Dela Cruz vs. People G.R. No.

200748, July 23, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February 2006. When
arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that the agents and special investigators of the NBI
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido. The complainants claimed,
Ariel Escobido was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police
officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James"
who demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of
Ariel. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation.
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for
itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite
the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right.
Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of
sufficient basis to convict him.

Issue: WON accused was validly arrested without a warrant.

WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

Ruling:
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."

We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing
law or jurisprudence. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of

physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
 Luz vs. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

Facts: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet
in violation of a municipal ordinanc; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation
of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin
or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one
(1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Issue: WON accused as validly arrested without a warrant.

Ruling: There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge
was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
 Martinez vs. People, G.R. No. 198694, February 13, 2013

Facts: PO2 Roberto Soque, PO2 Alejandro Cepe and PO3Edilberto Zeta conducted a routine
foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting
"Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised
Ordinance of the City of Manila which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later
identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof,
the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance and found the same positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (or shabu).

Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3),
Article II of RA 9165. RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs
as charged. CA denied Ramon’s appeal and thereby affirmed his conviction.

Issue: whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon
of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs.

Ruling: A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried
out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that
the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person
caught in flagrante delicto. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

In its totality, the Court observes that the facts and circumstances could not have engendered
a well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time
that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, no probable cause existed to justify Ramon’s
warrantless arrest.

Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the
nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, this
should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it is largely expected of them to conduct a more
circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The determination of probable cause is not a
blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It
demarcates the line between legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible
criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performed wisely and cautiously,
applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should
be clothed with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of public
accountability.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless search that
resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by
the above discussed constitutional provision. In this regard, considering that the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicit of the crime charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come
as a matter of course.
 Andaya vs. People, G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014

FACTS: Accused Pablito Andaya was charged for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling shabu. The
RTC and CA found him guilty of the crime charged.

A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap,
Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of
P100.00 bills both duly marked “X” were recorded in the police blotter. Upon reaching the
designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different
positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of
Pablito’s house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito
the marked money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal
signifying consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached
Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused.

Accused Andaya alleges that the Prosecution’s non-presentation of the confidential

informant who was the poseur buyer was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: WON non-presentation of the confidential informant fatal to the prosecution’s case?

Ruling: YES, the non-presentation of the confidential informant is tantamount to saying that
the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A buy-bust
operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. The justification
that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in
flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is
attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private
person. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution,
it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous
drug beyond reasonable doubt.

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those
instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the
accused. In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential
informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer’s testimony, the State did not
credibly incriminate Andaya. The members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate
Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing
something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer.

Moreover, the arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the
anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their
interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer,
unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself.
And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the
credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.

Hence, the prosecution failed to prove accused Andaya’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 People vs. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013

Facts: On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon was
driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance
of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus,
PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-
SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the
help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to
board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of
white crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Issue: WON arrest was valid.

Ruling: For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the appellant had committed it.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could
be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he
(appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts
per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange
acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in
order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5,
Rule 113. Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime
had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to
a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory
the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
 Pestilos vs. Generoso, G.R. No. 18260, November 10, 2014

FACTS: The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless
took place. The RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.

Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso.
The latter called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report,
SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance.
SPO2, together with augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the
police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon who fortunately survived the attack.

Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE: WON accused was validly arrested without warrant.

Ruling: YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.

The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it"
depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The element of ''personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances", however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances
should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered.
 Rebellion vs. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010
Facts: PO3 George Garcia and PO3 Romeo Sotomayor, Jr. together with Michael Fermin and Joseph
Apologista, all members of the Mayors Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City, were on
routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two individuals
chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers introduced themselves and then
inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out from his possession three strips of
aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic
sachet which contained white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the
substance was shabu, he confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later
identified as Clarito Yanson, were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0.03
gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. The test
on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu.
 
On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City Prosecutors Office.

Issue: WON accused was validly arrested without a warrant.

Ruling: Petitioners claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in
the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to
his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly
arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not
even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[

Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected
under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. 
 Comerciante vs. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015

Facts: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II were aboard a
motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay
Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road,
they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante
and a certain Erick Dasilla - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements,"
with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain
shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of
around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 
RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165. CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction.

Issue: WON accused as validly arrested.

Ruling: Section 2, Article III  of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general
rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III  of the Constitution
provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.

Three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect
in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances
are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a
"genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this
light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
 Rontos vs. People, G.R. No. 188024, June 5, 2013

Facts: PO2 Emil Masi dispatched PO1 Joven Pacis and PO1 Greg Labaclado of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan
City because of reports of illegal drug activity in the said area. When they got there, PO1
Pacis and PO1 Labaclado noticed petitioner standing about five meters away from them,
apparently preoccupied with scrutinizing two plastic sachets in his hand.
Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline
substance similar to shabu. PO1 Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic
sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the
offense the latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his
constitutional rights, while he just remained silent. PO1 Pacis marked the plastic sachets with
his initials "JCP-1" and JCP-2" and placed them in a makeshift envelope.
The tests on the contents of the plastic sachets yielded a positive result for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug more commonly known as shabu. A
Complaintfor violation of Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A.
9165, was drawn up and referred to the city prosecutor for the filing of charges before the
court.

Issue: WON accused was legally arrested without a warrant.

Ruling: We acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. We cannot uphold the
contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA correctly ruled that his
failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his plea during arraignment
operated as a waiver of that defense. "It has been ruled time and again that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his
arraignment."
In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely
and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged." Thus, he was estopped from
raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before
the CA or this Court.
 People vs. Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010

Facts: Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information for violating

Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165.
San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police
station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or
marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang
to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
 
In Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger
jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking.
PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside
its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked
the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
 
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught
up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were
under arrest, but one of the women got away. PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was
later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police
station.

Issue: WON accused were validly arrested.

Ruling: It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure
must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of
probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
the person arrested.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest.For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions
therefor
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search.  Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also
valid.
 IBP vs. DOJ, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 232413

Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus  with a petition for
declaratory relief filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)  Pangasinan Chapter
Legal Aid. The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP
Legal Aid Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National
Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that several
detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in court
by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or nonexistence of
probable cause.

The IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were allegedly
violated because he has been detained for at least eight months without any finding of
probable cause or a case having been filed in court.

Senin's case started when a complaint against him and other unidentified persons was
indorsed on February 9, 2015, by Police Chief Inspector Crisante Pagaduan Sadino of the San
Fabian Police Station, Pangasinan to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. He was arrested
while engaged in the sale of illegal drugs during a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, he
executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor resolved to dismiss the case. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ
Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic review.

The IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest the DOJ, Provincial
Prosecutor's Office (PPO), Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), and the PNP,
the unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the whims and caprices of the
reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides that preliminary investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception
if the person arrested had requested for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125. It follows, therefore, that the waiver of Article 125 must
coincide with the 15-day period of preliminary investigation. The detention beyond this
period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty. The review of the investigating
prosecutor's resolution has been pending with the DOJ for more than eight months. The IBP
concludes that Senin must be released from detention and be relieved from the effects of the
unconstitutional issuances of the DOJ.

Issue: WON Senin and those similarly situated should be released.

Ruling: The Court agrees with the OSG that this controversy has become moot and
academic. First, the DOJ already issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017, which recognizes the
right of a detainee to be released even if the dismissal of the case on preliminary investigation
is the subject of automatic review by the SOJ. Second, records show that the order of
dismissal was reversed; that upon filing of the information with the court, there was judicial
determination of probable cause against Senin; and that following such judicial
determination, the court issued a warrant of arrest and a commitment order.

The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper
judicial authoritieswithin the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the
public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded
on reasonable and allowable delays.
Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested
without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims
and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide
with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right
to liberty.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly
released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article
125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No.
91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases
where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima
facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.
 People vs. Cunanan, March 16, 2015 G.R. No.198024

Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

A confidential informant (CI) went to the EPD-District Intelligence Investigation Division

(EPD-DIID) Headquarters of Pasig City and informed PSI Abalos that a certain “Paeng
Putol,” later identified as the appellant, was engaged in selling illegal drugs
in Purok 4, Barangay Pineda, Pasig City.  Acting on the information, PSI Abalos organized a
buy-bust team. Thereafter, the team proceeded to and arrived at the target area at 9:20 p.m. 
PO1 Gunda and the CI walked towards a store along an alley while the others strategically
positioned themselves some five to seven meters away.  The CI saw a man wearing gloves
standing beside the store and informed PO1 Gunda that the man was the appellant.  Together,
they approached appellant who is familiar to the CI.  PO1 Gunda was introduced to appellant
as a drug user who wanted to buy shabu worth P200.00.  After receiving the marked money
from PO1 Gunda, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back with a small plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda.  Thereupon, PO1
Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the consummated
transaction and arrested appellant

Issue: WON accused was validly arrested without a warrant.

Ruling: Appellant assails the legality of his arrest contending that he was not caught in
flagrante delicto.  Appellant’s contention fails to convince.  The testimony of PO1 Gunda
who acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation clearly recounts how the sale
transaction between him and appellant transpired. It is crystal clear from the foregoing that a
sale transaction took place between appellant and PO1 Gunda.  That the said transaction
involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown by the prosecution through
its establishment of the following elements of the offense: “(1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.”16  Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu in a buy-bust operation.

In any event, jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused
should be timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment,
failing [in] which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of his
arrest.  As the records show, except during the inquest proceedings before the prosecutor’s
office, appellant never objected to the regularity of his arrest before his arraignment.  In fact,
he even actively participated in the trial of the case.  With these lapses, he is estopped from
raising any question regarding the same.
 People vs. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, February 06, 2013

Facts: A confidential informant arrived at Police Station 1, La Loma, Quezon City and talked
to the Officer-in- Charge. Thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge formed a team to conduct
surveillance and buy-bust operations at Isarog Street, Sta. Teresita, Quezon City.

Upon arrival at Isarog Street, PO2 Ibasco and the confidential informant approached Linda
Alviz outside her house. The confidential informant told Linda that PO2 Ibasco was deeply in
need of shabu. Linda asked for the money and PO2 Ibasco gave a ₱100.00 bill on which he
earlier placed his initials "EI." Linda called for Elizabeth dela Vega, who was inside the
house, and the two talked. Elizabeth then went inside the house. After a while, Elizabeth
came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda. Linda gave the ₱100.00 bill to Elizabeth and
the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco then gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching
his head. SPO4 Rebu[r]iano, who was only two (2) meters away, rushed to the group,
arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money, while PO2 Ibasco
arrested Linda.

Issue: WON accused was legally arrested.

Ruling: The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserts that the
warrantless arrest of Linda and Elizabeth was lawful because the police officers caught
them in flagrante delicto  selling shabu  to PO2 Ibasco in exchange for ₱100.00.

As a result of the finding that a buy-bust operation actually took place and that Linda and
Elizabeth were apprehended in flagrante delicto, the evidence gathered and presented by the
prosecution on the occasion of their lawful arrest without warrant cannot be deemed as the
"fruits of a poisonous tree," but are admissible and competent proof of their guilt.
 People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 191069, November 15, 2010

Facts: February 20, 2006, at around 1:15 in the morning, SPO2 Geronimo, SPO1 Quilala,
PO3 Avendano, and PO1 Cruz of the Makati City Philippine National Police (PNP)
conducted a manhunt operation against a suspect in a robbery case involving Korean
nationals along P. Burgos, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City. While on board their civilian
vehicle, they chanced upon a male individual selling certain items to two foreigners. They
heard him say, Hey Joe, want to buy Valium 10, Cialis, Viagra? Curious, they inquired and
the male individual told them that he was selling Viagra and Cialis, while, at the same time,
showing them the contents of his bag which yielded 120 tablets of Valium 10.

The male individual, who later turned out to be Sonny Boy, was immediately searched and
placed under arrest, after which they informed him of the nature of his apprehension and of
his constitutional rights. Sonny Boy was then brought to the office of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), where the items recovered from him
were marked and inventoried by PO1 Cruz. The items were turned over to the duty
investigator.

The RTC found accused guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. CA affirmed
RTC decision.

Issue: WON accused was validly arrested without a warrant.

Ruling: Accused-appellant never raised this issue before his arraignment. He never
questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal. On this alone, the contention must fail. It
has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with
regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure
by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before
he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Undoubtedly, the case at bar falls under Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113, that is, when the person to be
arrested is actually committing an offense, the peace officer may arrest him even without a
warrant. However, a warrantless arrest must still be preceded by the existence of probable
cause. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense charged.  Here, the arresting officers had sufficient
probable cause to make the arrest.
 Delima vs. Reyes, January 11, 2016, G.R. No. 209330

Facts: Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and
anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was
shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No: 091 creating a special panel
of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. On September 7, 2011, the
Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. Department Order No. 710 ordered
the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due process" to address the offer
of additional evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution dated September 2, 2011.
The Department Order also revoked Department Order No. 091.

On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes.

Issue: a. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function
beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition; and

b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel

of prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

Ruling:

a. The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is

not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming
or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.

b. Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.

Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice
may motu proprio  reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor
or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review.
 Hao vs. People, G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014

Facts: Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where
Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to
deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then
introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented
herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources
Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy his
higher investment return.

Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00. This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his investment to almost One Hundred Million
Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in
the name of State Resources. In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing
his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of ₱114,286,086.14.
All these checkswere subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them. He eventually
learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s
husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned
Dy’s money.

On the basis of Dy’s complaint and supplemental affidavit, the public prosecutor filed an

information for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. Judge
Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.

Issue: WON there is probable cause in issuing the warrant of arrest.

Ruling: A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts
and circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. This must be distinguished from
the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal
information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 

Probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa.

 Mangila vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

Facts: On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and
four others with syndicated estafa. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of
employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership
fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel
Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of
Mangila and her cohorts without bail.

Issue: WON the judge validly issued a warrant of arrest.

Ruling: Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule,
Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently,
the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested
and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial
officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to
relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and
pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the
public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause
should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to
seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her
proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the
City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records
of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them
to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ
of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.
 Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, March 11, 2015, G.R. No. 176033

Facts: Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa against
petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila.
Claiming to be business partners in financing casino players, private respondents alleged that
sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with
their P260,000.00 in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had
misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita De
Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.

On July 16, 2003, an Information charging petitioners with the crime of estafa was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment,

pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon
the prosecution's motion, the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until
the resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had
been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, alleging that
De Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of
their petition for review before the DOJ.

Issue: WON CA FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE

CASE AND ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE
CASTRO WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO CRIMINAL CASE

Ruling: On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to Reinstate
the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a party
to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a private
complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by
petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their P260,000.00.
Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to expunge, and treated
De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was filed by one who is
not a party to that case.

In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by one
who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review
in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23, 2005 Order denying
petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, despite the
pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the public respondent had been
very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows
suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For another, records show that
petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the preliminary investigation of their
estafa case.
 Honrales vs. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, August 25, 2010

Facts: On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent
Jonathan Honrales. Thus, an information for parricide against respondent was filed. Judge
Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, ordered respondents arrest.

On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider the October 28, 2002 Resolution of

Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which recommended the filing of parricide charges.
On December 19, 2003, however, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution
setting aside the October 28, 2002 Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the
information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia approved the Resolution.

On January 28, 2004, while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an
Information for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Determined to have respondent
prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for review [ with the DOJ questioning
the downgrading of the offense. 

Judge Barrios issued an Orderon September 26, 2005 granting the withdrawal of the

Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Judge
Barrios ruled that the Information for parricide found itself without a supporting resolution
and thus its withdrawal was appropriate.

On January 9, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing
the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders issued by the RTC through
Judge Barrios. Petitioner heirs argued that Judge Barrios granted the motion to withdraw the
Information for parricide on grounds other than his personal and independent findings. CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and
acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the
RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the reopening of the parricide case
which would violate respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: WON the withdrawal of the warrant of arrest was valid.

Ruling: It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without
making an independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record. By
relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.