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Safety

Edition January 2011


The Airbus Safety Magazine

CONTENT:
q What is stall?
How a pilot should react
in front of a stall situation
q Minimum control speed tests
on A380
q Radio Altimeter erroneous values
q Automatic NAV engagement
at Go Around

Issue 11
2 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Safety First
The Airbus Safety Magazine
For the enhancement of safe flight through
increased knowledge and communications

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ty information for the restricted use standards or recommended practices, to make editorial changes to manu-
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tor’s aircraft or supersede or amend be addressed to:
any Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, Airbus
Material for publication is FCOM, MEL documentation or any Product Safety department (GS)
obtained from multiple sources other approved documentation. 1, rond point Maurice Bellonte
and includes selected informa-
31707 Blagnac Cedex - France
tion from the Airbus Flight Safety
Contact: Nils FAYAUD
Confidential Reporting System, Articles may be reprinted without
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The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 3

Yannick MALINGE
Chief Product Safety Officer

Editorial

For those of you who knew Yves Benoist, it is my sad


Contents
duty to inform you that Yves passed away suddenly, The Airbus Safety Magazine
at the end of December.

Yves held the position of Vice-President Flight Safety Information ......................................................... 4


at Airbus for 16 years, before retiring in 2004.

Throughout my time working with him, he passed on What is stall?


three main lessons: investigations require rigor, thorough How a pilot should react
in front of a stall situation. . ............................... 5
technical understanding and patience. These lessons
remain valid today, despite the greater challenge imposed Jacques Rosay
by today’s environment.

Minimum control speed tests on A380............. 11


In addition to this, Yves stressed the importance of the
dissemination of information and sharing of lessons Claude Lelaie
learnt. This led him, in 1994, to launch the annual Airbus
Flight Safety Conference as well as the Airbus Safety
Magazine, Hangar Flying (now Safety First), which are Radio Altimeter erroneous values..................... 15
still today the most visible part of Yves’ heritage. Marc Baillion / Lorraine De Baudus

Our thoughts at this time are with Yves’ family. I have no


doubt you will join me in appreciation of his remarkable Automatic NAV engagement at Go Around....... 19
achievements.
Stéphane Granger / Eric Jeanpierre

Today, our challenge is to build upon Yves’ legacy.

Let me wish you a happy new year, to you and your


family.

Yannick MALINGE
Chief Product Safety Officer
4 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety
Nils Fayaud
Director Product Safety Information

Information
Magazine distribution Safety Information on the Airbus
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News SAVE THE DATE


17th
Rome, 21-24 March 2011

Following the successful event in The formal invitations with As always we welcome presentations
Brussels, in March of this year, we infor­mation regarding registration from you, the conference is a forum
are pleased to announce that the 17th and logistics and the preliminary for everybody to share information.
Flight Safety Conference will take agenda have been sent to our If you have something you believe will
place in Rome, Italy, from 21st to 24th customers in December 2010. benefit other operators and/or Airbus
of March 2011. or need additional invitations or infor-
mation, please contact Nuria Soler at:
The Flight Safety Conference e-mail:  nuria.soler@airbus.com
provides an excellent forum for the fax: +33 (0) 5 61 93 44 29
exchange of information between
Airbus and customers. The event
is a dedicated forum for all Airbus
operators. We do not accept outside
parties. This ensures that we can
have an open dialogue to promote
flight safety across the fleet.
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 5

Jacques ROSAY
VP Chief Test Pilot

What is stall?
How a pilot should
react in front of
a stall situation
Lift is function of
1. Introduction • Speed
• Density
Angle of • Wing area
The worldwide air transport fleet • Angle of Attack
has recently encountered a number Attack
of stall events, which indicate that Relative wind
this phenomenon may not be prop-
erly understood and managed in
the aviation community. As a con- Cho
rd li
sequence, the main aircraft manu- ne
facturers have agreed together to The lift coefficient increases
amend their stall procedures and to as a function of the Angle of
reinforce the training. A working Attack (AoA) up to a value, called
group gathering Authorities and Maximum lift, where it starts to
aircraft manufacturers will publish decrease.
recommendations for harmonized
procedures and appropriate train-
ing. This article aims at reminding
the aerodynamic phenomenon as- Maximum
sociated to the stall, and the recent- Lift
ly published new procedures.
Lift

2. The lift
A wing generates a lift equal to
1/2ρSV²Cl.

With: Angle of Attack


ρ = air density
S = wing surface reference For a given configuration, a given
V = True Air Speed speed and a given altitude, the lift is
Cl = lift coefficient of the wing only linked to the AoA.
6 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

3. The stall
phenomenum
The linear part of the curve corre- Beyond this point, the lift decreases
sponds to a steady airflow around as the flow is separated from the wing
the wing. profile. The wing is stalled.

6°, steady flow

separated
flow

CI CI
Not stalled Stalled Not stalled Stalled
Maximum Maximum
lift lift

Lift Lift

Critical Angle Critical Angle


of Attack of Attack

Angle of Attack AoA Angle of Attack AoA

When the AoA reaches the value of On this picture (extracted from a
the maximum Cl, the airflow starts video footage), the erratic positions of
to separate. the flow cones on this A380 wing
during a stall test show that the flow is
separated.
stall point, maximum lift
separated point

CI
Not stalled Stalled
Maximum
lift

Lift

Critical Angle
of Attack

Angle of Attack AoA


The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 7

4. Some important Figure 1


In NORMAL LAW,
CI
Not stalled Stalled
things to remember the EFCS limits the
AoA to a value lower Maximum
about the stall than AoA STALL
lift

q For a given configuration and at Lift


a given Mach number, a wing stalls
at a given Angle of Attack (AoA)
called AoA STALL. When the
Mach number increases, the value AoA
of the AoA STALL decreases.
MAX Critical Angle
q When approaching the AoA of Attack
STALL, the wing generates a cer-
tain level of buffeting, which tends
Angle of Attack AoA
to increase in level at high Mach
number. Figure 2
In ALTERNATE and CI
q When the AoA increases and ap- DIRECT LAW, the aural Not stalled Stalled
proaches the AoA STALL, in cer- Stall Warning is set
at a value lower than Maximum
tain cases, a phenomenon of pitch AoA STALL lift
up occurs as a result of a change
in the distribution of the lift along
the wingspan. The effect of the Lift
pitch up is a self-tendency of the
aircraft to increase its Angle of At-
tack without further inputs on the
elevators. Generally, for a given
AoA
wing, this phenomenon occurs at a Stall Warning Critical Angle
lower Angle of Attack and is more of Attack
prominent when the Mach number
is higher. Angle of Attack AoA
q The only mean to counter the
pitch up is to apply a nose down The EFCS adjusts the AoA MAX the protections against the stall.
elevator input. limitation to account for the Depending on the nature of the fail-
reduction of the AoA STALL with ure, they revert to ALTERNATE
q When the aerodynamic flow on increasing Mach number. LAW or to DIRECT LAW.
the wing is stalled, the only possi-
ble mean to recover a normal flow Equally, for a given Mach number In both cases, the pilot has to en-
regime is to decrease the AoA at a and a given AoA, the EFCS takes sure the protection against the stall,
value lower than the AoA STALL. into account the natural pitch based upon the aural Stall Warning
up effect of the wing for this (SW), or a strong buffeting which,
q Stall is an AoA problem only. It
Mach number and this AoA, and if encountered, is an indication of
is NOT directly a speed issue. applies on the elevators the appro- an incipient stall condition.
Knowing those two last character- priate longitudinal pre-command The conventional aircraft are
istics is absolutely paramount, as to counter its effect. permanently in DIRECT LAW, and
they dictate the only possible way
regarding the stall protection, they
to get out of a stall.
are in the same situation as the
6. Protections FBW aircraft in DIRECT LAW.
5. Protections against the stall in In both ALTERNATE and
against the stall in alternate and DIRECT LAW, the aural SW is set

normal law on direct law on at a value called AoA Stall Warn-


ing (AoA SW), which is lower than
fbw aircraft FBW and conven- the AoA STALL (fig. 2).
tional aircraft The triggering of the Stall Warn-
In NORMAL LAW, the Electronic ing just means that the AoA has
Flight Controls System (EFCS) On FBW aircraft, following cer- reached the AoA SW, which is
takes into account the actual AoA tain malfunctions, in particular in by definition lower than the AoA
and limits it to a value (AoA MAX) case of sensor or computer failure, STALL, and that the AoA has to be
lower than AoA STALL (fig. 1). the flight controls cannot ensure reduced.
8 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Knowing what the SW is, there is For those reasons, when in ALTER- many cases (this will be developed
no reason to overreact to its trigger- NATE or DIRECT LAW, it is rec- in the following chapter).
ing. It is absolutely essential for the ommended to fly at a cruise flight In addition, it is to be noticed that,
pilots to know that the onset of the level lower than the maximum rec- at high altitude, the effect of the
aural Stall Warning does not mean ommended. A 4,000 ft margin is to thrust increase on the speed rise is
that the aircraft is stalling, that be considered. Then, for the same very slow, so that the phenomenom
there is no reason to be scared, and cruise Mach number, the IAS will described above for the clean con-
that just a gentle and smooth reac- be higher, the AoA will be lower, figuration is exacerbated.
tion is needed. and therefore the AoA margin
towards AoA SW will be signifi- Obviously, such a procedure leads
The value of the AoA SW depends to potentially unrecoverable situ-
on the Mach number. At high Mach cantly increased.
ations if it is applied once the air-
number, the AoA SW is set at a In addition, as in RVSM space the craft has reached the aerodynamic
value such that the warning occurs use of the AP is mandatory, any stall (see next chapter).
just before encountering the pitch failures leading to the loss of the
up effect and the buffeting. AP mandates to descend below the Even if the traditional procedure
RVSM vertical limit. can work in certain conditions if
If the anemometric information the pilot reacts immediately to the
used to set the AoA SW is erro- SW, or if he is not too adamant on
neous, the SW will not sound at
the proper AoA. In that case, as 8. Stall Warning keeping the altitude, the major is-
sue comes from the fact that once
mentioned above, the clue indicat- and stall the Stall Warning threshold has
ing the approach of the stall is the been crossed, it is difficult to know
strong buffeting. In the remainder The traditional approach to stall if the aircraft is still approaching to
of this document, for this situa- training consisted in a controlled stall or already stalled. Difference
tion, “SW” must be read as “strong deceleration to the Stall Warning, between an approach to stall and an
buffeting”. followed by a power recovery with
actual stall is not easy to determine,
minimum altitude loss.
even for specialists.
Experience shows that if the pilot
7. Margin to the is determined to maintain the alti-
Several accidents happened where
the “approach to stall” procedure
Stall Warning in tude, this procedure may lead to the
was applied when the aircraft was
cruise at high stall.
A practical exercise done in flight
actually stalled.
Mach number and in DIRECT LAW on an A340-600
For those reasons, the pilots should
react the same way for both “ap-
high altitude and well reproduced in the simula-
proach to stall” and “stall” situations.
tor consists in performing a low alti-
Typically, in cruise at high Mach tude level flight deceleration at idle
number and high altitude, at or
close to the maximum recom-
until the SW is triggered, and then to
push the THR levers to TOGA while
9. How to react
mended FL, there is a small mar- continuing to pull on the stick in or- What is paramount is to decrease
gin between the actual cruise AoA der to maintain the altitude. the AoA. This is obtained directly
and the AoA STALL. Hence, in The results of such a manoeuvre by decreasing the pitch order.
ALTERNATE or DIRECT LAW, are:
the margin with the AoA SW is The pitch control is a direct AoA
even smaller. q In clean configuration, even if command (fig. 3).
the pilot reacts immediately to the The AoA decrease may be obtained
The encounter of turbulence in- SW by commanding TOGA, when
duces quick variations of the AoA. indirectly by increasing the speed,
the thrust actually reaches TOGA but adding thrust in order to increase
As a consequence, when the air- (20 seconds later), the aircraft
craft is flying close to the maxi- the speed leads to an initial adverse
stalls. longitudinal effect, which trends to
mum recommended altitude, it is
not unlikely that turbulence might q In approach configuration, if the increase further the AoA (fig. 4).
induce temporary peaks of AoA pilot reacts immediately to the SW, It is important to know that if such
going beyond the value of the AoA the aircraft reaches AoA stall -2°. a thrust increase was applied when
SW leading to intermittent onsets q In approach configuration, if the the aircraft is already stalled, the
of aural SW. pilot reacts with a delay of 2 sec- longitudinal effect would bring the
Equally, in similar high FL cruise onds to the SW, the aircraft stalls. aircraft further into the stall, to a
conditions, in particular at turbulence This shows that increasing the situation possibly unrecoverable.
speed, if the pilot makes significant thrust at the SW in order to increase Conversely, the first effect of re-
longitudinal inputs, it is not unlikely the speed and hence to decrease the ducing the thrust is to reduce the
that it reaches the AoA SW value. AOA is not the proper reaction in AoA (fig. 5).
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 9

Figure 3
Pitch control
is a direct
AoA command

Relati
ve airf
low

Figure 4
Adding thrust
leads to an
increase in AoA

Relati
ve airf
crease low
Thrust in

Figure 5
Reducing thrust
leads to a
decrease in AoA

Relati
Thrust reduction ve airf
low

In summary:
10. Procedure
FIRST: The AoA MUST BE RE- to gently push on the stick so as to
DUCED. If anything, release the decrease the pitch attitude by about As an answer to the stall situation,
back pressure on stick or column two or three degrees in order to de- a working group gathering the FAA
and apply a nose down pitch input crease the AoA below the AoA SW. and the main aircraft manufactur-
until out of stall (no longer have During manoeuvres, the reduction ers, including Airbus, ATR, Boeing,
stall indications). In certain cases, of the AoA is generally obtained Bombardier and Embraer, have es-
an action in the same direction on just by releasing the backpressure tablished a new generic procedure
the longitudinal trim may be need- on the stick; applying a progres- titled “Stall Warning or Aerody-
ed. Don’t forget that thrust has an sive forward stick inputs ensures a namic Stall Recovery Procedure”
adverse effect on AoA for aircraft quicker reduction of the AoA. applicable to all aircraft types.
with engines below the wings. If the SW situation occurs with This generic procedure will be pub-
SECOND: When the stall clues high thrust, in addition to the stick lished as an annex to the FAA AC 120.
have disappeared, increase the reaction, reducing the thrust may
This new procedure has been estab-
speed if needed. Progressively be necessary.
lished in the following spirit:
increase the thrust with care, due to
the thrust pitch effect. q One single procedure to cover
ALL stall conditions
In practice, in straight flight with-
out stick input, the first reaction q Get rid of TOGA as first action
when the SW is triggered should be q Focus on AoA reduction.
10 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Generic Stall Warning or Revision of Airbus’ Operational documentation


Aerodynamic Stall Recovery Procedure
Immediately do the following at the first indication of Airbus has updated its operational documentation in order to reflect
the changes introduced by the new generic stall recovery procedures.
stall (buffet, stick shaker, stick pusher, or aural or visual
In order to allow simultaneous fleetwide introduction, the procedure
indication) during any flight phases except at lift off. was provided via Temporary Revision.
This information was provided together with an FCTM update
1. Autopilot and autothrottle.............................. Disconnect advance copy and FOT 999.0044/10, on May 12, 2010.
Rationale: While maintaining the attitude of the aircraft,
disconnect the autopilot and autothrottle. Ensure A300:
A300 FCOM volume 8GE Temporary Revision number 219-1
the pitch attitude does not change adversely when A300 FCOM volume 8PW Temporary Revision number 051-1
disconnecting the autopilot. This may be very im- A300 QRH Temporary Revision number 076-1
portant in mis-trim situations. Manual control is
essential to recovery in all situations. Leaving one A300FFCC:
or the other connected may result in in-advertent A300FFCC FCOM volume 2 Temporary Revision number 052-1
changes or adjustments that may not be easily A300FFCC QRH Temporary Revision number 025-1
recognized or appropriate, especially during high A300-600/A300-600F:
workload situations. A300-600/A300-600F FCOM volume 2 Temporary Revision number 002-2
A300-600/A300-600F QRH Temporary Revision number 217-1
2. a) Nose down pitch control… Apply until out of stall
(no longer have stall indications) A310:
A310 FCOM volume 2 Temporary Revision number 004-2
b) Nose down pitch trim................................... As needed
A310 QRH Temporary Revision number 224-1
Rationale: a ) The priority is reducing the angle of attack.
A318/319/320/321:
There have been numerous situations where flight FCOM volume 3 Temporary Revision number 323-1
crews did not prioritize this and instead prioritized QRH Temporary Revision number 727-1
power and maintaining altitude. This will also
address autopilot induced full back trim. A330:
FCOM volume 3 Temporary Revision number 552-1
b) If the control column does not provide the QRH Temporary Revision number 353-1
needed response, stabilizer trim may be necessary.
However, excessive use of trim can aggravate the A340:
condition, or may result in loss of control or in high FCOM volume 3 Temporary Revision number 512-1 (A340-200/-300)
structural loads. FCOM volume 3 Temporary Revision number 513-1 (A340-500/-600)
QRH Temporary Revision number 369-1
3. Bank................................................................Wings Level
A380:
Rationale: This orientates the lift vector for recovery. FCOM Procedures / Non-ECAM Abnormal and Emergency Procedures /
Operating Techniques
4. Thrust................................................................As Needed
Rationale: D
 uring a stall recovery, many times maximum
power is not needed. When stalling, the thrust can
be at idle or at high thrust, typically at high altitude.
Therefore, the thrust is to be adjusted accordingly
during the recovery. For engines installed below
the wing, applying maximum thrust can create a
strong nose up pitching moment, if speed is low.
For aircraft with engines mounted above the wings,
thrust application creates a helpful pitch down
tendency. For propeller driven aircraft, thrust
application energizes the air flow around the wing,
assisting in stall recovery.
5. Speed Brakes..........................................................Retract
Rationale: This will improve lift and stall margin.
6. Bank................................................................Wings Level
Rationale: Apply gentle action for recovery to avoid second-
ary stalls then return to desired flight path.
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 11

Claude LELAIE
Special Advisor to CEO

Minimum control
speed tests on A380
When the aircraft has an engine Everything is not black and white dynamic tests, as it can lead very
shut down with the 3 others at and it is not because the aircraft quickly to a loss of control, due to
maximum thrust, it has a tendency is flying below a VMC that con- the rapid build up of side slip. Such
to yaw toward the “failed” engine. trol will always be lost or that a an event occurred a very long time
The pilot can deflect the rudder and crash will inevitably occur. But ago in a test flight, but fortunately
create a yaw moment in the other what is sure is that, when reach- control was immediately recovered
direction in order to maintain the ing the VMC, the pilot is on a and then modifications were made
heading. However, when the speed limit of manoeuvrability and he to the flight controls to reduce dras-
is decreasing the engines create cannot do what he wants freely in tically this risk. Anyway, we have
more or less the same yaw, but the a manoeuvring sense. Some rules to be very cautious in the execu-
aerodynamic efficiency of the fin of determination of the VMCs tion of these tests and they are only
and the rudder are reducing. At a are rather strange, and it is diffi- performed by well experienced test
given speed, with wings level, the cult to understand which logic is pilots.
rudder is on the stop and just able behind that. Nevertheless they
to counter the effect of the engines. have been applied for a very long
Then, we could say that we have time and their validity has been Measurement of VMCs is not a
reached some kind of minimum proven by the long experience on key priority at the beginning of
control speed as it is a limit of a huge number of flight hours on the development of a long range
manoeuvrability. all aircraft types. For all VMC air- aircraft. The reason is that all
borne, there is first a static demon- these speeds are rather low and
stration of the value, followed by therefore do not affect takeoff and
On any multi-engine aircraft, dynamic tests to show that the ma- landing performances, except for
below the Minimum Control noeuvrability remains sufficient operations at very low weights.
speeds (VMC), there is a risk of at this speed. VMCG is obtained This is not penalizing for an air-
losing the control of the plane in only by a dynamic exercise. craft like the A380. However, it
the case of failure of one engine is always useful to perform some
(outer for a quad) with the other(s) measurements at an early stage of
at maximum thrust. There are By nature, determinations of
VMCA and VMCL are risky flight the flight program to be sure that
several VMC: for takeoff configu- we will not have a bad surprise,
rations, it is called VMCA (A for tests, as one engine is shut down at
very low altitude. On a twin, the which might have an impact on
Airborne), for approach, VMCL (L performances at higher weight
failure of the “live” engine gives
for Landing). On a quad, another than expected or could necessitate
just enough time to relight the
one, VMCL-2, is associated with a modification of the design of the
other one. On a quad, the situation
the failure of 2 engines on the same flight controls.
is different, as in the event of the
side, in the approach configuration.
loss of the other engine on the same
It has to be demonstrated for certi-
side as the “failed” one, the thrust
fication, although this last situation For the A380, we had an issue to
on the remaining engines must be
is mainly considered when taking start these tests as, during the first
reduced immediately to avoid a
off for a ferry flight on 3 engines, month of flights, we discovered
loss of control.
without passengers, and if unfortu- that the vertical fin had to be modi-
nately a failure happens on the oth- fied. Due to the delay necessary for
er engine of the same side. Finally, However, the risk of failure of this modification, it was decided to
there is a VMC covering the case of another engine during these tests postpone VMCs determination by
the ground acceleration at takeoff. has a very low probability. The several weeks, until we receive the
It is called VMCG (G for Ground). critical issue is the execution of the improved fin.
12 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Figure 1
VMCA determination

5° bank angle

1. VMCA, VMCL, and here we will just show one ex-


ample for the VMCL. At this speed,
at the end of May 2006, unfortu-
nately in weather conditions not
VMCL-2 the rolling capacity is reduced on ideal for these types of measure-
the side of the deflection of the rud- ments. Some days later, with better
When engines and systems are der (at the opposite of the “failed” weather, a second flight allowed us
configured, we start about 20 kt engine). The rule is that it must be to confirm the results and also to
above the predicted value, then, we possible to go from 5° bank angle perform VMCL-2 tests. A third and
decelerate slowly keeping head- on the side of the rudder deflection, final flight was dedicated to certifi-
ing constant. Necessary rudder up to 25° in less than 5 seconds. cation. Usually, on other programs,
increases as the speed decreases, Whatever the type of aircraft, there all these tests are performed direct-
eventually up to the stop. Further are risks in this test as the side slip ly with the Authorities on board.
deceleration will need some bank is building up very quickly, be- However, due to some particu-
to still keep the heading constant. cause it cannot be compensated by larities of the aircraft, the decision
The “true” VMCA is obtained the yaw damper, the rudder being was made to perform preliminary
when the bank angle reaches 5° in already on the stop. When passing flights to be sure that there was no
the opposite sense to the “failed” 25° bank, the recovery must be im- issue with what was going to be
engine (fig. 1). This bank angle is mediate and very smooth, with the presented for certification.
very important as it allows a further engines reduced to idle, the speed
speed reduction of about 5 to 10 There was no surprise coming
increased and the side slip carefully
kt, compared to the same test per- from these flights and the VMCA,
minimized. At the very beginning
formed with wings levelled. Where VMCL and VMCL-2 values were
of the Fly By Wire programs, there
is this strange rule coming from? found to be as expected.
was plenty of roll capability at low
It is a mystery! Maybe that, in the speed. But in order to avoid reach-
old times, when reliable flight test
installations where not existing,
ing too high side slip, the roll rate
commanded by the pilot was divid-
2. VMCG
somebody had imagined to have ed by 2 to be limited at 7.5 deg/s at
some tolerance on the bank angle, The VMCG is established with a
low speed when the flight controls dynamic test. The aircraft is ac-
because it is true that a perfect sta- computers detect a large asymme-
bilization of the bank angle is diffi- celerated with all engines at maxi-
try in thrust. This roll rate allows mum thrust, with the nose wheel
cult when the rudder is on the stop. this test to be passed with almost
In doing so, he put some knots “in steering disconnected to simulate
no margin. The available roll effi- a wet or contaminated runway. At
his pocket”! Then the tradition has ciency to react to turbulence is not
been kept and officialised. This hy- a given speed, the outer engine is
modified. shut down with the master lever.
pothesis could explain the choice
of this odd 5° value. The pilot must try to minimize the
There are some other specific dy- lateral excursion, using the rudder
The tests to obtain VMCL and (fig. 2). As for the VMCA, at high
VMCL-2 are similar. namic tests at VMCA, but the dem-
onstration is straightforward for speed a small deflection is needed.
But there is more to do. A demon- our aircraft. But at low speed, even with full
stration that the roll manoeuvrabil- rudder, there could be a signifi-
ity at VMC is sufficient must be cant deviation. By definition, the
performed. The rules are slightly The first VMCA and VMCL test VMCG is the shut down speed for
different for VMCA and VMCL flight on A380 were performed which the deviation is 30 ft.
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 13

This test must be performed in per- In fact, we try to have at least one It is important to have always the
fect weather conditions, because result above 30 ft to be able to in- same pilot doing the same action
even a very light cross wind or terpolate back to the VMCG, but as, if there is a bias in the shut
some small turbulence can have we have to be careful as around down speed, it is most probably go-
an impact on the results. Generally VMCG, the lateral deviation is ing to be the same for all tests and
the flight test is planned at sunrise. very sensitive to the engine cut-off the speed decrease is going to be
The first test is usually not critical, speed. as progressive as planned. Data re-
as the shut down speed is about 10 During this series of tests, the pilot duction will then allow the analysis
kt above the planned VMCG. Then in the left hand seat is in charge of team to determine the right value.
some more trials are performed In the cockpit, on the jump seat,
the trajectory. He tries to minimize
with a progressive reduction of the a test flight engineer monitors the
the deviation and then completes
shut down speed, by steps of 3, 2 or engines and is in charge of the spe-
the takeoff when the maximum de-
even 1 kt, depending on the results. cific relight procedures generally
viation has been reached. The pilot
Most of the time, after about 6 given by the engine Manufacturers,
in the right hand seat shuts down
tests, the 30 ft deviation is reached. following such shut downs at maxi-
the engine at the planned value.
mum thrust.
As for the VMCA, most of the
Figure 2
VMCG test time, these tests are directly used
for certification, with an EASA
pilot in the left hand seat and an
Airbus pilot on the right. One of the
Rotation reasons for minimising the number
of times these tests are done, is
that repeating several shut downs
at maximum thrust is damaging
for an engine and we try to reduce
this risk. However, for the A380,
due to numerous new systems fea-
Maximum lateral deviation reached tures and some uncertainties on the
predictions, we decided to perform
a first evaluation ourselves. The
initial results demonstrated that we
were right.
The first VMCG flight could only
be performed after the installa-
tion of the modified fin and it took
x (m)

place on March 30th 2006. Takeoff


weight was 450 tons, configuration
3 and the predicted VMCG was
122 kt. As usual, we decided to per-
Full left rudder pedal input form the first test with the engine
shut down at 132 kt, 10 kt above
Engine # 4 shutdown the predicted value. It was planned
to “fail” the right outer engine,
therefore we lined up the aircraft
10 meters on the left of the centre
line. To help, we have on one of the
Toulouse runways, full length blue
lines at 5 and 10 meters on each
side. This makes it easier for the
handling pilot to keep precisely the
distance from the centre line during
the acceleration. The right engine
was shut down at 132 kt as planned.
At a speed about 10 kt above the
VMCG, the deviation should not
exceed 2 meters, but we had a sur-
prise as the aircraft started to skid
Brake release laterally and we eventually reached
-30 -10 10 30
Y (m)
14 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Figure 3
VMCG – enhanced Rudders close to stop
yaw control on ground

Spoiler and ailerons deflection

a deviation of 15 meters and we type of situation. This was not the Rolls Royce engines is 119 or 121
went on the other side of the cen- main reason for the huge deviation, kt, depending upon the maximum
tre line. A good demonstration that but the system was not robust. A engine thrust (option chosen by the
it was a sound idea to take some batch of modifications was needed Customers), which is slightly less
precautions and line up 10 meters before continuing VMCG tests. than the planned figures.
on the left, as if we were already at
To improve the situation, it was
the VMCG! An extrapolation let us
necessary to enhance the efficiency
think that the VMCG was probably
of the flight controls in yaw after an
at least 13 kt above the estimated
engine failure. Therefore, in order
value, which would have had seri-
to create some additional yaw, the
ous adverse consequences for air-
craft performance. solution was to increase the drag
on the wing which is on the side
of the deflected rudders when they
We landed immediately and decid- are close to their stop. For that, one
ed to redo the test at a slightly high- spoiler and 2 of the 3 ailerons were
er speed: 134 kt. A new surprise: fully deflected in the upper direc-
the deviation was almost the same, tion while the centre aileron was
just a bit smaller. The videos were put down (fig. 3). Having ailerons
showing the tyres of the main land- in different directions permitted to
ing gears skidding on the runway. minimize the effect on the bank an-
A third test was performed at 136 gle. Some modifications were also
kt. The deviation was 18 meters. made in the computers, allowing
It was increasing with the speed! faster deflection of rudders in this
Clearly, something was abnormal. specific situation.
Due to weather conditions, we
The following day, in order to un- performed the tests with all these
derstand the reasons of this strange modifications at Istres Air Base
behaviour, we tried again, but this on June 14th with excellent results:
time with a configuration 1+F in- the VMCG was now as planned,
stead of 3. With a lower flaps set- around 122 kt. However the exact
ting, we were expecting higher value was finally determined dur-
forces on the landing gears, which ing the certification flight at the be-
should have improved friction and ginning of September. The reason
therefore reduce skidding. We shut is that the value of the VMCG is
down the engine at 135 kt and the very sensitive to the pilot reaction
deviation reached 18 meters. Basi- time. This one is around 0.6 sec-
cally, no change! On top, we dis- onds, but 0.1 second more or less
covered an anomaly: because of can modify the VMCG by 1 or 2 kt.
a hidden failure, the deflection of The official value is given by the
one of the 2 rudders was too slow. tests performed by the certification
Only one servo control of this rud- pilot from EASA. The final value
der was active, instead of 2 in this agreed after data reduction for the
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 15

Marc BAILLION Lorraine DE BAUDUS


Flight Safety Director Group Manager A318/A319/A320/A321
Operational Standards, Customer Services

Radio Altimeter
erroneous values
2. System Flight Displays (PFD)/ Navigation
1. Introduction architecture
Displays (ND), Weather Radar
(WXR), Flight Warning Comput-
In-service events occurred where a ers (FWC), Traffic Alert and Col-
All Airbus aircraft, except the lision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Radio Altimeter (RA) provided an er- A380, are equipped with two RAs,
roneous height indication, which was and all audio indicators.
which provide height information
recognized as valid information by the Height information is received
to several aircraft systems (fig. 1).
aircraft systems. This resulted in an ear- from one RA at a time. In case of
ly flare activation during the approach. The A380 is fitted with three RAs,
detected failure, the remaining RA
which provide the aircraft’s sys-
In response to these events, Airbus is used as a back-up.
tems with a single median height
launched a series of investigation that The following systems are de-
value. As a result of this system ar-
led to the following conclusions: signed to receive an RA signal
chitecture, a single erroneous RA
in the most critical scenario, an early from only a single source:
activation of the flare law may lead height indication is not an issue for
to an increase of the Angle of Attack the A380. q On all aircraft models the
which, if not corrected, could reach This article will therefore con- Terrain Awareness and Warning
the stall value. All Airbus aircraft are centrate on the other members of System (TAWS) receives signals
affected except the A380. Airbus’ family of aircraft, fitted from RA1 only.
As a result of these investigations, with two Radio Altimeters. q On the A300B2/B4, A300-600
Airbus published: These two RAs provide height in- and A310, the Auto Pilot/ Flight
q A set of Operator Information formation to the Auto Pilots (AP), Director use only their on-side
Telex/Flight Operations Telex (OIT/ Auto Thrust (A/THR), Primary RA.
FOT) and Red Operations Engineering
Bulletins (OEB) describing the opera-
tional consequences, and containing
recommendations to follow, should a
RA provide erroneous height readings.
q New tasks in the Trouble Shooting
Manual (TSM) and Maintenance Plan-
ning Document (MPD) related to the
RA antennas and coaxial cables.
Erroneous RA occurrences should be
systematically reported so as to allow
proper implementation of the recom-
mended maintenance tasks. These con-
sist in the inspection of the RA antennas
coaxial cables, cleaning of the antennas
and possibly replacement of the RA.
Design improvements are currently
under development on the Radio
Altimeter as well as on other aircraft Figure 1
systems, in order to better detect RA RA1 and RA2 receiver
(R) and transmitter (T)
errors and to avoid untimely flare antennas location on
engagement. an A320
16 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

3. Typical cause a) Indication lower than real height


on RA1 during an ILS approach,
Consequences on the aircraft’s systems:

of erroneous RA with both APs/FDs engaged:


q RA 1 provides height informa-
tion to PFD 1, AP 1 and to the
height indications q Figure 2 shows the crew’s PFDs A/THR (the A/THR uses the same
before the RA1 issue. Both RAs RA as the master AP).
In-service experience has shown function properly and provide the Therefore:
that a Radio Altimeter may provide same height of 1 960 ft. The verti- • The RA reading on PFD 1 is – 6 ft
erroneous height indications due cal mode is on G/S, and the lateral • AP 1 engages in FLARE mode
to a direct link between the trans- mode is on LOC. The A/THR is and PFD 1 displays “FLARE”
mitter and the receiver antennas, engaged in SPEED. on the FMA
without ground reflection. This
q Figure 3 RA 1 provides an • The A/THR engages in RE-
can be related to causes that are
erroneous height indication of TARD mode and displays
either internal or external to the
RA system. – 6 ft, while RA 2 delivers the “THR IDLE” on the FMA of
correct height of 1 400 ft. PFD 1 and PFD 2.
The internal causes may be linked to: Figure 2
q Water flow on the antennas, e.g. Both RAs provide correct height of 1 960 ft
due to a defective drain valve. AP1+2
q Water ingress into the RA antenna Engaged
installation affecting the antennas,
and potentially the coaxial cables.
q Carbon dirt or ice accretion on
the antennas.
Identical to
Captain side
q Degraded installation at connec-
tors level.
The external causes may be linked
to aircraft flying over:
q Other aircraft, hail clouds or
bright spots, i.e. terrain presenting
reflectivity variations. Captain F/O
q Runways contaminated with wa-
ter or snow.
In these cases, the RA condition 1960
may not be detected by the systems,
which continue to use the erroneous
RA values. A value of -6ft has been Figure 3
observed in a number of events. Erroneous RA 1 reading is – 6 ft, correct RA 2 reading is 1 400 ft. Both AP/FDs are engaged

AP1+2
4. Operational Engaged
consequences and
recommendations
An erroneous RA height indication
may have effects on the:
q Primary Flight Displays (PFD)
q Systems Displays (SD)
q Warnings and callouts
q Auto Flight System mode changes
q Aircraft protections, such as the
unavailability of the High Angle of Captain Erroneous RA F/O
Attack Auto Pilot disconnection.
The two following examples
illustrate possible effects of an
1400
erroneous RA indication on an
A320 Family/A330/A340 aircraft:
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 17

q RA 2 provides height informa- Therefore: b) Indication lower than real


tion to PFD 2 and to AP 2. • The AUTOLAND warning height on RA1 during an ILS
Therefore: lights are activated. approach, with AP 1 and both
• The RA reading on PFD 2 is FDs engaged:
1 400 ft q Figure 4 shows the crew’s PFDs
• AP 2 is still engaged in G/S before the RA1 issue. Both RAs
vertical mode and LOC lateral function properly and provide the
mode. PFD 2 therefore displays same height of 1 960 ft. The verti-
“G/S” and “LOC” on the FMA. cal mode is on G/S, and the lateral
q AP 1 is engaged in FLARE mode mode is on LOC. The A/THR is
and one RA height goes below 200 engaged in SPEED.
feet. In addition, the difference q Figure 5 shows that RA 1 pro-
between both RA height indica- vides an erroneous height indica-
tions is greater than 15 feet. tion of – 6 ft, while RA 2 delivers
Figure 4 the correct height of 1 400 ft.
Both RAs provide correct height of 1 960 ft
Consequences on the aircraft’s
AP1 systems:
Engaged q RA 1 provides height informa-
tion to PFD 1, AP 1 and to the
A/THR (the A/THR uses the same
RA as the master AP).
Identical to
Therefore:
Captain side
• The RA reading on PFD 1 is
– 6 ft
• AP 1 engages in FLARE mode
and displays “FLARE” on the
FMAs of PFD 1 and PFD 2.
• The A/THR engages in
RETARD mode and displays
Captain F/O “THR IDLE” on the FMAs of
PFD 1 and PFD 2.
q RA 2 provides height informa-
1960 tion to PFD 2.
Therefore:
• The RA reading on PFD 2 is
Figure 5 1 400 ft.
Erroneous RA 1 reading is – 6 ft, correct RA 2 reading is 1 400 ft. AP 1 and both FDs are engaged
q AP 1 is engaged in FLARE mode
and one RA height goes below 200
AP1
feet. In addition, the difference
Engaged
between both RA height indica-
tions is greater than 15 feet.
Therefore:
• The AUTOLAND warning
lights are activated.

Captain Erroneous RA F/O

1400
18 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

In the examples above, the risk of


early flare engagement due to the
q Untimely TAWS alert (“PULL
UP” or “TERRAIN AHEAD”)
6. Design
too low height indication is com- q Impossible NAV mode engage- Improvements
pounded by the possible impact ment after takeoff
on the aircraft protections. On the The following improvements are
A320 Family, for example, the q Pulsing Cabin Differential being implemented in the RA sys-
CONF FULL High Angle of At- Pressure Advisory on ECAM CAB tem as well as in the aircraft systems
tack Auto Pilot disconnection is not PRESS page. which use the RA information:
available in the event of a very low In addition to the above cockpit q RA system:
erroneous RA height indication. indications, RA fault messages • A new gel gasket, between
Therefore, if a manual takeover is from the Electrical Flight Control the antenna and the aircraft
not performed when this early flare System (EFCS) may also be structure, will provide better
engagement occurs, the Angle Of recorded in the Post Flight Record. isolation against water ingress.
Attack will increase and may reach • A digital RA, with self moni-
the stall value. The Flight crews must report toring capability to eliminate
the erroneous heights, is under
The detailed effects on aircraft pro- any of the above symptoms in
certification.
tection on the A300/A310, A320 the aircraft technical logbook, in
and A330/A340 families can be order to ensure no dispatch with q Aircraft systems:
found in the OIT / FOT and OEB an erroneous RA. • Both the Auto Pilot and
referenced at the end of this arti- flight control systems will be
cle. These documents include as enhanced to detect most RA
erroneous height values.
well the following operational rec-
ommendations in the event of an 5. Maintenance
erroneous RA height reading: recommendations 7. Conclusion
q During all phases of flight, the If the flight crews report symptoms
The aircraft systems may not
flight crew must monitor and of an erroneous RA height indica-
always detect an erroneous Radio
crosscheck all primary flight tion, the following maintenance
Altimeter value. Depending on the
parameters and FMA indications. actions should be performed: flight phase and AP/FD and A/THR
q During ILS (or MLS, GLS) ap- q Clean the RA antennas and the status, prompt action from the crew
proach with AP engaged, in the adjacent area with cleaning agents may be required to prevent the
event of an unexpected THR IDLE (Material N° 11.010) and a lint free consequences of such situation.
and FLARE modes engagement, cloth It is essential that the crew identifies
the flight crew must immediately the symptoms of an erroneous RA
q If, during any subsequent flight,
react as follows: reading so as to:
the symptoms persist:
• Immediately perform an
• Replace the RA antennas q Take immediate actions.
automatic Go Around (thrust
levers set in TOGA), • Inspect the RA antennas q Report these symptoms to help
Or coaxial cables. If they are not maintenance teams troubleshoot er-
• Immediately disconnect the in correct conditions, repair or roneous RA readings.
AP, then continue the land- replace them.
ing using raw data or visual These recommendations have been References:
references (FDs set to OFF) or, added in the following new TSM OIT/FOT SE 999.0034/09 dated 4th May 2009 for
perform a manual Go Around tasks: A320/A330/A340 operators
with thrust levers set to TOGA
q 34-42-00-810-844 (A320 Family) q A318/A319/A320/A321: RED OEB 201/2
(significant longitudinal sides-
tick input may be required). q 34-42-00-810-862 (A330/A340) q A330: RED OEB 076/2
q A340: RED OEB 091/2
q 34-42-00-006-00 (A300/A310).
See OEB for detailed procedures
OIT/FOT SE 999.0035/09 dated 30th April 2009 for
In addition, scheduled maintenance
Several symptoms may assist the (MPD) include new tasks related to A300/A310 operators (no RED OEB as the operational
crew in identifying a potential the RA: consequences are different than for the A320/A330/
erroneous RA reading: • Every 6 months: RA antenna A340).
q Untimely ECAM L/G NOT surface cleaning The OIT/FOTs and OEBs are not applicable to the
DOWN warnings • Every 12 years: replacement of A380.
q Untimely or no “RETARD” callout RA antennas and RA coaxial ca-
bles during the heavy maintenance
q Interruption of, or no RA auto-
matic callout visit for the structure section.
The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 19

Stéphane GRANGER Eric JEANPIERRE


A320 Family Autoflight System Manager System Manager
Design Office A320 Family Program

Automatic NAV
engagement
at Go Around
2.1. Current Go Around procedure Once the Go Around is initiated, the
The Go Around is systematically crew will likely fly the published
1. Introduction initiated by pushing the thrust levers Missed Approach procedure: the
Pilot Flying (PF) or the Pilot Non
to TOGA.
Whatever the reasons to perform Flying (PNF) will have to engage
a Go Around, the need has arisen the NAV mode by pushing the HDG/
for an automatic engagement of TRK selector on the Flight Control
Navigation (NAV) mode. Unit (FCU).
To meet this increasing interest, Therefore, in the most probable Go
an operational enhancement Around scenario, the crew will per-
called “NAV in Go Around” has form two main actions (as far as the
been developed by Airbus. Autoflight system is concerned):
This article presents the opera- q Push the thrust levers to TOGA
tional context, and the solution q Push the HDG/TRK selector.
proposed with its advantages.

2.2.  Objectives of the modification


The modification reduces the crew
workload, and limits the potential
2. Operational deviations from the required flight
path when performing a Go Around.
context It covers the most probable Go
2.1.  Go Around options This ensures the engagement of the Around scenario, where the crew
Go Around Track (GA TRK) Auto has to follow the published Missed
The crew must always be prepared Pilot and/or Flight Director lateral Approach procedure. Moreover, it
for a Go Around, even though it is an mode1. makes the Go Around procedure as
infrequent occurrence. similar as possible to the Take Off
The FMS entered published Missed
After the initiation of a Go Around, Approach procedure becomes part procedure.
there are two options: of the ACTIVE F-PLN and the pre- Finally, in the context of RNP-AR
q In the most probable one, the viously flown approach is strung operations where the aircraft is more
crew follows the published Missed back into the F-PLN at the end of the likely to be in a turn, it will not inter-
Approach procedure. Missed Approach procedure. rupt the turn in case of a Go Around.
q Otherwise, if cleared by ATC, the The GA TRK mode guides the air-
crew follows a constant heading. The craft on a constant track (which is the
1: As well as the Speed Reference System (SRS)
heading target can be preset by the current track when the Go Around is Auto Pilot and/or Flight Director longitudinal
crew during the approach. initiated with wings level). mode, if the aircraft is not in a clean configuration.
20 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

3. Principle of q In a non-precision approach with


managed lateral guidance (NAV, APP
In other words, the AP/FD mode engage-
ment sequence is strictly the same as when
the modification NAV or FINAL APP), the NAV mode the pilot pushes the thrust levers to TOGA
is kept engaged. and pushes the HDG/TRK FCU selector.
The principle is to keep the NAV
mode engaged or, if a valid flight q In a non-precision approach with The “NAV in Go Around” modification
selected lateral guidance (HDG or does not modify the aircraft behaviour
plan exists, to arm the NAV mode at
TRK), the HDG or TRK mode is on the longitudinal axis.
the initiation of the Go Around. The
pilot does not need to push the FCU kept engaged and the NAV mode is
selector anymore: the new logics do
it automatically.
automatically armed (if a valid flight
plan exists). 4. Typical
The Auto Flight System automati- q In a precision approach (ILS, MLS operational scenarios
cally follows the published Missed or GLS) or in a FLS / Mixed LOC- Go Arounds during Precision Ap-
Approach procedure. VNAV approach, the GA TRK mode proaches are typically performed when
The AP/FD modes engaged are iden- is initially engaged (as currently) visibility conditions are not met at the
tical to the modes that would have and the NAV mode is automatically Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH).
been engaged by pushing on the FCU armed (if a valid flight plan exists and The Standard Operating Procedures
“HGD-TRK” selector immediately if no heading preset has been selected specify that a Go Around is performed
after the Go Around: during the approach). by setting both thrust levers to TOGA.

The following table illustrates the reduction in workload introduced by the “NAV in Go Around” modification.

Without With
“NAV in Go Around” modification “NAV in GO Around” modification
TOGA thrust is applied When TOGA thrust is applied,
and the SRS / GA TRK modes are engaged. the SRS / GA TRK modes are engaged.
In addition, the NAV mode is automatically armed
without any crew action on the FCU.

The crew has to arm the NAV mode manually


by pushing on the FCU HDG/TRK knob.

Then, the FMA displays the NAV mode.

The NAV mode engages immediately (or as soon as the aircraft


passes above 100ft if the Go Around has been initiated below 100 ft).

The aircraft is guided along the Missed Approach procedure.


The Airbus Safety Magazine Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 21

The “NAV in Go Around”


modification does not change Impact on aircraft and associated MOD and SB
operational procedures in the
following scenarios:
For the A320 Family, A330/A340 and A380, the activation of the function
q Go Around in Heading mode with
requires the following:
a heading preset
q The hardware pin programming of each FMG(E)C or software pin
When cleared by ATC to follow a programming of each PRIM computers, and if required, the upgrade of
constant heading in case of Missed the flight guidance or PRIM software.
Approach, the crew may preset
the heading on the FCU. If a Go q The update of volumes: 1.22.30, 3.03.2, 4.05.80. of the Flight Crew
Around is initiated, the NAV mode Operating Manual (FCOM).
is not automatically armed (prior-
ity is given to the preset). The crew
will then just have to pull the FCU Aircraft MOD SB FMG(E)C or PRIM
HDG/TRK knob to engage the type Number reference minimum standards
Heading mode. P1I11 (MOD 37311) or S4I11 (MOD 37252)
A320 for A320 IAE/PW Family
38399 22-1296
q Go Around in Heading mode
Family P1C12 (MOD 37934) or S4C12 (MOD 37935)
without heading preset for A320 CFM Family
In case of a late clearance from P4HJ1 (MOD 57545) or T4HJ1 (MOD 57547)
ATC to follow a constant heading for A330 PW/RR
after the Go Around (no heading Pending P4G1 (for 57544) or T4G1 (MOD 57548)
preset), the crew will have to turn A330/ FMGEC for A330 GE
200383
the FCU HDG/TRK knob to se- A340 certifica- P4F1 (MOD 57546) or T4F1 (MOD 57549)
lect the heading target then pull to tion for A340-200/300
engage the Heading mode. In this P4K2 or T4K2 (MOD To Be Defined)
case, the NAV mode is automati- for A340-600
cally armed then engaged at Go
Around until the pull action on the Under
A380
FCU. development

A320 Family
5. CONCLUSION The “NAV in Go Around” modification will become the production
With the “NAV in Go Around” standard starting from:
modification, the NAV mode is au- A318: MSN 4169
tomatically armed at the initiation A319: MSN 4522
of the Go Around2. The mode will A320: MSN 4674
then engage as soon as the capture A321: MSN 4560
conditions are met. It will also be included in the low RNP modification packages
(MOD 38073 Low RNP step2+, MOD 150371 / 150372 / 150373 Low
This modification reduces the crew
RNP step 3 and MOD 151180 RNP 0.3 AR).
workload, and limits the poten-
tial deviations from the required
flight path, when performing a Go A330/A340
Around.
The “NAV in Go Around” modification will become the production
The new logics are consistent with standard, MSN to be confirmed.
the most probable Missed Ap-
It will also be included in the low RNP modification packages
proach scenario and are essential
(MOD 200192 Low RNP step 2 for FMS R1A Thales on the A330 and
for specific operations such as low
new MODS RNP step 2 for FMS R1A Honeywell on the A330 and
RNP.
A340-500/600).

A380
The “NAV in Go Around” modification will become the production stan-
dard, MSN to be confirmed.

2 : If no heading preset.
22 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety

Articles published
in previous
Safety First issues
Issue 10, August 2010 Issue 5, December 2007
– A380: Flutter tests – New CFIT event during Non Precision Approach
– Operational Landing Distances: – A320: Tail strike at takeoff ?
A new standard for in-flight landing distance assessment – Unreliable speed
– Go Around handling – Compliance to operational procedures
– A320: Landing gear downlock – The future air navigation system FANS B
– Situation awareness and decision making
Issue 4, June 2007
Issue 9, February 2010 – Operations Engineering Bulletin reminder function
– A320 Family: Evolution of ground spoiler logic – Avoiding high speed rejected takeoffs
– Incorrect pitch trim setting at takeoff due to EGT limit exceedance
– Technical Flight Familiarization – Do you know your ATC/TCAS panel ?
– Oxygen safety – Managing hailstorms
– Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes
Issue 8, July 2009 – A320: Dual hydraulic loss
– The Runway Overrun Prevention System – Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems
– The Take Off Securing function operations based on GPS data

– Computer mixability: An important function


– Fuel spills during refueling operations Issue 3, December 2006
– Dual side stick inputs
– Trimmable horizontal stabilizer damage
Issue 7, February 2009
– Pitot probes obstruction on ground
– Airbus AP/FD TCAS mode:
A new step towards safety improvement – A340: Thrust reverser unlocked
– Braking system cross connections – Residual cabin pressure
– Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 – Cabin Operations Briefing Notes
– Fuel pumps left in OFF position – Hypoxia: An invisible enemy
– A320: Avoiding dual bleed loss
Issue 2, September 2005
Issue 6, July 2008 – Tailpipe or engine fire
– A320: Runway overrun – Managing severe turbulence
– FCTL check after EFCS reset on ground – Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP)
– A320: Possible consequence of VMO/MMO exceedance – Runway excursions at takeoff
– A320: Prevention of tailstrikes
– Low fuel situation awareness Issue 1, January 2005
– Rudder pedal jam – Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR reception problems
– Why do certain AMM tasks require equipment resets ? – The importance of the pre-flight flight control check
– Slide/raft improvement – A320: In-flight thrust reverser deployment
– Cabin attendant falling through the avionics – Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook
bay access panel in cockpit – Flight Operations Briefing Notes
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