DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO : SURVEY OF 2012 SC DECISIONS IN POLITICAL LAW

SURVEY OF 2012 SC DECISIONS IN
POLITICAL LAW
By: Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT
UP’s fraud, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
Q – UP through its President entered into a contract for the construction of the extension building and renovation of the College of
Arts & Sciences Building. It however did not pay a billing from the contractor. After trial, judgment was rendered ordering UP to pay,
hence, it appealed from the judgment. The RTC denied due course to the appeal, hence, upon motion of the plaintiff, a writ of
execution was issued. It assailed the denial of due course to its appeal at the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
certiorari upon finding that the notice of appeal had been filed late. In the meantime, monies of UP were garnished. A motion to
release the garnished funds was filed which was granted but UP filed a motion for reconsideration, hence, the court issued an order
holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writs of execution and all ensuing garnishment citing Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court which provides that the pendency of a timely motion for reconsideration stays the execution of the judgment. However, the
RTC later on authorized the release of the garnished funds of UP, but the bank refused to release the funds. In the meantime, UP
challenged the garnishment of the funds, citingDepartment of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104269,
November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 693 and Section 84 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 to the effect that “revenue funds shall not be paid
out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority;” and that
the order of garnishment clashed with the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280,
October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342 to the effect that the funds belonging to the UP were public funds. Is the contention correct?
Explain.
Answer: Yes. The UP was founded to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional
and technical training to deserving students. Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a “chartered institution”
performing a legitimate government function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any
dividends. In enacting Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has declared the UP as the national
university “dedicated to the search for truth and knowledge as well as the development of future leaders.” (UP v. CIR, 107 Phil. 848 (1960)).
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible
education. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV, Constitution). As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and
income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes
laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any
interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should
always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to
the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made
the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
(UP, et al. v. Hon. Agustin Dizon, et al., G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Distinction between immunity and suability.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. In Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. L-
52179, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 692, the SC ruled:
“A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”
Also, in Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 83,  where the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed
against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment was nullified, the Court said:
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
UP correctly contended that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorney’s
fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. It was, therefore, legally unwarranted for the
lower courts to hold that no appropriation by Congress to allocate and set aside the payment of the judgment awards was necessary because
“there was already an appropriation earmarked for the said project.” The lower courts unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the
trust funds of the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were
created or for which the funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control
of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations. (Sec. 84(2), P.D. No. 1445).
An appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s
fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The
Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (Art. VI,
Sec. 29(1), Constitution).
COA must adjudicate private respondents’ claim before execution should proceed.
The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. (Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445).
It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP. The settlement of the monetary claim was
still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. (National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation v. Abayari, G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 242, 256). As such, plaintiffs as the claimants had no
alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
               The RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the motions for execution against the UP
and the garnishment of the UP’s funds. It had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the
depository banks of the UP. By eschewing utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment, and by
authorizing the withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its orders and issuances thereon
were void and of no legal effect.
Corporation’s use of the term “State Corporation” merely descriptive of its nature; performing propriety functions.
Q – North Luzon Railways Corp. (North-rail) and China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement for the construction of the Railway System from Caloocan City to Malolos, Bulacan. Eximbank and the Department of
Finance entered into a loan agreement to finance the project as the Chinese government designated the bank as the lender. Atty.
Harry Roque, et al. filed a petition seeking to nullify the contract alleging that it violated the Constitution and RA 9184, otherwise
known as the Government Procurement Act. CNMEC contended that it cannot be sued since it was an agent of the People’s Republic
of China, performing a governmental function. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, it is performing proprietary activity.
The desire of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course of its business as a global construction company.
The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG.The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to
CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor
did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an
absurd situation, in which all Chinese corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing governmental
activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits. (China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Sta.
Maria, et al., G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012).
Q – When it was sued, it offered a Certification executed by the Economic & Commercial Office of the People’s Republic of China,
stating that the Northrail Projectr was in pursuit of a sovereign activity. Such Certification was endorsed by the OSG and the OGCC.
Is the certification endorsed by the OGCC and the OSG sufficient? Why?
Answer: No. The determination by the OSG and OGCC does not inspire the same degree of confidence as a DFA certification which can even
be inquired as to its intrinsic correctness.
The DFA’s function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a
determination which, when challenged entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have
likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA
as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. (China National
Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Sta. Maria, et al., G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012 citing Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technishe
Zusammenarbeit v. CA, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 150).
Doctrine of sovereign immunity; its concept.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994, 238 SCRA 524, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
xxx                              xxx                              xxx
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the
discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business
activities and international trading.
In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 108813, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 224, the Court affirmed the
Philippines’ adherence to the restrictive theory as follows:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per
se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought
about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. 
xxx                              xxx                              xxx
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure
imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz, 221 Phil. 179 (1985):
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (UP, et al. v. Hon. Agustin Dizon, et al., G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, Bersamin, J).
EMINENT DOMAIN
RTC-SAC has original jurisdiction to determine just compensation.
Q – What court has jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation payable to landowners under the land
reform program? Explain.
Answer: The RTC-SAC (sitting as Special Agrarian Court) has original exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 57, RA 6657).
The RTC-SAC is not an appellate court that passes upon DARAB decisions determining just compensation under the land reform program.  As
held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 1070 (1996), in the terminology of Section 57 [of RA 6657], the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.” It would
subvert this “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative
officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court where we likewise had the occasion to outline the procedure for cases involving the
determination of just compensation of lands acquired under the CARP:
Under RA 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform
program and the compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner of the
government’s intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt of
notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary
administrative proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be,
depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation of the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other
interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within
30 days after it is submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court.
xxx
The jurisdiction of the Regional Courts is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the
judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality
of administrative action. (Phil. Veterans Bank v. CA, 379 Phil. 141 (2000)).
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTC-SACs, the jurisdiction of these
designated courts to determine just compensation under Section 57 of RA 6657 is original and exclusive. Any effort to transfer this
original  jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to confer appellate jurisdiction on the RTC-SACs would be contrary to Section 57 and would result
in void rulings.  What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid
to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question on the merits. (LBP v. Agustin C. Dizon, G.R. No. 160394,
November 27, 2009, Brion, J).
Compensation to be paid; basis.
Q – In 1970, Napocor constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project
traversing over a parcel of land belonging to the respondents. When they demanded for payment, as they were not compensated for
the value of the land, Napocor contended that their claim for just compensation has already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of RA
6395 as amended by PD 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360 & 1443 prescribing a 5-year period to file any action. Is the contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and categorical
language that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” (Art. III< Sec. 9, Constitution). This constitutional
mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011). Thus, it has been
ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. (Napocor v.
Sangkay). It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and
deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from
the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation.
Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events,
before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain (Rule 67, Sec. 1, Rules of Court) and
deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its
omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation
before the trial court. NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses’ constitutional right to just
compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
Q – NAPOCOR contended that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the landowners’ property because,
under its Charter, it is only authorized to acquire easements of right-of-way over agricultural lands. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. When Napocor takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper
determination by the courts.” (NPC v. Ong Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 234).
In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 271 Phil. (1991), it was likewise argued that it should only be made to pay easement fees instead
of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In striking down its argument and ruling that the property owners were
entitled to the full market value of the land in question, it was ruled that:
x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary
rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters
is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be
caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property. (NPC v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
Similarly, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCOR’s transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced
underneath would not exceed three meters, danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents’ farm workers, such that the property is no
longer suitable for agricultural production. Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary use of their land.
Moreover, it has been ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon the Court. (NPC v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 193023,
June 29, 2011, 653 SCRA 84). “The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and . . . any valuation for
just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it
may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.” (NPC v. Bagui, G.R. No.
164964, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 401, hence, NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full market value of the affected property as
determined by the court a quo. (NPC v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
Q – Petitioner contended that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court is unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing
jurisprudence, because just compensation in expropriation cases must be determined from the time of the filing of the complaint or
the time of taking of the subject property, whichever came first. It therefore posited that since the taking of the property happened in
the 1970s, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation with reference to real property market values in the year
2000. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. In National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011, it was held that the
reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings for the reason that
“compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered x x x would not be just, for it would
compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x.
NPC's entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due
process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the
value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted. 
The owners would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses’ property. Because it failed to
comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s
until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines.
This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. To adequately compensate respondent
spouses from the decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of
the Complaint when respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation. (NPC v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25,
2012).
Factors to consider in determining the value of the land under RA 6657.
Q – What are the factors that should be taken into consideration in the computation of just compensation under RA 6657? Explain.
Answer: In determining the just compensation, the RTC is required to consider the following factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657: (1)
the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the
owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any.
In Land Bank v. Banal, 478 Phil. 701 (2004); LBP v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 285, it was said that these
factors and formula are mandatory and not mere guides that the SAC may disregard. “While the determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a [SAC], the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. [SACs] are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down [by the DAR], because
unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The [SAC] cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian
law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation.” (LBP v. Heirs of Encinas, G.R. No. 167735, April 18, 2012,
Brion, J).
Note:
Instead of taking into account the condition of the subject land at the time of taking on December 5, 1997 when the title was transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines, the RTC considered the respondents’ evidence on the condition of the subject land at the time of rendition of the
judgment, as well the updated schedule of fair market value of real properties in the Province of Sorsogon (Sanggunian
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 73-99). The RTC made use of no computation or formula to arrive at the P4,470,554.00 figure. In fact, it simply
enumerated the respondents’ evidence and plucked out of thin air the amount ofP4,470,554.00.
Taking; when.
               The “taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding.” In computing
the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the “value of the land at the time of the taking,
not at the time of the rendition of judgment.” “The ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.”
Note:
The agrarian reform process is still incomplete if the just compensation to be paid has not yet been settled. (LBP vs. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738
(2005) and that the land shall be considered taken only upon payment of just compensation because it would complete the agrarian reform
process (LBP vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 414).
POLICE POWER
Q – Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Section 6,7, and 9 of R.A. 8042,
(otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended) for being unconstitutional .The RTC of
Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional on the ground that its definition of “illegal recruitment” is vague as it fails to distinguish
between licensed and non-licensed recruiters and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation
of the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities. It also ruled that due to its sweeping
application of penalties, it is unconstitutional. Is the ruling of the court correct? Why?
Answer: No. “Illegal recruitment” as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a
distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not
they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs,
although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
In fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual
acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is
not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July
2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for
the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the country’s borders and beyond
its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its
jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs
fairly and humanely.
As held in People v. Ventura, 114 Phil. 162 (1962) the State under its police power “may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will
secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.” (Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al. v. Salac, et al., G.R. No. 152642, & companion cases).
BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS
Notice sufficient in due process.
Q – A person who was subjected to administrative charge requested for a formal investigation, but the PAGC denied it, hence, he
claimed that his right to due process was violated. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when
a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges
and defenses. (Cabalit v. COA, Region VII, G.R. Nos. 180236, 180341 & 180362, January 17, 2012; Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R.
No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327). But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course,said
party is not denied due process. (Cayago v. Lina, G.R. No. 149539, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 29).
As this Court held in Medina v. Commission on Audit:
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of petitioner’s request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her
right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions
for reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. (G.R. No. 176478, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA
684 citing Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003)).
Since petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself from the charges against him, as in fact he submitted a Counter-Affidavit with the
PAGC, though he failed to comply with the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot complain of denial of due process. (Dr.
Fernando Melendres v. PAGC, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012, Villarama, J).
Q – In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic
Enterprise (Operation of Market) (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal Planning and Development
Office.
               In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendana, who assumed office on June 30, 2001.
Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, Bendana also placed him on detail at the
Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility
Planning Project.
               On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the following day for
unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity.
               Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendana was not in a position to
effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his (Mayor Bendana’s)
assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically motivated. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: Yes, because he was deprived of the right to due process. In Tria v. Chairperson Patricia Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 85670, July 31, 1991,
199 SCRA 833, the prohibition in Art. IX(B)(2)(3) of the Constitution against dismissal of a civil service officer or employee "except for cause
provided by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal comes only
after notice and hearing, (Reyes v. Subido, 66 SCRA 2003 (1975), while substantive due process requires that the dismissal be “for cause.”
(Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84).
He was denied procedural due process when he received his notice of termination only a day before he was dismissed from the service.
Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to defend himself from the charge that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that
his conduct was unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the CSCRO-IV, he was not furnished with the submissions of Mayor Bendaña that
he could have opposed.  He was also denied substantive due process because he was dismissed from the service without a valid cause for
lack of any factual or legal basis for his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.   (CSC v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010).
Notice of termination must contain sufficient information to enable employee to prepare defense.
While unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity are valid causes that may be invoked for dismissal from the service, the Memorandum
terminating his employment did not specify the acts constituting his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.  It merely stated that the
character investigation conducted during his probationary period showed that his employment “need not be necessary to be permanent in
status.”
This notice indisputably lacks the details of his unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. Section VI, 2.2(b) of the Omnibus Guidelines on
Appointments and other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 12, Series of 1994), provides that the notice of termination shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare
an explanation.
Besides, Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment of Magnaye’s performance could not have served as a sufficient basis to dismiss him because
said mayor was not his immediate superior and did not have daily contacts with him. Additionally, Mayor Bendaña terminated his employment
less than one and one-half months after his assumption to office.  This is clearly a short period within which to assess his performance. In the
case of Miranda v. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003, 401 SCRA 303 (2003), it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution provides that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.” Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government  officer  or  employee  may be removed from the service on two (2)
grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity.  While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds,
however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or
employee from the service.  Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.  In the case at bar,
respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor performance.  Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service.
But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months
for the respondents.  Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his
immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. x x x.  
The CSC is the central personnel agency of the government exercising quasi-judicial functions. (Sec. 1, Rule 43, Rules of Court).  “In cases
filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” (Rule 133, Sec. 5, Rules of Court). The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person terminated was evidently wanting in capacity and had unsatisfactory conduct. In this case, the evidence against Magnaye was woefully
inadequate.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Q – In a case for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the prosecutor’s lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza, testified that, from a distance,
he saw Zafra and MArcelino holding shabu by their bare hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a
disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra
and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.
               He was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police station, who himself marked the confiscated
pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs, media, and in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. And,
worse, he was the same person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to the crime
laboratory for testing. No inventory was ever done, no inventory was presented in court. Can he be convicted of the crime? Why?
Answer: No, because of the failure to comply with the claim of custody rule. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. The dangerous drug itself
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will
not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact
that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same. (Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 190749, April 25, 2012, Perez, J).
In People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 186390, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 783, accused was acquitted for the failure of the police to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items. The Court also reversed a conviction in People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 589
SCRA 92, for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds.  People v.
Cantalejo also resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police. (G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586
SCRA 777; People v. Capuno, G.R. No. 185715, January 19, 2011; People v. Lorena, G.R. No. 184954, January 10, 2011 and People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2011).
Non-compliance with chain of custody rule does not necessarily seizure and custody of items void.
Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we reiterate that non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held valid, provided that (a) there is a
justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved.  These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for
the failure of SPO4 Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized items.  As we held in People v. De Guzman, the
failure to follow the procedure mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations must be adequately explained.  The
justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact.  The Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the
prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may
be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Note:
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the witness and the testimony is entitled to great weight
and is generally not disturbed upon appeal, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact of weight or substance.
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. (Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172593, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619). Evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the
innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. (Malillin v. People).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In investigation in aid of legislation, witness is not entitled to counsel.
Q – There was an investigation in aid of legislation. Witnesses were required to appear. Are they entitled to counsel? Explain.
Answer: No. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
               The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. (People v. Amestuzo, et al., G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001, 361 SCRA 184). Since
petitioners were invited to the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel. (Philcomsat
Holdings Corp., et al. v. Senate of the Phils., et al., G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012).
CITIZENSHIP
Naturalization laws are strictly construed, burden lies in the petitioner to prove qualifications.
Q – Kerry Lao Ong filed a petition for naturalization alleging that he was born in Cebu City of Chinese parents on March 4, 1958. He
alleged that he took his elementary and high school education at the Sacred Heart for Boys in Cebu City where social studies,
Pilipino, religion and the Philippine Constitution were taught. He obtained a degree of Bachelor Arts in Management at the Ateneo de
Manila in 1978. In 1981, he got married with a Chinese and have four (4) children. He has been engaged in business since 1989 with
an average annual income of P150,000.00. He alleged his various residence; has socialized with Filipinos and with sound physical
and mental health.
               After trial, the court granted the petition, but the Republic appealed alleging that he failed to prove that he possessed a
known lucrature trade, possession and occupation. The CA ruled that there was an appreciable margin of his income over the
expenses as to be able to provide for his family. The Republic contended otherwise, considering that he has four (4) children, all
studying in exclusive school. Is the contention of the Republic correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.  Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The  burden  of  proof   rests   upon  the  applicant  to  show  full   and complete
compliance with the requirements of law.
               Under the law, one of the qualifications for a person to become a Filipino citizen by naturalizarion is that he must own real estate in
the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. (Sec. 2, Revised Naturalization Law (RA 473)).
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life.  It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.” (Chua Kian Lai v.
Republic, 158 Phil. 44 (1974); In the Matter of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, supra; In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, supra; Chiao v.
Republic, 154 Phil. 8 (1974); Watt v. Republic, 150-B Phil. 610 (1972)).  His income should permit “him and the members of his family to live
with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage
of our civilization.” (In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552 (1974); In the Matter of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, 157 Phil.
107 (1974); Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643 (1965); Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012). 
Q – Is the income of the applicant’s spouse considered in determining lucrative income? Why?
Answer: No. In determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s
income should not be included in the assessment.  The spouse’s additional income is immaterial “for under the law the petitioner should be the
one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.” (Li Tong Pek v.
Republic, 122 Phil 828 (1965); See also Uy v. Republic, 120 Phil. 973 91964)).  Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. (Chiu Bok v. Republic, 245 Phil. 144 (1988); The San v. Republic,
132 Phil. 221 (1968); Lim Uy v. Republic, 121 Phil. 1181 (1965); Ong Tai v. Republic, 120 Phil. 1345 (1964) Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No.
175430, June 18, 2012).
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial evidence.  The applicant provided no documentary
evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a
business.  Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of “some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation.”  Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.
Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to
create an appreciable margin of income over expenses.  Without an appreciable margin of his income over his family’s expenses, his income
cannot be expected to provide him and his family “with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work.” 
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth
paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, Del Castillo, J).
CITIZENSHIP
Nature of citizenship; no res judicata; exception.
Q – May the citizenship of a person be threshed out again and again? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a
long line of decisions, the Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case;
whether the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata;
hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. (Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569 and other companion cases,
September 4, 2009).
Q – May the Board of Commissioners determine the citizenship of a person in deportation proceedings? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a
long line of decisions, the Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata;
hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.  Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the
following concur:
a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. (Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 95612-13, May 31, 1991; Burca
v. Rep., G.R. No. L-24252, June 15, 1973).
In the event that the citizenship of a person will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the
decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship.  (Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569 & other
companion cases, September 4, 2009).
Q – May the Board of Commissioners determine the citizenship of a person in deportation proceedings? Explain.
Answer: Yes. There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in
the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. (Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81798, December 29, 1989, 180
SCRA 756).  However, there is an  exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v.
Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 665 (1955), wherein it was stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves
believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that
the claim is correct. (Co v. The Deportation Board, No. L-22748, July 27, 1997, 78 SCRA 104).  Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings. (Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board; Co v. Deportation Board; Calacday v. Vivo, No. L-26681, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
413).
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in
proper proceedings.  After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship.  Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a
citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings.  The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts. (Chua Hiong v. Deportation
Board; Miranda v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 (1954); Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009).
Doctrine of jus soli.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship
by place of birth.  To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to
the Philippines.  We agree.  The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship.  However, the
Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor.  Since then, said doctrine only benefited
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
3-year period to elect Filipino citizenship.
Q – If a person was born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and a foreign father, he has to elect Philippine citizenship
by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before an officer authorized by law to
administer oaths and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. Within what period should he do it? Explain.
Answer: He must do it within 3 years from attainment of the age of majority. The 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.  The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be
made “upon reaching the age of majority.”  The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years.  In the opinions of the then Secretary
of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of the Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.  In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship
was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should
be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority.  The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. (Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009).
Note:
It is true that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a
Filipino.  Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year
period.  The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were
done after he elected Philippine citizenship.  On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship.  At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but
does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis).  The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the
rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino.  No presumption
can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
(Paa v. Chan, No. L-25945, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 753).
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but
to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings.  This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is
not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings
may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same.  And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be
enjoined. (Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009).
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Composition of the JBC.
Q – Atty. Francisco Chavez questioned the constitutionality of the practice of Congress of sending two (2) representatives to the JBC
with full separate votes when the Constitution provides for only one (1) representative. The petitioner contended that the framers of
the Constitution envisioned only seven (7) members but the practice is different as there are now (8) members. Furthermore, he
contended that the JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional. The OSG contended that
there are two (2) houses of the Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House without the Senate, is not the
Congress. Bicamerlism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress”, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
               It was contended by the petitioner that the use of the singular letter “a” preceding representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative that the Constitutional Commission had in mind that
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Constitution is very clear. The Constitution provides:
“A Judicial & Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio members, a representative of the Integrated Bar; a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court and a representative of the private sector.” (Art. VIII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution).
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to
the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. (National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493
Phil. 241, 250 (2005); Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289 (2002))It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003); Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May
5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110). Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure. (Francisco, Jr. v. House
of Representatives).
The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it
is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may,
thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or
restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible,
since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, “from the enumeration of the
membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.”
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language
of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional
Commission. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
Purpose of the 7-member composition.
Q – State the reason behind the 7-member composition requirement of the JBC. Explain.
Answer: The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and
eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory,
defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for
every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
(Chavez v. JBC, supra.).
Bicameral nature of Congress; effect.
Q – The respondents insisted that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorized that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when
the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. “Congress” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evidence that the definition of
“Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. (Sec. 27(1), Art. VI, Constitution). In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, (Sec. 24, Art. VI, Constitution), the declaration of an existence of a state of war, (Sec.
23(1), Art. VI, Constitution), canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, (Sec. 4, Art. VII, Constitution), and
impeachment (Sec. 3(1), Art. II, Constitution). In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the
roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship
with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more
pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of
the co-equal branches of government. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
Q – What is the rationale behind the creation of the JBC? Explain.
Answer: The Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of
eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and
hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full
vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among
the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. Hence, any act of the
government or of a public official or employee which is contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.
Q – It was contended that the JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional. In short, the
status of the prior acts would be unconstitutional and void. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Despite the unconstitutional composition of the JBC, the previous acts are still valid.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. (Yap v. Thennamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 485). This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation, the Court explained:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo
the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Considering the circumstances, the exception is applicable notwithstanding the unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC. All its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
Note:
At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as the sole representative of
Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.
Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the House of Representatives should be equally
represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the
Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give
effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct, by
reading into the law what is not written therein.
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Q –Lawyers Against Monopoly & Poverty (LAMP) filed a petition seeking to prohibit an automatic and direct allocation of lump sums
to individual members of Congress for the funding of projects. It contended that the GAA does not empower the individual members
of Congress to propose, select, identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. It contended that the act runs afoul against
the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for
which was made by them.  In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress cannot “virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive
Department how to spend taxpayer’s money. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It
is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,” and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
nothing less than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted
to Congress as a collegial body, “does not include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify
which projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive
Department.”  By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be
funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and
constitutionally repugnant.
               The respondent contended that the petitioner failed to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been
releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Member of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.
They likewise invoked Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, where CDF was described as an
imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects specified in the law.  In Philconsa, the
Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely
recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be
given each project. Rule on the contention of the petitioners. Explain.
Answer: The petition is devoid of merit. There was no evidence that the funds were directly released to the Members of Congress who actually
spent the same to their sole discretion.
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. While the budgetary process
commences from the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation
act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes.  Like any other piece of legislation, the
appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto.  Thereafter,
budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the
allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects.  Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment
schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel.  “The DBM lays down the guidelines
for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which
may be funded from the PDAF.  The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by
the Executive.”  This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per
se of the budget.
               As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter
spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are
not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the
Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa.  This remains as valid case law.  So long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. (Lawyers Against Monopoly & Poverty (LAMP), et al. v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management, et al., G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, Mendoza, J).
Note:
The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme
within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is
constitutional or unconstitutional. (Arroyo v. HRET, et al., 316 Phil. 464 (1995)).   The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
(Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997)).
Q – In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress on their own list of proposed projects,
did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws?
Answer: No. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to
statutory acts of Congress.  In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179 (2003), the Court held that:
 Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.  Every presumption should be indulged in favor of
the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In
case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based
on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”
(ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251). This presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
(Drilon v. Lina, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135).
ARTICLE VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Immunity of suit of the President.
Q – May the President be sued during her/his incumbency and even after the term of office? Explain.
Answer: No, during the incumbency of the President by reason of public policy. One reason for the immunity of the President from suit is the
respect due to the office.
               It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
(David vs. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006)). Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even
for acts committed during his or her tenure. (Rodriguez v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805 & 793160, November 15, 2011; Estrada v. Disierto, 408
Phil. 194 (2001)).
               If tenure of office has already ended the former President can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to
evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right of life, liberty and
security of a person who may have filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. (Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal, et al., G.R. No. 184379-
80, April 24, 2012).
How martial law power is shared with Congress.
Q – Former President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the
province of Maguindanao after the Maguindanao Massacre. The basic purpose was to secure the place from large groups of persons
that have taken up arms against the duly constituted authorities. She submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Art. VII,
Sec. 18 of the Constitution which required her, within 48 hours to submit the report. Congress in joint session convened to review
the validity of the Presidential’s action pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution but the President withdrew the proclamation
before Congress could act. The petitioners challenged the proclamation. Should the Court still decide the issue? Explain.
Answer: As a general rule, No, because the issue has become moot and academic. In exceptional cases, the Court may decide moot and
academic cases to prevent repetition of the issue or act being done. This is true if the issue is of transcendental importance to educate the bar,
the bench, and even the Executive Department. But in this case, the Court found no sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial
review. (Fortun, et al. v. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, and companion cases).
Q – The President has the power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In what way does the
President share the power with Congress? Explain.
Answer: Although the Constitution vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, he shares such power with the Congress.  Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of
reviewing its validity; and
4 The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or
extend the same if Congress deems warranted.

          It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.  They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. 
          Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated.  Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart.  The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. (Fortun, et
al. v. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 & companion cases).
Power of the President to remove Deputy Ombudsman is implied in the power to appoint.
In Emilio Gonzales III v. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 196231; Wendell Barreras-Sulit v. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196232,
September 4, 2012, the SC once again ruled that the power to appoint implies with it the power to remove.
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to
be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees, and is subsumed under the broad powers
“explicitly conferred” upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective,
with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide
for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of “check and balance” intended to address the lawmakers'
real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary
jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole. In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor
of Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman
had been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
(a)    A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be
filed before the Office of the President.

The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed as
having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials. Despite the fact
that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act was inferred
therefrom. Thus said the Court:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions
of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must
generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi,
i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament
is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence,
all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.
While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole upheld the plenary power of the Office of the  Ombudsman to discipline elective officials over the same
disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero tempered the
exercise by theOmbudsman of such plenary power invoking Section 23(2) of R.A. No. 6770, which gives the Ombudsman the option to “refer
certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers
or employees.”
The Court underscored therein the clear legislative intent of imposing “a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection
with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers”41 with the enactment of R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as “The Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers.” It thus declared that, while the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public school
teacher is concurrent with the proper investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been more prudent under the
circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint against the public school teacher.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them,
including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority
with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering the
principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales,
prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and
to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum
of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his
authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action against
petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the
President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the
President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for
unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine  Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court
categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely
filled an obvious gap in the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of
the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal
of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by
the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise – that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the
power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after
impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme
Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on
Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only
by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an
authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if
not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman
is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What
the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that “the terms
of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office” are “reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.”
And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as “protectors of the people” and constitutionally mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government [Section 12, Article XI]. Pertinent provisions
under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment [Section 11], prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term
of office Section 10], provides strict qualifications for the office [Section 8], grants fiscal  autonomy [Section 14] and ensures the exercise of
constitutional functions [Section 12 and 13]. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional
strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly
cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Nature of co-terminous appointment; temporary in nature.
Once again, the SC in Samuel Ong v. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 184219, January 30, 2012, the SC held that if an appointee to the
position Director III, NBI does not possess CES eligibility, his appointment is merely co-terminous with the appointing authority. His
appointment being both temporary and co-terminous, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.
It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (Mita
Pardode Tavera v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 197 Phil. 919 (1982)). However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the
right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature. (CSC v.
Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 347).
In Amores v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 160 the SC ruled that an appointment is permanent
where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.
x x x x
x x x Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a
permanent one. x x x
            Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence
of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government.  But in all such cases,
the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. x x x
            x x x
            Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES
examinations administered by the CES Board. x x x
Q – As an appointee holding a position “co-terminus with the appointing authority,” is he entitled to remain as Director III until the
end of the President's tenure on June 30, 2010? Why?
Answer: No. A co-terminous appointment as one co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at  his pleasure.
          In Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. the SC sustained the replacement of an incumbent, who held an
appointment at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Such appointment was in essence temporary in nature. The incumbent's replacement
is not a removal but rather as an expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. In Decano v.
Edu, ruled that the acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without
cause. Further, in Carillo vs. CA, L-24554, May 31, 1967, 77 SCRA 170, it was said that “one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed
tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination
is for cause.”
ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIARY
Power of judicial review; requisites.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (Senate of the Phil. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1).
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.”  In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern
is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties
entailed by withholding court consideration.  In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff.  Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. (Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 and 187910, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, citing Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415).
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers.  According to LAMP,
the practice ofdirect allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects
is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably,
as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this.  A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a
misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords “ripeness” to the present controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.
The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial
resolution. For LAMP, this is the right torecover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress.  Hence, without
prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may
have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed
cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say
that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Anent locus standi, “the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)).  The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” (Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 400).  In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other
person, and could be suing as a “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160). Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470)  Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)).
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established.  Thus, in
the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP
should be allowed to sue.  The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960), is authority in support of the petitioner:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule
is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur.
761) (Lawyers Against Monopoly & Poverty (LAMP), et al., G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012).
Q – In dismissing MERALCO’s petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, the Secretary of
Justice ruled that after carefully examining the petition and its attachments, no error on the part of the handling prosecutor was
found to have been committed which would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. It concluded that the challenged
resolution was in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.
MERALCO contended that the resolution was invalid because of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which it is
based, as required under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987. It claimed that the requirement to state the facts and the law in a decision is a mandatory requirement and the DOJ is not
exempt from complying with the same. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. MERALCO failed to note that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution refers to “courts,” thereby excluding the DOJ Secretary
and prosecutors who are not members of the Judiciary. In Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA
457, it was ruled that “Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution does not x x x extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary,” because the
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition
for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding.
In Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 184, it was
said that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court. “[This]
is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a
person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions” on determination of
probable cause. (Manila Electric Co. v. Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012, Brion, J).
Note:
When the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or
inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons
or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory
powers which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court.
The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence
presented to him, he should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights,
obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. Since the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely investigative or
inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the
DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a
resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon which it is based. (Manila Electric Co. v. Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June
27, 2012, Brion, J).
Note:
When the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or
inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons
or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory
powers which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court.
The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence
presented to him, he should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights,
obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. Since the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely investigative or
inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the
DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a
resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon which it is based. (Manila Electric Co. v. Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June
27, 2012, Brion, J).
It was ruled that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and legal requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying
MERALCO’s petition for review which is Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition
outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to
require consideration.
The DOJ resolution noted that MERALCO failed to submit a legible true copy of the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 and considered
the omission in violation of Section 5 of Department Circular No. 70.  MERALCO assails the dismissal on this ground as an overly technical
application of the rules and claims that it frustrated the ends of substantial justice.  We note, however, that the failure to attach the document
was not the sole reason of the DOJ’s denial of MERALCO’s petition for review. As mentioned, the DOJ resolution dismissed the petition
primarily because the prosecutor’s resolution is in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.
At this point, it becomes unnecessary to decide the legality of Section 7 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70 allowing the outright dismissal of
MERALCO’s petition for review. It is basic that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record
if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.
Also, DOJ Department Circular No. 70 is an enactment of an executive department of the government and is designed for the expeditious and
efficient administration of justice; before it was enacted, it is presumed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional. Lest
we be misunderstood, we do not hereby evade our duty; in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, we merely accord respect to the
basic constitutional principle of separation of powers, which has long guided our system of government.
The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function    
“The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the
public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice.” As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, “courts are not empowered
to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch”; (Cruzvale, Inc. v. Eduque, G.R. Nos. 172785-86, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA
534) the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information
and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. (Sanrio Co. Ltd. V. Lim, G.R. No. 168662,
February 19, 2008; Manila Electric Co. v. Atilano, et al., G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012, Brion, J).
NATIONAL PATRIMONY
Q – A foreigner and a Filipino got married. They acquired real properties, but when their marriage was annulled resulting in the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the foreigner contended that he is entitled to a share of the real properties emphasizing that
the money used in the acquisition of the same came from his own funds but registered under the name of his wife because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. Under the Constitution, save in cases of hereditary succession no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. He was well aware of the constitutional
prohibition and openly admitted the same. His actuations showed his palpable intent t skirt the constitutional prohibition, hence, he cannot be
entitled to a share of the real properties. Contracts that violate the Constitution and the law are null and void, vest not rights, create no
obligations and produce no legal effect at all. The denial of his claim does not amount to injustice. It is the Constitution itself that demarcates
the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. The purpose of the prohibition is to conserve and develop the national
patrimony. (Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012).
Q – He contended that he is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the parcels of land. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. He cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the properties
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines. In In Re: Petition for Separation of Property – Elena Buenaventura
Muller vs. Helmut Muller, G.R. 149615, August, 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65, it was held that the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. (UP v. Catungal, J., 338 Phil. 728 (1997); Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012).
Even on grounds of equity, he is not entitled to reimbursement.
               In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no righty
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. (Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July
11, 2003, 406 SCRA 55). Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations
and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded
to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also
involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem
verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that
a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for
his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of,
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff." (Marissey v. Bolonga, 123 2d 537 (1960)).
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only
to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon. Needles to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the
national patrimony. (Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)) and it is this policy which the Court is duty0bound to protect.
FRANCHISE
Sec. 2, Article XII, Constitution
Q – Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities,
where it provides that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. What is the meaning of the term “capital”? Explain.
Answer: The term capital refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors. Hence, it refers to common shares and not
to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. This interpretation is consistent with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, “capital” refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation. (Wilson Gamboa v.
Sec. of Finance Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011).
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised
through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of
provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common
shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors
and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as
bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. (Sec. 6, BP 68, or
the Corporation Code). Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of
incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have
the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. (Wilson Gamboa v. Sec. of Finance
Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, Carpio, J).
Meaning and effect of the 60 percent of the capital of a corporation.
 The 60 percent of the “capital” assumes, or should result in, “controlling interest” in the corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term
“capital,” as referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a “Philippine national” in the Foreign Investments Act of
1991, to wit:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
a.  The term “Philippine national” shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as
doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the
trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That
where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at
least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens
of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the
Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a “Philippine national.” (Emphasis supplied)
In explaining the definition of a “Philippine national,” the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide:
b. “Philippine national” shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by the citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee
retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue to the benefit
of the Philippine nationals;Provided, that where a corporation its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC] registered enterprise, at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations
must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%] of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both
corporation must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. The control test shall be
applied for this purpose.
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the basis of outstanding capital stock
whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote are considered.
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the
voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals.
Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals. (Emphasis
supplied)
Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned “capital” required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation
is “considered as non-Philippine national[s].”
“Capital” does not mean total outstanding capital including common and non-voting preferred shares.
Q – What is the effect if we construe capital as including common and non-voting preferred shares? In the case of PLDT, (1)
foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of
35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3)
preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common
shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the
authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%.
               PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock market value of P2,328.00per share, while PLDT
preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per share have a current stock market value ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per
share. Explain the effect of such kind of ownership of the shares of stock of PLDT, a public utility company.
Answer: This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution. Construing the term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry
to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an
interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the
exploitation of natural resources well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never
open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the
national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words
of the Constitution, “a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” (Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No.
176579, June 28, 2011).
Reservation by the Constitution of certain areas of Investment; self-executory.
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment,
such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional
provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil 82 (1997) thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in numerous cases, Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947); Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 (1953); Vasquez v.
Li Seng Giap, 96 Phil. 447 (1955); Soriano v. Ong Hoo, 103 Phil. 829 (1958); Philippine Banking Corporation v. LuiShe, 128 Phil. 53
(1967); Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885 (2003), the Court, even in the absence of implementing legislation, applied directly the provisions of the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions limiting land ownership to Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo, the Court ruled:
x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a citizen of his land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the
alien have violated the law, none of them should have a recourse against the other, and it should only be the State that should be allowed to
intervene and determine what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have said that what the State should do or could do in
such matters is a matter of public policy, entirely beyond the scope of judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-
5996, June 27, 1956.)While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy should be followed in cases of violations against the
constitutional prohibition, courts of justice cannot go beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative of the
Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean that since the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years,
not one of the constitutional provisions expressly reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the “capital” of
which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions miserably failed to effectively
reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the operation by corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral
resources, the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of educational institutions. All the legislatures that convened since
1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional provisions that determine who will effectively control the
national economy, Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an absurd interpretation of the Constitution. (Gamboa v. Teves, et al.,
G.R. No. 176549, June 28, 2011).
Legal & beneficial ownership of 60% of outstanding capital stock must be owned by Filipinos.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the
constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
constitutionally required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44%
owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional
requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly
contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that “[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.”
Filipinization provision of the Constitution; meaning and purpose.
Q – What is the meaning and purpose of the Filipinization of public utilities? Explain.
Answer: The Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which gripped the 1935
Constitutional Convention. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board, 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The 1987 Constitution “provides for
the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to
‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens.’ The provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national
economy and for national security.” The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public
utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities,
pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to “conserve and develop our patrimony” and ensure “a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its “capital”
must be owned by Filipino citizens. (Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011).
LGU
3-term limit; Mayor did not serve the 3-term limit when he was deprived of the right to occupy position although finally proclaimed
winners.
Q – Mayor Abundo was elected Mayor in the local elections of Viga, Catanduanes in 2011, 2004, 2007 and served as Mayor. However,
in the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner, but after the protest was decided Abundo was finally proclaimed as the
winner, hence, he served as Mayor starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007 or for a period of one
year and one month. In the 2010 local elections, he again filed his certificate of candidacy. The opponent filed a petition for
disqualification because he was running for a fourth term, violating of the 3-term limit rule. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, because he did not serve the full term in the 2004-2007 elections, when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code provide that no local elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The 3-term limit has two (2) basic requirements, thus:
(1)    That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2)    That he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602).

Abundo could not have served for a full term in 2004-2007 because the opponent was proclaimed as the winner, hence, Abundo was
termporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest. The declaration of being the winner in an
election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term but while was declared the winner for the
2004-2007 term, his full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service by his opponent. Hence, there was involuntary interruption in
the term of Abundo and cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 201716, January 8, 2013).
Note:
               Summary of prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption:
When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157).   If the official runs again for the same position he
held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50).
An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his
fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service.  For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376
SCRA 90; Socrates v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457).
The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601).
Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836. December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234).
 When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving  what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida  and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the
major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602).
When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. 
His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after
the expiration of the term (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295 & 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473; Rivera v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
167571 & 170577, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41; Abundo, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013).
3-term limit; preventive suspension is not interruption of term.
Q – Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor in Lucena City for three (3) terms, but he was suspended for 90 days by the SB on his third
term. In the 2007 elections, he filed his certificate of candidacy for councilor but there ws a petition to deny due course to his
certificate of candidacy alleging that he was running for a fourth term. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Asilo and denied the petition
to deny due course holding that the preventive suspension was an effective interruption of his term because it rendered him unable
to provide complete service for the full term, hence, such term should not be counted for the purpose for the three-term limit rule. Is
the ruling correct? Explain.
Answer: No, because he has already served three (3) terms as councilor.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8.  The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms.  This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. (Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160).
Significantly, this provision refers to a “term” as a period of time – three  years – during which an official has title to office and can serve.
In  Appari v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that:
The word “term” in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an
office.  According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.  Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless
he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or
appointed. (G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231; Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December
23, 2009, Brion, J).
Note:
               In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, 401 Phil. 77 (2000) it was likewise held that the term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. 
The “limitation” under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative – “no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.”  This formulation – no more than three consecutive terms – is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule.  While it gives no exact indication of what to “serve. . . three consecutive terms” exactly connotes, the meaning is clear – reference is
to the term, not to the service that a public official may render.  In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of
ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office “shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.”  This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.  
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that
does not affect “continuity of service for a full term” for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not
serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase “voluntary renunciation,” by itself, is not without significance in determining
constitutional intent. 
The word “renunciation” carries the meaning of abandonment.  To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1993), p. 1922). It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the
outside.  Read with the definition of a “term”, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but
mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word “voluntary” linked together with
“renunciation” signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by
conscious choice.  In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to
be  purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.       
               During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was expressed that abandonment is voluntary. In other words, the
incumbent cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term. It was also expressed that voluntary
renunciation is more general or embracing than abandonment and resignation. The interpretation of the term voluntary renunciation is that, the
framers’ intended to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation
has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the
clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated
by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth.   (Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836,
December 23, 2009, Brion, J).
Relevant Jurisprudence on the Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the provision’s contemplation, particularly on
the “interruption in the continuity of service for the full term” that it speaks of.  
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602,  presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner
of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. It was ruled that the two
requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, it was said that:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and
at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.  Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.  The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect.  Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
The intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule
inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 (January 23, 2006) and Rivera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41, like Lonzanida,
also involved the issue of whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however,
presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had expired so that
the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated. 
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the Court concluded that there was
nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final
decision that the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the
term.  The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view – that the official (referring to the winner in the election
protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling,
when another actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.  This factual variation led the Court to
rule differently from Lonzanida.     
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest was merely a “caretaker of the
office” or a mere “de facto officer.”  The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when
an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms.  Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercised the powers
and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him “to stay on indefinitely.” 
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly imply.  Although the election
requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit
elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule.  Effectively, these
cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.      
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections,  426 Phil. 472 (2002) dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit disqualification.  The case
presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was
elected in a recall election covering that term.  The Court upheld the COMELEC’s ruling that the official was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms.  The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 440 Phil. 106 (2002) also tackled recall vis-à-vis the three-term limit disqualification.  Edward Hagedorn
served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed
his third term.  In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor.  Less than 1 ½ years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election.  Hagedorn filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully
served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule.  We decided in
Hagedorn’s favor, ruling that: 
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term.  The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.  Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.  First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms.  Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no
further election after three terms, or whether there would be “no immediate reelection” after three terms.
x  x  x  x

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.  The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term.  A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same
term of office.  What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, presented the novel question of whether
a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the
municipality into a city.  During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials
of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city
officials.  The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor – the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the
inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over
whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their  chief executive for nine years.  The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.  To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception.  Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.  This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. 
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or
break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened.  In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title
to any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections.  Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as
private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively.  Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete break from
office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.  
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50,
where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law.  The question posed when he
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him
outside the operation of the three-term limit rule.  We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor.  This
result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did not
become a private citizen during the interim.  The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective
official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be
councilor – an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence    
From all the above, we conclude that the “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that
involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.  The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as held
in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should
not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the
failure to render service.  The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for
reasons established by law.  Of course, the term “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office
or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost. 
 
          To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X– fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in
office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention.  The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the
exercise of the powers of the elective position. The “voluntary renunciation” it speaks of refers only to the elective official’s voluntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office.  It does not speak of the temporary “cessation of the exercise of power or authority” that
may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them.  To quote Latasa v. Comelec:
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].  
 Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
 a.  Nature of Preventive Suspension
          Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act –
is aninterim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. 
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code “when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense,
there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.” Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding
of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the
evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive
salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual
finding of guilt or liability.
          Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of
the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder.  Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted.  Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official
is preventively suspended.  This was what exactly happened to Asilo. 
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the
Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws
themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present.  In light
of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme
situation – that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election
official’s term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials’ service in office and they do not overlap.   As
already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office
holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his
three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept – interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title to office.  If
preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both.  But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive
suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of
service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
               Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption
that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms.  A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack
of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Q – State the reason why a preventively suspended elective public officer cannot run for a fourth term. Explain.
Answer: To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to
allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some of them personal and
some of them by operation of law – that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way
that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty,
to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to
office.  Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term.  Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of
office.  The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what
an effective interruption is. (Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, Brion, J).
Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
 Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except
in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective,
preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of
renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and
involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office.  The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and
non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term.  It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the
three-term limitation.  It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it
be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office
even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.   
Renunciation of Filipino citizenship must be under oath.
Q – Teodora Sobejana-Condon, a Filipino citizenship acquired Australian citizenship. In 2006, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship but it was not under oath contrary to the mandate of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Then, she filed her certificate of candidacy
and was elected. Is she qualified to run for public office? Explain.
Answer: No. The requirement that the renunciation of her foreign citizenship must be under oath is mandatory.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino
American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation
of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be
valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath
stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. (Teodora
Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012, Reyes, J, citing De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June
19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149).
In Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it,
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels naturalborn
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
T]he intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.
Q – She contended that the requirement that the renunciation must be under oath is a mere formal requirement. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Answer: No, it is a mandatory requirement.
The “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a
natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship.
Never was it intended that those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an
unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere
qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise. (Teodora
Sobejan-Condon v. COMELEC, et al., supra.).
Section 5 was intended complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty,
which provides:
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will
be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal
effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, p. 1101).
Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s
abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
Q – Petitioner contended that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship,
is entitled to judicial notice. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. (Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. v. Guerrero, 445 Phil. 770 (2003)). To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for anypurpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copyattested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by asecretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
viceconsul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1)
a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes
verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the
circumstances, the Court is “satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the
Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law. (Teodora Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC, et al., supra.; citing Asiavest Ltd. v. CA, 357 Phil. 536 (1998)).
Q – Is not the act of running for public office an effective act of renunciation of foreign citizenship, thus, a person can run for public
office? Explain.
Answer: No. Her act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the
Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation
of foreign citizenship, (Valles v. COMELEC, 392 Phil. 327 (2000); Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999) such ruling was already adjudged
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Jacot v. Dal, supra.).
Q – What is the effect of her winning in the election? Explain.
Answer: The fact that she won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity. (Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 696; Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, et al., supra.).
Note:
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino
citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section
3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
Q – RA 10147, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) allocated P21B for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) headed by the DSWD. Such project provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to
meet certain human development goals. While admitting the wisdom of the CCTP, petitioners took exception to the manner of its
implementation thru the DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare have been
developed to the LGU under RA 7160. They contended that direct budgeting should be made in favor of the LGUs that would enhance
the delivery of basic services. The practice would result in the recentralization of basic government functions which is contrary to
the precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of descentralization. Rule on the contention.
Answer: The contention is not correct. It is true that the essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.
As held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 93252 & 95245, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 271  that while it is through a system of
decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local autonomy
does not imply the conversion of local government units into “mini-states.” With local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than “to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the local government” and, thus, did not intend to sever “the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units.”   In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court defined the
extent of the local government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national government in the pursuit of common national goals,
referring to such key concepts as integration and coordination.  Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions.  Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.  The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.  In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development.   But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.  Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. (Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 185770, July 17,
2012).
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the national
government in programs implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would
amount to a decentralization of power explicated in  Limbona v. Mangelin, as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.  There is decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments „more responsive and accountable‟ and „ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.‟ At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises „general
supervision‟ over them, but only to „ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.‟ He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared
to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,  decentralization  of  power  amounts  to  'selfimmolation,'  since  in  that¥  event, 
the  autonomous government  becomes  accountable  not  to  the  central authorities but to its constituency.
Indeed,  a  complete  relinquishment  of central  government  powers  on the matter of providing basic facilities  and services cannot be implied
as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.  The national government is, thus,  not  precluded  from  taking  a  direct  hand  in  the 
formulation  and implementation  of national  development  programs  especially  where  it  is implemented locally in  coordination with the
LGUs concerned.
Every  law has  in  its  favor  the  presumption of constitutionality,  and to justify its  nullification,  there must  be  a  clear and  unequivocal 
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful  and argumentative one. Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the
provisions under the GAA of 2011.  The  allocation  of a  P21  billion  budget  for  an  intervention program  formulated  by  the  national 
government  itself but  implemented  in partnership with  the  local  government units to achieve the common national goal  development and
social  progress  can  by  no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments. (Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Ochoa, et al., G.R.
No. 195770, July 17, 2012).
Vice-Mayor is included in computing the quorum.
Q – Petitioners alleged that Atty. Rex Rojo’s appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary is void. They maintained that
respondent’s irrevocable resignation as aSangguniang Panlungsod member was not deemed accepted during the regular session of
the Sangguniang Panlungsodof La Carlota City, Negros Occidental for lack of quorum. Consequently, respondent was still an
incumbent regular Sangguniang Panlungsod member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
               They contended that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, should not be counted in
determining whether a quorum exists. Excluding the vice-mayor, there were only six (6) out of the twelve (12) members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod who were present on 17 March 2004. Since the required majority of seven (7) was not reached to
constitute a quorum, then no business could have validly been transacted on that day including the acceptance of respondent’s
irrevocable resignation.
               On the other hand, Atty. Rojo maintained that the Sangguniang Panlungsod consists of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular
members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members, hence there was a quorum as the Vice-Mayor should be
included in the computation of the quorum. Whose contention is correct? Explain.
Answer: The contention of Atty. Rojo is correct. The Vice-Mayor is a member of the Sanggunian, hence, he should be included in the
computation of the quorum.
RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod “shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the
regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of
the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“composed of” as “formed of” or “consisting of.” As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding
officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a “member” of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would
create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a
“member” of the Sanggunian. (La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, etc. v. Atty. Rex Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012, Carpio, J).
Note:
In the 2004 case of Zamora v. Governor Caballero, 464 Phil. 471 (2004) the Court interpreted Section 53 of RA 7160 to mean that the entire
membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The Court held:
“Quorum” is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to
transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid
act. “Majority,” when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire
membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that
“majority of each House shall constitute a quorum,” Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the “majority of all members of
the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified” shall constitute a quorum.
In the same manner, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be computed based on the total composition of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this case, theSangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed of the presiding
officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 “members” of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7)
members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there
was a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted. (La Carlota City, etc. v. Atty. Rex Rojo, G.R. No.
181367, April 24, 2012, Carpio, J).
PARTY-LIST
Party list organization that advocates violence cannot be accredited.
Q – MAGDALO sought registration and accreditation as a Party-List Organization but it was denied by the COMELEC due to its
advocacy of the use of force or violence. The COMELEC took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the Oakwood
standoff. MAGDALO claimed that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or
military, was held hostage; (b) its members evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the
incident. Is the contention of MAGDALO correct? Why?
Answer: No. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides
that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and
sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition
for Registration and Program of Government obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of
military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an
alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. Hence, the COMELEC did not err in denying accreditation. (Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
190793, June 19, 2012, Sereno, J).
Effect of subsequent grants of amnesty.
Q – After the resolution denying the accreditation of MAGDALO as a party-list organization, the members were granted amnesty.
State the effect of such grant of amnesty. Explain.
Answer: It has no effect on the accreditation because the amnesty was a mere supervening fact which could not change the resolution. This is
despite the fact that the Court took judicial notice of the grant of amnesty.
In People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil. 690 (2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997), the concept of amnesty was once again explained,
thus:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
x x x                            x x x                            x x x
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x”
COMELEC
Q – COMELEC Resolution No. 9266 approved the creation of a committee jointly with the DOJ which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 & 2007 elections. Petitioners questioned the
validity of the creation of the Committee alleging that it violated the equal protection clause. They contended that the Committee
targeted only the Arroyo Administration. The respondents contended that the investigation has a wide array of the possible election
offenses and broad spectrum of individuals who may have committed them, not only the officials of the Arroyo Administration. Rule
on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The contention is not correct, because not all the respondents were linked to the Arroyo Administration. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The concept of equal protection has been laid down in  Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 where it was said:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism
or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes  of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.  (Biraogo v. Phil.
Truth Commission, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78).
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly-situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. (Biraogo v. PTC, supra.; Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082 &
companion cases, September 18, 2011).
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
under like circumstances and conditions shall be  treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. (Santos v. People, G.R.
No. 173176, April 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341).
We once held that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law and thus may,
for every particular investigation, whether commenced by complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to  pursue each investigation.
Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be
considered a violation of any of the parties’ rights to the equal protection of the laws. (Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129099,
July 20, 2008). This same doctrine should likewise apply in the present case.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the
Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such  constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues
various resolutions prior to every local or national elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections. This
shows that every election is distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing
circumstances. (Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082 & companion cases, September 18, 2012).
Q – Petitioners claimed that the Joint Panel does not possess the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge because it is all at
once the evidence- gatherer, prosecutor and judge. They  explained that since the Fact-Finding Team has found probable cause to
subject them to preliminary investigation, it is impossible for the Joint Committee to arrive at an opposite conclusion. Petitioners
likewise expressed doubts of any possibility that the Joint Committee will be fair and impartial to them as Secretary De Lima and
Chairman Brillantes had repeatedly expressed prejudgment against petitioners through their statements captured by the media.
For their part, respondents contended that assuming that said statements were made, there was no showing that Secretary De Lima
had tried to intervene in the investigation to influence its outcome nor was it proven that the Joint Committee itself had prejudged
the case. Is the contention correct?
Answer: No. It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements of both substantive
and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by
the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside over
or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge. Thus, as emphasized by the Court in
Ladlad v. Velasco:
x x x We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is
being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be
enhanced.
In this case, as correctly pointed out by respondents, there was no showing that the statements claimed to have prejudged the case against
petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes or were in the prejudicial context in which petitioners claimed the
statements were made. A reading of the statements allegedly made by them reveals that they were just responding to hypothetical questions in
the event that probable cause would eventually be found by the Joint Committee. 
More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself, tasked to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation against petitioners, made biased statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party.
Neither did the petitioners show that the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice or the Chairman of the Comelec intervened in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation or exerted undue pressure on their subordinates to tailor their decision with their public declarations
and adhere to a predetermined result. Moreover, insofar as the Comelec is concerned, it must be emphasized that the constitutional body is
collegial. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. In equating the alleged bias of the
above-named officials with that of the Joint Committee, there would be no arm of the government credible enough to conduct a preliminary
investigation. (Santos-Cancio v. DOJ, G.R. No. 175057, January 28, 2008, 543 SCRA 70; Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082 & companion
cases, September 18, 2012).
Q – Petitioners claimed that the Joint Panel is a new public office as shown by its composition, the creation of its own Rules of
Procedure, and the source of funding for its operation. It is their position that the power of the DOJ to investigate the commission  of
crimes and the Comelec’s constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws do not include the power to
create a new public office in the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the Joint Panel, the DOJ and the Comelec encroached
upon the power of the Legislature to create public office.
Respondents contended that the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team are not new public offices, but merely collaborations
between two existing government agencies sharing concurrent jurisdiction. This is shown by the fact that the members of the Joint
Panel are existing officers of the DOJ and the Comelec who exercise duties and functions that are already vested in them.  Whose
contention is correct? Why?
Answer: The contention of the petitioners is not correct. The Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute
cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is
mandated to administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system. It is specifically empowered to “investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system.”Also, the provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, as
well as the national and regional state prosecutors, are specifically named as  the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
Recently, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal offices, is given the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the
government such as the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.
Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the assailed Joint Order which give the DOJ and the Comelec the
power to conduct preliminary investigation. No new power is given to them by virtue of the assailed order. As to the members of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, they perform such functions that they already perform by virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of
the DOJ and legal officers of the Comelec. Thus,  in no way can we consider the Joint Committee as a new public office.  (Arroyo v. DOJ, et al.
& companion cases, G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012).
Q – Petitioners claimed that in creating  the Joint Panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated its constitutional mandate to
investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of election laws including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices in favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ Secretary. Under the set-up, the
Comelec personnel is placed under the supervision and control of the DOJ. The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has
willingly surrendered its independence to the  DOJ and has acceded to share its exercise of judgment and discretion with the
Executive Branch. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under  the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. 
The Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec  committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections and to
serve as the guardian of the people’s sacred right of suffrage – the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and 
in achieving and promoting political stability.
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec had the exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses. In the discharge of this exclusive power, the Comelec was given the right to avail and, in fact, availed of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government such as the prosecutors of the DOJ. By virtue of this continuing authority, the state prosecutors and
the provincial or city prosecutors were authorized to receive the complaint for election offense and delegate the conduct of investigation to any
of their assistants. The investigating prosecutor, in turn, would make a recommendation either to dismiss the complaint or to file the
information. This recommendation is subject to the approval of the state, provincial or city prosecutor, who himself may file the information with
the proper court if he finds sufficient cause to do so, subject, however, to the accused’s right to appeal to the Comelec. (Arroyo v. DOJ, et al.,
G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012).
Moreover, during the past national and local elections, the Comelec issued Resolutions requesting the Secretary of Justice to assign
prosecutors as members of Special Task Forces to assist the Comelec in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. These Special
Task Forces were created because of the need for additional lawyers to handle the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.      
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the prosecutors the power to conduct preliminary investigation. Otherwise, the prompt
resolution of alleged election offenses will not be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known  as deputation, has long been recognized
and, in fact, been utilized as an effective means of disposing of various election offense cases. Apparently, as mere deputies, the prosecutors
played a vital role in the conduct of preliminary investigation, in the resolution of complaints filed before them, and in the filing of the
informations with the proper court. 
As pointed out by the Court in  Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,  the grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the prosecutors had been
allowed to conduct preliminary investigation and file the necessary information by virtue only of a delegated authority, they now have better
grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of authority. If deputation was justified because of lack of funds and legal
officers to ensure prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses, the same justification should be cited to justify the grant to
the other prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent jurisdiction. 
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team is  dominated by DOJ officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under the Joint Order,
resolutions of the Joint Committee  finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by  the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings. In no way
can we say that the Comelec has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department. 
The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the Comelec the authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is to give
the Comelec all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.  The Comelec should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created.  We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly  illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this Court should not interfere. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
Although it belongs to the executive department, as the agency tasked to investigate crimes, prosecute offenders, and administer the
correctional system, the DOJ is likewise not barred from acting jointly with the Comelec. It must be emphasized that the DOJ  and the Comelec
exercise concurrent jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise
of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one
office (such as  the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said officeand the re-filing of substantially the 
same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will
not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. As cogently held by the Court in Department of Justice v. Hon. Liwag:
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It
would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to
appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would lead hapless litigants at a loss as
to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. 
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time
would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of
Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman. (Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082, September 18,
2012).
ELECTION/LGU
Candidate convicted of robbery is disqualified to run; petition for cancellation of COC is the remedy.
Q – Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the City of Dapitan, Zamboanga del Sur for the 2010
elections. His opponent Agapito Cardino filed a petition to deny due course and cancel his COC due to a false material
misrepresentation in his certificate when he declared under oath that he was eligible when he has been convicted of the crime of
robbery and sentenced to prison mayor by the RTC. Jalosjos contended that he was granted probation where the COMELEC found
out that the certificate of compliance with the requirement was fraudulently issued. He has not yet served his sentence. The penalty
of prision mayor carries with it perpetual special disqualification to hold public office. Is the COMELEC’s ruling correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility
that exited at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the election is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the
very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -- Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if
he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. (Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
193237; Cardino v. Jalosjos, et al., G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012).
Note:
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for
a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six
years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be
that of the principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the
sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of
such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which
is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes, the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor
which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
(Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by
final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such
disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of
Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus,
the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the
temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which
means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be
elected to or hold public office perpetually."
Immediate effect of accessory perpetual disqualification.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The
effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence
or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual
special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be
holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective
public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time
his judgment of conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is
an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation
may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As
this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78"
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
Q – Is conviction of the crime of robbery which carries a penalty of prision mayor to which perpetual special disqualification attaches
by operation of law a ground for disqualification of a candidate under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code? Explain.
Answer: No. Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual special disqualification attaches by
operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar
as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised
Penal Code.
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in
this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. 
In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, the Court declared that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. (442 Phil. 139 (2002); Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, Cardino v. Jalosjos, Jr., G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012).
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born
or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Q – Despite the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos, Jr., he obtained the highest number of votes. Cardino was the
second placer. Can Cardino be proclaimed as the winner? Why?
Answer: Yes. The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be
limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled
because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a
first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after
the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This
is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. (Jalosjos, Jr. v.
COMELEC, Cardino v. Jalosjos, Jr., G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012).
Duty of COMELEC to cancel COC even without petition.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and
the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but
also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the
final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." (Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1), Constitution)). The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of
the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special
disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos
was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment. (Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, Cardino v. Jalosjos, Jr., G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012).
Votes of nuisance candidate is counted for the legitimate candidate.
Q – If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy was still included or printed in the official ballot on election
day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Explain.
Answer: It is counted in favor of the bona fide candidate because the votes cast could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate.
The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the name of the nuisance candidate remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters mistakenly shaded the oval beside the
name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same. (Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012, Villarama, J).
Petition for mandamus to compel COMELEC to disqualify a party-list is not the remedy; petition for disqualification is the remedy.
Q – A petition for mandamus was filed with the Court to compel the COMELEC to disqualify Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) or to
cancel AGPP’s registration for failure to comply with Sec. 6 of Res. No. 8807 which requires them to submit documentary evidence to
prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and unrepresented sectors. It was alleged that they have not complied with
the rule, hence, the COMELEC should disqualify them motu proprio which the COMELEC did not. Will the petition prosper? Why?
Answer: No, because the appropriate remedy is to file a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification. (Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 4, Res. No. 8807). It should have been within five (5) days after the last day
of filing of the list of nominees or any day not later than the date of proclamation. Under Sec. 6 of RA 7941 any interested party may file a
verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with law, rules or regulations relating
to elections. Petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(Sec. 3, Rule 65; Bello, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998 & companion cases, December 7, 2010).
Q – State the effect of the filing of the petition for mandamus despite the aforementioned remedies that are available? Explain.
Answer: The petitioners violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. While this is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, the mandamus petitioner failed to
show that any of the exceptions apply. The filing of a petition for mandamus premature. It bears stressing that mandamus, as an extraordinary
remedy, may be used only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary remedy, may be used only in cases of extreme necessity where
the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. (Bello, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998 & other companion cases,
December 7, 2010).
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q – In a case, it was contended that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article
XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770, which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the
removal of a public official or employee. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is already well-settled that “the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory.” (Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135). In
Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005), the fact “that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with the order of
the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA 6670, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsman’s ‘recommendation’ is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.”
(Fajardo v. Officer of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012, Del Castillo, J).
               Under the “threefold liability rule,” any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative
liability, each of which is independent of the other. (Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244; Fajardo v.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012).
Probationary employee is entitled to security of tenure.
Q – Under Civil Service rules, the first six months of service following a permanent appointment shall be probationary in nature, and
the probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the
probationary period.
               In case, the CSC was of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during his 6-month
probationary period. It submitted that an employee’s security of tenure starts only after the probationary period. Specifically, it
argued that “an appointee under an original appointment cannot lawfully invoke right to security of tenure until after the expiration of
such period and provided that the appointee has not been notified of the termination of service or found unsatisfactory conduct
before the expiration of the same.” Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself.  Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the
Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful  concerted  activities, the
right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is
emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law."
Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.”
Our Constitution, in using the expressions “all workers” and “no officer or employee,” puts no distinction between a probationary and a
permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary
employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for
failure to qualify as regular employees. (CSC v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010). This was clearly stressed in the case ofLand
Bank of the Philippines v. Rowena Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009, it was said:
To put the case in its proper perspective, we begin with a discussion on the respondent's right to security of tenure. Article IX (B), Section
2(3)  of  the  1987 Constitution  expressly  provides  that:
"[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." At the outset, we emphasize
that the aforementionedconstitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular employee and a probationary employee. In the
recent case of  Daza v. Lugo, it was ruled that:
The Constitution provides that "[N]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."
Sec. 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states:
All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six months following their
original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer may
be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period; Provided,
That such action is appealable to the Commission.
Thus, the services of respondent as a probationary employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or
want of capacity.
 x x x.
X x x the only difference between regular and probationary employees from the perspective of due process is that the latter's termination can
be based on the wider ground of failure to comply with standards made known to them when they became probationary employees.” (G.R. No.
168999, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 532).
The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the career and non-career service positions, and
the cause under which an employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the officer
or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which the employment was extended. (Jocom v.
Regalado, G.R. No. 77373, August 22, 1991, 201 SCRA 73). Further, well-entrenched is the rule on security of tenure that such an
appointment is issued  and  the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2,
paragraph (3)] and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing. (Aquino v. CSC, G.R. No. 92403, April 22, 1992, 208 SCRA 240).
While the CSC contends that a probationary employee does not enjoy security of tenure, its Omnibus Rules recognizes that such an employee
cannot be terminated except for cause.  Note that in the Omnibus Rules it cited, a decision or order dropping a probationer from the service for
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period “is appealable to the Commission.”  This
can only mean that a probationary employee cannot be fired at will. (CSC v. Magnaye, Jr., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010).
Note:
In support of its position that an appointee cannot lawfully invoke the right to a security of tenure during the probationary period, petitioner CSC
banked on the case of Lucero v. Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank. (G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009).  This case is, however, not
applicable because it refers to a private entity where the rules of employment are not exactly similar to those in the government service.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Q – A resolution was issued by Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors removing a certain Setudo, Jr. as
a member of the Board of Directors. A petition for prohibition was filed with the RTC. Is the petition proper? Why?
Answer: No, because the National Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The NEA has the
power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence, the resolution removing the Director within
the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no jurisdiction (Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012,
Peralta, J).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R. No. 18487, August 15, 2011). In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., supra.).
Nature of the doctrine
         Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Court, in a long line of cases,
(City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008) has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. (City
Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, supra.).
Basis of the doctrine.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. (Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No. 183142, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 217). The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience,
will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
Exceptions to the doctrine.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there
is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l)
inquo warranto proceedings. (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011; Rep. v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007; Samar II
Electric Coop., Inc. v. Setudo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840).
Administrative Law
We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent,
nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively
liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. (Office of the Pres. V. Cataquiz, G.R.
No. 183445, September 14, 2011).
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no
moment. It is a fundamental ·principle of administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent
independently of a criminal action. for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt
as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge. (Amadore v. Romulo, G.R. No. 161608, August 9, 2005). Accordingly, the
dismissal of two criminal cases by the Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the absolution of
petitioner from the administrative charges. · (Hon. Fernando Melendres v. PAGC, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012, Villarama, J).
WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty and
security. (Sec. 1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo; Rodriguez v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 & 193160, November 15, 2011). Having been originally
intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and
curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action. (Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2005, 568 SCRA 1).
The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. (Reyes v. CA, G.R. No.
182161, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 580). Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the
right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and
is no longer imminent or continuing. (Tapaz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768). Instead, it must be granted
judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from
fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously,
lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. (Lozada, Jr., et al. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012).

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