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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171951               August 28, 2009

AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated
March 13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as
follows:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon
the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz
had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house
of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise
from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the
group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said
in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is
arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far
from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off
again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a
pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7

Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on
the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory,
petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny
is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group headed to the store
of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they move to Punta. On their
way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there,
decided to have some drinks.

At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming out of
his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly
punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why
did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz
attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the
blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s
head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.

When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered.
Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the
kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy
confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.

After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE
defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his
favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum;

2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱200,000.00)
PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of
this suit.

SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20,
2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March 13,
2006.

Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED
CAUSE OF DEATH.

III.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO
"FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."

IV.

BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12

In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.

In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the trial
court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the
prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from, misread
and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.14

At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando
Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns
responsibility for Chy’s demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction.
In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s medical condition
could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held liable
for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.

The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses and
its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the defense
in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioner’s appeal with favor.

The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises
questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from
which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the trial
court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was
based on a misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant case as would
justify a departure from the established rule.

Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the
determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the
decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the
situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F.
Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner himself.
Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse consequence his own
doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this argument would be to
sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of
justice.

We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that
the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not
follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a
valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge
Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the
evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was
recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge
Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on
rebuttal.

In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on the
basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.19

The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body embalmed, well preserved.


Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.

Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left
inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms.,
dorsum of left hand.

Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right side.

No fractures noted.

Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.

Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a reddish brown
myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion of the
anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the caliber of
the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological findings show mild
fibrosis of the myocardium.

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections
show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with
some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary edema
and hemorrhages.

Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological
examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1

Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially digested food
particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20

At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum,
however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight
physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his
death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us
with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In
open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:

ATTY. TUMARU:

Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was an
occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?

A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in] the
heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was
myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself.
(Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart, usually
from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls.
This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a
heart attack will not occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this
point:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?

A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the patient
[does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of myocardial
[ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement [cannot]
cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)26

The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium27 caused by a
previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the
middle and thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion
from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:

ATTY. CALASAN:

Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting on
the nape by a bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there was
less oxygen being pumped by the heart?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir, it could be.29

In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:

ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the blow
that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?

A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.

Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?

A: It could be, sir.

Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?

A: Yes, sir.30

It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from the
beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion
then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended
act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver
wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.31lawph!l

In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the
case of United States v. Brobst32 that:

x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact
that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33

In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:

x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because
of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is
responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary
and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he
intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so
grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate
as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on
the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the
latter’s heart was in good condition.

Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it,
the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its
minimum period,40or anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14)
years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the trial court properly
imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of
earning capacity in the amount of ₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual income
at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose, the
Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:42

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the victim at the annual net
income which time of this death) would have been received

by the heirs for support.43

Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was
receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was
earning a gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of ₱127,200. But, in view
of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also
deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records are
bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual living
expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel
Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2 (₱127,200)]


= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
= ₱1,229,600

We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as stipulated by the
parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.47 However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral damages
should be reduced to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing
expenses for the wake and burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 235071, January 07, 2019

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated July 13, 2017 and the
Resolution2 dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 37385 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated November 19, 2014
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station,
finding Evangeline Patulot y Galia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
charges of child abuse.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

In two (2) separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse, defined
and penalized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,4 the
accusatory portions of which read:

(Criminal Case No. 149971)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012 in the City of Taguig, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon
one AAA,5 a three (3) year old minor, by throwing on him a boiling oil, thereby
inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and
prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Criminal Case No. 149972)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon
one BBB, a two (2) month old baby, by throwing on her a boiling oil, thereby
inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and
prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution presented CCC,
mother of minors AAA and BBB, three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; DDD, father of the minors; and Dr. Francis Jerome Vitales as its
witnesses and offered documentary evidence7 to establish the following facts:

At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes from the
clothesline outside her house. As she was about to enter the house, she was
surprised to see Patulot who was holding a casserole. Without warning, Patulot
poured the contents of the casserole - hot cooking oil - on her. CCC tried to dodge,
but to no avail. AAA and BBB, who were nearby, suddenly cried because they were
likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three
neighbors who volunteered to bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal,
Taguig City, for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South Signal,
Taguig City, to report the incident. Accompanied by barangay personnel, she went
to Patulot's house, but Patulot was not there. She instead returned to her children
at the Polyclinic. While there, she learned from a neighbor that Patulot had been
arrested. Consequently, having been assured that her children were all right and
that medication had already been given, they returned to the barangay hall, where
DDD met them. At the barangay hall, CCC noticed that her children were shivering.
Thus, she asked her neighbors to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District Hospital
while she stayed behind to give her statement. Afterwards, she proceeded to the
hospital where she was likewise treated for injuries. While she and BBB were able
to go home, AAA needed to be confined but was discharged the next morning.
Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to the Taguig Police Station where
she executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay.8

Subsequently, Dr. Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig District Hospital, who examined and
treated CCC and her children, testified that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB
would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he
incurred P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children.9

Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her. She
recounted that prior to the alleged incident, she was on her way to the market to
sell her merchandise when CCC bumped her on the arm, uttering foul words against
her. Due to the impact, Patulot's merchandise fell. Because of this, she cursed CCC
back who, in turn, merely laughed and repeated the invectives as she moved away.
Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on November 14, 2012, she was repacking
black pepper at her house when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit
hindi ka pa sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na para pareha kayong
paglamayan." Because of this, Patulot proceeded to Barangay Central Signal,
Taguig City, to file a complaint against CCC, but she was ignored. So she went
instead to the Barangay South Signal, Taguig City. But upon reaching said location,
she was apprehended by the Barangay Tanod and brought to the Barangay Hall of
South Signal, Taguig City for questioning.10

On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse and disposed of
the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the offended
party the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual damages, and
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by way of moral damages;
2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the offended
party the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual damages, and
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by way of moral damages; and
3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in each case,
conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.

SO ORDERED.11 (Italics supplied.)
The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on AAA and
BBB, her negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which left visible scars that
are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides,
the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law such that intent is not
necessary for its violator to be liable.12

In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed Patulot's conviction, but
modified the penalty imposed by the RTC in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 163 (Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y Ga1ia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum;
and
2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.13 (Italics supplied, underscoring in the original.)


According to the appellate court, there was no reason to deviate from the trial
court's findings of guilt for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand. It, however, ruled that
the RTC was amiss in finding it unnecessary to determine intent merely because the
act for which Patulot stood charged is punishable by a special law. The CA clarified
that the index of whether a crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is,
whether or not it is found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal
statute, but the legislative intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot help
Patulot's case because even if she did not intend on inflicting harm on the children,
there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus, criminal liability is incurred although the
wrongful act done be different from that which Patulot intended. For the same
reason, the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed" cannot be appreciated in Patulot's favor. Thus, Patulot must still be
held guilty of the offense charged.14

Aggrieved by the CA's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Patulot filed the
instant petition on January 4, 2018, invoking the following arguments:
I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE


PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF VIOLATING SEC. 10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SHE HAD NO INTENT TO DEGRADE AND DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC
WORTH AND DIGNITY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S CHILDREN.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY ARTICLE


49 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WITH REGARD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE
PENALTY.15
According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child
abuse. Citing our pronouncement in Bongalon v. People,16 she submits that not
every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown to be
intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished
under the RPC. Thus, in the absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her
true intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely
accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of child abuse.

Patulot adds that even considering her to have committed child abuse, the CA erred
in determining the imposable penalty for failing to apply Article 4917 of the RPC.
According to Patulot, there was error in personae as the oil that was intended for
CCC accidentally hit the children. She intended to commit physical injuries, but
ended up committing child abuse. Applying Article 49, since the penalty of the
intended crime (physical injuries) is less than the crime committed (child abuse),
the imposable penalty is that which refers to physical injuries, in its maximum
period. As to the extent of the physical injuries intended, based on the finding of
Dr. Vitales that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average
period of thirty (30) days, the offense Patulot intended to commit is only Less
Serious Physical Injuries under the first paragraph of Article 26518 of the RPC. Thus,
the proper penalty should only be arresto mayor in its maximum or four (4) months
and one (1) day to six (6) months for each count.19

We deny the petition.

Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1)
psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) unreasonable
deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure
to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same Act provides:


SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Italics supplied.)
Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the infliction
of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or
exploitation of a child. In turn, the same Section defines "physical injury" as those
that include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal
injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.

In view of these provisions, the Court, in Araneta v. People,20 discussed the distinct


acts punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated
under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a)
child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the
questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and
from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to
the development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive


term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the
phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development"
supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse;
second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be
interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not
warrant such construal.21 (Italics supplied, citations omitted.)
It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical
abuse or injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No.
7610 by establishing the essential facts above. Here, the prosecution duly proved
the following allegations in the Information charging Patulot of child abuse: (1) the
minority of both AAA and BBB; (2) the acts committed by Patulot constituting
physical abuse against AAA and BBB; and (3) the fact that said acts are punishable
under R.A. No. 7610. In particular, it was clearly established that at the time of the
incident, AAA and BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on
CCC, consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act constitutes physical
abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.

On this score, Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement


in Bongalon, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because it was not proven that
she intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA
and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said ruling, however, is misplaced.
In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged George Bongalon, petitioner
therein, of committing acts which "are prejudicial to the child's development and
which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being."22 Thus, we ruled that he can only be held liable for slight physical injuries
instead of child abuse in the absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or
"debase the 'intrinsic worth and dignity'"23 of the victim.

A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no


similar allegation that Patulot's acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot
for willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and BBB "by throwing on [them]
a (sic) boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which
acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and
development."24 Accordingly, the RTC and the CA duly found that this allegation in
the Informations was adequately established by the prosecution. It bears stressing
that Patulot did not even deny the fact that she threw boiling oil on CCC which
likewise fell on AAA and BBB. Clearly, her actuations causing physical injuries on
babies, who were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old at the time,
are undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the words of the trial court,
Patulot's acts, which practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left visible scars
that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. She
cannot, therefore, be allowed to escape liability arising from her actions.

Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA
and BBB, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on
committing physical injuries against CCC. Our pronouncement in Mabunot v.
People25 is squarely on point. There, petitioner Jester Mabunot accidentally shoved a
female minor child consequently fracturing her rib while he was engaged in a
fistfight with another boy. But he points out that the injury sustained by the minor
victim was unintentional. Thus, according to Mabunot, this single and unintended
act of shoving the child while trading punches with another can hardly be
considered as within the definition of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Assuming, therefore, that he was the cause of the injury, Mabunot insists
that he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries under Section 265 of
the RPC. The Court, however, rejected Mabunot's contention and held him liable not
for slight physical injuries, but for child abuse. We explained:
The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then,
he could not have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm
Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal.

The foregoing argument is untenable.

"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No.
7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong,
rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to
consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to harm
Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly
intended to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who
ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for
his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.26 (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as she
expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even
granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an
unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot,
therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine mentioned
in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged
against Patulot is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not.
To the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this
definition. Thus, in view of the fact that her acts were proven to constitute child
abuse under the pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held liable therefor.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are children entitled to protection
extended by R.A. No. 7610. Time and again, the Court has stressed that R.A. No.
7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive
program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV,
Section 3, paragraph 2, that "[t]he State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development."27 This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing
laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the RPC and Presidential
Decree No. 603 or The Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for
a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and
exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition
of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse
under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development."28

As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo, we find no compelling reason
to modify the same for being within the allowable range. To conform to recent
jurisprudence, however, the Court deems it proper to impose an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the actual damages in the amount of Three Thousand
Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702) and moral damages in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000), to be computed from the date of the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed


Decision dated July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated September 25, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37385
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the P3,702.00 actual damages and
P10,000.00 moral damages awarded in each Criminal Case No. 149971 and
Criminal Case No. 149972 shall be subject to an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed
the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno
Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to
his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from
the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio
Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2
feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm
of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg
with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to
the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier
was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of
San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate
(Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of
age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound


was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated
by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences.
Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27,
1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their
amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each
other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him
and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any
grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital
in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of
Dr. Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile


11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after


muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo


bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but


to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao


at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought


home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New
Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised
the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was
based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the
last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that
swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a
town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam
which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so
much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the
canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said
canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my
secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo
Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result
of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981
which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from
the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a
period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the
deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in
the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his
death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim
suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is
no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the
wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause
of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences
of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072;
People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had
not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless
enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear
from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-
696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-


The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and


headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of
muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval
referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short
onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity
and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by
laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an


onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus
has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only
a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by
the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering
the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the
very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of
Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to
the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner
is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R.
No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx


... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that
the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to


unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of


the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 186412               September 7, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant
Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, plus the costs of suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of
murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ,
thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.4

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.
Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located at C-4
Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s
store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of
Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s
body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to
catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.5 Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center.6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that
he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical
chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruz’s death in the following manner:

The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of opening the
mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic
encephalopathy – neuro transmitted – due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus,
Stage III.8

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz
at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias’
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres’ testimony on
Cruz dying of tetanus.

For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two o’clock in the morning of
January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm
around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went
home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death
upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.9

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.10

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal
to assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacorta’s
brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief12 on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief13 on October 2, 2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.

Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was adopting the
Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it
was no longer filing a supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT


GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING


CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD


ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.16

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was
Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of
January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendeja’s account of the stabbing incident is replete
with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1)
instead of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja
attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were
other people who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly,
only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it
would have been physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator,
who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran
in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder
weapon, was left at her store, although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left
embedded in Cruz’s body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are
neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from
its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.17

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts
to impugn Mendeja’s testimony, thus:

Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is incredible because she
did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court
because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.
"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second reason which is, other persons could have run
after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness Mendeja, the other
person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further,
the stabbing occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, a time when persons are expected to be
asleep in their house, not roaming the streets.

His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible
or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission
that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning
and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support appellant’s
argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and
regular customers. There was light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and
¼ meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles
from the store. The victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further,
immediately after the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional
opportunity to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.18

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate
such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled
time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and
accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive
can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story
deserves much weight.19

The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters
that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed
Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendeja’s store.

In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz’s stabber, Villacorta could
only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is
inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found
to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the
stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection,
and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."21

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23,
2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe
tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did
not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical
Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up
medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with a case of very
similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s hand. Javier was treated by
Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and
convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javier’s serious condition was
caused by tetanus infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information
was filed against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that
Javier’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr.
Meneses examined Javier’s wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could
have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after
sustaining his injury. The Court granted Urbano’s appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are


encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in
the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is
the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region
of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the
signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to
as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with
a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system damage and death.

"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only
a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by
the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering
the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.23

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking incident
and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that
Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano
that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)24

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of
Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing
and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano,
severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit
symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.
Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its
subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The
infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1âwphi1 Villacorta is guilty of slight


physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and
form part of those constituting the offense of murder.25

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals
expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to
wit:

Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left
side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those made
of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can
ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt
as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the
appellant. x x x.26

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to
the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-
appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When
such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical
injuries only.27

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical
treatment immediately after the stabbing incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical
treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was
no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical
attendance for more than nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.28

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the


Information and proved during trial.

The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk
to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets
out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the
employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and
the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real
opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.29 Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person,
treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.30

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and
we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two o’clock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out
buying bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally
unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with
a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his
body, then swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity
at all to defend himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.31 The Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its coverage cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year.32 With the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the
maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon
Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has
been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence,
we order his immediate release.

Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a
proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to
previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) moral damages is
appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.33

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has
been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate release, unless Villacorta is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125909               June 23, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.

QUISUMBING, J.

Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision 1 dated November 7, 1995, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-4810, 4811 and 4812,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted
murder, and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 for indemnity,
P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity in Crim. Case SC-
4810 for the death of Emerita Roma; reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity,
P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss of earning capacity for the death of
Ireneo Gallarte in Crim. Case SC-4811; and imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor and payment of P15,000.00 to
Flor Espinas for injuries sustained in Crim. Case SC-4812.

On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas filed three separate
informations charging appellants as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4810

That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio
Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring
and confederating with accused Edwin Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one EMERITA ROMA y
DELOS REYES, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on her chest which
caused her immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation are present. 2

Criminal Case No. 4811.

That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio
Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMOGENES FLORA @ Bodoy,
conspiring and confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually
helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one
IRENEO GALLARTE y VALERA, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on
his chest which caused his immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.1âwphi1.nêt

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation are present. 3

Criminal Case No. 4812

That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio
Silab, Barangay Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring
and confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one FLOR
ESPINAS y ROMA, hitting the latter on her shoulder, and inflicting upon her injuries
which, ordinarily, would have caused her death, thus, accused performed all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which,
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, by
the timely and able medical attendance given the said Flor Espinas y Roma, which
prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice. 4

During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. Resolving jointly
Criminal Cases Nos. SC-4810, SC-4811 and SC-4812, the trial court convicted both appellants
for the murder of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:

In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita Roma, the Court finds both
accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder qualified by treachery and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as
expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo Gallarte, the Court finds both
accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, qualified by treachery and with the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and
burial; and (c) P470,232.00 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by Flor Espinas, the Court
finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Attempted Murder and sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay
P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:

Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent altercation
with a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.

On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-
jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes
Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with his brother and co-
appellant Edwin Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a high
school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a
neighbor of the Romas, was there too.

The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by Edwin
Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right
shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit
Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si
Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a
knife at her neck, threatened to kill her before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.

The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos, Kalayaan,
Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. 6

Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin Flora at his rented
house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest
of his brother, proceeded first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but
later that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San Fernando, Camarines Sur.

The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R. Yambot, Jr., revealed the
following fatal wounds sustained by the deceased:

EMERITA ROMA

a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the angle of the axillary region
measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut inverted edges involving deep muscles, and
subcutaneous tissues and travel through both lobes of the lungs, including the great
blood vessels.

About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver. The bullet caliver 38 was
extracted from the lungs.

The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock secondary to massive
blood loss secondary to gunshot wound of the posterior chest wall.7

IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut
inverted edges involving the deep muscles, subcutaneous tissues traveling through the
anterior chest wall hitting both lobes of the lungs and each great blood vessels obtaining
the bullet fragments.

About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.

His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock secondary to massive blood
loss secondary to gunshot wound of the left arm. 8

Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Dennis Coronado. Her medical
certificate 9 disclosed that she sustained a gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x 1 cm. right supra
scapular area mid scapular line (+) contusion collar; and another gunshot wound with point of
exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid area.

Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers, Hermogenes and Edwin, before
Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution
presented two eyewitnesses, namely, (1) Rosalie Roma, daughter of one of the victims, Emerita
Roma, and (2) Flor Espinas, the injured victim. Rosalie narrated the treacherous and injurious
attack by Hermogenes Flora against the victims. Flor detailed how she was shot by him.

Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was forty-nine (49) years old at the
time of her death and was a paper mache maker, earning an average of one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos a week. He claimed that his family incurred fourteen thousand (P14,000.00)
pesos as expenses for her wake and burial.

Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was fifty-two (52) years old, a
carpenter and a substitute farmer earning one hundred (P100.00) to two hundred (P200.00)
pesos a day. Her family spent fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos for his wake and burial.

The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora, and Imelda Madera, the
common-law wife of Edwin. Appellants interposed alibi as their defense, summarized as follows:

Version of Edwin Flora:

Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes Flora is his brother. On
January 10, 1993, around 1:30 in the morning, he was at Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete,
Laguna in the house of Johnny Balticanto, sleeping with his wife. Policemen came at
said house looking for his brother Hermogenes. Replying to them that his brother was
not living there, policemen took him instead to the Municipal building of Paete and
thereafter transferred and detained him to (sic) the Municipal building of Kalayaan.

He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the cockpit at about 3:00 p.m. he
and his accused brother passed by the house of Julito Malubago. His brother
Hermogenes was courting the daughter of Julito Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he went
home but his brother stayed behind since there would be a dance party that night. 10

Version of Hermogenes Flora:


Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill Ireneo Gallarte and Emerita
Roma and shot Flor Espina on January 10, 1993 at about 1:30 in the morning of Silab,
Longos Kalayaan Laguna.

On said date, he was very much aslept (sic) in the house of his sister Shirley at Sitio
Bagumbayan, Longos, Kalayaan. From the time he slept at about 8:00 in the evening to
the time he woke up at 6:00 in the morning, he had not gone out of her sister's house.
He knew the victims even before the incident and he had no severe relation with them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993, Imelda Madera came to their
house and told him that his brother Edwin was picked-up by the policemen the night
before. Taken aback, his sister told him to stay in the house while she would go to the
municipal hall to see their brother Edwin. Thereafter, his aunt and sister agreed that he
should go to Bicol to inform their parents of what happened to Edwin. 11

Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12

As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and
attempted murder. Appellants now raise this sole assigned error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS


DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR
IDENTITIES AND GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED.

At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both appellants have been positively
identified. However, they challenge the court's finding that they failed to prove their alibi
because they did not establish that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the
crime scene. According to the trial court, by Hermogenes' own admission, the house of his
sister Shirley, where appellants were allegedly sleeping, was only one (1) kilometer away from
Sitio Silab, where the offenses allegedly took place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns
only the plausibility of the appellants' alibi and the credibility of the witnesses who identified
them as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1)
he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. 13 The defense of alibi and
the usual corroboration thereof are disfavored in law since both could be very easily
contrived. 14 In the present case, appellants' alibi is patently self-serving. Although Edwin's
testimony was corroborated by his common-law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive
testimonies of eyewitnesses and surviving victims who contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi
becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the
accused himself and his immediate relative or relatives. 15 Appellants' defense of alibi should
have been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. 16 Said uncorroborated alibi
crumbles in the face of positive identification made by eyewitnesses. 17

In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not categorically and clearly identified
by the witnesses of the prosecution. They claim that the testimonies of the said witnesses were
not entitled to credence. They assail the credibility of two eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma
and Flor Espinas, because of the alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies. For instance,
according to appellants, Rosalie Roma testified she was in the dance hall when the gunshots
were heard, and that she was dancing in the middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot
Emerita Roma, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,

Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo Gallarte, Emerita Roma
and Flor Espinas?

A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)

Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot these persons while you
were dancing?

A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18

However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,

Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas
when Hermogenes Flora shot at them?

A They were beside each other.

Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?

A Because they were standing beside the fence and I was only seated near them,
sir. 19 (Emphasis ours.)

On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her credibility or renders her entire
testimony worthless. Nothing here erodes the effectiveness of the prosecution evidence. What
counts is the witnesses' admitted proximity to the appellants. Was she close enough to see
clearly what the assailant was doing? If so, is there room for doubt concerning the accuracy of
her identification of appellant as one of the malefactors?

Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas was focused on the dance
floor, it was improbable for her to have seen the assailant commit the crimes. On cross-
examination, said witness testified that while it was true she was watching the people on the
dance floor, nonetheless, she also looked around (gumagala) and occasionally looked behind
her and she saw both appellants who were known to her. 20 Contrary to appellants' contention
that Flor did not have a sufficient view to identify the assailants, the trial court concluded that
Flor was in a position to say who were in the party and to observe what was going on. On this
point, we concur with the trial court.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve
respect, for it had the opportunity to observe first-hand the deportment of witnesses during
trial. 21 Furthermore, minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. 22 Inconsistencies in the testimony
of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 23 Such minor
flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized
falsities.1avvphi1

Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased because they are relatives
of the victim Emerita Roma. However, unless there is a showing of improper motive on the part
of the witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim
does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of credit. On the contrary, their
natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating other
persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24

Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses in
pointing to the Flora brothers as the perpetrators of the crime. There is no history of animosity
between them. Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas were merely innocent bystanders when hit by
gunfire. Where eyewitnesses had no grudge against the accused, their testimony is
credible. 25 In the absence of ulterior motive, mere relationship of witnesses to the victim does
not discredit their testimony. 26

Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present case, when Hermogenes
Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead,
he became liable for Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability
on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended. 27

We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery. In order for
treachery to exist, two conditions must concur namely: (1) the employment of means, methods
or manner of execution which would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory
act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously chosen by the offender. 28 When Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot
Emerita and Ireneo, both were helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders, not
simply homicides since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to
conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of attempted murder of Flor
Espinas.1âwphi1.nêt

Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes? For the murder
of Ireneo Gallarte, was there conspiracy between appellants? For conspiracy to exist, it is not
required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused and co-accused had the
same purpose and were united in execution. 29 Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but
his conduct indicated cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence
unquestionably gave encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a
co-conspirator. 30 To hold an accused guilty as a co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it must
be shown that he had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy. 31 Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was correctly
appreciated by the trial court, viz.:

Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the crime. He
stayed beside his brother Hermogenes, right behind the victims while the dance party
drifted late into the night till the early hours of the morning the following day. All the
while, he and his brother gazed ominously at Ireneo Gallarte, like hawks waiting for their
prey. And then Edwin's flick of that lighted cigarette to the ground signaled Hermogenes
to commence shooting at the hapless victims. If ever Edwin appeared acquiescent
during the carnage, it was because no similar weapon was available for him. And he fled
from the crime scene together with his brother but not after violently neutralizing any
obstacle on their way. While getting away, Edwin grabbed Rosalie Roma and poked a
knife at her neck when the latter hysterically shouted "si Bodoy, Si Bodoy," in allusion to
Hermogenes Flora, whom she saw as the gunwielder. All told, Edwin, by his conduct,
demonstrated unity of purpose and design with his brother Hermogenes in committing
the crimes charged. He is thus liable as co-conspirator. 32

However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and
the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no
one else. For acts done outside the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual
perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:

. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-
conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended
crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano
Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing
away when shot.

To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of
Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor
Espinas caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and sentenced to each suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Ireneo Gallarte
in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P14,000.00 compensatory damages for
the wake and burial; and P470,232.00 representing loss of income without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of
Emerita Roma and the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas. For the MURDER of
EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Emerita Roma in the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial, and P619,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For the
ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay
P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries.

(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma and the
attempted murder of Flor Espinas.

Costs against appellants.


SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177218               October 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,


vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ
sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782
and RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information3 for parricide contained the following
allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening
at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of
the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood,
measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby]
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant
inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the
evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood,
one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the
damage and prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6


When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges
of parricide7 and slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon
manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.9 During the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar
Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family
was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur;
and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.10

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without
the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of
Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but
their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With
Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them
with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do
anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting
Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in
Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the
left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness.
Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told
appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then
told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have
to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the
junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and
because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,
appellant brought his son back to their house.

Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His
body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate
occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them
and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them.
During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on
September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information
that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife
could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as
his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After
whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and
frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga
City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their
house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in
breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him
say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in
vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just
bring Noemar back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of
the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital
more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers
from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after
15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.11 Thereafter,
appellant surrendered voluntarily.12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial
court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant
since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales,
beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised
Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall
be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated September
21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated
August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight
Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.18

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY


BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.19

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies
battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him,
Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth
in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they
would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and
complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during
his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that
Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of
tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or
guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must
not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is
incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing
the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family
dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This
was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace.
Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look
for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was
motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil
intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his
head, face and legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he
was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His
subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was
nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible
parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline
Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended
to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.20 Here,
there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries,
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired.
Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit.
This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence.
While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a
death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not
sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that
Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to
lend credence to his contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict
with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in
his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s
testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in
this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant
committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."21

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe
beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar
dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then
buried him the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.
Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were
whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the
house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant
delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a
tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much
for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately
after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While
Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be
considered.23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar
during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under
oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband.
These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so
Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor
of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the
barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the
police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"25 which is
the essence of voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they
were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his
face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the
acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce
the death of the victim."26

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid."28

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However,
even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the
exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating
circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.
With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of
death on appellant was thus proper.29

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries


The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by
their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit
on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.30 Maria
corroborated her son’s testimony.31

Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of
Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions
with hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which
could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2)
abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been
sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does
he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with
medication, the injuries would heal in a week.33

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was
beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and
supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries
sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly
meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime,
the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant
the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting
Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition,
an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the
shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially
Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons


or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that
the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as
these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired
by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act
which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in
order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is
the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police
officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused
failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill.
It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined
where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an
attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where
the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are
unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held
him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became
impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the
murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible
to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible
for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows
out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his
criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public
requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing
intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking
that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house.
The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make
this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot
rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators
and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the


crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if
done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send
a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However,
unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The
lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention,
the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal
by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until
such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for
an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as
an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge —
that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized
by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of


respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger
and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162540               July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated
December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside
the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro
Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals
the events that transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount
of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l.,
Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in
the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch,
who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the
subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the
bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of
a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto
and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the
matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for
her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from
company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in
his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown
woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted.
He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the
identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check
bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted
the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills
were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's
plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan
did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go
shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep
and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby
Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00
marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon
returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife
of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997,
but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time
before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former
and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had
no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of
Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the
NBI agents arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June
30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on
the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia)
could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she
agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where
Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby
Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to
wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca
gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto


mayor medium.

(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.8

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of
the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner,
as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged
to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with
intent to gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact
that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment
from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to
be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner
is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article
59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.
Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense
has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was
not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to
produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
xxxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of
personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing
of] personal property of another without the latter’s consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by
one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony
that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check
was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving
the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with
cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of


Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor,
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

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