C.
Article 4 – Proximate Cause and Impossible Crime
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38773         December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines
Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide committed on the
person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P1,000, with costs.
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age
and father of nine living children, has been suffering from partial
paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost
control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to
work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his
daughters was named Maria and another, are married, while still
another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other married
daughter and the nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live
with Maria upon whom they depend for support.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became
acquainted and had intimate relations later with the deceased
Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the
appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently
visited Pilar in his house. The relations between Pilar and the
deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant
did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had
gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the
information that she had gone to her godfather's house in
Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital
for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar
returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since
which time he has appeared sad and worried not only because of
the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because the child
meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended
for support. For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at
times were hostile and threatening and at other times entreating
the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or
at least, to support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed
to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never
complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one
day at the office where the deceased worked and asked leave of
the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the
undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a
wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers
from the testimony of the appellant that he proposed to said
deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that the
latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing
the appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the
neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face with
the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his
arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so
grave an injury as the death of the deceased. We find that his
conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the
appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a
wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the
deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital
for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it
would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least,
support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in
some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce
him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the
act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal
wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact
hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his
right arm on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended
for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause
so grave an injury as the death of the deceased as well as those of
his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and
acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be
taken into consideration in favor of the appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's
contention that he acted in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he
provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out and
brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where the crime
committed is different from that intended by the accused, should
be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the
old Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in cases
where the crime befalls a different person (decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899),
which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide
defined and penalized in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of
three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is prision
mayor, should be imposed.
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years and
(1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in
all other respects, with the costs. So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JULIO
GUILLEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from,
the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is
sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased
Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the
costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges contained in the information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura
Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the
trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused
moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of
the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the
soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital,
there to be examined by medical experts who should report their
findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report
of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of
the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane.
Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and
Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since
admission. There was not a single moment during his whole
24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated
above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved
not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or
symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally
decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and
conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction
and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is
his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr.
Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers,
and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a
policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight
several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a
fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat
in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him
deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a
weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that
Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without
psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was
asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court
ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired,
for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by
counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused
the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those
facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus,
although not affirmed with any particular political group, has
voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held
in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the
office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently
President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged
failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him
during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment
was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead
of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and
campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of
assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on
the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by
the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by
a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and
daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected
for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying
to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be
gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment
granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino
nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment
of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly
licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him
by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila
in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been
weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to
Malacañ an, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to
provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the
President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity
meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando
Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document
(Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in
the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the
Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting
held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it
proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An
English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived
it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took
me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to
my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion.
It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And
had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated
either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the
welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the
loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions
now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were
frustrated.
 I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a
man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he
had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice
them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our
future generations. For these reasons he should not continue
any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the
welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up
my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and
I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters
not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am
sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in
my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at
the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at
about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which
reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a
hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand
grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts.
He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his
evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting
and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade
at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was
being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to
leave the platform.
General Castañ eda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking,
hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it
away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the
least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to
the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the
ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who
were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the
crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who
died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by
the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about
two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia,
who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who
was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and,
after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near
the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the
thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had
almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff
resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia
pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the
real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under
arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of
the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one
Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with
whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous
ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments
previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio
Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his
home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person
who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and
whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily
admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to
justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so
called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was
then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police
where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit
D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A.
Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his
arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we
are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made
by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant,
several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court,
namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the
death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty
of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of
public authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen
statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of
doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to
assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing
one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President
Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons
who were around his main and intended victim from being killed
or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions
propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our
conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that
his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any
difference to him if there were some people around the President
when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President,
in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President
being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In
other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the
persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the
President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant
that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less
serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to
the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed,
the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to
be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article
70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of
killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order
that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that
either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene;
where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony
it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of
the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.'
(Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as
held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is
wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco
de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al
fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna;
pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego
disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C
y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si
solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de
homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo
Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno
al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a
un añ o de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de
que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y
no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es
evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera
ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia
teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable
de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del
articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo
hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la
pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo
dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se
ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de
otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la
disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de
18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p.
42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of
article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed
by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the
accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of
which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at,
supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack
was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any
manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it.
In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of
premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when
the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different
from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill
President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a
felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on
the four other persons already named as merely attempted and
not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is
abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact
his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main
purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem
his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official
capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in
question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging
Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain
making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder
committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand
grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating
circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the
most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused
the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no
alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous
vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with
article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the
Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix
within 30 days from the date the record shall have been
remanded. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 171951 : August 28, 2009]
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the
Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is
the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an
Information that alleges as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA
@ Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of
Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the
latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner,
Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the
apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house
of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group
to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine was blaring.
It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group
acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner
was heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny
napangas makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will
lay a hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the
marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya
Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off
again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a
napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This
Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group
convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr.
and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the 26th and
28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the
memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a
day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I
will finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group headed
to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner
proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the
group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and
there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who,
incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being
summoned, the latter approached petitioner who suddenly
punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok
hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing
anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz
attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose
while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a
bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s
head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his
house and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told
Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five
times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later,
unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen
floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial
infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9)
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his favor
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN
(10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as maximum;
 2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity;
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS,
representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as moral
damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND
(₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a
Decision dated December 20, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED]
and the July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in
a Resolution dated March 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE
FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY
THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE
OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT
RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART
FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND
OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the
death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of
the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who
penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the
prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had
wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy.
Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s
injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability.
Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise since
the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction. In
support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio 15 that
Chy’s medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime.
Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be held liable for slight
physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on Chy was
fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s
assessment of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of
Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
prosecution as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to
consider the petitioner’s appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is
opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum from
which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the
factual findings of the trial court do not find support in the
evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was
based on a misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in
the instant case as would justify a departure from the established
rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on
non-interference with the determination of the credibility of
witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the decision is
not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses.
But while the situation obtains in this case, the exception does not.
The records reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis inhibited from
the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner
himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the
alleged adverse consequence his own doing might have caused.
For us to allow petitioner relief based on this argument would be
to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further,
rather than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired
by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who
had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge
who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot
render a valid and just decision. 17 Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano
took over the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the
proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence
for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas
Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony.
Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided
during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin
Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in
its entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand. 18 He
can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the
testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men.
Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due
process of law.19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the
following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of
the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x
1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms.,
dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of
the upper lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No
hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface.
Cut sections show a reddish brown myocardium with an area
of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion of
the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum.
Coronary arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced
by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological
findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark
red to dark purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with
reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure
with some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological
examinations show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show
congestion. Histopathological examinations show mild
lymphocytic infiltration.
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish
materials and other partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis
supplied.)20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his
undated Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on
the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight physical injuries.
He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not
cause his death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious
analysis of the records would acquaint us with the causal
connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that
preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate
cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction
that is because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented
the flowing of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes,
the hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that
made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial
infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood
vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of
an artery of the heart, usually from progressive
arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the
arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person
with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative
to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,]
considering that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness]
of hypertension, no previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no
previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then
excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis
supplied.)26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis 28 or
formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and
thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to
coronary occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is
elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the
part of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on
the mouth and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by
emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast,
so much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the
heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the
deceased died because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered
the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that
the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate
constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was
the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious;
(b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful
acts.31lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the
victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was
previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s
liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the
doctrine laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32 that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some
internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the
foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is
responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration
as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury.
(Emphasis supplied.)35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although
the unlawful act performed is different from the one he
intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so
grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from
criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal
Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating
circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted
naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the
latter’s heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed without any aggravating circumstance to offset it,
the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that
is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or anywhere from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and
eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 41 the
trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of
Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of
₱332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the
time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account.
For this purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v.
Malinao:42
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of
the the victim at the annual net income which time of this death)
would have been received by the heirs for support.43
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the
salary which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At
the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was earning a
gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a gross annual income of
₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial
court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted
₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However,
the records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted
evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence
of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence 44 approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of
his death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should be awarded ₱1,229,600
as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2
=
capacity (₱127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
= ₱1,229,600
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000
as stipulated by the parties45 and civil indemnity of
₱50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases
of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. 47 However, in obedience to the
controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should be
reduced to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the
Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000
as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake
and burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013
FE ABELLA Y PERPETUA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 from the Decision2 and
Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 and August 11, 2011,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-
MIN affirming with modifications the conviction 4 by the Regional
Trial Court RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
39 of Fe Abella y Perpetua petitioner) for the crime of frustrated
homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella
Benigno). The RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1) day to eight 8)
years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1)
day to twelve 12) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay
Benigno ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages, ₱10,000.00 for
the medical expenses he incurred, plus the costs of suit. 5 The CA
concurred with the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA
modified the penalty imposed to six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s award in favor of
Benigno of (a) ₱10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding to the
medical expenses allegedly incurred; and (b) ₱100,000.00 as
consequential damages. In lieu of the preceding, the CA ordered
the petitioner to pay Benigno ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and
₱10,000.00 as temperate damages.6
Antecedent Facts
On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a
farmer, baker and trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated
homicide in an Information7 which reads:
That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill,
attack, assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y
PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck,
thereby inflicting the injury described below, to wit:
• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and
• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as
a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
some cause or causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is the timely and able intervention of the medical
attendance rendered to the said victim.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8
After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large
and was only arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation on October 7, 2002.9
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno; 10 (b)
Amelita Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro
Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and
(d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon from J.R. Borja
Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical
assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998,
at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his
house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to
pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store.
Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro
and a certain Dionisio Ybañ es (Dionisio). Benigno was able to
convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed
suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro
and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the
petitioner arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in each of
his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away
and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted to enter
Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not
to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held
in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the
scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s neck
once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to
the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of more than ₱10,000.00
for hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. 17 He further
claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move
his left hand and was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living
as a carpenter.18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking
wound left lateral aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound
left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm". 19 Benigno was initially confined in
the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on
September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection, since the
scythe used in the hacking was not sterile, complications and
infections could have developed from the big and open wounds
sustained by Benigno, but fortunately did not.21
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner; 22 (b)
Fernando Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and
(c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).
The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed
that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family
resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan,
Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred, is about
four (4) hours drive away. Fernando testified that on September 6,
1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to make a hut. 25 Later
in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner
drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26
The RTC Ruling
On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime
charged. The fallo of the Judgment27 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the
[petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered
finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized by
Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to
Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years
and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant Benigno
Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the
medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.28
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as
weak. No disinterested witnesses were presented to corroborate
the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere at the scene of the
hacking incident on September 6, 1998. Fernando and Urbano’s
testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC accorded
more credence to the averments of the prosecution witnesses,
who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner,
positively, categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as
the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show that
Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar was visible
when he testified during the trial.
The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the
medical expenses he incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to
offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to
pay ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages, but the RTC did not
explicitly lay down the basis for the award.
The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily
anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill which
accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck. The
petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental
especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have
impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one
wound negates intent to kill.
The CA Ruling
On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision30 affirming the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of
frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the
words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted
by him on the victim.
Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution.
The petitioner attacked Benigno with deadly weapons, two
scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of Benigno.
The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting Benigno was swift
and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend
himself.
Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical
Certificate, testified that Benigno suffered from a hack wound on
the left neck, and an incised wound on the left hand palm. He said
that the wounds might have been caused by a sharp, pointed and
sharp-edged instrument, and may have resulted to death without
proper medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for about a
month because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the
neck) shows the nature and seriousness of the wound suffered by
Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for the
timely intervention of medical science. 31 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as maximum."32 The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for
the crime of consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under
Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for a frustrated crime is
one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated
homicide is punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor . To determine the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by
one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range of six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.33 (Citation omitted)
The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and
consequential damages as there were no competent proofs to
justify the awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is entitled to
₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate
damages,34 the latter being awarded when some pecuniary loss has
been incurred, but the amount cannot be proven with certainty. 35
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 36 anchored on
the issue of whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in rendering
judgments which are not in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence and which if not corrected, will cause grave injustice
and irreparable damage to the petitioner.37
In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed
to appreciate relevant facts, which if considered, would justify
either his acquittal or the downgrading of his conviction to less
serious physical injuries. The petitioner points out that after the
single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and
Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to kill
on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since
at that time, he had two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred
in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and unexpected,
providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno
saw the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno could
not have been unaware of the danger facing him, but he knew that
the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus approached
the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit
with the latter’s scythe.

38
The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People  where this
Court found the downgrading of a conviction from attempted
murder to physical injuries as proper considering that homicidal
intent was absent when the accused shot the victim once and did
not hit a vital part of the latter’s body.39
Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted
from Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in
the hand. Such being the case, death could not have resulted. The
neck wound was not "so extensive because it did not involve a big
blood vessel on its vital structure" while the incised wound in the
hand, which only required cleansing and suturing, merely left a
slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen
(17) days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the
nature of less serious ones.
In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks
the dismissal of the instant petition. The OSG stresses that the
petitioner raises factual issues, which call for a re-calibration of
evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the
development of infections or complications on the wounds is a
necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious.
The petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from
the nature of the weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and
the circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had
there been no timely medical assistance rendered to him.
If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the
way to be able to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow,
push, or the use of a less lethal weapon directed against a non-vital
part of the body would have been sufficient. However, the
petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving
behind a big, open and gaping wound.
This Court’s Ruling
The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the
scope of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañ as42 is
instructive anent what is the subject of review in a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from
a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in
exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of
fact.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the question must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.43 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the
findings of the courts a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal
intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the
wounds the latter sustained could have caused his death had there
been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are
patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration of
the contending parties’ evidence.
It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron
Works, Inc. and Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among which is,
"when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension
of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant facts that would
otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x." 44 However, the
factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant
petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the
exceptions.

Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a
review of factual issues, still, the instant petition is susceptible to
denial.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following
elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without
any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention
to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by
that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to
have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on
the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
without medical intervention or attendance.45
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s
intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this
clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding
homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature,
location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 46
The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had
no motive to attack, much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise
invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal
intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the victim only
once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The
petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill Benigno,
he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death,
and not leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.
The analogy is flawed.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non
vital part of the body. The attending physician certified that the
injury would require medical attendance for ten days, but the
victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the
following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking
wound in the neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand
caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente
testified that "it is possible to have complications resulting from
these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were
big and they were open wounds, so there is a possibility of
infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the
instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated with
other things."48 No complications developed from Benigno’s
wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in
the hospital for a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to
September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the
CA that the use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was
determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the
hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to
figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a
scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead.
While no complications actually developed from the gaping
wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to
conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal
considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere
grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical
attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim
that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued
Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno.
What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there
was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the
hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention
provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s
will.1âwphi1
All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA
in affirming the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime
charged.
The Court modifies the award of damages.
As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in
deleting the payment of the consequential damages awarded by
the trial court in the absence of proof thereof. Where the amount
of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of
supporting receipts but entitlement is shown by the facts of the
case, temperate damages may be awarded. 49 In the instant case,
Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and
underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of his
injuries, it is prudent to award temperate damages in the amount
of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.50
Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in
the amount of ₱25,000.00. 51 There is sufficient basis to award
moral damages as ordinary human experience and common sense
dictate that such wounds inflicted on Benigno would naturally
cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and
similar injury.52
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated October 26, 2010 and August 11 2011,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe Abella y
Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages
in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for damages
shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 53
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, Petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980,
petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place
where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he
saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them
who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between
them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting
him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the
bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano
but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier
on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling
on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury,
his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe
brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked
for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis,
the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San
Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio,
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to
Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit
"C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo
Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the
following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the
lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days
period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal
examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p.
88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier
agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00
for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the
two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police
to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded
the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257
both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they
are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each
other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On
November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to
Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the
hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was
charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the
trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS
of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the
nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of
Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.
The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay
Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-
elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May
17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was
a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central
Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the
Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water
and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the
dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water
to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became
shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area
affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I
saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to
know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the
petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56
SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the
petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-
inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981
which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to
the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following
day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's
death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's
unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the
time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not
die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with
tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way
by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the
wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the
proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which
got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this
jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences
of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43
O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's
death was due to his own negligence in going back to work
without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he
went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt
by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself
in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive
that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a
disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of
the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his
farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound
inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted
the following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an
efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until
his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury
and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to
56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in
the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for
the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop
in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case
of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a
poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of
afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases
rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent
stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by
laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least
14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp.
1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside
a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his
right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking
him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days,
or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo,
et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free
of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty
of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's
criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own
act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities
of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where
Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed
under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause
and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather
unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is
also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041,
July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must
be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29,
Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
 responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads
to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes
of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is
the right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part
of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification
imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case
calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186412 : September 07, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN,
finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of
murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta
charging him with the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby
inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his
immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not
guilty.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina
Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr.
Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her
sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both
Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At
around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread
at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without
uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using
a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in
Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta
fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When
Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron
removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body. 5 Mendeja
and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San
Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January
23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was
treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro
Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the following day,
on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally
treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s
medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection
secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres specifically described the
cause of Cruz’s death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted, the patient
developed difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body
and abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic
encephalopathy – neuro transmitted – due to upper G.I. bleeding x
x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.8
The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr.
Matias), who attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the
prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias’
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate
Dr. Belandres’ testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied
stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home
from work at around two o’clock in the morning of January 21,
2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went
outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was
about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which,
Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt.
Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on
July 31, 2002.9
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused
Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the
costs of suit.10
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO), filed a notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the
RTC.11 The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacorta’s
brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

12
Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief  on May 30, 2007; while the
People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Appellee's Brief13 on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental
brief, as he was adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the
Court of Appeals.14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no
longer filing a supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment
of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A
CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES.16
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the
stabbing incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified
Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of
January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendeja’s account of the
stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and incredulities,
and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1) instead
of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed
Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2)
while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were other people who
witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet,
oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and
suddenly as Mendeja described, then it would have been physically
improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the
perpetrator, who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4)
after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite
directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the
alleged murder weapon, was left at her store, although she had
also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruz’s
body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies
are neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should engender some
doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial
court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the
appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the
trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor.17
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith
and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja.
The Court of Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts to impugn
Mendeja’s testimony, thus:
Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s
testimony is incredible because she did not shout or call for help
and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court
because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.
"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people
react differently and there is no standard form of behavior when
one is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second reason which is,
other persons could have run after the appellant after the stabbing
incident. As explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom
she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was
wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their
house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing
incident rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the
assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission that he
was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00
o’clock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim by boxing
him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record
cannot support appellant’s argument. Appellant and the victim
were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and
regular customers. There was light in front of the store. An
opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼ meters enables the person
inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles
from the store. The victim was in front of the store buying bread
when attacked. Further, immediately after the stabbing, witness
Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity
to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be
credibly ascertained.18
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or
motivation for Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse
Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled
time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was
familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus
criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive
can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused,
then her version of the story deserves much weight.19
The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s testimony pointed out
by Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the
fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta
stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in
front of Mendeja’s store.
In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of Villacorta as
Cruz’s stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated
denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is
inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.20
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by
Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed
Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for
the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of
Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the
early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated
as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14,
2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms
of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on
February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo
Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center
or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab
wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 22 the Court was
confronted with a case of very similar factual background as the
one at bar. During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s
hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980,
Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr.
Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javier’s serious
condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day, on
November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against
Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide,
because Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of
Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing
that Javier’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his death.
Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javier’s wound,
he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have
acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm
only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court granted
Urbano’s appeal.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in
Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an
efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until
his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and
the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the
commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle
involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients,
only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the
major muscle groups affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptoms, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and
their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As
the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce
more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous
system damage and death.
"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14
days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains
adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside
a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his
right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking
him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days,
or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.23
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time
between the hacking incident and the manifestation of severe
tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that
Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking
incident. We explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo,
et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at
p. 125)24
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to
set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been
an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the
date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would
have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted
in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period,
less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound
was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with
tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The
infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to
the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal
liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article
266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a
finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may
be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included
in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical
injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense
of murder.25
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or
frustrated murder because the prosecution was not able to
establish Villacorta’s intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals
expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent
beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo
stick, hitting him on the left side of the body and then immediately
fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those made of metallic
material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that
instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The
assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether
appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved
in favor of the appellant. x x x.26
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to
exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous)
intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-
appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to
kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not
frustrated murder but physical injuries only.27
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo
Medical Center for medical treatment immediately after the
stabbing incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical
treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as
an out-patient. There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz
was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance
for more than nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only
slight physical injuries.28
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it
being sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during
trial.
The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend
directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might
make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to
conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of
such means of execution as would give the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate
and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the
essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and
the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus,
depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.29 Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the
danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.30
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was
duly proven in this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the
victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two o’clock in the morning of January 23, 2002,
and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendeja’s store, was
unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for
an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from
nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without
uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then
swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz
with no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of
slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party from labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during
the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30)
days.31 The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said
law excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed one (1) year. 32 With the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment
anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e.,
twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose
upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto
menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002
until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we
order his immediate release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim
and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An
award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous
jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00)
moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight
physical injuries.33
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision
dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as
defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto
menor. Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated well
beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate
release, unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause,
and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered
to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum
of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 125909. June 23, 2000.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision 1 dated
November 7, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Santa
Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-4810, 4811 and 4812,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
double murder and attempted murder, and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 for indemnity,
P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P619,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity in Crim. Case SC-4810 for the death of Emerita
Roma; reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity,
P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss of
earning capacity for the death of Ireneo Gallarte in Crim. Case SC-
4811; and imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision
mayor and payment of P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas for injuries
sustained in Crim. Case SC-4812.
On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas
filed three separate informations charging appellants as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4810
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in
the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hermogenes
Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused
Edwin Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another,
while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one
EMERITA ROMA y DELOS REYES, thereby inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds on her chest which caused her
immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving
heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation are
present. 2
Criminal Case No. 4811.
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in
the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMOGENES
FLORA @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused
Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38
handgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm
one IRENEO GALLARTE y VALERA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds on his chest which caused his
immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving
heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation are
present. 3
Criminal Case No. 4812
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in
the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hermogenes
Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused
Erwin [Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38
handgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm
one FLOR ESPINAS y ROMA, hitting the latter on her shoulder,
and inflicting upon her injuries which, ordinarily, would have
 caused her death, thus, accused performed all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, by the
timely and able medical attendance given the said Flor Espinas
y Roma, which prevented her death, to her damage and
prejudice. 4
During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued. Resolving jointly Criminal Cases Nos. SC-4810,
SC-4811 and SC-4812, the trial court convicted both appellants for
the murder of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and the
attempted murder of Flor Espinas. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as
follows:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita
Roma, the Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and
Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder qualified by treachery and sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00
as expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost
(sic) of earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo
Gallarte, the Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora and
Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery and with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b)
P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial; and (c)
P470,232.00 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by
Flor Espinas, the Court finds both accused Hermogenes Flora
and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Attempted Murder and sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her
injuries and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes
Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent altercation with a certain Oscar
Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.
On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to
celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab,
Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora,
allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with
his brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in
attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a high school student; her
mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte,
a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence
erupted. On signal by Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38
caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right shoulder of
Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The
second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor.
Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy",
referring to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and,
poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her before he and his
brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health
Unit in Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. 6
Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested
Edwin Flora at his rented house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete,
Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest of his
brother, proceeded first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan,
in Pangil, Laguna but later that day, he fled to his hometown in
Pipian, San Fernando, Camarines Sur.
The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R.
Yambot, Jr., revealed the following fatal wounds sustained by the
deceased:
EMERITA ROMA
a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the
angle of the axillary region measuring 1 cm. in diameter with
clean cut inverted edges involving deep muscles, and
subcutaneous tissues and travel through both lobes of the
lungs, including the great blood vessels.
About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver.
The bullet caliver 38 was extracted from the lungs.
The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock
secondary to massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound
of the posterior chest wall.7
IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in
diameter with clean cut inverted edges involving the deep
muscles, subcutaneous tissues traveling through the anterior
chest wall hitting both lobes of the lungs and each great blood
vessels obtaining the bullet fragments.
About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.
His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock
secondary to massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound
of the left arm. 8
Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr.
Dennis Coronado. Her medical certificate 9 disclosed that she
sustained a gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x 1 cm. right supra
scapular area mid scapular line (+) contusion collar; and another
gunshot wound with point of exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid area.
Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers,
Hermogenes and Edwin, before Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution
presented two eyewitnesses, namely, (1) Rosalie Roma, daughter
of one of the victims, Emerita Roma, and (2) Flor Espinas, the
injured victim. Rosalie narrated the treacherous and injurious
attack by Hermogenes Flora against the victims. Flor detailed how
she was shot by him.
Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was
forty-nine (49) years old at the time of her death and was a paper
mache maker, earning an average of one thousand (P1,000.00)
pesos a week. He claimed that his family incurred fourteen
thousand (P14,000.00) pesos as expenses for her wake and burial.
Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was
fifty-two (52) years old, a carpenter and a substitute farmer
earning one hundred (P100.00) to two hundred (P200.00) pesos a
day. Her family spent fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos for
his wake and burial.
The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora,
and Imelda Madera, the common-law wife of Edwin. Appellants
interposed alibi as their defense, summarized as follows:
Version of Edwin Flora:
Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes
Flora is his brother. On January 10, 1993, around 1:30 in the
morning, he was at Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna in
the house of Johnny Balticanto, sleeping with his wife.
Policemen came at said house looking for his brother
Hermogenes. Replying to them that his brother was not living
there, policemen took him instead to the Municipal building of
Paete and thereafter transferred and detained him to (sic) the
Municipal building of Kalayaan.
He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the
cockpit at about 3:00 p.m. he and his accused brother passed
by the house of Julito Malubago. His brother Hermogenes was
courting the daughter of Julito Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he
went home but his brother stayed behind since there would be
a dance party that night. 10
Version of Hermogenes Flora:
Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill
Ireneo Gallarte and Emerita Roma and shot Flor Espina on
January 10, 1993 at about 1:30 in the morning of Silab, Longos
Kalayaan Laguna.
On said date, he was very much aslept (sic) in the house of his
sister Shirley at Sitio Bagumbayan, Longos, Kalayaan. From
the time he slept at about 8:00 in the evening to the time he
woke up at 6:00 in the morning, he had not gone out of her
sister's house. He knew the victims even before the incident
and he had no severe relation with them.
x x x           x x x          x x x
He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993,
Imelda Madera came to their house and told him that his
brother Edwin was picked-up by the policemen the night
before. Taken aback, his sister told him to stay in the house
while she would go to the municipal hall to see their brother
Edwin. Thereafter, his aunt and sister agreed that he should go
to Bicol to inform their parents of what happened to Edwin. 11
Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of
the crime of double murder and attempted murder. Appellants
now raise this sole assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES
AND GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED.
At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both
appellants have been positively identified. However, they
challenge the court's finding that they failed to prove their alibi
because they did not establish that it was physically impossible for
them to be present at the crime scene. According to the trial court,
by Hermogenes' own admission, the house of his sister Shirley,
where appellants were allegedly sleeping, was only one (1)
kilometer away from Sitio Silab, where the offenses allegedly took
place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns only the
plausibility of the appellants' alibi and the credibility of the
witnesses who identified them as the perpetrators of the crimes
charged.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused
establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the
time the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission. 13 The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration
thereof are disfavored in law since both could be very easily
contrived. 14 In the present case, appellants' alibi is patently self-
serving. Although Edwin's testimony was corroborated by his
common-law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive testimonies
of eyewitnesses and surviving victims who contradicted his alibi.
Moreover, an alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is
invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself
and his immediate relative or relatives. 15 Appellants' defense of
alibi should have been corroborated by a disinterested but
credible witness. 16 Said uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face
of positive identification made by eyewitnesses. 17
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not
categorically and clearly identified by the witnesses of the
prosecution. They claim that the testimonies of the said witnesses
were not entitled to credence. They assail the credibility of two
eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma and Flor Espinas, because of
the alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies. For instance,
according to appellants, Rosalie Roma testified she was in the
dance hall when the gunshots were heard, and that she was
dancing in the middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot
Emerita Roma, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,
Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo
Gallarte, Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas?
A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)
Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot
these persons while you were dancing?
A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18
However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,
Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo
Gallarte and Flor Espinas when Hermogenes Flora shot at
them?
A They were beside each other.
Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?
A Because they were standing beside the fence and I was only
seated near them, sir. 19 (Emphasis ours.)
On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her
credibility or renders her entire testimony worthless. Nothing
here erodes the effectiveness of the prosecution evidence. What
counts is the witnesses' admitted proximity to the appellants. Was
she close enough to see clearly what the assailant was doing? If so,
is there room for doubt concerning the accuracy of her
identification of appellant as one of the malefactors?
Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas
was focused on the dance floor, it was improbable for her to have
seen the assailant commit the crimes. On cross-examination, said
witness testified that while it was true she was watching the
people on the dance floor, nonetheless, she also looked around
(gumagala) and occasionally looked behind her and she saw both
appellants who were known to her. 20 Contrary to appellants'
contention that Flor did not have a sufficient view to identify the
assailants, the trial court concluded that Flor was in a position to
say who were in the party and to observe what was going on. On
this point, we concur with the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve respect, for it had the opportunity
to observe first-hand the deportment of witnesses during
trial. 21 Furthermore, minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken their credibility. 22 Inconsistencies in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 23 Such
minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they
guard against memorized falsities.1avvphi1
Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased
because they are relatives of the victim Emerita Roma. However,
unless there is a showing of improper motive on the part of the
witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that they are
related to the victim does not render their clear and positive
testimony less worthy of credit. On the contrary, their natural
interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them
from implicating other persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24
Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses in pointing to the Flora brothers as
the perpetrators of the crime. There is no history of animosity
between them. Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas were merely
innocent bystanders when hit by gunfire. Where eyewitnesses had
no grudge against the accused, their testimony is credible. 25 In the
absence of ulterior motive, mere relationship of witnesses to the
victim does not discredit their testimony. 26
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the
present case, when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo,
but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he
became liable for Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes
cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony,
although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by
treachery. In order for treachery to exist, two conditions must
concur namely: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner
of execution which would ensure the offender's safety from any
defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2)
such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously chosen by the offender. 28 When Hermogenes Flora
suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were helpless to defend
themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides
since the acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled
to conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita
Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of attempted murder of Flor
Espinas.1âwphi1.nêt
Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother,
Hermogenes? For the murder of Ireneo Gallarte, was there
conspiracy between appellants? For conspiracy to exist, it is not
required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused and co-accused had the
same purpose and were united in execution. 29 Even if an accused
did not fire a single shot but his conduct indicated cooperation
with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably
gave encouragement and a sense of security to the latter, his
liability is that of a co-conspirator. 30 To hold an accused guilty as a
co-conspirator by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he
had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy. 31 Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of
Hermogenes was correctly appreciated by the trial court, viz.:
Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the
scene of the crime. He stayed beside his brother Hermogenes,
right behind the victims while the dance party drifted late into
the night till the early hours of the morning the following day.
All the while, he and his brother gazed ominously at Ireneo
Gallarte, like hawks waiting for their prey. And then Edwin's
flick of that lighted cigarette to the ground signaled
Hermogenes to commence shooting at the hapless victims. If
ever Edwin appeared acquiescent during the carnage, it was
because no similar weapon was available for him. And he fled
from the crime scene together with his brother but not after
violently neutralizing any obstacle on their way. While getting
away, Edwin grabbed Rosalie Roma and poked a knife at her
neck when the latter hysterically shouted "si Bodoy, Si Bodoy,"
in allusion to Hermogenes Flora, whom she saw as the
gunwielder. All told, Edwin, by his conduct, demonstrated
unity of purpose and design with his brother Hermogenes in
committing the crimes charged. He is thus liable as co-
conspirator. 32
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the
death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The
evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one
else. For acts done outside the contemplation of the conspirators
only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21
SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are
liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other
acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or
which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the
intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here,
only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not
 even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away
when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for
the death of Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor Espinas
caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED
as follows:
(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Ireneo
Gallarte and sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Ireneo
Gallarte in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P14,000.00
compensatory damages for the wake and burial; and P470,232.00
representing loss of income without any subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the MURDER of Emerita Roma and the ATTEMPTED MURDER of
Flor Espinas. For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes
Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Emerita Roma in the sum of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial, and
P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity, without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. For the ATTEMPTED
MURDER of Flor Espinas, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor
Espinas as indemnity for her injuries.
(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita
Roma and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205228               July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA
SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30
May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009,
convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for
the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of
Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case
No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in
"People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2)
sets of Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the
morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving
together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia
Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her body, resulting in
her death to the damage of her heirs.3
Crim. Case No. 13160-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the
morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving
together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo
Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his body, resulting in
his death to the damage of his heirs.4
Version of the Prosecution:
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew
Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos),
in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga,
riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road. 5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a
speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635,
heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in
front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957. 6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the
front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to
swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4)
armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started
shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as
Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was
standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The
four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left
the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the
Corolla but lost track of the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds:
Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good
Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on
the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being
shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was
registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon
inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but
clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his
car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day,
Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was
identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four
assailants who alighted from the passenger's seat beside the
driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately
arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group
(PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .
45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber
firearm.9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the
time of the incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the
laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there. 10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben
Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his
motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went
home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his
mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga
(Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano
went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his
friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at
about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to
a store and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home.
After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia
(Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented
from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After
dropping Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the Corolla,
where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the
Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari,
Sunga, and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony.14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused,
Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe,
and Peter Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1)
PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V.
Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6)
P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes,
and (8) Ricky Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga,
Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's
defense of alibi on the ground that it was not supported by clear
and convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi
cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who
positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of the defense, the RTC
gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI
Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense
failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles
and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify
against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the assessment of
damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to
pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of ₱222,482.00 based on the
following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as
funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as
expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as
groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand
Pesos (₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV. 15
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated 7 April 2009
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano
is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the
amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as
actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise,
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00. 16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC
erred when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the
testimonies of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended
that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory.
In detail, Adriano referred to the following particulars: 1) whether
the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in
motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from;
3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4)
whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp
Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of
the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and
6) the precise minutes of the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. According to the Court of
Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be
overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court
of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in fact constitute
signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the R TC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince because it
was not impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the
crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which
can be reached by car in less than an hour. 17 The dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos.
13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification
that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil
indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the
Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes
the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as
moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of
the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence
of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and
Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a
qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse
of superior strength as generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the
crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the
same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or
retaliation from the victim—19 ambush exemplifies the nature of
treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms
in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must
be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were
indeed defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together with
the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the
unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise,
fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the
crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds.
When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was
forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to the road embankment,
finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped, precluding
all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion,
but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together
with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy
with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety.
The means of execution employed was deliberately and
consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was
committed with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no
way of escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was
merely a bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He was at the
wrong place at the wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without
warning, precluding the unknowing victim from repelling the
attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no
intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means
of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional
and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray a
bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty
of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While
it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this
fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of
Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v.
Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed a person other than their
intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original
intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the
crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is
responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes.
This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in
People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended.
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused.26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in
People v. Nelmida.27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-
appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of
separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of
attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were
not the result of a single act but of several acts. 28 The doctrine in
Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime:
compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also
made a distinction that "when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a .45
caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst.
Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which,
though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus
no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and
distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall
adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v.
Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated
in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two
separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita,
the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet.
The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in
Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora
doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was
not established, a perusal of the records would reveal that
Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution
offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like
denials, are inherently weak and unreliable because they can
easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when
the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene.33 In the case at bar, Adriano claimed
he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident.
Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As admitted, Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the
crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it
was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene
at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail
when corroborated not by credible witnesses but by the accused's
relatives and friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence
which is composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot
prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as
one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, as the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty
should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in accordance
with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that
the claimant must establish with a reasonable degree of certainty,
the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable.34 Documentary evidence support the award
of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount of
actual damages as ₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records
reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be
₱232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts. 35 Therefore, we
hereby increase the award of actual damages from ₱222,482.00 to
₱232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y
SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER
(Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is
ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages,
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two
Pesos {₱232,482.00) as actual damages.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case
No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs
of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand
Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per
annum from the date of finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177218               October 3, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed.
However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal
injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur
in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting
appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information 3 for
parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or
past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident
premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts
of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old
minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter
in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby]
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death
of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter’s heirs
in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-
789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the
following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or
past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit
with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his
second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of
five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victim’s heirs in
such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant
pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide 7 and slight physical
injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon
manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the
defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales
(Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the
incident, appellant’s family was living in the conjugal home located
in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine
and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the
fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñ afrancia without the
permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.
When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the
next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay.
Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to
return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two
kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them.
Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken
so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and
Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued
beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria
stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for
her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the
house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was
staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in
Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the
right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly
thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried
to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her
efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead.
However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told
appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one,
who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.
Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the
junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As
there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met
at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant
brought his son back to their house.
Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately
buried the following day. His body was never examined by a
doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their
residence on three separate occasions without the permission of
their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told
them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might
happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were
never physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their
parents’ permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return
for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his
sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow
money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When
his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece
of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior
simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his
sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was
chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant
decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a
vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from
their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and
observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar’s eyes
were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he
wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain.
However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was
then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring
Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent
could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result
of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the
whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar
was brought to a hospital more than a year before September
2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from
epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar
froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15
minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or
when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay
captain.11 Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that
appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries in the manner described in the
Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill
Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is
found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim.
Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty
(20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as
provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein
accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and
subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in
an Order16 dated September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
Decision17 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos.
RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical
Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court
via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-
fold issues:
I that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.19
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a
disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He
believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him,
Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss
of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar
was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would
take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had
difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends
that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his
whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife,
Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this
was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of
parental discipline on children of tender years must always be
with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or
guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the
proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their
parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent
upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by
anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will
undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with
them because they left the family dwelling without permission and
was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab
thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so
much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for
the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear
that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline
the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his
anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of
Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemar’s body
slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar
lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased
from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too
late to save the child’s life. It bears stressing that a decent and
responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic
punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he
merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him.
However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of
the crime committed by the perpetrator. 20 Here, there is no doubt
appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him
physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of
the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal
liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused
his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr.
Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar
died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to
prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth
emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never examined. Also,
even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his
contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in
conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar
suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while
Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by
evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime
of parricide are present in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused."21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the
first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her
son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating
he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack
doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria,
they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the
day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate 22 was also presented in
evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second
element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently
established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria
testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger
brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside
their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but
this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree
while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part,
Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by
their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too
much for Noemar’s frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and
died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the
deceased is his child. While Noemar’s birth certificate was not
presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be
considered.23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that
he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and
likewise made the same declaration while under oath. 24 Maria also
testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her
husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in
this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not
Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence
shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay
captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by
appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous
manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture"25 which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to
prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to
inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his
face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where
the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to
produce and did actually produce the death of the victim."26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of
the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity with
current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid."28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial
court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty
imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating
circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary
surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance,
which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance,
the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not
the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.29
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant,
while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit
on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a
physician thereafter.30 Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.31
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino
Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital
who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings
were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of
Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have
been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a
wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both
wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the
patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked
how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera
answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with medication, the
injuries would heal in a week.33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive
testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by
reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the
testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical
examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera
testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one
week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon
appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of
slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in
the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium
period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789,
convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the
award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In
addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-3634               May 30, 1951
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BARTOLO SALADINO and ANASTACIA ALEJO, Defendants-
Appellant.
DECISION
BENGZON, C.:
Bartolo Saladino and Anastacio Alejo have appealed from two
decisions of the court of first instance of Ilocos Norte convicting
them of the murder of Luis Bernabe.
Accused in one information, they asked, and were granted,
separate trials. But with their consent, the prosecution presented
its evidence against both at the same time. Bartolo Saladino
submitted his defense first. Judge Manuel F. Barcelona found him
guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P6000, without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay one half of
the costs. Thereafter Anastacio Alejo presented his witnesses.
Rebuttal and sub-rebuttal testimony followed. Judge Antonio
Belmonte, convicted and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with
the accessories, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P3000 with subsidiary imprisonment and to pay on
half of the costs.
In this appeal, the appellants submitted, by their respective
counsel, two briefs, which the Solicitor-General answered in one.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of documentary
evidence and the testimony of five witnesses: Januaria Corpus, Dr.
Juan Pedro Blanco, Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Oaman and Jesus
Menor.
These related in substance the following facts and circumstances:
In the night of June 23, 1948 Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private
Anastacia Alejo of the Philippine Constabulary were resting in the
house of Celso Abucay in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, together with
policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman and George Plan of
that municipality. They had gone on patrol duty to the barrio for
the purpose of apprehending those who on a previous night had
fired upon the dwelling. About midnight they were suddenly
awakened by cries for help.
They went down and were approached by one Felix Pasion who
reported he had been robbed, one of the robbers being Luis
Bernabe. The next morning, Saladino and Alejo, accompanied by
the policemen proceeded to the house of Luis Bernabe in Barrio
Samac of San Nicolas same province. Having found the suspect,
they brought him, for questioning, to the residence of Felix Pasion
in Barrio Singao same municipality. It was about ten in the
morning. As Pasion reiterated his imputation, Saladino led
Bernabe up the house for further investigation. He was followed
by Anastacio Alejo and the policemen. Bernabe denied
the charge. To extract a confession, Saladino repeatedly boxed and
kicked him in different parts of the body. Bernabe continued
denying his guilt. Saladino got a piece of wood, two inched
thick and one yard long, and clubbed him several times on the
chest, abdomen and the back.
Then he called on Alejo to take his turn. Alejo reluctantly whipped
Bernabe four times with the branch of a tree, and then retired to
the kitchen. Saladino again questioned his prisoner and as the
latter would not admit his culpability, he repeated the severe
beating, and tying Bernabe’s wrists together with a rubber strap,
made him stand on a chair, tied the strap to a beam in the ceiling
and then pushed the chair from under Bernabe with the result that
the latter was left hanging in the air. While in that position
Bernabe was cudgeled by Saladino, with the wooden club, on the
sides, armpits, stomach, hips and back. It was at this juncture that
policeman Plan interceded for the victim saying, Stop now
corporal. Better bring him to your headquarters and there you will
investigate him”. But Saladino ignored plea, and resumed the
maltreatment, loudly predicting that Bernabe would confess
before noon. After Bernabe had remained suspended for five
minutes, Saladino untied him, made him sit on a chair and urged
him to acknowledge his offense. As Bernabe persisted in his
refusal, Saladino kicked the chair and Bernabe fell on the floor,
even as Saladino pouncing on his captive booted him several times
until the latter lay motionless on the floor. “It seems he is dead,”
Policeman Oaman exclaimed. Saladino replied “No, he is only
feigning death” and presently stepped on Bernabe’s throat and
chest. Then Saladino let him alone for fifteen minutes, during
which time Bernabe did not stir nor breathe. An old man
approaching Bernabe and taking his pulse said that the man was
dead.
Suddenly realizing his predicament, Saladino ordered two civilians
to carry Bernabe down and told Alejo: “shoot him now and we will
say that he ran away”. Complying with the corporal’s order Alejo
shot Bernabe four times with his carbine, after the latter had been
laid down flat on his stomach about thirty meters away from the
house. Three days afterwards Bernabe was intered.
Saladino lost no time preparing his defense. On that same day, June
24, he swore before the assistant fiscal an affidavit stating that,
while he was conversing with Pasion inside the house, Luis
Bernabe was downstairs under the vigilance of Anastacio Alejo;
that four shots were suddenly heard; and that Alejo, it turned out,
had fired at Bernabe because the latter had attempted to escape.
We also wrote a joint affidavit of the three policemen
corroborating his own version of the affair. He requested the said
officers to sign, and they had not the courage to decline.
However a few days afterwards the fiscal quizzed Quevedo, and
this man gave a different story: one that subsequently accorded
with the account given by the People’s witnesses during the trial.
On the witness stand, Bartolo Saladino stuck to his version, which
was corroborated by Felix Pasion, the man who having charged
Luis Bernabe, was indirectly the cause of the outrage, and who was
understandably interested in Saladino’s exoneration. However it
was rejected by the trial judge, correctly we believe, because it was
contradicted (1) by the three policemen who had no reason to
falsify (2) by the nature and direction of the wounds described by
the doctor who saw them, wounds which could not have been
inflicted while Bernabe was running away and (3) by the discovery
of one of the bullets embedded in the ground underneath the
corpse of Luis Bernabe. There is no doubt in our minds that this
man is guilty of having cruelly tortured and treacherously caused
the death of Luis Bernabe.
On the other hand Anastacio Alejo admitted having whipped and
shot Luis Bernabe upon orders of Saladino, who allegedly backed
his command to shoot by pointing his pistol at Alejo. His attorneys
also insist that Luis Bernabe was already dead when Alejo fired at
the corpse.
Of course obedience to the order of a superior official is not an
excuse where the order was not for a lawful purpose. (People v.
Bañ aga 54 Phil. 247; People v. Moreno 43 Of. Gaz. 4644)
Like the trial judge, we do not believe Alejo fired the shots at the
point of Saladino’s gun. We believe the shooting occurred in the
manner described by the prosecution witnesses.
Yet the matter of Bernabe’s moment of death is of grave doubt.
Two eye-witnesses who declared for the prosecution, namely,
policemen Quevedo and Oaman repeatedly stated on the witness
stand that after the maltreatment, and before Bernabe was carried
downstairs to be shot, he had already expired. Policeman Jorge
Plan, another eye-witness confirming Alejo’s testimony declared
that when Bernabe lay flat on the floor and did not stir, an old man
felt his pulse and pronounced him dead.
The medical expert, on the contrary, asserted that death was due
to the loss of blood occasioned by the three shots that pierced the
body of Bernabe. Alejo’s attorney-de-officio made a thorough
analysis of such testimony, pointing out that the medical
examination was superficial, because it took place a few moments
before the burial when the body was already in a “moderately
advance state of decomposition”, and that the conclusion derived
by said expert from the amount of blood in the garments worn by
the corpse which he examined were not those worn at the time of
the shooting; second because the cadaver had been embalmed and
the stains on the clothing might have been produced by the
embalming fluid that oozed out; and third because in post-mortem
wounds blood comes out too from the blood vessels. (Angeles,
Legal Medicine Sec. 105) All of which raise, at least, a doubt that
Bernabe, was already dead when shot. Such doubt must be
resolved in favor of appellant Alejo.
From the foregoing it is plain that Bernabe having died as a
consequence of the violent mauling by Saladino, the latter must be
declared guilty of assassination. Anastacio Alejo does not appear to
have conspired with him, and is not liable either as principal or as
accomplice of the murder. But he is guilty as accessory after the
fact for having performed acts tending to conceal Saladino’s crime
by making it appear that Bernabe had run away.
U.S. v. Cuison 20 Phil. 433 is a relevant example. Facundo Balangac
was shot from behind by Private Valentin Fortuna in the cemetery
of Barili, Cebu. “Some hours afterwards, the defendant Cuison with
several constabulary privates, among them Valentin Fortuna, went
by order of Lieutenant Poggi to the place where the body of the
deceased lay, and commanded the
soldiers to spread out in skirmish like and discharge their firearms
into the air; then the defendant, with the private Fortunam, went
to the house of Epimaco Sosa to ask him for a dagger to place
beside the body of a man whom they had shot, thereby to give the
appearance that the deceased had been carrying a dagger.”
This court declared the defendant Cuison guilty of accessory
after the fact saying:
“But we do find criminal liability in the acts performed by
Corporal Cuison, even though he obeyed orders from his
Lieutenant, Poggi; such liability consists in his having
intervened subsequently to the commission of the crime, by
furnishing the means to make it appear that the deceased was
armed and that it was necessary to kill him on account of his
resistance to the constabulary man, who, to lend color to such
pretended resistance, discharged their firearms into the air,
under the direction of Cuison, at the place there where the
corpse was lying; and also consists in his having tried to find a
dagger to place beside the deceased. Such acts must be
characterized as concealment, and since they are not only
wrong but also unlawful, the defendant is not exempt from
liability, even though he acted in obedience to a command
from his superior, because such command was illegal and in
conflict with law and justice. Therefore it can not be alleged
that obedience was due, or that it exempts the defendant from
criminal liability.”
As accessory after the fact, Alejo is liable to a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
of murder, namely, prision correctional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. (Art. 53 in connection with
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.)
Therefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant Saladino
accords with the law, the judgment against him is affirmed, with
costs.
As to appellant Alejo the appealed decision is revoked and one will
be entered sentencing him to imprisonment for not less than 3
years of prision correctional nor more than six years and two
months, of prision mayor; and in case of insolvency of Saladino to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of his own inability to pay. No
costs against this appellant. So ordered.
(SGD) CESAR BENGZON
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103119. October 21, 1992.]
SULPICIO INTOD, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him
guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a
land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner,
Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and
her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No
one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was
hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by
witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the
premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic)
you were not injured".  . . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted
murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner
seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding
him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room
on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made
the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues
that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent.
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out
that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art.
3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code.
This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have
set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the
result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible.
So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him criminally liable. 
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected.  The
Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in
the offender his formidability,  and now penalizes an act which
were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out
with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is
to punish such criminal tendencies.  One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus
of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment.  There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act  in order to qualify the act an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime.  Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
(1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.  circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime.  One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention
to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.  control of the party.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the
place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality,
the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.
In People vs. Lee Kong,  the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and
fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It
turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court
convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the
attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet
pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well
settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the
criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be
operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor
at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State,  where the accused failed to
accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not
pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him
liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . .
It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous
he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder.
This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed,
either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as
to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the
impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the
In the case of Clark vs. State,  the court held defendant liable for
attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing
of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
 It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves
punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the
punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was
really present or not. The community suffers from the mere
alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted)
as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other
words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be
carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the
window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside.
However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the
house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied
upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of
attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely
upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
difference between the Philippine and the American laws
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2),
expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it
provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said
Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility.  In U.S. vs. Wilson the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is
no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be
invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S.
vs. Berrigan,  the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle
letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made
the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the
warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without
the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the
warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the
accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of
impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as
suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In
disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal
statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act
which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent
plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt
irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such
legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be
committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender
cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt
to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt
are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as
an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the
other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime —
neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only
reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a
defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible
crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was
Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby
GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We
hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and
degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162540 : July 13, 2009]
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003,
affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft,
and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de
Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the
crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of
MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by
JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the
aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence
reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in
the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer
Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of
₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found
to be more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as
follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as
Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check
Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of
₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of
Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the
latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam,
received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from one of
their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if
she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam,
instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check
payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle.
The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO
check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former
employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform
Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding
the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and
relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not
have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a
neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega
Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby
Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace
the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take
the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the
advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the
owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able
to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check
for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that,
sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to
tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from company
records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to
Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid
Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for
the dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted
depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but
explained that the check came into his possession when some
unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July
1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in
exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the
identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by
the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he
didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation
with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by
the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was
tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's
house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO check,
handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to
proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with
cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to
meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house,
where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her
husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she
decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband,
Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from
the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that
she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she
actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00
marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca
divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00
each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the
Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and
dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner
and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal
case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was
later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject
check and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped
collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before
her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on
the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house,
where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany
her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was
going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital,
Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her
husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan
City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait
in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino,
and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her
lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega
Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her
job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the
morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the
phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca)
to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do
so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did
not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to
said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother,
rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca
alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten
minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave
her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI
agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on
October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De
Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of
them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5)
YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY
(20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a
Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads,
thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court
is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4
months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision
was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same
was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not
charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft;
and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence
to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft defined
under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the
fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the
customer's check payment to her employer and, instead,
appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another
− the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain –
this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further
shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank
account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the
owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the
check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the
check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things
– the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer,
as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was
done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly
entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of
the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the
theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is
to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article
309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check
belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without
value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises
on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the
present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person,
peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended
victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial
court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon
review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of
the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions
of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall
be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis
supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the
crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has
already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person
are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him,
the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2)
that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by
the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus
of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or
(2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that
involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but
gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of
factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be
denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time,
that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the
₱5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court
held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of theft in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative
act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of
personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held,
thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article
308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the
law — that theft is already “produced” upon the “tak[ing of]
personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but
certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there
is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of
the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone
has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the
time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment
in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check
was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give
cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check
had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft
is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the
theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the
dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and
separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the
Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it
would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all,
that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its
Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

C. Article 5 – Duty of the Court in connection with Acts Which
Should be Represses but Which are Not covered
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner
Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September
5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with
modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private
complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces
of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at
the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or,
if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The
period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the
sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant
was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of
estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received
from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth
₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth
₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth
₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on
the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in
possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying
with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands,
the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit
the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo
Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the
lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of
Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of
extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made,
they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in
1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed
that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary
mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to
indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the
appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch
46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable
prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of
7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed
with this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING
THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE
MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED,
IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS
MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE
PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS
PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND
APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed
to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently
established the designation of the offense and the acts complained
of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the
crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive,
and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings
of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally
devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is
of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of
the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural
and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991
marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was
merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA
also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the
formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that
the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the
crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance
in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is
true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient
of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date
of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states
the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the
case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance
with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the
offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991"
is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise
time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission
thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render
the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is
also near the due date within which accused-appellant should
have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient
compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot
now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the
charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which
reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8
 No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be
demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. 12 As
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay expounded in Asejo v. People:13
them. Thus:
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that
PROS. MARTINEZ demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written.
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to
transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir. When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a
q For whom? written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so.
a Lito Corpuz, sir. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
q Were you able to look (sic) for him? meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
a I looked for him for a week, sir. failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence
q Did you know his residence? is not fatal.
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there? In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired
a Yes, sir. about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query
q Did you find him? was tantamount to a demand, thus:
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition
a I talked to him, sir. precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so
q How many times? happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
a Two times, sir. property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
q What did you talk (sic) to him? misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution
asked him where the items are and he promised me that he will was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime.
pay these amount, sir. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust,
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991
him partially or full? with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days,
a No, sir.9 if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to
remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale
took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or
after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the
rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and
binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such
finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses
are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was
deliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity of
imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came
up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value
of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised
Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no
unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were
invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions
on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean
Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor
Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista
appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the
matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided
for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render
the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately
presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for
acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the
court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper
decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the
subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable
act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus,
the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to
make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second
paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein
the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty
is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence
but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the
proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo
B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely
to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen,
nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable
act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body
does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal
sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish
such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the
execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report
the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice
Carolina C. Griñ o-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal
Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the
humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with mercy.
Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or
justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the
penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of
particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are
questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ;
but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in
all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within
the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the
Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes
against property be based on the current inflation rate or at the
ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the
definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the
penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will
not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law.
Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as
a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present
legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties
in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the
legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter
the further commission of those punishable acts which have
increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves
of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the
coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder,
from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered,
the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the
legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-
Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to
₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the
present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the
proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of
the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos
but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft
is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not
over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the
above-provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing
stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor
in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that
under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as
the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum
penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty
is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2
months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may
even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that
the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive.
The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value
of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in
the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty
imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed
and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value
would be modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
₱2,200,000.00, punished by arison mayor minimum to arison
mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to
₱1,200,000.00, punished by arison correccional medium and
to arison correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to
₱600,000.00, punishable by ra ison correccional minimum to
ra ison correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor medium to arison correccional
minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor
minimum to arresto mayor medium.
X x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value
would also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as
follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to
₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum
to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months).26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to
₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our
esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided
under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which
is determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR)
does not rest on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have
been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates
the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit
estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals
₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who
steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite;
and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is
limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno
and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what
then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the
thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems
that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to
refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent DEAN DIOKNO:
power to legislate laws. ….then….
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as
IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus: unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount …
xxxx DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA: No, Your Honor.
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty JUSTICE PERALTA:
should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd. … as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of
DEAN DIOKNO: Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and DEAN DIOKNO:
unusual punishment. No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the The Court cannot do that.
amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO: Could not be.
Well, that would be for Congress to … if this Court will declare the JUSTICE PERALTA:
incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would … the The only remedy is to go to Congress…
void should be filled by Congress. DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One JUSTICE PERALTA:
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos … … and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen … (interrupted) Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year
of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right? DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO: Yes, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory JUSTICE PERALTA:
interpretation. The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00)
JUSTICE PERALTA: Pesos.
Ah … Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of Thank you.
the law… x x x x29
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de … (interrupted)
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v.
Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme
Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the
duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein
ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence
is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature
and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2)
Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the
same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the
present case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed
cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota
after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the
original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the
maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true
that the imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless,
the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime,
the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing
the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s
loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty
to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the crime
and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the
penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed
by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred
pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the
Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender.
Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00
(under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and
the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may
not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00
compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a
special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3, 31 wherein the injury
caused to the government is not generally defined by any
monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This
should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the
public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle
the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of
the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the
cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if
we increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in
the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of
the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not
exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where
entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is
the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of
prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is
unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not
merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise
the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329,
the highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months)
if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the
proposal, the value of the damage will now become ₱100,000.00
(1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day
to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less
than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if
the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be
estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become
₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under
the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine
under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in
nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light
felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be
grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same
through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be
legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC
that may also be affected by the proposal, such as those that
impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value
of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of
the National Library and National Museum), Article 312
(Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article
316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor),
Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious
mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a
penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against
the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer),
Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts),
Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render
accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC.
It will also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal
laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest
products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent
to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty
imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the
timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we
accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular
crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is
concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and
310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the
soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions
of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed
to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this
Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the
framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such
is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature
which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter,
consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or
other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the
times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to
amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel
for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56)
bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised
Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and
updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when
the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law
in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under
the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel,
or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially
when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this
would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a
penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to
the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
 assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended
party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the
victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by
the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the
value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in
some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the
adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article
2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can
be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the
Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the
mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be
adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the
offense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However,
all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether
or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a
matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the
courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not
subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly
written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio
Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should
be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00,
regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended
by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the
crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper
penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter
to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the
dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by
virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in December 1993. The said law
has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no
punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time
the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did not impede the imposition
of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment"
within the purview of Section 19 (1), 42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress
suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-
imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on
Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic
proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed
Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even
issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to
unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character determine the value of Peso you have to take into consideration
of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or several factors.
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has PROFESSOR TADIAR:
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the Yes.
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on JUSTICE PERALTA:
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment Per capita income.
would not thus be within the prohibition.44 PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of JUSTICE PERALTA:
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Consumer price index.
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the PROFESSOR TADIAR:
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in Yeah.
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the JUSTICE PERALTA:
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly Inflation ...
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral PROFESSOR TADIAR:
sense of the community."45 Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to ... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those
amend the law and adapt it to our modern time. factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso
merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present can be determined utilizing all of those economic terms.
value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are JUSTICE PERALTA:
other factors and variables that need to be taken into Yeah, but ...
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to
pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order
to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to
the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to
dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus,
in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years
ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past
taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not
delving into the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is
no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes
against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light
of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides,
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the
Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead
to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress
and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.
With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The
same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated,
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several
other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum
amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed.
Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the
CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling
in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not
three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires
the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal
portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions,
the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty,
prisió n correccional maximum to prisió n mayor minimum should
be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article
6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is
₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum
penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article
315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of
₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more
than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for
each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would
be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform
its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt
Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting
laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut
by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare
trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed
is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE
(3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this
Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.