G.R. No.

209342

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification by a
witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person
matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The
unbiased character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.

Criminal prosecution may result in the severe consequences of deprivation of liberty, property, and,
where capital punishment is imposed, life. Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness identification
must be approached meticulously, cognizant of the inherent frailty of human memory. Eyewitnesses
who have previously made admissions that they could not identify the perpetrators of a crime but,
years later and after a highly suggestive process of presenting suspects, contradict themselves and
claim that they can identify the perpetrator with certainty are grossly wanting in credibility.
Prosecution that relies solely on these eyewitnesses' testimonies fails to discharge its burden of
proving an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This resolves an appeal from the assailed June 26, 2013 Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1

G.R. CR HC No. 04474, which affirmed with modification the February 24, 2010 Decision  of Branch
2

67, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal. This Regional Trial Court Decision found accused-
appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez (Nuñez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre (Pobre), and a
certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code,  as follows:
3

That on or about the 22nd of June 2000, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with handguns, by
means of violence against or intimidation of the persons of Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and
Byron G. Dimatulac, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
and carry away the money amounting to ₱5,000.00 belonging to the Caltex gasoline station owned
by the family of Felix V. Regencia to their damage and prejudice; that on the occasion of the said
robbery and to insure their purpose, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot said Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G.
Dimatulac on the different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which directly
caused their deaths. 4

At first, only Marciales and Nabia were arrested, arraigned, and tried. In its December 9, 2005
Decision,  the Regional Trial Court found the offense of robbery with homicide as alleged in the
5

Information, along with Marciales and Nabia's conspiracy with Pobre and Jun to commit this offense,
to have been established. Thus, it pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced them to death.  The case against Pobrn and Jun was archived subject to revival upon
6

their apprehension. 7
On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nunez was apprehended by the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the
Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved that the case against him be dismissed as he was
not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information. However, prosecution witnesses identified him as
one (1) of the alleged robbers and his motion to dismiss was denied. The information was then
atnended to state Nuñez's name in lieu of "Paul Pobre." 8

During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be adopting the evidence already presented in
the course of Marciales and Nabia's trial. Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution witnesses
Ronalyn Cruz (Cruz) and Relen Perez (Perez). In their testimonies, they both positively identified
Nunez as among the perpetrators of the crime. 9

Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, she was working as an attendant at
the Caltex gasoline station mentioned in the Infonnation. She was then sitting near the g1;1,soline
pumps with her co-employees, the deceased Byron G. Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and prosecution
witness Pierez. They noticed that the station's office was being held up. There were two (2) persons
poking guns at and asking for money from the deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix Regencia
(Regencia). Regencia hancied money to one (1) of the robbers while the other robber reached for a
can of oil. Regencia considered this as enough of a distraction to put up a fight. Regencia and Diaz
grappled with the robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) men ran to the
office. The first was identified to be Marciales and the second, according to Cruz, was Nunez.
Dimatulac also ran to the office to assist Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot Dimatulac while
Nunez shot Diaz. Cruz and Perez sought refuge in a computer shop. About 10 to 15 minutes later,
they returned to the gasoline station where they found Diaz already dead, Dimatulac gasping for
breath, and Regencia wounded and crawling. By then, the robbers were rushing towards the
highway. 10

Perez's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, she was working as a sales clerk
in the Caltex gasoline station adverted to in the Information. While seated with Cruz near the
gasoline pumps, she saw Nuñez, who was pointing a gun at Diaz, and another man who was
pointing a gun at Regencia, inside the gasoline station's office. Diaz shouted that they were being
robbed. Another man then rushed to the gasoline station's office, as did her co-employee Dimatulac.
A commotion ensued where the robber identified as Marciales shot Dimatulac, Diaz, and Regencia.
They then ran to their employer's house. 11

Nunez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances of his apprehension. He stated
that when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006, he was on his way to his aunt's fish store where he
was helping since 1999 when a man approached him. He was then dragged and mauled. With his
face covered, he was boarded on a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further
claimed that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his aunt at her fish store until
about 5:00 p.m. before going home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him to get pails from the store
and bring them to his aunt's house. 12

On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision  finding Nunez guilty beyond
13

reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. This four (4)-page Decision incorporated the original
Regional Trial Court December 9, 2005 Decision and added the following singular paragraph in
explaining Nunez's supposed complicity:

To convict Nunez of robbery with homicide requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that he: (1) took
personal property which belongs to another; (2) the taking is unlawful; (3) the taking is done with
intent to gain; and (4) the taking was accomplished with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code and (5) when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed[.] The facts
are simple. Nuñez along with Marciales and Nabia robbed the Tayuman Caltex gas station of
₱5,000.00 and some cans of oil. For such booty, he[,] along with his fellow thieves[,] shot and killed
Felix Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac. He was positively and unequivocally
identified by Renel Cruz and Ronalyn Perez as [one] of the perpetrators even as he tried to hide
behind another name and was arrested later. He ran but could not hide as the long arm of the law
finally caught up with him. As a defense, he can only offer his weak alibi which cannot offset the
positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. His guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, as follows:

Based on the foregoing, we find accused Crisente Pepaño Nuñez

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences (sic) him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and order
him to pay:

1. The heirs of Felix Regencia Php. 151,630.00 expenses for the wake, burial lot and funeral service;
Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php. 5,000.00 money stolen from the victim; exemplary damages
of Php. 50,000.00; and Php. 2,214,000.00 unearned income;

2. The heirs of Alexander Diaz Php. 20,000.00 expenses for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death
indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and Php. 1,774,080.00 unearned income;

3. The heirs of Byron Dimatulac Php. 18,000.00 for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity;
Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and Php. 966,240.00 unearned income[;] and

4. The costs.

Let the case against alias "Jun" who remains at large be archived.

SO ORDERED. 15

On March 5, 2010, Nuñez fifed his Notice of Appeal. 16

On June 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision  affirming Nunez's
17

conviction, with modification to the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated February 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case No. 00-473 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Crisente
Pepaño Nuñez is ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages each to the heirs of Felix Regencia, the heirs of Alexander Diaz and the heirs of Byron
Dimatulac.

SO ORDERED. 18

Nuñez then filed his Notice of Appeal. 19

The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court on October 22, 2013 pursuant to
its Resolution dated July 23, 2013. The Resolution gave due course to Nuñez's Notice of Appeal. 20
In its Resolution  dated December 4, 2013, this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of
21

Appeals and informed the parties that they may file their supplemental briefs. However, both parties
manifested that they would no longer do so. 22

The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the killing of Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac is no
longer in issue as it has been established in the original proceedings which resulted in the conviction
of Marciales and Nabia.

All that remains in issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Crisente
Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with
Marciales and Nabia.

Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court, this Court finds that it
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez
is thy same person identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this Court reverses the courts a quo and acquits
accused-appellant Crisente Pepano Nunez.

The prosecution's case rises and falls on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez. The
necessity of their identification of Nunez is so manifest that the prosecution saw it fit to recall them to
the stand, even as it merely adopted the evidence already presented in the trial of Marciales and
Nabia. Cruz's and Perez's testimonies centered on their supposed certainty as to how it was Nuñez
himself, excluding any other person, who participated in the robbery and homicide.

This Court finds this supposed certainty and the premium placed on it by the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court to be misplaced.

There are two (2) principal witnesses who allegedly identified accused-appellant as the same Pobre
who participated in the robbery holdup. When Cruz, the first witness, was initially put on the witness
stand, she asserted that she could not recall any of the features of Pobre. After many years, with the
police presenting her with accused-appellant, she positively identified him as the missing
perpetrator. The second principal witness' testimony on the alleged participation of accused-
appellant is so fundamentally at variance with that of the other principal witness. The prosecution did
not account for the details of the presentation of accused· appellant to the two (2) witnesses after he
was arrested. Finally, these witnesses' alleged positive identification occurred almost eight (8) years,
for the first witness, and almost nine (9) years, for the second witness, from the time of the
commission of the offense.

The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on human memory
in criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty, property, and
even life, is equally established.

Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In the first place, human memory is
more selective than a video camera. The sensory environment contains a vast amount of
information, but the memory process perceives and accurately records only a very small percentage
of that information. Second, because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle
pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways because of the
passage of time or subsequent events, such as exposure to "postevent" information like
conversations with other witnesses or media reports. Third, memory can also be altered through the
reconstruction process. Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and requiring the
witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the witness memory to change by unconsciously
blending the actual fragments of memory of the event with information provided during the memory
retrieval process.23

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably refers to as "positive

identification," is the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt. However, eyewitness identification is
but a product of flawed human memory. In an expansive examination of 250 cases of wrongful
convictions where convicts were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing, Professor Brandon
Garett (Professor Garett) noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these Wrongful convictions were
occasioned by flawed eyewitness identifications.  Another observer has more starkly characterized
24

eyewitness identifications as ''the leading cause of wrongful convictions." 25

Yet, even Professor Garrett's findings are not novel. The fallibility of eyewitness identification has
been recognized and has been the subject of concerted scientific study for more than a century:

This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of eyewitness errors in wrongful convictions is,
unfortunately, no surprise. Previous studies have likewise found eyewitness errors to be implicated
in the majority of cases of wrongful conviction. But Garrett's analysis went farther than these
previous studies. He not only documented that eyewitness errors occurred in his cases. He also tried
to determine why they occurred - an issue eyewitness science has investigated for over 100 years. 26

The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged: on one level,
eyewitness identifications are inherently prone to error; on another level, the appreciation by
observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of how an eyewitness identifies
supposed culprits is just as prone to error:

The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly documented. The painstaking work of
the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and others who have documented wrongful convictions,
participated in the exonerations of the victims, and documented the role of flawed evidence of all
sorts has clearly and repeatedly revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability for eyewitness
evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are subject to substantial error, and (2) observer judgments
of witness accuracy are likewise subject to substantial error. 27

The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness identification is borne not only by the
intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of
identification operates. It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as
environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time:

More than 100 years of eyewitness science has supported other conclusions as well. First, the ability
to match faces to photographs (even when the target is present while the witness inspects the lineup
or comparison photo) is poor and peaks at levels far below what might be considered reasonable
doubt. Second, eyewitness accuracy is further degraded by pervasive environmental characteristics
typical · of many criminal cases such as: suboptimal lighting; distance; angle of view; disguise;
witness distress; and many other encoding conditions. Third, memory is subject to distortion due to a
variety of influences not under the control of law enforcement that occur between the criminal event
and identification procedures and during such procedures. Fourth, the ability of those who must
assess the accuracy of eyewitness testimony is poor for a variety of reasons. Witnesses' ability to
report on many issues affecting or reflecting accuracy is flawed and subject to distortion (e.g.,
reports of duration of observation. distance, attention, confidence, and others). thereby providing a
flawed basis for others' judgments of accuracy. 28

Likewise, decision-makers such as jurists and judges, who are experts in law, procedure, and logic,
may simply not know better than what their backgrounds and acquired inclinations permit:
Additionally, the limits and determinants of performance for facial recognition are beyond the
knowledge of attorneys, judges, and jurors. The traditional safeguards such as cross-examination
are not effective and cannot be effective in the absence of accurate knowledge of the limits and
determinants of witness performance among both the cross-examiners and the jurors who must
judge the witness. Likewise, cross-examination cannot be effective if the witness reports elicited by
cross-examination are flawed: for example, with respect to factors such as original witnessing
conditions (e.g., duration of exposure), post-event influences (e.g., conversations with co-witnesses),
or police suggestion (e.g., repo1is of police comments or behaviors during identification
procedures). 29

II

Legal traditions in various jurisdictions have been responsive to the scientific reality of the frailty of
eyewitness identification.

In the United States, the Supreme Court "ruled for the first time that the Constitution requires
suppression of some identification evidence"  in three (3) of its decisions, all rendered on June
30

12, 1967-United States v. Wade,  Gilbert v. California,   and Stovall v. Denno.  Stovall emphasized

31 32 33

that such suppression, when appropriate, was "a matter of due process." 34

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the general rule in the United States was that any
problems with the quality of eyewitness identification evidence went to the weight, not the
admissibility, of that evidence and that the jury bore the ultimate responsibility for assessing the
credibility and reliability of an eyewitness's identification. In a trilogy of landmark cases released on
the same day in 1967, however, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the Constitution
requires suppression of some identification evidence. In United
States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the Court held that a post-indictment lineup is a critical
stage in a criminal prosecution, and, unless the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights,
defense counsel's absence from such a procedure requires suppression of evidence from the lineup.
The court also ruled, however, that even when the lineup evidence itself must be suppressed, a
witness would be permitted to identify the defendant in court if the prosecution could prove the
witness had an independent source for his identification ...

….

In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that, regardless of whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were in1plicated or violated, some identification procedures are "so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" that eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a
matter of due process.  (Citations omitted)
35

In Wade, the United States Supreme Court noted that the factors judges should evaluate in deciding
the independent source question include:

[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of
another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the
defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification." 36

Nine (9) months later, in Simmons v. United States, the United States Supreme Court calibrated its
approach by "focusing in that case on the overall reliability of the identification evidence rather than
merely the flaws in the identification procedure."
Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due process violation in admitting the evidence
because there was little doubt that the witnesses were actually correct in their identification of
Simmons. Scholars have frequently characterized Simmons as the beginning of the Court's
unraveling of the robust protection it had offered in Stovall; while Stovall provided a per se rule of
exclusion for evidence derived from flawed procedures, Simmons rejected this categorical approach
in favor of a reliability analysis that would often allow admission of eyewitness evidence even when
an identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. 37

In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the United States has "reaffirmed its shift toward a
reliability analysis, as opposed to a focus merely on problematic identification procedures" beginning
in 1972 through Neil v. Biggers: 38

The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case in which the confrontation and trial had taken place
before Stovall, identification evidence would be admissible, even if there had been an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure, so long as the evidence was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
To inform its reliability analysis, the Biggers Court articulated five factors it considered relevant to the
inquiry:

[(l)] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [(2)] the witness'
degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, [(4)] the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.

The Biggers Court clearly proclaimed that the "likelihood of misidentification," rather than a

suggestive procedure in and of itself, is what violates a defendant's due process rights. However,
the Biggers Court left open the possibility that per se exclusion of evidence derived from
unnecessarily suggestive confrontations might be available to defendants whose confrontations and
trials took place after Stovall.
39

The Biggers standard was further affirmed in 1977 in Manson v. Brathwaite;  40

The Manson Court made clear that the standard from Biggers would govern all due process
challenges to eyewitness evidence, stating that judges should weigh the five factors against the
"corrupting effect of the suggestive identification." Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." In rejecting the per se
exclusionary rule, the Court acknowledged that such a rule would promote greater deterrence
against the use of suggestive procedures, and it noted a "surprising unanimity among scholars" that
the per se approach was "essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice." However, the
Court concluded the cost to society of not being able to use reliable evidence of guilt in criminal
prosecutions would be too high. The Manson Court also made clear that its new stm1dard would
apply to both pre-trial and in-court identification evidence, thus resulting in a unified analysis of all
identification evidence in the wake of suggestive procedures. In contrast, the Stovall Court had not
specified whether unnecessarily suggestive procedures would require per se exclusion of both pre-
trial identification evidence and any in-court identification, or alternatively, whether witnesses who
had viewed unnecessarily suggestive procedures might nonetheless be allowed to identify
defendants in court after an independent source determination. 41

A 2016 article notes that Manson "remains the federal constitutional standard."  It' also notes that
42

"[t]he vast majority of states have also followed Manson in interpreting the requirements of their own
constitutions."43
The United Kingdom has adopted the Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police
Officers.  It "concerns the principal methods used by police to identify people in connection with the
44

investigation of offences and the keeping of accurate and reliable criminal records" and covers
eyewitness identifications. This Code puts in place measures advanced by the corpus of research in
enhancing the reliability of eyewitness identification, specifically by impairing the suggestive
tendencies of conventional procedures. Notable measures include having a parade of at least nine
(9) people, when one (1) suspect is included, to at least 14 people, when two (2) suspects are
included  and forewarning the witness that he or she may or may not actually see the suspect in the
45

lineup.  Additionally, there should be a careful recording of the witness' pre-identification description
46

of the perpetrator  and explicit instructions for police officers to not "direct the witness' attention to
47

any individual." 48

III

Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification is affected by "normal human

. 
fallibilities and suggestive influences."  People v. Teehankee, Jr 50 introduced in this jurisdiction the
49

totality of circumstances test, which relies on factors already identified by the United States Supreme
Court in Neil v. Biggers: 51

(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;

(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. 52

A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness' opportunity
to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at that time,
based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have been, for the
witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their
identity.  In People v. Pavillare: 
53 54

Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later
when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to
face and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the
complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of
their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he
s[aw] them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the
malefactors as he remember[ed] him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the
complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private
complainant admitted that he d[id] not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the
case was dismissed against him. 55

Apart from extent or degree of exposure, this Court has also appreciated a witness' specialized skills
or extraordinary capabilities.  People v. Sanchez  concerned the theft of an armored car. The
56 57

witness, a trained guard, was taken by this Court as being particularly alert about his surroundings
during the attack.
The degree of a witness' attentiveness is the result of many factors, among others: exposure time,
frequency of exposure, the criminal incident's degree of violence, the witness' stress levels and
expectations, and the witness' activity during the commission of the crime. 58

The degree of the crime's violence affects a witness' stress levels. A focal point of psychological
studies has been the effect of the presence of a weapon on a witness' attentiveness. Since the
1970s, it has been hypothesized that the presence of a weapon captures a witness' attention,
thereby reducing his or her attentiveness to other details such as the perpetrator's facial and other
identifying features.  Research on this has involved an enactme1'1t model involving two (2) groups:
59

first, an enactment with a gun; and second, an enactment of the same incident using an implement
like a pencil or a syringe as substitute for an actual gun. Both groups are then asked to identify the
culprit in a lineup. Results reveal a statistically significant difference in the accuracy of eyewitness
identification between the two (2) groups: 60

[T]he influence of [a weapon focus] variable on an eyewitness's performance can only be estimated
post hoc. Yet the data here do offer a rather strong statement: To not consider a weapon's effect on
eyewitness performance is to ignore relevant information. The weapon effect does reliably occur,
particularly in crin1es of short duration in which a threatening wea.pon is visible. Identification
accuracy and feature accuracy of eyewitnesses are likely to be affected, although, as previous
research has noted ... there is not necessarily a concordance between the two. 61

Our jurisprudence has yet to give due appreciation to scientific; data on weapon focus. Instead, what
is prevalent is the contrary view which empirical studies discredit.  For instance, in People v.
62

Sartagoda:

[T]he most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence [is] to strive to see the looks a..11d faces
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of
the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be
erased from their memory. 63

Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed natural propensity for remembering the faces of
assailants, this Court now emphasizes the need for courts to appreciate the totality of circumstances
in the identification of perpetrators of crimes.

Apart from the witness' opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of the Grime and
the witness' degree of attention at that time, the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness is equally vital. Logically, a witness' credibility is enhanced by the extent to which his or her
initial description of the perpetrator matches the actual appearance of the person ultimately
prosecuted for the offense.

Nevertheless, discrepancies, when properly accounted for, should not be fatal to the prosecution's
case, For instance, in Lumanog v. People,  this Court recognized that age estimates cannot be
64

made accurately:

Though his estimate of Joel's age was not precise, it was not that far from his true age, especially if
we consider that being a tricycle driver who was exposed daily to sunlight, Joel's looks may give a
first impression that he is older than his actual age. Moreover Alejo's description of Lumanog as
dark-skinned was made two (2) months prior to the dates of the trial when he was again asked to
identify him in court. When defense counsel posed the question of the discrepancy in Alejo's
description of Lumanog who was then prese11ted as having a fair complexion and was 40 years old,
the private prosecutor manifested the possible effect of Lumanog's incarceration for such length of
time as to make his appearance different at the time of trial. 65
The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the degree of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the moment of identification. What is most critical here is the initial
identification made by the witness during investigation and case build-up, not identification during
trial.66

A witness' certainty is tested in court during cross-examination. In several instances, this Court has
considered a witness' straight and candid recollection of the incident, undiminished by the rigors of
cross-examination as an indicator of credibility. 67

Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By the time a witness takes the
stand, he or she shall have likely made narrations to investigators, to responding police or barangay
officers, to the public prosecutor, to any possible private prosecutors, to the families of the victims,
other sympathizers, and even to the media. The witness, then, may have established certainty, not
because of a foolproof cognitive perception and recollection of events but because of consistent
reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced narrator. Repeated narrations before different
audiences may also prepare a witness for the same kind of scrutiny that he or she will encounter
during cross-examination. Again, what is more crucial is certainty at the onset or on initial
identification, not in a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings.

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the
crime and the identification made by the witness. "It is by now a well established fact that people are
less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than after a
short one."  Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the
68

incident. This Court has considered acceptable an identification made two (2) days after the
commission of a crime,  not so one that had an interval of five and a half (5 1/2) months.
69 70

The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes memory. Equally jeopardizing is a witness'
interactions with other individuals involved in the event.  As noted by cognitive psychologist
71

Elizabeth F. Loftus, "[p]ost[-]event information can not only enhance existing memories but also
change a witness's memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a
previously acquired memory." 72

Thus, the totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure undergone by a witness. Both verbal and non-verbal information might
become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a witness:

A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect has been caught and the witness should look at
some photographs or come to view a lineup and make an identification. Even if the policeman does
not explicitly mention a suspect, it is likely that the witness will believe he is being asked to identify a
good suspect who will be one of the members of the lineup or set of photos ... If the officer should
unintentionally stare a bit longer at the suspect, or change his tone of voice when he says, "Tell us
whether you think it is number one, two, THREE, four, five, or six," the witness's opinion might be
swayed. 73

In appraising the suggestiveness of identification procedures, this Court has previously considered
prior or contemporaneous  actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, media, or even fellow witnesses.
74

In People v. Baconguis,  this Court acquitted the accused, whose identification was tainted by an
75

improper suggestion.  There, the witness was made to identify the suspect inside a detention cell
76

which contained only the suspect. 77

People v. Escordiaz  involved robbery with rape. Throughout their ordeal, the victim and her
78

companions were blindfolded.  The victim, however, felt a "rough projection''  on the back of the
79 80

perpetrator. The perpetrator also spoke, thereby familiarizing the victim with his
voice.  Escordial recounted the investigative process which resulted in bringing the alleged
81

perpetrator into custody. After several individuals were interviewed, the investigating officer had an
inkling of who to look for. He "found accused-appellant [in a] basketball court and 'invited' him to go
to the police station for questioning."  When the suspect was brought to the police station, the rape
82

victim was already there. Upon seeing the suspect enter, the rape victim requested to see the
suspect's back. The suspect removed his shirt. When the victim saw a "rough projection" on the
suspect's back, she spoke to the police and stated that the suspect was the perpetrator. The police
then brought in the other witnesses to identify the suspect. Four (4) witnesses were taken to the cell
containing the accused and they consistently pointed to the suspect even as four (4) other
individuals were with him in the cell.
83

This Court found the show-up, with respect to the rape victim, and the lineup, with respect to the four
(4) other witnesses, to have been tainted with irregularities. It also noted that the out-of-court
identification could have been the subject of objections to its admissibility as evidence although
these objections were never raised during trial.84

Although these objections were not timely raised, this Court found that the prosecution failed to
establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.  It noted that the
85

victim was blindfolded throughout her ordeal. Her identification was rendered unreliable by her own
admission that she could only recognize her perpetrator through his eyes and his voice. It reasoned
that, given the limited exposure of the rape victim to the perpetrator, it was difficult for her to
immediately identify the perpetrator. It found the improper suggestion made by the police officer as
having possibly aided in the identification of the suspect.  The Court cited with approval the following
86

excerpt from an academic journal:

Social psychological influences.Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of

suggestibility in a lh1eup confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be
correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that
they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot
identify anyone and therefore1 may choose someone despite residual uncertainly. Moreover, the
need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target
for feelings of hostility.

Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This desire to conform
produces an increased need to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that
the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed
by the police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime.  (Emphasis in the original)
87

88
People v. Pineda,   involved six (6) perpetrators committing robbery with homicide aboard a
passenger bus.  A passenger recalled that one (1) of the perpetrators was referred to as "Totie" by
89

his companions. The police previously knew that a certain Totie Jacob belonged to the robbery gang
of Rolando Pineda (Pineda). At that time also, Pineda and another companion were in detention for
another robbery. The police presented photographs of Pineda and his companion to the witness,
who positively identified the two (2) as among the perpetrators. 90

This Court found the identification procedure unacceptable.  It then articulated two (2) rules for out-
91

of-court identifications through photographs:

The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be
shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a
group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect. 92

Non-compliance with these rules suggests that any subsequent corporeal identification made by a
witness may not actually be the result of a reliable recollection of the criminal incident. Instead, it will
simply confirm false confidence induced by the suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness.

Pineda further identified 12 danger signals that might indicate erroneous identification. Its list is by
no means exhaustive, but it identifies benchmarks which may complement the application of the
totality of circumstances rule. These danger signals are:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;

(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation against him
when questioned by the police;

(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness' original description and the actual
description of the accused;

(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some other person;

(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;

(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;

(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was unaware that a
crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the criminal and his identification of
the accused;

(11) several persons committed the crime; and

(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification. 93

Pineda underscored that "[t]he more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the crime."  Establishing the identity of perpetrators
94

is a difficult task because of this jurisdiction's tendency to rely more on testimonial evidence rather
than on physical evidence. Unlike the latter, testimonial evidence can be swayed by improper
suggestions. Legal scholar Patrick M. Wall notes that improper suggestion "probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor[.]"  Marshall Houts, who served the Federal
95

Bureau of Investigation and the American judiciary, concurs and considers eyewitness identification
as "the most unreliable form of evidence[.]" 96
People v. Rodrigo  involved the same circumstances as Pineda. The police presented a singular
97

photograph for the eyewitness to identify the person responsible for a robbery with homicide. The
witness identified the person in the photograph as among the perpetrators. This Court stated that,
even as the witness subsequently identified the suspect in court, such identification only followed an
impermissible suggestion in the course of the photographic identification. This Court specifically
stated that a suggestive identification violates the right of the accused to due process, denying him
or her of a fair trial: 98

The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused especially, when
this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the
reliability of the identification. This level of care and circumspection applies with greater vigor when,
as in the present case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional dimensions arising
from the due process rights of the accused.

….

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional law implications in
terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights
to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by
impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the
investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in
the mind of Rosita, or at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was one of the
robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying
only with respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators a.re the real actors in the
identification of the accused; evidence of identification is effectively created when none really
exists.  (Emphasis supplied)
99

IV

Applying these standards, this Court finds the identification made by prosecution witnesses Cruz and
Perez unreliable. Despite their identification, there remains reasonable doubt if accused-appellant
Nuñez is the same Pobre who supposedly committed the robbery with homicide along with
Marciales and Nabia.

The prosecution banks on the following portion of Cruz's testimony.  The Court of Appeals heavily
100

relies on the same portion, reproducing parts of it in its Decision:101

Q: Madam Witness, where were you on June 22, 2000 in the afternoon?

A: I was on duty at Tayuman Caltex station, Ma'am.

Q: And while you were on duty, what happened if any?

A: While we were on duty there was a pick-up which was getting gas and a person was in front and
we were joking baka kami mahold-up yun pala, hinoholdup na kami sa opisina.

Q: You mentioned that there was already hold-up happening?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: What time was that when you noticed that holdup?

A: Around 8:00p.m.

Q: Where was the hold-up going on?

A: In the office, Ma'am.

Q: And how far is that office from where you were at that time, how many meters?

A: From here to the wall of the court.

Court:

Anyway, I have the reference.

Prosecutor Aragones:

Q: What happened after you saw that there was [a] hold[-up] going on inside the office of the Caltex
Station?

A: After that me and my companions ran to the computer shop which is beside the office.

Q: By the way, why were you at the Caltex gasoline station?

A: I was an attendant, Ma'am.

Q: You mentioned that you proceeded to the computer shop which is beside the office?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: Where did you run, inside or outside the computer shop?

A: Inside, Ma'am.

Q: Before you went inside, what did you witness after you saw that there was hold-up inside the
office?

A: I saw that one of our companions, a gun was pointed to him and also to our employer.

Q: Who was your companion you saw who was pointed with a gun?

A: Alex Diaz, and Kuya Alex my employer.

Q: Who were those persons who pointed guns to your co-worker and to your employer?

A: The two accused who were first arrested.

Q: Aside from the two accused, do they have other companions?

A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Who was that person who was also with the two accused?

A: Paul Pobre.

Q: By the way, who were those two accused you are referring to according to you were arrested?

A: George Marciales and I cannot remember the other one.

Q: You mentioned of the name Paul Pobre, kindly look around if there is any Paul Pobre in court?

A: Yes, Ma'am, he is here.

Q: Can you point to him?

A: He is that one (pointing)

INTERPRETER;

Witness is pointing to a person wearing yellow shirt who when asked gave his name as Crisanto
Pepafio.

PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:

Q: Who told you that the name of that person is Paul Pobre?

A: Kuya Rommel

Q: Who is Kuya Rommel?

A: Brother of my employer Kuya Alex.

Q: Who was apprehended in Laguna?

A: He is the one, Paul Pobre.

Q: What was the participation of that person you pointed to as being the companion of accused
George Marciales and the other one?

A: He was the one who entered last and who shot.

COURT:

Q: Who did he shoot?

A: Kuya Alex. 102

The prosecution similarly banks on the narration and identification made by Perez:
Q: Madam Witness when Alex, the accused you pointed a while ago, the other accused Marciales
and your boss, all of them were inside the computer shop, the office of Caltex?

A: At first no[,] ma'am[.] Nagsimula po kasi andoon po kami sa labas may lalaking nakatayo po doon
sa malapit sa road, sya po yung na[] identify before as George Marciales. Ang nakita po lang naming
una sa loob apat po sila si boss, si Alex, that man (Nunez) and the man identified before as Orly
Nabia.

Q: Where were you at that time when these four persons were inside the office?

A: We were sitting in an island near the three pumps in front of the gas station[,] ma'am.

Q: The office in relation to that island is at the back, is that correct?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: There were no customers at that time?

A: None[,] ma'am.

Q: The cashier were (sic) Alex is positioned is facing you[.] [I]s that correct?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: So it was the back of the accused that you saw, is that correct?

A: No[,] ma'am. Sa pinto po kasi yung register namin e. So andito po si Alex nakatungo po sya
andito po yung accused naka[-]ganito po sya, nakatutok pos a (sic) kanya. (Witness was standing
while demonstrating the incident between the accused and Alex inside the office) very clear po yung
itsura nya nung nakita po namin sya.

Q: How far is that island from the cashier, from the place you were seated right now?

A: Around 4 to 5 meters[,] ma'am.

Q: Were you able to hear the conversation considering that distance of 4 to 5 meters?

A: I heard nothing[,] ma'am[,] except when Alex shouted[,] "Byron tulong, hinoholdap tayo[.]"

Q: Alex was shouting while he was still inside the office?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: And it was Byron who ran towards the office?

A: The first one was George Marciales, Byron only followed him.

Q: Where was George Marciales before he entered that office?

A: He was near the road[,] ma'am.

Q: But that is not within the gas station's premises?

A: Bali eto po yung pinaka sementado, andito sya. (Witness referring to the place where Marciales
is)

Q: When you said the cemented area, you were referring to the National road?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: After Byron went inside the said office, were you able to see what happened inside?

A: Yes[,] ma'am. Nakasuntok po sya ng isa kay George tapos tinadyakan po siya sa tagiliran tsaka
binaril po sya. Tapos bumagsak napo (sic) sya.

Q: You were still outside your office at that time?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: Nobody was with you at that time aside from your co-employees, only the accused was inside at
that time?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: You did not run or ask for help considering that that Caltex is along the National road? A:
Honestly speaking[,] we were not able to say anything at that time[,]ma'am.

A: After po ng pag shoot sa kanila tumakbo po kami ni Rona doon sa may computer shop, sa bahay
po nila. Pagkaraan po ng ilang minuto lumabas kami nakita po naming sila na nagtatakbuhan
together with Kuya Lawrence. Nakita po naming (sic) sila na tumatakbo, yung dalawa papuntang
Angono, yung isa hindi ko na po alam kung [saan] nagpunta. Nakita na lang po naming si boss na
gmnagapang asking for help. 103

The Court of Appeals also favorably cited the following identification made by Perez:

Prosecutor Aragones

Q : Now can you look inside the court and tell us if there is anybody here who took part in that
incident or involved in that incident?

Relen Perez

A: Him[,] ma'am. (witness pointing to the accused)

Q: What was the participation of that man whom you pointed today in that robbery with homicide
incident in Caltex gasoline station?

A: He was the one who was pointing a gun to my co-employee Alexander Diaz[,] ma'am. 104

V
These identifications are but two (2) of a multitude of circumstances that the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals should have considered in determining whether or not the prosecution has
surmounted the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lamentably, they failed to give due
recognition to several other factors that raise serious doubts on the soundness of the identification
made by prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez.

First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously admitted to not remembering the appearance of the
fourth robber, the same person she would later claim with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In the
original testimony she made in Marciales and Nabia's trial in 2002, she admitted to her inability to
identify the fourth robber:

Fiscal Dela Cuesta

Q: Can you describe the other holdupper during that date and time who were the companions of
George Marciales?

Ronalyn Cruz

A: I cannot describe them[,] ma 'am.

Q: Why can you not describe the appearance of the other holdupper?

A: I cannot remember their appearances, ma 'am.

….

Fiscal Dela Cuesta

Q: At what particular point in time that the 4th holdupper went inside the office?

Ronalyn Cruz

A: When they were wrestling with each other, ma'am.

Q: Was that before the shooting or after?

A: Before the shooting[,] ma'am. 105

Second, by the time Cruz and Perez stood at the witness stand and identified Nuñez, roughly eight
(8) years had passed since the robbery incident.

Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes, witnesses' identification of Nunez did not come
until after he had been arrested. In fact, it was not until the occasion of his arraigmnent,  Nuñez was
106

the sole object of identification, in an identification process that had all but pinned him as the
perpetrator.

VI

Cruz's admission that she could not identify the fourth robber anathemized any subsequent
identification. Moreover, the prosecution, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court all failed
to account for any intervening occurrence that explains why and how Cruz shifted from complete
confusion to absolute certainty. Instead, they merely took her and Perez's subsequent identification
as unassailable and trustworthy because of a demeanor apparently indicating certitude.

The conviction of an accused must hinge less on the certainty displayed by a witness when he or
she has already taken the stand but more on the certainty he or she displayed and the accuracy he
or she manifested at the initial and original opportunity to identify the perpetrator. Cruz had originally
admitted to not having an iota of certainty, only to make an unexplained complete reversal and
implicate Nunez as among the perpetrators. She jeopardized her own credibility.

Cruz's and Perez's predicaments are not aided by the sheer length of time that had lapsed from the
criminal incident until the time they made their identifications. By the time Cruz made the
identification, seven (7) years and eight (8) months had lapsed since June 22, 2000. As for Perez,
eight (8) years and nine (9) months had already lapsed.

In People v. Rodrigo,   this Court considered a lapse of five and a half (5 1/2) months as unreliable.
107

Hence, there is greater reason that this Court must exercise extreme caution for identifications made
many years later. This is consistent with the healthy sense of incredulity expected of courts in
criminal cases, where the prosecution is tasked with surmounting the utmost threshold of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not disputed that Nunez's identification by Cruz and Perez was borne only by Nunez's arrest on
July 2, 2006. The prosecution even acknowledged that his identification was initially done only to
defeat his motion to have the case against him dismissed.  Evidently, Nuñez's identification before
108

trial proper was made in a context which had practically induced witnesses to identify Nuñez as a
culprit. Not only was there no effort to countervail the likelihood of him being identified, it even
seemed that the prosecution and others that had acted in its behalf such as tile apprehending
officers, had actively designed a situation where there would be no other possibility than for him to
be identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

The dubiousness of Nunez's presentation for identification is further exacerbated by the

circumstances of his apprehension. In a Manifestation filed with the Court of Appeals, and which,
quite notably, the prosecution never bothered repudiating, Nunez recounted how his apprehension
appeared to have been borne by nothing more than the crudeness and sloth of police officers:

6). That, the truth of the matter as far as the offended charged against me, I ha[ve] no any
truthfulness (sic) nor having any reality as it was indeed only a mere strong manufactured, fabricated
and unfounded allegations against me just to get even with me of my [untolerable] disciplinary
actions of some individuals who had a personal grudge against me.

….

9). That, with all due respect, I ha[ve] nothing to do with the offensed (sic) charged and it is not true
that the case was done was charged against me it is Paul Borbe y Pipano it was wrong person pick-
up by the police officer, because the said Paul Borbe y [P]ipano was charged of several crimes,
while me my record has no single offense against me.

10). That, with due respect, there was no truthfulness that I was the one who committed the said
crime, it was a big mistake because we have the [same 1 family name they just pick up the wrong
person which is innocent to the said crime.
11). That, with all due respect, it was not true, also that it was me who committed the said crime, it
was Paul Borbe y Pipano is the one because he was habitual in doing crime in our community, in
fact my record is clean never been committed any crime in my life, I am a concern citizen who can
help our community well.  (Emphasis supplied)
109

The identification made during Nunez's trial, where eyewitnesses vaunted certainty, was but an
offshoot of tainted processes that preceded his trial. This Court finds Nunez's identification prior to
trial bothersome and his subsequent and contingent identification on the stand more problematic.

Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to withstand the rigors of the totality of circumstances test.
First, the witnesses failed to even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution witness
failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to identify him
as the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time had lapsed since the
criminal incident; the original witness' statement that none of his features were seen as to enable his
identification; and the positive identification made of him when the case was re-opened. And finally,
his presentation for identification before and during trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely,
suggestive as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to the exclusion of any
other person, must have been the supposed fourth robber.

These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse the fourth robber's
features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that this case does not
manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration under the totality of
circumstances test.

VII

Recall that both prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez acknowledged the extreme stress and fright
that they experienced on the evening of June 22, 2000.  As both Cruz and Perez recalled, it was
1âwphi1

enough for them to run and seek refuge in a computer shop. Their tension was so palpable that even
Cruz's and Perez's recollections of what transpired and of how Nuñez supposedly participated in the
crime are so glaringly different:

According to Cruz, two (2) other persons initiated the robbery, by pointing guns at Regencia and
Diaz inside the gasoline station's office. It was supposedly only later, when Diaz shouted, that a third
robber, Marciales, and a fourth robber, allegedly Nunez, ran in, to assist the first two (2) robbers. In
contrast, Perez claimed that Nuñez was one (1) of the two (2) robbers who were initially already in
the office. Nunez was then supposedly pointing a gun at Diaz while the other robber was pointing a
gun at Regencia.

They both claim that after Diaz shouted, the first two (2) robbers received assistance. Cruz,
however, claims that two (2) additional robbers came to the aid of the first two (2), while Perez
claims that there was only one (1) additional robber.

In the scuffle that ensued in the office, Cruz claims that Marciales shot Dimatulac while Nunez shot
Diaz. For her part, Perez claims that Marciales was the only one who fired shots at Regencia, Diaz,
and Dimatulac.

Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not

necessarily jeopardize the prosecution's case.  This, however, is on1 y true o f mm. or m.
110

consistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or merely incidental to the overarching narrative of
what crime was committed; how, when, and where it was committed; and who committed it. "It is
well-settled that inconsistencies on minor details do not affect credibility as they only refer to
collateral matters which do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself." 111

The inconsistencies here between Cruz and Perez are far from trivial. At issue is precisely the
participation of an alleged conspirator whose name the prosecution did not even know for proper
indictment. Yet, where the prosecution witnesses cannot agree is also precisely how the person who
now stands accused actually participated in the commission of the offense. Their divergences are so
glaring that they demonstrate the prosecution's failure to establish Nunez's complicity.

VIII

These failings by the prosecution vis-a-vis the totality of circumstances test are also indicative of
many of the 12 danger signals identified in People v. Pineda  to be present in this case. On the first,
12

fifth, and twelfth danger signals, prosecution witness Cruz originally made an unqualified admission
that she could not identify the fourth robber. On the third danger signal, there is not even an initial
description ·with which to match or counter-check Nuñez. On the tenth danger signal, a considerable
amount of time had passed since Cruz and Perez witnessed the crime and their identification of
Nunez. On the eleventh danger signal, several perpetrators committed the crime.

IX

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not require
absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty.  It is the degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate's
1âwphi1

conscience:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges
that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be
satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged. 113

This Court is unable to come to a conscientious satisfaction as to Nuñez's guilt. On the contrary, this
Court finds it bothersome that a man of humble means appears to have been wrongly implicated, not
least because of lackadaisical law enforcement tactics, and has been made to suffer the severity
and ignominy of protracted prosecution, intervening detention, and potential conviction. Here, this
Court puts an end to this travesty of justice. This Court acquits accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04474 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño
Nuñez is ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City,
for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. A copy shall also be
furnished to the Director General of Philippine National Police for his information.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 2-17. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and
1

concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Romeo F. Barza of the Seventh
Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

 CA rollo, pp. 18-21. The Decision, docketed as Crim. Case No. 00-473, was penned by
2

Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.

3
 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294(1) provides: Article 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons- Penalties. -Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.

4
 Rollo, p. 3.

5
 CA rollo, p. 73.

6
 Id. at 108 and rollo, pp. 3-4.

7
 Rollo, pp. 3-4.

8
 CA rollo, pp. 108-109.

9
 Rollo, pp. 4-5.

10
 Id. and CA rollo, pp.111-113.

11
 Id. at 5 and CA rollo, pp. 114-116.

12
 Id. at 5-6.

13
 CA rollo, pp. 18-21.

14
 Id. at 19.

15
 Id. at 21.

16
 Rollo, p. 6.

17
 Id. at 2-17.

18
 Id. at 16.

19
 Id. at 19-20.

20
 Id. at 1.

21
 Id. at 24.

 Id. at 27-30, Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General on behalf of the People of
22

the Philippines, and rollo, pp. 31-34, Manifestation of Nuñez.

 Elizabeth F. Loftus et a., Beyond the Ken – Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness
23

Reliability Evidence , 46 JURIMETRICS 177 (2005).

  Deborah Davis and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent;
24

Learning from the Past and Projecting into the Age of Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV.
769, 769 (2012).

 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Dauberi Gatekeeping for Eyewitness Identifications, 65

25

 Deborah Davis and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent:

26

Learning from the Past and Projecting into the Age of Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV.
769, 770 (2012).

 Id. at 808.
27

 Id.
28

 Id.
29

 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness Identification

30

Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99 (2016).

 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

31

 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

32

 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

33

 Id.
34

 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pi(falls of State Eyewitness Identification

35

Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 104-105 (2016).

 United States v. Wade, 3 88 U.S. at 24 I (I 967).

36

 Id.
37

 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

38

 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness Identification

39

Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99 (2016):

 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).

40

 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness Identification

41

Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99 (2016).

 Id.
42

 Id.
43
  Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, available at
44

<https://www.gov.uk/g9vemment/uploads/system/upload$1attachment_data/file/
181118/pace-coded 2008.pdf> (last visited October 3, 2017).

 Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, Annex B, par. 9.
45

Available at <https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
data/file/181118/pace-coded 2008,pdf.> (last visited October 3, 2017).

 Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, Annex B, par. 16.
46

Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/181118/pace-coded 2008.pdf> (last visited October 3, 2017).

 Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, sec. 3.2(a). Available
47

at
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181118/pace
-coded_ 2008.pdf> (last visited October 3, 2017).

 Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers, sec. 3.2(b). Available
48

at <https://www.gov.uk/governmen.t/uploacls/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/181118/pace-coded _2008.pdf.> (last visited October 3, 2017).

49
 People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 179 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]. See
also Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, January 12,
2016, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file""fjurisprudence/2016/january2016/174471_leonen. pdf.> [Per J. Brion, En Banc).

 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J.Puno, Second Division].

50

 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

51

 People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 180, citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188

52

(1973); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 us 98 (1977); DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

LAW AND PRACTICE 346 (3rd ed.) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471; January 12,
53

2016, <http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/j

urisprudence/20l6/january2016/174471_leonen. pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

 386 Phil. 126 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

54

 Id. at 144.
55

 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in People v. Pepino, G.R. No, 174471, January 12,

56

2016, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/january2016/
1744 71_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

 318 Phil. 547 (1995) [Per Kapunan, First Division].

57

 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 23-51 (1996). See also Dissenting

58

Opinion of J. Leonen in People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016,

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/174471_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

 Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW
59

AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 413, 414 (1992).

 Id. at 420.
60

 Id. at 421.
61

62
 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen ln People v. Pepino, Q.R. No. 174471, January 12,
2016, <http://so.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer. html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/174471_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

 People v. Sartagoda 2.93 Phil. 259, (1993) [Per J. Campos, Jr .. Second Division].

63

 644 Phil. 296 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

64

 Id. at 400-401.
65

66
 See also Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in People v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, January
12, 2016, <http;//sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/174471_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

 See People v. Rar1ios, 371 Phil. 66, 76 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc];

67

and People: v. Guevarra, 258-A Phil. 909, 916-918 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second

Division].

 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNGSS TESTIMONY 53 (1996).

68

 People v. Teehankee, .Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 152 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
69

 People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 536 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

70

 ELIZABETH F. LOfTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 54-55 (1996).

71

 Id. at 55.
72

 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 73.74 (1996).

73

 People v. Algarme, et al., 598 Phil. 423, 444 (2009) [Per J, Brion, Second Division].
74

 462 Phil. 480 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

75

 Id. at 495 to 496.

76

 Id. at 494.
77

 424 Phil. 627 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

78
  Id. at 633.
79

 Id. at 635.
80

 Id. at 639.
81

 Id,
82

 Id.
83

 Id. at 652-654.
84

 Id. at 665.
85

 Id at 659-662.
86

 Id. at 659, citing Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological

87

Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN L. REV 969 (1977).

 4 73 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

88

 Id. at 522.
89

 Id. at 536.
90

 Id. at 540.
91

 Id. at 540, citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL

92

CASES 74 and 81 (1965).

 Id. at 547-548, citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL

93

CASES 90-130 (1965). .

 Id. at 548.
94

 PATRICK M. WALL, EYE" WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965).

95

 MARSHALL HOUTS, FROM EVIDENCE TO PROOF 10-11 (1956).

96

 586 Phil. 515 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

97

 Id. at 529.
98

 Id. at 528-530.
99

100
 CA rollo, pp. 111-113.

101
 RoIIo, pp. 9-10.
102
 CA rollo, pp. 111-113.

103
 CA Rollo, pp. 114-116.

104
 Rollo, p. 10.

105
 Id. at 7.

106
 CA rollo, pp, 108-109.

107
 586 Phil. 515, 536 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

108
 CA rollo, p. 109.

109
 CA rollo, pp. 78-79.

 Jurisprudence even holds that "minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the

110

declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility, but even enhance their
truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony." People v. Arcega, G.R.
No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 687 [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division],
citing People v. Payumo, 265 Phil. 65 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, Third Division].

 People v. Canada, 228 Phil. 121, 128 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division] citing
111

People v. Pelias Jones, 221 Phil. 535 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division]; People v.
Balane, 208 Phil. 537 (1983) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]; People v. Alcantara, 144 Phil.
623 (1970) [Per J. Castro, En Banc]; People v. Escoltero, 223 Phil. 430 (1985) [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].

112
 473 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

 People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 335 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
113

Division], citing CONST., art. III, sec. 14(2); RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 2; People
vs. Garcia, 284-A Phil. 614 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]; People vs. Aguilar, 294
Phil. 389 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division]; People vs. Dramayo,149 Phil. 107 (1971)
[Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; People vs. Matrimonio, 290 Phil. 96 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
Third Division]; and People vs. Casinillo, 288 Phil. 688 (l992) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third
Division]
G.R. No. 192250               July 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN @ Mong, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the February 9, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
1 

HC No. 03458, which affirmed the May 2, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, San
2 

Jose, Occidental Mindoro (RTC), in Criminal Case No. R-5285, finding accused Hermogenes De
Guzman @ Mong (De Guzman) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

THE FACTS

De Guzman was charged with the crime of Murder in the Information, dated November 12, 2002, the
3 

accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 20th day of April, 2002 at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. San
Francisco, Municipality of Sablayan, Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being then armed with a sharp bladed instrument,
with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said weapon one Noriel Rosales Urieta, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
wounds which caused his untimely death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, De Guzman entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the offense charged. After pre-trial
4 

was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Ignacio
Flores (Flores), the childhood friend of victim Noriel Urieta (Urieta) and the purported eyewitness to
the stabbing incident; Dr. Ma. Socorro Ragos (Ragos), who conducted a post-mortem examination
on the cadaver of the victim; and Gina Urieta (Gina), the wife of the victim. The defense, on the other
hand, presented the lone testimony of De Guzman.

The Version of the Prosecution

The version of the prosecution is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in its Brief as follows:
5 

On April 20, 2002 at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, Noriel Urieta was in Brgy. Francisco,
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro along with Ignacio Flores. They were drinking in the amusement area.

When they were about to leave the premises, appellant suddenly approached them and without any
provocation, suddenly stabbed Noriel Urieta with a knife on his left chest.

After the first blow, the victim was already kneeling down and appellant proceeded to stab him three
(3) more times.

Appellant thereafter ran away.

Ignacio Flores called out for help and one Elmer Honato arrived to give them aid and bring the victim
to a secure place and thereafter proceeded to call for help.

He waited for Elmer Honato to arrive but he did not return anymore. With the condition of the victim
uncertain and as he was afraid, he decided to leave the victim and go home.

Two days later, Police Officer Gamba, together with the father of Noriel Urieta and Gina Urieta, the
wife of Noriel Urieta, went to the house of Ignacio Flores in order to get the sworn statement as to
the facts that happened in this case. They were able to do so.

Subsequently, an arrest on the person of Hermogenes de Guzman was made.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor then filed the appropriate charges thereafter. 6

The Version of the Defense

In his Brief, De Guzman denied the charge against him and presented his version of the events:
7 

On the evening of April 21, 2002, Hermogenes De Guzman joined a drinking spree at the house of a
relative at barangay San Francisco. He was there from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 12:00
o’clock midnight, when he went home with his wife.

The following day, he was drying palay when his wife informed him that police officers were looking
for him. He approached and inquired from the officers what was the reason.

He was told to go with them to the municipal hall for questioning. Thereat, he was incarcerated
because of his alleged involvement in a stabbing incident.

De Guzman does not personally know the victim, his wife, nor the supposed eyewitness, Ignacio
Flores.  He (De Guzman) was not with Urieta when the former had a drinking spree. He denied
1âwphi1

having stabbed and killed Urieta.8

The RTC Ruling

On May 2, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment finding that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude, through the credible testimony of prosecution witness Flores, that De Guzman stabbed
and killed Urieta on that fateful night of April 20, 2002. The RTC rejected the unsubstantiated
defense of alibi proffered by De Guzman in the face of the positive identification of Flores pointing
him as the perpetrator of the crime. It held that treachery attended the commission of the crime
which qualified the killing to murder. The RTC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias "Mong" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and in line with the
mandate of Republic Act No. 9346, hereby imposes the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Also, this Court hereby orders the said accused to PAY the surviving heirs of the victim the following:

1) The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto;

2) The sum of P38,000.00 as actual damages;

3) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

4) The costs of this suit.

The said accused is hereby credited of his total duration of preventive imprisonment in the service of
his imposed imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 9

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of De Guzman holding that his guilt for the
crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution's evidence. The CA added
that the facts established by the unwavering testimony of eyewitness Flores could not be displaced
by the empty denials and self-serving alibi of De Guzman. It sustained the RTC in appreciating the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery which elevated the killing to Murder. The
dispositive portion of the February 9, 2010 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch 45,
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental, Mindoro in Criminal Case No. R-5285 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 10

On February 18, 2010, De Guzman filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the CA
11 

in its March 3, 2010 Minute Resolution. 12

On July 2, 2010, this Court issued a resolution notifying the parties that they could file their
13 

respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice. Both parties
manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs.
THE ISSUES

Insisting his innocence, De Guzman imputes to the RTC the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT
AND DOUBTFUL TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION’S EYEWITNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF MURDER DESPITE THE EYEWITNESS' FAILURE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE FORMER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
SUBJECT KILLING. 14

De Guzman argues that the evidence for the prosecution did not meet that quantum of proof
necessary to convict him of the crime charged. The testimony of Flores was riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity
of the prosecution evidence. It was highly improbable for Flores to clearly identify the assailant
considering that the stabbing incident took place suddenly and quickly at 11:00 o'clock in the
evening in a remote barangay with no good source of illumination. The prosecution miserably failed
to show any ill motive on his part that could have possibly impelled him to commit the crime. Since
the prosecution's case is weak, his defense of alibi assumes importance and can effectively negate
his criminal liability. Finally, De Guzman asserts that even granting arguendo, that he indeed
stabbed Urieta, he cannot be convicted of murder because the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

For the prosecution, the OSG urges this Court to affirm in toto the challenged decision for failure of
De Guzman to show that the RTC committed any error in rendering a judgment of conviction. It
contends that the narration of Flores regarding the bloody assault on Urieta had clearly established
the corpus delicti of the crime which rendered inconsequential the alleged inconsistencies in his
testimony. It is of the position that eyewitness Flores testified in clear and unequivocal terms as to
the identity of the author of the crime. Lastly, it posits that treachery was alleged and duly proved by
the prosecution during the trial and, hence, the conviction of De Guzman for murder was correct.

THE COURT'S RULING

The crucial issue in this case is the sufficiency of evidence to convict De Guzman. More particularly,
the Court has to inquire whether there had been sufficient identification of De Guzman as the
perpetrator of the crime.

In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum
of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission
of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being
likewise clearly ascertained.15
Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had ample opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the declarants at the witness stand, this rule admits exceptions. The saving instance is
said to be when a fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked, or its
significance misconstrued by the trial court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its
conclusions. 16

After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that De Guzman committed the
crime charged. Reasonable doubt bothers the conscience. With a cloud of doubt continuously
hovering, the mind cannot rest easy.

The case for the prosecution was woven basically on the testimony of Flores, who claimed to be a
childhood friend of Urieta. This alleged eyewitness recounted that on April 20, 2002, at around
17 

11:00 o'clock in the evening, he and Urieta were drinking beer at a store near a "peryahan" in
Barangay Francisco, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro; that after they had finished their third bottle of
beer, they decided to leave their table; that when Urieta was about to stand up, De Guzman
suddenly appeared from nowhere and stabbed Urieta using a knife with a red handle, without any
reason or provocation; that the stab blow landed on the left breast of Urieta and caused him to fall
down; that while in a kneeling position, De Guzman stabbed him three more times; that Flores cried
for help but no one came to their aid; and that thereafter, De Guzman ran away.

Flores claimed that a certain Elmer Honato (Honato) came and brought Urieta to the corner of the
street; that Honato then went to the barangay hall allegedly to look for a physician who would attend
to the seriously injured Urieta; that he waited for Honato but sensing that the latter would no longer
return, he hurriedly went home leaving Urieta alone on the ground; and that he did not know whether
Urieta was still alive when he left him.

Flores testified that he was just a meter (an arm’s length) away from Urieta when the latter was
stabbed by De Guzman; that the light of the "moron" coming from the "peryahan" illuminated the
table where they were drinking, enabling him to see the face of the perpetrator whom he identified to
be De Guzman; that two (2) days after the stabbing incident, Police Officer Gamba, Gina and
Urieta’s father came to his house; that he then executed a sworn statement before a police officer
narrating his accounts of the stabbing incident which led to the death of Urieta; that he did not know
De Guzman and it was on the night of the stabbing incident that he first saw him; and that he came
to know of the name of De Guzman from the policemen.

A nexus of logically related circumstances, however, rendered the testimony of Flores as highly
suspect. His testimony is laden with improbabilities that detract from his credibility. The totality of the
evidence for the prosecution leaves much to be desired. Somehow, the Court cannot help but
entertain serious doubts on the veracity of the malefactor's identity. It is almost as if it was merely
contrived to pin criminal culpability upon De Guzman.

First, the condition of visibility at the time of the stabbing incident did not favor the witness Flores, as
it did not lend credence to his testimony. The incident took place during nighttime at 11:00 o'clock in
a remote barangay with no electric lighting in the surroundings and the only source of light then was
the illumination of a "moron" coming from a "peryahan." Apart from the testimony of Flores, no other
competent and corroborative evidence was adduced to settle this question of visibility and lighting
condition as well as to confirm that indeed the light of the "moron" was existent and adequate for
purposes of identification on the night of the incident. The Court observes that in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay, Flores stated that the "moron (de gas)" was just on the table where they were drinking
18 

which was contrary to what he had testified in court.

The distance of the "moron" in the "peryahan" from the site of the stabbing incident was not
disclosed either. It could have helped determine if the place was well illuminated. It is important to
note that illumination or brightness diffuses as the distance from the source increases. Moreover, it
is clear from the records that the stabbing incident was so swift for ample observation and Flores,
who had three bottles of beer, was admittedly very afraid so much so that all he did was to cry for
help. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the positive identification of De Guzman by Flores
hazy.

In People v. Faustino, the Court stated that the identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a
19 

vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for the prosecution. In
the case at bench, however, the inconclusive and unreliable identification by Flores of De Guzman
as the culprit failed to break the barrier of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Second, Flores' story, that a certain Honato came to their aid and brought the seriously wounded
Urieta to the corner of the street but left thereafter supposedly to seek a physician at the barangay
hall, simply does not make sense. It appears strange that Honato should proceed to the barangay
hall to look for a doctor when natural instinct and reason would dictate that he and Flores should
have brought Urieta straight to the hospital for the immediate medical treatment of his wounds. It
appears even stranger that this Honato was not presented in court to corroborate the testimony of
Flores. Besides, can one really find a physician at the barangay hall at that late hour of the night?

His story about Honato being nebulous, the Court doubts if Flores ever shouted for help at all. If he
really did, many people in the "peryahan" would have surely come to their aid. Indeed, if he was a
childhood friend, he would not have second thoughts in bringing Urieta to the hospital himself. As he
merely abandoned his dying friend, one cannot help but harbor a suspicion.

Furthermore, the reaction of Flores, in hurriedly going home and leaving Urieta alone to die, was
unnatural and contrary to common human experience. The seemingly apathetic behavior displayed
by Flores in leaving Urieta without even checking his condition to see if he was still breathing and his
failure to report the matter to the police or at least inform the victim's family about what happened on
the same night were highly inconsistent with the natural/common reaction of one who had just
witnessed the stabbing of his childhood friend. The Court cannot accept a story that defies reason
and leaves much to the imagination. The failure of Flores to lend a touch of realism to his tale leads
to the conclusion that he was either withholding an incriminating information or was not telling the
truth.

The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with
human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to
20 

the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance. Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to be believed must
proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the
test of conformity with the knowledge and common experience of mankind. In the case at bench,
21 

the testimony of Flores, the lone eyewitness of the prosecution does not bear the earmarks of truth
and, hence, not credible.

Third, the Court finds disturbing how the police officers were able to identify De Guzman as the killer
of Urieta. It is undisputed that on the day following the stabbing incident, De Guzman was invited by
the police officers to the municipal hall, was informed by them that he was a suspect in the
commission of a crime and then placed behind bars. De Guzman testified, to wit:

Atty. Jennifer Garcia

(On Direct Examination)

Q: The following day, what did you do?

A: I was drying our palay, sir.

Q: While drying your palay, do you know if there was anything that happened?

A: My wife arrived, sir.

Q: When your wife arrived what happened?

A: According to her I was being looked by some policemen, sir.

Q: Why are these policemen were looking at you?

A: Because according to them they are going to ask something from me, sir.

Q: After knowing that some policemen are looking for you, what did you do then?

A: I was the one who approached them, sir.

Q: Where did you approach them?

A: I asked them why they are looking for me, sir.

Q: Did they told you why they are looking for you?

A: They are inviting me to go with them in the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q: For what purpose they are asking you to come with them in the Municipal Hall?

A: According to them they are going to ask something from me, sir.

Q: Did you reach the Municipal Hall?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: While in the Municipal Hall, what happened?

A: I was incarcerated, sir.

Q: Did you come to know from them why you are incarcerated?

A: They said that I was involved in a stabbing incident, sir. 22

Also, on April 21, 2002, Gina, the wife of the victim, executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein
23 

she declared, among others, that she came to know the identity and the name of the assailant from
the police officers. Thus:
T: Kung ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay sa bukid naroroon kagabi ng maganap ang pananaksak ni
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias "Mong" sa iyong asawa, papaano mong nalaman na itong si

HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN nga ang may kagagawan ng pananaksak sa iyong asawa, gayong
wala ka naman kagabi sa lugar ng pinangyarihan?

S: Napag-alaman ko po sa mga Pulis na sumurender na ang sumaksak sa aking asawa kaya't ako
nga ay pumunta dito at ipinagtanong ko ang kanyang pangalan sa mga Pulis kaya ko siya

nakilala at napag-alamang siya nga ang sumaksak sa aking asawang si Noriel.

During the trial, Gina stated the same thing as she testified, to wit:

Asst. Pros. Dante V. Ramirez

(On Direct Examination)

Q: Who was the person who killed your husband?

A: Hermogenes de Guzman, sir. 24

COURT

Q: You mentioned a while ago that when you were asked who killed your husband, you answered
Hermogenes de Guzman, how did you come to know the killer of your husband?

A: I came to know from the Police Officer, Your Honor.

Q: Have you known Hermogenes de Guzman before the death of your husband??

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: You came to know him only upon the death of your husband?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Do you know any reason why Hermogenes de Guzman killed your husband?

A: I do not know any reason, Your Honor. 25

Two days after the incident in question or on April 22, 2002, Flores executed his Sinumpaang
Salaysay and gave his account of the stabbing incident only because Police Officer Gamba together
with the father and the wife of Urieta came to his house. Even so, nowhere in the record does it
26 

show that Flores gave the police officers a description of the physical features and attributes of the
assailant. During the trial, he admitted that he did not know De Guzman or his name at the time of
the stabbing incident. Thus:

Atty. Jennifer Garcia

(On Cross-Examination)
Q: How about accused, did you know him personally?

A: I only saw him on that night when he stabbed Noriel Urieta and I only learned his name from the
Police Officer.
27

The foregoing sequence of events clearly reveals that the police officers had already a suspect, De
Guzman, in the killing of Urieta, even before Flores could give his statement and despite the
absence of any description from Flores himself as to how the culprit looked like. Curiously, no police
officer was called to the witness stand to shed light on the matter.

This gray area in the case of the prosecution is fatal to its cause and casts serious doubt on the
veracity and credibility of its evidence.

The Court is likewise puzzled as to how the prosecution came into possession of the alleged murder
weapon marked as Exhibit "B." During the trial, a knife with a red handle was shown to Flores who
specifically identified it to be the same bladed weapon used by De Guzman in stabbing Urieta. The
information, however, as to who recovered that knife, and from whom it was seized remained a
mystery. At any rate, considering the visibility condition and other attending circumstances on the
night of the stabbing incident, the Court indeed doubts how Flores could have positively identified
the murder weapon.

Lastly, it has not been shown that De Guzman had any motive for killing Urieta. The brutal and
gruesome attack on Urieta, who sustained two stab wounds on the chest, a stab wound along the
waist area which hit the liver, and a stab wound on the elbow, clearly manifested the intention of the
perpetrator to purposely bring death upon the victim. There was no evidence, however, that De
Guzman carried a grudge or had an axe to grind against the victim or his family, or even knew the
victim at all. Prosecution witnesses Flores and Gina even attested that they did not know of any
reason why De Guzman killed Urieta.

Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be
proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the
identity of the assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said:
28  29 

It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for taking the
life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the commission of a
crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its commission
is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the
commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which
tempted the mind to indulge in the criminal act. (Underscoring ours)

In light of the weakness in the prosecution's case, the alibi of De Guzman assumes credence and
importance. While alibi is a weak defense and the rule is that it must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court, the said rule has never been intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases.
Otherwise, an absurd situation will arise wherein the accused is put in a more difficult position where
the prosecution evidence is vague and weak as in the present case. The burden of proof still lies in
30 

the prosecution to establish that De Guzman was responsible for the killing.

It is oft-repeated that a finding of guilt must rest on the evidence of the prosecution not on the
weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. Thus, it is required that every circumstance
favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In 31 
the case at bench, the evidence for the prosecution was unable to pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands. In People v. Fernandez, this Court has aptly said:
32 

It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been
proved by the required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court's support of ardent crusaders
waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the People's evidence fails to prove indubitably
the accused's authorship of the crime of which they stand accused, it is the Court's duty -- and the
accused's right -- to proclaim their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The February 9, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03458 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Hermogenes De
Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith · implement this decision and to
INFORM this Court, within five ( 5) days from receipt hereof, of the date when De Guzman was
actually released from confinement.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. No. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order
No. 1244 dated June 26, 2012.

Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justice Ricardo

1 

R. Rosario and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurring; rolla, pp. 2-11.

Penned by Judge Jose. S. Jacinto, Jr.; records. pp. 148-153.

2 

Id. at 1.
3 

Id. at 26.
4 

CA rollo, pp. 55-72.

5 

Id. at 60-62.
6 

Id. at 25-41.
7 

Id. at 31-32.
8 

Records p. 153.
9 

10 
CA rollo p. 87.

11 
Id. at 88-89.

12 
Id. at 91.

13 
Rollo, pp. 17-18.

14 
CA rollo, p. 27.

15 
People v. Bacalso, 395 Phil. 192, 199 (2000).

16 
Id.

17 
CA rollo, pp. 44 and 79.

18 
Records, pp. 11-12.
19 
394 Phil. 236, 259 (2000).

20 
Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 163705, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 547, 560.

21 
Zapatos v. People, 457 Phil. 969, 985 (2003).

22 
TSN, dated July 17, 2007, pp. 3-4.

23 
Records, p. 10.

24 
TSN, dated October 12, 2005, p. 8.

25 
Id. at 12-13.

26 
TSN, dated August 25, 2004, p. 10.

27 
Id. at 14.

28 
People v. Garcia, 390 Phil. 519, 528 (2000).

29 
369 Phil. 954, 965 (1999), citing US v. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47 (1910).

30 
People v. Caverte, 385 Phil. 849, 873 (2000).

31 
People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 145 (2002).

32 
434 Phil. 435, 455 (2002).