PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It
has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.

2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. — Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It
is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. — In case of doubt, the Constitution
should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law,
1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING
PROVISIONS. — Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left
to the legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING IN ANOTHER. —
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference
to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTING. — Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL, RESOURCES AND CULTURAL, HERITAGE. — When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST POLICY PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN
SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A STATE ACTION, SUBJECT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a" public function", (2) when the government is
so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and. (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.

10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE AND
GOVERNMENT. — When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.
It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY. — In the instant case, where a
foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF
BID. — The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos
and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly,
only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.

13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE
PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has
already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OR THE
LAWS. — While it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of
whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or
are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution
in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, CONSTRUED. — A study of the 1935 Constitution, where
the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the natural resources of
the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible
and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They
knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative
factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony.
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played
an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does,
as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.

2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is
very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit
from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries.
celebrities, and others.

3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO SALES OF SHARE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL. —
"Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It
must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain
to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a
non-Filipino, the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which
case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified
Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder
is to be significant at all. While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and
make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for
instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and
Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of
Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our
historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION GIVING PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,
SELF-EXECUTORY. — The provision in our fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-
executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of
rules.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE COUNTRY; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED THEREIN. —
The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical
landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; SALE OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, AN ACT OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. — The act of the
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51%
of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; DOES NOT REFER TO
ALLOWING QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO MATCH FOREIGN BID. — On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified
Filipinos" I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular
case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid
for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with
another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which
alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; FILIPINO BIDDERS SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. — I take the view that in
the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that" [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow
petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares
of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be given
preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or
corporation. Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian
firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"
so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder,
that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what "preference to qualified
Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF;
SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution should
be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which
ordain — "The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19),
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution
Commission proceedings. The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution. I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and
tradition are not legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture
and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for
almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where
profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people. The Filipino should be first under his Constitution and in his own
land.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE SELF-EXECUTING. — A Constitution provides the
guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and government.
As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. Some of its provisions,
however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing. Courts as a
rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement.
The reason is not difficult to discern For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by
the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule
that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT MERELY ANNOUNCES A POLICY AND EMPOWERS THE
LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS TO CARRY THE POLICY INTO EFFECT. — Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a
constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to
prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.

3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT SELF-EXECUTING. — The first paragraph directs Congress
to reserve certain areas of investments in the country to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent of whose capital stock
is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one
hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third
paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities. The first
paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws
restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of
wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.

4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS UNDER PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF SECTION 10,
ARTICLE 12, SELF-EXECUTING. — The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State
and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader for
they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely
"certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by
law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy
and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — The second issue is whether the
sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According
to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.
By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony.

6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. — The third issue is whether the constitutional command
to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government.
The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. They are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS.
Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees. The GSIS is
not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve
a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. As a state-
owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those
designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.

7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED IN ALL LEGISLATIONS AND ALL STATE ACTIONS. — The
constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word
"laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and regulations
adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making power.

8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; STATE NOT PROHIBITED FROM GRANTING
RIGHTS TO FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — In the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not
prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In
that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred. It is with deep regret that
I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be
supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right.
Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block
of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It deserves the award as a matter of right for
the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the
rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the
latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even
if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the
right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and
strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE WINNING BID OF FOREIGN FIRM FROM
BEING AWARE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO RESPECT. — I submit that petitioner is
estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It
knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an
inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner
cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and
disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence of bidding.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; LOSING FILIPINO NOT
GIVEN RIGHT TO EQUAL THE HIGHEST FOREIGN BID. — The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean
that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid,
and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no
law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid
and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained interpretation, I
respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can
lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines! Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial
legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. In the absence of a law
specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified
Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing
him and without being unfair to the foreigner. In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when
the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to
provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/ reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or
the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other
Qualified Bidders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .
. 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The
case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus,
any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably
part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the
bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. 8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited
in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not
make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.chanrobles

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if
the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise
of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should
fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to
enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
"PREFERENCE" is given to "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos
who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (Emphasis supplied by respondents).
MR RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide
a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around
the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first
and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building, 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on
the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the
promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only
our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World War
II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces
returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their
final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE.

I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

MR. MONSOD.

Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-
percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE.

The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD.

At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE.

Is that the intention?

MR MONSOD.

Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE.

I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities
or entities.

MR. MONSOD.

We agree, Madam President. 39

x x x

MR. RODRIGO.

Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO.

The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by
the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.
40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ.

Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO.

"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.

MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes."cralaw virtua1aw library

MR. FOZ.

Thank you. 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR NOLLEDO.

Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified
by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the
FILIPINO FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions. . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to
the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential
treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner"
and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."cralaw virtua1aw library

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the
qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is
that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory
and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the
government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts —
provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of
the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State.
After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in
the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid.
In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of
the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was
well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners
alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino
fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after
it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would
rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it
is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the
Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the
executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Court’s First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here."cralaw virtua1aw library

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to
or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate
the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there
is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing
in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot override the
demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a
historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking
about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of
the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping
of a country. 51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this
Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche
to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul
for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can
be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will
vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved
and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain
and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit more on the concept of
national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified Filipinos have the
preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point states:

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos." 1

Petitioner’s argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural
resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. 2 A study of the 1935
Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the
natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as
well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through
development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of
their national patrimony. 3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. 4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our
nation’s history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest
House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel L. Quezon once said, we
must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so with an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In
other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve
it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for
nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not make
the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment." 6 To
quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them
what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and encumbrances." 7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that
are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public
bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified
Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified
Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino
bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country, stress is on the
elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government agencies, including the courts should
re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet
we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage
are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the
Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our
national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in a well written
separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that" (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily
does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A
"historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine
heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the
State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path
traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems,
would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally
calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of
preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown that it did not deserve, by a
simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed
transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at times is seen to, instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which
create the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the Petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that" [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1
is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the
controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation
can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign
national or corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had
offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so
that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder,
that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me, is what "preference to qualified
Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of
public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were
not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance.
Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the
statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the
issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the preference granted under the statute
was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even
if there were available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a
conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to
preference immediately arises." 8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in America to realize the
promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination
against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting and licensing. 9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the
Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the country of the benefit of
foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trades or common means of livelihood which are open to
aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government largess or benefits. In the
words of Art. XII, sec. 10, we are dealing here with "rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy" and
therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the
Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in
the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be trading competence and
capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified, having hurdled the pre-qualification process. 12 It
is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after
it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is minimum bid required (P36.67 per share for a
range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity,
after passing the pre-qualification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign
firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least,
fanciful and has no basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., concurring:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are confronted in the case at bar with legal and
constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural aspect within the
meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nation."

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides :

x x x

"In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national goals and priorities."

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

"The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy, effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution
Commission proceedings, thus:

"MR. NOLLEDO.

The Amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by
the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III,
Records of the Constitutional, p. 608)
MR. MONSOD.

We also wanted to add, as Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this body already approved what is known as the
Filipino First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:

"MR. NOLLEDO.

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.

MR. FOZ.

In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipino enterprise shall be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Obviously.

MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO.

The answer is "yes" (Vol. III p. 616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have not reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest
cases, this Court said —

"The ‘nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be said that a law
imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or
unconstitutional (Ichong, Et. Al. v. Hernandez, Et Al., 101 Phil. 1155)."

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of events, customs,
usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul
of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too
numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal largesse which have given
rise to the controversy, as I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the
history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the
cherished historical values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the words of philosopher Salvador
de Madarriaga, (tradition) is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and one must view the flow in both directions. If you
look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people
towards the future; if you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not jettison the tradition of the
Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course, that men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he makes mistakes." On this note,
I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the belief that the Filipino is first under his Constitution and
in his own land.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic corporation, to stop the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila Hotel which it operates
through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in the privatization program of the government.
In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in
the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was
increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was
required to "provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel." 1 The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on
Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where pre-qualification documents and the bidding rules were furnished interested parties.
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, pre-
qualified. 2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Pre-qualification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization" provide:

"I. INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded
the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995.

x x x

IV. GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAY APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing
reservation, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS
is inviting to the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at
least one of the following qualifications:

a. Proven management expertise in the hotel industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to the requisite management expertise and/or
international marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

x x x

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

x x x

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation to the Prequalification and Bidding Conference

x x x

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the
Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The Applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the assistance of the TEC based on the Information Package and other
information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of the group, taking
into account the contribution of each member to the venture

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the criteria set forth below:

a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels
International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the Public Bidding without having to undergo the
prequalification process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at
the date specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by a member whose qualification was a material consideration
for being included in the shortlist is a ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock, representing Thirty
Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by
the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the option of determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The range
is intended to attract bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid required on a price per share basis for the Block of
Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form
must be properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase
price, in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH)

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which
adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with full authority to perform such acts
necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the Consortium/Joint Venture should submit a Board
resolution authorizing one of its members and such member’s representative to make the bid on behalf of the group with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos (P33,000.00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the
form of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. Manager’s check or unconditional demand draft payable to the "Government Service Insurance System" and issued by a
reputable banking institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if :

i. The bid does not have a Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than the required amount

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid
Security will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment
on the Qualified Bidder’s offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not
declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of contract specified
by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and
executing the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of contract specified
by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area

Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should be
submitted in a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No
bid shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of
submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These
boxes will be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient
documents or document/s which is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope
containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its
bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be determined on a price per share basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the
same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose
the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/
Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If
the Highest Bidder is intending to provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be distributed to
each of the Qualified Bidder after the prequalification process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management Contract are as follows :

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating profit (1) after deducting undistributed overhead expenses and the
basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of gross room revenues.(1)
The Applicant should indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with
the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the management
fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in accordance with the equivalent price per share of
their respective bids in the Public Bidding, i.e. first and second priority will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the
second and third highest bids on the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later
than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after deducting the Bid Security applied as
downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s Check or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the
"Government Service Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such
application as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require the submission
of any additional information from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public
bidding under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to
return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission of
the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior
to the respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the
Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless from any liability, suit or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the
Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding." 3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for 15,300,000 shares and
Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and
immediately returned petitioner’s bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of Renong Berhad.
It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a
manager’s check for thirty-three million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of the contract and technical
agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner’s request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution 4 on the "National Economy and
Patrimony" which provides:

"x x x

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.

x x x"

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over
and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built
the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-
executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only
through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of
the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion
and enforcement. 7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question. 8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as requiring future legislation for
their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the
ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not
suffocate them. 12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, 13 the rights of a
person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 16 It is
recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy
and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. 19
Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies"
should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of
Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-
executing or not. It reads:

"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall
enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities."

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to Filipino citizens or to
corporations sixty per cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will
encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the
national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our
national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact
laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of
wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the
right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27
The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we upheld
the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first
paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is
but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond
debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to
qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not
suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article
XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section
19 provides that" [T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It
engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of
our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view
as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision
giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the
Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and
centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the
American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous
materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and
Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries.
Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served
as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the
Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos
alike. Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were housed
in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic
meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and
awards from international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These
are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not
exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No 486, "he Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely
provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important
cultural property." 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot
be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate
cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal
that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of
government employees and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. 35 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and
other ventures for the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the GSIS’ investment in the Manila Hotel
Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by
Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service
Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the
policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these
policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their "preferential right." The
Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and
principles which can be bent to meet today’s manifest needs and tomorrow’s unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung
with elasticity can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo brushed aside a suggestion to define the
phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation,
viz:

"x x x

THE PRESIDENT.

What is the suggestion of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO.

No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or the prospective laws
will always lay down conditions under which business may be done, for example, qualifications on capital, qualifications or the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO.

It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes.

MR. RODRIGO.

If we say, "PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against
Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO.

Madam President, that was the intention of the proponents. The committee has accepted the amendment.

x x x"

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to
Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include
applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making
power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the, standards to measure the qualifications of bidders
Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino,
over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing
the bid, this right of preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission. I prescind from the premise that the second paragraph of section 10,
Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not,
however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-makers is
to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to
serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and
circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to
Filipinos and vice versa.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any given time is addressed
to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department
of our government, other branches of government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this
state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right
of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our
duty is to strike down acts of the State that violate the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules
and regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is
entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on
the degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to
mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is
deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them
from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can
not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded the block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS
and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner
cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longitude of the
right of preference as defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on a galaxy of facts and factors
whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to
respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must
uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the
right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules
and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during
the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the
rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on the essence of bidding.
Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its
capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners
participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are
prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the
parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner the privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it.
For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the
greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto’s counsel as a
state policy and our decision should be in sync with this policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a
Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the
Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must
be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against
unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, may I just add:
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing
Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2),
Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference.
Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
absence of such empowering law, the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial
legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the
Philippines!

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely
prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other countries — in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed
retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat
the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with
absolutely no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago
found out that unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional
preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino
ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame
is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 78059. August 31, 1987.]

 ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and
JOSE M. RESURRECCION, Petitioners, v. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the
Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ,
and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY OF THE PLEBISCITE. — The main
issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the
plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per
Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution
should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their
votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was
withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very
day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court’s
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in unanimously approving
(by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass
thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION; TENURE OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES; ONE YEAR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO
DESIGNATE SUCCESSOR SHORTENED BY THE RATIFICATION AND EFFECTIVITY ON FEBRUARY 2, 1987 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
— The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification
in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be
deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date,
February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen.
Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor’s designation on February 8, 1987 of their
successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period
expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the
ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been
otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory
provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by
the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their
respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of
Rizal.chanrobles law library

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner’s their Reply to respondents’
Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other
petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of
1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local
Government."cralaw virtua1aw library

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta, Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members
of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of
which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x       x       x

"That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

"That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed
as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the
Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

"That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8, 1987;

"That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9, 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

"Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987."cralaw virtua1aw library

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents
be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain
that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (8P Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which
shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to
June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has
the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986,
which provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986."cralaw virtua1aw library

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6)
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution.chanrobles law library

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may
continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1 

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term
of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace
petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the
effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions."cralaw virtua1aw library

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must
be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2,
Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982
declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities." 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President’s power to "general supervision" over local
governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constutution further provides in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided
for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay
officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal
force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners’ positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that
the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed
per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court’s decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section
27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on that same date.

The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at the
Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view
that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court’s judgment. It shows that
the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in
favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the
votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow:1 

"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section
12, unless there are other commissioners who would like to present amendments.

"MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

"MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.

On line 2, delete the words ‘its ratification’ and in lieu thereof insert the following: ‘THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT
THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED.’ And on the last time, after ‘constitutions,’ add the following: ‘AND THEIR AMENDMENTS.’
"MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence, the
committee would suggest that we take up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready
to comment on that proposed amendment.

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words ‘its ratification’ and in lieu thereof insert the words ‘THE PROCLAMATION
BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED.’ And the second amendment would be: After the word ‘constitutions,’ add the
words ‘AND THEIR AMENDMENTS.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot accept the second proposed
amendment after the word ‘constitutions’ because the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions,
necessarily it includes ‘AND THEIR AMENDMENTS.’

"MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, I will not insist on the second. But, Madam President, may I request that I be allowed to
read the second amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.

"MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: ‘THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE.’

"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee feels that the second proposed
amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for
us to impose a time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam President, in the approved
Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be faithfully
complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President that the
Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisions in the Article on
the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within which she will make
that declaration. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed
by the COMELEC.

Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.

"MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the
results by the President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.

"MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.

"FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

"FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment which makes the effectivity of the new
Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date
of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976
when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon
the proclamation of the President was that the draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the
proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway
on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President
since this will be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the
COMELEC who should make the announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should
be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?

"FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be
ratified.

"FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite,
the people exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested
amendment which says: ‘THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED,’ what would be, in clear terms,
the date when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?

"FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. If the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for
instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.

"MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections
which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial, Madam President.

"FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because ‘ratification’ is the act of saying ‘yes’ is done when one casts his ballot.

"MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?

"FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from the proponent, Commissioner
Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot subscribe to the view of Commissioner
Bernas that the date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of
reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters. Actually
and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the canvass conducted by
the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body which will make
the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon the completion
of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the President.

x          x           x

"MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

"MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President.

I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the
casting of the ‘yes’ votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution. The announcement merely confirms the
ratification even if the results are released two or three days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in
civil law, because an announcement is a mere confirmation. The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is
the date of the ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation; that proclamation will merely confirm the
act of ratification.

Thank you, Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?.

"MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because the
canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Pilipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

"MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.

"MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the effectivity of the Constitution.
Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon
the approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide amendment.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

"MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the Commission on Elections to declare
the results of the canvass?.

"FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the results.

"MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commission on Elections has declared the results of the
canvass, will there be a necessity for the President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?

"FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been
ratified or not.

"FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be immaterial because under the law, the
administration of all election laws is under an independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.

"MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.

"FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission on Elections says, it would have no
effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is
that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day
has 24 hours. So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous midnight.

So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the results of the canvass by the
COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
"FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

"MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.

"MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

"MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of
Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date of ratification that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite
date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.

Thank you.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

"MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.

"Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or the President, would announce that a
majority of the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes
effect, apart from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides that a constitution
becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast, although I would not say from the very beginning of the date
of election because as of that time it is impossible to determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the day of election or
plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time — the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a
date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified and therefore, effective.

"THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.

"MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view of
Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote,
have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third
person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on the date of ratification but it
retroacts from the date the contract was executed.

Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in
favor of the Constitution.

"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

"THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

"MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on his amendment.

"MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day of the
plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies — the Office of the President or
the COMELEC — will make the formal announcement of the results.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the committee.

"MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original committee report as Section 12.

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

We ask for a vote, Madam President.

VOTING

"THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)

The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved." 2 

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in
the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed
to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February
2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor’s designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer
produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987
within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on
February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so
provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of
Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the
convening of the first Congress, etc.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices,
71 provincial fiscals and 65 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious
questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement
thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date
of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven
Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were all appointed on or before January
31, 1987. 3 (Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of
provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were made on
January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record that since February 2,
1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar
Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as
now expressly declared by the Court.

CRUZ, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the tones of thunder.
She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la
Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having
acquired security of tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on
February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the
new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponencia completely.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With due respect to the majority, I register this dissent.

While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution with respect to the
tenure of government functionaries, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.chanrobles law library : red

was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period began on
February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind, the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to Proclamation No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.

I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained, and
not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Constitution was ratified
during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, yet determined.

Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take this view.

I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987, the government performed acts that would have been valid
under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the
appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended
on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, as follows:chanrobles law library

x          x           x

Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.

x          x           x

Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

x          x           x

such appointments could be open to serious questions.

Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the amendments thereto from
the date it is proclaimed ratified.

In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17, 1973, the date
Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further
to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary. 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding
Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty-five and an
amendments thereto.

On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the ratification of the 1976
amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16-17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter alia, that.

By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this certificate as duly ratified
by the Filipino people in the referendum-plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in full force and effect
as of this date.

It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.

On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by the Filipino People of
the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and justices). The
Proclamation provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together with the
election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.

It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take effect on the date
the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.

On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the
Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force
and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said amendments duly approved, further declared them" [e]ffective and in full
force and in effect as of the date of this Proclamation." It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. 1 and 2
of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the
same:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.

On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or Rejection, the
Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its
Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefor," provides, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shall canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates
submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.

We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the Amendments
to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the
amendments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.

It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643). which states,
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have been
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval
of the amendments.

albeit Resolutions Nos. 106, 111, and 113 provide, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution, as amended.

That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite
is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.

The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act
No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on April 9, 1947. The
April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive application.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacañang
Palace:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the
Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4 

the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.

I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was ratified on February
2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing - we did not resolve the case on
account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life on-February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call
for its reexamination.

I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done on February 8,
1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]

RESTITUTO YNOT, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED

NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, Respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike — but hear me first!’" It is this
cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

The said executive order reads in full as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and.

"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.

"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines" 

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued
for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could
no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2 

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now
come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4 

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there
was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they
are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6
We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality
of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may
be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the
path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise
the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation,
or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead
of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed
or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of
any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity
of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President
"in his judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this
matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to
avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate
it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman
of the Committee on the Pill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10 

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the
due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves
in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever
indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained
by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter
of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process - and in so doing sums it all up — as
nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." 12 

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not
proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the
land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free
society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing
reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have
his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the
other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in
contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct
ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less
that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or
ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that
the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14
as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so
if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would
degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the
interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect
the general welfare from a clear and present danger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion
of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and
eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is
born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its
reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification
is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued
for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be
conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a
measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme
Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their
number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore,
because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned
statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . . 

"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was
required by `the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class’ and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
`reasonably necessary’ limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals
by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man’s tractor, so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the
basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals,
again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are
at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say
with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but
on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could
be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to
be flippant, dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding
the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly
taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases
accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded
all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order
No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice,
which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall
they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit,
and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is
not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively
valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to
execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity.
We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.chanrobles law library : red

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights,
as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44007             March 20, 1991

THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, EASTERN EXTENSION AUSTRALASIA and CHINA TELEGRAPH COMPANY, LTD.,respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenges the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals dated February
18, 1976 in CTA Case No. 2498 entitled "Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue." The dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed from is reversed. Respondent's income
tax assessment of P21,523,288.37 issued against the petitioner is hereby cancelled and declared to be without any legal force
and-effect. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 71)

Petitioner also seeks annulment of the Resolution dated June 18, 1976 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
abovementioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 1976 to be without sufficient legal and valid
justification, the same has to be, as it is hereby, DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 99)

From the records, the antecedents facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent, Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co., Ltd. is a foreign corporation, organized and existing
under the laws of Great Britain and is engaged in international telecommunications. By a Royal Decree of the Spanish
Government dated March 30, 1898, petitioner was given a concession for the construction, operation and maintenance of
submarine telegraph cable from Hongkong to Manila.

On June 21, 1952, when the concession expired, Republic Act No. 808 was approved granting to respondent corporation a
legislative franchise "to land, construct, maintain and operate at Manila in the Philippines a submarine telegraph cable connecting
Manila with Hongkong." Section 8 thereof granted to the Corporation a tax exemption from the payment of an taxes whether
municipal, provincial, or national except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and the tax on its real property. Thus —

Sec. 8. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the Grantee shall pay to the Republic of the Philippines
during the life of this franchise a tax of five percent of the gross earnings derived by the grantee from its operation under this
franchise and which originate in the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable annually, within ten (10) days after the audit
and approval of the accounts as prescribed in Section seven of this Act, and shall be in lieu of all taxes of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or Republic Authority except that the Grantee shall pay
the tax on its real property in conformity with existing law.  (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 180)

On May 2, 1967, Republic Act No. 808 was amended by Republic Act No. 5002 by enlarging the scope of the franchise granting
respondent corporation a franchise to land, construct, maintain and operate telecommunications by cable or other means known
to science or which in the future may be developed for the transmission of messages between any point in the Philippines to
points exterior thereto.
Respondent corporation, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 808 which was not amended by Republic Act
No. 5002, had duly reported its gross Philippine earnings and paid the corresponding franchise tax thereon beginning the year
1952 to the General Auditing office.

The controversy commenced on November 25, 1971 when petitioner assessed private respondent in the amount of
P7,122,571.61, representing private respondent's deficiency income tax, inclusive of surcharges, interests and penalties thereon
for the years 1965 to 1970. It is obvious that petitioner made its assessment in view of its belief that respondent corporation's
franchise under Republic Act No. 808, later amended by Republic Act No. 5002 is inoperative for failure of the latter to conform
with the constitutional requirement that it be organized under Philippine laws with 60% of its capital owned by Filipinos. The
provision of Section 8, Art. XIV of the 1935 Constitution provides as follows:

Art. XIV. Sec. 8. — No franchise, certificate or any other forms of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizen of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines
sixty  per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any
individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the public interest so requires. (Rollo, p. 58)

Petitioner contends that since private respondent is 100% owned by British citizens, it is illegally operating its business in the
Philippines it being a fact that private respondent is engaged in the operation of a public utility. Private respondent through
counsel questioned and disputed this assessment by means of two letters dated 17 and 18 January 1972. The letter questioned
petitioner's authority to assess income taxes against private respondent pointing out the franchise and its exclusive tax feature.
It contends further that the assessment is incorrect and without basis and that prescription had set in on part of the assessment
assuming that the assessment is valid.

Petitioner in a letter dated February 28, 1973, rejected the private respondent's position and declared that the Office of the
Commissioner finds no reason to withdraw much more cancel its assessment and even reassessed the private respondent not
only from 1965 to 1970 but from 1952 to 1971 in the aggregate amount of P21,523,288.37 representing deficiency income
taxes, inclusive of surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.

On March 13, 1973, private respondent filed with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review contesting the
legality of the assessment dated February 28, 1973 with prayer for a restraining order directing the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to desist from enforcing and collecting the same.

In the meanwhile, President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated on July 24, 1974 Presidential Decree No. 489 authorizing the
herein respondent corporation to transfer and assign the franchise granted to it under Republic Act No. 808 as amended by
Republic Act No. 5002, to the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Thereabout, respondent corporation transferred its
franchise to Eastern Telecommunications, Inc. a duly organized corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines with at
least 60% of its capital owned by Filipino citizens.
On February 18, 1976, public respondent rendered the assailed decision. While holding the franchise as unconstitutional, public
respondent declared the petitioner's assessment as cancelled and without any legal force and effect, the "ratio decidendi" being
that the assessment was made beyond the prescribed period required by the Tax Code; and that the assessment which is
tantamount to a revocation of the Tax on Franchise under Section 259 (now sec. 117) of the Tax Code cannot be given
retroactive effect pursuant to the provisions of Section 338- A (now Section 246) of the same code. Unable to obtain a
reconsideration from the said decision, this petition for review is now before Us raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to the respondent Corporation should have been
passed upon by the respondent Court when it was not an issue raised in the pleadings;

II. Whether or not the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is
unenforceable and without effect, considering that the franchise is inoperative for failure of the respondent Corporation to comply
with the requirements of the Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act.

III. Whether or not the respondent Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring the assessment in question as "fantastic
and fabulous" considering that there had been no trial on the merits of this case.

IV. Whether or not the assessment was issued within the period prescribed by law.

V. Whether or not petitioner's assessment against respondent Corporation is in the nature of a ruling within the purview of
Section 338-A of the National Internal Revenue Code. (pp. 11 -12, Rollo)

It has been the persistent contention of the petitioner that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 808 was never raised as an issue by
either party. Moreover, petitioner argued that said issue was not necessary in the resolution of this case. On the other hand,
both public and respondent corporation maintained that the issue was properly raised during the trial. Respondent tax court, in
its resolution dated June 18, 1976 stated as follows:

The constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to petitioner (now private respondent) under Republic Act No. 808, as
amended, is not only an indispensable issue in this case but a prejudicial question to be resolved by the Court. We will first begin
with the BIR Records. In their memorandum to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated November 2, 1972, the
Investigating Revenue Examiners reported, among others, as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

9. That the Court of Tax Appeals has previously decided on an issue of constitutionality  in the case of Jose Ma. Espino v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA No. 1532 March 31, 1969. (Emphasis supplied; p. 308, BIR Records).

In the statement of Mrs. Librada R. Natividad, Chief, Litigation Division of the BIR, dated October 5, 1973, she stated, among
others, as follows:

Observations and Recommendations:

1. That Eastern is operating illegally because:

(a) Eastern was not organized under Philippine law and/or licensed to do business in the Philippines;

(b) That it is wholly owned by British;

(c) It is engaged in the business of public utility; and

(d) That Republic Act No. 808 is unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied, p. 448, BIR records)

Even before this case was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the in investigating Revenue Examiners and the Chief of the
Litigation Division, BIR, were already certain that the only way to negate and counteract the broad legislative grant of tax-
exemption to petitioner (private respondent) from the payment of any municipal, provincial, and national tax under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 808 was to impugn and consider petitioner's legislative franchise invalid and/or unconstitutional; otherwise,
respondent's income tax assessment against petitioner will have no solid and justifiable legal basis to stand on. (Rollo, pp. 83-
85)

x x x           x x x          x x x

It has been said that a review and analysis of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on January 16, 1965
failed to show that the issue of constitutionality of petitioner's legislative franchise was ever raised by respondent. It is to be
noted, however, that before the formal hearing of this case on the date abovementioned, a pre-trial conference was held in the
private chamber of the undersigned Judge where Attys. Manuel Tomacruz and Cirilo Francisco where then and there present. At
the suggestion of the Court, both counsel agreed that the prejudicial issue of whether or not petitioner's legislative franchise is
valid and constitutional should be resolved first. (Rollo, pp. 88-89)

Although We sustain the respondent tax court's finding that the constitutional issue was squarely raised by the parties, We find
merit with the contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. The fact that constitutional
question was properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality.
This is supported by recent Supreme Court rulings which oblige every court to approach a constitutional question with grave care
and considerable caution. Thus:

It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the following requisites of a judicial
inquiry are present: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case" (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95
SCRA 400 [1980]; National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657 [1989]).

Undoubtedly, the last criterion is not present. This case can be resolved based on the other available grounds obtaining in this
case. Respondent court should have avoided the issue and instead maintained the presumption of constitutionality. A law is
supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted by Congress and
approved by the Chief Executive. Accordingly, this Court gives high respect for the acts of the other departments of the
government and, as much as possible, avoids deciding the constitutional question.

The evidence demonstrate quite clearly the logic of the above ruling. Republic Act No. 808 was enacted in 1952 and it was
amended in 1967 by Republic Act No. 5002. These Acts conferred the said franchise to the private respondent for the operation
of an international telecommunications system during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. This is a persuasive indication that
Congress excluded the operation of international telecommunication from the coverage of the constitutional prohibition. The
deliberations in Congress, as extensively quoted in respondent's brief, indubitably show that a legislative franchise was granted
to said private respondent on the premise that its operations were merely that of an international airline, establishing merely a
terminal or station in the Philippines. As such, it is the opinion of Congress "that a company which operates only a cable station
or a terminal in the Philippines, does not and cannot fall under that provision of the Constitution that confines the granting of
franchises, permits and other certificates to Filipino citizens and Filipino corporations" (Respondent's Brief, p. 38; Rollo, p. 231).

It is rather unusual that in the case at bar, petitioner is the one seeking the annulment of the respondent tax court's decision
declaring R.A. No. 808 unconstitutional. It's argument is premised on the fact that despite the validity of Republic Act No. 808,
respondent corporation cannot avail of the tax exemption granted therein because of its failure to comply with the requirements
of Section 8, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, the Public Service and the Corporation Law, which formed part and should be
read into Republic Act No. 808. Respondent corporation, according to petitioner, should have:

1) restructured its equity by transferring at least 60 per centum  of its capital to citizens of the Philippines;

2) obtained the certificate of convenience and public necessity required by Section 15 of the Public Service Law; and

3) secured a license as required by Sections 68 and 69 of the Philippine Corporation Law.

In resolving this issue, this Court adverted to the terms and conditions set fourth in the said legislative franchise. Thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 7. The Grantee shall keep a separate account of the gross earnings from submarine telegraph cable messages originating in
the Philippines, and shall furnish to the General Auditing Office, or its successor a copy of such account not later than the thirty-
first day of January of each year for the preceding year. For the purpose of auditing accounts so rendered, all of the books and
accounts of the Grantee, or duplicates thereof, so far as they relate to submarine telegraph cable messages originating in the
Philippines, shall be kept in the Philippines, and shall be subject to the official inspection of the Auditor General or his authorized
representatives, and the audit and approval of such accounts shall be final and conclusive evidence as to the amount of said
gross earnings, except that the Grantee shall have the right to appeal to the courts of the Philippines, under the terms and
conditions provided in the laws of the Philippines.

Sec. 8. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the Grantee shall pay to the Republic of the Philippines
during the life of this franchise a tax of five per cent of the gross earnings derived by the Grantee from its operation under this
franchise and which originate in the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable annually, within ten (10) days after the audit
and approval of the accounts as prescribed in section seven of this Act, and shall be in lieu of all taxes of any kind, nature and
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or Republic authority except that the Grantee shall pay
the tax of its real property in conformity with existing law.

Sec. 9. The grantee shall hold the national, provincial and municipal governments of the Philippines, harmless from all claims,
accounts, demands, or actions arising out of accidents or injuries, whether to property or to persons, caused by the construction
or operation of the cable and station for transmission and reception of submarine telegraph cable messages of the Grantee.

Sec. 10. The Grantee shall be subject to the Corporation laws of the Philippines now existing or hereafter enacted.

Sec. 11. It shall be unlawful for the Grantee to use, employ, or contract for the labor of persons held in involuntary servitude.

Sec. 12. The franchise hereby granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines,
and the rights to use and occupy public property and places hereby granted shall revert to the Government, upon the
termination of this franchise, by such repeal, or by forfeiture or expiration in due course.

Unless earlier terminated by any such repeal or forfeiture, or extended, the franchise and rights hereby granted shall terminate
by expiration of time fifty years after the date of the acceptance of this Act by the Grantee.

Sec. 13. As a condition of the granting of this franchise the Grantee shall execute a bond in favor of the Government of the
Philippines, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos; in a form and with sureties satisfactory to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the Grantee's obligations hereunder during the first three years of
the life of this franchise. If after three years from date of acceptance of this franchise, the Grantee shall have fulfilled said
obligation, or so soon thereafter as the Grantee shall have fulfilled the same, the bond aforesaid shall be cancelled by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Sec. 14. Acceptance of this franchise shall be given in writing within six months after approval of this Act. When so accepted by
the Grantee and upon the approval of the bond aforesaid by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Grantee
shall be empowered to exercise the privileges granted hereby.

Sec. 15. The Grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise nor the right and privileges
acquired thereunder to any person, firm company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity, nor merge with any other
company or corporation organized for the same purpose, without the approval of the Philippine Congress first had. Any
corporation to which this franchise may be sold, transferred, or assigned shall be subject to the corporation laws of the
Philippines now existing or hereafter enacted, and any person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity to
which this franchise is sold transferred, or assigned shall be subject to all the conditions, terms, restrictions and limitations of
this franchise as fully and completely and to the same extent as if the franchise had been originally granted to the said person,
firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity. (Rollo, pp. 179-182)

Undisputedly, respondent corporation duly complied with all the foregoing conditions. It accepted in writing the franchise within
the requisite period and filed the required bond. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications in turn approved and
accepted the bond. Respondent corporation further complied with the tax requirement by paying to the Republic of the
Philippines a tax of five per cent of the gross earnings from Philippine operations regularly since its creation.

A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract. In the case of the Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric
Power and Light Company, Inc., (G.R. No. L-45355, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 38), We stated:

So was the exemption upheld in favor of the Carcar Electric and Ice Plant Company when it was required to pay the corporate
franchise tax under Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 39 (Carcar Electric and Ice Plant v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 O.G. [No. 4] 1068). This Court pointed out that such exemption is part of the inducement for
the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the grantee. As a charter is in the nature of a private
contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the
contract between the government and the Corporation (Emphasis supplied)

Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private citizens made upon valuable considerations, for
purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. It is generally considered that the obligation resting upon the grantee
to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes a sufficient consideration. It can also be said that the benefit to
the community may constitute the sole consideration for the grant of a franchise by the state. Such being the case, the franchise
is the law between the parties and they are bound by the terms thereof

Petitioner, being a government agency, is also bound by the terms of the franchise. It cannot declare the franchise as
"ineffective and unenforceable" merely by stating that the private respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the
general statutes which are not mentioned in R.A. No. 808. To allow petitioner's claim would be to defy and ignore the superiority
of a legislative franchise granted by a special enactment over a mere authorization or permit granted in accordance with the
provisions of laws of general application. Republic Act No. 808 as amended by Republic Act No. 5002, is a special law applicable
only to the respondent corporation, while the Public Service Act and the Corporation Law are general statutes. The presumption
is that special statutes are exemptions to the general law because they pertain to special charter granted to meet a particular set
of conditions and circumstances (Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., supra).

In the same vein, We cannot accept petitioner's claim that the franchise is "inoperative and unenforceable" due to the failure of
the respondent Corporation to comply with the constitutional requirement. Under Section 15 of the same act, the respondent
corporation is expressly prohibited from leasing, transferring, selling or assigning the franchise thus granted to it, without the
approval of the Philippine Congress being previously obtained. Presidential Decree No. 489 which authorized respondent
Corporation to transfer to another corporation its franchise was issued only on June 24, 1974. Consequently, respondent
corporation cannot be faulted in not restructuring its equity to conform with the constitutional requirement of 60% Filipino
ownership in view of its limited right to transfer its property. Why then should the private respondent be at the receiving end or
the "horses to be beaten" for its inability to comply with the "60% Filipino ownership" when the franchise itself prohibited it from
doing so. This Court is not prepared to punish the respondent corporation which remained firm in not violating its franchise.

Petitioner claims that the respondent court had no basis in declaring the assessment as "fantastic and fabulous" considering that
there was no trial on the merits — thereby implying grave abuse of discretion. In justifying its position, petitioner argued:
. . . Had there been such a hearing petitioner could have presented the examiners who conducted the examination of the book of
accounts and accounting records of respondent Corporation. And they would have testified on all of the facts that they were able
to gather in the course of their examination. . . . Without their testimonies, there is really no way of ascertaining whether or not
the assessment or the deficiency income tax on respondent Corporation is "fantastic and fabulous" . . . (Brief for the Petitioner,
pp. 34-35, Rollo, p. 222)

The main thrust of petitioner's argument in this regard is directed to the propriety of the respondent court's pronouncement that
the assessment is "fantastic and fabulous." The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:

The  fantastic and fabulous income tax assessment of P21,523,288.37 issued by respondent (herein petitioner) against petitioner
(herein private respondent) is without sufficient legal and valid justification under Sections 331 and 332(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 72 of the same Code which reads as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Rollo, p. 65) (words in parenthesis supplied)

Petitioner displayed a crude attempt to impress upon this Court that respondent tax court made a grave error and abused its
discretion in declaring the assessment "fantastic and fabulous." While such phrase is an "obiter dictum" petitioner capitalized on
it in assailing the decision as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Assuming that the same was really made
without basis, considering that there was really no trial on the merits of the case, as the respondent court decided to avoid a
tedious and prolonged litigation involving the disputed income tax assessments, and limited its consideration only on the validity
or constitutionality of the franchise, does it constitute grave abuse of discretion which amounts to lack of jurisdiction?

The answer is in the negative. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility (Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L- 45473, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 297; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon
Traders, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163, SCRA 489).

The phrase "fantastic and fabulous" is a collateral matter and is not substantially material to the instant case because, as already
stated above, the court did not proceed with the merits of the case or did not deal with the factual issue to prove or disprove the
figures or amount of the assailed assessment. This case will necessarily be decided upon with this Court simply disregarding the
said phrase and by so doing, this Court perceives no substantial change in the respondent Court's assailed decision.

As regards the fourth assigned error, this Court finds that respondent tax court erred in declaring that the assessment was
issued beyond the period prescribed by law. The National Internal Revenue Code then in force provides:
Sec. 331 (now Section 203). Period of Limitation upon assessment and collection. — Except as provided in the succeeding
section, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years (now 3 years) after the return was filed, and no proceeding in
court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after expiration of such period. . .

It is clear from the foregoing provision that internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five (5) years after the taxpayer's
return was filed. It is, however, undisputed that petitioner has failed to file any corporate income tax return for a period of
twenty (20) years from 1952 to 1971. With this, petitioner argued that under Section 332 (a) (now Section 223 a of the Revenue
Code, private respondent's failure to file the income tax returns authorizes him to assess the income tax due from the private
respondent within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission. Petitioner relied on Section 332 (now Section
223) of the same Code:

Sec. 332 (now Section 223). — Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.

(a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or
a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the
discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission. (Emphasis supplied)

The omission was discovered only in 1971 upon investigation conducted by petitioner's examiners. Accordingly, petitioner has
ten (10) years from 1971 or until 1981 within which to assess respondent corporation. The assessment on the deficiency income
tax against private respondent in the amount of P21,523,288.37 was issued on February 28, 1973 which is well within the period
prescribed by law.

But while it is true that the assessment is within the prescribed period, it does not necessarily follow that it is a valid assessment
in its entirety. We have already ruled that Republic Act No. 808 is an operative act. Because of this, private respondent is
exempted from the payment of all taxes whether local, provincial or national, except franchise and real property taxes. It goes
without saying that the assessment cannot be held valid against the income derived from private respondent's operation
authorized by the franchise. It can only stand valid insofar as the assessment is for income derived from services within the
Philippines and which is beyond the scope of R.A. 808.

For example, private respondent should be held liable to pay the taxes on its income derived from the managerial services it
rendered to other corporations, like the Oceanic Wireless, Inc., a domestic corporation; and the income derived from rentals on a
leased portion of its building. Private respondent may not escape payment of these taxes by claiming tax exemption in view of
the provision of R.A. 808. To hold otherwise would open the gate to rampant tax evasion.

Lastly, We find that respondent tax court erred in declaring that the assessment for deficiency income tax against respondent
corporation is in the nature of a ruling within the purview of section 338-A of the tax code.

The Court of Tax Appeal' decision stated:

Sec. 338 (now Section 246) of the National Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of Finance, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the same code. One of these provisions relate to the franchise tax under Section 259 of the
aforesaid Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 259 (now Sec. 117). Tax on franchises. — There shall be collected in respect to all franchises, upon the gross receipts from
the business covered by the law granting the franchise, a tax of five per centum or such taxes, charges, and percentages as are
specified in the special charters of the grantees upon whom such franchises are conferred, whichever is higher, unless the
provisions thereof preclude the imposition of a higher tax. For the purposes of facilitating the assessment of this tax, reports
shall be made by the respective holders of the franchises in such form and at such times, as shall be required by the regulations
of the Department of Finance.

The taxes, charges and percentages on franchises, shall be assessed, collected by and paid to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or any of his collection agents, any provision in the franchise to the contrary notwithstanding, and shall be due and
payable as specified in the particular franchise, or, in case no time limit is specified therein, the provisions of Section one
hundred eighty three shall apply; and if such taxes, charges, and percentages remain unpaid on the date on which they must be
paid, twenty-five per centum shall be added to the amount of such taxes, charges, and percentages, which increase shall form
part of the tax. (As amended by Sec. 7, Republic Act No. 39; Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 418; and Sec. 53, Republic Act No. 6110).

It can thus be seen from the said provisions that for the purpose of facilitating the assessment of the franchise tax, the Secretary
of Finance, upon the recommendation of respondent, may promulgate the implementing rules and regulations. It is to be noted
that the said rules and regulations will merely implement the provisions of the franchise tax. law. Any revocation, modification or
reversal of the ruling or the franchise tax law itself by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given
retroactive application. The mandatory requirement for the prospective operation of the new ruling is explicit under Section 338-
A (now Section 246) of the National Internal Revenue Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 338-A. (Section 246). Non-retroactivity of rulings. — Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and
regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or reversal will be
prejudicial to the taxpayers except in the following cases; (a) where the taxpayers deliberately misstates or omits material facts
from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently
gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the
taxpayer acted in bad faith. (inserted by Sec. 61, Republic Act No. 6110).

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent's income tax assessment against petitioner for a period of twenty (20) years is tantamount to a revocation of the tax
on franchise prescribed by Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, supra, because the provisions thereof were
disregarded in favor of Section 24 of the same code which imposes the corporate income tax. In such a case, the revocation of
the franchise tax law shall have prospective operation except in the following cases.

x x x           x x x          x x x
(Rollo, pp. 69-71)

(Words in parenthesis supplied)

Contrary to the Court of Tax Appeals ruling, We believe that the assessment against the petitioner cannot be likened to a
revocation of the tax on franchise prescribed in Section 259. Firstly, a ruling by a Commissioner cannot revoke a provision of the
National Internal Revenue Code, a substantive law. Secondly, the provision above stated contemplates of a revocation,
modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated for the enforcement of the provisions of the tax code but
not a revocation, modification or reversal of the tax code's provision itself. The reason why the Commissioner issued the assailed
assessment of P21,523,288.37 was not because he wanted to revoke, expressly or implicitly, Section 259 of the Tax Code, but
because the Commissioner believed that private respondent is liable for corporate income tax by virtue of an inoperative
franchise. Hence, the said assessment should not be regarded as a ruling contemplated under Section 338-A. It should be
treated as an ordinary assessment for the payment of taxes, like any other assessment issued against any person or entity,
holding a legislative franchise and is exempted from the payment of Certain national and local taxes, including corporate income
tax but, nevertheless, found to be liable to pay the latter due to its earnings derived from sources within the Philippines but
beyond the scope of the franchise.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby modified, as follows:

1. Republic Act No. 808 is presumed to be an operative act and the decision of the respondent tax court declaring the same to be
unconstitutional is hereby SET ASIDE;

2. the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of 5% of gross receipts as franchise tax in lieu of any and all taxes is
enforceable and operative;

3. the assailed assessment was issued within the period prescribed by law;

4. the assailed assessment is not in the nature of a ruling within the purview of Section 338-A of the National Internal Revenue
Code; and

5. the decision of the respondent tax court declaring the Commissioner's assessment cancelled and without any legal force and
effect is hereby SET ASIDE. A remand of this case to respondent Court of Tax Appeals is ordered for trial on the merits to
determine the income tax liability of the private respondent corresponding to its income beyond the scope of Republic Act No.
808.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of
93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies
just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-
2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have
three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand,
petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even
when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at
home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he
would have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He
even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent,
though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma.
At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned
his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing
on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of
private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his
cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at
home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the
house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy
almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank
manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home,
that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a
child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not
get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations
– 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent
are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a
monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not
less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the
same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited
cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted
him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped
raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists
or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states
"regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any
danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the
Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other
persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the
like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police
Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should
also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and
medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1
January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the
Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller,
copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days,
which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they
are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in
Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and
(2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private
respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by
private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge
Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal
dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal
home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three
petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer
president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A
writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident
traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their
daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her. 26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with
a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl
Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended
party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended
party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J.
Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from
a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well
as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the
children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August
6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and
should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties
in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod
City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION
ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any
person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave
petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon
petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO,
the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion
is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August
23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after
each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-
G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in
the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO,
the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a
collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner
is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS
NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the
propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the
Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of domestic violence against women and children. 42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and
binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not
be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action
which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are
to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as
any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the other
hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of
his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause
of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a
protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same
in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing
the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the
30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for
the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds
succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious
and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for
thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even
though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary
powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence.
To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should
put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men
be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of
the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of
which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We
would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship.
They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing
safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family. 65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was
the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women,
if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there
is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their
spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men,
assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for
women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber
who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world.
Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the
domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have
been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of
violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the
fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless
victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to
justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and
standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution.
Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to
uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a
series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and
children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment.
Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she
is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to
the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a
matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake,
puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The
abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even
by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not
venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse
under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous
but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is
instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments
of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification
under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men
otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and
take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need
to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on
Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against
women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the
right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in
virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right
over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated
structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his
commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the
entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the
rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased.
Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme
Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her
about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These
leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated
and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more.
Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male
partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past
year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents
discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English
well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA,
"researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-
partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source
of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8
percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have
been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of
Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14,
Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor
and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903).
And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total
number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for
the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD
cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year
period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200 201
2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

1,04
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 832
2

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lascivious 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ness

Physical 3,5 2,3 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,4 2,01 1,58

Injuries 53 35 92 05 07 98 8 8

Sexual
Harassme 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
nt

1,2 2,3 3,5 5,2 9,97 9,02

RA 9262 218 924
69 87 99 85 4 1

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

 Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubina
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
ge

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
/Kidnappin 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
g 29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,2 5,3 4,8 5,7 6,9 9,4 15,1 12,9

Total
71 74 81 29 05 85 04 48

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In
the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those
who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman
against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result
of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot
render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and
deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas,
parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited
to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the
same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also
traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the
rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or
things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice
President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of
the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in
the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double
victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in
the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant
brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature
of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as
"only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the
police, the prosecution and the judges." 85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State
parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by
said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions
as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or
to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the
dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes
the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not
guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive
the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity,"
and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we
have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above,
VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly,
the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's
husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the
husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator
from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their
financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to
be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only
to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to
the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006,
gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the
required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order
if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied
due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal
home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence,
either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner
seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has
done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason
behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection.
Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the
issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is
problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order
has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
"Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and
(b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant
on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on
the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance
of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the
law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is
about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are
required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and
impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262,
which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that
one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a
hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment." 118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as
it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

April 28, 2010

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 162230               April 28, 2010

 ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA
L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M.
ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO,
ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C.
CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEÑA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA,
ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL,
TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO
C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEÑA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA
M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA,
LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER
C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G.
GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their
capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization”, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE
HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged
full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation
for plaintiffs’ hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of
the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world
services the debt.1

There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either
challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange
indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature
of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay
down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions
necessary to reach a decision on this matter.

Factual Antecedents
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women
as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were
publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells,
where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese
tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and
emotional suffering.2

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issues

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Petitioners’ arguments

Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void.
They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted
a crime against humanity,3 sexual slavery,4 and torture.5 They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus
cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to
espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for
crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine government’s acceptance of the “apologies” made by
Japan as well as funds from the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law.

Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. 6

Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace7 provides:

Article 14. Claims and Property

a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the
war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable
economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations.

b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other
claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the
prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan 8 have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the
individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian Women’s Fund.

Historical Background

The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces captured
the city of Nanking in China and began a “barbaric campaign of terror” known as the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes
and murders of an estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women. 9

In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end international
condemnation10 by establishing the “comfort women” system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously appease
soldiers’ sexual appetites and contain soldiers’ activities within a regulated environment. 11 Comfort stations would also prevent
the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories. 12

Daily life as a comfort woman was “unmitigated misery.” 13 The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided into
tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day. 14 The 30 minutes allotted for
sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute increments of unimaginable horror for the women. 15 Disease was
rampant.16 Military doctors regularly examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the spread of venereal
diseases; little notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted on the
women by soldiers.

Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war. 17 Their agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical,
psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives. Some returned home and were ostracized by their families. Some
committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never returned home. 18

Efforts to Secure Reparation

The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay compensatory damages
for the comfort women system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various
nations, and the Women’s International Criminal Tribunal. The Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of
public apologies and the creation of the AWF.19

Lawsuits

In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the
Japanese government. The Tokyo District Court however dismissed their case. 20 Other suits followed,21 but the Japanese
government has, thus far, successfully caused the dismissal of every case. 22

Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system brought their
claims before the United States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action lawsuit in the US District
Court for the District of Columbia 23 “seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture
before and during World War II,” in violation of “both positive and customary international law.” The case was filed pursuant to
the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 24 which allowed the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a US federal district
court.25 On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that “[t]here is
no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a
century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign immunity, plaintiffs’ claims are non-justiciable and must be
dismissed.”

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case. 26 On appeal, the US Supreme Court
granted the women’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and
remanded the case.27 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior decision, noting that “much as we may feel for the
plight of the appellants, the courts of the US simply are not authorized to hear their case.” 28 The women again brought their case
to the US Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006.

Efforts at the United Nations

In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the UN
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women
and seeking reparations for former comfort women. 29 The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika
Coomaraswamy as the issue’s special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report reaffirming Japan’s responsibility in
forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the following recommendations:

A. At the national level

137. The Government of Japan should:

(a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War was a
violation of its obligations under international law and accept legal responsibility for that violation;
(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special
administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very
advanced age;

(c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort stations and other related activities
of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War;

(d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be substantiated as women victims of
Japanese military sexual slavery;

(e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical realities;

(f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort stations
during the Second World War.

Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitled Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of
the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for ‘Comfort Women Stations’ established during the Second World War, 30 which
contained the following findings:

68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and
humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese Government’s arguments to
the contrary, including arguments that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape,
remain as unpersuasive today as they were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50
years ago. In addition, the Japanese Government’s argument that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second World
War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large
part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to admit the extent of the Japanese military’s direct
involvement in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres. The Japanese Government’s silence on this point
during the period in which peace and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being
negotiated following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace
treaties to extinguish liability in these cases.

69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to
which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a
massive scale during the Second World War has added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today.
The Government of Japan has taken some steps to apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women
and girls who were brutalized in “comfort stations” during the Second World War. However, anything less than full and
unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that flow from such liability is wholly
inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to provide adequate redress.

The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought.

Women’s International War Crimes

Tribunal

The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a “people’s tribunal” established by a number of Asian women and
human rights organizations, supported by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations. 31 First proposed in 1998,
the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to “adjudicate Japan’s military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of
comfort women, to bring those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence
against women.”

After examining the evidence for more than a year, the “tribunal” issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the former
Emperor Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of women. 32 It bears
stressing, however, that although the tribunal included prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding
since the tribunal itself was organized by private citizens.

Action by Individual Governments

On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six co-sponsor representatives, introduced
House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former comfort women. The
Resolution was formally passed on July 30, 2007,33 and made four distinct demands:

[I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and
accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into
sexual slavery, known to the world as “comfort women”, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific
Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity
and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official
capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the “comfort women”
for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime
while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the “comfort women.” 34

In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to House
Resolution 121.35 Entitled, “Justice for Comfort Women,” the resolution demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility
by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of the legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of
the past. The resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these issues, stating: “the right of individuals
to claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the
survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the
survivors.”

The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada’s resolution demands
the Japanese government to issue a formal apology, to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands
of women into sexual slavery, and to restore references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes. 36 The Dutch parliament’s
resolution calls for the Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei
Kono.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom’s Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled, “Global
Security: Japan and Korea” which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of comfort women in
order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea.

Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government

Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the comfort system:

a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993:

The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime “comfort women” since December 1991. I wish to
announce the findings as a result of that study.

As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent
that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military
authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of
the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private
recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they
were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel
directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the
Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment,
transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and
dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies
and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and
psychological wounds as comfort women.

It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned
circles, how best we can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of
history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our
memories through the study and teaching of history.

As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of
Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.

b) Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s Statement in 1994

On the issue of wartime “comfort women”, which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take
this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies”

c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women

The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the
honor and dignity of a large number of women.

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured
immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up
squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005

Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history, and
recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries, especially in Asia,
the Members of this House hereby express deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995)

e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent. I
will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those who
suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime
Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same
feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11,
2007).

I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of
Japan, March 26, 2007).
I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the
extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to
President George W. Bush, April 3, 2007).

I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As a
human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them. My
administration has been saying all along that we continue to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced
these women to go through that hardship and pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an
interview article “A Conversation with Shinzo Abe” by the Washington Post, April 22, 2007).

x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme hardships
as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and harsh
conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the
21st Century a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make
significant contributions to that end. (Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe’s remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit
meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007).

The Asian Women’s Fund

Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government’s concrete attempt to address its moral
responsibility by offering monetary compensation to victims of the comfort women system. 37 The purpose of the AWF was to
show atonement of the Japanese people through expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to
restore their honor, and to demonstrate Japan’s strong respect for women. 38

The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund paying ¥2
million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2) medical and welfare support programs, paying ¥2.5-3 million ($25,000-
$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding for the
program came from the Japanese government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF
provided ¥700 million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; ¥380 million
(approximately $3.8 million) in Indonesia; and ¥242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the Netherlands.

On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare
support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

Our Ruling

Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion
in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

The petition lacks merit.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Baker v. Carr39 remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court
explained that:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.

In Tañada v. Cuenco,40 we held that political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”

Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. 41 One such category involves questions of foreign
relations. It is well-established that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative—’the political’—departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” 42 The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that
decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility. 43

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. 44 However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 45 the US Supreme Court held that “[t]he President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.”

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—
is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation
and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x

This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. Executive Secretary 46 and Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary;47 its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Puno’s dissent in Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion:48

x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the
nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the
best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive
and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on
meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the
presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their
judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national
embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy
interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of
Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international
claims:

x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters, `chips’,
in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that
were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the
other, or against larger political considerations unrelated to debts. 49

Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private
claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,50 a case brought by a British subject to recover
a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote:

I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in
dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences,
injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those
things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution
of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be
provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the treaty, they could not
be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied).

This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v.
Regan,51 the US Supreme Court held:

Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another
country are “sources of friction” between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86
L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective
nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the
government of another “are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory.” L. Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign
authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under such agreements, the President has agreed to
renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the
establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants
themselves, since a claimant’s only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a
diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the “United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its
citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole.” Henkin, supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 213 (1965) (President “may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state x x x [even]
without the consent of the [injured] national”). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today.

Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of
the suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security
purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic position in the Far East.
Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.

This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the war. 52 In a consolidated
case in the Northern District of California, 53 the court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with
Japan,54 because of the following policy considerations:

The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue
once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood
that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace:

Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.

On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan’s aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering.
On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to
produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x

The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of
six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP)
for the region, General Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic
affairs of the vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan’s financial condition
would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as
a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that “[t]he use of
reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means”
and “recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay.”

That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example:

Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries
and their nationals would wreck Japan’s economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its
people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be
contrary to the basic purposes and policy of x x x the United States x x x.

We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle—and particularly here,
where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration—the Executive
must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal
system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. 55 Even then, it
is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s own rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly
reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924  Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions Case:

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the
case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant. 56
Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of
states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the
legal merits of the particular claim.57 As clearly stated by the ICJ in

Barcelona Traction:

The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection
by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or
legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also
confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions.
However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.58(Emphasis supplied)

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will
it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political
or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.

The International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i)
state that “the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State,” 59 (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying
that diplomatic protection is a “sovereign prerogative” of the State; 60 and (iii) stress that the state “has the right to exercise
diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so.” 61

It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty  to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when
rights are injured.62 However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States
to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad. 63 Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio
juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means
of enforcing its fulfillment.64

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited
under contemporary international law. 65 However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions
automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly
since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the
state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-
derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states’ reluctance to directly prosecute
claims against another state, recent developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in
suits against perpetrators of international crimes. 66 Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions
calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of
states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. 67 Of course a customary
duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state
practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or  de
facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity.” 68

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question
of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations
owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction:

x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law … others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-
based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the
relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice. 69

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term “ jus cogens”
(literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. 70

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s, 71 but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly
attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross’s influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law. 72 The
recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s preparation of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).73 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus
cogens,74the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that “there is not as
yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus
cogens.”75 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that “the prudent course seems to be to x x x
leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.” 76 Thus,
while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance, 77 beyond a tiny core of
principles and rules.78

Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror
they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of
fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before
appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their
fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners’
cause. Ours is only the power to urge  and exhort  the Executive Department to take up petitioners’ cause.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya
Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela
Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M.
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO
M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the
school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES,
Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, 

vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo
M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor,
Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel,
Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO
BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-
General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and
the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners, 

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health,
and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is,
the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main
facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the
executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan
dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its
watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that
holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception.
As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings
organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on
the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center,
Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, 9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in
their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a
member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc. 24 and several others,25 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others, 29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat)
;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31in their capacities as
citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the
RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides that skilled
health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical
officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it
is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be
forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public
would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce
the number of the poor.45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services
they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to
curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to
the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level
and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf
of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral,
Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58 Ana Theresa
"Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several
others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for
the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until
July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On
July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO
was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time
posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs
and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed,
they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device
capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or
sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted
male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on
August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for
Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective
means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except
abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that
policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with
its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. 70 Thus, on August 14,
2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education. 71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a
paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000
and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in
the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to
the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to
reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive
health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that
the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and
the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the
situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained." 73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921
and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly
licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its
agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers'
money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices
and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political
wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement
the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that
in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often
sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the
basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down
the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the
acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus,
while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect
those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise.
The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted
in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the
Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This
is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on
applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court
wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy
as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the
chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation. 95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every
claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law
has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication
since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights
has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that
is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of the act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the
Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures
to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of
being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened
to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched
to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters
or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues
raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right
to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure.
The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in
fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal
care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are
already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple
or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives
that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows
that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the
product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products
and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for
abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition
of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the
RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a
determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the
RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the
fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the
family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle
of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather,
originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed
upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception,
there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the
male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition
for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all
reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records
reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x
x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes
in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows
from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital
signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the
ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to
form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the
fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human,
then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from
the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would
leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that
would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There
can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going
to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today
are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus.
If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root.
What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore,
if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right
to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should
be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect
the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just
like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado.
I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of
the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device
which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.
Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your
Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a
viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes
that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that
begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei
(the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum,
known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization
is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or
political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process.
They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being
complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was
to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision
passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted
not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody
the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to
have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual
health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word "
or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear
because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon.
Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the
fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's
womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing
to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It
started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the
fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or
device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive
product or supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court
finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second
paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital
pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health
product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of
the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears
to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent
here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With
this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion,
the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives
that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of
acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed
in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in
the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives
as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is
discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased
risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH Law,
the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of
the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim
that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care
to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-
reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will
of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be
maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription
of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA
No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for
or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and
kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies
to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among
others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which
is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public
health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are
assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness
or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency
tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first
be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or
intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the
inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables,
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives
are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there
are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient
or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX
explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to
the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the
very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services
and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working
in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in
Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another
health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that
compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law
are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects,
mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of
those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in
the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State,
the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public. 193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to
equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make
decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the
threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down
as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be
used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only
seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal
and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and
that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They
assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to
violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH
Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed
to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect
that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State
under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance
in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any
information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State. 204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural
and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in
crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as
a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes
with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in
the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest
of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its
secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the
1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this
part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief
and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion
clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs
and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised
of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards.
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard
to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts." 217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject
to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise
Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this
test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case
mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went
back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious
speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the
rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the
authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano
was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects.
The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach,
thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious
belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching.
A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A
mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only
a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is
right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for
the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the
Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with
due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance
with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and
children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing
and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health
status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their
beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy
for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's. 221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line
with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The
said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care
and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state
interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case,
the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless
the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to
the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with
what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life
health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience,
do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization
of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the
liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent,
freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State,
on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS
Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of
Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were
involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking
part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse
to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in
the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." 10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences
for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for
an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional
guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective
of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from
the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in
every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must
be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or
through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced
in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is
violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-
IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to
the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able
to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and
2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of
the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to
a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the
State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to
what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting
according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the
subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given
to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom,
the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override
a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the assertion
that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of
women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection
of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act
of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in
relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and
programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life
cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and
duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education
and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and
the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal
deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed to substantiate
this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to
48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still
insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not
be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty.
Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of
religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the
principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a
"good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always
to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The
mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if
is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the
same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the
religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any
information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are
completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding
into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote
its solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article,
Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the
family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack
of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature,
should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the
founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to
found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their
right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses
as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one
family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint
decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a
shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo
reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as
such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where Justice William O. Douglas
wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of
its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of
privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors
will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except
when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent
is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of
parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal
and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples
entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect
to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access
to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information
to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of
their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor
child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should
not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate
medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement
of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child
as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of
parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.
5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education
even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an
increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can
only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they
will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of
this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the
1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents
in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing
the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed,
the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for
values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence
against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the
teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court
finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of
the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that
it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the
Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but
does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only
makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also
exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures
under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same
time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and
devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical
and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker
engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any
accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been
accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information
and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally
withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference,
the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together
in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While
health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those
mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide
for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may
be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to
the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to
a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the
non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases
supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care
to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to
have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law
seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need
to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service
providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro
bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of
medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A
fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which
affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions
or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono
service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court
does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated
with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards
of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization
and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or
contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with
the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive,
and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to
the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except
in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the
hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national government that will
provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in
the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said
reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH
Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to
the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply
delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as
a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man
emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape
or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes
to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on
the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the
large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the
country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers
is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have
helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are
still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we
have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing
population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total
fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in
the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by
the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application
of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,
with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive
and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional,
there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for
women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 132986 : May 19, 2004]

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion Resolution 97-22 1 denying petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels
Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and Resolution No. 98-02 2 denying his
motion for reconsideration in SET Case No. 001-95, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Gregorio B. Honasan, et al.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private respondent herein, filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an
election protest against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Petitioner, and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995
senatorial elections, docketed as SET Case No. 001-95.

On June 30, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Issues having been joined, the SET required the parties to
submit the list of pilot precincts numbering not more that 25% of the total precincts involved in respondents protest.

Subsequently, the SET conducted the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts, namely: Paoay, Ilocos Norte; Tarlac, Tarlac; Tawi-
Tawi; Maguindanao; Sulu; Bulacan; Lanao del Sur; Lanao del Norte; Pasig City; Bian, Laguna; Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; Pangasinan;
Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte. Thereafter, the SET directed the parties to submit their evidence and memoranda.

On August 21, 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall
announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. A press release entitled Partial Results
in Pimentels Protest3 was then issued accompanied by the tabulation of votes for the parties. In the said tabulation, the name of
petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15. 4 cralawred

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another
Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. 5 Petitioner alleged that the partial results were manifestly erroneous. The
SET then issued Resolution No. 97-20 requiring all the parties to file their respective comments on petitioners motion. Only
respondent and Senator Nikki Coseteng filed their separate comments alleging, among others, that petitioners motion is
premature considering that the SET has not yet resolved respondents election protest.

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an oversight, hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte
should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were given back to
him.

Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion, holding that there is no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.

The Tribunal took pains in reviewing its records and hereby acknowledges that an adjustment should be made in the tally of
votes for the Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte. However, the Tribunal alone should not be faulted for this oversight. Although
the Regional Tally for Region I was offered in evidence by the Protestant, Protestee Enrile, far from claming that the same
reflected the accurate number of votes garnered by the senatorial candidates, even went to the extent of objecting to its
admissibility.

In the province of Ilocos Norte, the vote total of Enrile in the SOV/M of 65,343 is listed in the PCOC at 95,343 or an increase of
30,000 votes. As unearthed, Enriles votes had already been corrected by the COMELEC in the Regional Tally such that the
30,000 votes deducted by the Tribunal must be, as it is hereby, given back to him. Similarly, Mitra regains the 20,000 votes
deducted from him in this province.

These corrections, notwithstanding, the Tribunal finds no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.In fact, the ranking of
the parties is not at all affected by the omission.

Finally, to grant Enriles prayer to have himself represented in the appreciation of ballots by the Tribunal amounts to an
encroachment on judicial functions. Needless to state, appreciation of evidence is the Tribunals exclusive domain.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in its Resolution No. 98-02.

Hence, this petition, petitioner contending that:

A.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RULING THAT NO SIFFICIENT BASIS EXISTS TO ANNUL THE MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS TABULATION OF THE RESULTS OF
REVISION AND APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.

B.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED PATENT AND GROSS ERROR IN RECTIFYING THE RESULTS OF THE PHYSICAL COUNT, AS
REFELCTED IN THE REVISION RPORTS BY USING OTHER ELECTIOB DOCUMENTS.

C.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RELEASED PARTIAL AND TENTATIVE RESULTS
WHICH CAUSED GRAVE PREJUDICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER.

D.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO BE
HEARD IN THE APPRECIATION PROCEEDINGS.

The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion To
Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties.

Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are erroneous because they are improbable and not supported by
evidence.

In their comments, both respondent and the Solicitor General maintain that the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the challenged Resolutions. Furthermore, the Solicitor General asserts that the present petition has become moot and
academic because the tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions
originated expired on June 30, 1998.

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET explained the process in determining the partial results,
thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

The entire process in determining the parties votes in the pilot municipalities is explained in the corresponding written reports
thereon shortly to be completed. In the meantime, let it be stressed that the proceedings conducted by the Tribunal with respect
to the pilot areas of Protestant Pimentel consisted of several stages or steps, to wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

a.Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;

b.Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c.Examination of the different election documents including the verification of the accuracy of the addition of the figures
appearing on Statement of Votes by Precincts (SOV/M or SOV/C); andcralawlibrary

d.Comparison of the figures appearing on the SOV/P, the Municipal or City Certificate of Canvass (MCOC or CCOPC), the SOV/M
or SOV/C and the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (PCOC).

From the arguments of protestee Enrile, it is apparent that only the revision of ballots and the SOV/P were taken into account.
Worse, he speculated on the rulings made in the appreciation of ballots.

xxx

Put differently, the number of ballots objected to against a particular party is not necessarily the maximum number of votes that
may be deducted from the said party, in the same way as the number of ballots/votes claimed by a party is not necessarily the
maximum number of votes that may be credited to said party. As a result of the appreciation of the contested ballots, the parties
may be deducted more votes than the number of ballots specifically objected to against them, or may be credited with additional
votes even if the parties made no claims.

Aside from the ruling on the claims and objections, the Tribunal likewise verified the accuracy of the counting of ballots done by
the revision teams. Errors in the revision reports were rectified which also resulted in the addition to, or deduction of votes from
the parties.

Consistent with the allegation of Protestant Pimentel that Operation Dagdag-Bawas was affected through the padding or
deduction of votes in the different election documents, the Tribunal also conducted accuracy checks on the addition of the figures
appearing on the SOV/P and the SOV/M. The verification process disclosed errors which have resulted in the addition or
deduction of votes from the parties.

To ensure that the correct figures were recorded from one election document to the other, the Tribunal compared the figures
appearing on the SOV/P vis--vis the MCOC/CCOC; the MCOC/CCOC with the PCOC.Where the discrepancies in the figures were
noted, the corresponding adjustments were made which resulted in the addition or deduction of votes from the parties.

Thus, while the votes of the parties in the municipal level are determined through the counting and appreciation of the ballots,
the votes of the parties on the provincial level are also adjusted on the basis of the comparison of the different election
documents.The written report/decision on the pilot precincts, soon to be released, contains the specifics and sets forth in detail
the reason for each addition or deduction of votes.

The above process clearly shows why the figures presented by petitioner in his motion do not tally with the figures released by
the SET.

At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has become moot and academic. The tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.6 cralawred

In Garcia v. COMELEC ,7 we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.

Likewise, in Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,  8 we ruled:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in
which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no
actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
and TINGA, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. C.J., and Puno, J., on official leave.

Vitug, J., acting Chief Justice, no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x————————————-x

G.R. No. 171409             May 3, 2006

NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x————————————-x

G.R. No. 171485             May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J.
AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB.
CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL
V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C.
NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO,
SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.

x————————————-x

G.R. No. 171483             May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL
MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS – KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY
ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO
ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR
GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x————————————-x

G.R. No. 171400             May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO,Respondents.

G.R. No. 171489             May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A.
RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA,
ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.

x————————————-x

G.R. No. 171424             May 3, 2006

 LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary. 1 Superior strength—the use of
force—cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of
the citizens, specifically their liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: “ In cases involving liberty, the
scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.” Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts “with a
heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.”2

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners
contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions,
are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for
being unconstitutional.

Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people
combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes
license?3

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists—the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State—who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State—by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of
the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and
the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and
present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left,
represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the
democratic Philippine State—and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over
a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of
the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the
State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present
danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP,  to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been
filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation
No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to
undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. 4They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017
was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned
Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio
Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to “show
and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest,
but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.” 5

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I  ” which detailed plans for bombings and
attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets
including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.  6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to
attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA
parade ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession
were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s
Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.  7 Prior to his arrest, Lt.
San Juan announced through DZRH that the “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”

On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were
planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to  “disavow” any defection.
The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: “All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and
trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.“

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and
mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported
that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted.
Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout
Ranger. Lim said “it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.“8

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed
component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way
they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the
President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately
took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments
in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “The
Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of
accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will
not take much longer to end it.”9

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly
announced: “Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered
by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.” He claimed that
with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups
that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first
half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also
considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet
resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. 10

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the
gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and
ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that
might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization,
are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that “warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities,
including media, can already be implemented.”11

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members
of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various
parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water
cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action
was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That
same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas
Street in Makati City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)
of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the  Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news
stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City
were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were
stationed outside the building.13

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is “meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets
not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government.”  The PNP warned that it would take
over any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national
emergency.” Director General Lomibao stated that “if they do not follow the standards—and the standards are—if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017—we
will recommend a ‘takeover.’” National Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks
to “cooperate” with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for “balanced reporting” from
broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will
not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national
security is threatened.14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the  Anakpawis Party and Chairman
of Kilusang Mayo Uno  (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985.
Beltran’s lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime,
had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel
in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.

Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and
golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was
arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where
the “Batasan 5” decided to stay indefinitely.

Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not
being raised in these petitions.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

InG.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David,  et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law;
and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding
the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of “censorship” or “prior restraint.” They also claimed that the term “emergency” refers
only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the
issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of
the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel
Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “usurpation of legislative powers“; “violation of freedom of
expression” and “a declaration of martial law.” They alleged that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out
the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is
necessity to do so.“

In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual
basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b)Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI,
and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the
President of her Martial Law powers.” And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued
that “it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval.” In addition, petitioners
asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative
Code.”

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are “unconstitutional for
being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.” In this regard, she
stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being
moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and
171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth,  PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free
expression and redress of grievances.

On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be
summarized as follows:

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),

and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

A. PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury
v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation—

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers
limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these
limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and
thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the
courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-starting capacity.” 23 Courts may exercise such power
only when the following requisites are present: first,  there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to
raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,  the
decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 24

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
“definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the
present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26 so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case 28 or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the
eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing
it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital
issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”30

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 31second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 32  third,  when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and
of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the
extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. 35 And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate
Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an
otherwise “moot” case may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.” The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing
discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” 37 In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.“38Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either
case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in
a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but
the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 “In
matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.“
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed
with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled
that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action,  he must
show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate,45Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,46Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix.48

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases,Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the “transcendental
importance” of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In  Aquino v.
Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the “far-reaching implications” of the petition
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of
cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. 51

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to
sue under the principle of “transcendental importance.” Pertinent are the following cases:

(1)Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to
information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe
the petitioner with locus standi;

(2)Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that “given the transcendental importance of the
issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of
direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review” of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers
absent a showing that “Balikatan 02-01” involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of
constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue
as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the “direct injury” test
with respect to concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that “there must be a showing that the citizen
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.”

In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-
interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to
sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of
Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice
Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with
petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does
not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue
of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.
Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to
the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,62  Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Tañada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We
take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners,  Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no
legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In  Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that
the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.

In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of
illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a
legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that
she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of
her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing
rules.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of
judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the
validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical
matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental importance” doctrine, a relaxation of the standing
requirements for the petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases.”

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any  civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this
does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. 69

B. SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not “necessary” for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has
reached its distilled point—from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era
of Lansang v. Garcia,72Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining
“political questions,” particularly those questions “in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.” 75Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to
decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the
courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has
the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency.  From the
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, “under which the
President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect,
is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.“76 In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There,
the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or
justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-
examine the latter case, ratiocinating that “in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute
control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable
only to his conscience, the People, and God.”79

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80—a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar—echoed a principle similar
to Lansang.  While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom,
it stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.”This ruling is
mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power,
the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,”
but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The latter part of the authority represents
a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. 81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also
of duty.82

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang  adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not  that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus,
the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. 83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he
fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.”

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of
the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling
for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject—the power of the President in times of emergency .  A glimpse at the various
political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.

John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the
problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a
fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative
“power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even
against it.”84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall
judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted
defeat, suggesting that “the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on
earth, but to appeal to Heaven.”85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of
emergency. According to him:

The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them
disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State…

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even
Sparta allowed its law to lapse…

If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a
supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no
doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish. 86

Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or “supreme magistracy” as he termed it. For him, it would more
likely be cheapened by “indiscreet use.” He was unwilling to rely upon an “appeal to heaven.” Instead, he relied upon a tenure
of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: “I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.”88

Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic
contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory,
thus:

Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra-constitutional measures; for although they may
for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little
while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law
provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it. 89

Machiavelli—in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill—sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby
emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet
the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with
effective constitutional restraints.90

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies,
have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins saw “no reason why absolutism should not
be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions,” provided it “serves to protect established institutions from
the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the
previous forms of political life.”92He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as
all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time”imposing
limitation upon that power.”93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions
of success of such a dictatorship: “The period of dictatorship must be relatively short…Dictatorship should always be
strictly legitimate in character…Final authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never
rest with the dictator himself…”94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be “strict political
conservatism.”

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. 95 “It is a problem of concentrating power—in a government
where power has consciously been divided—to cope with… situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a
broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to
what end.”96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit:  “The
emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means—i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy
power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time
limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order.”97

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar,
Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of “constitutional dictatorship” as solution to the vexing
problems presented by emergency.  98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the
“constitutional dictatorship,” thus:

1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even
indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order…

2) …the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the
dictator…

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination…

4) …all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of
constitutional or legal requirements…

5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely
necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or
effect…

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the
existing constitutional order. . .

8.) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the
man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted…

11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions
existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship… 99

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would
secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in
the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees. 100

Scott  and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, “the
suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger
to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory.” To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional
dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term “dictator” is used
in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency
powers. However used, “constitutional dictatorship” cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of
constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the “concept of constitutionalism” articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent
with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude
some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural
limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And
in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the
existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the
enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental
power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but
rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism
with “limited” as distinguished from “weak” government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly
procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete
political responsibility of government to the governed.101

In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists—from Lock’s “theory of prerogative,”
to Watkins’ doctrine of “constitutional dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain’s “principle of constitutionalism”—ultimately aim
to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the
Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under
effective limitations and checks.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s “balanced
power structure.”102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency.
Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President,
it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same
time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

a. “Facial Challenge”

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on
both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawlessviolence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held
that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment”
(freedom of speech).

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” In  Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it
was held:

It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such
summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’
toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
“spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that
PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last
resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. 108 A
writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as
applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The
factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws
and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v.
Harris,109 it was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the  relative remoteness of
the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,…ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even
attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.“110 It is subject to the same
principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free
speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is  vague in all its
possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP
1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision:

“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;”

Third provision:

“as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr.
Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or  ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion”
(in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state
of rebellion” emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakaswas Section 4, Chapter 2,
Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls
for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or
not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the
character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist
in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.” 113

In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice” on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 114 an authority in
constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses
the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle
or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the
people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires.

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;
(c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can
be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.  It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: “Take Care” Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as
to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the
Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” 116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ
the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, 117 including the Philippine
National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government. 119

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza,
and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the
clause “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.”

Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from Former President
Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article
VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the
Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees“?

PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.“

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance
of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.121

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national
emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military
not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17,
Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without
any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the “martial law” thinking of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972
instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over “the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the
Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.“

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17,
Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “ other national
emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
“state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then
is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia  are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different
clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other. 123 Considering thatSection 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section
17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et
al. v. Sawyer,125 held:

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.
And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential
power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in
Article II which say that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;” that “he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed;” and that he “shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged
in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though “theater of war” be an
expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power
to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first
article says that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . .”126

Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term “emergency” under Section 17, Article XII refers to “tsunami,”
“typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences.”This is a limited view of “emergency.”

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or
well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and
perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)economic,128b)natural disaster,129 and c)national
security.130

“Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or
epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is evident in the Records of the
Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee’s definition of “national emergency” which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads:

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.

MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?

MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term “national emergency.”

MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service. 132

xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if “national emergency” refers to military national emergency or could this
be economic emergency?”

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133

It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to
delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised,
remains in Congress even in times of crisis.

“x x x

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains
that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling
of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how
serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have
specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department—unless we regard as
legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting
a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances ‘the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial,’ given the ability to act, are called upon ‘to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities
committed to them respectively.”

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,  without legislation,  the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.

c. “AS APPLIED CHALLENGE”

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the
guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are
curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the
greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate “direct injury.”

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on
their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the
arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune  Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG
operatives “raided and ransacked without warrant” their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible
“source of destabilization.” Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were “turned away and dispersed”
when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.

A perusal of the “direct injuries” allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts?  In general, does the illegal
implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in
a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command
the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted
President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal
arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The
answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of
situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this
were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations
create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them. 139 They are based on and are
the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. 140 For these reasons, one requirement
for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”

Unlike the term “lawless violence” which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably
associated with “invasion, insurrection or rebellion,” the phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept.
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

In fact, this “definitional predicament” or the “absence of an agreed definition of terrorism” confronts not only our country, but
the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the “fight against terrorism” has become one of the basic slogans when it
comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states
“sponsoring terrorism” and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not
always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these military actions—or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States
against Iraq—consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as
liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying “One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter.” The apparent
contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term “terrorism” may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that
leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben
Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but
later became internationally respected statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts—the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually
legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue
of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who
associate “terrorism” with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military
installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or
against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of
organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—which is a terrorist group for Israel and a
liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims—the Kashmiri resistance groups—who are terrorists in the perception of India,
liberation fighters in that of Pakistan—the earlier Contras in Nicaragua—freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the
Socialist camp—or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War
period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet
Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way—
because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its
actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states.
Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power
in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will “fluctuate” accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the
rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a “liberation struggle,” not of “terrorism” when
acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these
conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-
state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A “policy of double standards” on this vital issue of
international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.

This “definitional predicament” of an organization consisting of sovereign states—and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in
the Preamble to the United Nations Charter!—has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one
superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium
powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 I the United States.141

The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An
illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act
as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part.
It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the
corresponding penalty thereon.

So far, the word “terrorism” appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by
President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled “Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and
Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations.” The word “terrorism” is mentioned in the following
provision: “That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x
x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal  x x x.”

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define “acts of terrorism.” Since there is no law defining
“acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares
that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are  necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise,
such acts are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396(David et al.)

The Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,  and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” 142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests
are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed
with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 143

In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City
where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen
who “held his head and tried to push him” inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually
released for insufficiency of evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.

Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to seditionand violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that
some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally. 146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge
of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally. 147

But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but
also their right to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

“Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression,
the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a
permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public
place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of
that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In  De Jonge v.
Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot
be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if
the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the
freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other
violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses,
seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.

On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No.
171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits
previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present dangerof a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”149 Tolerance is the rule and
limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny
the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts
amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected
and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have
the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of
clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. 150 The first time
they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.

G.R. No. 171409,(Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners’
narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were
searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted
at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribuneexcept the security guard of the building; and fifth,  policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
Tribune offices.

Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying
that such raid was “meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would
help the rebels in bringing down this government.” Director General Lomibao further stated that “if they do not follow
the standards—and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not
subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017—we will recommend a ‘takeover.’” National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to “cooperate“ with the government for the
duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of
any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is
threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and
seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made  in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the
degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In theBurgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that—

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the “Metropolitan Mail” and the “We
Forum” newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print.
This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the
above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of
materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribuneoffices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the
citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. 153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions
because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it
involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the seizure of
its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible “for any purpose,” thus:

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of
gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the
admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for
any purpose.155

xxxxxxxxx

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you
have to go there at 1 o’clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of
rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017.

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and
inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Is it based on any law?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don’t know if it is premature to say this,  we do not condone this. If the
people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156

Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot
be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I don’t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I
said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of
the police officers, that is their responsibility. 157

The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and “should result in no
constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter.”

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this
point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and
illegal.

In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of
this ponencia.

SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021—a supervening event—would have normally rendered this case
moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof.
Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media
reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed “if the May 1 rallies” become “unruly and violent.”
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be “evaded;” they must now be resolved to prevent
future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in
the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President—acting as Commander-in-Chief—
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard—that
the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.”But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and
made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced
generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s
authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of
the Tribune  offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual
police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes
of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this
Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves.
How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual
rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in
breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it
is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to
the governed.158

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a
call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP
1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.“ Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45685             November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATIONPetitioners,
vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge .of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,Respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari  and of prohibition to
the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in
criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter
prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for
probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final
judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the
plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case
entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge  ad interim of the
seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner
herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial
unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the
testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment
of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of
prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven
days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and
four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on
December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in             November, 1936. This court, on             November 24, 1936,
denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new
trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on            
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that
he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge
Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the
same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality
of Act No. 4221.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han
establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o
incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of
the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the
reason that:

. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo
de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las
suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de
una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones
enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and
a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by
counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as  amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-
four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion
subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae  on the ground that the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae  was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937,
and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me
(him)."chanrobles virtual law library

On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of
the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to
said judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied
with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu
Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants
for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City
of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both
motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion
for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this
juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an
interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and
ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."chanrobles virtual law library
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by
this court on August 21, 1937.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the
respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following
reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the
Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the
term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is
also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has
provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular
Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being
different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.

II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for
reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937,
denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:

(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for
probation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and
executory at the moment of its rendition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same.

III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted by
final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore
in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first
instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued his
order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to
jail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further
contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or
over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its
province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an
unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones
Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the
further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law
(section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In
another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners,
the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to
grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No.
4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of
legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the
City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and
the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint
memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional
because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that
the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private
prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court
may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each and
every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As special defenses, respondents allege:

(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of  certiorari or of
prohibition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for
by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial
court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is
unappealable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as
to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance
has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the
case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial
court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."chanrobles virtual law
library

(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by the
trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although
the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First
Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court
is appealable to the superior court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same
had not become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration
and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining
order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not
final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the
hearing of the said motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the
accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it
believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a
rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorarigrounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could
have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a
reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or
resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in
the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order
execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be
closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional
because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not
infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an
additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is
free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation
proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped
from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that
probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last
memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by
resolution of this court and filed anew on             November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised
by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in
passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the
task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation
case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings
and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil.,
333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of
inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated
judicial system of the nation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers
to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said
Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule
that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised
and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-
782, 783.)chanrobles virtual law library

The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may
be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not
plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus  proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a
statute may be questioned in habeas corpus  proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117),
although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the
determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regardsprohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059;
Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S],
843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present
one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent
in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972
was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the
judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction,
however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:

By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent
jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of
first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court
that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried
regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where
a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions,
the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of
the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed.,
714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A.
1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E,
938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the
petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad
powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition
will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its
decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal
without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex
parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A.,
799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields
[1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)chanrobles virtual law library

Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in
detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they
have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the
sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and
Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909],
156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58
Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E,
1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under
the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent
judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:

Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose
the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such
subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert
their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the
proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the
proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that
indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance
to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise
beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according
to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29
Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences
pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents
are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the question
has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30
S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the
constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon
the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise
said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and
762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court
will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio  take up the
constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with
due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on
the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo  admits that the constitutional question was
raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein
reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the
application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are
parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the
statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by
persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the
issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in
an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26
Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion,
may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (  In re  Woolsey [1884],
95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may
be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil
cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville &
B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108;
Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will
be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911],
175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before
this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of  Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on
the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper
party to raise the constitutional question here - a point we do not now have to decide - we are of the opinion that the People of
the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law.
ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan,
through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining
corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was
though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction
of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And,
even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that
the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-
Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict
of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court
or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional
question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of
the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage
Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has
been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of
the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional
question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of  Yu
Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the
private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here - a point we do not now have to decide - we
are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is
such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of
an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277
U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the
Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the
State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because
it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the
statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:

. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives;
that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is
an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only
in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted.
The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature
and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice
Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep
and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1
Sum., 314.)

In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-
General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may
bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party - indeed, the proper party - to bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity
of its Constitution or statutes is involved.

"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show
grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707;
103 Pac., 839.)

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise
his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its
validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State
vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel.
vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).

Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H.
Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's
[1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918],
187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme
Court of Luisiana said:

It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no
right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State  ex rel. Hall, District
Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New
Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47
L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict
with one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should
not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information
charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional
until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a
party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute
imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State  ex
rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer,
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the
state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in
his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the
Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.

The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may impugn the
validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have
proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be
invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that
the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge
the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10,
17 and 23.)chanrobles virtual law library

The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason
for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised
before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the
statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual law
library

It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the
instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of
wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other
points." ( Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286,
287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of
the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212
N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan
vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the
right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs.
Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the
respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being
assailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition
to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted
of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely
take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of
about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271
U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo
vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said:
"Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and
inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide
the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point
was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can
not be found.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the
main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?chanrobles virtual law library

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear
implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act
of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as
well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself."
(U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913],
26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the
Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been
true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts
cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the
governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of
the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will
not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the President of
the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the
Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity
and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937,
recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the
approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out
from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this
connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the
reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual
controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his
opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time
pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is
expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from
taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any
vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less
than of the Legislative department of our government - independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any
consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as
we see it and as we understand it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning
power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal
protection of the laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval
of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to
grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art.
VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive"
found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be
granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction ( Vide Constitution of the United States,
Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the
President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our
Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only
be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of
impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States ( Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec.
2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone,
"after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further
restrained or abridged." ( Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass.,
323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is
obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to
the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence,
inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the
offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution
also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such
conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution
but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental
changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is:
Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?chanrobles virtual law
library

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may
not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. 
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions,
nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have
nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases
cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is
exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon
the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?chanrobles virtual law library

In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an
order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. ( Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A.
1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities,
expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and
that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not
in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief
Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by
probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to
enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them
for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately
complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and
others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925
(chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses
of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)chanrobles
virtual law library

In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United
States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his
sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not
considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:

Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of probation either, by
suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte
United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme
Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for
action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual
law library

Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably
reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a
probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for definite action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment of those convicted
of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation
law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles
and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)

The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States  supra,
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:

Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no
manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special
reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh
Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.

We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as
possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the
constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by
the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law
under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities.
In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of
the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment."
And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The
legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer
on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the
punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455;
95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the
legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts - particularly the trial courts - large discretion in imposing the
penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should
suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed
in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see
art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a
crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64,
paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty
prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are
allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1,
of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of
age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the
period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And,
in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art.
59, Revised Penal Code.)chanrobles virtual law library

Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of
imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is
more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof
are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within
the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age
(art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is
serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of
such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly
demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in
1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting
the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in
imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act
No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act
have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently
reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the
legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by
law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The
Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the
conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with
the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a
judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of
criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." ( Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162
Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it
attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the
power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may
be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."chanrobles virtual law
library

We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in
the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the
pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9
Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908],
22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903],
202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L.
R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People
vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)chanrobles virtual law library
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F.
[2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871;
48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac.,
392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin
vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State
[1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135
Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909],
156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925],
73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State  ex rel.
Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates
[1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y.,
288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y.
Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp.,
49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275;
233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112;
70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S.
W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W.,
998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S.
W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211;
54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State
vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29;
26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs.
Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted
in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that
the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms
as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional
provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, ReGiannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122
Pac., 831.)chanrobles virtual law library

Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both
in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R.
A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:

. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was
always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or
indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is
rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. ( Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs.
Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)chanrobles virtual law library

The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant
pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the
words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in
the colonies. ( Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend
any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and
pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal
courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left separate and
distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute
which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, - a power
inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial
function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach,
in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times.
(Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring,
at pp. 294, 295.)

In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not
exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by
the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and
the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the
probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the
conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody - subject to the control of
the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and,
when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No.
4221.)

The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of
punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal
laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to
the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or
rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the
Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67
Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in
support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief
Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the
indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons
convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of
sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:

That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the
decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a
reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs.
People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115,
6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a
commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.

In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under
consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised
Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:

. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was
adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is
employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the
laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed
(United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a
forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs.
Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite"
is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind.,
373).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but
the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to
whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose.
(See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The
President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)chanrobles virtual law library

2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void,
does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?chanrobles virtual law library

Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially
independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its
authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The power to make laws - the legislative power - is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a
unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or
the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This
principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there
developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation
of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an
accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the
rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the
following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature
to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state
has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted
cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias
[1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter
of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)chanrobles virtual law library

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An
exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a
cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation
of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not
regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to
the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas.,
688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C.
J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616).
However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and
referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S.,
118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by
certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of
the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379;
1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may
be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix
within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article
of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the
foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the
other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles
virtual law library

The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute
was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil.,
1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the
proclamation a crime. ( See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil.,
136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-
179.)chanrobles virtual law library

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in
this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at
least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves
around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action - or the sufficiency thereof - in the statute, to aid the delegate in
exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still
others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. ( See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947;
People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L.,
title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are
fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a
"roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature
does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application
of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the
Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect
are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court
sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries.
In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on
unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held
proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the
importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased
among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."chanrobles virtual law library

It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we
were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs.
Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)chanrobles virtual law library

It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is
true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people
of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate
a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65
N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially
legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental
process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee
[1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this
modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July,
1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147,
152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof.
Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language - speaking of declaration of legislative
power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may
determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this
authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In
other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative
action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what
the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it
may designate." ( See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.)
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the
specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act
contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute
and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule, - limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into
consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give
any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which
rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time - we cannot say when - the provincial boards may appropriate
funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute.
The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other
than legislature itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law
in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or
by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state
shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation
of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not
confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or
the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by
others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs.
James  ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:

By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of
suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived
from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William
and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the
protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of
dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in the
claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of
parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by  non
obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a
dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power
here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all
governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  chanrobles virtual
law library

The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the
people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the
exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according
to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting
this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the
general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the
first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy
privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses,
damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.

To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic
animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power
was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by
the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The
court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in
such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38
Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec.,
275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county
should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation
of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county for the period
specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in
force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to
the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an
original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became
by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act
in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent
provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the
former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge
before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be
delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the
abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order
suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present
indictment . . . ." ( See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)chanrobles virtual law library
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while
recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the
submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They
relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be
differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject,
though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the
class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving
matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe
that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject
of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the
statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces
but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation
officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation
Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating
the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.
(Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)chanrobles virtual law library

It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed
legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible
reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the
people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind
that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain
exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person
of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)chanrobles virtual law library

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on
the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs.
North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
(Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily
or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F.
Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil.,
136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.],
489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79,
55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S.,
375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54
Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)  chanrobles virtual law
library

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in
the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act
would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its
provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer - which is the situation now - and, also, if
we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and
that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different
situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in
section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to
be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of
setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of
Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a
law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust
and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275;
23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25
Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28
Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218;
18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed.,
Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the
law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.
S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80
A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one
province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year - and have probation during that year - and
thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to
the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but
"a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
255.)chanrobles virtual law library

Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law.
ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to
uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman
vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial
uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases
originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal
protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila
(Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the
defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a
due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an
analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney - although not in the form
had in the provinces - was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the
city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of
Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain
counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The
provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of
territorial jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-
protection clause of our Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not
the entire Act should be avoided.

In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination
only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs.
Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S.,
235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In  Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this
court stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:chanrobles virtual law
library

. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446;
Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.)
The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to
the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255;
51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill.,
279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the
invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N.
W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
[1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)

It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the
Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is,
in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left
is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the
intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards
through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the
provinces - and this is the actual situation now - appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation
under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given,
as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see
that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those
conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:

That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;chanrobles virtual law library

(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;chanrobles virtual law library

(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;chanrobles virtual law library

(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;chanrobles virtual law
library

(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition; "(f)
Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;chanrobles virtual law
library

(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense;chanrobles
virtual law library

(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; andchanrobles virtual law library

(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law.

The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only
after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the
probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally
discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by
the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or
without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation,
and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of
probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his
supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep
informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such
other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement
in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two
months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the
information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with the
functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as
parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when
designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one
Hundred and Three, without additional compensation."chanrobles virtual law library

It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under section 10 of Act
which provides as follows:

There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the
direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who
shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds
in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice,
who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil
service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil
Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act.

But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation
officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation
officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as
the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law
provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer"
shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer"
(sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries
on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the
probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in
charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to
require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in
Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct
him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of
provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is.
Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law
better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to
amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose - not
even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply
thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the
Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the
legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include
said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among
other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be
said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that
there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos
appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than
that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an
impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in
the provinces without probation officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in
other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty
to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the
rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into
hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as
the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313;
48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the
individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into
the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our
fundamental law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties,
as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we
have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the
cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is
supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40
Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our
attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because:

(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual character of
the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the
United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th
Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),chanrobles virtual law library

(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of
the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);chanrobles virtual law library

(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49
Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in
Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec.
1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environment.

Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner, 
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin. 3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of
rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master. 4 This practice was later compared to the
actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. 5 While the advent of refrigeration has
made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district
and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. 7Some scholars on the subject further use it
to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered 11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines
since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the
area of fund release, Section 3 12 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects 13 "shall be distributed x x
x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from
each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval
of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented 15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and
realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the
extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to
legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives
of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘" 16 During this period, the pork
barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators
for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill
prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives
added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act. 17 In the 1960‘s,
however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the
Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when
"one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under
the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports, 20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving
lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen
would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or
municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under
the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects", 21 or non-
public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood. 22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was
revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-
sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and
Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented 23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar
funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA 24 with an
initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, 25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the
implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from
1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of
project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993, 28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of
the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President. 29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the
1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency
concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations
which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the
Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case
of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The
same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM, 35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds"
and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998, 36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except
that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad
ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well
as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund. 39 The allocations for the School Building
Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security
Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund," 44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of
the funds.

It was in the year 2000 46 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior
consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing
agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was
expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment 48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the
funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year,
2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign.
Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted. 53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point
agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program
menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project
may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted 56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the
same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007, 57 2008,58 2009,59 and
201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors,
explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress 61anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO)
in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the
appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the
amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made
available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio
School" program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same
allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget. 63 Also, it was in 2007 that the
Government Procurement Policy Board 64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007),
amending the implementing rules and regulations 65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form
of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity 68(the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF Article included an express statement on
lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each,
broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on
realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed
the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural
Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is
within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment
released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x."
However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations 75 as well as fund realignment 76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the
allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House. 78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of
project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the
present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized
the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. 82 Due to the energy-related activities of
the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project", 83 the
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than
two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86 amending Section 1287 of the
former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered
by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, 89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents
who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. 90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19
percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the stories,
including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked
public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects." 96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits
of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into
Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some
of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the
several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation 99covering the use of
legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit
was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs). 101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and
VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period. 102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings
contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs
endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion
were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their
utilization of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were
not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in
the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds. 105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged
before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for
Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever
form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The Alcantara Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B.
Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA
and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to
2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566. 110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012
(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the
Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority. 111 The Nepomuceno
Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents
to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer,
the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before
the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes,
of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. 113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013,
Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply
dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral
Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent
Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments
representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to,
among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and
thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues
raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue;
and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain
ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an
actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 121 In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." 122 Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." 124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these
public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. 125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter,
remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render
the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the
passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your
Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty
to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the
release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the
meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code 128 x x x. So at most
the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report,
because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have
the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and
prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court
declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized
and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that
reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA, 131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the
CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of
the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in
the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when
the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only
when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems
the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s
constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of
disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the
courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more
importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national
budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not
cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014." 134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious
iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface
wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous
course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar
questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the
manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence,
must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of
the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is found, among others,
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the
best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province
to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government
but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because
it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the expanded concept of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant
of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner
impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm
constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own
sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons,
the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
"dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." 146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized.
It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so
rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be
classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a
systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls" 149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness
of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told, petitioners have sufficient
locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means
"follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the
effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the
applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa
and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases
at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to
present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who
actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up
held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or
reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil
Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue. 153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was
resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of
Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to
the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the
power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it
can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of
Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and
PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses
herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare
decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s
fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification
authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise,
the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should
exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of
law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in
the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same
case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds
for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and
current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa
insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that
such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party
List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of
the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in
the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not
apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System,"
"Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government
to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through
the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds
will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad
or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to
help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits. 157 They further state that the Pork Barrel
System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910
and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel
System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the
fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it
appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to
refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In
the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, 164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President, 165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of separation
of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided
to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording
its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of
another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches
on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two
(2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with
and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally
assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the
Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly
includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all
"other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in
the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of
the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona,
Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the
process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with
an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end
and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive." 176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be
made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the
assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way
past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179 They state that the findings and
recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over
project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers." 180 Further, they point out
that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to
recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation. 181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains
"ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘
proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to
propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory." 183 As such, they claim that
"everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, 185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed
from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special
Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to
identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly,
Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a
more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may
make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators" 188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified
by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project
identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be
seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund
release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release
of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to
participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4 189 which explicitly state s,
among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second ,
paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry 190 x x
x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among
others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation
of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said authority is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa
which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the
entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the
individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very
much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by
an identification from the legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator
make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only
in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must
be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno)
during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial
thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress
frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words
you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised
that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section
all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF
Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or
informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution
has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress,
acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President
to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 199The conceptual treatment and
limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren 200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote
the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
(Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority
to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. 201 That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes
an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor 202 (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. 203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment."
The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms
part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication." 205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained
that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-
making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to
the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his
will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant
of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief
Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict
construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power
as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or
of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is
meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object
of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." 211 This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that
the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered
as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may
be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be
allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice
Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes
shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on
singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said
funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be
tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both
the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple
purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money ‖ and
hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again,
both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of
the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the
demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which
are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount
would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made
by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire
₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. 215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-
sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e.,
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item
veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218
c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the
Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget"
which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners." 219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re-
election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of
impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘" 220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public
officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of
congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and
its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the
2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in
the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of
government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of
his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s
use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely
borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is
an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which
states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as
may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action. 226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, 227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the
policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units
(LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the
Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended
to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its
strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important,
imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be
blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and
inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to
the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds
for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual
members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement,
previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork
Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas
which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects. 232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech
on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally
established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to
make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local
autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following
wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole
credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of
the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local
autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the
Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively
provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that
Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. 237 In similar regard, petitioners argue
that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of
PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their
proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
"appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the
law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for
as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be
made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws
by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate
means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means
the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if
the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific"
purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under
contemplation of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements
such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration,
development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of
the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings
be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which
creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources"
(a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b)
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the
said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement
and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court
observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only
authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used." 243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making
authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-
making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed
adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview
of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own
position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development
is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it
allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the
avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same. 252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision
may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first,
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while
the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use
the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To
note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support
commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8
of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its
pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from
the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including
the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" 255 (Presidential Pork Use Report).
Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in
the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on
the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise,
the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant
duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by
the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not
include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it
is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant
a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding
duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any
law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested.
While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been
impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release
of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information
requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly
foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘
prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through
a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and
report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public
record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be
proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list
requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to
the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss
of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and
that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p.
538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-
budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from
the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of
the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response
to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM
issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been
issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long
as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned
prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of
funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that
once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are
already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a
matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the
consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision,
the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact
on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by
obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM
Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO
are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority
issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose
indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject
to separate approval or clearance by competent authority." 263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay.
Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the
disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release
of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is subsequent to
the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments: 265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments.
The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the
SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing
banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect,
therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding
NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from
an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released –
meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were
altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-
stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article
and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective
in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the
invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect
and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the
language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the
Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it
operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has
flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it
has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect
of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred
to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may
deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once
more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court
has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or
similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision
today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged
by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s
bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court
hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in
any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional
oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which
the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases
(1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910
and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations
(NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining
PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer
seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and
the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds
subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these
funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory
prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations
of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to
the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 G.R. No. 176278               June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as
Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications
despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’
confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and
mootness,2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised,
novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as
Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March
2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the
mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. 3 Petitioner theorizes
that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the
DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents)
raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. 4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public
respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent
Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does
not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the
propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender
for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated retirement age applies only to career
diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to
citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent
resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of
the crucial issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or
statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. 6 None of
petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a
statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission
that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more
direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age
unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring
enforcement of the law.1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’ contributions to the state’s coffers
entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. 7 However, the
salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive
issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in the annual
budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment),
respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, 8 negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of
scarce public funds."9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law
bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post
at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it
a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies.
In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades
and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of
the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens reain crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code,  all of which are purportedly clear violations
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a  combination or series of overt or criminal acts  as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove  each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 ( Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack
of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that
the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July
2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder
as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is
fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force
of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To
doubt is to sustain." 5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public
officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of
the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as
follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR

PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE
DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern"
in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6 much less do we have to define every word
we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word
in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed
in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least,
can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT
OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there
are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if
it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder
there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood,
the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer
and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme
or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would
be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14cräläwvirtualibräry

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge
a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19cräläwvirtualibräry

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."  21Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24cräläwvirtualibräry

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore,
its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged. 27cräläwvirtualibräry

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible
of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of TheAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three
(3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge
of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated
because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from
the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3
[e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. 30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in
the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than  P100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is  P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because,
say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able
to accumulate only  P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate  P1 million. Now, when we add the
totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so
how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be  P110 or P120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is  P100 million, then there is
a crime of plunder(underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no
need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31cräläwvirtualibräry

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element
of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that
you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause
of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of
plunder.33cräläwvirtualibräry

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34cräläwvirtualibräry

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens reamust be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35cräläwvirtualibräry

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetuato death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:36cräläwvirtualibräry

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well
as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659
is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution
now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its
very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder
Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society
against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED , this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.

Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.

Kapunan,  Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez,Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.

Mendoza  , J., please see concurring opinion.

Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149036            April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, 

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C.
 DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on
Elections, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag ("Petitioner" for
brevity) questions the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo
("Benipayo" for brevity) as Chairman of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity); and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra
("Borra" for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. ("Tuason" for brevity) as COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions
the legality of the appointment of Velma J. Cinco 1 ("Cinco" for brevity) as Director IV of the COMELEC’s Education and
Information Department ("EID" for brevity).

The Facts

On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then
Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On
February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
"Temporary" capacity.2

On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,3and Borra4 and
Tuason5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his
oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed
their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May
22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation. 6 However, the Commission on
Appointments did not act on said appointments.

On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions
and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. 7 They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office
of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. 8

Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. 9 The Office
of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. 10 They took their oaths of
office anew.

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 11 addressed to petitioner as Director
IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning
petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment
in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 12 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned
Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.

On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department.13 Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads
of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until
June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, 14 citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, which states in part:

"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
to appoint, hire new employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the effective
performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of its field
personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing."

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23,
2001.15 Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law Department17 against Benipayo, alleging that
her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments
of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department. Simultaneously, petitioner challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID. Petitioner,
moreover, questions the legality of the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon
C. De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other emoluments.

In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interimappointments of
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on
February 2, 2008.18 They all took their oaths of office anew.

The Issues

The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows:

1. Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in
constitutional cases;
2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interimappointments issued by
the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal,
whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate
the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

4. Whether or not Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body;

5. Whether or not the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELEC’s Finance Services Department, in continuing to make disbursements in
favor of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in excess of jurisdiction.

First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review

Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may exercise its power of judicial
review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-equal with this Court,
respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President
to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of
the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the
case.19 Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that
petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result
of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that
petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does
petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these three respondents.

Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the earliest
opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that the  ad interimappointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three
respondents were issued ad interim appointments.

Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law
Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of this case.

We are not persuaded.

Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department, where she was placed on
detail service.20 Respondents claim that the reassignment was "pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, and as the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer."21 Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of
petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not
Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is
without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.

On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution,
then petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s
assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her
with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition.

Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first  ad interimappointments were issued
as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before
a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial,
and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." 22 Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest
opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the
exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. 23 There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.

Moreover, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interimappointment and
assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the
legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined. Clearly, the  lis mota of this case
is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions
made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have
remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may even brush aside
technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised. 24 Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite
technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a temporary appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity." (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can
even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an  ad
interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.

Based on petitioner’s theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to the other two constitutional
commissions, namely the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. The last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution is also found in Article IX-B and Article IX-D providing for the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that the ad
interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments for only then
does his appointment become permanent and no longer temporary in character.

The rationale behind petitioner’s theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments can
guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the
Commission on Appointments since his appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the
appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time for
any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword of Damocles hangs over the head of every appointee whose confirmation is
pending with the Commission on Appointments.

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an
ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an  ad interim appointment is permanent in character.
In Summers vs. Ozaeta,25 decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:
"x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that the ‘President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other
than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is
merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued." (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interimappointment takes
effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the
office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,26 this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad
interim appointment as follows:

"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His
title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’"

Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being."
Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not new and
was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 where we explained that:

"x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in understanding the situation.
Private respondent had been extended several ‘ad interim’ appointments which petitioner mistakenly understands as
appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word ‘ ad interim’ which creates such belief. The
term is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an officer  ad interim is one appointed to fill a
vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black’s Law
Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Dr. Esteban’s appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him.  Rather, it is
used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the
meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is
unable to act. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that
can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite
legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an  ad interim appointment
in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals,28where the Court stated:

"We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not
indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr.
was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive
Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that
private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at
any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them." (Emphasis supplied)

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore
part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that "[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." 29 Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable
once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
removal from office.30 Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by
statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of
his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the
heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of
Damocles over the heads of the ad interimappointees.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. 31A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC. Thus,  in
Brillantes vs. Yorac,32 this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate
Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:

"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
xxx

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is
the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines."

Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,33 a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did not have a provision
prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, this Court nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation
of the Solicitor General as acting member of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an acting Commissioner
would undermine the independence of the COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. We declared then: "It would be more in
keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a  permanent Commissioner than to
designate one to act temporarily." (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner
Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36 , this provision should be harmonized with the
President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission
on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power
to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments - did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout
the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. The following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission elucidates this:

"FR. BERNAS: X x x our compulsory recess now is only 30 days. So under such circumstances, is it necessary to provide for ad
interim appointments? Perhaps there should be a little discussion on that.

xxx

MS. AQUINO: My concern is that unless this problem is addressed, this might present problems in terms of anticipating
interruption of government business, considering that we are not certain of the length of involuntary recess or adjournment of
the Congress. We are certain, however, of the involuntary adjournment of the Congress which is 30 days, but we cannot leave to
conjecture the matter of involuntary recess.

FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are trying to look for a formula. I wonder if the Commissioner has a formula x x x.

xxx

MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the matter raised by Commissioner Aquino and after conferring with the
Committee, Commissioner Aquino and I propose the following amendment as the last paragraph of Section 16, the wordings of
which are in the 1935 Constitution: THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS
OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT BE VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL
DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.

This is otherwise called the ad interim appointments.

xxx

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the proposed amendment of Commissioners Aquino and Bengzon, adding a paragraph
to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved."37 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of
avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices,
including the three constitutional commissions. In his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes,38 decided under the 1935
Constitution, Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in this manner:

"Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited? Because, if they expired before the session of Congress, the evil
sought to be avoided – interruption in the discharge of essential functions – may take place. Because the same evil would result
if the appointments ceased to be effective during the session of Congress and before its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once
Congress has adjourned, the evil aforementioned may easily be conjured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or
reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution barely avoided the interruption of
essential government services in the May 2001 national elections. Following the decision of this Court in Gaminde vs.
Commission on Appointments,39 promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms of office of constitutional officers first appointed
under the Constitution would have to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the date of ratification of the Constitution,
regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this reckoning, the terms of office of three Commissioners of the
COMELEC, including the Chairman, would end on February 2, 2001. 40

Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou was appointed only on January 11, 2000 to serve, pursuant to her
appointment papers, until February 15, 2002, 41 the original expiry date of the term of her predecessor, Justice Bernardo P. Pardo,
who was elevated to this Court. The original expiry date of the term of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores was also
February 15, 2002, while that of Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was November 3, 2001. 42 The original expiry dates of the terms
of office of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners Flores and Desamito were therefore supposed to fall after the May 2001
elections. Suddenly and unexpectedly, because of the Gaminde ruling, there were three vacancies in the seven-person COMELEC,
with national elections looming less than three and one-half months away. To their credit, Chairperson Demetriou and
Commissioner Flores vacated their offices on February 2, 2001 and did not question any more before this Court the applicability
of the Gaminderuling to their own situation.

In a Manifestation43 dated December 28, 2000 filed with this Court in the Gaminde case, Chairperson Demetriou stated that she
was vacating her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed any delay in choosing her successor might create a "constitutional
crisis" in view of the proximity of the May 2001 national elections. Commissioner Desamito chose to file a petition for
intervention44 in the Gaminde case but this Court denied the intervention. Thus, Commissioner Desamito also vacated his office
on February 2, 2001.

During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess between February and June considering that many of the
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate run for re-election. In 2001, the Eleventh Congress adjourned from
January 9, 2001 to June 3, 2001. 45 Concededly, there was no more time for Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, who were originally
extended ad interim appointments only on March 22, 2001, to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before the May
14, 2001 elections.

If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to fill up the three vacancies in the COMELEC, there
would only have been one division functioning in the COMELEC instead of two during the May 2001 elections. Considering that
the Constitution requires that "all x x x election cases shall be heard and decided in division", 46 the remaining one division would
have been swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by
the Commission en banc", the mere absence of one of the four remaining members would have prevented a quorum, a less than
ideal situation considering that the Commissioners are expected to travel around the country before, during and after the
elections. There was a great probability that disruptions in the conduct of the May 2001 elections could occur because of the
three vacancies in the COMELEC. The successful conduct of the May 2001 national elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II
and EDSA III events, was certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad interimappointments
prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound
judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two
modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an  ad
interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.

Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within
the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of
the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.

The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC is a long-standing practice. Former President Corazon
Aquino issued an ad interim appointment to Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg.47 Former President Fidel V. Ramos extended ad
interim appointments to Commissioners Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Guiani, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F.
Gorospe.48 Former President Joseph Estrada also extended ad interim appointments to Commissioners Abdul Gani M.
Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and Ralph C. Lantion. 49

The President’s power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the
appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, is only for a short period - from the time of issuance of the  ad
interim appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this
situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the check-and-balance
under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The
Constitution has wisely subjected the President’s appointing power to the checking power of the legislature.

This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the
COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and not one President
will appoint all the COMELEC members. 50 In the instant case, the Commission on Appointments had long confirmed four 51 of the
incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a majority, who could now be removed from office only by impeachment. The special
constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the COMELEC remain in place. 52 The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy,
appoints its own officials and employees, and promulgates its own rules on pleadings and practice. Moreover, the salaries of
COMELEC members cannot be decreased during their tenure.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments

Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as
follows:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last members for three years, without reappointment. X x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad interim
appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits
reappointments. Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, which is the
situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in character.

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a
new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on
the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide
for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In
this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment,
but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is
another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the
ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, which provides as follows:

"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the
President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the
President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission." (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President
renews the appointment.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed appointees. Justice
Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes53why by-passed ad
interim appointees could be extended new appointments, thus:

"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because the incumbent can not
continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the
Congress", simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the
Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect
adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied
disapproval of ad interimappointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the
Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination
of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the
circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or
reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present
Constitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim.54 The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad
interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the
present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation
of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for
a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the President.

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-
passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interimappointment
because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited
under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x  for
a term of seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four situations where this provision will apply. The
first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves
his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because
he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a
part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving
more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died
or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or
chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven
years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from
death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an
unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are
less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies
to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC member –
whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of
time – can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this manner:

"MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of  Visarra vs. Miraflor,
to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where
the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words
"without reappointment" in the case of those appointed, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on their
case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.

Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of those first appointed under the
Constitution, no reappointment can be made."55 (Emphasis supplied)

In Visarra vs. Miraflor,56 Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring opinion, quoted Nacionalista vs. De Vera57that a
"[r]eappointment is not prohibited when a Commissioner has held office only for, say, three or six years, provided his term will
not exceed nine years in all." This was the interpretation despite the express provision in the 1935 Constitution that a COMELEC
member "shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed."

To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present
Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second
phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of
appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of
office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.

However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term
of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an
unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of
a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the
confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.

The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise
will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.

In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the  ad
interim  appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will
certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere
inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make  ad
interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a
proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.

The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution
prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously
appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three
constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. As reported in the  Journal of the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who sponsored 58 the proposed articles on the three constitutional commissions,
outlined the four important features of the proposed articles, to wit:

"Mr. Foz stated that the Committee had introduced basic changes in the common provision affecting the three Constitutional
Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal autonomy which provides (that) appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released to the Commission in the same manner (as) provided for the Judiciary; 2) fixed term of office without reappointment on
a staggered basis to ensure continuity of functions and to minimize the opportunity of the President to appoint all the members
during his incumbency; 3) prohibition to decrease salaries of the members of the Commissions during their term of office; and 4)
appointments of members would not require confirmation." 59 (Emphasis supplied)

There were two important amendments subsequently made by the Constitutional Commission to these four features. First, as
discussed earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided to require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of all
appointments to the constitutional commissions. Second, the framers decided to strengthen further the prohibition on serving
beyond the fixed seven-year term, in the light of a former chair of the Commission on Audit remaining in office for 12 years
despite his fixed term of seven years. The following exchange in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

"MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarificatory questions, Madam President. May I call the sponsor’s attention, first of all, to Section
2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein it is stated: "In no case shall any Member be appointed in a temporary or acting
capacity." I detect in the Committee’s proposed resolutions a constitutional hangover, if I may use the term, from the past
administration. Am I correct in concluding that the reason the Committee introduced this particular provision is to avoid an
incident similar to the case of the Honorable Francisco Tantuico who was appointed in an acting capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit for about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and then in 1980, was appointed as Chairman with a tenure of
another 7 years. So, if we follow that appointment to (its) logical conclusion, he occupied that position for about 12 years in
violation of the Constitution?

MR. FOZ: It is only one of the considerations. Another is really to make sure that any member who is appointed to any of the
commissions does not serve beyond 7 years."60 (Emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Christian Monsod further clarified the prohibition on reappointment in this manner:

"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is no reappointment of any kind and,
therefore as a whole there is no way that somebody can serve for more than seven years.  The purpose of the last sentence is to
make sure that this does not happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting capacities."61 (Emphasis
supplied)

Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any kind. On the other
hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on
reappointment that may result in an appointee’s total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by
the twin prohibitions are very specific - reappointment of any kind and exceeding one’s term in office beyond the maximum
period of seven years.
Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution tightened even further the screws on those
who might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word "designated" was inserted to plug any loophole that might be
exploited by violators of the Constitution, as shown in the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, between the words "appointed" and "in", I propose to insert the words OR DESIGNATED so that
the whole sentence will read: "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): What does the Committee say?

MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning of this sentence. The sentence reads: "In no case shall any Member be appointed in a
temporary or acting capacity."

MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding Officer, the reason for this amendment is that some lawyers make a distinction between an
appointment and a designation. The Gentleman will recall that in the case of Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think his term
exceeded the constitutional limit but the Minister of Justice opined that it did not because he was only designated during the time
that he acted as Commissioner on Audit. So, in order to erase that distinction between appointment and designation, we should
specifically place the word so that there will be no more ambiguity. "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED
in a temporary or acting capacity."

MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved."62

The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the
prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and
renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008.63 Any delay in their confirmation
will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad
interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions
in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms
of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

Fourth Issue: Respondent Benipayo’s Authority to Reassign Petitioner

Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and reassign her to the Law
Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a collegial body, can authorize such reassignment.
Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process and
therefore illegal.
Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We
have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the
powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following power:

"Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the
Commission, shall:

xxx

(4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law
to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner’s appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, attached as Annexes "X",
"Y" and "Z" to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in an acting or
temporary capacity.64 Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive
Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications
Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. 65 Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as
Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal,66 this Court held that:

"As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position
cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in  Achacoso v.
Macaraig:

‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only ‘to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.’ Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and ‘at
a moment’s notice’, conformably to established jurisprudence x x x.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even
if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated x x x.’"
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the necessary qualifications to hold the
position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law. This
time, the vigorous argument of petitioner that a temporary or acting appointment can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure
of the appointing power happens to apply squarely to her situation.

Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited act under Section 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which provides as follows:

"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service - Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail
whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon
prior approval of the Commission."

Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect transfers or reassignments of
COMELEC personnel during the election period. 67 Moreover, petitioner insists that the COMELEC en banc must concur to every
transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period.

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6,
2000,68 exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. The resolution states in part:

"WHEREAS, Sec. 56 and Sec. 261, paragraphs (g) and (h), of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:

xxx

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service – Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail
whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon
approval of the Commission.

WHEREAS, the aforequoted provisions are applicable to the national and local elections on May 14, 2001;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to appoint, transfer or reassign personnel of the Commission on Elections during the
prohibited period in order that it can carry out its constitutional duty to conduct free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections;

"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
to appoint, hire new employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the effective
performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of its field
personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing." (Emphasis supplied)

The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or reassignment can be made
within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the
petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Code,69 the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power
to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power
because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.

COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the
concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the
resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the
resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such
transfer or reassignment.

The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person
holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the
transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order reassigning petitioner from
the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayo’s
order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable.

Fifth Issue: Legality of Disbursements to Respondents

Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent Gideon C. De Guzman, Officer-in-Charge of the Finance Services Department of
the Commission on Elections, did not act in excess of jurisdiction in paying the salaries and other emoluments of Benipayo,
Borra, Tuason and Cinco.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166006               March 14, 2008

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders,
presidential decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional
Trial Courts.

The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with
modification that of the RTC in Makati City, 2 finding petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) liable to private respondent Fertiphil
Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465.

The Facts

Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. 3 They are both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.

On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the
Philippines.4 The LOI provides:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution
component of not less than ₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI
viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. 5 (Underscoring
supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid ₱10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.
Fertiphil paid ₱6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986. 6
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the ₱10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil
demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. 7

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages 8 against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to
a denial of due process of law.9 Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the
proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

In its Answer,10 FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police
power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain
any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.

RTC Disposition

On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Planters Product, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the former:

1) the sum of ₱6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand;

2) the sum of ₱100,000 as attorney’s fees;

3) the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling that the imposition of the ₱10 CRC was an exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy
for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose, viz.:

It is apparent that the imposition of ₱10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the exercise of the
power of taxation. It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is plenary. Comprehensive and supreme, the
principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents. However, there
are two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the constitutional limitations.

One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public purposes:

The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose. By the same token, taxes may not be levied
for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the redress of private wrongs. They cannot be levied for
the improvement of private property, or for the benefit, and promotion of private enterprises, except where the aid is incident to
the public benefit. It is well-settled principle of constitutional law that no general tax can be levied except for the purpose of
raising money which is to be expended for public use. Funds cannot be exacted under the guise of taxation to promote a purpose
that is not of public interest. Without such limitation, the power to tax could be exercised or employed as an authority to destroy
the economy of the people. A tax, however, is not held void on the ground of want of public interest unless the want of such
interest is clear. (71 Am. Jur. pp. 371-372)

In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of ₱6,698,144.00 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant to the ₱10
per bag of fertilizer sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the defendant Planters Products, Inc.
thru the latter’s depository bank, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the plaintiff, Fertiphil Corporation,
which is a private domestic corporation, became poorer by the amount of ₱6,698,144.00 and the defendant, Planters Product,
Inc., another private domestic corporation, became richer by the amount of ₱6,698,144.00.

Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-quoted jurisprudence, it is quite evident that LOI 1465
insofar as it imposes the amount of ₱10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and orders that the said amount should go to the
defendant Planters Product, Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate that a tax can be levied only for a public purpose
and not to benefit, aid and promote a private enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc. 12

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 13 PPI then filed a notice of appeal with the RTC but it failed to pay the
requisite appeal docket fee. In a separate but related proceeding, this Court 14 allowed the appeal of PPI and remanded the case
to the CA for proper disposition.

CA Decision

On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming with modification that of the RTC, with the following fallo:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED.15

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA ruled that the lis mota of the complaint for collection was the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465, thus:

The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially determine the constitutionality of
the subject statute in the instant case.

As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law (Lim v.
Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.

However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following requisites are obtaining in a controversy
before it: First, there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 [2000]).
Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also
reveals that the instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is
present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465. 16

The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is still
unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare. The CA explained:

In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was an invalid exercise of
the State’s power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for
public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the
latter used to advance its private interest.

On the other hand, appellant submits that the subject statute’s passage was a valid exercise of police power. In addition, it
disputes the court a quo’s findings arguing that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation,
Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PPI.

Of the three fundamental powers of the State, the exercise of police power has been characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It may be exercised as long as the
activity or the property sought to be regulated has some relevance to public welfare (Constitutional Law, by Isagani A. Cruz, p.
38, 1995 Edition).

Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, which requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure as
follows: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals (National Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257 [1990]).

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial court’s holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure, ensuring
the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the
method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The
government’s commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an
unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute’s impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like
PPI, as identical with the general interest of the country’s farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress,
substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a statute’s public
purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an
arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues
derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals.17
The CA did not accept PPI’s claim that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Inc., a
foundation created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI. The CA stated:

Appellant next claims that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a
foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PFI on the strength of Letter of
Undertaking (LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on April 18, 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice in an
Opinion dated October 12, 1987, to wit:

"2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the
outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters Foundation), which unpaid
capital is estimated at approximately ₱206 million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) (such unpaid
portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the ‘Unpaid Capital’), and subsequently for such
capital increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

The capital recovery component shall be in the minimum amount of ₱10 per bag, which will be added to the price of all domestic
sales of fertilizer in the Philippines by any importer and/or fertilizer mother company. In this connection, the Republic hereby
acknowledges that the advances by Planters to Planters Foundation which were applied to the payment of the Planters shares
now held in trust by Planters Foundation, have been assigned to, among others, the Creditors. Accordingly, the Republic, through
FPA, hereby agrees to deposit the proceeds of the capital recovery component in the special trust account designated in the
notice dated April 2, 1985, addressed by counsel for the Creditors to Planters Foundation. Such proceeds shall be deposited by
FPA on or before the 15th day of each month.

The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or
(b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on the amounts
which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables and (d) the capital increases
contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the ‘carrying cost’ shall be at such rate as will
represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations." (Records, pp. 42-43)

Appellant’s proposition is open to question, to say the least. The LOU issued by then Prime Minister Virata taken together with
the Justice Secretary’s Opinion does not preponderantly demonstrate that the collections made were held in trust in favor of
millions of farmers. Unfortunately for appellant, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish its claims, this Court is
constrained to rely on what is explicitly provided in LOI 1465 – that one of the primary aims in imposing the levy is to support
the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI. 18

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 19 It then filed the present petition with this Court.

Issues

Petitioner PPI raises four issues for Our consideration, viz.:

I

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN
A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION AND DAMAGES WHERE THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE VERY LIS MOTA OF
THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI 1465 BE CHALLENGED BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH HAS NO STANDING TO DO SO.

II

LOI 1465, BEING A LAW IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING THE FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE
COUNTRY, AND FOR BENEFITING A FOUNDATION CREATED BY LAW TO HOLD IN TRUST FOR MILLIONS OF FARMERS THEIR
STOCK OWNERSHIP IN PPI CONSTITUTES A VALID LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF TAXATION AND POLICE
POWER FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES.

III

THE AMOUNT COLLECTED UNDER THE CAPITAL RECOVERY COMPONENT WAS REMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND BECAME
GOVERNMENT FUNDS PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE AND VALIDLY ENACTED LAW WHICH IMPOSED DUTIES AND CONFERRED
RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "OPERATIVE FACT" PRIOR TO ANY DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI
1465.

IV

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST VEXATION (SHOULD BE ENRICHMENT) FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.20 (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

We shall first tackle the procedural issues of locus standi and the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues.

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be
waived.

PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a
"personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 21 It asserts that Fertiphil
did not suffer any damage from the CRC imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers
themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company." 22

We cannot agree. The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by
this Court in a catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a
case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 23
In public suits, this Court recognizes the difficulty of applying the doctrine especially when plaintiff asserts a public right on
behalf of the general public because of conflicting public policy issues. 24 On one end, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to
petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the other end, there is the public
policy precluding excessive judicial interference in official acts, which may unnecessarily hinder the delivery of basic public
services.

In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the "direct injury test" to determine locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera, 25 it was
held that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The "direct injury test" in public suits is similar to the "real party in
interest" rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 26

Recognizing that a strict application of the "direct injury" test may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in
cases of "transcendental importance" or with "far reaching implications." Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been
held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest. 27

Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil
suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the ₱10 levy imposed for every
bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate
consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it
bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of
payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The
levy certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their
business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to
meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be
competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.

Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the liberal policy consistently adopted by this Court on locus
standi must apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It involves not only the constitutionality of
a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes for public purpose. Former President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 with the
intention of rehabilitating an ailing private company. This is clear from the text of the LOI. PPI is expressly named in the LOI as
the direct beneficiary of the levy. Worse, the levy was made dependent and conditional upon PPI becoming financially viable. The
LOI provided that "the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable."

The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of the statute. It is Our constitutional duty to squarely
resolve the issue as the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies. The doctrine of standing, being a mere procedural
technicality, should be waived, if at all, to adequately thresh out an important constitutional issue.
RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue was adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the
case.

PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality of the
LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection. 28 Alternatively, the resolution of the constitutional issue is not
necessary for a determination of the complaint for collection. 29

Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the constitutionality
of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue. 30

It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive order.
This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Underscoring supplied)

In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,31 this Court recognized the power of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues, thus:

On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.32

In the recent case of Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 33 this Court reiterated:

There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this Court
alone for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules promulgated by
administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.34

Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions
cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal actions, as in
People v. Ferrer35 involving the constitutionality of the now defunct Anti-Subversion law, or in ordinary actions, as in Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds36 involving the constitutionality of laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring public lands. The constitutional issue,
however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. 37

Contrary to PPI’s claim, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised in the complaint for collection
filed with the RTC. The pertinent portions of the complaint allege:

6. The CRC of ₱10 per bag levied under LOI 1465 on domestic sales of all grades of fertilizer in the Philippines, is  unlawful,
unjust, uncalled for, unreasonable, inequitable and oppressive because:

xxxx

(c) It favors only one private domestic corporation, i.e., defendant PPPI, and imposed at the expense and disadvantage of the
other fertilizer importers/distributors who were themselves in tight business situation and were then exerting all efforts and
maximizing management and marketing skills to remain viable;

xxxx

(e) It was a glaring example of crony capitalism, a forced program through which the PPI, having been presumptuously
masqueraded as "the" fertilizer industry itself, was the sole and anointed beneficiary;

7. The CRC was an unlawful; and unconstitutional special assessment and its imposition is tantamount to illegal exaction
amounting to a denial of due process since the persons of entities which had to bear the burden of paying the CRC derived no
benefit therefrom; that on the contrary it was used by PPI in trying to regain its former despicable monopoly of the fertilizer
industry to the detriment of other distributors and importers. 38 (Underscoring supplied)

The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to
compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The
thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy.
Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code principle against
unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order
PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the
refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.

The ₱10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation.

At any rate, the Court holds that the RTC and the CA did not err in ruling against the constitutionality of the LOI.

PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI was
implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for benefiting a foundation
created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI.
Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private company. The levy was
imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still
unconstitutional because it did not promote the general welfare of the people or public interest.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for
validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare,39 while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main
purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects"
and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. 40 The power of taxation, on
the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While it is true that the
power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power, 41 the primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly
called a tax.42

In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu,43 it was held that the imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State of
its police power, but of its taxation power, thus:

It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth Act 123 and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code that the legislative intent and purpose behind the law requiring owners of vehicles to pay for their registration is  mainly to
raise funds for the construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the operating expenses of
the administering agency. x x x Fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of
regulation.

Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148).  If the purpose is primarily
revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the
case of motor vehicle registration fees. The same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land Transportation Code. It is
patent therefrom that the legislators had in mind a regulatory tax as the law refers to the imposition on the registration,
operation or ownership of a motor vehicle as a "tax or fee." x x x Simply put, if the exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a
regulatory fee, the imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an "additional" tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other "fees" such
as the special permit fees for certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10) and additional fees for change of registration (Sec.
11). These are not to be understood as taxes because such fees are very minimal to be revenue-raising . Thus, they are not
mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as taxes like the motor vehicle registration fee and chauffeurs’ license fee. Such fees are to
go into the expenditures of the Land Transportation Commission as provided for in the last proviso of Sec. 61. 44 (Underscoring
supplied)

The ₱10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on
the seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. 45 A plain reading of
the LOI also supports the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided that the levy was
imposed "until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable."

Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The ₱10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The levy
was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.

An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. 46 The reason for this is simple. The power to tax
exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose. It
would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States
case bluntly put it: "To lay with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to
bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is
done under the forms of law and is called taxation." 47

The term "public purpose" is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence
states that "public purpose" should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those purposes which are
traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes
those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.

While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are continually expanding in light of the expansion of government
functions, the inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a public purpose still stands. Public purpose is the heart of
a tax law. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and
advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of "public purpose."

The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other secondary sources. Here, We agree with the RTC and that
CA that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose.

First, the LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. The purpose is explicit from Clause
3 of the law, thus:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution
component of not less than ₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI
viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. 48 (Underscoring
supplied)

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the text of a statute should be given a literal meaning. In this case, the text of the
LOI is plain that the levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI. The framers of the LOI did not even hide the insidious
purpose of the law. They were cavalier enough to name PPI as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes levied under the LOI. We find
it utterly repulsive that a tax law would expressly name a private company as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes to be levied
from the public. This is a clear case of crony capitalism.
Second, the LOI provides that the imposition of the ₱10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially
"viable." This suggests that the levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. The LOI notably does not fix a maximum amount when
PPI is deemed financially "viable." Worse, the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of fertilizer to pay the levy is made
indefinite. They are required to continuously pay the levy until adequate capital is raised for PPI.

Third, the RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far East Bank
and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. 49 This proves that PPI benefited from the LOI. It is also proves that the main
purpose of the law was to give undue benefit and advantage to PPI.

Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. A reading of the Letter of Understanding 50 dated May 18, 1985
signed by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata reveals that PPI was in deep financial problem because of its huge corporate debts.
There were pending petitions for rehabilitation against PPI before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The government
guaranteed payment of PPI’s debts to its foreign creditors. To fund the payment, President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465. The
pertinent portions of the letter of understanding read:

Republic of the Philippines

Office of the Prime Minister
Manila

LETTER OF UNDERTAKING

May 18, 1985

TO: THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

LISTED IN ANNEX A HERETO WHICH ARE
CREDITORS (COLLECTIVELY, THE "CREDITORS")
OF PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. ("PLANTERS")

Gentlemen:

This has reference to Planters which is the principal importer and distributor of fertilizer, pesticides and agricultural chemicals in
the Philippines. As regards Planters, the Philippine Government confirms its awareness of the following: (1) that Planters has
outstanding obligations in foreign currency and/or pesos, to the Creditors, (2) that Planters is currently experiencing financial
difficulties, and (3) that there are presently pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippines a petition
filed at Planters’ own behest for the suspension of payment of all its obligations , and a separate petition filed by Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company, Manila Offshore Branch for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for Planters.

In connection with the foregoing, the Republic of the Philippines (the "Republic") confirms that it considers and continues to
consider Planters as a major fertilizer distributor. Accordingly, for and in consideration of your expressed willingness to consider
and participate in the effort to rehabilitate Planters, the Republic hereby manifests its full and unqualified support of the
successful rehabilitation and continuing viability of Planters, and to that end, hereby binds and obligates itself to the creditors
and Planters, as follows:

xxxx

2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to  include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the
outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. ("Planters Foundation"), which unpaid
capital is estimated at approximately ₱206 million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) such unpaid portion
of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the "Unpaid Capital"), and subsequently for such capital
increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

xxxx

The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or
(b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on the amounts
which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables, and (d) the capital increases
contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the "carrying cost" shall be at such rate as will
represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

By:

(signed)
CESAR E. A. VIRATA
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance51

It is clear from the Letter of Understanding that the levy was imposed precisely to pay the corporate debts of PPI. We cannot
agree with PPI that the levy was imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. The letter of
understanding and the plain text of the LOI clearly indicate that the levy was exacted for the benefit of a private corporation.

All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. LOI
No. 1465 failed to comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws.

The LOI is still unconstitutional even if enacted under the police power; it did not promote public interest.

Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with
the test of "lawful subjects" and "lawful means." Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 52
For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to
give undue advantage to a private corporation. We quote with approval the CA ratiocination on this point, thus:

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial court’s holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. 1awphil To be sure,
ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However,
the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare.  The
government’s commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an
unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute’s impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like
PPI, as identical with the general interest of the country’s farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress,
substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed.  When a statute’s public
purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an
arbitrary exercise of government power.To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues
derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals. (Underscoring
supplied)

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact is inapplicable.

PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of
operative fact, which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to
retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.

We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the
court a quo.53 PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It cannot belatedly
raise the issue with Us in order to extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law.

At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights,
imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been
passed.54 Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general
civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. 55It nullifies
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.56
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy57 or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. 58

Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly
benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account.
Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of
Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of performance by another comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him." We cannot
allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 171101               November 22, 2011

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,Petitioners-in-
Intervention, 
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL
MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR
ANDAYA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For resolution are the (1) Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. (HLI); (2) Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011 filed by public respondents Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) and Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); (3) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011 filed by
private respondent Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA); (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 21, 2011 filed by respondent-intervenor Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM); (5) Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. (Supervisory Group) and Windsor Andaya (collectively referred to as "Mallari, et al."); and (6) Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011 filed by private respondents Rene Galang and AMBALA. 2

On July 5, 2011, this Court promulgated a Decision 3 in the above-captioned case, denying the petition filed by HLI and affirming
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and PARC Resolution No.
2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006 with the modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda
Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.

In its Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011, HLI raises the following issues for Our
consideration:

IT IS NOT PROPER, EITHER IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, TO DISTRIBUTE TO THE ORIGINAL FWBs OF 6,296 THE UNSPENT OR
UNUSED BALANCE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF THE 500 HECTARES AND 80.51 HECTARES OF THE HLI LAND, BECAUSE:

(1) THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE BELONG TO THE CORPORATION, HLI, AS CORPORATE CAPITAL AND ASSETS IN SUBSTITUTION
FOR THE PORTIONS OF ITS LAND ASSET WHICH WERE SOLD TO THIRD PARTY;

(2) TO DISTRIBUTE THE CASH SALES PROCEEDS OF THE PORTIONS OF THE LAND ASSET TO THE FWBs, WHO ARE
STOCKHOLDERS OF HLI, IS TO DISSOLVE THE CORPORATION AND DISTRIBUTE THE PROCEEDS AS LIQUIDATING DIVIDENDS
WITHOUT EVEN PAYING THE CREDITORS OF THE CORPORATION;

(3) THE DOING OF SAID ACTS WOULD VIOLATE THE STRINGENT PROVISIONS OF THE CORPORATION CODE AND CORPORATE
PRACTICE.

IT IS NOT PROPER, EITHER IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, TO RECKON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FROM NOVEMBER 21,
1989 WHEN THE PARC, THEN UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF DAR SECRETARY MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, APPROVED THE
STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP) PROPOSED BY TADECO/HLI, BECAUSE:

(1) THAT PARC RESOLUTION NO. 89-12-2 DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1989 WAS NOT THE "ACTUAL TAKING" OF THE
TADECO’s/HLI’s AGRICULTURAL LAND;

(2) THE RECALL OR REVOCATION UNDER RESOLUTION NO. 2005-32-01 OF THAT SDP BY THE NEW PARC UNDER THE
CHAIRMANSHIP OF DAR SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN ON DECEMBER 22, 2005 OR 16 YEARS EARLIER WHEN THE SDP
WAS APPROVED DID NOT RESULT IN "ACTUAL TAKING" ON NOVEMBER 21, 1989;
(3) TO PAY THE JUST COMPENSATION AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1989 OR 22 YEARS BACK WOULD BE ARBITRARY, UNJUST, AND
OPPRESSIVE, CONSIDERING THE IMPROVEMENTS, EXPENSES IN THE MAINTENANCE AND PRESERVATION OF THE LAND, AND
RISE IN LAND PRICES OR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.

On the other hand, PARC and DAR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raise the following issues in their Motion for
Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011:

THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

THERE IS NO LAW OR RULE WHICH HAS BEEN INVALIDATED ON THE GROUND OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; AND

II

THIS DOCTRINE IS A RULE OF EQUITY WHICH MAY BE APPLIED ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A LAW. IN THIS CASE, THERE IS A
POSITIVE LAW WHICH MANDATES THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LAND AS A RESULT OF THE REVOCATION OF THE STOCK
DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP).

For its part, AMBALA poses the following issues in its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011:

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 31 OF
REPUBLIC ACT 6657 (RA 6657) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

II

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ONLY THE
[PARC’S] APPROVAL OF HLI’s PROPOSAL FOR STOCK DISTRIBUTION UNDER CARP AND THE [SDP] WERE REVOKED AND NOT
THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT (SDOA).

III

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
OPERATIVE FACTS AND IN MAKING THE [FWBs] CHOOSE TO OPT FOR ACTUAL LAND DISTRIBUTION OR TO REMAIN AS
STOCKHOLDERS OF [HLI].

IV

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IMPROVING THE
ECONOMIC STATUS OF FWBs IS NOT AMONG THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF HLI UNDER THE SDP AND AN IMPERATIVE
IMPOSITION BY [RA 6657] AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10 (DAO 10).
V

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVERSION OF THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS DID
NOT VIOLATE THE CONDITIONS OF RA 6657 AND DAO 10.

VI

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION. SHOULD THE HONORABLE COURT AFFIRM THE ENTITLEMENT OF THE PETITIONER TO JUST COMPENSATION,
THE SAME SHOULD BE PEGGED TO FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 40,000.00) PER HECTARE.

VII

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP. (LIPCO) AND RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (RCBC) ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE.

In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011, FARM similarly puts forth the following issues:

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE STRUCK DOWN SECTION 31 OF [RA 6657] FOR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS-INTERVENORS IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF "OPERATIVE FACT" TO THE CASE. THE
OPTION GIVEN TO THE FARMERS TO REMAIN AS STOCKHOLDERS OF HACIENDA LUISITA IS EQUIVALENT TO AN OPTION FOR
HACIENDA LUISITA TO RETAIN LAND IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. THE
DECEPTIVE STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION / STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN CANNOT JUSTIFY SUCH RESULT, ESPECIALLY AFTER
THE SUPREME COURT HAS AFFIRMED ITS REVOCATION.

III

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED [LIPCO] AND [RCBC] AS INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR
VALUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

Mallari, et al., on the other hand, advance the following grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21,
2011:

(1) THE HOMELOTS REQUIRED TO BE DISTRIBUTED HAVE ALL BEEN DISTRIBUTED PURSUANT TO THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT. WHAT REMAINS MERELY IS THE RELEASE OF TITLE FROM THE REGISTER OF DEEDS.

(2) THERE HAS BEEN NO DILUTION OF SHARES. CORPORATE RECORDS WOULD SHOW THAT IF EVER NOT ALL OF THE
18,804.32 SHARES WERE GIVEN TO THE ACTUAL ORIGINAL FARMWORKER BENEFICIARY, THE RECIPIENT OF THE DIFFERENCE
IS THE NEXT OF KIN OR CHILDREN OF SAID ORIGINAL [FWBs]. HENCE, WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT SINCE THE SHARES
WERE GIVEN TO THE SAME "FAMILY BENEFICIARY", THIS SHOULD BE DEEMED AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF DAO 10.

(3) THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE 3-MONTH PERIOD TO IMPLEMENT THE [SDP] AS PROVIDED FOR BY SECTION 11
OF DAO 10 AS THIS PROVISION MUST BE READ IN LIGHT OF SECTION 10 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229, THE PERTINENT
PORTION OF WHICH READS, "THE APPROVAL BY THE PARC OF A PLAN FOR SUCH STOCK DISTRIBUTION, AND ITS INITIAL
IMPLEMENTATION, SHALL BE DEEMED COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAND DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENT OF THE CARP."

(4) THE VALUATION OF THE LAND CANNOT BE BASED AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1989, THE DATE OF APPROVAL OF THE STOCK
DISTRIBUTION OPTION. INSTEAD, WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE "TIME OF TAKING" FOR VALUATION PURPOSES IS A
FACTUAL ISSUE BEST LEFT FOR THE TRIAL COURTS TO DECIDE.

(5) TO THOSE WHO WILL CHOOSE LAND, THEY MUST RETURN WHAT WAS GIVEN TO THEM UNDER THE SDP. IT WOULD BE
UNFAIR IF THEY ARE ALLOWED TO GET THE LAND AND AT THE SAME TIME HOLD ON TO THE BENEFITS THEY RECEIVED
PURSUANT TO THE SDP IN THE SAME WAY AS THOSE WHO WILL CHOOSE TO STAY WITH THE SDO.

Lastly, Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the Public Interest Law Center (PILC), submit the following grounds in support of their
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011:

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE HOLDING OF A VOTING OPTION INSTEAD
OF TOTALLY REDISTRIBUTING THE SUBJECT LANDS TO [FWBs] in [HLI].

A. THE HOLDING OF A VOTING OPTION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS. THE REVOCATION OF THE [SDP] CARRIES WITH IT THE
REVOCATION OF THE [SDOA].

B. GIVING THE [FWBs] THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS STOCKHOLDERS OF HLI WITHOUT MAKING THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN
THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE WOULD ONLY SUBJECT THEM TO FURTHER MANIPULATION AND HARDSHIP.

C. OTHER VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY HLI UNDER THE [SDOA] AND PERTINENT LAWS JUSTIFY TOTAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION
OF HACIENDA LUISITA.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE [RCBC] AND [LIPCO] ARE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE OF THE 300-HECTARE PROPERTY IN HACIENDA LUISITA THAT WAS SOLD TO THEM PRIOR TO THE
INCEPTION OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY.
Ultimately, the issues for Our consideration are the following: (1) applicability of the operative fact doctrine; (2) constitutionality
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; (3) coverage of compulsory acquisition; (4) just
compensation; (5) sale to third parties; (6) the violations of HLI; and (7) control over agricultural lands.

We shall discuss these issues accordingly.

I. Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine

In their motion for partial reconsideration, DAR and PARC argue that the doctrine of operative fact does not apply to the instant
case since: (1) there is no law or rule which has been invalidated on the ground of unconstitutionality; 4(2) the doctrine of
operative fact is a rule of equity which may be applied only in the absence of a law, and in this case, they maintain that there is
a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the stock distribution plan (SDP). 5

Echoing the stance of DAR and PARC, AMBALA submits that the operative fact doctrine should only be made to apply in the
extreme case in which equity demands it, which allegedly is not in the instant case. 6 It further argues that there would be no
undue harshness or injury to HLI in case lands are actually distributed to the farmworkers, and that the decision which orders
the farmworkers to choose whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or to opt for land distribution would result in inequity and
prejudice to the farmworkers.7 The foregoing views are also similarly shared by Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC. 8 In
addition, FARM posits that the option given to the FWBs is equivalent to an option for HLI to retain land in direct violation of RA
6657.9

(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to

Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws

Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared
unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have discussed in Our
July 5, 2011 Decision:

That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts––in this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for
stock distribution––is well-settled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held:

Petitioner postulates that the "operative fact" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine
which could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office.

On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements implementing the SMDRP
is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored, citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines.

The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious.

The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive
act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:
x x x           x x x          x x x

This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, wherein we ruled that:

Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less
retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave
application. For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or
omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is
an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from
relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.

The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further explicated by this Court in Rieta v. People, thus:

Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law upon
which it was predicated — General Order No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos — was subsequently declared by
the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera, 33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is
inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of various presidential
issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court said:

". . .. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

‘The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
. . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’

x x x           x x x          x x x

"Similarly, the implementation/ enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is ‘an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration . . . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’"
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity of
taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and
presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 — long before our Decision
in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner — is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored. (Citations
omitted; emphasis in the original.)

Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 10––an executive act––was declared invalid in the instant case, the operative
fact doctrine is clearly applicable.

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to
statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or
those which are quasi-legislative in nature. Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase "executive act" used in the case of De
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank 11 refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law.
The minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito,12 where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to executive acts, which are ultimately
quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what "executive act" mean.
Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning
in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase "executive act" does not have such specific definition under existing
laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term "executive act" is confined
to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term "executive act" is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and
agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.

A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public
Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. 13 In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in
violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the
appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good faith and in reliance of the
appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.

In Tan v. Barrios,14 this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the
military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon the rights
of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 15it was ruled that "military tribunals pertain
to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives." 16
Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department
that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and rules and
regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the
executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to
encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact
doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in
nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such
acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.

Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force
and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or
recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must
be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from
the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.

More importantly, respondents, and even the minority, failed to clearly explain how the option to remain in HLI granted to
individual farmers would result in inequity and prejudice. We can only surmise that respondents misinterpreted the option as a
referendum where all the FWBs will be bound by a majority vote favoring the retention of all the 6,296 FWBs as HLI
stockholders. Respondents are definitely mistaken. The fallo of Our July 5, 2011 Decision is unequivocal that only those FWBs
who signified their desire to remain as HLI stockholders are entitled to 18,804.32 shares each, while those who opted not to
remain as HLI stockholders will be given land by DAR. Thus, referendum was not required but only individual options were
granted to each FWB whether or not they will remain in HLI.

The application of the operative fact doctrine to the FWBs is not iniquitous and prejudicial to their interests but is actually
beneficial and fair to them. First, they are granted the right to remain in HLI as stockholders and they acquired said shares
without paying their value to the corporation. On the other hand, the qualified FWBs are required to pay the value of the land to
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) if land is awarded to them by DAR pursuant to RA 6657. If the qualified FWBs really want
agricultural land, then they can simply say no to the option. And second, if the operative fact doctrine is not applied to them,
then the FWBs will be required to return to HLI the 3% production share, the 3% share in the proceeds of the sale of the 500-
hectare converted land, and the 80.51-hectare Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) lot, the homelots and other benefits
received by the FWBs from HLI. With the application of the operative fact doctrine, said benefits, homelots and the 3%
production share and 3% share from the sale of the 500-hectare and SCTEX lots shall be respected with no obligation to refund
or return them. The receipt of these things is an operative fact "that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored."

(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity

As mentioned above, respondents contend that the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity which may be applied only in the
absence of a law, and that in the instant case, there is a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a result of
the revocation of the SDP.

Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. 17 As a complement of legal jurisdiction, equity "seeks to reach and
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts." 18 Remarkably, it is applied
only in the absence of statutory law and never in contravention of said law. 19

In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied since there is a positive law,
particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the SDP. Pertinently,
the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states:

If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or the
plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or
corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

Markedly, the use of the word "or" under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 connotes that the law gives the corporate
landowner an "option" to avail of the stock distribution option or to have the SDP approved within two (2) years from the
approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the well-established principle in statutory construction that "[t]he
word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word." 20 In PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging, Inc.,21 this Court held:

Evidently, the letter did not make a demand for the payment of the P8,248,657.47 AND the return of the equipment; only either
one of the two was required. The demand letter was prepared and signed by Atty. Florecita R. Gonzales, presumably petitioner’s
counsel. As such, the use of "or" instead of "and" in the letter could hardly be treated as a simple typographical error, bearing in
mind the nature of the demand, the amount involved, and the fact that it was made by a lawyer. Certainly Atty. Gonzales would
have known that a world of difference exists between "and" and "or" in the manner that the word was employed in the letter.

A rule in statutory construction is that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing
from other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation. 22

In its elementary sense, "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often
connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of
the enumeration are to be taken separately.23

The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated.24 (Emphasis in the original.)
Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period reckoned from June 1988 when
RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Pertinently, said provision does not bar
Us from applying the operative fact doctrine.

Besides, it should be recognized that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, affirmed the revocation of Resolution No. 89-12-2
and ruled for the compulsory coverage of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita in view of HLI’s violation of the SDP and DAO
10. By applying the operative fact doctrine, this Court merely gave the qualified FWBs the option to remain as stockholders of
HLI and ruled that they will retain the homelots and other benefits which they received from HLI by virtue of the SDP.

It bears stressing that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 Decision is favorable to the
FWBs because not only were the FWBs allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
This is in recognition of the fact that despite the claims of certain farmer groups that they represent the qualified FWBs in
Hacienda Luisita, none of them can show that they are duly authorized to speak on their behalf. As We have mentioned, "To
date, such authorization document, which would logically include a list of the names of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be
submitted to be part of the records."

II. Constitutionality of Sec. 31, RA 6657

FARM insists that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is the lis mota of the case, raised at the earliest
opportunity, and not to be considered as moot and academic. 25

This contention is unmeritorious. As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to
explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, l989 when PARC
approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its members received benefits from
the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP via PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to
stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of
the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of the
provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31
only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from
November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM
members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality
of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM
failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from
the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it
is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly
questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise
obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The
unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If
some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
favored. Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:

Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review — means that the Court will not pass
upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such
as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved
unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members
previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support
a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said
section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA
6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "[T]hat after
June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing
law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, We maintain that this Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657. In this regard, We clarify that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. There was, however, a determination of the existence of an apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality, to which this Court ruled in the negative. Having clarified this matter,
all other points raised by both FARM and AMBALA concerning the constitutionality of RA 6657 deserve scant consideration.

III. Coverage of Compulsory Acquisition

FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75
hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares, 26 which is the agricultural land allegedly
covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco). 27

We cannot subscribe to this view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which
only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75
has. of agricultural land.

Moreover, as admitted by FARM itself, this issue was raised for the first time by FARM in its Memorandum dated September 24,
2010 filed before this Court.28 In this regard, it should be noted that "[a]s a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is
a limited form of review."29 The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope as it is restricted to resolving errors of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, and not errors of judgment. 30 To allow additional issues at this stage of the
proceedings is violative of fair play, justice and due process.31

Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform
law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not
transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

DAR, however, contends that the declaration of the area 32 to be awarded to each FWB is too restrictive. It stresses that in
agricultural landholdings like Hacienda Luisita, there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and this may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB.33 DAR also argues that the July 5, 2011 Decision of this Court does not give it any leeway in adjusting the
area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. 34

The argument is meritorious. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified
FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws
are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, 35 it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be
awarded.

(a) Conversion of Agricultural Lands

AMBALA insists that the conversion of the agricultural lands violated the conditions of RA 6657 and DAO 10, stating that "keeping
the land intact and unfragmented is one of the essential conditions of [the] SD[P], RA 6657 and DAO 10." 36 It asserts that "this
provision or conditionality is not mere decoration and is intended to ensure that the farmers can continue with the tillage of the
soil especially since it is the only occupation that majority of them knows." 37

We disagree. As We amply discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:

Contrary to the almost parallel stance of the respondents, keeping Hacienda Luisita unfragmented is also not among the
imperative impositions by the SDP, RA 6657, and DAO 10.
The Terminal Report states that the proposed distribution plan submitted in 1989 to the PARC effectively assured the intended
stock beneficiaries that the physical integrity of the farm shall remain inviolate. Accordingly, the Terminal Report and the PARC-
assailed resolution would take HLI to task for securing approval of the conversion to non-agricultural uses of 500 hectares of the
hacienda. In not too many words, the Report and the resolution view the conversion as an infringement of Sec. 5(a) of DAO 10
which reads: "a. that the continued operation of the corporation with its agricultural land intact and unfragmented is viable with
potential for growth and increased profitability."

The PARC is wrong.

In the first place, Sec. 5(a)––just like the succeeding Sec. 5(b) of DAO 10 on increased income and greater benefits to qualified
beneficiaries––is but one of the stated criteria to guide PARC in deciding on whether or not to accept an SDP. Said Sec. 5(a) does
not exact from the corporate landowner-applicant the undertaking to keep the farm intact and unfragmented ad infinitum. And
there is logic to HLI’s stated observation that the key phrase in the provision of Sec. 5(a) is "viability of corporate operations":
"[w]hat is thus required is not the agricultural land remaining intact x x x but the viability of the corporate operations with its
agricultural land being intact and unfragmented. Corporate operation may be viable even if the corporate agricultural land does
not remain intact or [un]fragmented."38

It is, of course, anti-climactic to mention that DAR viewed the conversion as not violative of any issuance, let alone undermining
the viability of Hacienda Luisita’s operation, as the DAR Secretary approved the land conversion applied for and its disposition via
his Conversion Order dated August 14, 1996 pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657 which reads:

Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands.¾After the lapse of five years from its award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR upon application of the beneficiary or landowner with due notice to the
affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the x x x conversion of the land and its dispositions. x x x

Moreover, it is worth noting that the application for conversion had the backing of 5,000 or so FWBs, including respondents Rene
Galang, and Jose Julio Suniga, then leaders of the AMBALA and the Supervisory Group, respectively, as evidenced by the
Manifesto of Support they signed and which was submitted to the DAR. 39 If at all, this means that AMBALA should be estopped
from questioning the conversion of a portion of Hacienda Luisita, which its leader has fully supported.

(b) LIPCO and RCBC as Innocent Purchasers for Value

The AMBALA, Rene Galang and the FARM are in accord that Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO) are not innocent purchasers for value. The AMBALA, in particular, argues that LIPCO, being a wholly-
owned subsidiary of HLI, is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of the agrarian dispute on the subject land and could not
feign ignorance of this fact, especially since they have the same directors and stockholders. 40 This is seconded by Rene Galang
and AMBALA, through the PILC, which intimate that a look at the General Information Sheets of the companies involved in the
transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita, specifically, Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), LIPCO and RCBC,
would readily reveal that their directors are interlocked and connected to Tadeco and HLI. 41 Rene Galang and AMBALA, through
the PILC, also allege that "with the clear-cut involvement of the leadership of all the corporations concerned, LIPCO and RCBC
cannot feign ignorance that the parcels of land they bought are under the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program [CARP] and that the conditions of the respective sales are imbued with public interest where normal property relations
in the Civil Law sense do not apply."42

Avowing that the land subject of conversion still remains undeveloped, Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC, further
insist that the condition that "[t]he development of the land should be completed within the period of five [5] years from the
issuance of this Order" was not complied with. AMBALA also argues that since RCBC and LIPCO merely stepped into the shoes of
HLI, then they must comply with the conditions imposed in the conversion order. 43

In addition, FARM avers that among the conditions attached to the conversion order, which RCBC and LIPCO necessarily have
knowledge of, are (a) that its approval shall in no way amend, diminish, or alter the undertaking and obligations of HLI as
contained in the [SDP] approved on November 21, 1989; and (b) that the benefits, wages and the like, received by the FWBs
shall not in any way be reduced or adversely affected, among others. 44

The contentions of respondents are wanting. In the first place, there is no denying that RCBC and LIPCO knew that the converted
lands they bought were under the coverage of CARP. Nevertheless, as We have mentioned in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, this
does not necessarily mean that both LIPCO and RCBC already acted in bad faith in purchasing the converted lands. As this Court
explained:

It cannot be claimed that RCBC and LIPCO acted in bad faith in acquiring the lots that were previously covered by the SDP. Good
faith "consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received it was the owner of the same and could convey
his title. Good faith requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the
land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where there is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage from another." It is the opposite of fraud.

To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock
distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they
are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots
were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by
them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP
land acquisition "after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes." Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them
the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes, granted the
conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA.
In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and
LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the second place, the allegation that the converted lands remain undeveloped is contradicted by the evidence on record,
particularly, Annex "X" of LIPCO’s Memorandum dated September 23, 2010, 45 which has photographs showing that the land has
been partly developed.46 Certainly, it is a general rule that the factual findings of administrative agencies are conclusive and
binding on the Court when supported by substantial evidence. 47However, this rule admits of certain exceptions, one of which is
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 48

In the third place, by arguing that the companies involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita have
interlocking directors and, thus, knowledge of one may already be imputed upon all the other companies, AMBALA and Rene
Galang, in effect, want this Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. However, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is
warranted "only in cases when the separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one." 49 As succinctly
discussed by the Court in Velarde v. Lopez, Inc.:50

Petitioner argues nevertheless that jurisdiction over the subsidiary is justified by piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Piercing
the veil of corporate fiction is warranted, however, only in cases when the separate legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the
corporations as merged into one. The rationale behind piercing a corporation’s identity is to remove the barrier between the
corporation from the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate
personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.

In applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the following requisites must be established: (1) control, not
merely majority or complete stock control; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest acts in contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights;
and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.  (Citations
omitted.)

Nowhere, however, in the pleadings and other records of the case can it be gathered that respondent has complete control over
Sky Vision, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked, so that Sky Vision had
at the time of the transaction no separate mind, will or existence of its own. The existence of interlocking directors, corporate
officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public
policy considerations.

Absent any allegation or proof of fraud or other public policy considerations, the existence of interlocking directors, officers and
stockholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction as in the instant case.

And in the fourth place, the fact that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, ordered the payment of the proceeds of the sale of
the converted land, and even of the 80.51-hectare land sold to the government, through the Bases Conversion Development
Authority, to the qualified FWBs, effectively fulfils the conditions in the conversion order, to wit: (1) that its approval shall in no
way amend, diminish, or alter the undertaking and obligations of HLI as contained in the SDP approved on November 21, 1989;
and (2) that the benefits, wages and the like, received by the FWBs shall not in any way be reduced or adversely affected,
among others.

A view has also been advanced that the 200-hectare lot transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) should be included in the
compulsory coverage because the corporation did not intervene.

We disagree. Since the 200-hectare lot formed part of the SDP that was nullified by PARC Resolution 2005-32-01, this Court is
constrained to make a ruling on the rights of LRC over the said lot. Moreover, the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita, of
which the 200-hectare portion sold to LRC and the 300-hectare portion subsequently acquired by LIPCO and RCBC were part of,
was already the subject of the August 14, 1996 DAR Conversion Order. By virtue of the said conversion order, the land was
already reclassified as industrial/commercial land not subject to compulsory coverage. Thus, if We place the 200-hectare lot sold
to LRC under compulsory coverage, this Court would, in effect, be disregarding the DAR Conversion Order, which has long
attained its finality. And as this Court held in Berboso v. CA, 51 "Once final and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be
questioned." Besides, to disregard the Conversion Order through the revocation of the approval of the SDP would create undue
prejudice to LRC, which is not even a party to the proceedings below, and would be tantamount to deprivation of property
without due process of law.

Nonethess, the minority is of the adamant view that since LRC failed to intervene in the instant case and was, therefore, unable
to present evidence supporting its good faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land, then LRC should be given full
opportunity to present its case before the DAR. This minority view is a contradiction in itself. Given that LRC did not intervene
and is, therefore, not a party to the instant case, then it would be incongruous to order them to present evidence before the
DAR. Such an order, if issued by this Court, would not be binding upon the LRC.

Moreover, LRC may be considered to have waived its right to participate in the instant petition since it did not intervene in the
DAR proceedings for the nullification of the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 which approved the SDP.

(c) Proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land

and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX

As previously mentioned, We ruled in Our July 5, 2011 Decision that since the Court excluded the 500-hectare lot subject of the
August 14, 1996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government from compulsory coverage,
then HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary, should be liable to the FWBs for the price received for said lots. Thus:

There is a claim that, since the sale and transfer of the 500 hectares of land subject of the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order
and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot came after compulsory coverage has taken place, the FWBs should have their corresponding
share of the land’s value. There is merit in the claim. Since the SDP approved by PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 has been nullified,
then all the lands subject of the SDP will automatically be subject of compulsory coverage under Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Since the
Court excluded the 500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired
by the government from the area covered by SDP, then HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary, shall be liable to the FWBs for the
price received for said lots. HLI shall be liable for the value received for the sale of the 200-hectare land to LRC in the amount of
PhP 500,000,000 and the equivalent value of the 12,000,000 shares of its subsidiary, Centennary, for the 300-hectare lot sold to
LIPCO for the consideration of PhP 750,000,000. Likewise, HLI shall be liable for PhP 80,511,500 as consideration for the sale of
the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot.

We, however, note that HLI has allegedly paid 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and 80.51-hectare SCTEX
lot to the FWBs. We also take into account the payment of taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of the land and HLI’s
statement that most, if not all, of the proceeds were used for legitimate corporate purposes. In order to determine once and for
all whether or not all the proceeds were properly utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary, DAR will engage the services of a
reputable accounting firm to be approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI to determine if the proceeds of the sale of the
500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot were actually used for legitimate corporate purposes, titling expenses and in
compliance with the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order. The cost of the audit will be shouldered by HLI. If after such audit, it is
determined that there remains a balance from the proceeds of the sale, then the balance shall be distributed to the qualified
FWBs.

HLI, however, takes exception to the above-mentioned ruling and contends that it is not proper to distribute the unspent or
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot to the qualified FWBs
for the following reasons: (1) the proceeds of the sale belong to the corporation, HLI, as corporate capital and assets in
substitution for the portions of its land asset which were sold to third parties; (2) to distribute the cash sales proceeds of the
portions of the land asset to the FWBs, who are stockholders of HLI, is to dissolve the corporation and distribute the proceeds as
liquidating dividends without even paying the creditors of the corporation; and (3) the doing of said acts would violate the
stringent provisions of the Corporation Code and corporate practice. 52

Apparently, HLI seeks recourse to the Corporation Code in order to avoid its liability to the FWBs for the price received for the
500-hectare converted lot and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot. However, as We have established in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, the
rights, obligations and remedies of the parties in the instant case are primarily governed by RA 6657 and HLI cannot shield itself
from the CARP coverage merely under the convenience of being a corporate entity. In this regard, it should be underscored that
the agricultural lands held by HLI by virtue of the SDP are no ordinary assets. These are special assets, because, originally, these
should have been distributed to the FWBs were it not for the approval of the SDP by PARC. Thus, the government cannot renege
on its responsibility over these assets. Likewise, HLI is no ordinary corporation as it was formed and organized precisely to make
use of these agricultural lands actually intended for distribution to the FWBs. Thus, it cannot shield itself from the coverage of
CARP by invoking the Corporation Code. As explained by the Court:

HLI also parlays the notion that the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead of to RA 6657, in
determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Code, it adds, should be the applicable law on the disposition of the
agricultural land of HLI.
Contrary to the view of HLI, the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodying the SDP are
primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that HLI was precisely created in order to comply with
RA 6657, which the OSG aptly described as the "mother law" of the SDOA and the SDP. 53 It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to
shield itself from the coverage of CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under the guise
of being a corporate entity.

Without in any way minimizing the relevance of the Corporation Code since the FWBs of HLI are also stockholders,
its applicability is limited as the rights of the parties arising from the SDP should not be made to supplant or
circumvent the agrarian reform program.

Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant. 54 Besides, the present impasse between HLI and the private respondents is not
an intra-corporate dispute which necessitates the application of the Corporation Code. What private respondents questioned
before the DAR is the proper implementation of the SDP and HLI’s compliance with RA 6657. Evidently, RA 6657 should be the
applicable law to the instant case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that the 500-hectare converted land, as well as the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot, should have been included in the
compulsory coverage were it not for their conversion and valid transfers, then it is only but proper that the price received for the
sale of these lots should be given to the qualified FWBs. In effect, the proceeds from the sale shall take the place of the lots.

The Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, however, takes into account, inter alia, the payment of taxes and expenses relating to
the transfer of the land, as well as HLI’s statement that most, if not all, of the proceeds were used for legitimate corporate
purposes. Accordingly, We ordered the deduction of the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to the transferees,
and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary for legitimate corporate purposes, among others.

On this note, DAR claims that the "[l]egitimate corporate expenses should not be deducted as there is no basis for it, especially
since only the auditing to be conducted on the financial records of HLI will reveal the amounts to be offset between HLI and the
FWBs."55

The contention is unmeritorious. The possibility of an offsetting should not prevent Us from deducting the legitimate corporate
expenses incurred by HLI and Centennary. After all, the Court has ordered for a proper auditing "[i]n order to determine once
and for all whether or not all the proceeds were properly utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary." In this regard, DAR is
tasked to "engage the services of a reputable accounting firm to be approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI to
determine if the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot were actually used for legitimate
corporate purposes, titling expenses and in compliance with the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order." Also, it should be noted
that it is HLI which shall shoulder the cost of audit to reduce the burden on the part of the FWBs. Concomitantly, the legitimate
corporate expenses incurred by HLI and Centennary, as will be determined by a reputable accounting firm to be engaged by
DAR, shall be among the allowable deductions from the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot.
We, however, find that the 3% production share should not be deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
converted land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot. The 3% production share, like the homelots, was among the benefits received
by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and, thus, should not be taken away from the FWBs.

Contrarily, the minority is of the view that as a consequence of the revocation of the SDP, the parties should be restored to their
respective conditions prior to its execution and approval, subject to the application of the principle of set-off or compensation.
Such view is patently misplaced.

The law on contracts, i.e. mutual restitution, does not apply to the case at bar. To reiterate, what was actually revoked by this
Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, is PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 approving the SDP. To elucidate, it was the SDP, not the
SDOA, which was presented for approval by Tadeco to DAR. 56 The SDP explained the mechanics of the stock distribution but did
not make any reference nor correlation to the SDOA. The pertinent portions of the proposal read:

MECHANICS OF STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN

Under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6657, a corporation owning agricultural land may distribute among the qualified
beneficiaries such proportion or percentage of its capital stock that the value of the agricultural land actually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to the corporation’s total assets. Conformably with this legal provision, Tarlac
Development Corporation hereby submits for approval a stock distribution plan that envisions the following: 57 (Terms and
conditions omitted; emphasis supplied)

xxxx

The above stock distribution plan is hereby submitted on the basis of all these benefits that the farmworker-beneficiaries of
Hacienda Luisita will receive under its provisions in addition to their regular compensation as farmhands in the agricultural
enterprise and the fringe benefits granted to them by their collective bargaining agreement with management. 58

Also, PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 reads as follows:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN OF TARLAC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY/HACIENDA LUISITA
INCORPORATED (TDC/HLI)

NOW THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded,

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the stock distribution plan of TDC/HLI.

UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED.59 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, what was approved by PARC is the SDP and not the SDOA. There is, therefore, no basis for this Court to apply the law
on contracts to the revocation of the said PARC Resolution.

IV. Just Compensation

In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be
transferred to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.

In its Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration, HLI disagrees with the foregoing ruling and contends that the "taking"
should be reckoned from finality of the Decision of this Court, or at the very least, the reckoning period may be tacked to
January 2, 2006, the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01
recalling/revoking the approval of the SDP.60

For their part, Mallari, et al. argue that the valuation of the land cannot be based on November 21, 1989, the date of approval of
the SDP. Instead, they aver that the date of "taking" for valuation purposes is a factual issue best left to the determination of the
trial courts.61

At the other end of the spectrum, AMBALA alleges that HLI should no longer be paid just compensation for the agricultural land
that will be distributed to the FWBs, since the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) already rendered a decision ordering "the
Cojuangcos to transfer the control of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which will distribute the land to small
farmers after compensating the landowners P3.988 million." 62 In the event, however, that this Court will rule that HLI is indeed
entitled to compensation, AMBALA contends that it should be pegged at forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) per hectare, since
this was the same value that Tadeco declared in 1989 to make sure that the farmers will not own the majority of its stocks. 63

Despite the above propositions, We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved
HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is
akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
FWBs. As this Court held in Perez-Rosario v. CA:64

It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political disturbances
that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people as well as the continuity of the national order. To
subdue these acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of the nation passed a series of laws calculated to
accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material standards of living and eliminate discontent. Agrarian reform is a
perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of social justice found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite
them, the extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing national consciousness, all command the great departments of
government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of
the law. But annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every effort to arrive
at an equitable solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they
sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice
happen to be on her side. In the occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect
societal harmony, the considerations of social advantage must be weighed, an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is
necessary in the adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social interdependence of these
interests, recognized. (Emphasis supplied.)

The minority contends that it is the date of the notice of coverage, that is, January 2, 2006, which is determinative of the just
compensation HLI is entitled to for its expropriated lands. To support its contention, it cited numerous cases where the time of
the taking was reckoned on the date of the issuance of the notice of coverage.

However, a perusal of the cases cited by the minority would reveal that none of them involved the stock distribution scheme.
Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. Moreover, it should be noted that it is precisely because the stock
distribution option is a distinctive mechanism under RA 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly with that of compulsory land
acquisition as these are two (2) different modalities under the agrarian reform program. As We have stated in Our July 5, 2011
Decision, RA 6657 "provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock transfer, pursuant to either of which the corporate
landowner can comply with CARP."

In this regard, it should be noted that when HLI submitted the SDP to DAR for approval, it cannot be gainsaid that the stock
distribution scheme is clearly HLI’s preferred modality in order to comply with CARP. And when the SDP was approved, stocks
were given to the FWBs in lieu of land distribution. As aptly observed by the minority itself, "[i]nstead of expropriating lands,
what the government took and distributed to the FWBs were shares of stock of petitioner HLI in proportion to the value of the
agricultural lands that should have been expropriated and turned over to the FWBs." It cannot, therefore, be denied that upon
the approval of the SDP submitted by HLI, the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita became subject of CARP coverage.
Evidently, the approval of the SDP took the place of a notice of coverage issued under compulsory acquisition.

Also, it is surprising that while the minority opines that under the stock distribution option, "title to the property remains with the
corporate landowner, which should presumably be dominated by farmers with majority stockholdings in the corporation," it still
insists that the just compensation that should be given to HLI is to be reckoned on January 2, 2006, the date of the issuance of
the notice of coverage, even after it found that the FWBs did not have the majority stockholdings in HLI contrary to the supposed
avowed policy of the law. In effect, what the minority wants is to prejudice the FWBs twice. Given that the FWBs should have
had majority stockholdings in HLI but did not, the minority still wants the government to pay higher just compensation to HLI.
Even if it is the government which will pay the just compensation to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as they will be paying
higher amortizations to the government if the "taking" will be considered to have taken place only on January 2, 2006.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final
and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to
determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.65

A view has also been advanced that HLI should pay the qualified FWBs rental for the use and possession of the land up to the
time it surrenders possession and control over these lands. What this view fails to consider is the fact that the FWBs are also
stockholders of HLI prior to the revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. Also, the income earned by the corporation from its
possession and use of the land ultimately redounded to the benefit of the FWBs based on its business operations in the form of
salaries, benefits voluntarily granted by HLI and other fringe benefits under their Collective Bargaining Agreement. That being
so, there would be unjust enrichment on the part of the FWBs if HLI will still be required to pay rent for the use of the land in
question.

V. Sale to Third Parties

There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme
on May 11, 1989, then the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999,
and, consequently, the qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with respect to their land interests to third
parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they have fully paid for the lands or not.

The proposition is erroneous. Sec. 27 of RA 6657 states:

SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a
period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase
the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by
the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian
Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior
approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall
give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter
has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land. (Emphasis supplied.)

To implement the above-quoted provision, inter alia, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989 (DAO 1) entitled
Rules and Procedures Governing Land Transactions. Said Rules set forth the rules on validity of land transactions, to wit:

II. RULES ON VALIDITY OF LAND TRANSACTIONS

A. The following transactions are valid:

1. Those executed by the original landowner in favor of the qualified beneficiary from among those certified by DAR.

2. Those in favor of the government, DAR or the Land Bank of the Philippines.

3. Those covering lands retained by the landowner under Section 6 of R.A. 6657 duly certified by the designated DAR Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) as a retention area, executed in favor of transferees whose total landholdings inclusive of the
land to be acquired do not exceed five (5) hectares; subject, however, to the right of pre-emption and/or redemption of
tenant/lessee under Section 11 and 12 of R.A. 3844, as amended.

xxxx

4. Those executed by beneficiaries covering lands acquired under any agrarian reform law in favor of the government, DAR, LBP
or other qualified beneficiaries certified by DAR.

5. Those executed after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the Emancipation Patent or Certificate of Land
Ownership Award.

B. The following transactions are not valid:

1. Sale, disposition, lease management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner
prior to June 15, 1988, which are registered on or before September 13, 1988, or those executed after June 15, 1988, covering
an area in excess of the five-hectare retention limit in violation of R.A. 6657.

2. Those covering lands acquired by the beneficiary under R.A. 6657 and executed within ten (10) years from the issuance and
registration of an Emancipation Patent or Certificate of Land Ownership Award.

3. Those executed in favor of a person or persons not qualified to acquire land under R.A. 6657.

4. Sale, transfer, conveyance or change of nature of the land outside of urban centers and city limits either in whole or in part as
of June 15, 1988, when R.A. 6657 took effect, except as provided for under DAR Administrative Order No. 15, series of 1988.

5. Sale, transfer or conveyance by beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land he acquired by
virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the law.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Without a doubt, under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after ten (10) years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the
EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even
started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under
CARP coverage.

Moreover, if We maintain the position that the qualified FWBs should be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory by this Court, since, at the
end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP. As aptly noted by the
late Senator Neptali Gonzales during the Joint Congressional Conference Committee on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program Bills:
SEN. GONZALES. My point is, as much as possible let the said lands be distributed under CARP remain with the beneficiaries and
their heirs because that is the lesson that we have to learn from PD No. 27. If you will talk with the Congressmen representing
Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Central Luzon provinces, law or no law, you will find out that more than one-third of the original, of
the lands distributed under PD 27 are no longer owned, possessed or being worked by the grantees or the awardees of the
same, something which we ought to avoid under the CARP bill that we are going to enact. 66 (Emphasis supplied.)

Worse, by raising that the qualified beneficiaries may sell their interest back to HLI, this smacks of outright indifference to the
provision on retention limits 67 under RA 6657, as this Court, in effect, would be allowing HLI, the previous landowner, to own
more than five (5) hectares of agricultural land, which We cannot countenance. There is a big difference between the ownership
of agricultural lands by HLI under the stock distribution scheme and its eventual acquisition of the agricultural lands from the
qualified FWBs under the proposed buy-back scheme. The rule on retention limits does not apply to the former but only to the
latter in view of the fact that the stock distribution scheme is sanctioned by Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which specifically allows
corporations to divest a proportion of their capital stock that "the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities,
bears in relation to the company’s total assets." On the other hand, no special rules exist under RA 6657 concerning the
proposed buy-back scheme; hence, the general rules on retention limits should apply.

Further, the position that the qualified FWBs are now free to transact with third parties concerning their land interests, regardless
of whether they have fully paid for the lands or not, also transgresses the second paragraph of Sec. 27 of RA 6657, which plainly
states that "[i]f the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed,
with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP x x x." When
the words and phrases in the statute are clear and unequivocal, the law is applied according to its express terms. 68 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 69

The minority, however, posits that "[t]o insist that the FWBs’ rights sleep for a period of ten years is unrealistic, and may
seriously deprive them of real opportunities to capitalize and maximize the victory of direct land distribution." By insisting that
We disregard the ten-year restriction under the law in the case at bar, the minority, in effect, wants this Court to engage in
judicial legislation, which is violative of the principle of separation of powers. 70 The discourse by Ruben E. Agpalo, in his book on
statutory construction, is enlightening:

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to
it that its mandate is obeyed. Where the law is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Thus, where what is not clearly provided in the law is read into the law by construction because it is more logical
and wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law, which is judicial legislation. For
whether a statute is wise or expedient is not for the courts to determine. Courts must administer the law, not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 71 (Emphasis supplied.)

And as aptly stated by Chief Justice Renato Corona in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC: 72
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and interpret the Constitution
and the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political departments
if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.

Considerably, this Court is left with no other recourse but to respect and apply the law.

VI. Grounds for Revocation of the SDP

AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP
and is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10. 73 FARM further asserts that "[i]f that minimum threshold is not met,
why allow [stock distribution option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a political accommodation to the
powerful."74

Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that improving the
economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP or is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and
DAO 10, a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution option. As We have painstakingly explained in Our
July 5, 2011 Decision:

In the Terminal Report adopted by PARC, it is stated that the SDP violates the agrarian reform policy under Sec. 2 of RA 6657,
as the said plan failed to enhance the dignity and improve the quality of lives of the FWBs through greater productivity of
agricultural lands. We disagree.

Sec. 2 of RA 6657 states:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies.¾It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farm workers will receive the highest consideration to promote social
justice and to move the nation towards sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner
cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.

To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers with the
opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention limits set forth in this Act,
having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. The State shall respect the right of small landowners and shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Paragraph 2 of the above-quoted provision specifically mentions that "a more equitable distribution and ownership of land x x x
shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality
of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands." Of note is the term "opportunity" which is defined as a favorable
chance or opening offered by circumstances. Considering this, by no stretch of imagination can said provision be construed as a
guarantee in improving the lives of the FWBs. At best, it merely provides for a possibility or favorable chance of uplifting the
economic status of the FWBs, which may or may not be attained.

Pertinently, improving the economic status of the FWBs is neither among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP nor an
imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution option. Nothing
in that option agreement, law or department order indicates otherwise.

Significantly, HLI draws particular attention to its having paid its FWBs, during the regime of the SDP (1989-2005), some PhP 3
billion by way of salaries/wages and higher benefits exclusive of free hospital and medical benefits to their immediate family. And
attached as Annex "G" to HLI’s Memorandum is the certified true report of the finance manager of Jose Cojuangco & Sons
Organizations-Tarlac Operations, captioned as "HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. Salaries, Benefits and Credit Privileges (in Thousand
Pesos) Since the Stock Option was Approved by PARC/CARP," detailing what HLI gave their workers from 1989 to 2005. The sum
total, as added up by the Court, yields the following numbers: Total Direct Cash Out (Salaries/Wages & Cash Benefits) = PhP
2,927,848; Total Non-Direct Cash Out (Hospital/Medical Benefits) = PhP 303,040. The cash out figures, as stated in the report,
include the cost of homelots; the PhP 150 million or so representing 3% of the gross produce of the hacienda; and the PhP 37.5
million representing 3% from the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted lands. While not included in the report, HLI
manifests having given the FWBs 3% of the PhP 80 million paid for the 80 hectares of land traversed by the SCTEX. On top of
these, it is worth remembering that the shares of stocks were given by HLI to the FWBs for free. Verily, the FWBs have benefited
from the SDP.

To address urgings that the FWBs be allowed to disengage from the SDP as HLI has not anyway earned profits through the
years, it cannot be over-emphasized that, as a matter of common business sense, no corporation could guarantee a profitable
run all the time. As has been suggested, one of the key features of an SDP of a corporate landowner is the likelihood of the
corporate vehicle not earning, or, worse still, losing money.

The Court is fully aware that one of the criteria under DAO 10 for the PARC to consider the advisability of approving a stock
distribution plan is the likelihood that the plan "would result in increased income and greater benefits to [qualified beneficiaries]
than if the lands were divided and distributed to them individually." But as aptly noted during the oral arguments, DAO 10 ought
to have not, as it cannot, actually exact assurance of success on something that is subject to the will of man, the forces of nature
or the inherent risky nature of business. 75 Just like in actual land distribution, an SDP cannot guarantee, as indeed the SDOA
does not guarantee, a comfortable life for the FWBs. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there were many
instances wherein after a farmworker beneficiary has been awarded with an agricultural land, he just subsequently sells it and is
eventually left with nothing in the end.

In all then, the onerous condition of the FWBs’ economic status, their life of hardship, if that really be the case, can hardly be
attributed to HLI and its SDP and provide a valid ground for the plan’s revocation. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)

This Court, despite the above holding, still affirmed the revocation by PARC of its approval of the SDP based on the following
grounds: (1) failure of HLI to fully comply with its undertaking to distribute homelots to the FWBs under the SDP; (2) distribution
of shares of stock to the FWBs based on the number of "man days" or "number of days worked" by the FWB in a year’s time; and
(3) 30-year timeframe for the implementation or distribution of the shares of stock to the FWBs.

Just the same, Mallari, et al. posit that the homelots required to be distributed have all been distributed pursuant to the SDOA,
and that what merely remains to be done is the release of title from the Register of Deeds. 76 They further assert that there has
been no dilution of shares as the corporate records would show that if ever not all of the 18,804.32 shares were given to the
actual original FWB, the recipient of the difference is the next of kin or children of said original FWB. 77 Thus, they submit that
since the shares were given to the same "family beneficiary," this should be deemed as substantial compliance with the
provisions of Sec. 4 of DAO 10. 78 Also, they argue that there has been no violation of the three-month period to implement the
SDP as mandated by Sec. 11 of DAO, since this provision must be read in light of Sec. 10 of Executive Order No. 229, the
pertinent portion of which reads, "The approval by the PARC of a plan for such stock distribution, and its initial implementation,
shall be deemed compliance with the land distribution requirement of the CARP." 79

Again, the matters raised by Mallari, et al. have been extensively discussed by the Court in its July 5, 2011 Decision. As stated:

On Titles to Homelots

Under RA 6657, the distribution of homelots is required only for corporations or business associations owning or operating farms
which opted for land distribution. Sec. 30 of RA 6657 states:

SEC. 30. Homelots and Farmlots for Members of Cooperatives.¾The individual members of the cooperatives or corporations
mentioned in the preceding section shall be provided with homelots and small farmlots for their family use, to be taken from the
land owned by the cooperative or corporation.

The "preceding section" referred to in the above-quoted provision is as follows:

SEC. 29. Farms Owned or Operated by Corporations or Other Business Associations.¾In the case of farms owned or operated by
corporations or other business associations, the following rules shall be observed by the PARC.

In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.

In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned collectively by the worker-beneficiaries
who shall form a workers’ cooperative or association which will deal with the corporation or business association. Until a new
agreement is entered into by and between the workers’ cooperative or association and the corporation or business association,
any agreement existing at the time this Act takes effect between the former and the previous landowner shall be respected by
both the workers’ cooperative or association and the corporation or business association.

Noticeably, the foregoing provisions do not make reference to corporations which opted for stock distribution under Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Concomitantly, said corporations are not obliged to provide for it except by stipulation, as in this case.
Under the SDP, HLI undertook to "subdivide and allocate for free and without charge among the qualified family-beneficiaries x x
x residential or homelots of not more than 240 sq. m. each, with each family beneficiary being assured of receiving and owning a
homelot in the barrio or barangay where it actually resides," "within a reasonable time."

More than sixteen (16) years have elapsed from the time the SDP was approved by PARC, and yet, it is still the contention of the
FWBs that not all was given the 240-square meter homelots and, of those who were already given, some still do not have the
corresponding titles.

During the oral arguments, HLI was afforded the chance to refute the foregoing allegation by submitting proof that the FWBs
were already given the said homelots:

Justice Velasco: x x x There is also an allegation that the farmer beneficiaries, the qualified family beneficiaries were not given
the 240 square meters each. So, can you also [prove] that the qualified family beneficiaries were already provided the 240
square meter homelots.

Atty. Asuncion: We will, your Honor please.

Other than the financial report, however, no other substantial proof showing that all the qualified beneficiaries have received
homelots was submitted by HLI. Hence, this Court is constrained to rule that HLI has not yet fully complied with its undertaking
to distribute homelots to the FWBs under the SDP.

On "Man Days" and the Mechanics of Stock Distribution

In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, We find that
it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC]
the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of
one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held by
the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and
distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

Based on the above-quoted provision, the distribution of the shares of stock to the FWBs, albeit not entailing a cash out from
them, is contingent on the number of "man days," that is, the number of days that the FWBs have worked during the year. This
formula deviates from Sec. 1 of DAO 10, which decrees the distribution of equal number of shares to the FWBs as the minimum
ratio of shares of stock for purposes of compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. As stated in Sec. 4 of DAO 10:

Section 4. Stock Distribution Plan.¾The [SDP] submitted by the corporate landowner-applicant shall provide for the distribution
of an equal number of shares of the same class and value, with the same rights and features as all other shares, to each of the
qualified beneficiaries. This distribution plan in all cases, shall be at least the minimum ratio for purposes of compliance with
Section 31 of R.A. No. 6657.
On top of the minimum ratio provided under Section 3 of this Implementing Guideline, the corporate landowner-applicant may
adopt additional stock distribution schemes taking into account factors such as rank, seniority, salary, position and other
circumstances which may be deemed desirable as a matter of sound company policy.

The above proviso gives two (2) sets or categories of shares of stock which a qualified beneficiary can acquire from the
corporation under the SDP. The first pertains, as earlier explained, to the mandatory minimum ratio of shares of stock to be
distributed to the FWBs in compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. This minimum ratio contemplates of that "proportion of the
capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the
company’s total assets." It is this set of shares of stock which, in line with Sec. 4 of DAO 10, is supposed to be allocated "for the
distribution of an equal number of shares of stock of the same class and value, with the same rights and features as all other
shares, to each of the qualified beneficiaries."

On the other hand, the second set or category of shares partakes of a gratuitous extra grant, meaning that this set or category
constitutes an augmentation share/s that the corporate landowner may give under an additional stock distribution scheme,
taking into account such variables as rank, seniority, salary, position and like factors which the management, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, may deem desirable.

Before anything else, it should be stressed that, at the time PARC approved HLI’s SDP, HLI recognized 6,296individuals as
qualified FWBs. And under the 30-year stock distribution program envisaged under the plan, FWBs who came in after 1989, new
FWBs in fine, may be accommodated, as they appear to have in fact been accommodated as evidenced by their receipt of HLI
shares.

Now then, by providing that the number of shares of the original 1989 FWBs shall depend on the number of "man days," HLI
violated the afore-quoted rule on stock distribution and effectively deprived the FWBs of equal shares of stock in the corporation,
for, in net effect, these 6,296 qualified FWBs, who theoretically had given up their rights to the land that could have been
distributed to them, suffered a dilution of their due share entitlement. As has been observed during the oral arguments, HLI has
chosen to use the shares earmarked for farmworkers as reward system chips to water down the shares of the original 6,296
FWBs. Particularly:

Justice Abad: If the SDOA did not take place, the other thing that would have happened is that there would be CARP?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: That’s the only point I want to know x x x. Now, but they chose to enter SDOA instead of placing the land under
CARP. And for that reason those who would have gotten their shares of the land actually gave up their rights to this land in place
of the shares of the stock, is that correct?

Atty. Dela Merced: It would be that way, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: Right now, also the government, in a way, gave up its right to own the land because that way the government
takes own [sic] the land and distribute it to the farmers and pay for the land, is that correct?
Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: And then you gave thirty-three percent (33%) of the shares of HLI to the farmers at that time that numbered x x x
those who signed five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498) beneficiaries, is that correct?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: But later on, after assigning them their shares, some workers came in from 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and the rest
of the years that you gave additional shares who were not in the original list of owners?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: Did those new workers give up any right that would have belong to them in 1989 when the land was supposed to
have been placed under CARP?

Atty. Dela Merced: If you are talking or referring… (interrupted)

Justice Abad: None! You tell me. None. They gave up no rights to land?

Atty. Dela Merced: They did not do the same thing as we did in 1989, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: No, if they were not workers in 1989 what land did they give up? None, if they become workers later on.

Atty. Dela Merced: None, Your Honor, I was referring, Your Honor, to the original… (interrupted)

Justice Abad: So why is it that the rights of those who gave up their lands would be diluted, because the company has chosen to
use the shares as reward system for new workers who come in? It is not that the new workers, in effect, become just workers of
the corporation whose stockholders were already fixed. The TADECO who has shares there about sixty six percent (66%) and the
five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498) farmers at the time of the SDOA? Explain to me. Why, why will you x x x what
right or where did you get that right to use this shares, to water down the shares of those who should have been benefited, and
to use it as a reward system decided by the company?

From the above discourse, it is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of the
approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32
HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and
distribution of the HLI shares were based on "man days" or "number of days worked" by the FWB in a year’s time. As explained
by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls
below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares distributed varies
depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the
original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total
number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs,
were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI.
Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of "man
days" and the hiring of additional farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock
transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the
approved stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by
PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of the qualified FWBs should be
recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty (60) days from implementation. As
stated:

Section 11. Implementation/Monitoring of Plan.¾The approved stock distribution plan shall be implemented within three (3)
months from receipt by the corporate landowner-applicant of the approval thereof by the PARC, and the transfer of the shares of
stocks in the names of the qualified beneficiaries shall be recorded in stock and transfer books and submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) within sixty (60) days from the said implementation of the stock distribution plan.

It is evident from the foregoing provision that the implementation, that is, the distribution of the shares of stock to the FWBs,
must be made within three (3) months from receipt by HLI of the approval of the stock distribution plan by PARC. While neither
of the clashing parties has made a compelling case of the thrust of this provision, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
intent is to compel the corporate landowner to complete, not merely initiate, the transfer process of shares within that three-
month timeframe. Reinforcing this conclusion is the 60-day stock transfer recording (with the SEC) requirement reckoned from
the implementation of the SDP.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month threshold. Remove this
timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits
the implementation of the stock distribution scheme.

The argument is urged that the thirty (30)-year distribution program is justified by the fact that, under Sec. 26 of RA 6657,
payment by beneficiaries of land distribution under CARP shall be made in thirty (30) annual amortizations. To HLI, said section
provides a justifying dimension to its 30-year stock distribution program.

HLI’s reliance on Sec. 26 of RA 6657, quoted in part below, is obviously misplaced as the said provision clearly deals with land
distribution.

SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries.¾Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty
(30) annual amortizations x x x.

Then, too, the ones obliged to pay the LBP under the said provision are the beneficiaries. On the other hand, in the instant case,
aside from the fact that what is involved is stock distribution, it is the corporate landowner who has the obligation to distribute
the shares of stock among the FWBs.
Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of the land thus awarded them
to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To be sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation
does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued
in a much shorter period of time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld for violating DAO 10. It bears
stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or
procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly complied with.
The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989
approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and voided. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)

Based on the foregoing ruling, the contentions of Mallari, et al. are either not supported by the evidence on record or are utterly
misplaced. There is, therefore, no basis for the Court to reverse its ruling affirming PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 and PARC
Resolution No. 2006-34-01, revoking the previous approval of the SDP by PARC.

VII. Control over Agricultural Lands

After having discussed and considered the different contentions raised by the parties in their respective motions, We are now left
to contend with one crucial issue in the case at bar, that is, control over the agricultural lands by the qualified FWBs.

Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have control over these agricultural lands for
as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, this Court made the following observations:

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over
the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the
farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that
the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always
be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be
more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are
composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that
control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the
majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the
formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather,
it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional
policy of ensuring control by the farmers. (Emphasis supplied.)

In line with Our finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our ruling
that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never
gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
A revisit of HLI’s Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) upon which
the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is PhP 590,554,220, while the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is
PhP 196,630,000. Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided
by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-
beneficiaries.1awp++i1 Control, of course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved
by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI. Hence, control can
NEVER be attained by the FWBs. There is even no assurance that 100% of the 118,391,976.85 shares issued to the FWBs will all
be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into account the previous referendum among the farmers where said shares were not
voted unanimously in favor of retaining the SDP. In light of the foregoing consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted to
the individual FWBs will have to be recalled and revoked.

Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and
will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary
stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.

In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and homelots 80 received by all the FWBs shall
be respected with no obligation to refund or return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011 Decision, "the
benefits x x x were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other fringe benefits were
granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining agreement with Tadeco."

One last point, the HLI land shall be distributed only to the 6,296 original FWBs. The remaining 4,206 FWBs are not entitled to
any portion of the HLI land, because the rights to said land were vested only in the 6,296 original FWBs pursuant to Sec. 22 of
RA 6657.

In this regard, DAR shall verify the identities of the 6,296 original FWBs, consistent with its administrative prerogative to identify
and select the agrarian reform beneficiaries under RA 6657. 81

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011 filed by public respondents Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council and Department of Agrarian Reform, the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011 filed by private respondent
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita, the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by
respondent-intervenor Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc., and the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011
filed by private respondents Rene Galang and AMBALA are PARTIALLY GRANTED with respect to the option granted to the
original farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita to remain with Hacienda Luisita, Inc., which is hereby RECALLED and SET
ASIDE. The Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by petitioner HLI and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya are DENIED.
The fallo of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Decision is hereby amended and shall read:

PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the
lands subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED
with the following modifications:

All salaries, benefits, the 3% of the gross sales of the production of the agricultural lands, the 3% share in the proceeds of the
sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot and the homelots already received by the 10,502 FWBs
composed of 6,296 original FWBs and the 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return
them. The 6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and relinquish their rights over the HLI shares of stock issued to them in favor of HLI.
The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares issued to the said FWBs and transfer them to HLI in the stocks and transfer
book, which transfers shall be exempt from taxes, fees and charges. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall remain as stockholders
of HLI.

DAR shall segregate from the HLI agricultural land with an area of 4,915.75 hectares subject of PARC’s SDP-approving Resolution
No. 89-12-2 the 500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, l996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to, or acquired
by, the government as part of the SCTEX complex. After the segregation process, as indicated, is done, the remaining area shall
be turned over to DAR for immediate land distribution to the original 6,296 FWBs or their successors-in-interest which will be
identified by the DAR. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs are not entitled to any share in the land to be distributed by DAR.1âwphi1

HLI is directed to pay the original 6,296 FWBs the consideration of PhP 500,000,000 received by it from Luisita Realty, Inc. for
the sale to the latter of 200 hectares out of the 500 hectares covered by the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order, the
consideration of PhP 750,000,000 received by its owned subsidiary, Centennary Holdings, Inc., for the sale of the remaining 300
hectares of the aforementioned 500-hectare lot to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation, and the price of PhP 80,511,500 paid by
the government through the Bases Conversion Development Authority for the sale of the 80.51-hectare lot used for the
construction of the SCTEX road network. From the total amount of PhP 1,330,511,500 (PhP 500,000,000 + PhP 750,000,000 +
PhP 80,511,500 = PhP 1,330,511,500) shall be deducted the 3% of the proceeds of said transfers that were paid to the FWBs,
the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to the transferees, and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary
Holdings, Inc. for legitimate corporate purposes. For this purpose, DAR is ordered to engage the services of a reputable
accounting firm approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc. to determine if the PhP
1,330,511,500 proceeds of the sale of the three (3) aforementioned lots were actually used or spent for legitimate corporate
purposes. Any unspent or unused balance and any disallowed expenditures as determined by the audit shall be distributed to the
6,296 original FWBs.

HLI is entitled to just compensation for the agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR to be reckoned from November 21,
1989 which is the date of issuance of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR and LBP are ordered to determine the compensation
due to HLI.
DAR shall submit a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It shall also submit, after submission of
the compliance report, quarterly reports on the execution of this judgment within the first 15 days after the end of each quarter,
until fully implemented.

The temporary restraining order is lifted.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

In the Court’s Decision dated July 5, 2011, the crucial questions that the Court resolved were: (1) whether the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) has the power to revoke or recall its approval of a stock distribution option entered into between
a corporate landowner and its farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs), under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); and (2) whether the PARC has a ground to revoke or recall the stock distribution
plan (SDP) between petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) and its FWBs.

The Court was unanimous in declaring that the PARC’s express power to approve the plan for stock distribution of corporate
landowners, under Section 31 of the CARL, includes the implied power to revoke its approval. In the case of HLI, the majority of
the Court, myself included, found that the PARC has solid bases to revoke its approval of HLI’s SDP. 1

In view of this ruling, the corollary issue of the effects of the revocation arose, and it was at this point that I diverged from the
majority’s position. The majority — speaking through Justice Velasco — found it equitable to recognize the existence of certain
"operative facts," notwithstanding the revocation of the SDP. Hence, the majority gave the qualified FWBs the option of choosing
whether or not to remain as HLI stockholders. On the same principle, the majority authorized the FWBs to retain all benefits
received under the SDP. The dispositive of the July 5, 2011 Decision, thus, decreed that:

1. the qualified FWBs, totaling 6,296, are given the option to choose whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. Should
they choose to remain, they are entitled to 18,804.32 shares each; otherwise, they are entitled to land distribution. The non-
qualified FWBs totaling 4,206, however, are not given this option, but are allowed to retain the shares already received;

2. all the 10,502 FWBs are entitled to retain the following items they received on account of the SDP:

a. salaries and benefits,

b. 3% production share,

c. 3% share of the proceeds of the sale of the 500 hectares of converted land and the 80-hectare Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX) lot, and
d. 6,886.5-square meter homelots that each FWB received;

3. From the 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land shall be segregated:

a. the 500 hectares of converted land acquired by Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO)/Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC);

b. the 80 hectares of land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX; and

c. the aggregate area of homelots of FWBs who choose to remain as HLI stockholders. 2

After segregation, the remaining areas shall be turned over by HLI to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for land
distribution to qualified FWBs who prefer land distribution over stock ownership.

4. HLI is directed to turn over the consideration of

a. ₱500 million from the sale of the 200 hectares of converted land to LRC,

b. ₱750 million from the sale of the 300 hectares of converted land to Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), and

c. ₱80 million from the expropriation of 80 hectares for the SCTEX.

From the sum total of ₱1.33 billion shall be deducted

a. the 3% production share,

b. the 3% share in the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and expropriation of the 80-hectare land,

c. the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles, and

d. the expenditures incurred by HLI for legitimate corporate purposes.

The remaining balance shall be distributed among the qualified FWBs, and

5. HLI shall be paid just compensation for the agricultural land that will be subject to land distribution, the amount of which shall
be determined by the DAR.

I dissented from the majority’s determination of the effects of the revocation, objecting primarily to their application of the
"operative fact doctrine" to justify the option given to the FWBs on whether or not to remain as HLI stockholders. I opined that
the revocation of the PARC’s approval of the SDP carried with it the nullification of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement
(SDOA) between HLI and the qualified FWBs. As a consequence of the nullification, restitution should take place, and the parties
are to account and restore what they received from one another. Subject to certain adjustments, I maintain the same view
regarding the inapplicability of the operative fact doctrine to the present case. Based on this perspective, I propose to dispose of
the case as discussed below.
The application of the Operative Fact Doctrine to "Executive Acts"

The ponencia misapplies the operative fact doctrine. I maintain the view that the doctrine is applicable only in considering the
effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a law (a generic term that includes statutes, rules and regulations issued by the
executive department and are accorded the same status as a statute). The doctrine’s limited application is apparent from a
review of its origins.

The doctrine of operative fact is of American origin, first discussed in the 1940 case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank.3 Chicot Country sought to resist the Baxter States Bank’s claim by raising a debt readjustment decree issued by a
district court pursuant to a law enacted by the US Congress. 4 The Baxter States Bank countered that the readjustment decree
was no longer binding, as the law upon which the decree was based has been declared unconstitutional. The lower court
sustained the Baxter States Bank’s argument, following the void ab initio doctrine 5 laid down in the 1886 case of Norton v.
Shelby County.6 The US Supreme Court reversed the decision and ordered the remand of the case, rejecting the broad
application of the void ab initio doctrine through this rationalization:

[T]he effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects – with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts x x x and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. [italics and emphasis
ours]

Notably, Chicot and the numerous cases that followed its lead applied the "operative fact doctrine" only in considering the effects
of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute.

De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank (PNB), 7 promulgated in this jurisdiction in 1971, was the first instance when the
"operative fact doctrine" was extended to consider the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of an "executive act." The
ponencia cites De Agbayani (as well as subsequent cases that echoed the "operative fact" principle) to support its position, but
this reliance proceeds from a misreading of the context in which De Agbayani used the term "executive act."

The executive act referred to in De Agbayani was Executive Order No. 32 (EO 32) issued by then President Sergio Osmeña in
March 10, 1945, which imposed a debt moratorium. Since the Court (in the case of Rutter v. Esteban 8) already declared EO 32
unconstitutional, Francisco de Agbayani contended that the PNB’s action for foreclosure against him had already prescribed. The
Court was then confronted with the issue of whether to give effect to EO 32 prior to the declaration of its unconstitutionality. The
Court, per Justice Enrique Fernando, resolved the issue in this manner:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a
municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify
any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents
and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code [Article 7] puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.["] Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be
so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not
admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than
that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must
be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has
the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. 9

When these paragraphs are read together, the phrase "such challenged legislative or executive act" quite obviously pertains to
the "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations" mentioned in Article 7 of the Civil Code. Thus, the context in which
the term "executive act" was used in De Agbayani referred to only executive issuances (acts, orders, rules and regulations) that
have the force and effect of laws; it was not used to refer to any act performed by the Executive Department. De Agbayani’s
extension of the operative fact doctrine, therefore, more properly refers only to the recognition of the effects of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of executive issuances, and not to all executive acts as the ponencia loosely construes the term. The limited
construction of an "executive act," i.e., executive issuances, is actually more consistent with the rationale behind the operative
fact doctrine: the presumption of constitutionality of laws. Accordingly, it is only to this kind of executive action that the
operative fact doctrine can apply.

In my separate opinion to the July 5, 2011 Decision, I raised the propriety of applying the operative fact doctrine to the present
case, primarily to object to the option granted by the ponencia to the qualified FWBs of whether to remain as HLI stockholders or
not. Although in the present Resolution, the ponencia reconsidered and has now withdrawn the option given to the qualified
FWBs to remain as HLI stockholders, it still relied on the operative fact doctrine to justify the FWBs retention of certain benefits
arising from the revoked SDP:

With the application of the operative fact doctrine, said benefits, homelots and the 3% production share and the 3% share from
the sale of the 500-hectare and SCTEX lots shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them. The receipt of these
things is an operative fact "that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored." 10(emphasis ours)
Because of this continued (and mistaken) reliance on the operative fact doctrine, I regretfully have to register my continued
objection to the manner by which the ponencia proposes to dispose of this case.

Indeed, much of the confusion that arose in the disposition of this case stemmed from the varying perspectives taken by the
members of the Court on what are the effects of the revocation and when these effects should accrue. The revocation of the SDP
amounts to the nullification of the SDOA, and the logical and legal consequence of this should be the restoration of the parties to
their respective situations prior to the execution of the nullified agreement. There should be no question that the PARC’s
revocation of the approval of the SDP carried with it the nullification of the SDOA because the PARC’s approval is necessary to
the validity of the SDOA11; accordingly, the effects of the revocation should be deemed to have taken place on November 21,
1989, the date when PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 approving the SDP was issued. To consider any other date (either at the time
PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01, revoking its approval of the SDP, was issued or at the time this Court’s decision becomes final)
is not only iniquitous for the parties but also preposterous under the law. Hence, to accomplish a complete, orderly, and fair
disposition of the case, we have to consider the effects of the revocation to accrue from November 21, 1989. The Court should
decree that compulsory Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage should start at this point in time, and then proceed
to adjust the relations of the parties with due regard to the intervening events that transpired. 12

Treatment of the Sale of the Converted Land

Since the effects of the revocation are deemed to have taken place on November 21, 1989, the entire 4,915.75 hectares of
agricultural land should be considered as placed under compulsory coverage as of this time. To declare (as the ponencia does 13)
that 500 hectares of the subject land can no longer be included under the CARL’s compulsory coverage because it had already
been converted into industrial land14 is erroneous, as this implies that the land was placed under compulsory coverage only when
revocation of the SDP was declared, not in 1989. If this was the case then, the FWBs should not be entitled to any of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500 hectares of converted land because their right to these proceeds stems from their right to own
the land which accrues only when the land is placed under compulsory coverage. Oddly enough, the ponencia takes an
inconsistent position by subsequently declaring that –

Considering that the 500-hectare converted land, as well as the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot, should have been included in the
compulsory coverage were it not for their conversion and valid transfers, then it is only but proper that the price received for the
sale of these lots should be given to the qualified FWBs. In effect, the proceeds from the sale shall take the place of the lots.

xxxx

x x x. We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the
stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice
of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. 15 (emphases, italics, and underscoring ours)
To reconcile these inconsistent positions, I venture to guess that what the ponencia perhaps meant was that, on account of the
revocation, the entire 4,915.75 hectares were deemed placed under compulsory coverage on November 21, 1989; however,
despite the inclusion, portions of the land (specifically, the 500 hectares of converted land and the 80 hectares of the SCTEX
land) can no longer be distributed among the qualified FWBs under Section 22 of the CARL 16 because of the valid transfers made
in favor of third parties. Thus, it was not the conversion of the 500-hectare land that exclude it from compulsory coverage as it
was already deemed included in the compulsory coverage since 1989; it was the recognition of the valid transfers of these lands
to third parties that excluded them from the actual land distribution among the qualified FWBs.

The ponencia itself recognizes this legal reality by citing the "valid transfers" of the land as basis for exclusion. Yet, this is
precisely what is lacking in LRC’s case. By failing to intervene in this case, LRC was unable to present evidence supporting its
good faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land. The ponencia’s conclusion that there was a valid transfer to LRC of the
200 hectares of converted land, therefore, lacks both factual and basis.

Thus, I propose, as I did in my separate opinion to the July 5, 2011 Decision, that LRC be given "full opportunity to present its
case before the DAR x x x the failure of [LRC] to actively intervene at the PARC level and before this Court does not really affect
the intrinsic validity of the transfer made in its favor if indeed it is similarly situated as LIPCO and RCBC. x x x [A] definitive
ruling on the transfer of the 200 hectares to [LRC] is premature to make." The FWBs’ right to the 200-hectare converted land
itself or only to the proceeds of the sale (amounting to ₱500 million 17) can be determined only after LRC has presented its case
before the DAR.

On the other hand, LIPCO/RCBC’s acquisition in good faith has been adequately proven. Thus, although the 300-hectare
converted land should belong to the FWBs on account of the revocation of the SDP, the valid transfer to LIPCO/RCBC entitles
them only to the proceeds of the sale. The ponencia, however, decrees that the entire ₱750 million paid for the 200-hectare
converted land should be paid to the FWBs.

I disagree with this position, as it fails to take into account that it was HLI which invested in and caused the conversion of the
land from agricultural to commercial/industrial:

Since the sale and transfer of these acquired lands came after the compulsory CARP coverage had taken place, the FWBs are
entitled to be paid for the 300 hectares of land transferred to LIPCO based on its value in 1989, not on the ₱750 million selling
price paid by LIPCO to HLI [through its subsidiary, Centennary] as proposed by the ponencia. This outcome recognizes the reality
that the value of these lands increased due to the improvements introduced by HLI, specifically HLI’s move to have these
portions reclassified as industrial land while they were under its possession. Thus, unless it is proven that the ₱750 million is
equivalent to the value of the land as of [November 21, 1989] and excludes the value of any improvements that may have been
introduced by HLI, I maintain that the land’s 1989 value, as determined by the DAR, should be the price paid to the FWBs for the
lands transferred to LIPCO/RCBC.18

In case the LRC is able to prove its good faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land before the DAR, the treatment of the
proceeds of the sale of this land shall be the same as those of LIPCO/RCBC’s 300-hectare converted land – the FWBs will be
entitled only to the land’s value as of November 21, 1989, and the balance shall be for the HLI as compensation for any
improvements introduced.

With respect to the proceeds of the sale of the 80-hectare land to the government for the SCTEX, "the FWBs are entitled to be
paid the full amount of just compensation that HLI received from the government for the 80 hectares of expropriated land
forming the SCTEX highway. What was transferred in this case was a portion of the HLI property that was not covered by any
conversion order. The transfer, too, came after compulsory CARP coverage had taken place and without any significant
intervention from HLI. Thus, the whole of the just compensation paid by the government should accrue solely to the FWBs as
owners."19

Amounts to be Deducted from the Proceeds of the Sale of the Lands

HLI claimed that it had already paid out 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the lands to the FWBs. This amount should thus be
deducted from the total proceeds that should be returned to the qualified FWBs. The taxes and expenses related to the transfer
of titles should likewise be deducted, since the same amounts will be incurred regardless of the seller (HLI or the FWBs). The
ponencia proposes that the 3% production share and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary for legitimate corporate
purposes should also be deducted from the total proceeds of the sale.

In proposing that the 3% production share be deducted from the total proceeds of sale to be returned to the FWBs, the ponencia
has effectively reversed its own insistent declaration that all the benefits received by the FWBs shall "be respected with no
obligation to refund or return them." 20 Its reliance on the "operative fact doctrine" to authorize the FWBs’ retention of all the
benefits would thus be for naught; what the ponencia has given with its right hand, it takes away with its left hand.

Also, I do not find any legitimate basis for allowing HLI to deduct from the proceeds of the sale to be turned over to the FWBs
the amounts it used for legitimate corporate purposes. It is irrelevant for the ponencia to order the DAR "to determine if the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80-hectare SCTEX lot were actually used for legitimate corporate
purposes."21 The FWBs are entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the 300-hectare land in lieu of the actual land which they are
deemed to have acquired under the CARL since 1989. The ponencia never explained why the FWBs should bear such portion of
the proceeds of the sale that HLI used to finance its operations.

Transferability of Awarded Lands

The ponencia denies the applicability of Section 27 of the CARL, which states:

Sec. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a
period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase
the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by
the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian
Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior
approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall
give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter
has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

The ponencia opposes the application of the above provision by denying the FWBs the right to sell the land to third parties,
including HLI. Citing DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1989 (DAR AO 1-89), it states that "the awarded lands may only
be transferred or conveyed [to third persons] after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent
(EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified
FWBs x x x, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started." 22

I agree with the ponencia’s declaration, but only to the extent of prohibiting the qualified FWBs from selling the land directly to
HLI (or other non-qualified purchasers). Properly construed, the law means that, as a general rule, the FWBs are prohibited from
transferring or conveying the lands within 10 years from the issuance of the EPs or CLOAs, except if the transfer or conveyance
is made in favor of (a) a hereditary successor, (b) the government, (c) the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), or (d) other
qualified beneficiaries; transfers or conveyances made in favor of any of those enumerated, even within the 10 years period, are
not prohibited by law. A contrary interpretation would prevent the beneficiary’s heir from inheriting the land in the event that the
beneficiary dies within the 10-year period, and put the land’s ownership in limbo. Thus, under Section 27 of the CARL, the FWBs
who are no longer interested in owning their proportionate share of the land may opt to sell it to the government or the LBP,
which in turn can sell it to HLI or the LRC (if it is unable to prove its good faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land), in
order not to disrupt their existing operations.

Distribution of land to FWBs and payment of just compensation to HLI

As a consequence of the revocation of the SDP, the 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land subject of the SDP are deemed placed
under the CARL’s compulsory coverage since November 21, 1989. Corollary, the taking is deemed to have occurred at this time
and HLI is entitled to just compensation based on the value of the entire 4,915.75-hectare land in 1989 .23 In light of this
conclusion, the question that begs for a definitive response is: is HLI entitled to interest from 1989 up to the present on the
amount of just compensation it should receive?

In several cases, the Court awarded interests when there is delay in the payment of just compensation. The underlying rationale
for the award is to compensate the landowner not simply for the delay, but for the income the landowner would have received
from the land had there been no immediate taking thereof by the government. 24

This principle, however, does not apply to the present case because HLI never lost possession and control of the land; all the
incomes that the land generated were appropriated by HLI. No loss of income from the land (that should be compensated by the
imposition of interest on the just compensation due) therefore resulted. On the contrary, it is the qualified FWBs who have been
denied of income due to HLI’s possession and control of the land since 1989. Thus, HLI should pay the qualified FWBs rental for
the use and possession of the land up to the time it surrenders possession and control over these lands. The DAR, as the agency
tasked to implement agrarian reform laws, shall have the authority to determine the appropriate rental due from HLI to the
qualified FWBs. In recognition, however, of any improvements that HLI may have introduced on these lands, HLI is entitled to
offset their value from the rents due.

Application of the principle of set-off

The consequence of the revocation of the SDP, as I have repeatedly stated, is the restoration of the parties to their respective
conditions prior to its execution and approval – thus, they are bound to restore whatever they received on account of the SDP.
However, this does not prevent the application of the principle of set-off or compensation. The retention, either by the qualified
FWBs or the HLI, of some of the benefits received pursuant to the revoked SDP is based on the application of the principle of
compensation, not on the misapplication of the operative fact doctrine.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Accordingly, I maintain my vote to DENY HLI’s petition and AFFIRM the PARC’s Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01
revoking the SDP.

The entire 4,915.75 hectares of land are deemed PLACED UNDER COMPULSORY COVERAGE of the CARL AS OF NOVEMBER 21,
1989, and the 6,296 qualified FWBs shall be deemed to have acquired rights over the land as of this date. The DAR shall
DISTRIBUTE the land among the 6,296 qualified FWBs, EXCLUDING:

a. the 300 hectares of converted land acquired by LIPCO/RCBC; and

b. the 80 hectares of land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX.

The LRC shall be entitled to prove before the DAR that there was valid transfer of the 200 hectares of converted land. If the DAR
finds that LRC is a purchaser in good faith and for value, the 200 hectares of converted land shall likewise be excluded from the
land to be distributed among the qualified FWBs.

The DAR is ORDERED to determine the amount of just compensation that HLI is entitled to for the entire 4,915.75 hectares of
agricultural land, based on the value at the time of taking – November 21, 1989, and no interest shall be imposed on this
amount. The DAR is FURTHER ORDERED to determine the amount of RENTALS that HLI must pay to the qualified FWBs for the
use and possession of the land beginning November 21, 1989, until possession is turned over to the DAR, for distribution (with
due adjustment for the portions conveyed to LIPCO/RCBC, the government for the SCTEX, and, if found by the DAR to be a valid
transfer, LRC). HLI, however, is entitled to DEDUCT from the rentals due the value of the improvements it made over the land
(excluding those sold to LIPCO/RCBC and LRC, if the DAR finds that there was a valid transfer).

HLI shall PAY to the FWBs the value of the

a. 300 hectares of converted land conveyed to LIPCO/RCBC, based on its November 21, 1989 value, as determined by the DAR;
and

b. if the DAR finds that there was a valid transfer, 200 hectares of converted land conveyed to LRC.

HLI shall also PAY the qualified FWBs just compensation received from the government for the 80 hectares of expropriated land
for the SCTEX.

From the total amount of the proceeds of the sale and the just compensation to be paid by HLI to the qualified FWBs, the DAR
shall DEDUCT the ₱150 million, representing the 3% production share and the aggregate value of the homelots that the qualified
FWBs received from HLI. The amount of the 3% production share shall depend on the amount actually received by the FWBs
from HLI, to be determined by the DAR.

All the FWBs shall return to HLI the 59 million shares of stock. They are, however, entitled to retain all the salaries, wages and
other benefits received as employees of HLI.