LTD: Module 5 Goals
1. To identify the facts that must be proven in a land registration proceeding.
2. To identify the specific pieces of evidence that are admissible, acceptable
and proper to prove the facts necessary to successfully obtain a Torrens
title.
3. To know which proofs are insufficient and unacceptable in land
registration proceedings.
Cases:
Heirs of Ammunategui vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-27873, 29
November 1983, 126 SCRA 69
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title
to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant
petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in
1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions
implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No.
88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been
in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest."
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
(Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of
the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass
upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as
such issues are rendered moot by this finding.
Sec. of DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, 8 October 2008, 568 SCRA 164
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to
Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41
giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an
informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information
title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded
on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal
grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion
posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of
the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the
definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v.
Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration
by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and
made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the
nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of
the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation
of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February
16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the
Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from
the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an
agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These
cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases
did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it
into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would
classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as
timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was
then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the
dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an
argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those
already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly
inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration
cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those
cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of
imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves
of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and,
by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land
was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a
mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class
or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon
it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry
land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that
in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable
for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or
future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the
fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other
of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions
of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened,
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for
itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands
from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive
prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title
in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed
by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer
authorized to determine the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants
cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in
the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited
by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain
are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied
on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron
and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here,
since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify
lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108
(Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No.
705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay,
no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign
tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112
classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or
timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants
and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted
from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not
by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands.
Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA.
All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau
of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind
the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not
address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but
sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a
15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular,
much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the
President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make
such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is
a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands
shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the
same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of
land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is
the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of
public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not
been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of
determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within
the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands
under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801
did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island
remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian
doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because
of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership
or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since
June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right
to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the
island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism
industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people
have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the
law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141,
as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither
will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are
needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in
Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary
green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops,
livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed,
the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
Leonidas vs. Vargas, GR No. 201031, 14 December 2017
The Petition is denied.
Requisites for the confirmation and registration of an imperfect and incomplete
title under CA 141 and PD 1529
"The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land."39
"[Commonwealth Act No. 141, in turn,] governs the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain. Section 11 [thereof] provides, as one of the modes
of disposing public lands that are suitable for agriculture, the 'confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.' Section 48 [thereof], on the other hand,
enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or
incomplete title over public lands and, therefore, entitled to confirmation and
registration under the Land Registration Act [now PD 1529]."40 The latter law
then "specifies who are qualified to apply for registration of land."41 Taken
together, all the foregoing provide for the requisites for the confirmation and
registration of an imperfect and incomplete title, thus —
x x x In particular, Section 14 (1) [of PD 1529] in relation to Section 48 (b) of [CA]
141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073, states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
[PD 1529], to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
[alienable and disposable lands] of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section
14 (1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that his possession has been
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
These triple requirements of alienability and possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier under Section 14 (1) are indispensable prerequisites to a
favorable registration of title to the property. Each element must necessarily be
proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise, the
application for registration should be denied.42
Petitioner did not cite the specific provision of CA 141 upon which he based his
Application. Nevertheless, the allegations therein seem to establish the fact that
his claim is one of imperfect title under the above quoted Section 48(b) of CA 141
in relation to Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
The subject lots are considered alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
The first requirement is complied with in the case at bench. Notwithstanding that
only a CENRO certification covering the subject lots was presented in the instant
case, the subject lots are considered alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain because of this Court's ruling that an application for land registration may
be granted despite the absence of the DENR Secretary's certification, provided
that the same was pending at the time Republic v. Vega43 was promulgated on
January 17, 2011. In Republic v. Alora,44 this Court expressly clarified this matter
in this wise:
x x x [I]n Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., which was promulgated on 26 June
2008 x x x we held that applicants for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. x x x
x x x In Republic v. Serrano [(decided on 24 February 2010)], we allowed the
approval of a land registration application even without the submission of the
certification from the DENR Secretary. As this ruling presented an apparent
contradiction with our earlier pronouncement in Republic v. TA.N. Properties, Inc.,
we sought to harmonize our previous rulings in Republic v. Vega [(decided on 17
January 2011)]. We then said that the applications for land registration may be
granted even without the DENR Secretary's certification provided that the
application was currently pending at the time Republic v. Vega was promulgated. x
x x45
It is worth stressing, however, that the foregoing ruling is the exception, not the
rule. As explicitly elucidated in Republic v. Vega:46
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies
pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that
the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the
Decisions of the lower court and the [CA] were rendered prior to these rulings. To
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public
land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under [PD
1529] must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified
true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts — in their sound discretion and based solely
on the evidence presented on record — may approve the application, pro hac vice,
on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive
act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of
effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to
applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this
Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications. (Underscoring and
emphases in the original)47
That said, we hold that both the petitioner and Tancredo failed to establish clearly
and convincingly their respective rights to registration of imperfect titles under CA
141 and PD 1529, as will be discussed below.

Petitioner failed to prove possession of the subject lots in the manner and for the
period required by law
First off, petitioner failed to establish bona fide possession and ownership over the
subject lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier. His contention that his predecessors-in-
interest became the owners of the subject lots pursuant to the May 17, 1937
Certificate of Sale48 of the Forfeited Real Property issued by the Provincial
Treasurer of Iloilo appears to be consistent with the fact that TD 3549 in Tomas's
name which was found by the CA as issued in 1945 bears an annotation stating
that such is "[c]ontested by [Asuncion]".49 Even then, the Certificate of Public
Sale indicated that the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P29.44, was
yet to be paid on or before December 31, 1937.50
No incontrovertible proof was, however, presented to establish the fact that this
balance of the purchase price in the said amount of 29.44 had indeed been paid
on or before December 31, 1937. In addition, the CA also correctly pointed out
that even as petitioner was able to submit TDs and evidence of tax payments only
for a few years, he nevertheless failed to explain why he or his predecessors-in-
interest declared the subject lots for taxation purposes only in 1976, this despite
his claim that his predecessors in-interest had been in possession and occupation
of the subject lots since 1937, as allegedly shown in the Provincial Treasurer's
Certificate of Sale. It is settled that intermittent and irregular tax payments run
counter to a claim of ownership or possession.51
Second, even assuming for argument's sake that petitioner's predecessors-in-
interest had paid the balance of the delinquent tax payment, petitioner
nonetheless failed to prove his and his predecessors-in-interests actual, notorious,
exclusive and continuous possession of the subject lots for the length of time
required by law.
To be sure, petitioner's failure to explain what happened after his family
supposedly left the subject lots in 1941, when the war broke out, vis-à-vis his
failure to prove that he had indeed introduced valuable improvements in the
subject lots during the time that he and his parents had been allegedly in actual
possession and occupation thereof, cast doubts upon his claim of actual
possession and occupation thereof. Withal, petitioner's testimony of having swum
near the subject lots, of having planted trees thereon, and his having finished high
school at the Victorino Salcedo High School in the neighboring town of Sara can
hardly be considered as acts of dominion or ownership over the subject lots.
Besides, petitioner did not present clear and convincing evidence that the subject
lots had indeed been cultivated by him or by his predecessors-in-interest for the
period of time required by law. Needless to say, all these failings weaken his claim
that he has been a bona fide possessor and occupant of the subject lots in the
manner and for the period prescribed by law, to wit:
The possession contemplated by Section 48 (b) of [CA] 141 is actual, not fictional
or constructive. In Carlos v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court explained the
character of the required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to quality, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.52(Emphases in the original)
Oddly enough, while in its Decision the RTC appeared to have granted petitioner's
Application, said Decision seemed to have indulged in a bit of non-sequitur when it
said that "[petitioner] and his predecessors were not in actual possession of the
[subject lots] all the time" x x x. 53 Simply said, the CA effectively ruled that since
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest had indeed
performed the required acts of possession and occupation, or specific acts of
dominion over the subject lots, it stands to reason that registration thereof in his
name cannot be allowed.
Tancredo also failed to establish possession and occupation over the disputed
portions in the manner and for the period required by law
At this juncture, we shall revisit the uniform finding by both the RTC and the CA,
which in effect upheld Tancredo's right to register the disputed portions in his
name (as an exception to the settled rule that questions of fact are proscribed in a
Rule 45 petition since a correct evaluation of the facts will yield a different
conclusion).54
First off, Tancredo failed to show that his or his predecessor-in interest's
possession and occupation over the disputed portions had been under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. We are inclined to agree with
petitioner's posture that Tancredo failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence
which established the origin or antecedents of Tomas's straightforward possession
and occupation, or claim of ownership, over the disputed portions. Consider the
following exchange/s between/among Tancredo, the petitioner, and the Court —
More than this, Tancredo did not present clear, convincing evidence to support his
claim that the disputed portions were in fact transferred to him by his father,
Tomas. Tancredo merely testified that the disputed portions were given to him
solely by Tomas, an act that was allegedly consented to by his siblings. Thus —
Nonetheless, there is nothing in the records to support or confirm Tancredo's claim
that the property was in fact deeded over to him by his father, Tomas.
In Buenaventura v. Pascual,57 this Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of
the claims for registration of imperfect titles because, among others, both the
applicant and oppositors failed to adduce evidence as to how they acquired the
subject property from their respective predecessors-in-interest, i.e., whether by
succession or by donation or by some other mode. Furthermore, we stressed
therein that the applicant failed to prove the manner by which her predecessors-
in-interest possessed the subject property.
Then, again, Tancredo also failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had/have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the disputed portions since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.
If anything, the records showed that Tancredo merely submitted photocopies of
four tax declarations which were attached as annexes to his Opposition. These
included the 1945 TD 3549 as adverted to by the CA in the records58 pertaining to
a 3.6237-hectare lot in an unstated cadastral lot, TD 0548 covering an 813-hectare
lot in Cadastral Lot No. 1676-A,59 TD 0549 for a 2.3642-hectare lot in Cadastral
Lot No. 1677-A,60 and TD 0550 concerning a 1.1782-hectare lot in Cadastral Lot
No. 566-A.61 All four TDs are in Tomas's name, without copies of the dorsal
portions thereof, and bearing annotations stating either "[c]ontested by
[Asuncion]" or "[a]lso declared in the name of [Asuncion] or [Ponciano]".
It would thus appear that Tancredo had erected his opposition/claim to the lots in
question upon the said photocopies of four tax declarations whose authenticity or
genuineness is open to the most serious doubts. And, even on the assumption that
the said tax declarations are in fact authentic and genuine, still it is settled that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. If anything, tax declarations
are merely corroborative of a person's claim of possession. More than that, as
elsewhere indicated, intermittent and irregular tax payments, as in this case, do
not really provide strong support for a claim of ownership or possession.62
It is axiomatic of course that "[i]t is the policy of the State to encourage and
promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth
and in line with the social justice ideal enshrined in the Constitution. At the same
time, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest
they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony."63 This
ruling controls the present case.
As a final note: All of the foregoing discussion showed that the issues raised in this
case have all been previously resolved and determined by settled jurisprudence;
hence, there is no reason to grant petitioner's prayer for this case to be referred to
or heard by the Court En Banc, as this is not a case of first impression at all.
Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, GR No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA
477 (2008);
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain.
Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of
the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.15
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas
City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at
Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square
meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30,
Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued
by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR
(FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable
land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No.
582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18
dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within
the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of
land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification
status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas
below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of
land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case,
respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per
DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20
and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber
dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber
dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares
for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in
the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications
were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the
facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication21 of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section
23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil
Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook.23
The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of
original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.24 The certifications are
conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.25
Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed
by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications may fall
under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23
of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27
Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative, identified the
certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not
testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be
given probative value.28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because
Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of
CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the
land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent
show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable
and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue
print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds
of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and
classification of the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-
geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s
classification.31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that
would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records
Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the
tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved
subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful
reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the
discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain
why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other
certifications submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista
and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista’s statement that the
possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather
than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent
failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable
and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista
testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of Kabesang
Puroy’s possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had
worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court of
Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is
not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and
everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events
regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land
spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public
knowledge to them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However,
he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy
and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did
not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact,
Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one
of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista’s testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of
a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista’s
uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient
corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent’s acquisition of
the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he
obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the
Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of
the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas
claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations
from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of
lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.
Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino
citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The
Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x
x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could
have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that
corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on
individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under
the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the
land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation,
upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the
next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the
public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired
the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide
his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since
the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available
alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding
filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an
area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could
be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not
to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land
when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a
registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire
public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could
acquire not more than 144 hectares.39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed
possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of
this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time
no prohibition against said corporation’s holding or owning private land. x x x.40
(Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the
"land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by
Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting,
who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of
that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years
since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the
land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of
alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when
its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the
land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad
v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land
in question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased
them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the
previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the
1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not
apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but
private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the
statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land
under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176)
further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area
applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act
shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12
hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares.
Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area
of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land
registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course,
that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land
had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private
land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
Republic vs Vera, GR No. L-35778, 27 January 1983
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1
the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of
the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad.
Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were
issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision dated
October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the
lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an
answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed
by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant;
(2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the
case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in
which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If
claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the
land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need
state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was
acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his
predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in possession or
occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and
the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for
taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots
and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful
claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their
answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the
portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The
Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its
decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the
subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in
rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-
litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must
necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the
respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied
for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3
Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during
the period required by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not
approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The
Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in
this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents
applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-
divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan
is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not
of much value. 4
What the applicant must prove
During trial, the land registration applicant must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following facts:
1. The classification of the land as alienable and disposable, thus registrable;
2. The identity of the land;
3. The ownership over the land;
4. Possession and occupation of the land for the length of time and in the
manner required by law;
In the succeeding pages, let us identify the specific pieces of evidence to prove
each of the foregoing facts.
Evidence to prove land classification
Fact to be proven: The classification of the land from the forest zone; that it is A &
D, thus registrable.
Legal basis: A positive act of the government is needed to reclassify the land.
READ: Heirs of Ammunategui vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-27873, 29
November 1983, 126 SCRA 69;
The power to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable and disposable lands
belongs to the executive branch of government. READ: Sec. 6 & 8, Commonwealth
Act No. 141; READ: Sec. of DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, 8 October 2008, 568
SCRA 164;
Acceptable proofs
1. Presidential proclamation. READ: Sunbeam Convenience Foods vs CA, 181
SCA 443
2. Executive Order.
3. Administrative Order issued by the Secretary of the DENR. READ: Republic
vs. Heirs of Ocol. GR No. 208350, 14 November 2016. BUT READ:
Notwithstanding that only a CENRO certification covering the subject lots
was presented in this case, the subject lots are considered alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain because of the Supreme Court’s
ruling that an application for land registration may be granted despite the
absence of the DENR Secretary’s certification, provided that the same was
pending at that time Republic vs. Vega was promulgated on 17 January
2011. The foregoing ruling is the exception, not the rule. READ: Leonidas
vs. Vargas, GR No. 201031, 14 December 2017.
4. Legislative act. READ. IHVCP vs. UP, GR No. L-521518, 13 August 1991,
200 SCRA 554
5. Bureau of Forest Development Land Classification Map
6. Certification by the Director of Forestry and reports of the district forester.
READ: Republic vs Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 (1987);
 7. Investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands. READ: Republic vs. De
Porkan, G.R. No. L-66866, 18 June 1987. 151 SCRA 88; Supposing the
forester did not testify, is a mere report admissible? READ: Tattoc vs IAC,
180 SCRA 386 (1989). Is a mere recommendation of the District forester
for release of the land from its unclassified origin evidence of such
release? READ: Director of Lands vs. CA, 129 SCRA 689 (1984); BUT, in
the case of erroneous classification, the Government cannot be estopped
by acts of its agents. READ: Republic vs IAC, G.R. No. 69138, 19 May
1992 citing Republic vs. CA, 135 SCRA 156
8. Copy of the original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. READ:
Republic vs. Tan Properties, GR No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477
(2008);
The Republic vs Tan Case
The burden to overturn the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. READ:
Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, GR No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477
(2008);
TAN RULING applied without qualification. READ: Republic v. Spouses Castuera,
G.R. No. 203384, 14 January 2015
TAN RULING held inapplicable; reasons. READ: Republic v Alora, GR No. G.R. No.
210341. 1 July 2015.
Insufficient proofs to establish land classification: Survey plan even if approved by
the Bureau of Lands. READ: Rep. vs. CA, 154 SCRA 476; Conversion of lands into
fishponds and the titling of lands around it. READ: Director of Lands vs. CA, 129
SCRA 689; Development of forest land into residential and commercial does not
alter its status as forest land. READ: Republic vs. Bacus, 176 SCRA 376.
Evidence to prove identity of the land
Fact to be proven: the identity of the land
Acceptable proofs of identity:
1. Survey plan in general. READ: Republic Cement Corp. vs. CA, 198 SCRA 734;
Note: A survey plan even if approved by the Bureau of Lands does not
convert the land into alienable and disposable much less private property.
READ: Republic vs CA, 154 SCRA 476 (1987)
2. Tracing cloth plan must be produced. READ: Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177;
3. A blue print copy of the plan will suffice where the original tracing cloth plan
was attached to the application for registration. Read: Director of Lands vs. IAC,
195 SCRA 38; or a duly certified correct copy of the original plan. READ: Director
of Lands vs. IAC & Espartinez, 195 SCRA 98
Note: Submission of the approved plan and technical description of Lot
No. 9100 constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement to
ascertain the identity or location of the lands subject of the application for
registration. READ: Republic v. Alba, G.R. No. 169710. August 19, 2015
Proof as to boundaries and area; well defined boundaries prevail over area. READ:
Romero vs. CA, 40 SCRA 172; Republic vs. CA, 135 SCRA 156; Evidence as to such
natural boundaries must be clear and convincing. 500-hectare difference negates
application of natural boundaries. READ: Carabot vs. CA, 145 SCRA 368
Evidence to prove possession
Fact to be proven: possession
Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. READ: Section 14(1), PD 1529;
Sec. 48 (b), CA 141, as amended; See also TAN vs. Republic, GR No. 177797, 4
December 2008 & Republic vs. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA
183.
Possession not established. Petitioner failed to establish bona fide possession and
ownership over the subject lots since 12 June 1945 or earlier; it is settled that
intermittent and irregular tax payments run counter to a claim of ownership or
possession. Petitioner failed to prove his and his predecessors –in interest actual,
notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the subject lots for the length of
time required by law. READ: Leonidas vs. Vargas, GR No. 201031, 14 December
2017. READ also: Republic v. Alba, G.R. No. 169710. 19 August 2015
Acts of a possessory character by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part
of the real owner are not sufficient. READ: Seminary of San Carlos vs. Municipality
of Cebu, GR No. L-4641. 13 March 1911, 19 Phil 32
Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without
substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute
exclusive and notorious possession under claim of ownership. READ: Municipality Applicant must prove genuineness of document evidencing title. READ: Republic
of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734. vs. Cement Corp.,198 SCRA 734.

Acceptable proof and its limitations
Tax Declarations. Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof
of ownership but have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of
actual possession or supported by other effective proof. READ: TAN vs. Republic,
GR No. 177797, 4 December 2008;
Spanish titles are no longer proof of ownership. The so-called TITULO DE
PROPRIEDAD No. 4136 is inexistent. READ: PD 892, 16 August 1976; Santiago vs.
SBMA, GR No. 156888, 20 November 2006; Quezon Province vs. Marte, GR No.
139274, 23 October 2001; Spanish titles in pending cases: When an applicant
relies on a Spanish title as composition title, he must produce that title or prove
contents by secondary evidence; otherwise the precise boundaries and location of
the land applied for cannot be established. READ: Director of Lands vs. CA, 130
SCRA 91.

Tax declarations or realty tax payments of public lands are good indicia of Insufficient proofs
possession in the concept of an owner. READ: Republic vs. Sps. Ocol, GR No.
208350, 14 November 2016. Insufficient proofs to establish private ownership

Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a while do not
constitute acts of possession. READ: Director of Lands vs. IAC, 209 SCRA 214;
Tax declarations are not evidence of the right of possession unless supported by
other effective proof. But they constitute proof that the holder has claim of title
over the property. READ: Municipality of Antipolo vs. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820;
Compromise agreement. READ: Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71;
Decision in estate proceedings. READ: Director of Lands vs. IAC, 195 SCRA 38;
Survey plan even if approved by the Bureau of Lands. READ: Republic vs. CA, 154
SCRA 476

Payment in lump sum to cover all past taxes is “irregular” and affects the validity
of the applicant’s claim of ownership. READ: Republic vs. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140;

But mere failure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that
there was abandonment of the property. Read: Reyes vs. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472;

Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax

purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession in
the concept of owner. READ: Regalado vs. Republic, G.R. No. 1681155, 15
February 2007;

Function of tax declarations: A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered

conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.
Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s
ownership. READ: Daclag vs. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, 28 July 2008

Evidence to prove private ownership

Fact to be proven: private ownership