SESINANDO MERIDA v. PEOPLE, GR No.

158182, 2008-06-12
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial
court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil,...
Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M.
Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
l
Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil.
When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting
the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who,
according to petitioner, bought the Mayod
Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale.
Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.
Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez took custody of the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and
issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at
the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the... matter.
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon
(Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in
Tansiongco's favor.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but
ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor.
Issues:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Ruling:
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of
the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod
Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property.
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2)
the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or... disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
Petitioner... stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other
forest products from a private land[28] without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his
liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing]... and remov[ing]
timber," under the second category.
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra
tree in the Mayod Property and that he did... so only with Calix's permission. However,
when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes
"timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant,"... which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood... products.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14
May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is
sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three
(3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
Principles:
Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint
before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of
PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer...
assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest
officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in
Court.
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25] penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable... public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further...
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products... are found.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CFI OF QUEZON, et al.

G.R. No. L-46772, February 13, 1992

FACTS

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They entered the privately-
owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, then illegally cut, gather, take, steal
and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without
any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, 60 logs of
different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of
P50,205.52 including government charges. The trial court dismissed the
information.

ISSUE

1. whether the information charged an offense

2. whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING

1. Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were
owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject
of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private
woodland registered in the name of complainant’s deceased father,
Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license
agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the
logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those
produced in private woodlands.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60

of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of
the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the
taking was without any authority or license from the government.
2. Yes, with the exception of the so-called “private crimes” and in election
offenses, prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an
information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation.
Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority.
Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary
investigations.
G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988

DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA, HONORATO ACHANZAR and RESTITUTO

DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO MAGLANA and the EASTCOAST
DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, respondents.

Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.

Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents
for closing a logging road without authority.

In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:

In Paragraph 5(a):

a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued
a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing the
latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for
the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the
national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with
this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by
plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof
while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and were
allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S
"Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. A xeroxed copy of this Nombrado memorandum,
the original of which is however in the possession of defendants, is hereto attached
as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.

In Paragraph 5(b):

b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station Officer-in-

Charge, BFD Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to plaintiff Laguas'
complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was addressed by Aspiras to the Resident
Manager of Defendant Eastcoast with instructions to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas'
trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by
Defendant Eastcoast. A xeroxed copy of this letter is hereto attached as Annex "D"
and made a part hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident Manager of
Defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to their Chief Security Guard for the latter to
comply with the Aspiras letter. These events, however, took the whole day of 2
January 1976 so that notwithstanding the lifting of the road closure no hauling of logs
could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on that day.
In Paragraph 5(c):

c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs
towards the Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same road, only the day
before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was
closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order
of Defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by
Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing laws, rules and
regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. A xeroxed copy
of the Maglana message, the original of which is in the possession of the defendants,
is hereto attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part hereof.

And in paragraph 5(d):

d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in
defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order
of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao
Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to
seek the assistance of the PC thereat. Thus on 5 January 1976, Provincial
Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment Commander
at Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by defendants. A xeroxed copy of this
directive is hereto attached as Annex "F" and made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction,
and (2) lack of cause of action.

The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the
legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is
properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity
to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners' complaint
on the basis of the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:

The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to
determine whether their use is in violation of laws. Since the damages claimed to
have been sustained by the plaintiffs arose from the alleged illegal closure of a
logging road — in the language of the defendants on page 3 of their motion to
dismiss. The simple fact is there was an illegal closure of the national highway
affecting the private rights of the plaintiffs who sustained damages and losses as a
consequence thereof — the question whether or not the road was illegally closed
must first be determined by the Bureau of Forest Development. If the said Bureau
finds that the road was legally closed, an action for damages may be filed in Court.
Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would be no tortious act. (Rollo,
pp. 58-69).

xxx xxx xxx

 After the logging road was closed for the first time, more so after the second time, by
the defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., the plaintiffs should have
asked the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality or illegality of the
closure since they wanted to file, as they did file, an action for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure. The fact that the letter of January 2, 1976, directed defendant
Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. to open the road does not necessarily
mean that the Bureau of Forest Development had found that the closure was illegal.
There must be a positive finding that the closure was illegal. ... (Rollo, p. 60)

xxx xxx xxx

As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A. Lagua is not entitled to, and cannot cannot claim,
damages in her personal capacity. For she could not have sustained damages as a
result of the alleged illegal closure of the road in her personal capacity while acting in
her representative capacity. So if she and her husband sustained damages, it must
have been because their legal rights were violated by a tortious act committed by the
defendants other than the alleged illegal closure of the road. But as stated elsewhere
in this order, even the plaintiffs admit that the damages they claimed to have
sustained arose from the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Assuming,
however, that another tortious act violated the legal rights of the Laguas, still they
could not joint Achanzar and Donga in this complaint for there would be misjoinder of
parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)

Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for certiorari in the interest of
justice.

The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction
over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of
Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an
action for damages can be instituted.

We agree.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the
Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be
maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be
established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents.
This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside
a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):

The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents can recover
damages as a result of the of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely
legal question and nothing of an a administrative nature is to or can be done
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7
SCRA 533; Limoico v. Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v.
Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.
The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court, alleged that the logs
of petitioner Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the area granted to the latter under his
Private Timber License No. 2 and therefore inside the concession area of respondent company's
Timber License Agreement. This, apparently, was the reason why the respondent company denied
to the petitioners the use of the logging road. If we hold the respondents to their contention that the
Bureau of Forest Development has the power and authority not only to regulate the use or blockade
of logging roads but also to exclusively determine the legality of a closure of such roads, why then
did they take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed logging road before taking up the
matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again notwithstanding the Bureau's order to open it
after the petitioners had duly informed the said Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureau's authority
which the respondents ignored to now defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable.
We, therefore, find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling
that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own
behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the real parties in interest.
However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in
interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the
dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of
the respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial
on the merits

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.