NIKKA DORIA ATTY. MARCELINO S.

MARATA
JD-2B

G.R. No. L-41278

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 
Petitioner
-vs -

HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Presiding Judge,

Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II,
MARIA O. GARCIA, and IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Respondents

Facts of the case:

Up for resolution is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the following orders and
decision of the respondent Judge and praying for the dismissal of the Imperial Development
Corporation’s application for registration.
The herein respondent, Maria Garcia, filed an application for land registration on September 8,
1973 in the Court of First Instance in Bataan which subsequently furnish a copy thereof to the Solicitor
General thru the Director of Lands. On February 1974, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
received application, which consequently, the Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized
the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearings of the same.
A Motion to Substitute Party Applicant was filed by the respondent Corporationwhich was
subsequently granted by the respondent Judge, substituting the applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial
Development Corporation, without causing any amendment to boundaries and the area of the parcels of
land transcribed in the original application.
The respondent Judge sent a Notice of Initial Hearing to the concerned parties which entail a
warning that a party would be declared in default for failure to appear the said hearing. However, on the
actual initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present which was acted by the respondent
Judge issuing an order of general default. The latter adjudicated the lands in favor of Imperial
Development Corporation.
In response to the decision, the petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial contending that the
failure of his client to appear at the initial hearing was ex excusable, and that the decision was contrary
to the facts and to law. However, the said motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the herein respondent, Judge Santiago, erred in decreeing the following
decisions:

1. Declaring the Director of Lands in default.

2. Adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation.
3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.

Held:
The Court granted the petition declaring all the orders and decisions void, namely; the Order of
general default; the Order denying the Motion for New Trial and the decree of the registration issued
pursuant thereto.
On the first aforecited order, the Court held that the respondent Judge erred in declaring the
oppositor in default simply because of the failure to appear on the day of the initial hearing as the latter
formally filed its opposition based on substantial grounds including the objection to the application and
the interest claimed by the petitioner which serves as the answer. The declaration of default was
evidently invalid because he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer prior
to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing. The Judge should have set another hearing for the
reception of evidences.

Moreover, on the second decision, the Court held that the lower court granted the respondent
corporation’s application for registration with grave abuse of discretion as it wasn’t able to scrutinize
evidentiary requirements that the applicant possessed an imperfect and imperfect and incomplete title
that is registrable under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by the Public Land Act.
The respondent Judge erred in stating that the respondent corporation, through its predecessors-in-
interest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of public domain considering the fact that the respondent corporation purchased the
subject lots from Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin who have still have pending sales application which
manifest that they themselves do not own the land. The registration cannot be granted because the
subject lands were forest lands in which Section 48, Par. B, of the Public Land Act applies exclusively
to agricultural lands of the public domain.

On the third order, the Court held that the respondent Judge ignored the established rule that
courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment. It further sited the case of Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corp. v. Hontanosas which declares that: “the Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could
have restored their standing on court and give them an even chance to face their opponents.”

Hence, the Court granted the petition and declared the orders and decisions rendered by the
respondent Judge void, dismissing the respondent’s subject application for land registration.
G.R. No. 178411

Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City, et. al

Petitioners

-vs-

Mario D. Ebio et.al

Respondents

Facts of the case:

The herein respondents claimed to be the absolute owner of a parcel of land consisting of 406
square meters which was an accretion of Cut-cut creek situated at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Brgy.
Vitalez, Parañaque City declared in the name of Mario D. Ebio. Respondents contend that the original
occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was Jose Vitalez, their great grandfather who in turn
sometime in 1930, gave such land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. In 1966, Pedro was able to obtain a tax
declaration over the said property under his name.

In 1961, Mario Ebio married Zenaida, Pedro’s daughter. In April 1964 and in October 1971,
Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their
house within the compound. On April 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights in favor of
Mario Ebio.The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08 seeking
assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut
Creek located in the said barangay. The road involved in the Resolution covers the lot occupied by the
respondents. In response to this, respondents immediately opposed the project which was consequently
suspended.

In January the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the subject lot. Thereafter, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to vacate the area. Respondents then asserted their claim over the subject property. Threatened of
being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.

Issue:
Whether the character of respondent’s possession and occupation of the subject property entitles
them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

Held:
The Court affirmed the resolution of the Court Appeals in favor of the herein respondents and
hold that they have proven their right over the property in question. In the instant case, the respondents
filed an action for injunction to prevent the government of Parañaque from pursuing the construction of
an access road traversing the parcel of land which they claimed as their property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
The subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the
banks of Cut-cut creek in which in this case, the law governing the ownership over the accreted portion
are Art. 48 of the Spanish Law of Waters and Article 457 of the Civil Code. These laws manifest that it
does not form part of the public domain but rather belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may
have been added. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he possesses a right in
esse. The respondents in the instant case acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription. Hence, the Court held that the respondents are entitled to avail the relief of prohibitory
injunction as they possessed a right in esse which is actual and existing.
G.R. No. 144057

Republic of the Philippines

Petitioner

-vs-

The Honorable Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit

Respondents

Facts of the case:

The herein respondent, Corazon Naguit, filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land
located in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The subject land consists of planted trees in addition to existing
coconut trees which were 50 to 60 years old and the corresponding taxes were paid. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objections until filing of the application. On the initial hearing on the application, the public prosecutor
appearing for the government and the Heirs of Rustico Angeles represented by Jose Angeles, opposed
the petition. Consequently, the MCTC, rendered a decision in favor of Corazon Naguit. The Solicitor
General representing the Republic of the Philippines contends that the subject land was only declared
alienable on October 15, 1980 in which Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree.

Issue:
Whether it’s necessary under that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

Held:

The Court held that there is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Consequentially, Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession of the land since 1945.

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree provides the requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title which requires that the property subject to the application is alienable
and disposable land of public domain and the applicants or their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation and such shall be under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This then implies that the aforementioned provision
requires the property sought to be registered, at the time of the application for registration of title is
filed; it shall already be alienable and disposable. It is not necessary that the land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
start. As being held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, to prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government. In
the instant case, the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable; hence there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
G.R No. 103727

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO

SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its
HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO,
Petitioner-appellant
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO,

DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ,
Respondents-appellees

Facts of the case:

The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban claim ownership of an area involving 173,000
hectares against third persons and the Government itself. The basis on their claim is the Spanish Title-
“Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136” covering the lands of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and
Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and
City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of
Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south.
A complaint was filed by Engracio San Pedro for recovery of possession of real property and/or
reconveyance with damages and with a prayer of preliminary injunction. The contentions in the
complaint includes the discovery by Engracio San Pedro relative to the titles to the portions of the
subject estate secured by the respondents from the Registry of Deeds which emanates from OCT No.
614 and OCT No. 333 which were cancelled. Moreover, it contends that the respondents acquired the
ownership and possession through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation and that the issue of the
existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 which covers the subject estate had
been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate. However, RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the
defendants are already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by
the alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. 

Issue:
Whether the heirs of Mariano have the legal claim over the properties involved.

Held:
The Court ruled in negative. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles should cause their land
covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from the date of
effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Consequentially, Spanish titles can no longer be
allowed as evidence of land ownership. In the instant case, the petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence
showing that the Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892. Thus, the
Court held that the said Spanish title is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents.

Hence, the petitioners-heirs have no legal claim over the properties involved pursuant to the
aforementioned system of registration which abolished Spanish titles and consequently invalidates any
claim of the title which must be registered first under the Torrens system of titling to be countenanced as
evidence of ownership.