RAMONITO MANABAN v. CA, GR NO.

150723, 2006-07-11
Facts:
The Facts
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o'clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the
UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center.
There, the doctors prescribed certain medicines... to be purchased. Needing money therefore, Joselito
Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some
money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because he could not effectively withdraw
money, he started kicking and pounding on the machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito
Manaban, approached and asked him what the problem was. Bautista... complained that his ATM was
retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had checked the receipt, he
informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just
return the next morning. This angered
Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine.
Manaban then urged him to calm down and referred him to their customer service over the phone. Still not
mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he
fired a... warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine,
he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista.[4]
On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with the crime of murder
When arraigned on 4 December 1996
The prosecution presented six witnesses
:
Faustino Delariarte
SPO1 Dominador Salvador
Rodolfo Bilgera
Celedonia H. Tan
Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas
Editha Bautista
Delariarte testified that in the early morning of 11 October 1996, their duty officer, Diosdado Morga, called him
and informed him that one of the guards stationed at the BPI Kalayaan Branch
("BPI Kalayaan") was involved in a shooting incident.
SPO1 Salvador testified that... the duty desk officer SPO2 Redemption Negre sent him, SPO1
Jerry Abad and SPO1 Ruben Reyes to BPI Kalayaan to investigate an alleged shooting incident. SPO1 Salvador
testified that when they arrived at BPI Kalayaan, they were met by Delariarte and Cancisio. Manaban then
approached them and surrendered his service firearm, a .38 caliber... revolver, to SPO1 Salvador.
Dr. Vargas, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)... testified that Bautista died of a gunshot wound.
According to him, the point of entry of the bullet was at the back, on the right side of the body and... there
was no exit point.
Bilgera testified that... he conducted a ballistic examination
Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that she was married to Bautista
According to Editha, her husband then left to withdraw money at BPI Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines.
Later, she was fetched by members of the UP Police Force who informed her that her husband had been shot.
Editha claimed that as a consequence of... her husband's death, she spent more than P111,000
The Defense's Version
The defense presented four witnesses:
Manaban
Renz Javelona
Tan
Patrick Peralta
Manaban narrated that
Bautista tried to withdraw money from the ATM. Manaban then saw Bautista pounding and kicking the ATM.
When Manaban asked Bautista what was the problem, Bautista replied that no money came out from the
machine. According... to Manaban, Bautista appeared to be intoxicated.
Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista and saw that the receipt indicated that a wrong PIN was
entered.
Javelona was an ATM Service Assistant of BPI. Javelona testified that on 11 October 1996, between 1:30 a.m.
and 2:00 a.m
The client, who was later identified as Bautista, complained: "Nagwi-withdraw ako dito sa ATM
Kalayaan. Mali daw yung PIN ko, alam ko tama yung PIN ko.
Javelona tried to placate Bautista and advised him not to insert his card anymore because it might be captured
by the machine and to try again later in the morning.
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalaya... an... testified that... she discovered that the ATM was out of
order. According to Tan, the ATM keyboard was not properly mounted and the keys were damaged.
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified
BPI Kalayaan sought his assistance regarding their ATM.
According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard... was damaged and mis-aligned.
The Trial Court's Ruling
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS... and ONE (1) DAY of Pris[i]on Mayor, as
maximum
Issues:
The Issues
The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming the erroneous factual appreciation and interpretation by the
trial court a quo in practically affirming the decision of the latter court which are based on... a clear
misappreciation of facts and findings grounded... entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures "in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence of the Supreme Court."
The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioner's self-defense on the sole fact that the entrance of
the deceased victim's wound was from the back.
The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression just
because the holster of the victim was still in a lock position.
Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake in his appreciation that there was an attempt on the part of
the deceased victim to draw his gun who executed "bumalikwas," such mistake of fact is deemed justified.
Finally, the Respondent Court gravely erred in awarding exorbitant and baseless award of damages to the
heirs of deceased victim.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals later reconsidered and
modified its decision with respect only to the award of loss of earning capacity. Using the formula 2/3 [80 age
at the time of death] x [gross annual income 80% gross... annual income], the Court of Appeals recomputed
the award for loss of earning capacity. In its Resolution dated 8 November 2001, the Court of Appeals reduced
the award for the loss of the victim's earning capacity from P1,418,040 to P436,320.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him
to prove that he killed the victim to save his life.[27] The accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that all the requisites of... self-defense are present.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a
person.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression... nless the threat is...
offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.[35] There must be an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant's life in real peril.[36]
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is
mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the latter turned
his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in... danger considering that Manaban, who had
already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a policeman, would have
realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked
holster tucked in... his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to
shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that Manaban's
firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
The trial court credited Manaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation.
It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the shooting incident. When the police arrived,
Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the police to the police station for
investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the... mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance.
In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Bautista turned around and was allegedly
about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in turning around is not unlawful and sufficient
cause for Manaban to lose his reason and shoot Bautista. That
Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make
Bautista's act unlawful.
The records[42] reveal that Bautista was 36 years old at the time of his death and not 26 years old as stated
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[43] Moreover, the annual salary of Bautista at the time of his
death was already
P60,864 and not P60,600.[44] We likewise modify the formula applied by the Court of Appeals in the
computation of the award for loss of earning capacity. In accordance with current jurisprudence,[45] the
formula for the indemnification... for loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning
Capacity
=
Life Expectancy x
[Gross Annual
Income (GAI)
Living Expenses]
=
2/3(80 age of deceased) x (GAI 50% of GAI)
Using this formula, the indemnification for loss of earning capacity should be:
Net Earning
Capacity
=
2/3 (80 36) x [P60,864 (50% x P60,864)]
=
29.33 x P30,432
=
P892,570.56
Thus, we reduce the actual damages granted from P111,324 to P69,500
We likewise reduce the indemnity for death from P75,000 to P50,000 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 May 2001 and
its Resolution dated 8 November 2001. We find petitioner Ramonito Manaban guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide. Applying... the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, Ramonito Manaban is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day... of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Ramonito Manaban is ordered to pay the heirs of Joselito Bautista:
P892,570.56 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; P69,500 as actual damages; and P50,000 as indemnity
for death.
Principles:
U... nder paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a
justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means... employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself.[29] Unlawful
aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense.[30] Self-defense is... founded on the necessity on the
part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression.[31] Thus, without prior
unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-defense.[32]
Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation
Under paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation is appreciated where the accused acted upon an impulse so... powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation are:
(1) that there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) that
the act which produced the... obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[40]
Award of Damages
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and laviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction
and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his
house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit,
proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He
also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a
legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months
after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On
the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property
rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close
and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of

his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only
if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of
the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or
intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on
account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view
to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to
mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64)
to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil
indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465
made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage
caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was
enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is
not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating

circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of
attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should
then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he
should be released.
PEOPLE V RICOHERMOSO

11FEB

L – 30527 – 28 | March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino

Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury 
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales,
chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano
asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested
from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and asked him
about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens.
Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his
father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermoso’s
brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which
point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried
beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.

The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.

Issue:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury

Held:
No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in preventing
Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was designed to insure
the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not  an act to prevent infliction of
greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves, from
an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s version of the case and
trial court’s finding of guilt.)
 MAMANGUN V PEOPLE

GR No. 149152 | February 2, 2007 | J. Garcia

Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right

Facts:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted
residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio
Abacan.  Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and
saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun
once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the
gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop. He was
beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun
at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?”
and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when Mamangun
noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!” whereupon the
person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the
person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him.
Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen here.” Mamangun
reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident.
Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.

 
Issue:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of his duty
 
Held:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the petitioner’s
testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per Sandiganbayan’s
observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to his co-policemen-
witnesses because:
1. After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human
experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns
2. Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the
one?” clearly belies their claim
3. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the victim instinctively
shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk and was only
conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Acts in the fulfillment of duty  and  self-defense  does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal
gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure
of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a privileged mitigating circumstance)
in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused by necessary consequence of due
performance of duty.

PEOPLE V BERONILLA

L – 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes

Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement
of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La,
Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who
was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15 th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which
authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or
abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed under custody
and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla
reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment you for your impartial but
independent way of handling the whole case.”

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the murder of
Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to
persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the
grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to lawful
order of superior
 
Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could not
question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was
done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received
the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality of
Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to
Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the conduct of the
trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death
sentence review sent to the superior officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea  (Crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable doubt
as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the
accused.”

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997

ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister
Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from
Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January
1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal
instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta,
caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January
1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by
Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA
funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed,
however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the
money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same
day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received.
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for
P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this
amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do
the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s
car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon
delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for
malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume
of the questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review,
appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December
1991.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries
with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently
lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor
for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The
questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation,
probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is
nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal
since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from
whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.