G.R. No.

185740

G.R. No. 185740               July 23, 2013

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O.

TYPOCO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte's (petitioner) petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated December 2, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97425, reinstating respondent Beatriz O. Gonzales as the Province
of Camarines Norte’s provincial administrator, or to an equivalent position.

Factual Antecedents

Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor
Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999,
Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no
administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of
official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this was later on captioned as
Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
administratively liable.4 On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.5

Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued
Resolution No. 0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and
suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its
Resolution No. 001952.7

Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that
she had already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued Resolution No.
002245,8 which directed Gonzales’ reinstatement.

Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her
services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance with its
order, and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited
Resolution No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that the provincial administrator position is highly confidential
and is coterminous in nature.

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,11 which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as
provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160)
made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot
operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the
new law’s effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent
appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent
classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to
a non-career service should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution.
As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of
trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under
existing laws.

In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr.,
Camarines Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No.
061988,13 which ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent
position.Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to
nullify the CSC’s Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No. 061988.

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

The CA supported the CSC’s ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator or to an equivalent
position.14

Citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,15 the CA emphasized that an appointee acquires a legal right to his
position once he assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment. This legal right is
protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and
previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal, or without any cause.

The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officer’s removal under Section 46,16 Book V, Title
I, Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative Code (Administrative Code), and noted that lack of confidence was
not in the list. Thus, the CA concluded that Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her
security of tenure, and that she has the right to be reinstated with payment of backwages.

The CA further held that Gonzales’ dismissal was illegal because it was done without due process. The
proceedings under Administrative Case No. 001 cannot be the basis for complying with the requirements of
due process because they are separate and distinct from the proceedings in the present controversy. Thus,
Gonzales was illegally terminated when she was dismissed for lack of confidence, without any hearing, the day
after she was reinstated.

Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which modified Governor Pimentel’s decision, has long been
final and executory. The petitioner did not file any petition for reconsideration against Resolution No. 002245,
and hence, it is no longer alterable.

The petitioner sought a reconsideration17 of the CA’s Decision, which the CA denied in a Resolution18 dated
December 2, 2008.

The Present Petition

In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has
been converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer
enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160’s enactment.

In her Comment19 and Memorandum,20 Gonzales maintained that the provincial administrator remained a career
service position. Section 721 of Presidential Decree No. 807, which was one of the bases of the Court in Laurel
V v. Civil Service Commission22 to declare the provincial administrator as a career service position, is a
verbatim copy of Section 7,23 Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code. This classification, established by law and
jurisprudence, cannot be altered by the mere implementing rules and regulations of RA 7160. And assuming
arguendo that the provincial administrator position has indeed become a primarily confidential position, this
reclassification should not apply retroactively to Gonzales’ appointment on a permanent capacity prior to RA
7160’s effectivity.
 Issues

The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:

1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a
primarily confidential, non-career service position; and

2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the
Province of Camarines Norte.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, non-career position

We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily
confidential, non-career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. First, prior
to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code (LGC), did not include a provincial
administrator position among the listing of mandatory provincial officials,24 but empowered the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to create such other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government.25 RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province.26 Thus, the creation of the
provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the
qualifications for the provincial administrator position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement
of civil service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with the educational requirements, it shortened
the six-year work experience requirement to five years.28 It also mandated the additional requirements of
residence in the local government concerned, and imposed a good moral character requirement.

Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority,
reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential.

Before RA 7160 took effect, Laurel classified the provincial administrator position as an open career position
which required qualification in an appropriate examination prior to appointment. Laurel placed the provincial
administrator position under the second major level of positions in the career service under Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 807. This provision reads:

Section 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.

(a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into
three major levels as follows:

xxxx

2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional,
technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief level.

Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrator’s functions closely related to the prevailing provincial
administration by identifying the incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the
governor’s direction for the province with what the provincial administrator would implement. In contrast with
the general direction provided by the provincial governor under the Manual of Position Descriptions cited in
Laurel, Section 480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates constant interaction between the provincial administrator and
the provincial governor, to wit:
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall:

(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case
may be, implement the same particularly those which have to do with the management and
administration-related programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement
and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code;

(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:

(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision,
direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and
other officials of the local government unit;

xxxx

(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other
matters relative to the management and administration of the local government unit. [emphases and italics
ours]

As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158,29 the administrator position demands a close intimate
relationship with the office of the governor (its appointing authority) to effectively develop, implement and
administer the different programs of the province. The administrator’s functions are to recommend to the
Sanggunian and to advise the governor on all matters regarding the management and administration of the
province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the governor’s full trust and confidence.

To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators’ functions have with the office of the
governor, RA 7160 even made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing
authority.30 This provision, along with the interrelations between the provincial administrator and governor under
Section 480, renders clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial administrator position primarily
confidential under the non-career service category of the civil service.

Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative
power that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure

Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the provincial administrator position to a primarily
confidential employee, the next question to address would be its impact on Gonzales’ security of tenure.
According to the petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of tenure when the provincial administrator position
became a primarily confidential position. Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the
position should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent appointee. Both the CA and the CSC
ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales’ original permanent appointment under the old LGC.
They posit that Gonzales acquired a vested legal right over her position from the moment she assumed her
duties as provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause and after due
hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a violation of her security of tenure.

The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement between
the nature of the position and an employee’s right to hold a position. These two concepts are different. The
nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on
the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to
the nature of the position.

Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator
position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative
power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of
society;31 Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When
done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term.32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not
at the incumbent.33

In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon,34 for instance, Congress enacted a law modifying the offices in
the Board of Dental Examiners. The new law, RA 546, raised the qualifications for the board members, and
provided for a different appointment process. Dr. Alfonso C. Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were
incumbent board members at the time RA 546 took effect, filed a special civil action for quo warranto against
their replacements, arguing that their term of office under the old law had not yet expired, and neither had they
abandoned or been removed from office for cause. We dismissed their petition, and held that Congress may,
by law, terminate the term of a public office at any time and even while it is occupied by the incumbent. Thus,
whether Dr. Salcedo and Dr. Ignacio were removed for cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial.

More recently, in Dimayuga v. Benedicto II,35 we upheld the removal of Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent
appointee to the Executive Director II position, which was not part of the career executive service at the time of
her appointment. During her incumbency, the CSC, by authority granted under Presidential Decree No. 1,
classified the Executive Director II position to be within the career executive service. Since Dimayuga was not a
career executive service officer, her initially permanent appointment to the position became temporary; thus,
she could be removed from office at any time.

In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator position but
significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career
service tranche of the civil service. This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she
was not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change was
part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local governments and decentralize
the delivery of public service. Section 3(b) of RA 7160 provides as one of its operative principles that:

(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic
organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of
its communities.

Thus, Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is
immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For purposes of determining whether Gonzales’
termination violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her
removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered
government service.

In echoing the CSC and the CA’s conclusion, the dissenting opinion posits the view that security of tenure
protects the permanent appointment of a public officer, despite subsequent changes in the nature of his
position.

Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes our categorical declaration that "a permanent
employee remains a permanent employee unless he is validly terminated," and from there attempts to draw an
analogy between Gabriel and the case at hand.

The very first sentence of Gabriel spells out its vast difference from the present case. The sole and main issue
in Gabriel is whether backwages and other monetary benefits could be awarded to an illegally dismissed
government employee, who was later ordered reinstated. From this sentence alone can be discerned that the
issues involved related to the consequences of illegal dismissal rather than to the dismissal itself. Nowhere in
Gabrielwas there any mention of a change in the nature of the position held by the public officer involved.

Further, key factual differences make Gabriel inapplicable to the present case, even if only by analogy: first, the
public officer in Gabriel received a Memorandum stating that he would be appointed as Transportation District
Supervisor III under their office reorganization. Second, the Court in Gabriel clearly pointed out that the reason
for his eventual appointment as a casual employee, which led to his termination from service, was due to a
pending protest he filed before the CSC – indicating that there was no ground for him to not receive the
appointment earlier promised. In contrast, the issue of Gonzales is whether the appointing authority’s lack of
trust and confidence in the appointee was sufficient cause for the termination of employment of a primarily
confidential employee. And third, there was a change in the position held by the public officer in Gabriel. He
was a permanent employee who was extended a different appointment, which was casual in nature, because
of a protest that he earlier filed. In contrast, the current case involves a public officer who held the same
position whose nature changed because of the passage of RA 7160.

The dissent also quotes the penultimate paragraph of Civil Service Commission v. Javier37 to support its
contention that permanent appointees could expect protection for their tenure and appointments in the event
that the Court determines that the position is actually confidential in nature:

The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various
GOCCs. The officers likely assumed their positions on permanent career status, expecting protection for their
tenure and appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is
unfounded, however, since the statutes themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as
permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will not be classified as
confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final
determination as to which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the light of the
instant controversy, the Court's view is that the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate
secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature.38

The quoted portion, however, even bolsters our theory. Read together with its succeeding paragraph, the
quoted portion in Civil Service Commission v. Javier39 actually stands for the proposition that other corporate
secretaries in government-owned and –controlled corporations cannot expect protection for their tenure and
appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential position. There, the Court
emphasized that these officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent appointments, if and
when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential. In the succeeding paragraph after the portion
quoted by the dissent, we even pointed out that there is no vested right to public office, nor is public service a
property right. Thus:

Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office is a public trust," and that
there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to a
public office, as public service is not a property right. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. The rule is that
offices in government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime
by statute. And any issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to and determined
by the courts.40 (emphases and italics ours)

Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of tenure in the provincial administrator position on
a permanent capacity

In extending security of tenure to Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator, the dissenting
opinion cites as authority Executive Order No. (EO) 503 which provided certain safeguards against the
termination of government employees affected by the implementation of RA 7160. According to the dissenting
opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive department’s intent to protect and uphold both the
national government and the local government employees’ security of tenure. It cites Section 2(a), paragraph 8
(providing for the tenure of an administrator) to prove its point:

8. Incumbents of positions, namely administrator, legal officer, and information officer declared by the Code as
coterminous, who hold permanent appointments, shall continue to enjoy their permanent status until they
vacate their positions.

At first glance, EO 503 does seem to extend the provincial administrators’ security of tenure in their permanent
appointments even beyond the effectivity of RA 7160. EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of the
local government affected by RA 7160’s enactment. The title of EO 503 clearly provides for its scope of
application, to wit:
Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and
Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies whose Functions are to be Devolved to the
Local Government Units and for other Related Purposes. [underscore, italics and emphases ours]

A reading of EO 503’s whereas clauses confirms that it applies only to national government employees whose
functions are to be devolved to local governments:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, hereinafter
referred to as the Code, transfers the responsibility for the delivery of basic services and facilities from the
national government agencies (NGAs) concerned to the local government units (LGUs);

WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic services and facilities shall be accompanied by the
transfer of the national personnel concerned and assets to ensure continuity in the delivery of such services
and facilities;

WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the required transfer of national personnel
concerned and assets to the LGUs. [underscores, italics and emphases ours]

Thus, paragraph 8, section 2(a) of EO 503 cannot apply to Gonzales, a provincial administrator. As explained
earlier, the existence of the provincial administrator position was a prerogative of the Sanggunian
Panlalawigan, and was not even a mandatory public office under the old LGC. It is clearly not a national
government position whose functions are to be devolved to the local governments.

The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argues that EO 503 does not apply to national government
employees only. According to the dissent, the phrase "and for related purposes" in EO 503’s title could
encompass personnel not necessarily employed by national government agencies but by local government
units such as the administrator, the legal officer and the information officer, as enumerated in Section 2(a),
paragraph 8 thereof. This provision, according to the dissent, fills the crucial gap left by RA 7160 which did not
provide whether the term of an incumbent provincial administrator would automatically become coterminous
with that of the appointing authority upon RA 7160’s effectivity.

This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503’s object matters that it did not explicitly provide for. The
phrase "and for other related purposes" can only add to EO 503 matters related to the devolution of personnel,
basic services and facilities to local government units. The impact of the change in a local government
position’s nature is clearly different from the implementation of devolution and its ancillary effects: the former
involves a change in a local government position’s functions and concept of tenure, while the latter involves
(among other things) the transfer of national government employees to local government units. This difference
is highlighted by the fact that EO 503, as reflected by its whereas clauses, was issued to implement Section 17
of RA 7160. In contrast, the change in the nature of the provincial administrator position may be gleaned from
Section 480 of RA 7160. Hence, by no stretch of reasonable construction can the phrase "and for other related
purposes" in EO 503’s title be understood to encompass the consequences of the change in the local
government position’s nature.

Furthermore, construing that the administrator position in Section 2(a), paragraph 8 pertains to city, municipal
and/or provincial administrators would result in a legal infirmity. EO 503 was issued pursuant to the President’s
ordinance powers to provide for rules that are general or permanent in character for the purpose of
implementing the President’s constitutional or statutory powers.41 Exercising her constitutional duty to ensure
that all laws are faithfully executed, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 503 to ensure the executive’s
compliance with paragraph (i), Section 17 of RA 7160, which requires local government units to absorb the
personnel of national agencies whose functions shall be devolved to them.42 This is reflected in EO 503’s title
and whereas clauses, and its limited application as discussed earlier.

Thus, the dissenting opinion’s interpretation would result in the judicial recognition of an act of the Executive
usurping a legislative power. The grant of permanent status to incumbent provincial administrators, despite the
clear language and intent of RA 7160 to make the position coterminous, is an act outside the President’s
legitimate powers. The power to create, abolish and modify public offices is lodged with Congress.43 The
President cannot, through an Executive Order, grant permanent status to incumbents, when Congress by law
has declared that the positions they occupy are now confidential. Such act would amount to the President’s
amendment of an act of Congress – an act that the Constitution prohibits. Allowing this kind of interpretation
violates the separation of powers, a constitutionally enshrined principle that the Court has the duty to uphold.44

The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that Section 2(a), paragraph 8 of EO 503 enjoys the legal
presumption of validity. Unless the law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its
validity stands. The EO’s validity, however, is not in question in the present case. What is at issue is a proper
interpretation of its application giving due respect to the principle of separation of powers, and the dissenting
opinion’s interpretation does violence to this principle.

Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee

To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure.  All permanent
1âwphi1

officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career
service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by
law and after procedural due process.45 The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for
primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the
confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the
appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not
"removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires"46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just
cause" provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and
confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he
decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.

Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or
dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to
public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally
correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when she was removed
without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales
was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time
of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential
and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority.
Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial
administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without
prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government
service.

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP No. 97425.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178454

G.R. No. 178454               March 28, 2011

FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision1 dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution2 dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b)3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission with office at the
Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.

Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the
latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reach ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the
titling of respondent’s land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the
land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000, respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer
against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from
office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed service when she
embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the latter’s land.4

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order5 dated March 15, 2004, reduced the penalty to
three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s
payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct
required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:

x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from the [respondent] and
even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer to do the surveys.

While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the processing
of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act in accepting the money from the
[respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a
perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and employees
shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.

xxxx

x x x [petitioner’s] act to x x x restore the amount of [₱50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.
x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was agreed upon
by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00
including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available money to pay and had been persistent in returning
the amount of [₱50,000.00] to the [respondent], she would have easily given the same right at that moment (on
19 October 2002) in the presence of the Barangay Officials.6 x x x. (Stress in the original.)

The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that contrary to
petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter. The
CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer when she
demanded and received the amount of ₱50,000 on the representation that she can secure a title to
respondent’s property and for failing to return the amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler
of undue patronage.7

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a government
employee or where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty?

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable despite the
dismissal of the estafa case?

3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of mitigating
circumstances?8

Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for
holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding that she
was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be attributed to her. And even assuming that she is
guilty of misconduct, she is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the
first charge against her in her long years of public service.9

Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the CA correctly
resolved.10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when
she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.11

We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add, however, that
petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.

On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint
against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them.12 Section 13(1),13 Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any
person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, or improper. Under Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states
that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or
irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-
connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the
illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.
Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.16
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she
cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.17

For proper consideration instead is petitioner’s liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:

SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the
public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of
their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter
public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at
all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors
on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with
respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as
members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone
without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt,
courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when
required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information on
their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an
understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country,
especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the
Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources
and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall
endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to

the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and
manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times
uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives
appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
 (B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these
standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit
increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their
office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing
research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and
employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.

Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section 4(A)(b) on
professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a
profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed, to call
a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or polished.18 In the
context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of professionalism also means upholding the
integrity of public office by endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of impropriety
affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted that Section 4(A) enumerates the
standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution of official duties."

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of professionalism
by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public duty. The Ombudsman said
that petitioner’s act deprived the government of her committed service because the generation of a certificate of
title was not within her line of public service. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
said that it would have been sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials incharge
of the processing of the documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it may be true that she did not
actually deal with the other government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property,
petitioner’s act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that she would work for the
issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.

On its part, the CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those "wrong
perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins public officers, at all times to
respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good customs, public order, public
policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the
commission of the act itself.

Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to apply
even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s office. We hold, however, that
petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. The reason though does not
lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to petitioner’s discharge of her duties as department
head of the Population Commission.

In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized19 the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the
Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter,
Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for
public officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:

RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM

SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have demonstrated
exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4
of the Code, namely:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x

(b) Professionalism. - x x x
 (c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x

(d) Political neutrality. - x x x

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x

(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x

(h) Simple living. - x x x

On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, as follows:

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under existing laws, the
acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual,
temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall
constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities
provided herein, such as:

(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval
of his office. x x x.

(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by his
office, unless expressly allowed by law;

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or
regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions;

(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending
official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated by (1) law, or
(2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions of his office;

xxxx

(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason of his
office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue advantage to
anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;

(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything
of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his office. x x x.

xxxx

(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or public
policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to
the general public;

(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference;
 (i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;

(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules;

(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a reasonable
time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;

(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act promptly
and expeditiously on public personal transactions;

(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business
interests and financial connections; and

(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from
assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself of his
shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such assumption of
public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in the
service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest himself of
said interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the conflict of
interest had arisen.

In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,20 this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the norms
of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for
disciplinary action, to wit:

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The provision commands
that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an
ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness
and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to
democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713
adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to officials and
employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the norms of
conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials
and employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so
cannot expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they
will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared
unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or
omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct
under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that case.

We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse the CA and
Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we do
no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority given
to it by Congress. Needless to stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in
the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.21

But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action under R.A. No.
6713?

We also rule in the negative.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved
by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.22 Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of
misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct
because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of
supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules.23 We have also ruled that complicity in the
transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct only as there
was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable of gross misconduct.24 On the
other hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance
of the law, and grave misconduct, since the complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the judge
which were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.25

In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite rule of action or
unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent could merely point to
petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly
meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.

True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that public
office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that belongs to
another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts of interference
were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed
interference. And causing the survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs
of another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission. It does not
show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. Even the Ombudsman has
recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor.  Respondent said nothing on
1ih pwa1

the propriety or legality of what petitioner did. The survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task
under their agreement. Thus, respondent’s allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is
not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that the
land is government property.

However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.

But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of ₱50,000 from respondent
because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from her.26 We find in the allegations
and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner’s house in Biñan, Laguna, and asked petitioner if
she can help respondent secure a title to her land which she intends to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When
respondent asked about the cost, petitioner said ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the
initial expenses.27

We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the aborted
transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman, if
petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of ₱50,000 until the preliminary investigation of
the estafa case on September 18, 2003,28 there would have been no need for the parties’ agreement that
petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s belated
attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of
the estafa case against her.

For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public
officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of conduct
unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent documents
notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the
subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the respondents.29 Recently, in Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming
conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.30 1avvphi1
This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office shall not
be countenanced.31 The Constitution categorically declares as follows:

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.32

Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to accomplish
the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing
the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the element of deceit was not proven
in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated
basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer,
petitioner’s transgression could erode the public’s trust in government employees, moreso because she holds a
high position in the service.

As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-Rodriguez. Under
the circumstances of this case, a fine of ₱15,000 in lieu of the three months suspension is proper. In imposing
said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact
that this is the first charge against her.33 Section 5334 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And
since petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of ₱50,000 including interest, we find it proper to order
her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and Order dated
March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new judgment as follows:

We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her a FINE of ₱15,000.00
to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this Decision.

We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of ₱50,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221153

April 17, 2017

G.R. No. 221153

CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS, City Treasurer, Pasay City, and Concurrent OIC, Regional Director Bureau
of Local Government Finance (BLGF) Region VII, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by TROY FRANCIS C. PIZARRO, JOSELITO F. FERNANDEZ,
REYNALDO* L. LAZARO, MELCHOR B. PIOL, and ISMAEL S. LEONOR, and THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE,, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition   for review on certiorari assailing the Decision   dated August 27, 2014 and the
1 2

Resolution   dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851, which dismissed
3

petitioner Concepcion C. Daplas’ (petitioner) petition for review, thereby upholding the Joint Decision  dated
4

May 8, 2007 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the administrative aspects of the cases,
docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0234-E and OMB-C-A-06-0354-G. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, and imposed the
penalty of dismissal from service, and all its accessory penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

The Facts

Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite
sometime in 1968, and had held various posts until she was appointed as the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19,
1989, with a gross monthly salary of ₱28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints, petitioner was
concurrently holding the position of Officer-in- Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government
Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City. 5

Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman; respondents) for averred violations  of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019,  Section 8 (A) of RA 6713,8
6 7

Section 2 of RA 1379,  Article 183  of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Executive Order No. (EO) 6  dated
9 10 11

March 12, 1986,  constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
12

the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and
net worth, business interests, and financial connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs).   In particular, petitioner: (1) failed to declare (a) a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant
13

sedan with Plate No. TBH-238 (Galant sedan) registered under the name of her late husband with an estimated
value of ₱250,000.00; (b)  her stock subscription in KEI Realty and Development Corp. (KEI) valued at
₱1,500,000.00 with a total paid up amount of ₱800,000.00;   and (c) several real properties in Cavite   (which
14 15

had been the subject of a previous administrative complaint against her that had been dismissed   );16

and (2)  traveled multiple times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast doubt on her real net
worth and actual source of income considering her modest salary.  17

For her part, petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and maintained that she
was not totally dependent on her salary to finance the said acquisitions.   She alleged that: (a)  her late
18

husband purchased the Galant sedan out of his personal money, hence, the same did not form part of their
conjugal properties;   (b) she had already divested her interest in KEI in 1998, along with her husband, but her
19

husband and children reacquired their respective shares sometime in 2003;  and (c) her travels were
20

sponsored by the government or by her relatives abroad. 21

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Joint Decision  dated May 8, 2007, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave
22

Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory
penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution.   It observed that petitioner committed perjury under Article
23

183 of the RPC when she failed to declare in her SALNs for 1997 to 2003 the Galant sedan, and her business
interest in KEI in her 1997 SALN, which is sufficient basis to hold her liable for Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct.   Likewise, it found her liable for violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 for her failure to disclose the
24

said assets despite the legal obligation to do so. 25

However, the Ombudsman found respondents to have failed to substantiate the charges that: (a) petitioner's
numerous foreign travels were indicia of her acquisition of unlawful wealth;  and (b) KEI was put up as a
26

subterfuge for petitioner's ill-gotten wealth.

27

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Joint Order  dated May 30,
28

2011, prompting her to elevate her case before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
122851.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the Ombudsman's ruling was
29

sufficiently supported by substantial evidence.   It found that petitioner's failure to declare all her assets and
30

business interests constituted Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and a violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713.  It31

gave no credence to her defense of good faith considering that she knew of the said assets and gave no
justification for their exclusion in her SALNs.  Moreover, it ruled that her resignation from the government
32

service did not render the Ombudsman ruling moot.  33

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution  dated October 22,
34

2015; hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Joint Decision of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA
6713, and imposing on her the corresponding penalties.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution  in order to promote
35

transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on
enriching themselves through unlawful means.   By mandate of law, i.e.,  RA 6713, it behooves every
36

government official or employee to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her
assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her spouse and
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households,  in order to suppress any
37

questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such
matters. 38

In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years
1997 to 2003 despite the legal obligation to do so. Both the Ombudsman and the CA held that such omission
provides substantial basis to hold petitioner liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of dismissal from
service, with all its accessory penalties.

The Court disagrees.

Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses
of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct  are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.
39

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material

fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration,
appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.  40

On the other hand, misconduct is intentional  wrongdoing or deliberate  violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance

of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.   Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule
41

is properly characterized as simple misconduct only.   Most importantly, without a nexus between the act
42

complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail. 43

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would
normally amount to dishonesty.  It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required
1âwphi1

data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes
susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming
manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to
properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions. 44

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the
authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to
disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of
bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. 45

Notably, petitioner readily admitted in her Counter-Affidavit her business interest in KEI in 1997,   which belied
46

any malicious intent to conceal. While concededly, the omission would increase her net worth for the year
1997, the Court observes that the Ombudsman declared respondent's evidence insufficient to warrant a finding
that petitioner had any unexplained wealth.  On the contrary, it found that her children have the financial
47

capacity to put up KEI.  48

It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus,
in several cases   where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court
49

deemed the same an "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any
intent to commit a wrong, and having accounted for the source of the "undisclosed wealth," as in this case,
petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for having
failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.

Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is
negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.   An act done in good faith, which constitutes
50

only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes,  as in the present case, is
51

merely Simple Negligence.

In the same vein, petitioner's failure to declare the Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 stemmed
from the fact that the same was registered in her husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his
personal money.  While such bare allegation is not enough to overthrow the presumption that the car was
52

conjugal, neither is there sufficient showing that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in not disclosing the
same. In fact, the Ombudsman conceded that petitioner's husband was financially capable of purchasing the
car,   negating any "unexplained wealth" to warrant petitioner's dismissal due to Dishonesty.
53

Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the omission to include the
subject properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not amount to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of
showing that such omission had, in some way, hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no
direct relation or connection between the two.  54

Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her SALN. Simple

Negligence is akin to Simple Neglect of Duty,  which is a less grave offense punishable with suspension
55

without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, for the first offense.   Since the penalty of
56

suspension can no longer be imposed on account of petitioner's resignation,  and considering that she readily
57

admitted her omissions which do not appear to have been attended by any bad faith or fraudulent intent,   the
58

Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to one (1) month and one (1) day  of petitioner's
59

last salary is reasonable and just under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2014 and the
Resolution dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851 are hereby SET ASIDE.
A new one is ENTERED finding petitioner Concepcion C. Daplas GUILTY of SIMPLENEGLIGENCE in
accomplishing her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 1997 to 2003, and is meted a
fine in the amount equivalent to one (1) month and one (1) day of her last salary.

SO ORDERED.