BAGTAS vs. HON. SANTOS, et. al - GR NO.

166682; NOVEMBER 27, 2009

TOPIC: SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

FACTS: Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S.
Gallardo (Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel ran away
to live with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo
(Maryl Joy). Maricel’s boyfriend left her.

Thereafter, Maricel returned to her parents but she was allegedly disowned by her
parents and was compelled to left her child with herein petitioners and went to Negros
Occidental.

Spouses Gallardo then tried to obtain the custody of Maryl from petitioners, but the latter
refused. Spouses Gallardo then filed with the RTC a petition for Habeas Corpus. Months later,
the parties entered into a compromise agreement giving visitorial rights to each party.

However, petitioners learned that Spouses Gallardo brought Maryl to Samar. Petitioners
went to court and prayed that Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl and explain why
they violated the Court's order.

RTC in dismissing the petition ruled that since the person subject of the petition has
already produced to the court and has been turned over to the maternal grandparents of the
minor, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action for custody of the minor.

ISSUE: WON RTC IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE PETITION.

RULING: No, The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents
to regain custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own
free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.

The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl
Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had
the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the
petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis.

In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important
consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. In Sombong
v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:
The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in
a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any
mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child
due weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the court’s view of the best
interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.
Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any
person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the
time appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.

Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the
same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands,
deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as
may be proper under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors:
(1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor,
(2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and
(3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner.
In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily
dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without
conducting any trial.

Case to be REMANDED for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine fitness of the
Spouses Gallardo to have custody of Maryl Joy Gallardo.
 VANCIL vs. BELMES - GR NO. 132223; JUNE 19, 2001

TOPIC:SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

FACTS: Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22,
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Despite the fact that petitioner is currently living in the US, she filed for guardianship of
the two minors Valeri and Vincent, who was at the time, 6 and 2 years old respectively.
Consequently, the natural mother of the minors, herein respondent submitted opposition.

RTC and CA rejected the claims of Vancil and stresses that Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children.

ISSUE: WHO BETWEEN THE MOTHER AND GRANDMOTHER SHOULD BE THE

GUARDIAN.

RULING: Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that
of petitioner to be his guardian.

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very
much alive and has exercised continuous parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to
prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
 ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, AND ROSALINDA TABUGO
vs. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO MIRANDA - GR NO. 182353;
JUNE 29, 2010

TOPIC:SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

FACTS: Petitioners in this case is the school and subject teacher of herein respondent
wherein a school science experiment leads to an accident where the left eye of respondent was
chemically burned, and has to undergo surgery.

Respondent parents', through counsel, demanded petitioners to shoulder all the medical
expenses that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused
by the science experiment. The counsel for petitioner explained that the school cannot accede
to the demand because "the accident occurred by reason of Jayson's failure to comply with the
written procedure for the experiment and his teachers; repeated warnings and instruction that
no student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated
compound has cooled.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent, awarding actual, moral and reasonable
attorney's fees. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF JAYSON;

RULING: YES, they are liable. Petitioners were negligent since they all failed to eercise the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students.

The proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to
prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight
incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the
heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. Mary’s preclude their liability in this case.