the SDO. Park also claimed that he should no longer be considered
an undocumented alien because (a) he had been issued a Travel Certificate by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila
that was valid from January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he was a holder of a Special Investor’s Resident Visa (SIRV).
The BID, however, did not act on his petition
 About 6 months after the BID issued the SDO, Park filed a motion to have it set aside. He insisted that he should not be
considered as an undocumented alien since his Passport had not really been cancelled as falsely stated in the July 6, 2000
letter – a letter which he claimed was later disavowed by the Korean Embassy. Even assuming that this passport was actually
cancelled, Park argues that the Korean Embassy had already issued him a new passport on April 5, 2001, with validity up to
April 5, 2006. Moreover, he was a holder of a SIRV and a travel certificate.
 Without, however, going into the merits of Park’s claims, the BID denied his motion to set aside the SDO; it ruled that the
motion was belatedly filed, since the SDO had already become final and executory for Park’s failure to appeal it within the
reglementary period provided in the Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings.
 Park assailed the BID’s SDO and October 15, 2001 Resolution, through a certiorari petition filed before the CA. He reiterated
his arguments why he should no longer be considered as an undocumented alien and submitted the following in support of
his claim:
o the Fe 16, 2001 letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Young Chai Kim, Consul for
Passport Affairs, stating that he did not write the July 6, 2000 letter and that a travel certificate had been issued in Park’s
favour; and
23
 o the May 28, 2001 letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Consul/Police Attaché Gyung
Taek Cha (the same person who wrote the July 6, 2000 letter), stating that Park had no pending criminal cases in Korea.
 Park also claimed that he had been denied of his right to due process, since no hearing of his case was conducted before the
BID’s Board of Special Inquiry or the Board of Commissioners; the SDO was in fact issued on the same day that the Charge
Sheet was filed.
 CA found Park’s certiorari petition meritorious. It considered material the Feb 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters of the
Korean Embassy officials that effectively negated the July 6, 2000 letter. The appellate court also relied on Park’s travel
certificate and SIRV as documents supporting his claims. As a result, it set aside the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution
of the BID.
ISSUE(S): WON SDO and Resolution denying Parks motion to set aside the SDO are valid

HELD: YES
RATIO:
 All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippines
under Section 10 of the Immigration Act:
Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in
the nature of passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel
documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid passport visas granted by diplomatic
or consular officers, except that such document shall not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child qualifying as a
non-immigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying parent, the visa not having
expired; and (b) a seaman qualifying as such under section (9) of this Act.
 Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned to the Phil. on Oct 28, 2000, he used his Passport
No. NW0057145 – a passport that had already been cancelled according to the Korean Embassy’s July 6, 2000 letter . At the
time Park was indicted, there was no official document repudiating the July 6, 2000 letter. Park did not present other
competent proofs that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled. In deportation proceedings, the alien bears the
burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully.
 We do not believe that Park was able to discharge this burden by belatedly presenting a photocopy of his Passport No.
NW0057145 that bore stamp marks of the date of his arrival in and departure from Malaysia, just days before his return to
the country. In all his pleadings before the BID and the CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip, and he conveniently
excused the presentation of his Passport No. NW0057145 by claiming he had misplaced/lost it. Since the authenticity of the
arrival and departure stamp marks in Park’s Passport No. NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either the BID or the CA,
we cannot accord it weight and credence.
 when the SDO was issued, there was no evidence that would negate the cancellation of Park’s Passport that was stated in the
Korean Embassy’s July 6, 2000 letter. The BID had sufficient ground to believe that Park did not have with him a valid and
existing passport upon his return to the country. We thus cannot fault the BID for relying in good faith on the letter when it
issued the SDO; its act can hardly be classified as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, correctable by a writ of certiorari.

No due process violation when the summary deportation proceedings were held and when the SDO was issued
 The Charge Sheet indicted Park for violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act, which provision reads:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted as a non-immigrant;
 However, the Charge Sheet contained not just a citation of the provision of law allegedly violated by Park, but more
importantly, a statement of the act constituting the offense, i.e., Park’s status as an undocumented alien whose passport had
been cancelled by the Korean Government.
 The actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the
Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform Park of the specific ground for his deportation. In this case, we think it was.
Notably, in the pleadings Park filed with the BID, he insisted that his Passport had not been cancelled; that he possessed the
requisite travel documents; and that he is not an undocumented alien. Under these circumstances, we highly doubt Park’s
claim that he had been denied of his right to be informed; otherwise, he would not have found the need to raise such
defenses against the charge. Our opinion is fortified by the fact that Park never raised this particular objection to the charge
when the case was still before the BID and the CA.
 Thus, the allegations in the Charge Sheet were sufficient, and there was full compliance by the BID with the requirement
under Section 37(c) that no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for his deportation.
24
We likewise do not agree with Park’s claim that his case should be heard under the regular deportation proceedings where a
full hearing is required before the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry.
 Section 1, Rule X of the Deportation Rules states that:
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying or expiration of his
passport. In such case, the Board of Special Inquiry shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and
shall submit the appropriate recommendation on the bases thereof.
 Park was charged for having a cancelled passport, which theoretically is equivalent to an expired passport – in either case, the
alien does not possess the valid passport required under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. The July 6, 2000 letter in fact
stated that "Park’s Korean Passport No. NW0057145 has been expired and cancelled." The BID Office Memorandum Order
No. 19 on Summary Deportation lists aliens with cancelled passports to be covered under Summary Deportation Proceedings.
Thus, Park’s case was properly heard as one for summary deportation, and a full-blown deportation hearing was not
necessary.
 Upon issuance of the SDO, Park immediately and without any question or reservation paid the administrative fines and fee
imposed on him under the SDO. He supposedly paid the fees to support the petition for bail which he filed with the BID. The
payment of the administrative fines and fees, however, is not material in considering a bail petition. In deportation
proceedings, the decision to grant bail is entirely at the discretion of the BID Commissioner. While not material in the grant of
his bail petition, the payment of the fines and fee was nonetheless a significant indication of Park’s acceptance of and
compliance with the SDO. Park’s act of payment effectively placed him in estoppel and now bars him from contesting the
validity of the SDO.
 Contrary to Park’s claims, the Feb 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters did not categorically repudiate the cancellation of Park’s
Passport that was stated in the July 6, 2000 letter. The Feb 16, 2001 letter simply declared that its author, Young Chai Kim, did
not write any letter similar to the July 6, 2000 letter – an immaterial allegation since it was Gyung Taek Cha who wrote it.
Gyung Taek Cha’s May 28, 2001 letter cannot be considered a repudiation of his July 6, 2000 letter, as it only stated that Park,
as of that date (May 28, 2001), did not have any pending criminal cases in Korea. Not one of the letters definitely stated that
Park’s Passport No. NW0057145 was not cancelled on March 8, 2000. Gyung Taek Cha may have written a letter on Oct 7,
2002 acknowledging error in making the July 6, 2000 letter, but this came in too late and was vague in denying the
cancellation of the passport. Besides, the fact that Park had been previously deported on the strength of the July 6, 2000
letter renders the Oct 7, 2002 letter suspect. Simply put, the Korean Embassy’s letters never directly repudiated the
cancellation of Park’s Passport No. NW0057145.
 Section 10 of the Immigration Act requires non-immigrants to have (1) unexpired passports, and (2) valid passport visas. The
grant of the SIRV only relieves the alien from the necessity of securing a valid visa; it does not replace the requirement of a
valid passport. Section 2(a) of EO No. 63 declares that the SIRV entitles the alien to enter and leave the Philippines without
further documentary requirements other than valid passports or other travel documents in the nature of passports. Neither
can Park rely on the travel certificate; it was issued on Jan 16, 2001 by the Korean Embassy after Park had been charged and
indicted, and served only as authority for Park to return to Korea.
 The issuance of a new passport to Park in no way obliterated the fact that he entered the country on Oct 28, 2000 without
the requisite valid passport. Park’s new Passport was issued only on April 5, 2001, months after he had been charged and
indicted for violating our immigration laws.
 the SDO had already lapsed into finality for Park’s failure to contest it on time. The BID thus correctly denied Park’s motion to
set aside the SDO in its October 15, 2001 Resolution.
 Deported aliens are generally barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting state
Section 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines:
(15) Persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in the
discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the Commissioner of Immigration shall
not exercise his discretion in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of conviction for any crime
involving moral turpitude or for any crime penalized under sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act or on the
ground of having engaged in hoarding, black-marketing of profiteering unless such aliens have previously
resided in the Philippine immediately before his exclusion or deportation for a period of ten years or more or
are married to a native Filipino woman;
 As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting State. However, States may, upon proper
application, waive previous deportation orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-entry and readmission of
the alien do not pose a risk to the general welfare. The Commissioner of Immigration may exercise sound discretion in the
readmission of previously excluded aliens (subject to certain limitations). After Park was first deported back to Korea on the
strength of the July 6, 2000 letter, he returned to the Philippines apparently without the requisite consent of the
Commissioner of Immigration prior to his re-entry. Whether the July 6, 2000 letter was actually repudiated by the Korean
Embassy does not figure into this equation, as Park’s earlier deportation was already a fait accompli. His failure to secure the
Commissioner of Immigration’s consent/waiver prior to readmission into the deporting State leaves the Commissioner
25
sufficient ground to charge him with violation of Section 37(a)(2) of the Immigration Act, which declares that:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at
the time of entry

26