Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Intelligent
Investor
Chapter
3:
A
Century
of
Stock-‐Market
History:
The
Level
of
Stock
Prices
in
Early
1972
• The
intelligent
investor
should
have
a
solid
understanding
of
stock-‐market
history
• Price
levels
and
their
relationship
to
earnings
and
dividends
paid
are
of
paramount
importance
• This
background
information
gives
the
investor
the
ability
to
gauge
the
attractiveness
of
the
current
market
level
• A
chart
is
displayed
of
the
Dow
Jones
Industrial
Average
and
the
S&P
500
from
1871
through
1972
• In
only
two
of
the
nine
decades
shown
did
corporate
earnings
decrease
• There
were
no
decades
where
average
dividend
yields
decreased
• Growth
rates
varied
significantly
in
many
of
the
decades
studied
• Valuation
levels
and
dividend
yield
also
fluctuated
wildly
• The
S&P
traded
at
6.3
times
earnings
in
1949
and
rose
to
22.9
times
earnings
in
1961
• Dividend
yield
was
7%
in
1949
and
3%
in
1961
• Graham
ultimately
concluded
that
the
market
was
expensive
in
1972
for
two
reasons
• The
price
to
earnings
ratio
of
18.0
was
high
by
historical
standards
• The
yield
available
on
common
stocks
was
less
than
half
of
the
available
yield
on
high
quality
bonds
• Based
on
his
conclusion
that
the
market
was
overvalued
he
recommended
the
following
course
of
action
• No
borrowing
to
buy
or
hold
securities
• No
increase
in
the
proportion
of
funds
held
in
common
stocks
• A
reduction
in
common
stock
holdings
where
needed
to
bring
it
down
to
a
maximum
of
50%
of
the
total
portfolio
• Commentary
on
Chapter
3
• “You’ve
got
to
be
careful
if
you
don’t
know
where
your
going,
‘cause
you
might
not
get
there.”
–
Yogi
Berra
• Graham’s
warnings
of
dangerous
valuation
levels
in
1972
proved
to
prophetic
as
the
market
declined
37%
during
the
bear
market
of
1973-‐1974
• He
believed
that
the
intelligent
investor
must
never
forecast
the
future
by
extrapolating
the
past
• During
the
bull
market
of
the
1990’s
many
of
these
lessons
were
completely
forgotten
§ Forecasters
argued
that
because
stocks
had
returned
7%
on
average
since
1802
that
investors
should
expect
that
return
regardless
of
what
level
they
purchased
common
stocks
§ Some
claimed
that
stocks
“always”
beat
bonds
over
a
30
year
period
and
as
a
result
could
be
bought
without
paying
attention
to
valuations
as
long
as
the
investor
planned
to
hold
forever
• The
market
crash
in
the
early
2000’s
proved
that
valuation
levels
always
matter
and
should
not
be
ignored
• The
problem
with
extrapolating
past
market
returns
is
that
it
includes
an
inherent
“survivorship
bias”
§ This
means
that
many
past
companies
went
bust
and
are
not
accounted
for
when
analyzing
historical
market
returns
§ This
leaves
analysts
with
a
hand
full
of
exceptional
companies
that
have
survived
to
use
as
data
points
§ For
every
Coca
Cola
there
are
twenty
companies
from
previous
eras
that
are
no
longer
in
existence
• Because
the
profits
that
companies
can
earn
are
finite
the
price
that
investors
are
willing
to
pay
must
also
be
finite
• If
future
returns
are
guaranteed
to
match
successful
past
returns
investors
would
bid
up
stocks
to
unsustainable
levels
• Extrapolating
rosy
historical
returns
into
the
future
is
illogical
and
dangerous
according
to
Graham
• The
performance
of
the
stock
market
relies
on
three
factors
§ Real
growth
(the
rise
of
companies
earnings
and
dividends)
§ Inflationary
growth
(the
general
rise
of
prices
throughout
the
economy)
§ Speculative
growth
or
decline
(any
increase
or
decrease
in
the
investing
public’s
appetite
for
stocks)
• Corporate
earnings
per
share
have
grown
1.5%
to
2%
annually
• As
we
discussed
in
the
last
chapter
3%
is
a
suitable
inflation
estimate
• Average
dividend
yield
on
the
S&P
500
is
currently
1.7%
• By
totaling
these
three
percentages
the
investor
can
find
the
expected
return
for
common
stocks
• Currently
the
expected
return
for
common
stocks
would
be
6.7%
or
3.7%
after
inflation
• The
only
constant
in
markets
is
that
they
continue
to
surprise
investors
• It
is
therefore
extremely
important
for
investors
to
be
humble
and
realize
that
their
forecasts
and
projections
are
far
from
certain
• In
financial
markets
the
worse
the
future
looks
the
better
it
usually
turns
out
to
be