RULE 130: RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017

SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN and ALICE TAPAYAN, Petitioners,

vs. PONCEDA M. MARTINEZ, Respondent.

FACTS:
The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister of
Clark Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is Respondent's son.
The parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP
Mortgage. The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due. Respondent filed a complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages (Complaint) against Petitioners before the RTC of
Ozamiz city.
The RTC noted that the Deed of Undertaking was acknowledged before Atty.
Emmanuel V. Chiong, a notary public, and reasoned that since the latter enjoys the
presumption of having performed his duties regularly, Petitioners' claim that the Deed of
Undertaking was a falsity must be rejected. On such basis, the RTC held that the Deed of
Undertaking constitutes a valid and binding contract, which Petitioners are bound to respect.
The CA held that the Deed of Undertaking merits consideration, since Petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of regularity ascribed to it as a public document.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible as proof of
its contents, in violation of the best evidence rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Yes. The plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible for failure to raise a
timely objection.
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of
Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary.
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents
of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Nevertheless,
evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy
of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
Having failed to timely raise their objection when the Formal Offer of Evidence was
filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived the same. Hence, they are
precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking.
DIOSO vs. TOMAS
G.R. No. 150155 | SEPTEMBER 1, 2004
PETITION: Petition for review on certiorari
PETITIONERS: Spouses Ramon and Felicisima Dioso
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Tomas and Leonara Cardeño

FACTS: Lot 248-A was originally owned by Magno Eraña, the father of the petitioner
Felicisima Eraña Dioso, respondent Leonera Eraña Cardeño and their other sisters. Upon
Magno Eraña’s death Lot 248-A was adjudicated in favor of respondent Leonera Eraña
Cardeño, et. al.

Lot 248-A was then partitioned into two, whereby the outer portion became the property of
the respondents where they built their house. While the inner portion became the property
of the Encarnacion Eraña Javel (now deceased), one of the sisters of respondent Leonora
Cardeño and petitioner Felicisima Dioso.

Subsequently, Encarnacion sold her portion to Felicidad Legaspi who, in turn, sold the same
to the petitioners, Spouses Ramon and Felicisima Dioso.

After they bought Encarnacion’s property, the petitioners wanted to construct a new house
at the interior portion of Lot 248-A. They then demanded that they be given a right of way
and claiming that they were entitled thereto under the “Pinanumpaang Salaysay” executed
between respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel.

When the respondents refused to give them the right of way, the petitioners filed with the
RTC a compliant for specific performance and an easement of right way with damages.

In their answer to the complaint, the respondents specifically denied the genuineness and
due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was falsified.

According to the respondents, respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel could not
have claimed co-ownership over Lot 248-A to the exclusion of their other siblings as early as
1977 when the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was supposedly executed, because it was only on
August 27, 1992 that the other siblings waived or renounced their shares over the said
property in favor of respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. Petitioners evidence did not
support their claim that respondent Leonora Cardeño and Encarnacion Javel executed the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay or entered into an agreement granting the latter, the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, a right of way.

The trial court noted that the petitioners presented only a photocopy or machine copy of the
purported document, and, during the trial, failed to lay the foundation or prepare the basis
for the admission of secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof.

While the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in denying the petitioners motion
for reconsideration/new trial.

Whether or not petitioners were able to establish the existence of “Pinanumpaang Salaysay”
by secondary evidence.

RULING:

First issue: On this score, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the concurrence of the following
requisites must be established: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative,
cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably change the
judgment.

Second issue:
We rule in favor of the petitioners.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof further
states that “When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.”

The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or unavailability of the original
document is thus warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or
existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in
court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.

Admittedly, in this case, the original document of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was not
presented during trial. However, the petitioners presented a photocopy thereof, as well as
testimonial evidence to prove its due execution and the loss or unavailability of the original
document. Specifically, the existence and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was
established by Yldeso, one of the petitioners witnesses, who testified that he was one of the
witnesses to the execution thereof and that his signature appears thereon.

Moreover, the unavailability of the original document was established by Veneranda

Legaspi, daughter of Felicidad Legaspi, who bought Encarnacion Eraña’s portion of Lot 248-
A and eventually sold it to the petitioners.