1.
Zaldivia vs Reyes
Facts:
Petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial
purposes without a mayor’s permit – in violation of
Ordinance No.2, s. 1988, the Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11,
1990
However, the referral-complaint of the police was
received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990.
The corresponding information was filed with the
Rodriguez MTC on October 2, 1990.
Zaldavia moved to quash the information on the
ground that the crime had already prescribed, but the
motion was denied by the MTC. The RTC of Rizal
also sustained the denial of the motion.
Zaldavia argues that the charge against her is
governed by Section 1B(4) and Section 9 of the Rules
on Summary Procedure. (Refer to full text)
She then invokes Act No. 3326 – An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run –
specifically Section 1 of the said law which states that
violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after 2 months.
She concludes that since the information was filed
way beyond the 2-month statutory period from the
date of the alleged commission of the offense, the
charge against her should have been dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
However, prosecution contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
The Sol Gen also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Respondent,
Judge Reyes maintains that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes
under the phrase “such institution” and that phrase “in
all cases” applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Said paragraph, according to Judge Reyes, was an
adoption of the obiter dictum in Francisco vs CA:
where, the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility.
However, it is important to note that this decision was
promulgated on May 30, 1983, 2 months before the
promulgation of the Rules on Summary Procedure on
August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule
110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the
revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on
January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph which
was added on October 1, 1988.
Issue: Whether the violation of municipal
ordinances are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. YES
Ruling:
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure.
The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by
the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by
the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation
conforms to the canon that words in a statute should
be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of
the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is
for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez,
is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
"the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination
or preliminary investigation."
Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent
the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case
is actual filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-

quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty party."

The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are

"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a
matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict

between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section
1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law.

And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and

Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation,

a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the

crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted
by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was
not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

2. Panaguiton vs Department of Justice
Facts:
Rodrgio Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to nearly 2 million pesos from petitioner,
Panaguiton.
Thereafter, Cawili and his business associate Ramon
Tongson, jointly issued in favor or Panaguiton 3
checks in payment of the loans. However, said checks
were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or
by the closure of the account.
Panaguiton made numerous demands for payment
from Cawili and Tongson, but to no avail, thus
prompting him to file a BP 22 case against them
before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and claimed that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent in the case since
Panaguiton had lent money to Cawili in the latter’s
personal capacity and in appreciation of his services.
Tongson denied having issued the bouncing checks
and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks
had been falsified.
Panaguiton countered by presenting several
documents showing Tongson’s signatures, which
were purportedly the same as those appearing on the
checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of
adverse claim where Tongson himself had claimed
that he was Cawili’s associate.
City Prosecutor found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even
while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. After finding that Tongson co-signed
the bounced checks, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson
and to refer the questioned signatures to the NBI.
However, Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State
Prosecutor’s Resolution.
Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that violations penalized by BP 22 shall
prescribe after 4 years.
In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the
date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint
before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings.
Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than
four (4) years had already elapsed and no information
had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.
Panaguiton appealed to the DOJ, but Undersecretary
Teehankee dismissed the same, stating that the
offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326.
When Panaguiton filed a Motion for Recon, this time,
Undersecretary Gutierrez, ruled in favor and declared
that the offense had not prescribed and the filing of
the complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco vs
Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City was directed to file 3 separate informations
against Tongson for violation of BP 22.
However, when DOJ acted on the Motion for Recons
filed by Tongson, it had a sudden turnabout, now
ruling that the subject had already prescribed; it
explained that Act No 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive
period for the offenses.
Since BP 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes,
Act No 3326 applies to it, and not Art 90 of the RPC
which governs the prescription of offenses.
The DOJ also cites the case of Zaldivia vs Reyes,
wherein the proceedings referred to in Act No 3326,
as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one
before the prosecutor’s office.
CA dismissed the appeal, in view of Panaguiton’s
failure to attach a proper verification and certification
of non-forum shopping.

Issue: Whether the filing of a case in court is the
only action that can toll the prescription of the
offense.
Ruling:
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses
under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running
of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment", and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted.
prosecution of the case as early as August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act
No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who
do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and
thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P.
Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company

Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused.

In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange

Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et
al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of
the investigation conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured

party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.

Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control.

After all, he had already initiated the active
 Juarez. At this point, the period of prescription for
the alleged crime had already started to run.

The 1 prescriptive period for the crime was

3. Arambulo vs Laqui
interrupted on February 2, 1994 when private
respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for
Facts:
libel against Arambulo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Quezon City. At this point, the
On December 21, 1993 when petitioner circulated
prescription period had already run for 42 days.
a letter containing allegedly malicious imputations
Arambulo’s contention:
against private respondents Ojario and Juarez.
The prescription period for the crime of libel
charged against her commenced to run again when
Private respondents Ojario and Juarez filed a case
the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the
for libel against petitioner, Arambulo before the
filing of the information for libel. Petitioner
Office of City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
further argues that the prescriptive period could
have been interrupted again had the information
The information for libel was filed before the
been filed with the Regional Trial Court, the court
Quezon MTC on May 18, 1994.
with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for
libel.
After prosecution presented its evidence,
Arambulo filed a Demurer to Evidence. Without
Considering however that the case was filed
resolving the incident, the MTC ruled that it had
before the Metropolitan Trial Court, which under
not jurisdiction over the case and ordered the same
the law does not have jurisdiction over the crime
to be forwarded to the RTC for further
of libel, the period of prescription continued to run
proceedings.
its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that
when the information for libel was finally filed
After the case was forwarded to the Quezon RTC,
with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had
Arambulo later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
already prescribed and the State can no longer
ground of jurisdiction and prescription of the
pursue the case against her.
offense of Libel.
Reliance should be given to the Court’s ruling on
The RTC dismissed the case but stated that the
the landmark case of People vs Olarte.
offense had not yet prescribed and ordered the
Quezon City Prosecutor to re-file the information
Petitioner submits that the adherence to the Olarte
for Libel with the RTC.
case must be examined considering that in the said
case, the principal issue was whether or not the
Information for Libel was re-filed; when
filing of a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court
Arambulo filed a MQ based in prescription, the
for purposes of preliminary investigation,
same was denied.
interrupts the period of prescription of a crime.
Petitioner argues that the cited case is inapplicable
CA upheld the TC’s decision that the offense of
as it is not disputed in the case at bench that the
libel had not yet prescribed.
period of prescription was interrupted during the
process of preliminary investigation.
Issue: Whether the crime of libel has not yet
prescribed.
WE ARE NOT PERSUADED.
Ruling:
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the
complaint or information for purposes of
Under Article 90 of the RPC, the crime of libel
preliminary investigation represents the initial step
prescribes in 1 year.
of the proceedings against the offender.
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly
This is one of the reasons why such filing is
occurred on December 21, 1993 when petitioner
deemed as having interrupted the period of
circulated a letter containing allegedly malicious
prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This
imputations against private respondents Ojario and
period of prescription commences to run again
when the proceedings terminate without
conviction or acquittal, “if the court (or
prosecutor) should discharge the accused because
no prima facie case has been shown.”
When the City Prosecutor recommended the filing
of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings
against her were not terminated, precisely because
a prima facie case for libel was found against her.
In the case at bench, besides the filing of the
petitions before the Court of Appeals and this
Court, petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to
Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218.
As such, it is clear that petitioner is not without
fault in the delay in the prosecution of the case
against her.

In the case at bar, private respondents were not

remiss in their right to seek grievance against as
they filed their complaint before the city
prosecutor 42 days after the alleged crime of libel
occurred. It was the Office of the City Prosecutor
that committed an error when it filed the
complaint with the MTC.

The error was probably due to the confusion as

to the proper venue for the crime of libel
brought about by the passage of RA 7691,
which took effect on Apil 15, 1994.

The confusion was cleared up when this Court

issued AO No. 104-96 which categorically
stated that “LIBEL CASES SHALL BE
TRIED BY THE RTCs HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE MTCs, MUNTCs,
MUNCTCs.

The mistake of the Office of the City

Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the
MTC in taking cognizance of the case was thus
understandable. The error was immediately
rectified by the said court upon realizing its
mistake when it ruled it was the RTC which
had the proper jurisdiction over the case.

This mistake should not operate to prejudice the

interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses,
and, more importantly, the right of the offended
party to obtain grievance.

Petitioner's other argument that she has been

denied her right to a speedy trial deserves scant
consideration. Well-established is the doctrine that
the right to a speedy trial is violated only where
there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive
delay without participation or fault of the accused,
or when unjustified postponements are sought
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length
of time.

4. People vs Pangilinan
Facts:
Sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning
date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period
within which herein respondent was notified by
private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the
checks and the five-day grace period granted by law
elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were
filed against respondent on 16 September 1997.
The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
on 3 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed
by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of
"prejudicial question".
The matter was raised before the Secretary of
Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings.
It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered
that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22
were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
On March 2, 1998, ACP Ruben Catubay recommended
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action Pangilinan filed against
Virginia Malolos with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, Malolos raised the matter before the DOJ.
DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution
of the City of Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered
the filing of informations for violation of BP 22 against
Pangilinan.
This is in connection with her issuance of a City Trust
Check worth more than 4 million and RCBC Check
also worth more than 4 million. Where, both checks
totaled in the amount of 8,604,000.
The estafa and violation of BP 22 charges involving the
7 other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
were, however, dismissed.
2 counts of BP 22 violation were then filed against
Pangilinan before the Office of the COC. MeTC
Quezon City. The cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch
31.
Thereafter, Pangilinan filed an Omnibus MQ the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest alleging that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon
City, granted the MQ.
Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the criminal cases
were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City. The
presiding RTC judge reversed the order of the MeTC
stating that the criminal action had not yet prescribed
since the filing of proceedings before the Office of the
Prosecution tolled the prescription period.
Respondent filed a petition to review with the SC. The
Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate
action.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision holding that the
cases for violation of BP 22 had already prescribed.
OSG commented that it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court of
with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that
interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged.
It submits that the filing of the complaint-
affidavit by Malolos on September 16, 1997 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
effectively interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP 22 cases.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the
Supreme Court ruled that the fling of a
complaint with the Fiscal's Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running
of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded
that the fling of the informations with the MeTC
of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still
within the allowable period of four years within
which to file the criminal cases for violation of
BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
 Respondent contends that the arguments
advanced by petitioner are anchored on
erroneous premises. She claims that the cases
relied upon by petitioner involved felonies
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Section 1, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed
against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which
is indisputably a special law and as such, is
governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She
submits that a distinction should thus be made
between offenses covered by municipal
ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and
offenses covered by the RPC.
the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been
charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on
their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency
of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime
in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP
Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the
fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace
period granted by law elapsed.

Issue: Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for

estafa and BP 22 agaisnt respondent with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on Sept 16, 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
YES

Ruling:

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a

penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law.

The running of the prescriptive period, however,

should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this

Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits.

This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of

Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. when it held
that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal's Office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of
a criminal offense.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of

Justice , which is in all fours with the instant case, this
Court categorically ruled that commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before
the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted

5. Disini vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Office of the Ombudsman filed 2 informations
charhing Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption
of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
relation to Article 210 of the RPC (Criminal Case No.
28001) and with a violation of Section 4 (a) Republic
Act 3019 (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The relevant provisions in the accusatory portions of
the information: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28001
Disini conspired with then President Marcos, giving
him gifts and presents, consisting of Disini’s ownership
of 2.5 billion shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and
Mining Corporation and 4 billion shares of stock in
The Energy Corporation.
All of these stocks were to be owned and controlled by
Marocs, with Disini taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his
office in exchange for the engineering and architectural
design and construction project of the Nuclear Power
Plant Project in Bataan to be awarded to the foreign
company, Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation.
The relevant provisions in the accusatory portions of
the information: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28002
Disini conspired and confederate with then President
Marcos, being his close personal friend and golfing
partner,
And being the husband of Pacencia Escolin-Disini who
was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos
Willfully, unlawfully, and criminally took advantage of
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project, receiving
from foreign consultant, Burns and Roe, total amount
of 1 million US dollars for having done business with
the Philippine Government.
Disini filed a MQ alleging that the criminal actions had
been extinguished by prescription, and that the
informations did not conform to the prescribed form.
The Prosecution opposed the motions to quash.
However, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for
arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable
action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.
He pleaded not guilty for both informations.
The Sandiganbayan denied his MQ.
Issues:
Whether Sandiganbayan acted with GAD when it
disregarded Disini’s constitutional and statutory
right to prescription. NO
Ruling:
1. Preliminary Considerations: reference to the Court’s
ruling in his 2010 case which involved the civil action
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
and damages filed by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG)
The Court finds that under the circumstances of
the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it
could be impartial in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It
cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary
investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair
administration of justice can be promoted if the
PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints
subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same
should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as
an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct
such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.
2. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002. He contends that:
(1) the informations did not allege that the
charges were being filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A;
(2) the offenses charged were not of the nature
contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
because the allegations in the informations
neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases;
(3) the cases were filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and
(4) being a private individual not charged as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular
courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had
initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the
Ombudsman taking over the investigation of
Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco,
Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the
criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman
on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima
facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
That Disini was a private individual did not
remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG
with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of
all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration
of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship," expressly granted the authority of
the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered
President Marcos' immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without
distinction as to their private or public status.
Section 2 of E.O. No. 1 expressly granted the
authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten
wealth covered President Marcos' immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, without distinction as to their private
or public status.
3. The offenses charged in the informations have not
not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following
must be considered, namely:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time when the period of
prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As
to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time
when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead
of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials
involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally
extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for
the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the
commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA
Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-
known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only
through the PCGG's exhaustive investigation, resulting
in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for
the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against
Disini.
Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which
partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption
of their execution having been regularly done in the
course of offocial functions.
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
will establish the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law.
Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the
presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution
to proceed to trial.

Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no

person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that
the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible
prior to 1986.

We not, too, that the criminal complaints were filed

and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the
conduct of preliminary investigation. In accordance
with Article 91 of the RPC and the ruling of
Panaguiton Jr. vs DOJ, the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudmsan effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of

whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing
of the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.

Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because

only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the
discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the
time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.

4. The informations were sufficient in form and

substance

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must

state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to
quash on the ground that the complaint or information
charges no offense may be properly sustained.

The fundamental test in determining whether a motion

to quash may be sustained based on this ground is

6. Tolentino vs People
In 2018, it held that the time limit for an offended
person to file a cyberlibel case is 15 years – but it did
so in an “unsigned resolution” that may not be a
binding precedent and part of case law.
Facts:
The case concerned Wilbert Tolentino’s Facebook
posts on April 29, 2015, which accused ERP Wellness
Enterprises owner Eva Rose Pua of selling bogus
products and shortchanging him by giving fewer tablets
than he ordered.
Pua claimed to have found out about the posts only in
April 2017, or two years after the posts were made. She
filed a cyber libel case and the Quezon City RTC
Branch 90, in a March 19, 2018 order, denied
Tolentino’s motion to quash the case.
Tolentino’s appeal eventually reached the SC, where he
argued that the prescription period was only one year.
But the First Division affirmed the Quezon City RTC’s
order.
Issue: Whether cyberlibel prescribes in one year
(like libel). NO
The SC said that because the Cybercrime Prevention
Act did not explicitly provide for the prescription
period, it should be based on the penalty.
But the SC used a different basis. Instead of Act No.
3326 applied by prosecutors and the Manila court, the
SC used the RPC itself.
The maximum penalty for cyberlibel is prision mayor
in its minimum period (or eight years’ imprisonment).
This is called an “afflictive” penalty under Article 25
of the RPC.
Following Article 90 of the RPC, the prescription
period for crimes punishable by afflictive penalties is
15 years – although, again, the very same section
provides for a one-year period for libel.
Anent petitioner's claim that the action has
prescribed, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, does not categorically state the prescriptive
period for such action, the new prescriptive period
for the crime of libel in relation to RA No. 10175
can be derived from the penalty imposed on the
said crime.
Section 6 of RA No. 10175 provides that the
"penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, and special laws, as the
case may be."
As such, the former penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods is increased
to prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period.
The new penalty, therefore, becomes afflictive,
following Section 25 of the RPC.
Corollarily, following Article 90 of the RPC, the
crime of libel in relation to RA 10175 now
prescribes in fifteen (15) years.
Thus, respondent Eva Rose Pua's filing of the
complaint on August 8, 2017 against petitioner's
Facebook post dated April 29, 2015 was well within
the prescriptive period for libel in relation to RA
10175.
Lastly, on the issue of jurisdiction, Section 21 of RA
10175 vests the RTC with jurisdiction without any
qualifications as to the place where the same should be
filed.
Section 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional Trial
Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation of
the provisions of this Act including any violation
committed by a Filipino national regardless of the
place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any
of the elements was committed within the
Philippines or committed with the use of any
computer system wholly or partly situated in the
country, or when by such commission any damage
is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at
 the time the offense was committed, was in the
Philippines.

There shall be designated special cybercrime

courts manned by specially trained judges to
handle cybercrime cases.

Given that there is no qualification as to where a

criminal action for libel in relation to RA 10175 must
be filed, the filing of the Information before the RTC of
Quezon City, where respondent Eva Rose Pua resides,
is proper.

The SC, in this resolution, did not mention if it was

treating cyber libel as a different crime from ordinary
libel. It did not even include the Disini case among its
citations.

The unsigned resolution was signed by First Division

Clerk of Court Librada Buena, not any of the five
justices who composed the First Division at the time –
Associate Justices Teresita Leonardo-de Castro (who
later became chief justice), Mariano del Castillo,
Francis Jardeleza, Noel Tijam and Alexander
Gesmundo.

The SC’s resolution allowed the case against Tolentino

to proceed to trial. But unlike Ressa and Santos,
Tolentino ended up being acquitted in a Sept. 27, 2019
decision, according to defense lawyer Berteni Causing.
The trial court found that it was not enough that
Tolentino used offensive language against Pua.

Gesmundo is currently the only member of the division

that tackled Tolentino’s case who has not yet retired –
and can still participate in a future case where the
prescription issue may be raised again.