G.R. No.

L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF
CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY,
EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and
FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN
BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant, 
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and
her Children, claimants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate leaving a
homestead, consisting of two parcels of land. They had three children, Francisco (1948
he died), Prima and Concepcion (1961 she died). In 1963, Special Proceeding No. 508
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted for the settlement of
the estate. In 1965, the administrator, petitioner Coca presented a project partition. It
was provided that the P 5, 088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate of Concepcion
should be divided equally among the three set heirs, and that Prima and Heirs of
Francisco should pay the amount to the heirs of Concepcion.
‘Heirs of Francisco opposed the same and argued that it contravene the lower court’s
order which recognized their right to a twelve hectare portion of the first lot and that
Prima who sold her share to the late Francisco shall not be included in the partition. The
lower court in its order directed the administrator to pay the debts to the Heirs of
Concepcion and deferred the action on the project of partition until the ownership of the
12 hectares which were claimed by Heirs of Francisco and 6 hectares were claimed by
Respondent Borromeo. Lower court considered this as an ordinary action.
Heirs of Francisco filed a supplemental opposition. In 1966, the lower court, acting on its
volition tackled again the project of partition. However, no separate action had been
filed to determine the ownership of the 12 hectares. Hence, it issued an order approving
the project of partition but excluding the 12 hectares. CFI, likewise granted the claim of
Heirs of Francisco for reimbursement of litigation expenses and reiterate that the
administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion the amount reimbursed to her estate.
The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to
recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin
Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

Hence, this appeal of Administrator Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion contending that the lower court as a probate court has no jurisdiction to
decide ownership of the 12 hectares..
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court as a probate court has the authority to decide on
question of ownership of the 12 hectares land?

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that it should be clarified that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional
question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived".
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the
estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action.
(Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule
has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.ee
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet
if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that
questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding
twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082)
and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras
and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are
reversed and set aside.

PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI,

Petitioners,
- versus -
FE S. FACTOR,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Fe Factor was one of the co- owners of a land located in
Almanza, Las, Pinas City. The siblings, except respondent’s father Enrique Factor
shared during a sale of the factor compound as it was agreed that the latter would have
his share portion in the said compound. Enrique caused the construction of several
houses in the compound including the subject property, a rest house. Petitioner Precy
Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the
compound. When Enrique died, administrator of the Factor Compound was entrusted to
his eldest Child Gloria Factor-Labao who was married to Ruben Labao. When Gloria
died, administration was transferred to Respondent Fe Factor. In 2002, Ruben Labao
married petitioner Precy Bunyi. Later on Ruben died.
Respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest
house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then
audaciously occupied the premises. Hence, in 2003, respondent filed a complaint for
forcible entry against petitioners. Petitioners questioned Fes claim of ownership of the
subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They
asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that they moved
into the subject property.
MeTC ruled that petitioners vacate the property and paid the corresponding
rentals. Petitioners appealed to the RTC but it affirmed in toto the decision of MeTC and
denied their MR. CA likewise denied their appeal. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Precy Bunyi has better right of possession over the
subject property as surviving spouse of Ruben Labao as against the claim of
possession of Respondent Fe as predecessor-in-interest.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that for one to be considered in possession,
one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at
all times.[18]  Possession can be acquired by juridical acts.  Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the
inscription of possessory information titles.[20]While petitioners claim that respondent
never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior
possession of the subject property.

The right of respondent predecessors over the subject property is more

than sufficient to uphold respondents right to possession over the
same. Respondent’s right to the property was vested in her along with her
siblings from the moment of their fathers death. [23] As heir, respondent had the
right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from encroachments made or
attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary
rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings. [24]

All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully
proved the extent and character of her possession over the disputed property. As a
consequence of her ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession,
considering petitioners failure to prove prior possession. The Court stresses, however,
that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional
determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar
or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to
the subject property.[29]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. 

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS: This case involves the estate of the late novelist Esteban Javellana, Jr, who
died a bachelor without any successor in interest as he was considered a posthumous
child. His father died ten months after the latter’s marriage with Salustia Solivio.
Petitioner Celedenia was Salustia’s sister. When Salustia died she left all her properties
to her only child Esteban. During his life time, the late Esteban expressed to petitioner
Celedonia to place his estate in a foundation to honor her mother.
Two weeks after his funeral, Respondent Concordia Solivio and Petitioner Celedonia
talked about what to do with the Esteban properties. They agreed that Celedonia would
take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Hence, she filed
a special proceeding for an appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Estaban. The court declared her as the sole heir of Esteban. Thereafter, she paid all the
obligations of the estate and set up Salustia Solvio Vda. De Javellana Foundation and
registered it before the SEC.
Respondent Concordia Javellana Villanueva moved for reconsideration since she too
was an heir of the deceased but the same was denied. Instead of appealing, she filed a
case for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages before the RTC of
Iloilo Branch 26 which ruled in her favor.
On respondent’s motion, RTC Branch 26 ordered an execution of its judgment pending
appeal and required petitioner to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and averred that the properties of the deceased
had already been transferred to the foundation but the same was denied. CA affirmed in
toto the RTC’s judgment. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Branch 26, RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case for
partition and recovery of Concordia’s shares of the sate Estaban even while probate
proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of the same Court
RULING: No. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's
action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are
still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the
submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the
residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to
the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole
heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings
We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. In the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a
co-equal court. 
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.