Boyce v Brown

Issue: Whether negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon by reason of his departure from the
proper standard of practice, be established by expert medical testimony.

Facts: In 1927 Boyce (P) saw Dr. borwn (D) to reduce a fracture in her ankle. An operation was
performed by which the bone fragments were positioned and secured by use of a metal screw placed in
the bone. D continued to see P until recover was apparent. In 1934, P returned to D complaining of
swelling. He taped the ankle and filed the edge of her arch support which had worn sharp. After
removing the tape the pain and swelling got worse. In 1936 P saw Dr. Kent who found discoloration and
swelling. An x-ray showed necrosis of the bone around the screw which Dr. Kent removed. Recovery
was complete. P alleged that D was negligent in failing to take an x-ray. Dr. Kent testified as to what
was proper in 1936 and was unable to express an opinion as to her condition in 1934. Directed verdict
given to D and P appealed on the basis of D’s failure to x-ray, which was argued to be negligence
inferable by a layman.

Rule: Negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon, by reason of his departure from the proper
standard of practice, must be established by expert medical testimony, unless the negligence is so
grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty in recognizing it.

Reasoning: YES) Negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon, by reason of his departure from the
proper standard of practice, must be established by expert medical testimony unless the negligence is so
grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty recognizing it. P did not go back in 34 she
waited 2 years before seeing Dr. Kent. No evidence showed whether the screw should have been
removed prior to 36 or whether earlier removal would have been justifiable. Dr. Kent also said that he
might have suspected arthritis had P came to him in 34 and would have taken an x-ray . The failure to
taken an x-ray isn’t negligence which is so obvious an appropriate means of diagnosis. AFFIRMED.
Morrison v MacNamara

Issue: whether the standard of care applicable to board certified physicians, hospitals, medical
laboratories, and other health care providers measured by the national standard of care?

Facts: Morrison (P) reported to MacNamara (D) a nationally certified med. Lab. For a urethral smear test
for trichomonas. Test was administered while Morrison was standing. P had a reaction to the test and
fainted, suffering serious injuries. P sued D contending that there was negligence in administering the
test to him while he was standing. He sought to introduce the testimony of an expert witness to testify
that the standard of care nationally was to administer the test while the patient was either sitting or
lying down. Ct refused to allow the testimony but allowed testimony presented by D from local Drs that
the test was always administered in the area with the patient standing. P appealed from the ruling
arguing that since D was nationally certified it should be held to a national standard.

Rule: The standard of care applicable to board certified physicians, hospitals, medical labs, and other
health care providers is measured by the national standard of care.

Reasoning: YES. The standard of care applicable to board cert etc is measured by national standard of
care. The locality rule was premised on notions of disparity and access to advances in medical science
between urban and rural areas. This jurisdiction has no relevance to this, and may serve to foster
substandard medical care by judging conduct against other practitioners in the community. (no loner
valid)
Scott v Bradford

Issue: Whether a doctor must disclose sufficient info to a patient so as to enable him to make an
informed decision regarding a proposed medical treatment?

Facts: Scott (P) developed complications following surgery performed by Bradford (D). She sued D in
malpractice, contending he failed to advise her as to the risks involved in her surgery or for alternative
methods for treatment. She asserted that had she been so advised, she would have refused the surgery
and thus avoided the resultant complications. The case was submitted to the jury, which was advised in
broad terms of the physician’s duty to disclose. A verdict for D was returned, and (P) appealed.
Claiming the jury instructions had been erroneously framed.

Rule: A dr is under legal obligation to disclose sufficient info to a patient to enable him to make sure an
informed decision regarding a proposed medical treatment.

Reasoning: YES. Doctrine of informed consent, which prohibits a physical from substituting his
judgment for that of the patient regarding treatment of the patient’s medical problems. The dr must
adequately apprise the patient of all potential risks ad consequences of a proposed procedure so that
she may properly determine for herself whether she wishes to undergo surgery.
Patient must prove:
1. Dr. failed to inform her adequately of a material risk before securing her consent to the proposed
treatment
2. Had she been informed of the risks she would not have consented to the treatment
3. The non-disclosed risk of injury did in fact occur.
-found 1 and 3 jury didn’t believe about 2.
Moore v The Regents of U Cali

Issue: Whether a Dr. has a duty to disclose to a patient intended research connected to the patient’s
treatment?

Facts: Moore (P) was treated at UCLA Med Center for leukemia. Golde (D) was his treating physician.
Tests revealed that Ps tissues had certain unique properties that made it valuable in genetic engineering
research. Without informing P of this area of inquiry D removed various tissues over a span of several
years, including blood and his spleen. D largely as a result of this research, obtained certain biomedical
patents potentially worth large sums of money. P later brought a suit claiming a proprietary interest in
his tissues, as well as conversion, trespass, and breach of fiduciary duty. Tl ct dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Ct of appeals affirmed and the Cali Sp Ct granted review.

Rule: A Dr. has a duty to disclose to a patient intended research connected to the patient’s treatment.

Reasoning: YES. A physician has a duty to disclose to a patient intended research connected to the
patient’s treatment. As an inherent ancillary to a patient’s right to control his own body, a patient has
the right to make an informed choice in decided whether to consent to treatment. When a physician
has a pecuniary interest in the treatment, the patient has a right to know. This may influence a Dr’s
decisions regarding treatment, and the patient should be allowed to consider this possible conflict of
interest in deciding whether to consent to treatment. Failure on the part of D to disclose his research
and financial interest in Ps cells constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, if proved. REVERSED.

Pokora v Wabash Ry Co

Issue: Whether Pokora’s failure to get out of the car and walk forward to look down the track before
driving forward contributory negligence as a matter of law?

Facts: Pokora (P) drove a truck up to a RR crossing where Wabash Ry Co (D) had 4 tracks. B/c of boxcars
on the 1st track, P could NOT see the tracks to the north. He stopped looked and listened but heard
nothing. He didn’t get out of his truck to walk forward and look down the tracks. As he drove slowly
onto the main track he was struck by a train coming from the north. The trial ct took the case from the
jury and granted a directed verdict for the Wabash Ry (D). on the ground that Ps conduct was
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The case was affirmed by the Circuit Ct of Appeals the Sp Ct
granted certiorari.

Rule: Unless reasonable minds could NOT differ on the point the standard by which negligence is
measured is for the jury to decided. Failure to get out of a vehicle and look before crossing a railroad
track is not contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Reasoning: No. It is for the jury to decide whether a Ps conduct is contributory negligence unless the
conduct is so obviously negligent that reasonable minds couldn’t differ on the point. What is safe varies
and it is up to the jury to decided whether a particular conduct is safe for the particular situation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Osborne v McMasters

Issue: Whether violation of a duty imposed by statute constitute negligence per se?

Facts: Osborne’s P intestate bought a deadly poison from McMasters (D) clerk, who was acting within
the course of his employment at a drug store. The clerk sold the poison without labeling it poison
although a statute made it a crime to do so. The object of the statute was to protect the public. P
claimed that a statute imposes a specific duty, and that one who neglects to perform the duty is liable to
those for whose protection or benefit the duty was imposed. D claimed that since no CL duty to label
poison existed, failure to label according to statute was not conclusive evidence of negligence in a civil
action arising from a CL right.

Rule: When a statute imposes a legal duty, violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of
negligence, i.e. negligence per se.

Reasoning: YES. Where a statute or ordinance imposes on any person a specific duty for the protection
or benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is liable to those for whose protection or
benefit it was imposed for any injuries which the statute was designed to prevent and which were
proximately caused by such neglect. Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the
duty is imposed by the CL or by statute. The Statute establishes a fixed standard by which the fact of
negligence may be determined. Here, the master is civilly liable for the negligence of his servant
committed in the course of his employment and resulting in injuries to the 3 rd persons. AFFIRMED.

Stachniewicz v Mar-Cam Corp

Issue: Whether a violation of a statute or regulation constitute negligence as a matter of law when
violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation
and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was intended to prevent?

Facts: A barroom fight erupted when American Indian patrons, sitting in a booth next to the table where
Stachniewicz (P) was seated with friends, were apparently offended by the refusal of one of the friends,
were apparently offended by the refusal of one of the friends to permit his wife to dance with one of the
Indians who was intoxicated. Before the fight the bartender who had received complaints about insults
from the Indians, warned Ps friends not to start any trouble with them. When cops arrived Indians ran
out a door with one of the friends in pursuit. The friend found P lying just outside, his feet wedging the
door open. He suffered retrograde amnesia and couldn’t recall how he got there. P contended that D
violated state regulations against serving liquor to visibly intoxicated persons on the premises. When
the Tr Ct didn’t find D action negligence per se, P appealed.

Rule: A violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when violation
results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation and
when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was intended to prevent.

Reasoning:
Ney v Yellow Cab Co.

Issue: Whether the violation of a statute designed to protect the public safety constitute prima facie
evidence of negligence?

Facts: A driver for Yellow Cab (D) left his taxi unattended with the key in the ignition. The cab was
subsequently stolen and involved in an accident in which Ney (P) was injured. P brought suit against
Yellow Cab for the negligence of its employee. He alleged that negligence was proven by the fact that
the cabdriver’s action in leaving his car unattended with the key in the ignition was in violation of Article
XIV, 92 of the Illinois Uniform Traffic Act. Tl Ct found for P upon jury verdict, and the ct of appeals
affirmed. D appealed, arguing that the statute in question was intended as a traffic regulation only and
therefore couldn’t give rise to liability.

Rule: The violation of a statute designed to protect the b=public safety constitutes prima facie evidence
of negligence.

Reasoning: YES.