General Provisions / Preliminary Considerations

[1] NAVAJA V. DE CASTRO

GR No. 182926 | 22 June 2015 | Jurisdiction | PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Petitioner: Noel Navaja

Respondent:

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. Section
15 (a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides: a. Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the
place where the document is actually falsified.

Facts:

 DKT Philippines filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Ana Lou Navaja alleging that while she was
still its Regional Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal
expenses in the amount of P1,810, instead of the actual amount of P810 at Garden Café, Jagna,
Bohol and claimed reimbursement for it.

 Navaja was charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the MCTC of
Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.

 Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the ground that none of the essential
elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the
MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.

 MTC denied the Motion to Quash.

 RTC and CA affirmed the denial of the Motion to Quash.

 Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol has jurisdiction over Navaja’s case

Ruling:

 In Foz v. People, the Court ruled that “for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information.

 Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
  Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides: a. Subject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

 In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is
actually falsified.

 Contrary to Navaja’s claims, the allegations in the information and the complaint-affidavit make
out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol.

 Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit alleged that she committed the said crime in Jagna, Bohol.

 With that, the Court holds that Navaja’s case for falsification of private document falls within
the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna Bohol.

[2] DAZON vs. YAP

GR No. 157095 | 15 January, 2010 | Jurisdiction | DEL CASTILLO, J.
Petitioner: MA. LUISA DAZON
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the material averments in the complaint
as well as the character of the relief sought. P.D. 957 having limited the grant of power to the former
NHA, now HLURB, over the imposition of fines to those which do not exceed P 10k, it is clear that the
power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in its provisions, that to impose a fine exceeding P 10k
and/or imprisonment was not conferred on it. Not having been specifically, conferred with power to
hear and decide case which are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that
the HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957. However, BP 129
provides that the RTC shall have “exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body…” Based on this provision, it is the RTC that has
jurisdiction over criminal cases arising from violations of PD 957.
Facts:

 Kenneth Yap was the president of Primetown, the developer of Kiener Hills Mactan
Condominium.

 Ma. Luisa Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown for the purchase of a unit of the said
Condominium project.

 Dazon made a downpayment and several installment payments totalling about Php 1.114 M.

 However Primetown failed to finish the condominium project, as a result, Dazon demanded for
the refund of her payments from Primetown.

 Primetown failed to refund Dazon’s payments.

  Dazon filed a criminal complaint with the OCP of Lapu-Lapu City against Yap as President of
Primetown for violation of PD 957.

 Subsequently, an Information was filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City.

 However, the DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the prosecutor to withdraw the Information.

 RTC granted the prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw Information.

 Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from the violation of PD 957

Ruling:

 The Court finds that the DOJ Resolution’s basis for withdrawing the Information was not due to
the lack of probable cause, but the finding that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the
case.

 Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the material averments in the complaint as
well as the character of the relief sought.

 PD 957 having limited the grant of power to the former NHA, now HLURB, over the imposition of
fines to those which do not exceed P 10k, it is clear that the power in relation to criminal liability
mentioned in its provisions, that to impose a fine exceeding P 10k and/or imprisonment was not
conferred on it.

 Not having been specifically, conferred with power to hear and decide case which are criminal in
nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.

 However, BP 129 provides that the RTC shall have “exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body…”

 Based on this provision, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over criminal cases arising from
violations of PD 957.

 In this case, the affidavit-complaint alleges the violation of Section 23 of PD 957 and asks for the
institution of a criminal action against Yap.

 The OCP found probable cause for the filing of information for such offense.

 DOJ did not reverse this finding, but directed the withdrawal of the information on the
erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the case.

 However, as discussed, it is not the HLURB, but the RTC that has jurisdiction to hear the said
criminal action.
  Petition GRANTED.

RULE 110 – Prosecution of Offenses

[1] SALAZAR vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 149472 | October 15, 2002 | Rule 110 | PUNO
Petitioner: JORGE SALAZAR

Respondents: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE:  As a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of
which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended
party and in case of an information, same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a "complaint" filed with
the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

Facts:
 Salazar was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of estafa
o Misappropriated the amount of $41,300.00 as advance payment by Skiva International,
Inc. for the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred dozen stretch
twill jeans which Salazar was duty bound to deliver to the Skiva.
 Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 Hence, this present petition. Salazar maintained that Skiva has no authority to institute the
present action as estafa was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group.
 Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the offended party as
contemplated by the Rules.
Issue: Whether or not Skiva has the authority to institute the present action of estafa.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court clarified that the complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is
filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended
party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal.
 It is not necessary that the offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal.
 Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower
court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

[2] PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

GR No.152662 | 13 June 2012 | Rule 110 | Perez |
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Ma. Theresa Pangilinan

DOCTRINE: As laid down in Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
Facts:

 Pangilinan issued 9 checks with an aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Malolos

sometime in 1995.
 When Malolos presented the checks, they were dishonored.
 Malolos filed a complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan with the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City in 1997.
 Pangilinan filed a civil case for recovery of commercial documents.
 The City Prosecutor recommended the suspension of criminal proceedings in view of the
existence of a prejudicial question.
 The Secretary of Justice however, reversed this recommendation, and ordered the prosecutor to
file the information with the appropriate court.
 The complaints were filed in court on November of 1999, or more than four years after the
alleged violation of BP 22.
 Hence, Pangilinan moved to quash the filing of the information on the ground that her criminal
liability has prescribed, since the prescriptive period for violation of BP 22 is four years according
to Act No. 3326.
 It is the People’s contention however, that the filing of the affidavit-complaint by Virginia
Malolos with the prosecutor interrupted the prescriptive period.

Issue:  Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor interrupted the
prescriptive period.

Ruling:

 The Court here held that the judicial process contemplated by Section 1, Rule 110 which, when
initiated, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, is the filing of the affidavit-complaint.
 The Court cited People v. Olarte, which ruled that the filing of the affidavit complaint with the
MeTC even if only for purposes of preliminary investigation, interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of criminal offenses.
 This, the Court said, was expanded by the ruling in Francisco v. CA, where it was held that the
filing of the affidavit-complaint with the fiscal interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
of criminal offenses.
 Moreover, the delay in the filing of the information in this case, was due to the accused’s own
motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.
 The delay incurred in the criminal proceedings then, was due to the accused’s own motion, and
not by any negligent omission by the complainant, nor prosecution.
 In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the
instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
 Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies
 [3] PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO
GR No.207041 | November 09, 2015 | Rule 110 | J. Peralta |

Petitioner: People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City

Respondent: Jesus Arrojado

DOCTRINE: Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance
of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.

Facts:

 Respondent Arrojado is charged with the crime murder by the Petitioner Prosecutor.
 However, respondent filed Motion to dismiss due to Petitioner’s failure to indicate her MCLE No.
and date of issuance in accordance with BM No. 1922.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to indicate the MCLE no. and date of issuance warrants the dismissal of
the information.

Ruling:

 Yes. It is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a
person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a
plaintiff’s cause or cause of action.
 Furthermore petitioner cannot invoke the principle of liberal construction on procedural rules
because absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the
observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.

[4] Neri vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 202243. | August 07, 2013 | Rule 110 | J. Velasco, Jr.
Petitioner: Romulo Neri
Respondent: Sandiganbayan (5th Division) & People of the Philippines
DOCTRINE: Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts
constituting, or the elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in the
information are crucial to the success or failure of a criminal prosecution. It is for this reason that the
information is considered the battle ground in criminal prosecutions.
Facts:

 Neri, Director General of NEDA during President Arroyo’s incumbency, allegedly violated Sec.
3(h), R.A. 3019, in relation to Sec.13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because he had
interest in the played up and botched Philippine-ZTE NBN Project.
  Prosecution moved to consolidate Neri’s Case with the Abalos case [another case involving the
same project].
 Neri opposed primarily because 1.) The two cases involve different issues. 2.) The consolidation
is oppressive and violates his rights as accused. 3.) The trial of both cases are in their advanced
stages and he is the Principal Witness in the Abalos case.
 The Sandiganbayan granted the consolidation.
 Neri’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the consolidation was proper.

Ruling:

 It is improper.
 It does not follow that the two cases are the same because they are from the same issue. The
two cases are completely substantially different from each other.
 The consolidation would also infringe on Neri’s rights because the inculpatory acts complained
of, the particulars and specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar even though they were
allegedly done in connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN
Project.
 He will also be forced to hear the many testimonies from the witness of the Abalos Case when, if
separate, the prosecution no longer have any more witness for his case.
 Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts
constituting, or the elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in
the information are crucial to the success or failure of a criminal prosecution.
 It is for this reason that the information is considered the battle ground in criminal prosecutions.

[5] Kummer vs. People

G.R. No. 174461. | September 11, 2013 | Amendment of complaint | Brion, J.
Petitioner: Leticia Kummer

Respondent: People of the Philippines

DOCTRINE: Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits formal amendment of a complaint even
after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Facts:

 An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan, a minor, for
homicide.
 According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19, 1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim, accompanied
by Amiel Malana went to the house of Kummer.
 When Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice.
 Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children were already
asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
 The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner
and Johan.
  Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
 They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.
 Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the complaint that was from
July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month.
 Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
 Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence.
 She claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted.

Issue: Whether or not Kummer should be arraigned again because of the amendment of the information

Ruling:

 According to the Supreme Court, second arraignment is no longer needed.

 A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is
more formal than substantial.
 Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
 Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits formal amendment of a complaint even after
the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

[6] DOMONDON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 129904 | March 16, 2000 | Rule 110 | J. Buena
Petitioner: Director Guillermo Domondon
Respondent: Sandiganbayan, Aniano Desierto (Ombudsman), Francisco Villa (Overall Deputy
Ombudsman), Leonardo Tamayo (Deputy Special Prosecutor and OIC)

DOCTRINE: Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction
or a writ of prohibition, except in the eleven instances enumerated above.

While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of
discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

 In February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations were filed at the Sandiganbayan
against certain officials of the PNP, including.

 Domondon on account of his approval of the Advice Allotment in the amount of P5M and P15M
respectively which amounts to a violation of the Anti-Graft Law under Sec 3 of RA 3019.

 On May 17, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders: (1) for the prosecution to demonstrate
probable complicity in the transaction described in the information and (2) deferring action on
 the motion for consolidation considering the uncertainty of the Court in proceeding the case at
this time and considering that only one of the 15 accused filed a motion for consolidation.

 Domondon alleged that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases
have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has re-vested" in the latter and "...it is
grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the hearing and other
incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against Domondon during the pendency of the petition

Ruling:

 Citing the case of Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, the Court said ‘well settled is the rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a
writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied; (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by
the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

 Corollary to the foregoing rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense
charged.

 While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there
is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 Domondon has not shown that respondents Desierto and Villa committed grave abuse of
discretion in their determination to proceed with Domondon's prosecution.
 On the basis of their reinvestigation, Desierto and Villa found sufficient probable cause to
include petitioner in the indictment.

[7] BROCKA vs. ENRILE

GR No. 69863-65 | Dec. 10, 1990 | Criminal actions, when enjoined | Medialdea

Petitioner: Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Rodolfo Santos, Valentino Salipsip, Ricardo
Vega, Eric Mariano, Jose Emmanuel Oyales, etc.

Respondent: Juan Ponce Enrile, Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Pedro Balbanero, Col. Abad, etc.
DOCTRINE: General Rule: Criminal Charges could not be enjoined. However, there are exceptions. One
of its exceptions is filing charges for the persecution of the accused.

Facts:

 Brocka et al. seek that charges of Inciting of Sedition by City Fiscal of QC be enjoined.
 On January 28, 1985, Brocka et al was initially charged with Illegal Assembly for joining a
jeepney strike in support of ACTO.
 Some of the petitioners were granted bail except for Brocka et. al. because they were charged as
leaders of Illegal Assembly.
 Brocka et al. were granted provisional bail and was supposed to be released on Feb. 9, 1985.
 However, despite the order of release, they were continually detained by the respondents
invoking a PDA.
 Brocka et. al were subsequently charged with Inciting to Sedition cases and no bail was
recommended.
 Brocka et al alleged that the Inciting to Sedition charge was a sham for being hastily filed.
 In fact, it was shown that upon the petitioners’ arrival in Fiscal’s office no complaint was found
with the Records Custodian yet.

Issue: W/N Brocka et al may legally enjoin Inciting to Sedition cases against them for being a case of
persecution.

Ruling:

 If in case the PDA indeed existed, it should have been invoked within 24 hours.
 In the case at bar, it took 12 days for the respondents to raise it.
 Clearly, the Inciting to Sedition case was hastily crafted and there was bad faith in its filing.
 The second case was a sham and should be enjoined.
 As a general rule, criminal Charges could not be enjoined. However, there are exceptions. One
of its exceptions is filing charges for the persecution of the accused.

[8] TRENAS vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 195002 | Jan. 25, 2012 | Rule 110 (Venue of Criminal Actions) | SERENO

Petitioner: Hector Trenas

Respondent: People of the Philippines

DOCTRINE: The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Facts:

 Petition for Review, seeking to annul and set aside the CA Decision
 In December 1999, Margarita wanted to buy a house and lot in Iloilo City. It was mortgaged with
Maybank.
  The bank manager Palma recommended the petitioner Trenas to Elizabeth (the employee and
niece of Margarita) to advise regarding the transfer of the title to Margarita. Trenas informed
Elizabeth that for the titling, the following expenses would be incurred: P20,000 (attorney's
fees), P90,000 (Capital Gains Tax), P24,000 (Documentary Stamp), P10,000 (Miscellaneous
Expenses)
 Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Trenas who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
 When Elizabeth consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. Trenas
admitted they were fake and that he used the P120,000 for his other transactions.
 Trenas issued a check amounting to P120,000 to Elizabeth. Upon deposit, the check at Equitable-
PCI Bank in Makati, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
 A case of Estafa was filed against Trenas at RTC Makati.
 The RTC found Trenas guilty of Estafa under Art. 315 Sec. 1b. Trenas filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
 An appeal was filed in the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
 In his petition to the SC, Trenas raises as a defense the lack of jurisdiction as the same appears in
the evidence of the prosecution.
 He claims that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the
P150,000 was given in Makati.
 He argues the Receipt has no mention of any place.
 The Deed of Sale was signed and notarized in Iloilo City
 Lastly he claims the only time Makati was mentioned was when the check was dishonored.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

Ruling:

 The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.
 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
 Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
 Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory.
 Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
 However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
 This case is similar to Fukuzume vs. People: it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of
the offense took place in the said city.
 Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction.
  In this case, the crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.
However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution
presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement
or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed
in Makati.
 Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.
 There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where
the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed.
 The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the
court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise.
 That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given
only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
 There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.

[9] ARMILYN MORILLO vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 198270 | December 09, 2015| Rule 110 | PERALTA

Petitioner: Armilyn Morrillo

Respondent: Richard Natividad

DOCTRINE: Violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that
some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. The court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case. Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Facts:

 Natividad, as a contractor in Pampanga, purchased construction materials inside the Subic

Freeport Zone from petitioner via credit which shall be via post-dated checks.
 Morillo then delivered the materials in Pampanga and the respondent paid in cash and issued
post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
 The checks were deposited in Morillo’s account in Makati but were dishonored, thus, this
complaint on B.P. 22.
 It is the contended that the Makati MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the MeTC of Makati has territorial jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
  Violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
 The court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case.
 Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed - in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
 The fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in
Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is
undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati
Branch of Equitable PCIBank.
 The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

[10] YALONG vs. PEOPLE

GR No.187174 | 28 August 2013 | Rule 110 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Petitioner: Fely Y. Yalong

Respondent: People of the Philippines and Lucila Ylagan

DOCTRINE: A person charged with a continuing crime or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal
case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred -- in
particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored.

Facts:

 Fely Yalong borrowed P450k from Lucila Ylagan and issued a corresponding check with a similar
amount of P450k.
 However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for payment, it was dishonored. As verbal
and written demands made on Yalong to pay her loan proved to be futile, Ylagan filed a case for
BP 22 before the MTCC of Batangas.
 MTCC found Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of BP 22.
Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC of Batangas City.
 After RTC denied Yalong’s certiorari petition, she then filed a petition for review before the CA.
 CA dismissed the petition for review on the ground that the Order of the RTC was issued in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction -- where appeal, and not a petition for review is the proper
remedy.
 Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed

Ruling:
  While the ROC do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review
instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2 (a), Rule 41, ROC provides that
appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC.
 As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper
reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from
further contesting the same.
 The subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and was properly dismissed by the CA.
 Even discounting these considerations, Yalong’s appeal still remains dismissible on the ground
that MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over her case.
 Violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the
acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another.
 A person charged with a continuing crime or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
 With that, criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its
elements occurred.
 As such, petition is dismissed.

[11] UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192565| February 28, 2012 | RULE 110 Venue of Criminal Actions | Brion, J.

Petitioner: Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas

Respondent: People of the Philippines

DOCTRINE: Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. The reason for this rule is two-
fold: First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the
venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and cases carries jurisdictional consequences. Unlike in civil
cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. Section 10 and
Section 15(a) under Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure basically states that the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Facts:

 Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a case of forum shopping
involving Union Bank.
 Tomas argues that the venue (MeTC-Makati) is improper because it is in Pasay where the
certification was submitted and used. MeTC and RTC Makati denied motion to quash stating
that it is MeTC-Makati that has jurisdiction because the certificate was notarized in Makati.

Issue: Whether or not Makati City is the proper venue

Ruling:

 The court upheld that lower court’s decision, that the proper venue and proper court is MeTC-
Makati.
 The allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati.
 Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases.
 The reason for this rule is twofold:
o First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial
court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.
o Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and cases
carries jurisdictional consequences.
 Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences.
 Section 10 and Section 15(a) under Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
basically states that the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

RULE 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action

[1/5] Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan

GR No. 157547| February 23, 2011 |Rule 111 | Bersamin, J.

Petitioners: Heirs of Eduardo Simon

Respondents: Elvin Chan and the CA

DOCTRINE: There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000,
which relevantly provides: x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed. This rule is based on SC Circular 57-97 (1997), the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the
Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint.

Facts:
  Simon issued to Elvin Chan a LandBank check.
 Upon presentation to the drawee bank, the check was dishonored due to the reason of
“Account closed”.
 The Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila filed in the MTC an information charging Eduardo
Simon a violation of BP 22.
 Afterwards, Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC a civil action for the collection of the amount
on the check. Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of litis
pendentia because the criminal case against him is still pending.
 Simon argues that under Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Issue: Whether or not Chan’s independent civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was
proper.

Ruling:

 The Court held that the civil action must be dismissed for violating Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.
 Even though the revised RoC was in effect only after Chan instituted the civil case, it is still
applicable.
 The SC held that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
 Rule 111 states: b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed.
 Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed
vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 (1997)
which states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action.
 It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved.
 Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil
action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon
the filing of the complaint.

[2] Lee PueLiong a.k.a. Paul Lee vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee

G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013 | (Rule 111 Sec. 1) | J. Perlas-Bernabe

Petitioner: Lee PueLiong a.k.a. Paul Lee

Respondents: Chua Pue Chin Lee

DOCTRINE: Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that “every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.” Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in
the prosecution of the offense.

Facts:

 Lee Pue Liong aka Paul Lee (petitioner), is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI).
 Paul Lee on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a petition for the Issuance of a (TCT) which covers a
property owned by CHI.
 Paul Lee submitted an Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced
from his files and he discovered such loss but it had not been found and is already beyond
recovery.
 Chua Lee (respondent), joined by her brother Nixon Lee filed a petition asking for the RTC order
that granted a new TCT to be set aside claiming that Paul Lee knew fully well that Chua Lee was
in possession of the said TCT.
 On May 9, 2000, Chua Lee filed a complaint-affidavit stating among others, that Paul Lee made a
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony as he
perfectly knew that she was in possession of the TCT.
 As such, Chua Lee clarified that she was accusing Pau Lee of PERJURY.
 Atty. Augusto Macam appeared as counsel for Chua Lee and as private prosecutor with the
consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
 Paul Lee argued that under Article 183 of the RPC, there is no mention of any private offended
party hence, private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution of the case.
 MeTC denied the motion.
 On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action

Ruling:

 Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense.
 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
 When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives
in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
 An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
  Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged.
 Thus, the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

[3] Sanchez v FEBTC,

G.R. No. 155309,November 15, 2005 | (Rule 111 Sec. 2(b) | J. Panganiban

Petitioner: Josephine Sanchez

Respondents: Far East Bank and Trust Corp.

DOCTRINE: a finding in a final judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise does not exist
carries with it the extinction of civil liability.

Facts:

 Sanchez was charged with Estafa by FEBTC.

 She was the secretary of the director and senior VP of FEBTC. It is claimed that Sanchez made
several unauthorized withdrawals of money from the account of CIFL with FEBTC, and using
forged signatures, she was able to deposit the value on the checks into her account, and
withdraw the same to misappropriate them for her personal benefit.
 FEBTC had to reimburse CIFL P3,787,530.86 in total. Sanchez denied the allegations, and would
be acquitted based on a finding that she did not commit the crime charged.
 FEBTC, aggrieved, filed an appeal on the civil aspect of the case.

Issue: Whether or not Sanchez may be held civilly liable, her acquittal notwithstanding.

Ruling:

 Sanchez may not be held civilly liable.

 The Court distinguished between two types of acquittal in this case.
 The first being an acquittal based on a finding that the accused did not commit the crime, and
the second being an acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
 When the Court acquits the accused based on a finding that the accused did not commit the
crime, the civil action is also extinguished pursuant to Rule 111, Sec. 2(b). When the accused is
acquitted based on reasonable doubt, then the Court may still make pronouncements as to civil
liability.
 Thus, in the case at bar, the acquittal of Sanchez, being based on the finding of the court a quo
that she was not the author of the crime charged, carries with it the extinction of the civil aspect
of the case, and precludes FEBTC from recovering any civil indemnity based on the crime
charged.

[4] JOSE BURGOS, JR., vs. SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL AND ARLINA B. NAVAL, AND AMALIA B. NAVAL
GR No. 219468| June 08, 2016 | Extinction of Criminal Action Does Not Carry Extinction of Civil Action
(Rule 111 Sec. 2) | J. Perlas-Bernabe

Petitioner: JOSE BURGOS, JR.,

Respondents: SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL AND ARLINA B. NAVAL, AND AMALIA B. NAVAL

DOCTRINE: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action
based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist

Facts:

 On April 26, 2012, Petitioner Jose Burgos filed a complaint against Respondents Sps.Eladio and
Arlina Naval together with their daughter Amalia charging them with the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents.
 According to Burgos, he and his wife Rubie were the registered owners of a lot situated in
Taytay Rizal.
 However, the subject lot was mortgaged to a certain Antonio Assad. Burgos reached out the
Sps.Naval to obtain a loan in order to avoid foreclosure.
 Sometime in February 2011, Burgos discovered that their TCT was cancelled, and that a new one
was issued in favor of the Sps. Naval on April 1, 1998. Hence the complaint.
 He claims that the blank documents he and his wife previously signed were apparently receipts
and Deed of Absolute Sale.
 On February 11, 2013 an Information was filed charging the respondents Naval on the said
crime. Before arraignment, they filed “Motion to Quash” against the said Information.
 Among their grounds was that the said Information filed on February 11, 2013, was already
beyond the reglementary period of 10 years from the registration of the title on April 1, 1998.
Hence, the crime had already prescribed.
 RTC issued an order ruling in favor of the Sps. Naval, on the ground of prescription.
 Aggrieved they filed MR (Motion For Reconsideration) to amend Information.
 However, it was denied.
 CA, upon appeal dismissed the same for failure of the Burgos to join the People in his certiorari
petition as required by Administrative Code of 1987.
 Hence this petition

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the People as
represented by the OSG was not impleaded as a party.

Ruling:

 It is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an appeal on the
criminal aspect of a case.
 The OSG is "the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that
of representing the Republic and/or the People before any court in any action which affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require."
 In this case, records show that Burgos's petition for certiorari in CA sought for the reinstatement
of the Information and/or a ruling that the crime has not vet prescribed.
  Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the
case.
 Thus, as his certiorari petition was filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of
the case, it is necessary that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law,
is the proper representative of the People, the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings.
 As the CA aptly noted, "too this date, the OSG as counsel of the People has not consented to the
filing of the present suit."
 There being no authorization given - as his request to the OSG filed on April 10, 2015 was not
shown to have been granted - the certiorari petition was rightfully dismissed.
 It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without
prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
 It is noteworthy to point out that "the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.
 The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist."
 In this case, the RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist; instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby,
dismissed the criminal case on the sole ground of prescription.
 Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People, thru the OSG, and
not for Burgos to argue.
 As earlier intimated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case under the parameters of Rule
111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[6] PEOPLE vs. GERRY LIPATA, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016
G.R. No. 200302 | April 20, 2016 | Section 1, Rule 111 | J. Carpio
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Gerry Lipata

DOCTRINE: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the
then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.

Facts:

 Gerry Lipata was accused of the crime of Murder of one Ronaldo Cueno.
 RTC found him guilty of the crime charged.
  CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, before the promulgation of CA’s decision Lipata
died.
 PAO tried to contact Lipata’s next of kind and his relatives but they failed to communicate back
with PAO.

Issue: Whether or not Lipata’s death extinguished his criminal liability.

Ruling:

 The Court here ruled that if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation.
 The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against
whom the same shall be enforced.
 Here, Lipata’s criminal and civil liabilities are extinguished.
 His civil liabilities are also extinguished because it is solely based on his criminal liability which
was extinguished.
 In the institution of a civil action to claim damages, the offended party must then follow Section
1, Rule 111.
 He must file a separate civil action for damages predicated on other sources of obligation.

[7] CO VS MUNOZ, JR.

G.R. No. 181986 | December 04, 2013 | Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC | Brion, J.

Petitioner: Elizalde S. Co.

Respondents: Ludolfo P. Munoz, JR

DOCTRINE: The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party
may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three
instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability
of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

Facts:

 Muñoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury.

 Suspecting that Co, a wealthy businessman, was behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made
statements in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City.
 Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
information for libel before the RTC.
 Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz’
libelous remarks against him.
  Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty,
and in fact filed the cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging
project. (OMB dismissed the cases against Co.)
 The RTC ruled that the prosecution established the elements of libel.
 In contrast, Muñoz failed to show that the imputations were true and published with good
motives and for justifiable ends.
 The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and acquitted Muñoz.

Issue: Whether or not a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to
enforce the accused’s civil liability.

Ruling:

 The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action.
 The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
 Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal,
the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that
the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
 HOWEVER, Munoz is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
 The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication.

[8] Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles,

G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990 | (Rule 111 Sec. 1) | J. Cruz

Petitioner: Interpacific Transit, Inc. (ITI)

Respondents: Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles

DOCTRINE: The filing of a separate civil action is not necessary when the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a
keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a
separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.

Facts:

 ITI sued Aviles for estafa after they collected client payments for airway bills in the amount of
P204,030.66 as sub-agents and failed to remit the same to ITI.
  During trial and direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution
presented photocopies of the airway bills.
 The defense objected, invoking the best evidence rule.
 The prosecution said it will submit the originals in due time.
 But when the photocopies, together with the rest of the prosecution’s evidence, were formally
offered in evidence, the defense made no objections.
 The RTC acquitted Aviles, ruling that there was only a creditor-debtor relationship. The RTC also
held inadmissible the photocopies of the airway bills.
 ITI appealed to the CA, claiming that the RTC should not have rejected the evidence of airway
bills for it sufficiently established the indebtedness of Aviles.
 The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
 ITI raised to the SC the question of the admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil liability of
Aviles.

Issue: Whether or not the Aviles are civilly liable on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the
photocopies of the airway bills?

Ruling:.

 The certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered, under the rule that
objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit
and not before.
 Objection prior to that time is premature. The SC explained the difference of the premature
objection and a seasonable objection.
 And evidence not properly objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
the court in arriving at its judgment.
 Rule 120, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides that in case of acquittal, unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
 With the admission of the questioned evidence, the SC found concrete proof of Aviles’
accountability.
 And because no proof of payment was presented, Aviles is civilly liable to ITI for P204,030.66.
 The SC further cited Padilla v. CA in holding that ITI is not required to file a separate civil action
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted

[9] PEOPLE VS ALFREDO MORALES

G.R. No. 206832| January 21, 2015 | Extinguishment of Liability Upon Death of the Accused | Perez

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM

DOCTRINE: A judgement from the lower court, pending appeal , has not yet reached a final judgment.
Thus it follows Art. 89 of the RPC where the criminal liability of the accused is totally extinguished upon
his death. Both the civil and criminal liability is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

Facts:

 Morales was found guilty by the RTC of Santo Mateo Rizal in two criminal cases for violating the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for illegally selling shabu, and having the same in
his possession.
 Upon appeal, CA affirmed the findings of RTC. CA upheld the presence of all the elements of the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and procedural steps required to preserve
the corpus delicti of the crime done.
 Morales filed a Notice of Appeal to the SC. However, while the case is pending appeal, Morales
died while in committed in the New Bilibid Prison.

Issue: whether or not the criminal civil liability is extinguished with criminal liability upon the death
of the accused while the case is pending on appeal.

Ruling:

 According to Art 89 0f RPC, Criminal liability and civil liability are totally extinguished when
death of the offender occurs before the final judgment.
 Since the case is on appeal, the final judgment has not yet been rendered.
 This totally extinguishes both the civil and criminal liabilities of the offender.
 Since RA 9165 entails no civil liability, there is no civil liability to extinguish.

[10] PEOPLE vs. CONSORTE

G.R. No. 194068| Nov. 26, 2014 | Rule 111 | J. Perez

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Benjie Consorte y Franco

DOCTRINE: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

Facts:

 This is a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision affirming the decision convicting the
accused Benjie Consorte for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar.
 The decision increased the civil indemnity from P50,000 to P75,000 and exemplary damages
from P254,000 to P30,000.
 An interest rate of 6% per annum was also imposed on all damages
 Accused raised the incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the crime.
 He alleges that despite the positive identification made by Visbe, the testimony of the
prosecution witness Mendoza shows the impossibility of the same.
 He claims Visbe had unbelievable and inconsistent statements on how such identification was
made.
  Sep. 21, 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that the
accused died on July 14, 2014.
 A death certificate was issued by the medical officer of NBP.

Issue: Whether or not Consorte’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:

 The Court cited People vs. Brillantes citing People vs. Bayotas.
 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.
 As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore
 In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court.
 As such, it therefore becomes necessary to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability
ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

[11] PEOPLE vs. ARAMBULO,, June 17, 2015

G.R. No. 186597 | June 17, 2015| Rule 111 (Prejudicial Question)| Perez

Petitioner: People of the Philippines, Jose Buban

Respondents: Victoria Arambulo, Miguel Arambulo

DOCTRINE: A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case
as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.

Facts:
  Buban filed a complaint for estafa against Victoria and Miguel for failure to remit the rentals
collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to
Anaped.
 Victoria filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of SEC Case 6259 in the RTC, which questions the authority of Anaped’s officers,
including Buban, to act for and in behalf of Anaped.
 This goes into one of the elements of estafa – demand by the offended party.

Issue: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:

 A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
 The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of
the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

 In this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by Victoria and Miguel, depends
upon the result of SEC Case 6259.

 If it is ruled that the present Anaped officers were not validly elected, then Victoria may have
every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban.

 Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.

[12] CHUA V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No.79021 | 17 May 1993 | Rule 111 | Bidin, J

Petitioner: Romeo S. Chua

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Dennis Canoy, Alex De Leon

DOCTRINE: A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that the complainant
therein is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle. What is material is the existence of evidence that
would show that the respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to another.
Facts:

 By virtue of a search warrant by RTC Cebu Branch XIII, Dennis Canoy was able to seize and took
custody of an Izusu dump truck.
 Meanwhile, Romeo Chua filed a civil action for Replevin to recover the possession of the same
vehicle, questioning the validity of the said search warrant.
 RTC Cebu Branch VIII granted Chua a writ of replevin and the vehicle was seized by its sheriff. On
top of all that, a case for carnapping entitled Alex De Leon v. Romeo Chua, pending before the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was provisionally dismissed upon the motion of Chua with
the following reservation: “without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is
resolved.” CA nullified the writ of replevin ordered by RTC Cebu Branch VIII.
 Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case by the Office of the City Fiscal in Cebu is correct

Ruling:

 The dismissal of the case of the Office of the City Fiscal is erroneous because a criminal
prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that the complainant therein is the
absolute owner of the motor vehicle.
 What is material is the existence of evidence that would show that the respondent took the
motor vehicle belonging to another.
 The Court also ruled that a co-equal court could not order the delivery of the property under
custodia legis of another co-equal court.
 RTC Cebu Branch VIII should have dismissed the case by virtue of the provisional dismissal of the
carnapping case since there is still a possibility that a criminal case would be filed; hence a
conflict in jurisdiction could still arise.
 A judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch
of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately.

[13] San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Perez

GR No. 166836 | 4 September 2013| Rule 111 | Bersamin

Petitioner: San Miguel Properties Inc.

Respondents: Sec. Hernando Perez et al.

DOCTRINE: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

Facts:

 San Miguel Properties bought lots from BF Homes.

 BF Homes delivered only 2 out of 3 of the deeds because Atty. Orendain (Atty of San Miguel)
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver.
  BF refused to deliver despite demands.
 San Miguel filed a complaint affidavit charging officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 with the
Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) and for Specific Performance.

Issue: Whether or not the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could
be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling:

 The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case.
 Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential
Decree No. 957.
 This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but
could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was
exclusive and original.
 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The
essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

[14] Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P. Samson

G.R. No. 205972, November 9, 2016 and G.R. No. 164352, November 9, 2016 | (Rule 111 Sec. 7) |
BERSAMIN, J

Petitioner: Caterpillar, Inc.

Respondents: Manolo P. Samson

DOCTRINE: The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court,
to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

Facts:

 In G.R. No. 164352, Caterpillar, Inc. filed a criminal case against the Samson for unfair
competition.
 Subsequently, petitioner also commenced a civil action against respondent and his business
entities, with the IPO as a nominal party.
  Respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases in the RTC citing that the
resolution of the civil case in the IPO will determine the outcome of the instant criminal cases.
 The RTC suspended the arraignment of the said criminal case which the Petitioner appealed.
 They appealed to the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in suspending the arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243 on the ground of the existence of an alleged prejudicial
question in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 then pending in the RTC in Quezon City whose resolution
would determine the outcome of the criminal cases but was denied.
 Caterpillar commenced G.R. No. 205972.
 In G.R. No. 205972, caterpillar insists that it presented substantial evidence to warrant a finding
of probable cause for unfair competition against Samson.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court a quo did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on account of a prejudicial
question

Ruling:

 A common element of all such cases for unfair competition - civil and criminal - was fraud.
 Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil action.
 At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.
 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party.
 It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
 The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of Court, to
wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial
question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair competition.
 A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issues to be determined in the criminal case.
 It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.