Republic of the Philippines Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the

SUPREME COURT President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a
Manila letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo
Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.
FIRST DIVISION
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the
  Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil
Action No. 9661, for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros
Court of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private
Oriental, HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A.
respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955
VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL
entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local
LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A.
Government, et al."
VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and
FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD,
NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners, On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed
vs. as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:
BINAOHAN and DELIA ESTRELLANES, respondents.
INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special

KAPUNAN, J.: Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P.
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of
Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines committed as follows:
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for suspension of
their arraignment. That during the period from February 1989 to
February 1991 and subsequent thereto, in the
The present controversy arose from the following antecedents: Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO
Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G.
agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL
Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA
and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES
1989, respectively. and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the
performance of their official functions and taking
advantage of their public positions, with evident
bad faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring and
 confederating with each other did, then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury
to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan
and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay
despite demand the amount of NINETY FIVE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS
(P108,900.00) representing respectively
their per diems, salaries and other privileges
and benefits, and such undue injury continuing
to the present to the prejudice and damage of
Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.  1
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null
and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local
Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having
been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code. 3
The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v.
Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion
cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792,
87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990,
ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the
President (or the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government) may appoint members of the
local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial
and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a
determination to be made by the Sanggunian
itself that the said sectors are of sufficient
number in the city or municipality to warrant
representation after consultation with
associations and persons belonging to the
sector concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled —
For that matter, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code
even prescribe the time and manner by which
such determination is to be conducted by the
Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian
concerned has not yet determined that the
Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their
particular city or municipality are of sufficient
number to warrant representation, there will
absolutely be no basis for the
designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of
the sector concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian
is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations
and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation
with the sector concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so
considering that those who belong to the said sector are the
ones primarily interested in being represented in the
Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not
by any other person or body) as a condition sine qua non to a
valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the
required prior determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of
private defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.
This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases,
the Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where
the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not
complied with. Just to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang
Bayan of Valenzuela that the sectors concerned
are of sufficient number to warrant
 representation and there was no consultation
whatsoever with the associations and persons
belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor
Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private
respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael
Cortez are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et al.
v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394,
August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently pending
resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners.
Said respondent Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the
private complainants have been rendering services on the basis
of their respective appointments as sectoral members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption
of regularity. Having rendered such services, the private
complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their office.
Even assuming arguendo  that the said Regional Trial Court shall
later decide that the said appointments of the private
complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are
entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have
actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial
declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at
least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of
apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities.
In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered
in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld
salaries for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral
representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the
decision that may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the innocence
or guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of
Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the
accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in
view of the decision promulgated by the trial court nullifying the appointments of
private respondents but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that the grounds stated in
the said motion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the
case in abeyance.  The dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:
6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the
accused which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor
Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto,
Erenieta K. Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado
Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should
not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in
court today for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is
to be filed by the counsel for the defense, set this case for
arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all
dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding
consideration of all incidents pending the issuance of an extended resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May
1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June
1993. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the
scheduled hearing today which We deem to be excusable, reset
this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the
merits on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to
start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
 Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty.
Alfonso Briones. Considering that the accused come all the way
from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be
allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9 related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners
attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency
of a prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would
entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e.,
the validity of the appointments of private respondents and their
entitlement to compensation which is already pending resolution
by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively
allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative
theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de
facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or
validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives which is
pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code)
because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal
case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of
the issues involved in said criminal case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative
of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal.  It is a question based on a fact
12
distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.  It has two essential elements:
14
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in
the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to
warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal
case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in
this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action
(No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of
the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad
faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and  per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether
or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were
made in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there
will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest
partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This
refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations
were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from
were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No.
decision declaring null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.
representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners would no SO ORDERED.
longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad
faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay
private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to
demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of
Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine
whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are SECOND DIVISION
entitled to compensation for actual services rendered.  We disagree. As found by
16

the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by
petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President
copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989,
barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office.  Hence, private
17
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral
representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in
the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they
may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for
services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith.
18
G.R. No. 137567               June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati
City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999
issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled
"Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said
Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the
ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are
present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. 19
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on
June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,
Quezon City. 1

August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four
children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
2 
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch
87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged
that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a
4  the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason
criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
5  of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office
of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. The case,
6  before a married man.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61. 1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden
Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order dated August 7 
31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial
was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the
concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. In an Order dated January 28, 1999, the
8  9 
Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court
subsequently issued another Order  dated February 23, 1999, denying his
10 
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the
criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal
case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that
his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits
that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on
subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly,
petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.  11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is
not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,  this Court ruled that the import of said
12 
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said
Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than
proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato
vs. Luna  where this Court held that:
14 
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome
of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred
in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that
pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159186               June 5, 2009
JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General
Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA
DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA,  J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance
of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real
estate business through their company Primetown Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain
Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early
part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank,
they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were
made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make
good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of
sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231. 3 On December
15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General
Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No.
35522-I.5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings
on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the
private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. 6 Petitioner prayed that
the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending
before the RTC were finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the
motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869
and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question
relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in
the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case
No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On
July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which was denied in an Order
dated October 18, 2001.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status
Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals
that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed
out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled
to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have
rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the
rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each
other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in
question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's
contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the
sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale
that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the
petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof
or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and
void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the
resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the
petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 17
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the
Order19 dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR
COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL
CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION
OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF
B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by
law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion
that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages
were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further
alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private
respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of
consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration
for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that
he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other
elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for value. There
must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be
rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks
was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in
order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the
failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there
is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale
between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are
entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the
petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to
private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has
absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a
prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the
MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question
would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based
on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P.
Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to
collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have
rediscounted from Evelyn. lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is
no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the
payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
itself an offense.25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the
daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to
cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the
cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that
"whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared
void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22
cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of
bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a
bouncing check has been issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended
or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as
an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the
same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
xxxx
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a
guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.28
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case
of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an
alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa
was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same
alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that
there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was
based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether
the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and
damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the
material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad
checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the
issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money
and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense
during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a
party’s defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of
testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during
trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective
rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations
and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the
defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal
cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and
decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and
the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
68250 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184861               June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26,
2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated
October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.
Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P.
Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S.
Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was
docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal
information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on
February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated
August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the
RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-
0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC,
were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately
related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words,
private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as
against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in
an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question 7 on the grounds that: (1) there is
no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from
the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial
question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action";
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded
the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of
the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant
criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated
filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111,
Revised Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008, 9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13,
2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26,
2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial
question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed
civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private
respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action
was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in
the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197. 11
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a
prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v.
People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however,
became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule
111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be
established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal
case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation
wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending
criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of
court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.
Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers
a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent
to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had." 14 In the
instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
"subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no other
logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal
action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on
the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion
for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case
No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that
which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before
a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with
the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by
the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be
construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. 17 1 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting
laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to
mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the
preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil
Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the
criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of
Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the
relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case
indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend
the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question
were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a
civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a
criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In
resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the
filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal
charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was
instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no
valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three
(3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the
cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere
afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And
as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions
cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as
provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus,
such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction
agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would
become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal
prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP
22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support
the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court
has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the
issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding
such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the
framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that
the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which
were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of
a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a
check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn,
may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the
party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who
makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in
blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the
proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-
existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when
the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista
starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with
Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the
law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would
not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact
of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22. lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant
case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable
to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC,
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and
March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in
Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-
trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC
Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for
lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the
RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon
City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would
be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already
been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of
the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October
2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14
February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on
7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was
dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and
the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder 14 or
homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married
to respondent. 1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that
"the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x."
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on
a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in
that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences." 18 In fact, the Court declared in
that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned." 19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.