1. Macariola vs.
Asuncion FACTS:
114 SCRA 77
May 31, 1982
Bernardita R. Macariola, complainant, vs. Honorable Elias B.
Asuncion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
FACTS:
Honorable Elias B. Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Arcadio Galapon. Said lot was involved in
Civil Case No. 3010 which was presided and rendered final by the
respondent on June 8, 1963 because none of the parties therein
filed an appeal within the reglementary period. On November 11,
1963, the order of project partition was approved and became final
for again, there was no appeal from the parties. Lot 1184-E was
then after sold by respondent Judge to Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. in which he and his wife, Victoria Asuncion,
were stockholders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the judiciary are prohibited from
engaging in or having interest in any lawful business.
HELD:
No. There is no provision in both the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there any existing law
prohibiting Judiciary members from engaging or having interest in
any lawful business.
2. Ernesto Francisco vs. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003
Ponente Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
The 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
was approved on November 28, 2011.
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court on
grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.
A day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
first impeachment complaint for insufficiency in substance, the
second impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,
along with a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by
one-third of all the Members of the House of Representatives, was
filed on October 23, 2003 with the Secretary General of the House
by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William Funtebella.
On October 27, 2003 Atty. Ernesto Francisco, enforcing his duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, raised a petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to thwart an
unconstitutional impeachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Congress Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional.
Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Congress Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional.
Yes. The second impeachment case against Justice Hilario G. Davide
falls within one year from the initiation of the first impeachment
case thus rendering it unconstitutional.
3. Mutuc vs Commission on Elections
36 SCRA 228
November 26, 1970
FACTS:
Five days after filing for his candidacy as delegate of the
Constitutional Convention, Amelito R. Mutuc, received a telegram
from respondent Commission on Elections stating that albeit his
certificate of candidacy was given due process, a prohibition from
using jingles to be played through sound systems in his mobile units
had to be imposed in accordance with the Consitutional Convention
Act. The respondent’s orders regarding the use of jingles was for the
petitioner, a violation of his constitutional right to freedom of
speech.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s exercise of prohibition violates the
supremacy of the Consitution.
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution as the fundamental law of the land becomes
the only standard for the validity of any public act. In an unequivocal
language, the Constitution prohibits the abridgement of freedom of
speech. Freedom of speech includes the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the vital right of suffrage
which is being hindered by the Constitutional Convention Act.
4. Alih vs. Castro
51 SCRA 228
June 23, 1987
FACTS: On November 25, 1984, 200 Philippine Marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the petitioner’s
compound in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. The gunfire that ensued resulted to the petitioner’s
arrest. The petitioners cited that the respondents evaded due
process and therefore bypassed the Constitution with the
warrantless search. The respondents contented that the search was
done under a superior officer’s orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s invocation of action under
superior’s orders violate the supremacy of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. Superior orders can never countermand the fundamental
law of the land. The fact that the petitioners were suspects of the
killing of Mayor Climaco, did not excuse anybody from following due
process and honouring the Constitution in general.
5. Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
G.R.122156
February 3, 1997
FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, respondent Government Service Insurance System,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a
close bidding, two bidders participated. Petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, offered to buy 51% of the
MPHC shares at P2.42 less than Renong Berhad’s, a Malaysian firm,
bid for the same percentage of shares at P44.00. Pending the
declaration of winning bidders, the petitioner issued a manager’s
check by Philtrust Bank for P33,000,000.00 as bid security to match
Renong Berhad’s bid offer. Respondent GSIS refused to accept. In
apprehension, MPHC came to court and invoked the First Filipino
Policy mandated by Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII, of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the sale of MHC to Renong Berhad is
violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First Policy
mandated by Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING: Yes. The Filipino First Policy is a firm mandate of the
Constitution and as so, the court orders GSIS to cease and desist the
selling of 51% of the MHC shares to Renong Berhad and to accept
the matching bid by Filipino petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation.
6. Gonzales vs. Comelec
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
FACTS: On June 19, 1967, Republic Act No. 4913 submitting to the
Filipino people for approval the amendments of the constitution
was enacted. Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, a taxpayer, voter and
citizen challenged RA 4913 and petitioned an action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections
from complying with RA 4913.
ISSUE: Whether RA 4913 is unconstitutional for holding the
plebiscite for approval on the same day as the general elections.
RULING: No. Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution that states that the plebiscite is to be held
during special elections.
7. Santiago v Commission on Elections
G.R. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS: Respondents initially filed a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials. By People’s
Initiative”. After private respondent filed the petition, the public
respondent issued and order directing the former, inter alia, to
publish the petition together with the attached Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners in this case filed for a
special civil action for prohibition raising an argument, among
others, that the constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. Public
respondent, on the other hand, contends that R.A. No. 6735 deals
with, inter alia, people’s initiative to amend the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 6735 is sufficient to implement a
people’s initiative to amend the constitution.
RULING: This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
8. Lambino v Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
FACTS: Lambino Group, with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners, claiming that their initiative
petition constitutes twelve per centum of all registered voters
whose signatures had been duly verified by election registrars,
asked respondent to hold a plebiscite for purposes of ratifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 of Artivle VII. The
respondent denied due course to said petition for “lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution”.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people’s initiative
RULING: Petitioners miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s
initiative. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the
"draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready
and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. In the
case at bar, petitioners failed to prove this fact.
10. Tolentino vs. Comelec
41 SCRA 702
October 16, 1971
FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 proposed to hold the
plebiscite for the Organic Resolution No. 1 which amends Section 1
of Aricle XV, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, on the same day
as the senatorial elections. Petitioner Arthur Tolentino petitioned
for prohibition to restrain respondent COMELEC from undertaking
the said plebiscite prior submission to the people of all the other
amendments.
ISSUES: Whether or not the plebiscite for Organic Resolution No. 1
violates the Philippine Consitution.
RULING: Yes. The plebiscite on a single amendment violates Section
1 of Article XV of the Consitution which is unequivocal in its
mandate that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a
single election.
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11. The United States vs. H. N. Bull
15 Phil 259
January 15, 1910
FACTS: H.N. Bull, an American citizen, was the master of Standard, a
Norweigan steam sailing vessel. Standard was engaged in
transporting cattle, carabaos and other animals from a foreign port
to the city of Manila. On December 2, 1908, defendant-appellant
H.N. Bull wilfully and unlawfully transported 677 animals aboard
Standard from the port of Ampieg, Formosa to Manila. All 677 of the
animals experienced cruelty aboard the steam vessel. The animals
lacked proper dwelling and had rings through their noses which
caused physical injuries. A number of animals were cruelly
wounded, killed, and thrown out to sea. The defendant-appellant
was convicted of violation of Act No. 55 as amended by Section 1 of
Act No. 275 and so contends that Act No. 55 as amended is in
violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, and void as applied to the facts of this case because neither
was it said that the court sitting where the animals disembarked
would take jurisdiction.
It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither
was it said that the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not
licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 55 as amended is valid considering
the facts of this case.
RULING: Yes. Philippine laws shall apply to vessels that come within
the 3-mile radius from the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay. The Philippine Commission has full constitutional power
to enact laws for the regulation of the commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands.
12. Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1
March 5, 1947
FACTS: Three of the plaintiff Senators and eight of the plaintiff
Representatives who, on April 23, 1946, were declared elected by
the Commission on Elections were immediately suspended shortly
after the first Congressional for alleged irregularities in their election
and were not allowed to sit in the Lower House except when the
time for the election for Speaker happened, respectively. As a result
of the suspension and isolation, the plaintiff Senators and
Representatives failed to participate in the passage of a questioned
resolution, nor was there consideration for their participation within
the computation of the required three-fourths vote in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If all eleven of the members’ votes
have been considered, the affirmative votes in favour of the
proposed amendment would have resulted to a shortage of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
There was a petition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional
resolution designated “Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended
as an ordinance thereto”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction.
HELD: No. Proposal of Constitutional amendments is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity. The legislative’s exercise of power is
independent of any intervention from the Chief Executive. If
ratification of a political amendment is a political question, a
proposal which precedes a ratification is definitely a political
question as well.
13. Planas vs. Comelec
G.R. No. L-35925
January 22, 1973
ISSUE: On November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 73 “Submitting to the Filipino people
for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefore,”. On the same day, the President set
the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973. Charito Planas petitioned to
enjoin the respondents from implementing Presidential Decree No.
73 in any manner on the grounds that said Presidential Decree has
no force and effect as law and no proper submission to the people
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 23 is justiciable in nature.
RULING: Yes. Since Presidential Decree 73 has the force and effect
of legislation, the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a
justiciable one. Not only does the Court have a long list of cases in
which it has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and acts
of the Executive, but also of no less than that of Section 2, Article
VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the
authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30
March 31, 1973
FACTS: Three days after President Marcos issued Proclamation
1102, Josue Javallana petitioned to enjoin respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution
that are not found in the 1935 Constitution. Javellana insisted that
the respondents and the President himself were action in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the proposed Constitution. Similar
actions were filed by Gerardo Roxas and Vidal Tan among others,
praying for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 and any order,
decree and proclamation which are similar in their objectives.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings for the ratification of the
proposed 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly in
conformance with the Consitution.

RULING: The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV
1935 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution provides only one way for
ratification, that is in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered
voters. However, according to doctrines in American decisions
relating to the validity of ratifications, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition
by the Court.
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15. Sanidad v Commission on Elections
73 SCRA 333
October 12, 1976
FACTS: On September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law. Soon after,
the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree
No. 1031, which amends the previous decree. On the same date,
the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, which states the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. Petitioners, Pablo and Pablito
Sanidad, filed for petition of prohibition of the aforementioned
Presidential Decrees insofar as the first two propose amendments
to the constitution and the third directs the respondent to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-plebiscite.
Petitioners contend that Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite has
no constitutional or legal basis. The Solicitor General considered the
question at bar to be political in nature and claimed no jurisdiction
over the issue
ISSUE: Whether the question of the constitutionality of the
aforementioned Presidential Decrees are justiciable or political.
HELD: The question raised is justiciable in nature. Political questions
are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular
act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or
validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of
the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or
to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
16. Occena vs. Comelec
104 SCRA 1
April 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena, suing as a tax payer, is a member
of the Philippine Bar and a former delegate of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Petitioner challenged the validity of 3
resolutions of the Batasang Pambansa that proposed constitutional
amendments, asserting that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law
of the land, in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa
resolutions were promulgated.

RULING: Yes. The ruling in Javallena vs. Executive Secretary is
authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution whose
provisions have already been applied by the Supreme Court in
several cases. The Supreme Court concluded that here is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect as of January 17, 1973.
17. Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. Comelec
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS: A total of 11 petitions were filed assailing the validity of
Batasang Pambansa 883 which calls for special Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections on February 7, 1986.
President Marcos issued his letter-resignation on November 11,
1985, which without, the Batasang Pambansa would have no
authority to enact BP 883.
Sen. Pelaez argues that the President's letter of conditional
resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,
Article VII of the Constitution. The letter states that the President is
irrevocably vacat(ing) the his position effective only when the
election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
President by taking his oath office ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
RULING: No. 7 justices voted to dismiss the case, while 5 others
voted to declare BP 883 as unconstitutional, a number less than
what was needed to declare the aforementioned as
unconstitutional in accordance with Javellana vs. Executive
Secretarty. The petitions in this case are rendered dismissed along
with the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the February 7, 1986 elections.
18. Lawyer’s League for Better Philippines vs. President Corazon
Aquino
G.R. 73748
May 22, 1986
FACTS: Proclamation No. 1 was issued by President Corazon Aquino
on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were assuming power. On March 25 of the same year, Proclamation
No. 3 was issued stating that “the new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines”.
Petitioners challenged the Aquino government
ISSUE: Whether or not the Aquino government is legitimate.
RULING: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter, but rather a political one. The Filipino people
have made their judgment and accepted Aquino’s government as a
de jure government which took effect on February 8, 1987.
19. In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez
G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986
FACTS: In a petition for declaratory relief, petitioner quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution and renders in unclear as to whom it refers as
President and Vice President of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not this petition questioning the clarity of the
aforementioned provision states a cause of action.
RULING: No. It is of common knowledge that the officials referred
to in the 1st par. of Sec. 5, Art XVIII there of are incumbent Pres.
Aquino and Vice-Pres. Laurel. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it
being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that
the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel,
and to no other persons.
20. De Leon vs. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
August 31, 1987
FACTS: On May 17, 1982 under Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 with 6-
year office terms, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain while the other petitioners were elected as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay,
Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Magno as Barangay
Captain while the other respondents as members of the Barangay
Council of the same barangay and municipality.
Action for prohibition was instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin
respondents from ousting them from their seats as Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality
of Taytay, Rizal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was
held or on February 11 of the same year, the date its ratification was
proclaimed through Proclamation No. 58.
RULING: The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice
Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Article XVIII,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held
on that same date.
The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date
when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987
Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous
constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions.
21. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 45081
JULY 15, 1936
FACTS: On September 17, 1935, Jose A. Angara, petitioner, and
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the
petitioner was proclaimed as member-elect and took oath on
November 15, 1935. Resolution No. 8 was passed on December 8,
1935 by the National Assembly declaring Angara’s victory.
On December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion for protest against Angara, that he be
declared elected member. The Electoral Commission declared
December 9, 1935 as the last day for the filing of electoral protests
through a resolution. Angara, on December 20, 1935 filed a “motion
to dismiss the protest” citing that the protest was filed out of the
prescribed period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the issue; whether
or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

HELD: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the issue for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission has jurisdiction
to hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the petitioner Angara. The petition for a writ of prohibition
against the Electoral Commission was denied.
23. Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary
of Education
G.R. No. L-5279
October 31, 1955
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 known as the act of
making inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.
As contended, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following
reasons: 1. It deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well
as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process
of law, 2. It deprives the parents of their natural rights and duty to
rear their children for civic efficiency and 3. Its provisions conferred
on the Sec of Education unlimited powers and discretion to
prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful
delegation of legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706 states that “it shall be the duty if the
Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so
that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in
accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,
and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized
representatives shall have authority to advise, inspect and regulate
said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of
instruction given in the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Act No. 2706 is constitutional. PACU failed to show that it
suffered any injury in the exercise of the Secretary of Education of
such powers granted to him by the said law. The State has the
power to regulate, control the ownership of schools. The
constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education. The State control of private education was intended by
the organic law.
24. Mariano v Comelec
G.R. No. 118577
March 7, 1995
FACTS: Two (2) petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA
7854 as unconstitutional. On the first petition (GR No. 118577) only
Mariano was a resident of Makati. Petitioners assail Sections 2, 51
and 52 on the following grounds: (1) Sec. 2 did not properly identity
the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, (2) Sec. 51 attempts to alter the three-consecutive term
limit for local elective officials, (3) Sec 52 was unconstitutional as it
increase the legislative district of Makati only by special law, the
increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill, and the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Sec. 5 of the Constitution.
The second petition was filed by John H. Osmeña, on the same
grounds with the first petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case to challenge the
mentioned provisions of RA 7854 as unconstitutional.
HELD: The court finds no merit in the petitions.
In re: Section 2, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. Congress did not intend that
laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in titles, as petitioners seem
to imply.
In re: Section 51, The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before a litigant
can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections.
In re: Section 52, Courts had then ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city. And Constitution does not command that
the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details
----------------------------------------------------------------------
25. Cutaran v DENR
G.R. No. 134958
January 31, 2001
FACTS: A petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals in
1998 to prevent DENR from implementing Special Order Nos. 31, as
amended by 31-A and 31-B, Special Order No. 25 and all other
administrative issuances relative thereto, for having been issued
without prior legislative authority.
The petition was brought about when the petitioner’s relative were
denied from their application of Certificate for Ancestral Land Claim.
The heirs of Calantes filed for the same application and their
property overlapped with the petitioners. Using the administrative
issuance of the DENR, the Calantes tried to acquire the land they
applied on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR.
The CA on their decision on the petition, assailed the Special Order
Nos 31, 31-A and 31-B but sustained the validity of Special Order
No. 25. The petitioners then filed within the Court a petition for
review of the appellate court’s decision on the ground that the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Special-Order No.
25 and its implementing rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
validity of Special Order No. 25.
HELD:
It is prematurely filed, no justifiable controversy for the Court to
resolve and should have been dismissed by the Appellate Court on
this regard.
There was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners
suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned
regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief.
This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that
the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes.
There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or
will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the
petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court
may be invoked. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts
will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there
has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a
direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its
validity.
For lack of justiciable controversy, the decision of the appellate
court is hereby set aside.
26. Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 152295
July 9, 2002
FACTS: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
seeking to prevent the postponement of Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
elections originally scheduled on May 6, 2002. As well as a petition
to prevent reduction of the age requirement for membership in the
SK.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to
respondents
HELD: The petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the
time the petition was filed, RA 9164- resetting of the SK elections
and reduction of age requirement for SK membership was not yet
enacted into law. After the passage of RA no. 9164, petitioners
failed to assail any provision of the said act that could be
unconstitutional. The court ruled that petition raised no actual
controversy and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondents. The petition is dismissed for utter
lack of merit.
27. Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 93100
June 19, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation
of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petition-in-intervention Archie’s
Fishpond, Inc and Arsenio Al Acuna are in the aquaculture industry
utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. Petitions questioning the
constitutionality of portions of the Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
In the petition’s argument, they contended that in the case of Luz
Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the court has impliedly
ruled that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. That in
aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only
incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and hence,
they too should be excluded from RA 6657 just as land devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry have been excluded for the same
reasons.
On February 20, 1995, RA No. 7881 was approved by Congress with
provisions are pertinent to the assailed provisions of the CARL (Sec.
3 B, Sec. 10, Sec. 11, Sec. 32-A)
ISSUE: Whether or not the said provisions of RA 6657 are
unconstitutional.
HELD: The provisions of the RA NO. 7881 state that fishponds and
prawn are excluded from the coverage of the CARL. The question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has
become moot and academic with the passage of the RA No. 7881.
28. Gonzales v Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835
August 14, 2000
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reports (PCCR) by virtue
of EO Nos. 43 and 70 in order to “study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
Ramon Gonzalez, as a citizen and a tax payer, filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality of PCCR on two grounds: (1) he
contends that it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of law and (2) petitioner asserts that by creating such
body the President is intervening in a process from which he is
totally excluded by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can assail the constitutionality of
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reports.
HELD: In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70,
petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government. In the instant case, petitioner
sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he
claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of
being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCR's activities. Clearly, petitioner has
failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek
judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. In the case at
bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the
PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that
he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
29. Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo faced
by an angry and violent mob armed with deadly weapons assaulting
and attempting to break into Malacanang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the NCR and
likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP
to suppress the rebellion in the said region. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests and the declaration of the
state of rebellion, Panfilo Lacson, Micheal Ray B. Aquino and Cezar
O. Mancao filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, mandamus
and habeas corpus.
On May 6, 2001, President Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of the state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation of state of rebellion and
General Order 1 are constitutional.
HELD: Petitions are dismissed, rendered moot and academic as
President Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of state of
rebellion on May 6, 2019.
30. DeFunis v Odegaard
416 U.S. 312
April 23, 1974
FACTS: In 1971, petitioner Marco DeFunis Jr. filed a suit against
University of Washington for being denied admission at said school
due to his race, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. The Trial Court
agreed with his claim and granted the requested relief, petitioner
was then admitted to the Law School and began on the fall of 1971.
On his second year, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the
judgement of the Trial Court holding that the school's admissions
policy was not unconstitutional. He then petitioned this Court for a
writ of certiorari, and the Circuit Justice stayed the judgment of the
Washington Supreme Court pending the "final disposition of the
case by this Court." By virtue of this stay, DeFunis has remained in
law school, and was in the first term of his third and final year when
this Court first considered his certiorari petition in the fall of 1973.
After oral argument, the Court was informed that petitioner had
registered for his final quarter and have assured the Court that this
registration is fully effective regardless of the ultimate disposition of
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is moot given that petitioner was
already on his final year in law school and the Law School’s
assurance that his registration is fully effective regardless of the
ultimate disposition of the case.
HELD: Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at
the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of
any decision this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation,
we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations
of [416 U.S. 312, 320]   Art. III of the Constitution, consider the
substantive constitutional issues tendered by the parties, and the
case is moot.
31. Romeo Acop Vs Teofisto Guingona
G.R. No. 134855
July 2, 2002
Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court filed by Chief Supt. Romeo Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco
Zubia seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 30,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which dismissed this
petition for injunction. The facts of the leading to the petition are as
follows: On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the
criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed
along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout
with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the PNP. The
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be
admitted to the government’s Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said
Program.
Herein petitioners avers, that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz,
are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection
program even though they may be testifying against other law
enforcement officers. Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC
be reversed and set aside.
Issue: Whether the petition for judicial review should prosper.
Held: No, the petition is denied due course and affirms the decision
of the Quezon City RTC. In the present case, it is clear that the
legislative intent provided under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does
not apply to Section 4, of the same Act. Hence, in the absence of a
clear reference to Section 3(d), a witness in a legislative
investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be
admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements
provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No 6981. The admission in the
WPP of SPO2 Delos Reyes and SPO2 Dela Cruz was recommended
by the Senate Comm. On Justice and Human Rights and was duly
indorsed by the Senate President.
32 .Sanlakas v. Angelo Reyes
(G.R. No. 159085)
February 3, 2004
FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President
issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 ("Declaring a State of
Rebellion") and General Order No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and the
PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring “a state of
rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had
ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return
to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
through Proclamation No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of
Rebellion Has Ceased to Exist").
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration by the president of a state of
rebellion and directing the armed forces to suppress such, is in
accordance with Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD:  Yes, the Court held that it is within her prerogative as Chief
Executive for the President to declare a state of rebellion. For the
fact is, the Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive
powers.
It is equally true that Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides the President with the power to call out the
armed forces, as a first step, to prevent or supress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion whenever it becomes necessary.
33. Aquilino Pimentel vs Exec Secretary Ermita
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005
FACTS: While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap
et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were
appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7 other
senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al.
During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in
acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA should not have
appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because “in case of a
vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who
can be designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that
“while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,
whether regular or acting, to a vac ant position of an office needing
confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent;
GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law
does not give the President such power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by GMA is valid.
HELD: Yes it is valid, pursuant to the Constitution, the President
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot
impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
34. Joya v Presidential Commission on Good Government
GR No. 96541
August 23, 1993
FACTS: On August 15,1990, Chairman Caparas of the PCGG, signed
the Consignment Agreement with the authority given by the
President Aquino on August 14,1990, through former Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., allowing Christie's of New York to
auction off (82) Old Masters Paintings and  the (71) cartons of
antique silverware in the custody of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be
identified by PCGG.
The new PCGG Chairman David M. Castro, defended the contract
made and refuting the allegations of Chairman Domingo on
November 15,1990. On that same date, Director of National
Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject
of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification
of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as
part of the Filipino cultural heritage.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners has the legal standing & the actual
controversy of the petition.
RULING: The petition have become moot and academic thus
dismissed for lack of merit. The court held that one having no right
or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in an action on the premised of Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining
the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. And since the
purpose of the petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues
raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
            
35. Agan v PIATCO
G.R. No. 155001.  En Banc 
May 5, 2003
[Non-legislative power of Congress; Police Power; Delegation of
emergency powers]
FACTS: On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the
1997 Concession Agreement which PIATCO the franchise to operate
and maintain the terminal III during the concession period and to
collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the
rates or schedules stipulated in the Agreement.  Meanwhile, the
MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with
various service providers.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline
service providers filed a petition for prohibition and several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of
the various agreements. During the pendency of the cases, PGMA,
on her speech, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts
which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null
and void.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioning employees has legal standing to
raise validity of the PIATCO contracts?

DECISION: Petition granted and contracts declared null and
void. Petitioners have direct and substantial interest to protect by
reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. They stand
to lose their source of livelihood, a property right which is protected
by the Constitution. Subsisting agreements between MIA and
petitioners stand to be terminated by the PIATCO contracts. The
financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to
petitioners is legitimate interests sufficient to give them legal
standing to file the petition.
36. CHR Employees Assoc. v. CHR
G.R. 155336
Nov. 25, 2004
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION
(CHREA) Represented by its President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
FACTS: CHR promulgated a resolution adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but
the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In
light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office
that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM's
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers
of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm
the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. The CSC-Central
Office denied CHREA's request and reversed the recommendation of
the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office
denied the same. Petitioner CHREA then elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement
of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading,
retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy.
The CHREA filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHREA has legal standing to file petition for
review against CHR?
DECISION: CHREA is a proper party to file for judicial review. The
Court held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of. CHREA sufficiently meets the injury
test since CHR's upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commission's savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from
which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and
file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file the case was recognized
by the CSC when it took cognizance of the petitioner’s request to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region
Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the
Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. The
Supreme Court further stated that it is settled jurisprudence that an
issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
37. Tanada vs. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.
FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition stating that in
the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question, said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding,
they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings.
HELD: The Court, citing the case of Severino vs. Governor General,
held that the reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely
to the present petition; hence, petitioner is a proper party to the
proceedings. The Court held in the aforementioned case that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at
large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
38. Chavez v. PEA and Amari
G.R. 133250
July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS: In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into
a contract with the Construction and Development Corportion of
the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim areas of Manila Bay.
In 1977, PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President
Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas" and "to develop, improve, acquire,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring
to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP). President Marcos issued a memorandum
directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP so that all future
works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517
transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three
Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque
to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM
ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom
Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered
the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused
a stir when Senator Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that
such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
“mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for
mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking
Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts
that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of
the State that are of public dominion and prays that, on
constitutional and statutory grounds, the renegotiated contract
(amended JVA) be declared null and void.
ISSUE/S: (Issue No. 3 covers the issue for Judicial Review)
1. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE
PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
2. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING
TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY
OF COURTS;
3. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS
SUIT;
4. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION
INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
5. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT
VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF
CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED,
VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
HELD:
1. The signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the
petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. If the
Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty
of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional
contract. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership
of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a
single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling
for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government
itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution
intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening
events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation
of the Constitution.
2. The Court resolves to exercise primary jurisdiction over the
case. Although the principle of hierarchy of courts applies
generally to cases involving factual questions since the
instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public, the Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue. Also, Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
3. The Court ruled that since the instant petition, brought by a
citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural
resources - matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. The case cited
the case of Tañada v. Tudera wherein the Court asserted
that when the issue concerns a public right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real parties in interest.
4. The Court ruled that the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. Requiring a consummated contract
will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.
5. The Amended Joint Venture Agreement violates Sections 2
and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
 declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. Section 2
and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits (1) the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain and (2) the private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
respectively. The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service; hence, these are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
39. KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia
G.R. 115381
Dec. 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP),
respondents.
FACTS: In 1990, the Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman,
Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. Finding the
implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible,"
Fernando submitted a memorandum to Orbos stating the
considerations and suggesting that the implementation of the
proposed fare range scheme this year be further studied and
evaluated
In December 1990, the PBOAP applied for fare rate increase and the
same was granted by LTFRB in accordance with a fare schedule.
In 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a
memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift
action on the adoption of rules and procedures to implement
Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and
other liberalization policies for the transport sector to which the
LTFRB, in 1993, issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 (MC)
promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC
Department Order No. 92-587.
The MC, among others, states that "The existing authorized fare
range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the
authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as
the basis for the expanded fare range."
Respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the
DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and
minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition
for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing
fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the
LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the
LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit; hence, the instant petition for
certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: (Issue No. 1 falls on Judicial Review)
1. Whether or not the petitioner has no legal standing to sue
or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining
the reliefs prayed for.
2. Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus
fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%)
and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the
existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for
the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
HELD:
1. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. The requirement of
locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power.
Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to
suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars
and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that
was violated and continues to be violated with the
enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars
and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of
buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by
the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger
fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who
comprise the riding public. Their rights must be protected,
not neglected nor ignored. The court also stated that it is
ready to brush aside procedural infirmity and recognize the
legal standing of the petitioner in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised.
2. Yes, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized
existing fare, is unconstitutional, illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority.
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum
Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994
issued by respondent LTFRB are declared contrary to law
and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a)
delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the
authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed
transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of
public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a
certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of
proving that there is no need for the proposed service to
the oppositor. Potestas delegata non delegari potest - what
has been delegated cannot be delegated. Under section
16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to
the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing
the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing
regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same
under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987.
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law
are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.
40. John Hay PAC. v. Lim
G.R. No. 119775
Oct. 24, 2003
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIÑO
FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED
AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA
MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER
MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C.
PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,
URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL,
CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE MONDOC,
Petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD
INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Respondents.
FACTS: R.A. No. 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992," which was enacted setting out the
policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military
bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military
Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations
as well as their extensions including the Camp John Hay Station in
the City of Baguio. It created public respondent Bases Conversion
and Development Authority2 (BCDA), and the Subic Special
Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ). Also the said law
granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and
national taxes.
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex
(B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for
the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as
premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months
later, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint
venture company known as the Baguio International Development
and Management Corporation.
Meanwhile, the Baguio City government passed a number of
resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA in their MOA
and as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. One of which is
Resolution No. 255, seeking and supporting the issuance by then
President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of
288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420
which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay, and in
effect, granted tax exemptions pursuant to R.A. No. 7227 to Subic
SEZ extends to other SEZs.
The petitioners now allege that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a
grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas,
unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and
investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The
grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude,
thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which
provides that "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress."
On the other hand, respondents contend that by extending to the
John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the
Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the
proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said
law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or
investment. They underscore the point that the government's policy
of bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the
same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other
SEZs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 420 (particularly Sec. 3) is
unconstitutional since it provides for national and local tax
exemption and grants other economic incentives to the John Hay
SEZ.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled in favor of the Petitioners.
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment
incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the
aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via
presidential proclamation.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the
creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant
thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives
under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the
extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.
Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find
support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation
No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the
proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is
one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a
provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt
any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its
power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than
Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions, or local governments may pass ordinances on
exemption only from local taxes.
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the
Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax exemption
must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to
the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate
upon. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay
SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it
would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
Thus, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no
legal force and effect.
CASE #41
BP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 (Judicial Review; Civilian
supremacy clause)
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement.  The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed.  file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its
CASE #42
Executive Secretary vs Court of Appeals
GR No 131719 25 May 2004 (Judicial Review)
FACTS:
Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of
1995) took effect on 15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition
for declaratory relief. The alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to
(m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment
agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It
contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between
recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in
the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any
distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an
invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal
protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties
are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. In their
answer to the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil has no legal
standing, it being a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not
the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. It is service-
oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are
profit-oriented.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not ARCO-Phil has legal standing to assail RA 8042?
DECISION: 
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an
association with that of its members. An association has standing to
members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to
assert the concerns of its constituents. However, the respondent
has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled
workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled
workers in its petition.
CASE #43
Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and
PGMC
G.R. No. 113375 05 May 1994                       cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because
FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds.  Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO
was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator
Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources
to PCSO.  Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims
that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC
to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings
to local investors.  An open letter was sent to President Ramos
strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to
ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and
2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1
of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:
1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental
importance to the public that the case demands.  The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral
well-being of the people.  The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the
Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
2. PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and
of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
CASE #44
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)
United States v. Richardson
No. 72-885
Argued October 10, 1973
Decided June 25, 1974
418 U.S. 166
Syllabus
Respondent, as a federal taxpayer, brought this suit for the purpose
of obtaining a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act, which permits the CIA to account for its
expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director. . . ." 50 U.S.C.
§ 403j(b). The complaint alleged that the Act violated Art. I, § 9, cl.
7, of the Constitution insofar as that clause requires a regular
statement and account of public funds. The District Court's dismissal
of the complaint for, inter alia, respondent's lack of standing
under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. That court held that respondent had standing as a taxpayer
on the ground that he satisfied Flast's requirements that the
allegations (1) challenge an enactment under the Taxing and
Spending Clause of Art I, § 8, and show (2) a "nexus" between the
plaintiff's status and a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing
and spending power.
Held: Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit. Pp. 418 U. S.
171-180.
(a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the requirements of make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy,
Art. III, did not completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site
"undermine the salutary principle . . . established by Frothingham \ or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
[v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447] . . . that a taxpayer may not 'employ a Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment
federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no
about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or
Federal System.'" reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be,
Pp. 418 U. S. 171-174. nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any
(b) Respondent's challenge, not being addressed to the taxing or attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does
spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA's accounting not create an attorney-client relationship.
and reporting procedures, provides no "logical nexus" between his
CASE #45
status as "taxpayer" and the asserted failure of Congress to require
ITF vs Comelec
more detailed reports of expenditures of the CIA. Pp. 418 U. S. 174-
GR No 159139 13 January 2004
175.
(c) Respondent's claim that, without detailed information on the
CIA's expenditures, he cannot properly follow legislative or
FACTS: 
executive action, and thereby fulfill his obligations as a voter, is a
generalized grievance insufficient under Frothingham or Flast to
RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to
show that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
conduct nationwide computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo
Page 418 U. S. 167
allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated election system on
sustaining direct injury as the result" of such action. Ex parte
24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634. Pp. 418 U. S. 176-178.
month and out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC.
465 F.2d 844, reversed.
Although DOST’s evaluation report states that the two obtained a
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals
BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed
and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
a concurring opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 180. DOUGLAS, J., filed a
Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition
dissenting opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 197. BRENNAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, post, p. 418 U. S. 235. STEWART, J., filed a
ISSUE: 
dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 418 U. S.
202.
Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the
print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is
DECISION: 
provided for general informational purposes only, and may not
reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We
The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental
importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of
“illegal disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being
“deflected to any improper use,” or when petitioner seek to restrain
“wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional law.”
CASE #46
Jumamil vs. Café, et al.
[GR 144570, 21 September 2005]
Third Division, Corona (J): 4 concur
FACTS:
 
In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order
against Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the
constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989
(Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance 111,
provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the
construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the
Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently,
the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution 49,
series of 1989 (Resolution 49), denominated as Ordinance 10,
appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction
of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of
these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts
with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal
treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some
of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et al. The
construction of the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the
preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished,
rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the
stalls were then awarded by public raffle which, however, was
limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition
was amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as
private respondents. Jumamil alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49
were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business,
occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents, some of
which were close friends and/or relative of the mayor and the
sanggunian, who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall,
and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the
would be constructed stalls to all private respondents; that
resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of
publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits
conferred on the private respondents may be availed of by anybody
who can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there were
any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into
by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be
awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by
anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed Jumamil’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered
Jumamil to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of
the 57 private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR
CV 35082), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE [1]: 
Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for
declaratory relief
HELD [1]: 
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls
for more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest”
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s
constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or
ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in
his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del
Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the
official acts of the the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in
passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with
private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being
assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these
ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment
and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private
benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed,
Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease
contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls.
Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the
municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the
municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits,
however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the
stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus,
the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who
advanced their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did
not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result
of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It
was only in the “Remark to Comment” he filed in the Supreme Court
did he first assert that “he (was) willing to engage in business and
(was) interested to occupy a market stall.” Such claim was obviously
an afterthought.
ISSUE [2]: 
Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed.
HELD [2]: 
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality,
standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a
tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits
of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There
being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. But, even if the Court disregards
Jumamil’s lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The
subject resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000
for the construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil alleged that
these ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to their
enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market
stalls to the private respondents who deposited P40,000 each and
who were either friends or relatives of the mayor or members of the
Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that “there (was) no publication or
invitation to the public that this contract (was) available to all who
(were) interested to own a stall and (were) willing to deposit
P40,000.” Respondents, however, counter that the “public
respondents’ act of entering into this agreement was authorized by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution 180 dated 10
October 1988” and that “all the people interested were invited to
participate in investing their savings.” Jumamil failed to prove the
subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.
Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the acts of the
local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should
have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly
against those who were not notified and who were thus not given
the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated
allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice.
Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity
of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.
Posted by Notario Boy at 9:47 PM  CASE #48
CASE #47
Tolentino vs COMELEC
GR No 148334 21 January 2004
FACTS:  Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a
After becoming president on January 2001, Gloria Arroyo
nominated Senator Teofista Guingona as vice-president. After
confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the Senate calling
the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election to be held
simultaneously with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided
that the candidate garnering the 13 th highest vote will serve for the
unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and
Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming the
winner. They contend that it is without jurisdiction because it failed
to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in (special
election) due to this the people voted without distinction in one
election for 13 seats irrespective of term.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner’s have standing to maintain suit?
DECISION: 
In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners assert
harm classified as “generalized grievance.”  They failed to establish
direct injury they suffered from the said governmental act.
However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised its discretion to give due course to voter’s suit involving
the right of suffrage.
Ople vs Torres
GR No 127685 23 July 1998
FACTS: 
National Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued
by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople
filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to
privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
ISSUE: 

Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
DECISION:  effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As
a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring
suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is
a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive
branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power
of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute
laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
CASE #49
People vs Vera
GR No 45685 16 November 1937
FACTS:  interest in the case. If Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in a criminal case
where he was convicted. Cu Unjieng appealed up to the Supreme
Court but was denied. On 27 November 1936 he filed fan
application for probation under the provisions of Act 4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition that
he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has
no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The CFI of Manila denied the petition on18 June 1937.
Thereafter, the seventh branch of  CFI of Manila, set the petition for
hearing on 5 April 1937. The Fiscal of the City of Manila and the
private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937 that Act
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article
XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said
Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law
respective provinces
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present
case.
DECISION: 
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule
that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
CASE #50
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
GR No 148560 19 November 2001
FACTS: 
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional.  He contends
that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with
the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are violations of
fundamental right of due process.
ISSUE:  denied. CA reversed the decision and was elevated to SC. One of
Whether or not R.A. 7080 is unconstitutional?
DECISION:  Issue:  Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally
repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its
unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
allows to be done.40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must
be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful,
argumentative implication.41 Of some terms in the law which are
easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best,
managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from
establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and
glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to
the Anti-Plunder law must fail.
51
UMALI VS. GUINGONA
[305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Facts:  Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. However, a confidential memorandum
against him was sent to President Ramos and thus forwarded to
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for
investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings and hearings set
by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not raise clarificatory questions
during the hearing. PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support
the charges and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali.
He appealed to the Office of the President but was denied. He
elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not accorded due process
and deprived of security of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was
Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of PCAGC as a
government agency.
earliest opportunity?
Held:  The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity. To raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court. Regarding the
constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late
to raise the said issue for the first time at such a late stage of the
proceedings.
52
Arceta vs. Mangrobang
[GR 152895, 15 June 2004]
Facts: The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila
charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 alleging
in an Information that Arceta issued a Bank check Oscar R. Castro
payable in cash, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have
sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment,
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay
said payee with the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after
receiving notice. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her
dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine
still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was
highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus
go against prevailing jurisprudence. Later on, Arceta was arraigned
and pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. However, she manifested
that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present
petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend
proceedings in the trial court. Arceta then filed the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary
restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP 22). On the other hand, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Dy issued Prudential Bank in
favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
later on dishonored for the reason that the account was declared
“close” and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said
complainant despite receipt of notice from the bank that said check
has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta, Dy made
no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that BP
22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her
part to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the
Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court
invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for
Constitutional infirmity.
Issue: Whether or not the Court should render BP22
unconstitutional.
Held: When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative
act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites
are present:
(1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota/ cause of
the suit or action of the case.
The supreme court did not find the constitutional question
to the very lis mota presented in the controversy. Every law has in
its favor the presumption of the constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.
53
MIRASOL VS CA
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing
Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar
and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued
to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals
from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still
leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific
performance, and damages against PNB.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor
General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue
for the resolution of the Trial Court.
2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
1. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Courts.
2. The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is
to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or
treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in
court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand,
the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where
there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is
no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing
issuances are void for violating the due process clause and
the prohibition against the taking of private property
without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court
to exercise its power of judicial review.
3. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the
exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court
an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
54
Mitra vs. Comelec
104 SCRA 58 (1981)

Facts: Petitioners Mitra et al. questioned the validity of
the 1973 constitution and filed a petition to the Supreme Court to
hold a plebiscite where the people can either vote to ratify it or
reject it. In the even that it is rejected, the petitioners pray that the
1935 Constitution be restored with the lifting of Martial Law on
January 17, 1981.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution is valid.
Held: Yes. Regardless of the valid ratification, the
acquiescence of the people can render a new constitution in force
and effect. The acceptance of the people of the 1973 Constitution is
unquestionable given that the people attended referenda on July
1973, February 1975, and October 1975 where the amendments to
the Constitution were adopted and another one on December 1977.
Two elections were also held under that Constitution. These shows
clear recognition of the present Constitution by the people and
since sovereignty resides with them, the Court was duty-bound to
render obeisance to it as well.
In addition, while the president had the power promulgate law and
decrees during Martial Law, the Supreme Court maintained and
continued to act as independent branch of the government and
exercise the power of judicial review. Hence, the court duly
established the validity of the President’s competence to issue
orders and decrees.
55
Salonga vs. Cruz-Paño
134 SCRA 438 (1985)
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally
protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents
from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute
him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the
bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file
his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to
the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against
him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October
1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges
against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz
Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano)
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation
of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people,
including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would
be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the above case still falls under an actual
case
2. Whether or not the above case dropped by the lower
court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court.
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia  was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied
its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating
for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the
Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the
case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was
clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude
this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall
not be required.”
56
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates
in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men.
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing
trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-
election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s
proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections
to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to
this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made
only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc
as required by the Constitution.
The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition
due to the petitioner being dead and the respondent missing.
Held: The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the
disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate
ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But
there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once
and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The
more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong
on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become
moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions
but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us
in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter
because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only
for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for
the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
57
YNOT VS. IAC
[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the
transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to
another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of
Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from
Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive
Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to
conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of
Substantive Due Process.
Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose
of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how
prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another
can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the
transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not
prevent the slaughter either.
58
Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB
35 SCRA 429
Facts: Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM,
which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to
foreclose the REM.
Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by
prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against
the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the
period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342
was issued should be deducted.
o E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt
moratorium
o RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt
moratorium
The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO
32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.
Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32,
suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342
could not pass the test of validity. Th law was later declared
unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of
contractual obligations clause in the constitution.
PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the
prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal
steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet
prescribed.
Issue: Whether or not to follow the prescribed action.
Held: NO.The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because
it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged
legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares
its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative
act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has
the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the
law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration.
(OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.
During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force,
prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in
the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.
59
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO
[183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with
the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against
him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to
petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order.
The group, accompanied by media men and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to
a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for
the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also
alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code is unconstitutional.
Held: Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot
issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order
was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
“We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must
go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect… The power of the President to order the arrest of
aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to
order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one
at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.”
Furthermore, the search and seizure order were in the nature of a
general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void,
because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
60
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda
GR L-13250, 42 SCRA 23 [Oct 29, 1971]
Facts: Maria Cerdeira, a Spanish national and resident of
Tangier, Morrocco died in 1955, leaving intangible properties in the
Philippines. Petitioner CIR assessed deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes due on the transfer of said intangible personal
properties, which her administrator (respondent Campos Rueda)
refused to pay, claiming exemption from payment under the
reciprocal provision of Sec. 122 of the Tax Code: That no tax shall be
collected… in respect of intangible personal property … if the laws of
the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the
time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character isn respect of intangible personal
property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country...” The laws of Tangier in fact provides substantially
that “transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal
or incorporeal… were not subject… to the payment of any death tax,
whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his
heirs and legatees.” CIR ruled that Tangier was a mere principality,
not a “foreign country” with international personality falling within
the exemption under Sec. 122 of the Tax Code.
Issue: Whether or not the intangible personal properties
of Maria Cedeira are exempt from estate and inheritance tax
Held: Yes. The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in
section 122 of the NIRC. It reads thus:
that no tax shall be collected under this title in respect of intangible
personal properties
1. if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible personal
properties of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country; or
2. if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal properties owned by citizens of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign country.
This court commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
hardly an international personality in the sense did fall under the
exempt category.
61. Reagan VS. CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner William Reagan, a citizen of the United States was
assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines. Petitioner questioned the
payment of income tax assessed on him by respondent Commission
on Internal Revenue (CIR) on sale of his car to a member of the US
marine corps, the transaction having taking place at the Clark Field
Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside Philippine
territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Clark Air Base is outside of our Philippine territory
and therefore excluded from Philippines to tax.
HELD:
No. The Clark Air Base is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes
of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including
the power to tax are preserved.
62. People VS. Gozo
FACTS:
The appellant Loreta Gozo constructed a house located inside a US
Naval base without acquiring a building permit from the City Mayor.
The appellant was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance
and found her guilty and sentence her to pay a fine of P200 and to
demolish the building constructed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal ordinance is applicable to her in view
of the location of her house is with the US Naval Base.
HELD:
Yes. The US Naval base is not a foreign territory. It is under lease to
the US Armed Forces by virtue of the Military Base Agreement. The
Philippine has its authority to exercise administrative jurisdiction.
63. MIAA VS. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Parañaque City issued notices of levy and warrants of levy to Manila
International Airport Authority and threatened to sell at public
auction the airport lands and buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
real estate tax delinquency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not airport lands and buildings of MIAA are subject for
real estate tax?
HELD:
No. MIAA is an instrumentality of the National Government thus
exempt from local taxation. Real Properties of MIAA are owned by
the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate
tax.
64. People VS. SB
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution and ordered the dismissal of
a case of malversation through falsification of public documents
from the funds of Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction valid.
HELD:
No. The character and operations of AFB-RSBS are imbued with
public interest. As such, that it is a government entity and its fund
are in the nature of public funds. The criminal case is ordered
reinstated and the Sandiganbayan is directed to resume
proceedings.
65. ACCFA VS CUGCO
FACTS:
The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
(ACCFA) was a government agency created under R.A. No. 821
amended its administrative machinery was reorganized and its
name changed to Agricultural Credit Administrative (ACA) under the
Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844).
On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement which was
to be effective for a period of one year from July 1, 1961 was
entered into by and between the unions and ACCFA. On October
30, 1962 the unions together with its mother union, Confederation
of Unions in Government Corporation and Offices (CUGCO) filed a
complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against ACCFA for
having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice.
At the pendency of the above mentioned case specifically on August
1963 the president of the Philippines signed into law the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844).
ACCFA Supervisor’s Association (ASA) and ACCFA worker’s
Association (AWA) filed a petition for certification election with the
Court of Industrial Relations praying for exclusive bargaining agents
for supervisors and rank and file employees in ACA.
ACA in effect challenges the Jurisdiction of Court of Industrial
Relations to entertain the petition of Unions for certification
election on ground that ACA is engaged in governmental functions.
The unions join issue on single point contending ACA form
proprietary functions.
ISSUE:
Is ACCFA (ACA) performing governmental functions?
HELD:
Yes, Under Section 3 of Agricultural Land Reform Code. ACA
established among other governmental agencies to extend credit
and similar assistance to agriculture, in pursuance under Section 2.
Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. E.O 75 placed ACA
under Land Reform Program Administration and by virtue of R.A.
3844. The implementation of Land Reform Program of government
is a governmental function not a proprietary function.
ACA can’t step down to deal privately. It is ministerial and
government functions are exercised by the state as attributes of
sovereignty and not merely to promote welfare, progress, and
prosperity.
66. Valmonte VS. Belmonte
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not
having yet received the reply of the Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the
former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD:
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege
of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition.
His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time
the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied
that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I
suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to
a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the
intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering
further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded
the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
67. Government VS. Monte de Piedad
FACTS:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in
1863. Contributions were collected during the Spanish regime for
the aid of the victims. Out of the aid, an amount was left
untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need
for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the
transfer of the remaining amount as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de
Piedad to return the amount. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order.
The Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit
against the Monte de Piedad for a claim of the amount with
interest, for the benefit of the victims or their heirs.
Judgment was entered in favor of the government for the claim of
the amount with interest.
Monte de Piedad appealed contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries not the government.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine government is capable to file a
complaint against Monte de Piedad for the reimbursement of the
money of the victims?
HELD:
Yes. The government has the right to file the case as parens patriae
in representation of the legitimate claimants. The government of
the state, as parens partriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over
the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
68. Cabanas VS. Pilapil
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child be his sole
beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is
still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
hence, his brother took charge of his benefits for the child.
Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and
allows herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms
of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not state may interfere by virtue of parens partriae to
the terms of the insurance policy?
HELD:
Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family
as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof
such as in the case would be prejudiced and his interest is affected
then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve
according the best interest of that person. The mother should be
the trustee as she was the immediate relative of the child and it is
assumed that the mother shows more care toward the child than an
uncle. It is supported by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the state acting as parens patriae, is called
upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a
minor to accord priority to his best interest.
69. Gonzales VS Marcos
FACTS:
President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30, which is a trust
that provides for the construction of a national theater, a national
music hall and an arts building and facilities that would be
collectively known as the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The
project aimed to promote, preserve, enhance, and develop the
Philippines’ cultural heritage. First Lady Imelda Marcos headed the
Board of Trustees entrusted in building the project and they were
also the respondents in the petition for certiorari alleging the
encroachment of E.O. 30 on the legislative powers of the executive
branch and the question of whether the funds would come from
taxpayer’s money.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of Executive Order No. 30 is constitutional?
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the President did not encroach on the
legislative power in issuing EO 30 because he was merely acting in
accordance with the constitutional provision to promote arts and
letters, Sec. 4, Art. XIV of the Constitution. Therefore, the creation
of the Cultural Center through the funding of donations from private
entities and the United States gives the President the authority,
under the doctrine of parens patriae, to implement the project for
the benefit of the Filipino people.
70. Co Kim Cham VS. Valdez
FACTS:
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance
of and continue the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court
which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation
of the Philippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the said
governments. He also argued that the said governments during the
Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines
under the names of Philippines Executive Commission and Republic
of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime
were de facto governments.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission
which was organized by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the
Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military
forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. The source of its authority comes from the Japanese
military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war. The same is
true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently established
and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality,
71. Lawyers league for better Philippines vs Aquino
G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
 
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.
 On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines.”
 Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the administration of Corazon Aquino is a de facto
government.
Held:
NO. The Corazon Aquino administration is not a de facto
government. Its legitimacy is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government.  Moreover,
the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
72. Macariola vs Asuncion, supra
114 SCRA 77 (1982)
Facts:
Judge Elias Asuncion was charged by Bernardita Macariola for
having violated (1) Article 1491 of the New Civil Code when he
acquired by purchase portion of a lot which was involved in a civil
case decided by him; (2) Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when
he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a
judge of the Court of First Instance.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent, Judge Asuncion is liable for the said
charge(s) against him.
Held:
The respondent is not liable for the said charges.
 (1) The prohibition in the Article 1491 applies only to the sale
or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. In the case at
bar, when the respondent Judge purchased the lot, the
decision in the civil case which he rendered on was already
final because none of the parties therein led an appeal
within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question
was no longer subject of the litigation.
(2) That respondent may not be held liable under Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage),
because the provision partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees and as such is
deemed to have been automatically abrogated with the
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States.
73. Harvey vs Commissioner
162 SCRA 840 [G.R. No. 82544. June 28, 1988.]
Facts:
Foreign national petitioners Andrew Harvey, 52 y/o and John
Sherman,72, and Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58, were among the
twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan,
Laguna. The petitioners were apprehended by virtue of Mission
Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago of the CID.
On April 4, 1988, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following
grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents
were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure
as required by the said provision.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest of the petitioners valid.
Held:
YES. The warrant of arrest is valid. In this case, the arrest of
petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest
and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power.
Petitioners' contentions were rejected and respondent's official acts
defended by the Solicitor General are upheld.
74. Republic vs Feliciano
148 SCRA 424
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21,
1980.
The 86 intervenor settlers led a motion to dismiss the complaint of
respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land in Barrio Salvacion, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; principally on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action
cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising,
issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went
to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for certiorari. On
April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision
reversing the order of Judge Lising and remanding the case to the
court a q u o for further proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession
of a parcel of land.
Held:
NO. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application
in this case. Judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting
aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a quo,
dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed by respondent
Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as
defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of
a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.
On this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
75. Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. v. Trinidad-Lichauco
GR 142362 [May 3, 2006]
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the DOTC concerning the planned launch of a
Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. After having secured 2
orbital slots with the International Telecommunication Union,
having secured the confirmation from the government of the
assignment of said slots, and having proceeded with preparations
for the operation of its satellites, respondent DOTC Undersecretary
Lichuaco allegedly maligned PASI and, with bad faith, issued a
Notice of Offer to interested applicants of one of the orbital slots
(153 East Longitude) previously assigned to PASI. This allegedly
resulted in the awarding of said orbital slot to a third party. PASI
filed a civil complaint against Lichauco.
The causes of action were (1) for injunction against Lichauco’s
performing any act in relation to said orbital slot, (2) for declaration
of nullity of award of said orbital slot to the third party and (3) for
damages against Lichauco herself due to her alleged malicious
defamation of PASI.
Lichauco now moves to dismiss averring she is being sued for the
issuance of the Notice of Offer which she claims was done in the
discharge of her official functions, and thus this is a suit against the
State without its consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the action is dismissed on the ground of State
immunity?
Held:
NO. The rule in actions against government officials is that if a
judgment against such officials will require the State itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the State itself
although it has not been formally impleaded. Thus, as to the first
two (2) causes of action, the defense of state immunity from suit
does not apply since said causes of action do not seek to impose
financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of
State action. These actions cannot be properly considered as suits
against the State in constitutional contemplation. However, the rule
is different if the government official is made to account for a
tortuous act in the performance of his duties. Unauthorized acts of
government officials are not acts of the State, and an action arising
therefrom is not a suit against the State in constitutional
contemplation. But to establish whether the official concerned had
in fact committed the illegal or tortuous acts, a full-blown trial on
the merits is necessary. Thus, as for the third cause of action in this
case, the defense of State immunity cannot be accorded merit
before trial, factual as they are in character. Wherefore, RTC is
ordered to try and decide the case on the merits.
76. Sayson vs Singson
54 SCRA 282 (1973)
Facts:
The Office of the District Engineer in Cebu requisitioned various
items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. It was then
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. So,
a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The
committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service
[owned by respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of P43,530.00.
The petitioner, Highway Auditor Sayson received the purchase
voucher and approved its payment in the amount of P34,824.00 ,
20% of which was withheld until supporting documents will be
submitted to the Supervising Auditor for review. However, after the
document submission to General Auditing Office (GAO), the
transaction was found to be overpriced by P40,000.00 compared to
a quoted price submitted by USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer
of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines.
Charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. This led to the filing of the mandamus
suit, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier
Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of
P8,706.00. The lower court ruled in favour of the respondent. Thus,
the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the collection by the respondent is valid through a
mandamus suit filed against the petitioners.
Held:
NO. It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a
money claim against the government, for the payment of the
alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the
Bureau of Public Highways. Even if the claim is valid, mandamus is
not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the
State but an ordinary action for specific performance.
The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to
approve the vouchers for payment is a suit against the State, which
cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State.
Thus, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu of was
reversed and set aside, and the suit for mandamus led against
petitioners was dismissed.
77. Republic vs Purisima
G.R. No. L-36084 78 SCRA 470. August 31, 1977
Facts:
The jurisdictional issue raised by Solicitor General Estelito P .
Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines arose from the
failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of reiterated
doctrine of the nonsuability of a State including its offices and
agencies, from suit without its consent.
It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss led by defendant Rice and
Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent
Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged
breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball
Freight Lines, Inc. Such a motion to dismiss was led on September
7, 1972.
Thus, there is more than sufficient basis for an allegation of
jurisdictional infirmity against the order of respondent Judge
denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s decision is valid.
Held:
NO. The respondent’s decision is not valid. The doctrine of non-
suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity
of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates the assertion
of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law
on which such a right may be predicated.
The petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October
4, 1972 denying the motion to dismiss led by the Rice and Corn
Administration nullied and set aside and the petition for prohibition
is likewise granted restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil
Case No. 79082 pending in his sala except for the purpose of
ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
78. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 11154, 34 Phil 311 [Mar 21, 1916]
Facts:
Petitioner Meritt was riding on a motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura
when the General Hospital ambulance struck the plaintiff. The
chauffeur of the ambulance was employed by the Hospital. Meritt
suffered severe injuries. The Legislature passed Act No. 2457
authorizing Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippines. The Court of First Instance (CFI) found for Meritt. In
this appeal to the judgment rendered, the Government claims that
the CFI erred in holding that the State is liable for the damages
sustained by Meritt even if it be true that the collision was due to
the negligence of the chauffeur.
Issue:
Whether or not the state is liable for the damages notwithstanding
that it was due to the negligence of the chauffeur employed by the
State?
Held:
YES. By consenting to be sued, a State simply waives its immunity
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the
claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law
of civil responsibility. The negligent chauffer of the ambulance was
not such special agent.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
79. PNB vs CIR
120 SCRA 707
Facts:
Pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of Industrial
Relations in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala and
against the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, respondent
clerk of court Gilbert P . Lorenzo, in his capacity as special deputy
sheriff, served a notice to garnish the funds of the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation which were deposited with
petitioner PNB bank. Petitioner moved to quash the notice of
garnishment but respondent Court denied the motion. Claiming that
respondent Court's denial amounted to grave abuse of discretion
because the appointment of the clerk of court as authorized deputy
sheriff was contrary to law and the funds subject of the garnishment
"could be public in character", petitioner instituted instant certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not an order of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion to quash a
notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion.
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court held that respondent clerk of court is the
legally authorized deputy sheriff to serve the Court of Industrial
Relations' writ of execution as provided for in Republic Act No. 4201
which amended the Court of Industrial Relations Act; and that funds
of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation may be the
object of garnishment because although the said corporation is a
government-owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality
separate and distinct from the government which subjects it to the
rules of law governing private corporations.
80. SSS vs Court of Appeals
120 SCRA 707 (1983)
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals stems from the following facts, as narrated by the Trial
Court, adopted by the Court of Appeals, and quoted by both
petitioner and private respondents.
The officers and employees of the petitioner, Social Security System,
negligently foreclosed a mortgaged property of spouses David B.
Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz for the reason that the conditions of
the mortgage have been broken since October 1967.
The Sps. Cruz, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and
attorney's fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had
fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not
defaulted in any payment.
In its Answer, with counterclaim, the SSS stressed its right to
foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by private respondents
by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause provided in the
mortgage contract, even after private respondents had paid their
amortization instalments.
The Trial Court rendered judgment on March 5, 1971, against
defendant SSS, directing it to pay plaintiffs for damages. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals armed the lower Court judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner SSS being a government agency is
entitled for the immunity from suit.
Held:
NO. The immunity from suit of a government was waived in this
case. There should be no question on this score considering that the
SSS is a judicial entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate
powers separate and distinct from the government. For by the
waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages
arising from contract, and even for tort.
The judgment sought that petitioner SSS shall pay private
respondents for damages.
81. Rayo vs. CFI Bulacan

FACTS: During the height of typhoon “KADING” the respondent
corporation, acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin
Chavez, opened or caused to be opened simultaneously all the three
floodgates of the Angat Dam. As a result of the sudden, precipitate
and simultaneous opening of said floodgates, several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. Hardest-hit was Norzagaray and about a
hundred of its residents died or were reported to have died and
properties worth millions of pesos destroyed or washed away.
Victims of the man-caused flood filed eleven complaints for
damages against the respondent corporation. Respondent argued
that “in the operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely
governmental function”, hence it “cannot be sued without the
express consent of the State.” Petitioners opposed for dismissal and
contended that respondent corporation is performing not
governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its
own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can ‘sue
and be sued in any court’.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the respondent to sue and be
sued under its organic charter include the power to be sued even in
tort claims.
HELD: YES. The government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under
its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter
provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without
qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a
tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
82. Farolan vs. CTA
FACTS: An importation of 80 bales of screen net consigned to
Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay) was declared through a
customs broker which was classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-
B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay
paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00 through
the Bank of Asia.
The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of
the shipment which revealed that the shipment consisted of 80
bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600
rolls. The value of the shipment was re-appraised. Furthermore, the
Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of
synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under Tariff
Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay
Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
shipment in question.
Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value,
the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of
the government which was also affirmed by the Commissioner of
Customs (Ramon Farolan, Jr.). However, the Court of Tax Appeals
reversed the decision of the Commissioner declaring that the latter
erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent because fraud is
never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the
articles in question was not in accordance with law. As a
consequence, several motions were filed and private respondent
demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for
damages sustained with regards to its goods.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable.
HELD: The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual
damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its
goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper
would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands
that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual
damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the
government, it is obvious that this case has been converted
technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued
without its consent," categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent
power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of
Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues
which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private
respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of
Customs must fail.
83. RP vs. Sandiganbayan
84. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping
FACTS: Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping
Commission a vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and
agreeing to pay the balance in installments. For various reasons,
among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping
Commission took possession of said vessel and considered the
contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting
the Cabinet restored to him all his rights under his original contract
with the Shipping Commission.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying
his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said
vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after
hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The
lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by
virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its
possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under
the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was
delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose
of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover
possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said
property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene
in said civil case praying for the possession of the vessel in order
that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RP is immune from suit.
HELD: No, because by filing its complaint in intervention the
Government in effect waived its right of non-suability. "The
immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right
to sue private parties in its own courts." The state as plaintiff may
avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants.
In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defense
he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court
thus explains: No direct suit can be maintained against the United
States. But when an action is brought by the United States to
recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against
them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of
setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to
an application to Congress.'”. It is however, contended for the
intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the
plaintiff against whom the complainant in intervention was directed.
This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in
intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant’s claim
over the possession of the vessel in question.
85. Lim vs. Brownell
FACTS: The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land
situated in Tondo, Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. m., which,
after the last world war, was found by the Alien Property Custodian
of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa,
national of an enemy country, Japan. For such reason, the said
Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States,
vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos.
1 and 2; and subsequently under the same statue, on Lots 3 and 4
on July 6, 1948. Two formal agreements were then executed, one
referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4; whereby the
said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic
of the Philippines upon indemnifying the U.S.
On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia
Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a
formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator. On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito
E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of
the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with
back rents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RP can be charged for damages over the
use of the property.
HELD: The appellate court's order of dismissal, with respect to
plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant Attorney General
of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines must be
upheld based upon the principle that a foreign state or its
government cannot be sued without its consent.
With respect to the recovery or return of the properties vested,
section 33 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended,
provides:
"SEC. 33. Return of property; notice; institution of suits,
computation of time.—No return may be made pursuant to section
9 or 32 unless notice of claim has been, filed: (a) in the case of any
property or interest acquired by the United States prior to
December 18, 1941, by August 9, 1948; or (b) in the case of any
property or interest acquired by the United States on or after
December 18, 1941, by April 30, 1949, or two years from the vesting
of the property or interest in respect of "which the claim is made,
whichever is later.
Lots 1 and 2 were vested by the Alien Property Custodian on March
14, 1946". The two-year period, therefore, within which to file a suit
for their return expired on March 14, 1948. The claim filed by
plaintiff with the Philippine Alien Property Administration on
November 15, 1948 obviously could not toll the two-year period
that had already expired on March 14, 1948.
Regarding Lots 3 and 4, these lots were vested only on July 6, 1948
and consequently the two-year period within which to file the
action for their recovery expired on July 7, 1950. But in computing
that two-year period, the time during which plaintiff's claim with the
Philippine Alien Property Administration was pending— from
November 16, 1948 when the claim was filed to March 7, 1950
when it was disallowed—should be excluded. The complaint
therefore filed on November 13, 1950 is well within the prescribed
period. Hence the case on said lots is hereby remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
86. Malong vs. PNR
FACTS: The Malong spouses alleged that their son was killed when
he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The
tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach.
The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of
the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the
PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling P136,370. Upon the
Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It
ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a
government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State
(Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution).
The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to R.A. No.
5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only
questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or
toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNR is immune from suit.
HELD: No, PNR is not immune. The State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did
not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the
operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common
carriers.
87. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration
and driven officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's
death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against
Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses
Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the
NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but
is an agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver
Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused
by its driver Hugo Garcia.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. On the basis of the
foregoing considerations, We conclude that the National Irrigation
Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency
of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
88. Santiago vs. Republic
FACTS: Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the
Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should
construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot,
Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of
donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is
a suit against the government and should not prosper without the
consent of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent government has waived its
immunity from suit.
HELD: Yes. The government's waiver of immunity was implied by
virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The
government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did
not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right
to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard
would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so
advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed
with the case.
89. Amigable vs. Cuenca
FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which
was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues
without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales.
Because of this, she filed a case in CFI Cebu. Defendants argue that
1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been
prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and;
4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such. CFI rendered a
decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her
ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the
complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its
consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the
government without its consent.
HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it
was held that when the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent.
In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the
government, then she remains as the rightful owner of the lot.
She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land
anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot
has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price
or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
90. Torio vs. Fontanilla
FACTS: The municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2
resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and
the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive
Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-
committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the
cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed.
Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon
of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages
with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the
municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer,
defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized
public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding
of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they
merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the
municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town
fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,
they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the
municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised
due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and
dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all
defendants solidarily liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized
by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of
the municipality.
HELD: The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of
Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal consequence
thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as
an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as
its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers,
directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule
co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa
aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on
their part. The records do not show that municipal
councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the
"zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go
up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.
91. THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by
the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the
squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages
against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three
other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and
Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss
the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent. The trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off
its sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only
on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the
Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity.
RULING:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we
have adopted the generally accepted principles of International
Law.  In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in
the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.  However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal
of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.  its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of
concern is non-proprietary in nature.  The lot was acquired by
petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.  The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.  It
merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation.  
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
92. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY,
WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V.
M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35645       136 scra 487   May 22, 1985
FACTS:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain
perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. 
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of
a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein
informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for
the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third
parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by
him against the US
ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
RULING:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from
being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. It does not
apply where the contracts relates the exercise of its sovereign
function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably,
a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized
for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
93. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND
YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO,
Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO
C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
FACTS:
In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on
the ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not
consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting
Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for
barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F.
Shaw
● Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del Pilar
● Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the
private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not
included in the invitation to bid
● The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its
representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse,
upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil
Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
● But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then
known as the NCO club concession
● On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint
in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a
writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation
● Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to
maintain the status quo
● On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the
ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had
not waived its non-suability
● On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction
● On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion
to dismiss
On the second suit:
●  Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and
Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
● It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into
the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers
● His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C.
Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF
Clark Air Force Base
● Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
● The defendants, joined by the United States of America,
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the
manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for
the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the
suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be
sued
● Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting
intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what
their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective
mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning
On the third suit:
● Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp
O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J.
King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air
Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators
(AFOSI)
● Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of
the filing of the charge
● He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual
petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed
● Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in
the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American
bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
●  The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants
were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect
a suit against the US without its consent
● Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under
the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil
cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of
the court when they submitted their answer
On the fourth suit:
● Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents
against the petitioners (except USA)
● According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up,
handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on them
● Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were
arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest
● USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a
suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be
sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official
functions
● Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts
cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by
the defendants
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against
United States of America without its consent
 2. In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune
from suit for acting within their official functions.
RULING:
1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial
enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of
the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case
should be remanded to the lower court.
2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering
into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners
are only suable, not liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the
exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as
agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued.
4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer
study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can
it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time
of the incident.
94. KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondent
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
FACTS:
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against
Minucher following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine
police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims
that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a
Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic
immunity.
HELD:
YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked
with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to
make the arrest.
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.
95. THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR
SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM,
petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name
and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent.
G.R. No. 154705     405 SCRA  126 June 26, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with
respondent where the counsellor before was Siti Partinah. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments:
air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective
for 4 years.
Petitioners claim that prior to the date of expiration of the said
agreement, they informed respondent that the renewal of the
agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of
Administration, Kasim, who allegedly found respondents work and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set
in the Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement. The latter claimed that his termination was unlawful
and arbitrary. Respondent filed a complaint in RTC of Makati.
Petioner filed a Motion to Dismiss in RTC of Makati alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity
from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of
sovereign immunity from suit.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The mere entering into
a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri
imperii or juri gestionis. There is no dispute that the establishment
of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter
into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of
Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered
into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement
was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. Therefore, it cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit.
96. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE
VERSTUYFT, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and
CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC), respondents.
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
FACTS:
Petioner, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft is a recognized official of the WHO.
His personal belongings contained in 12 crates entered the
Philippines as unaccompanied baggages were allowed free entry
from duties and taxes. Respondent officers of the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspect that the crates
“contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the
official needs of Verstuyft and for alleged violation of the Tariff and
Custom Code. Thereby, requesting Respondent judge, Hon.
Benjamin H. Aquino to issu a search and warrant.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino
that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for
his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the
search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly
joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but
respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting
diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not search and seizure of petitioner’s personal
belongings was legal.
HELD:
No. Petitioner is entitled to diplomatic immunity as recognized by
the executive branch if the government. Such diplomatic immunity
carries with it, among other diplomatic privilege and immunities,
personal inviolability, inviolability of the official’s properties,
exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and
customs duties.
97. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V.
DE CASTRO and JOSE C. MAGNAYI, respondents.
G.R. No. 113191 September 18, 1996
FACTS:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal
dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two summonses
were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the
Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and
Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article
50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and
Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The
Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters
(the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the
impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from
suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did
not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA
referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a
"formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was immune from suit.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari is granted, and the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is vacated for being null and void. The provisions stipulated
by both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able to
establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowings and
guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy
immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.. Being an international organization that has been
extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the
municipal law.
98. ISIDRO, ZENAIDA, IRWIN, ZENDA and DORNET, all surnamed
ANIMOS, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
its Administrator, JUAN L. GACAD and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 79156,  June 22, 1989
FACTS:  Luna, Sison & Manas for petitioners.
Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of
the USAFFE and the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case
was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners against PVAO, for the
payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under
Republic Act No. 65, as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim
was denied on the basis that Animos’ disability was only considered
partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on Disability
Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension
benefits. The petitioner submits that the rating system adopted by
PVAO is null and void.
ISSUE:  manager of the NEX JUSMAG. Accordingly, some time in January
Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a
suit against the state.
HELD:  claimed that checking of purchases is a routine procedure observed
No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. When officers and
agents of the government are sued in their individual capacity, the
cloak of protection from the government is removed. Hence, the
complaint cannot be considered a suit against the state because it is
a well-settled principle of law that we may consider a public official
liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his
acts when done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of
his authority and jurisdiction.
99. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MAXINE BRADFORD,
petitioners, vs. HON. LUIS R. REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch
22, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, and NELIA T. MONTOYA,
respondents.
Evelyn R. Dominguez for private respondent.
G.R. No. 79233 (79253) March 1, 1993
FACTS: 
Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification
checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United
States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon
City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American
citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity
exchange, for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory
acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store
22, 1987, Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while
the latter was already in the parking area after buying some items
NEX JUSMAG’s retail store. To support the motion, the petitioners
at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise,
cash, and equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of
NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7. Therefore, Bradford’s order
to check all employee purchases was done in the exercise of her
duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity.
 
HELD: 
No. Under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement
creating the JUSMAG, “only the Chief of the Military Adviser Group
and not more than six other senior members thereof designated
under by him will be accorded diplomatic immunity”. The court also
ruled that Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provided an exception; stating that even diplomatic agents who
enjoy immunity are liable if they perform any professional or
commercial activity outside his official functions. Therefore, since
Bradford works as NEX-JUSMAG’s Manager, she is not among those
officers granted diplomatic immunity.
100. AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 102667           February 23, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition to review decision of court of appeals.
Private respondent, General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were
allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this
verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no
document or instrument involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC,
petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and
terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded
that they vacate the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent
Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but
later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice stating
that Ricardo Villanueva, the Chief Warden of the Park said it was
just mere acknowledgement of the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for
damages and injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was
dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against
the state which could not be sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and ruled that a government official being sued in his official
capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts
done without or in excess of his authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality
a complaint against the State, which could not prosper without the
State’s consent
HELD:
No. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints
filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their
duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the
state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official
concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such
as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages
awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public
official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful
and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt,
in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed
in bad faith.
We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on
record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man
and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly,
there was no written contract. That private respondents were
allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a
matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being
so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be
ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot
and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.