Cases for Family Code

Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals

In Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that under the Civil Code, there can be no recovery of moral damages
for a breach of promise to marry However, there can be an action for the recovery of actual damages, and if there be seduction (as
defined in Arts. 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code), moral damages may be recovered.

Republic v. Molina

Guidelines in interpreting and applying Art. 36, to wit:

(a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the
existence of the marriage and against its nullity.

(b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(1) sufficiently proven by experts; and

(2) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) alleged in the complaint;
(4) medically or clinically identified;

(c) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration of the marriage,’’ although the manifestation need
not be perceivable at such time.

(d) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable, although the incurability may be relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. Furthermore, the incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not to those not related to
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

(e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and
Arts. 220-225, same Code, in regard to parents and their children. Such non-compliance must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.

(g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling, should be given great respect by our courts.

(h) The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor- General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General and the fiscal shall submit such certification to the court within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is submitted for resolution.

In the case at bar, finding that there was no psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent-husband but more a “difficulty’’ if
not outright “refusal’’ or “neglect’’ in the performance of some marital duties, and that the evidence merely showed that the parties
could not get along with each other, the Supreme Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage fi led by petitioner-
wife.

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda

Under the Family Code, both men and women need only commit one act of sexual infidelity to fall under Article 55 (8).
In Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, the Supreme Court said that a criminal conviction of concubinage is not necessary, only preponderance
of evidence. In fact, a civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal
action.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

There are 2 more grounds not found in Article 56:

1. Death of either party during the pendency of the case (Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio)

2. Reconciliation of the spouses during the pendency of the case (Article 66 (1))

In Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio, the lawyer wanted to proceed with legal separation despite of the death of one of the parties. The Supreme
Court denied it since the primary purpose of legal separation is bed and board separation while the effect on their property relations
is merely incidental.

Araneta vs. Concepcion

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.

This is the cooling-off period – can only try the petition for legal separation after 6 months from filing. The Supreme Court has
interpreted Article 58 to mean that there shall be no hearing on the main issue but the court may hear incidental issues.

In the case of Araneta vs. Concepcion, the Supreme Court allowed the court to hear the issue regarding the custody of the children
even if the 6-month period had not yet elapsed. Professor Balane didn’t like the ruling in this case. According to him, what are you
going to talk about if you don’t go to the main case?

Ocampo vs. Florenciano

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession judgment. In Ocampo vs. Florenciano, the
Supreme Court said that legal separation cannot be granted on the basis of the wife’s admission alone. There must be other proof.

Goitia vs. Campos Rueda

The person obliged to render support may fulfill his obligation in 2 ways at his option:

1. Paying the amount fixed or

2. Receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support

This 2nd option cannot be availed of when there is a moral or legal obstacle. For example, a husband in supporting his wife, cannot
choose the 2nd option if he had been maltreating her (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda).

PSBA vs. CA

Article 2180 is applicable to both academic and non-academic institutions.

1. Academic institutions – the liability attaches to the teacher

2. Non-academic institutions – the liability attaches to the head of the establishment (Amadora vs. CA)
If a student is injured and the persons who caused the injury were not students, Arts. 218, 219 of the Family Code and Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code are not applicable. The school is liable in such a case based on the contract between the student and the school. The
school is supposed to provide the student adequate protection (PSBA vs. CA).

Republic v. Orbecido

In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effe cts of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. (Fujiki v. Marinay G.R. No. 196049,
June 26 2013)

Niñal vs. Bayadog

“Annulment of marriage is in the nature of a court proceeding with the end view of severing the marital bond between husband and
wife. It is applicable only to voidable marriages, and is availed of in a situation where the marriage is valid from the beginning but
can be annulled on various grounds by the court, specifically provided for under Article 45 of the Family Code. A petition for
annulment of marriage is applicable to marriages that are voidable. Under Philippine law, a voidable marriage is one that “is valid
until otherwise declared by the court.” (Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000)

Cariño v. Cariño

In Cariño v. Cariño, the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held
that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.(G.R. No. 132529)

Renato Reyes So vs. Valera

No, lack of affection or love is not a ground to file a petition for nullity against your husband. The Supreme Court held in the case of
Renato Reyes So vs. Valera, “To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or
where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.” (G.R. No. 150677, 05 June 2009)

Santos v. Court of Appeals

“Psychological incapacity refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.” (Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 310 Phil. 21 (1995))

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

1.Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
2.Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the ma rriage; and

3.Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if I were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. (Santos
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 310 Phil. 21 (1995))

Mere inability to physically comply with his marital obligations does not necessarily mean that your husband is psychologically
incapacitated. The psychologically incapacity refers to the mental incapacity that prevents the party from complying with his basic
marital covenants. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 310 Phil. 21 (1995))

Marable vs. Marable

No, personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. (Marable vs. Marable, G.R. No.
178741, 17 January 2011)

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA

Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. (Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, G.R. No.
108763, 13 February 1997)

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te

Either party, even the psychologically incapacitated, can file the action. (Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,
G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009)

Fujiki v. Marinay

Furthermore, in cases of bigamous marriages involving foreign spouses, the first spouse who is a Filipino can have the decree of
divorce of the second marriage of his spouse to a foreigner be recognized in the Philippines.

“When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.” (Fujiki v. Marinay G.R. No. 196049, June 26 2013)

Marcos vs. Marcos

There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. “(Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No.
136490. 19 October 2000)
Marable vs. Marable

It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Marable vs. Marable, G.R. No. 178741, 17 January 2011)

It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. (Marable vs. Marable, G.R. No. 178741, 17 January 2011)

Villalon vs. Villalon

Infidelity is not enough per se to illustrate or establish that the guilty party is psychologically incapacitated.

“It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.” (Villalon vs. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, 18 November 2005)

Toring vs. Toring

“To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.” (G.R. No.
165321, 03 August 2010)

Tuason vs. Tuason

In cases of annulment and declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, collusion between parties is prohibited. (Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines)

This prohibition is due to the fact that “our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
breakup of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.” (Tuason vs. Tuason, G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996)

Albano cases

Arañes vs. Judge Occiano

The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined in their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

Niñal, et al. vs. Bayadog

From a reading of the law and the decision of the Supreme Court in Niñal vs. Bayadog, the cohabitation of the spouses in a marriage
without a license must be a continuous one, which means that it must be for an uninterrupted period of five (5) years immediately
prior to the day of the celebration of the marriage.

A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy

Despite the fact that the judge who solemnized the marriage was a resident of a municipality different from the place where he was
serving as a judge, and yet solemnized it at his residence, the Supreme Court still upheld the validity of the marriage because the
requirement of authority to solemnize marriage is only a formal requisite of marriage, not an essential one. Any defect in any of the
formal requisites does not render the marriage void, it is valid but without prejudice to the three-fold responsibility of the judge who
solemnized the marriage, like criminal, civil and administrative liability. The judge was fined.

Pilapil vs. Somera

Once divorce has been obtained, the Filipina can no longer be prosecuted for adultery by her former husband because the marriage
bond has already been severed. He has no more personality to sue her.

Republic vs. Obrecido

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to re-marry.

Choa vs. Choa

Even if taken as true, the alleged lack of attention to their children, immaturity and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality,
singly or collectively, does not constitute “psychological incapacity.” The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that he
and his wife could not get along with each other. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes “psychological incapacity.”

Dedel vs. CA

Santos vs. CA: “psychological incapacity’’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.

Santos vs. CA

“Psychological incapacity” must be characterized by:

(a) gravity;

(b) juridical antecedence;

(c) incurability.

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would not be capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Tsoi vs. CA

No sex for 10 months. Respondent unwilling to have sex with his wife. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to “psychological incapacity’’ than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to “psychological
incapacity.’’ Thus, the prolonged refusal of the spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
“psychological incapacity.”

Velasco vs. Velasco

It must be observed that the Supreme Court, in Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Quezon City, silently agreed with the Regional Trial
Court on the pari delicto rule. In this case, the lower court voided the marriage even as it recognized their pari delicto. At any rate, it
was not the issue as the main case became final and executory in the lower court. But, an examination of Article 36 of the Family
Code shows that if “any party” to the marriage is not capacitated to comply with his or her duties to the marriage bond, then, the
marriage can be declared void on the ground of “psychological incapacity.’’

Republic vs CA

“The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.”

Antonio vs. Reyes

The lies attributed to the wife were not adopted as false pretenses to induce Leonilo into marriage with her. They indicate a failure
on her part to distinguish truth from fiction or at least abide by the truth. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning and the corresponding
obligations to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.

Roberto Domingo vs. CA

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a defense. (Article 39,
Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contradicting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. (Article 40, Family Code).

Terre vs. Terre

The reason behind the rule that even if the marriage is void, there is a need to have it declared void is because of the fact that the
parties to the marriage cannot decide for themselves the invalidity of their marriage. This is especially so that no less than the
Constitution seeks to preserve the sanctity of the marriage, it being the foundation of the family.

Donato vs. Luna

It was ruled that assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by the petitioner, the fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity is so declared can it be held as void.
So long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Mercado vs. Tan

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent marriage may be celebrated. If the second
marriage is celebrated without first obtaining such judicial declaration the violator is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if
the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”

Morigo vs. People

In a nutshell, what is contemplated by the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code as the void marriage that must be declared
void before a party may contract a subsequent marriage is one that must exist although it is void. For, even if it is void it is a legal
impediment to marry, such that if there is no prior declaration of its nullity, a person cannot contract a subsequent marriage,
otherwise, he can be charged with and convicted of bigamy.

Republic vs. Nolasco

Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is already
dead.

While the Court understands the need of respondent’s young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still, the requirements of the
law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirement of the law, his petition for judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract.

Manuel vs. People

There must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, otherwise, the spouse who contracted the second
marriage may be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a person for bigamy
if he contracts a second marriage before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

Sarao vs. Guevarra

The incapacity for copulation was only temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment. The supervening
sterility of the wife is not a ground for annulment because the test of impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to
copulate.

Sison vs. Te Lai Li

While it is true that a marriage which is voidable by reason of violence or intimidation is susceptible of ratification by cohabitation,
such cohabitation, must be more than living together in the same house or even occupying the same bed. It must be voluntary living
together as husband and wife under the same roof, including sexual relations.

Anaya vs. Palaroan

Further, the intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that constitute fraud to those above enumerated is clearly shown by
the interdiction that: “No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as
will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.’’
Reynolds vs. Reynolds

That a woman who has not only submitted to the embraces of another man, but who also bears in her womb the fruit of such
illicit intercourse, has, during the period of her gestation, incapacitated herself from making and executing a valid contract of
marriage with a man who takes her as his wife in ignorance of her condition and on the faith of representations that she is chaste
and virtuous.

Tuason vs. CA

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in the annulment of marriage is to determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.

Espiritu, et al. vs. CA

The law says that the court shall provide for appropriate visitation rights to the other parent. This is true where the custody of the
children has been awarded to one of the parents. The parties may even agree on the visitation rights, but in case of disagreement, it
is incumbent upon the court to provide for the same in the judgement annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void.

Legal Separation

Bugayong vs. Ginez

Having sexual intercourse with one’s spouse is condonation of acts constituting ground for legal separation –– adultery.

The court ruled against the plaintiff saying that with the conduct of the latter in sleeping together with his wife despite his belief that
his wife has committed acts of infidelity deprives him of any action for legal separation because he actually condoned said sexual
infidelity and this comes within the restriction of Art. 56, par. 1 of the Family Code.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The
Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation, and in
Art. 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Matubis vs. Praxedes

Art. 100 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 57, Family Code) provides that separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown by evidence, the plaintiff has
consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband in writing. This stipulation in writing is an unbridled license she gave
her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
Sabalones vs. CA

Pending the appointment of an administrator, the wife may be allowed to continue with the administration of the mass of
properties. Under Article 124, Family Code, there is a grant of joint administration, but when an action for legal separation is filed,
the court may appoint one of the spouses as administrator or a third person may be appointed, if no formal agreement is entered to
that effect.

Obligation and Rights of H&W

Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo

While the obligation of the spouses to live together is mandated by law, the same cannot, however be compelled by any proceeding
in court. The reason is that, the act of living together is a mere voluntary act of the spouses. Hence, if one of the spouses leaves the
conjugal dwelling, the other spouse cannot go to court and seek for an order to compel such spouse to return. A writ of habeas
corpus will not even issue to compel a spouse to live with the other.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mere process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority
and is best left to the man and woman’s choice.

Tenchavez vs. Escaño

Spouse who gives dishonor to the family is liable for damages.

Wife’s act is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. There was failure to comply with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without justifiable reasons. The action can be based on Article 72 of the Family Code since the act of the woman gave
dishonor to the family. The law says:

“When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or
injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.”

Heirs of Raymundo Bañas vs. Heirs of Bibiano Bañas

Raymundo was not an acknowledged natural child of Bibiano on the basis of a letter with a complimentary ending “su padre,”
especially if the full context of the letter is to be taken into consideration. It was not considered as an indubitable acknowledgment
of paternity. It is a mere indication of paternal solitude.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. de Batocael

It having been proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.

Spouses Ricky and Anita Wong, et al. vs. IAC

Property acquired during the marriage, even if spouses are separated, is presumed to be conjugal.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she
borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper
sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband, and when the
wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not
bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina’s personal obligations to them.

Laperal vs. Katigbak

To reach both kinds of property, it is not necessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife Evelina. Where the husband alone is liable, no
action lies against the wife, and she is not a necessary party-defendant.

Ferrer vs. GSIS

Retirement Benefits are payments or services provided after reaching the age of retirement or upon withdrawal from one’s position
or occupation and are separate and distinct from the salaries received. It was held that retirement benefits are not conjugal
properties but belong to the beneficiary designated by the deceased member.

Carlos vs. Abelardo

The term “benefit” is the crucial point in determining whether the properties of the husband and wife are liable for obligations
contracted prior to or during the marriage. The burden of proof that the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family of the
debtor lies in the creditor.

Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon

The sale of the land is voidable (now void) since it was made by the wife without the consent of the husband subject to annulment
by the husband during the marriage, because the wife, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely
had an inchoate right to the lands sold.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works

Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal
circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that
the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the code took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws.

Margaret Maxey, et al. vs. The Court of Appeals

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 (now Article 147, Family Code) codified the law established through judicial
precedents, but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife
relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.
Juaniza vs. Jose

What is contemplated in Art.144 of the Civil Code (now Art. 147, Family Code) is that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage to Rosalia Arroyo and; therefore, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney.

Agapay vs. CA

The property cannot be considered property governed by the law on co-ownershipp since Erlinda failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland. It should therefore belong to the conjugal partnership of Miguel and
Carlina. Under Art. 148, Family Code, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.

Tumlos vs. Sps. Mario Fernandez

Under Article 148, Family Code, only the properties acquired by both parties thru their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by Article 148, Family Code in contrast to Article 147, Family Code which states that the efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry.

FAMILY

Guerrero vs. RTC

As early as two decades ago, it has been held in Gayon vs. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104, that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as
members of the same family, does not comprehend brothers or sisters-in-law; hence, there is no need to exert efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present case.

Vda vs. CA

Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

Silva vs. CA

There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships.
Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the
legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well.

Modequillo vs. Breva

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, “The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable.” It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Andal and Dueñas vs. Macaraig

The boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of said husband and his wife, he having been born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. That presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. The fact that the wife has
committed adultery cannot overcome this presumption.

Jao vs. CA

There is now almost a universal scientific agreement that the blood-grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, that is, the
fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents, but if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when blood type of the mother and that
of the alleged father after it had been cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

Concepcion vs. CA

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. (Baluyut vs. Baluyut, 186 SCRA 504; Art. 2035, NCC). Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.

Benitez vs. CA

The enumeration is exclusive as no one, except the father and the children of the father, can impugn the legitimacy of a child. The
relatives cannot do so.

Liyao vs. Liyao

The action filed by Corazon for the recognition of the boy as an illegitimate child of William is in reality an action to impugn the boy’s
status as a legitimate child of Ramon. It may be true that Corazon and Ramon were no longer living together at the time of the boy’s
conception but such fact is just a ground to impugn the status of the boy as a legitimate child of Ramon. Unfortunately, the law does
not give the boy the right to impugn his own legitimate status. Only Ramon, or his heirs in case he dies before the birth of the boy, or
before the lapse of the period to file it, or after filing it, may file and maintain the action to impugn the status of the boy as his
legitimate child.

Bernabe vs. Alejo

The right granted by Article 285 to illegitimate children who were minors at the time of the death of the putative parent to bring an
action for compulsory recognition within 4 years from attaining the age of majority, is a substantive right that vests from the time of
the illegitimate child’s birth. Therefore, the Family Code did not impair or take away the right of Adrian to file the present petition
for recognition despite the death of his putative father.
De Jesus vs. De Jesus

Petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father. The law established the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. In an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus which the law does not allow. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife.

Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.

Rodriguez vs. CA

The Family Code now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. (Art. 175, Family Code).

De Aparicho vs. Paraguya

The plaintiff ’s filiation of being a legitimate child is proven by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register. However, the court
finds it unnecessary to determine her paternity. In the last will and testament, which was duly probated, Fr. Lumain not only
acknowledged Consolacion as his natural daughter but he, in fact, designated her as his only heir.

Fernandez vs. CA

Petitioner cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the respondent in the baptism. They are far from proof that the
private respondent is the father of the child. The baptismal certificate naming respondent as the father has scant evidentiary value.
There is no showing that he participated in its preparation. The certificates of live birth of petitioner identifying private respondent
as their father are also not competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. The private respondent had no hand in the
preparation of the said certificates.

People vs. Tumimpad

The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father, or any one of many others of the same blood type,
may have been the father of the child.

Cabatana vs. CA

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or
similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law. This only shows the very
high standard of proof that a child must present to establish filiation.
Potenciano vs. Reynoso

The way to prove the filiation of illegitimate children is provided by the Family Code under Articles 172 and 175. The due recognition
of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

Marquino, et al. vs. IAC

Article 175, however, is not applicable if the father died while the illegitimate child is a minor and that he acquired the right to go to
court to establish filiation under the Civil Code. For, while the Family Code provides for retroactivity (Art. 256), yet, the retroactive
effect does not apply if vested rights would be impaired. Let us examine the following case for purposes of clarifying the above-cited
rule.

Santos, Sr. vs. CA

“The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in
Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to
the extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.’”

Luna vs. CA

The Supreme Court ruled that the manifestation of the child that she would kill herself if she should be taken away from her
grandparents would make the execution of the judgment unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code (now Art. 213,
FC) provides that, in all questions relating to the child, his welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the child can
override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since the very life and existence of the
minor is at stake and the child is in an age where she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect,
enforce, and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical and
moral, as well as intellectual development.

Unson III vs. Hon. Navarro and Araneta

It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that all controversies regarding the custody of a minor, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, education, social, and moral welfare of the child, taking into account the social and moral situations of the contending
parents. The Court finds no difficulty in this case, the custody of the child cannot be awarded to the wife who might create an
immoral influence over the child’s moral and social outlook at her tender age.

Tonog vs. Daguimol

While it is true that the right to custody springs from the exercise of parental authority, and in case of an illegitimate child the
mother alone has parental authority, the mother may be deprived of her custody if such will be for the best interest of the child. And
while a child less than 7 years old may not be separated from the mother, the mother may be deprived of custody if there is a
compelling reason. In the case at bar, it will be for the best interest of Gardin Faith that she remains with Edgar during the pendency
of the guardianship proceeding.

Laxamana vs. Laxamana

The child, if over 7 years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the Court is not bound by
such choice if the parent chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as the social and moral situations of the
opposing parents.

Espiritu, et al. vs. CA

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling reasons.” If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount, but
again, the Court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the Court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the
other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. “Her mother hugging and kissing a ‘bad’ man who
lived in their house and worked for her father.”

Gualberto vs. CA

Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a
prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have
distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.

Santos vs. CA

The father should be given the custody of the child. The law vests on the father and mother joint authority over the persons of their
common children. (Art. 211, Family Code). In the absence or death of either parent, the parent’s present shall continue exercising
parental authority. (Art. 212, Family Code). Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

PSBA, et al. vs. CA

It has been stressed, that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable. However, does the appellate court’s failure to consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability?

It does not necessarily follow, for it was said that when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos

Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of the school was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Cuadra vs. Monfort

The culprit’s father is not liable, for he could not have prevented the damage. The child was at school, where she ought to be under
the supervision of the school authorities. The record of the case shows that no suit was brought against the school authorities, like
the teacher-in-charge. Had this case happened today, and a suit was filed against the school, its administrators and teachers, the
latter would have been liable, regardless of the nature of the school.

Elcano vs. Hill

The reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Art. 2180 is that, it is their obligation to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. The marriage of a minor does not
relieve its parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation.

Libi vs. IAC

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box.

Tamargo vs

Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at that time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.

Sombong vs. CA

The Court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or any person, but should, in the consideration of the facts,
leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.”

No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.

Ilano vs. CA is a reverse of the case of Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar (102 Phil. 108). While the Supreme Court said in Roces that, the
unsigned birth certificate of the child is inadmissible as proof of filiation, yet, in Ilano it was said that, even if the birth certificate was
unsigned, it was admissible in evidence. The reason in Ilano was that, the father was the one who supplied the data in the record of
the birth that he is the father of the child. In Roces, it was the mother alone who supplied the data that Roces was the father of the
child.

If the child was born under the Civil Code andthe putative father died when he was a minor, he has a period of 4 years from the
attainment of the age of majority within while to ask for recognition. (Art. 285, NCC). This is a vested right which cannot be washed
ways by the new law. (Tayag vs. CA).

Leonardo vs. CA, The rule is that an illegitimate child uses the surname of the mother. Not even mandamus could compel the Local
Civil Registrar to register the child under the name of the father. Even if the father admits paternity, still, the child should carry the
surname of the mother. This has always been the rule.
Wang vs. Cebu City Civil Registrar, An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as
such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in
a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.