LLAMANZARES V. J. Perez As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

ens.—As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
COMELEC 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution,
an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation . The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are
accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” are principles “established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,”
such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is
embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child
is stateless.—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18)
years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law .
The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of
the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage

1
 is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied) The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.

Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Equal protection guarantee. —To impose an additional burden for the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization
was obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would
IN RE: APPLICATION be clearly to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot countenance.
FOR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP OF Decision of court on matter of citizenship should be given preclusive effect; Reasons. —Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end
J. Fernando
CHAN TECK LAO. to litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. x x x The same
CHAN TECK LAO vs. observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it which is
REPUBLIC affirmed by this Court. For the “effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of
and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages
disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation.
As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens,” the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino
parent is a citizen of the Philippines and is entitled to be recognized as such. Recognition is accorded by the BI and the DOJ to qualified individuals,
provided the proper procedure is complied with and the necessary documents are submitted. In this case, respondent was accorded recognition
as a citizen on 24 February 2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued Identification Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and
REPUBLIC vs. HARP J. Sereno
affirmed his entitlement to all the rights and privileges of citizenship.

Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may
resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation
proceeding.—It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens of the Philippines.
LAMBINO v. J. Carpio The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a
COMELEC petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These
essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every
one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing . Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
2
 An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most
likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people
The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The
proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of government. In equal vein, the
submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act,
although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
SANIDAD v.
COMELEC J. Martin
“Plebiscite” and “Referendum” distinguished.—A “referendum” is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public
reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the
executive power of the President. It is participated on by all citizens from the age of 15, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-
minded, or ex-convicts. A “plebiscite,” on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those “citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.” Literacy, property, or any other substantive requirement is not
imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. —The conclusion then is
inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has
Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the
exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act.

R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
SANTIAGO v. approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances,
COMELEC J. Davide or resolutions.”—Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
1997 the Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the word
“Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
“laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”
National ID System requires a law not a mere administrative order.
OPLE v. TORRES Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. x x
J. PUNO
1998 x An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
ANG NARS Joint Resolution No. 4, being a mere resolution, cannot amend or repeal a prior law such as RA 9173 or the Philippine Nursing Act. The same
PARTYLIST v. applies to EO 811 which is also not a law, but an executive directive.
3
 EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
2019
Since the issuance of an Executive Order (EO) is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
GALICTO vs.
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
AQUINO
J. Brion proper recourse.
2012
There is no vested right in salary increase.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest.

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it
LEAGUE OF CITIES enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress
vs. COMELEC enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income,
J. Carpio
population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
2008 component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However,
Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold
its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially
accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But
it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view
that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

Only congress can amend a law.

SILVERIO vs. J. Corona The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
REPUBLIC
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
2007 he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for
his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.

4
 petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.

No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
NOGRALES vs. Comelec resolution: Implement the law 6 months after the conduct of May 2019 elections.
COMELEC
J. Carandang
if We were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would result as the winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections would serve
2019 a term less than that provided for in Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In upholding the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, this Court declared that the limitation provided by the said Circular on permissible
extensions of service after reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five has a reasonable relationship with or is germane to the purpose of
civil service laws on retirement. And as reiterated in the said case, the policy considerations behind the limitation on the maximum extension of
service allowable for compulsory retirees, as summarized in the dissenting opinion of Justice Griño-Aquino in the case of Cena, were as follows: “x
TOLEDO vs.
x x extending the service of compulsory retirees longer than one (1) year would: (1) Give a premium to late-comers in the government service and
COMELEC
J. Purisima in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age (2) Delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees;
and (3) Prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various governmental
1999
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by ‘extendees’ who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension
of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old age pension.” Thus, the one-year limitation on the extension of
service of a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five imposed under Memorandum Circular No. 27 was
held valid and reasonable.
ONG vs. ALEGRE J. Garcia For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
2006 consecutive terms.

There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May
2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around
the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections
and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold
that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of
the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for
more than three consecutive term for the same position.

Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not
make him less than a duly elected mayor.—It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was
Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest
5
 did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor
in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of
the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a
petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that
its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was
already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.—
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not
hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a
rigid application of procedural rules.

LATASA vs. An examination of the historical background of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution on term limits reveals that the members of the
COMELEC Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
J. Azcuna
monopolization of political power.—As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will
2003 govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The
term of office of elective local officials, except such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. An
examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be
no further reelection for local and legislative officials. The members, instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod
that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive
term

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved
in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
MARCOS vs. domicile Romualdez-
COMELEC
J. Kapunan
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
1995 satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
ONGSIAKO REYES J. Perez It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of
6
 Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are
the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment
but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the
vs. COMELEC
COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding.―The HRET’s constitutional
authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
2013
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and
exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at
the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall
sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the
dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications
of the Member.
ATONG PALAUM vs. J. Carpio What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
COMELEC different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that
national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
2013 parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

“Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government.”
On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To
require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no

7
 requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens.
It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.”
Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
ANG LADLAD vs.
system.—We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
COMELEC
J. Del Castillo participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the
2010
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment and Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration
BAGABUYO vs. of boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A pronounced
COMELEC distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local
J. Brion
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
2008 government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239
SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up
because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan.
In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new
legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none
was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
UMALIS vs. J. Velasco The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in
8
 the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the
substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. In
this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 of the LGC
are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized
once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language
“shall” used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.

The Supreme Court rules that conversion to a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code (LGC).—Verily, the
upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-
cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence.
With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction
of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija
COMELEC
stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving
out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.” Needless to
2014
stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and
abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and more often
than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs. In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to
an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec.
453 of the LGC.

The issue on who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to
resolve the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to
say that conversion of said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact
doctrine—that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the
unit or units that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986) and
Padilla v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (1992) are worth revisiting. We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of
the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to
participate in the plebiscite.
ALDABA vs. J. Carpio A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the
COMELEC attainment of the 250,000 population.—The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face
2010 because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal

9
 demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB); Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are declared official
by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only
by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cited Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes),
otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.—Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG,
representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection,
“the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000.”
This projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of
Certification of Population Sizes), which states: x x x (d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which
the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f) Certifications of
population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers.
Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.” (Emphasis
supplied) Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That
is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.
—A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city
must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There
is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before
the 10 May 2010 elections.
TAN vs. COMELEC J. Alampay A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to
the constitutional requirements. —We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement
1986 but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the
parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out
what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and
overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed,
respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3
thereof. Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.

When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right to participate in said plebiscite.—It is a well-accepted rule that “in
ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from
the provisions in pari materia.” Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4
thereof that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this

10
 Act.” As this draft legislation speaks of “areas,” what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically,
those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent
province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirements for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other
words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative,
AQUINO vs.
it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case,
COMELEC
J. Perez which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be
2010
needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation
and regardless of its population.
ABAYON vs. HRET J. Mendoza An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates,
based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal
2016 votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.

The Constitution no less, grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests
involving the members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other
irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. —The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the
power granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections.

The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives,
may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in
doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.

The passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority
conferred by no less than the Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative
functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), the Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it
by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole
judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power
refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such
power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be
gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s
administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the

11
 declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling
elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other
hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if there
was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is
no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other
irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in
the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We
therefore strike down the In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

BANAT vs. COMELEC The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
J. Carpio guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated,
2009 at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.—Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.—By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list
elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA
210, G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
CIPRIANO vs. J. Puno The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. —The
COMELEC Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a

12
 candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76
of the Omnibus Election Code, thus: Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.—The Commission, provincial election
supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have
the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion
2004
to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy
filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not
appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
NAVARRO vs.
party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation of one
ERMITA J. Peralta
legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party
2010
A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee .—As the law states in unequivocal terms that a
nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be
that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No.
7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

AMORES vs. HRET Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the Same party will not only be eligible
J. Carpio
for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation of the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. —What is clear is
Morales
2010 that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since
multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six
months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of
intention.
Republic Act 3836: Increase in emoluments of members of Congress. —Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement benefits for members of
PHILCONSA vs.
Congress which, in effect, are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the
GIMENEZ
J. Regala approval of the Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to
1965
the prohibition, in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
PEOPLE vs
SATURNINO J. Concepcion
1955
POBRE vs. Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
SANTIAGO misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his /her oath as a lawyer. —
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her
oath as a lawyer.

It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew
13
 that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against  prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the
courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS, NOT ABSOLUTE. —While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum  outside of the Congressional
Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison,
suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

FAILURE TO CONFORM TO RULES, EFFECT OF. —Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

OSEMENA vs.
POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBERS; SEPARATION OF POWERS. —The House of Representatives is the
PENDATUM
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature.

PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR. —The House of Representatives of the United States has
taken the position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several
instances, it acted against offenders, even after other business had been considered.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS. —While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair.
BELGICA vs. OCHOA The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ―
Pork Barrel System. ―The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will the President’s declaration that he had
already ― abolished the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law
may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality . ―As for the
PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate
the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF

14
Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already
“abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to
nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the
passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” ―The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the
foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct.
691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he
political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of
their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this stage.”

Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.―A political question refers to
“those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon . Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is
the Court’s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches
but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that
each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems
of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.

Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or

15
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing.” Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully
contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
“Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or
simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which
both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”)
and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”)
are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in
reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of
the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum
discretionary funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;
and Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government; To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the
power to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.” To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the

16
power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch
from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches
of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the
inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest assertions of another or others.

Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional; Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in  Guingona,
Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,
“in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution,
which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation
by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play  any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is
a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.

Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution; Towards this end, the Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned
the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same
falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment
are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in —
as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational  aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically
articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its

17
ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares the 2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority
in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and
thus unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
11of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices
do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.

Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively
exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people,
through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other; Exceptions. ―As an adjunct to the
separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice,
are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court observes that the 2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is
lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to  individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the

18
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to
veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill
presentment.”―A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s
item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x  x x. x x x x (2) The President shall
have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As
stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process; It is meant to
“increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. ”―The justification for
the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the
legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process. In  Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community
against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that
body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design.”

Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be
tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.―What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for
a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further
determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder
some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be
exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter

19
before another office of government ― renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office .―The Court agrees with
petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or
its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation — a matter before another office of government — renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have
been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-President — who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which
is “to make equal the unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given
unto them on the sole account of their office.

Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
16provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. ―“An
appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word “appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply
to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into the law,  demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution “does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may — according to  Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly

20
deemed as a legal appropriation precisely because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations.―It is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators
which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since
it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used.―The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.  As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy
of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective
18and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds
would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO), as defined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
competent authority.” ―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet
to be “released” under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by

21
competent authority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to
pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand,
the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined
from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments.

Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has been issued, public funds should not be
treated as funds which have been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only
covered by obligated Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), and without any corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the
time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.―Unless an NCA
has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013
PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must,  at the time of this Decision’s
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else
the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the
Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released — meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated
but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with.―It must be stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF
Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact
doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66
(2013), the doctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.’”

Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in
the rules within which it operates. ―The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the
final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it

22
 operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of
budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it
has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired  public accountability;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable
local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by
21law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
GUINGONA vs. Constitutional Law; Commission on Appointments; Rule on Proportional Representation;  Conversion of fractional membership of a political
GONZALES party into a whole membership amounting to a reduction of the other party's representation in the Commission on Appointments is a clear
violation of the Constitutional mandate requiring membership therein be based on proportional representation of the political parties.—We find
the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in
accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To
disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a
whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

Same;  Same;  Same;  The proportional representatives of each political party in the Commission on Appointments is based on the actual
number of members of each political party at the time of the election of members therein in recognition of changing political alignments at the
time of its orgarnization.—Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each
political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of
election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona
with the Lakas NUCD upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission
based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Compliance with the rule on proportional representation is held mandatory and must prevail over Constitutional
mandate requiring election of twelve Senators in the Commission which merely indicates maximum complement allowable under the Constitution.
—We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the
Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The
overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the
Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum
complement allowable under the Constitution. x x x This interpretation finds support in the case of  Tañada vs. Cuenco, where this Court held that
the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled
that they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter
mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail.

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 Same;  Same;  Same;  Commission can function even if not fully constituted provided that it has the required quorum. —Even if the
composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required
quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its
business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments
for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of
house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
ARNAULT vs. 1. ; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY. —The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential
NAZARRENO and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

1. 2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY. —The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of
the United States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits by
which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.

1. 3.ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT. —No person can be punished for contumacy as a
witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

1. 4.ID.; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

1. 5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION. —The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is determined by its
direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

1. 6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY. —Where the immateriality of the information sought by the legislative
body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the
legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that
power.

1. 7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION. —Since the Court has no power to determine what
legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which. is material to the subject of
the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or
imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.

1. 8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION.
—There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every session and not to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four
years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution
of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases

24
 where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

1. 9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO ANSWER. —Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.

1. 10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is INCRIMINATORY. —It is not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real
to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general 'Conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may
criminate or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an. imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.

1. 11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN. —It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a
competent authority. His constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When a
specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative,
the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive
him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others

BENGZON vs. Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. —The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
SENATE BLUE conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. xxx the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx, absolute or
RIBBON unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be “in
aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected”. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right
not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.

Same; Same. —As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the
aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the
speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

Same; Judicial power. —It cannot be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes
of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioners’ respective answers thereto, the issue sougth to be
investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been
pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan

25
 would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee’s
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of
the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted. In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.

Same; Rights of accused; Right against self-incrimination. —One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right
against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it
may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. xxx Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Pamaran, the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-
incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
NERI vs. SENATE Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; There is a recognized presumptive
BLUE RIBBON presidential communications privilege; The presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.—Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor
of the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006),  the case relied
upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was
recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 (1998) and Chavez v.
PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the government may withhold
from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters;” and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be
exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official,
such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. —Respondent Committees’
observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the “presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favour of disclosure” arises
from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. Note that the
aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in  Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void Sections
2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the above
discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Obviously, the last sentence of the
above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita  refers to the “exemption” being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O.

26
No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that  when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in
the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive
privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and
in favor of disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,” Defined; The fact that a power is subject to the
concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something,
the concentrated essence of substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit
to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the
power.—The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. “Quintessential” is
defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable” means that a
power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing
foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down in In
re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications
privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by
explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity”
to direct presidential decision-making.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to use—whether the Operational Proximity Test or
the Organizational Test—the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the
President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. —In the case at bar,
the danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because
the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a
member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the
Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President,
not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent
Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. —It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita

27
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for
the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.  Given the confidential nature in which this information
was conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), it was held  that Congress must not require the
Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the
President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire  into
not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that
said questions serve some vague legislative need.—Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily
inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the
pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences
of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can
effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-
making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency; The constitutional right of the people to
information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government.—There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government.
The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to
information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions,
did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of such information covered by executive privilege is a recognized principle in other democratic States. —This Court did not rule that
the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself
has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3)
questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public
interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is
not an absolute right. Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By
their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does

28
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a citizen the
power to exact testimony from government officials.—The right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain
information allegedly in aid of legislation,  not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision
the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), “the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a  subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress” and
“neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong
to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner
Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature’s right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public’s right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a
witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the
expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can only
be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.—It must be clarified that the
Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent
Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent
Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a
whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical
and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. —The need for hard facts in crafting
legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power
to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which
unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the
Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege. —Whatever test we may apply, the
starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard
look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications
privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a
presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor
of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees
to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions
subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before

29
legislative bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. —The presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific
need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought
by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion:  …If respondents
are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or
prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from
proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.   For sure, a factual basis for
situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of
cases by courts of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative
in nature—curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose
of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the
primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their
purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight
function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials,
including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to make
laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged
bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials,
including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make
laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the
Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. —No matter how noble the
intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of
who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to
court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal
guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather
incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and
our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true for our
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.—It is important to stress that complaints relating to

30
the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our
Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty “to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the
Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same
holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in
the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and
witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.

Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling
enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information
related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or
branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling
enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on
graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.

Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at
accurate factual findings to which to apply the law; Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not
subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that “technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings
which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive
questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public
official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or
body.

Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent
Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas to
contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry” along with the “usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the
questions relative to and in furtherance thereof” is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an  obiter dictum. On the contrary, the Court
sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked
Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the potential for
abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function
effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative
inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the “roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880). Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be
covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too
little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry.

Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal
branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. —

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Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”)  are
beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch
of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.

Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they
wish, and this is especially true where what is involved is the contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to benefit
legislative committees—more than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules. —Obviously the
deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by
all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As
a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said
date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the
matter was taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the
witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority
vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of
protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that
respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the
contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the
highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members, but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:  RULE
XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.  All
pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress , but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings,  i.e. unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,  not in the Same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have
a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no
part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with
the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or

32
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed
to sufficiently put public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an
election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin
their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until
they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.

Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void—only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.  

Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of these Executive and Legislative branches
inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect.—On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the
Executive and the Legislature are political branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably
clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is imperative
for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different
branches of government.

Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its
veracity, but the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and the absence
of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out
corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the
Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves
an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and public
accountability. The recent clamor for a “search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a
concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the
political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle
in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people

33
 deserve a more exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
The President has the inherent power to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive
agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence. —As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief
architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with other states
and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains,
and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade,
investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states. As previously discussed, this
constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative
to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence. The existence of this presidential power is so well-
entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise. As expressed below, executive
agreements are among those official governmental acts that can be the subject of this Court’s power of judicial review:  (2) Review, revise,
SAGUISAG vs.
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a)
OCHOA
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Executive Agreements; Words and Phrases; In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), executive agreements are
defined as “international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.”—In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), executive
agreements are defined as “international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.” In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), this Court
further clarified that executive agreements can cover a wide array of subjects that have various scopes and purposes. They are no longer limited
to the traditional subjects that are usually covered by executive agreements as identified in Eastern Sea Trading.
KULAYAN vs. TAN There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic—this means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. —As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
(1939), it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that
when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena: With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-
clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

Same; Calling-Out Powers; By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone.—The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual
basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the
President alone. As noted in Villena, “(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must
be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.

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 Calling-Out Powers; Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding; the calling-
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. —Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power
to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
ESTRADA vs. Presidency;  Resignation;  Resignation is not a high-level legal abstraction—it is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
DESIERTO must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. —The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as
President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic.
Resignation is not a high-level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its  elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Totality Test; Whether erstwhile President Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.—In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the  totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned
as President.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The Court holds that; the resignation of former President Estrada cannot be doubted—it was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang. —In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In
the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any  future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a  future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Former President Estrada’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will, especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. —To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.
The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither
did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter,
despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its
existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being.  Under any circumstance, however, the

35
 mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it
commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will,
especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance
to petitioner’s letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority
over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of
judicial review.—Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His
failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the
case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial
review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
MACALINTAL vs. PET
Same; Statutory Construction; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-
presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.—Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has
filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our
jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the  overarching
framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide
presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
CIVIL LIBERTIES vs. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding
EXECUTIVE other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of
SECRETARY the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII when other provisions of the Constitution on
the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. —Moreover, such intent is underscored by a
comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from
holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, “(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries.” Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides “(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government.”

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public
and private office or employment.—It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In
striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.” In the
latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition imposed on the President

36
 and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President and his official family are proof of the intent of
the 1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.—Going further into Section 13, Article
VII, the second sentence provides: “They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees
such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.—Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it allows Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so.—In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.—Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and
CALDERON vs. Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the “third groups” of
CARALE appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of
the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MATIBAG vs. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
BENIPAYO President once the appointee has qualified into office—the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character.—An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making
it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,

37
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any
time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately; In case of an appointment made by the President when Congress is in session, the President nominates, and
only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office, while with reference to an ad interim
appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. —The Constitution
imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is thus made between
the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it
is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named
assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform
his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ ”

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  The term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.—The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters
of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It
does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the
Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an  ad
interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated: “We have already mentioned that
an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment
extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status
of private respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly
terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and
the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies,
as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.—An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office
becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an  ad interim appointment becomes
complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only
if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal

38
 from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

Same;  Same;  Same;  An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution—first, by the disapproval of
his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment.—An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress
without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of  ad
interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of
the ad interim appointees.

Same;  Same;  Same;  Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the
Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions.—While an ad interim appointment is
permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or
revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly.
This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions,
including the COMELEC.
GONZALES III vs. The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics — they do
OFFICE OF THE not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.—Under the
PRESIDENT Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as “independent.” The extent of the independence enjoyed by these
constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind:  first, the functions performed or the
powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks
and balances. Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics — they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy
fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these “independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure
to the extent that the absence of “independence” would result in the impairment of their core functions.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself.—In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at
risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key
officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents
of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem
for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be

39
 declared void.

Same; The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would
result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very
persons who can remove or suspend its members.—The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the
Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an
absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons
who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the public if the rule were otherwise. A
complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged
from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be
susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of
the Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies
or enter into negotiations; Case at bar.—We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have proved records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers
presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains
ARIAS vs
important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
SANDIGANBAYAN
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement
voucher’s accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of
documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling.
The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he recommended for approval documents for emergency repair and purchase
in the absence of the signature and certification by the end- user, in complete disregard of existing Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds thereby causing undue
REPUBLIC vs. ARIAS injury to the government.—The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he recommended for approval documents for
emergency repair and purchase in the absence of the signature and certification by the end-user, in complete disregard of existing DPWH rules,
constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds thereby causing undue injury to the
government. In sum, this Court finds substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable.
Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by a local government unit to determine if the officials performed
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under
the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control.—Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
DRILON vs. LIM
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He
did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
40
 ARANETA vs.
GATMAITAN
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was
introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).—The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known
as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939). In said case, the
Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of bribery,
extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon
approval by the President of the recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his
suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no specific law granting such
power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court
disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the
DEMEGILLO vs. Secretary of Interior.
TIDCORP
Same; Same; The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter
egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President
unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.—The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official
duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact
that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive
Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
HONTIVEROS vs. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act
REGULATORY personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
BOARD presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter.—The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters
on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised
through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the
latter. As explained in Villena v. Executive Secretary, 67 Phil. 451 (1939), this doctrine is rooted in the Constitution: x  x x With reference to the
Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the
President’s bosom confidence,” and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, “are subject to the direction of the President.” Without
minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, “each head of a department is, and
must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.” Secretaries of
departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control
and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive

41
 Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts;
he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries.

Same; Same; There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter.—There can be no
question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC
Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the
President, on 24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB.
Presidential Immunity from Suit; The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for prohibition is directed not against
the President himself but against his subordinates; Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.—Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is
improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Petitioners’ contention
GLORIA vs. CA
is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of
petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

SAMIO vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
LAGMAN vs. Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is determined solely by
MEDIALDEA the President, while the extension of the declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved by Congress.—Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that “the President x x x may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.” From the foregoing, it is clear that the President’s declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is effective for 60 days. As aptly described by Commissioner Monsod, “this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates.” Any extension thereof should be determined by Congress. The act of
declaring martial law and/or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President, however, is separate from the approval of the
extension of the declaration and/or suspension by Congress. The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
is determined solely by the President, while the extension of the declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved
by Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Sufficiency of Factual Basis; The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion
or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion.—We held that “the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.” Moreover, we stated in the assailed Decision that “the phrase ‘sufficiency of factual basis’ in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President’s power to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Requiring the Court to determine the accuracy of the factual basis of the President
contravenes the Constitution as Section 18, Article VII only requires the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis. Accuracy is not the
same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of standard.

42
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than
not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. —“The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence
showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.” The standard of proof of probable cause does not require
absolute truth. Since “martial law is a matter of urgency x x x the President x x x is not expected to completely validate all the information he
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Notably, out of the several facts advanced by the
President as basis for Proclamation No. 216, only five of them were being questioned by the petitioners. However, they were not even successful
in their refutation since their “counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor
the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the
circumstances proved futile.” Even granting that the petitioners were successful in their attempt to refute the aforesaid five incidents, there are
other facts sufficient to serve as factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
FORTUN vs.
ARROYO
KULAYAN vs. TAN
MONSATO vs Pardon, Effects of; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
FACTORAN relinquished or forfeited by reason of such conviction. —Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the
privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The pardon granted to petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment, but
to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.—For petitioner Monsanto, this is
the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction. And in considerins her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and
should be evaluated and considered to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability, Extinction Of; The pardon granted to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime
she has been convicted of.—Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence.
The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights
of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of Pardon; Petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal when she accepted the pardon granted to her.—
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be
given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth
mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the
present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having
43
 accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality.
Absolute disqualification from office forms part of punishment prescribed under the Penal Code; Although pardon restores a person’s eligibility to
a public office, it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement.—-In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute
disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees
the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a
SABELLO vs. DECS
public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
Administrative Law; Reinstatement of employee as Principal I, as no circumstances warrant diminution in his rank.—As there are no circumstances
that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I
and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.
PALATINO vs.
PELOBELLO
SAGUISAG vs.
OCHOA
BELGICA vs. OCHOA

44