Determination of Probable Cause

Fenequito vs. Vergara, G.R. No.172829 July 18,2012

G.R. No. 172829               July 18, 2012

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: On February 11, 2004, an Information for falsification of public documents was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein
petitioners. On April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on
Absence of Probable Cause. After respondent's Comment/Opposition was filed, the MeTC issued an
Order  dismissing the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, respondent, with the
express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila .The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC and directing
the said court to proceed to trial. Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
review and the latter court dismissed the petition, ruling further that the Decision of the RTC is
interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated May 22, 2006.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in outrightly dismissing the Petition for Review
on the ground that the remedy availed of by petitioners is improper.

Whether or not strict enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the purposes of justice
so require. (this is where probable cause was discussed…somehow hahah )

RULING: In affirming the ruling of the CA, the Supreme Court held that :Petitioners erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. Thus, they
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under:

Section 3 (b), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: (b) The appeal
to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, x x x.

The above provisions contemplate of an appeal from a final decision or order of the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 resorted to by
petitioners is improper. To repeat, the RTC Decision is not final, but interlocutory in nature.
A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits.Tested against the above
criterion, the RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of
petitioners' motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e ., the
continuation of the criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined.
Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then proceed to trial and finally render the
proper judgment. In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the
MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its
evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case
completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.

In their second assigned error, petitioners claim that assuming for the sake of argument
that the remedy they availed of is not proper, the facts of the case would readily show that there
exist just and compelling reasons to warrant the relaxation of the rules in the interest of substantial
justice.

The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory
Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the document examiner found that the signatures
appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard signatures "reveal
divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they
WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON." The Court agrees with the prosecutor's
pronouncement in its Resolution21 dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings of the PNP
Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that "no definite
conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein
minute details are not clearly manifested," the fact that an expert witness already found that the
questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates probable cause
to indict petitioners for the crime of falsification of public document.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. In the instant case, the
Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was
committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof. With respect to respondent's
legal personality to appeal the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the appeal filed
with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the case.

Aguilar vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 197522 September 11, 2013

G.R. No. 197522               September 11, 2013
ELISEO V. AGUILAR, Petitioner, 
vs.
 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PO1 LEO T. DANGUPON, 1ST LT. PHILIP FORTUNO, CPL. EDILBERTO
ABORDO, SPO3 GREGARDRO A. VILLAR, SPO1 RAMON M. LARA, SPO1 ALEX L. ACAYLAR, and PO1
JOVANNIE C. BALICOL, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet. On April 10, 2002, he filed a
criminal complaint4 for murder against the members of a joint team of police and military
personnel who purportedly arrested Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him, resulting to his
death. The persons charged to be responsible for Tetet’s killing were members of the Sablayan
Occidental Mindoro Police Force, identified as respondents.

Petitioners averred that on February 1, 2002, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the morning, at
Sitio Talipapa, Brgy. Pag-asa, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro (Sitio Talipapa), Tetet was arrested by
respondents for alleged acts of extortion and on the suspicion that he was a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/National People’s Army Revolutionary Movement. Despite his
peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by respondents. In particular, Tetet was hit on different
parts of the body with the butts of their rifles, and his hands were tied behind his back with a black
electric wire. He was then boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga River where he was
gunned down by respondents.Petitioner’s complaint was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida
Samillano and Rolando Corcotchea who stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands as
a sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed persons.

In defense, respondents posited that, they were engaged in an operation organized to

entrap a suspected extortionist (later identified as Tetet) who was allegedly demanding money
from a businesswoman named Estelita Macaraig. For this purpose, they devised a plan to
apprehend Tetet at Sitio Talipapa which was the place designated in his extortion letters to
Macaraig. At about 11:00 in the morning of that same day, Tetet was collared by Sgt. Ferdinand S.
Hermoso while in the act of receiving money from Macaraig’s driver, Arnold Magalong. Meanwhile,
Tetet was handcuffed and boarded on a military jeep. On the other hand, Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and
Balicol were left behind at Sitio Talipapa with the instruction to pursue Tetet’s two companions. As
the first group was passing along the Viga River, Tetet blurted out to the operatives that he would
point out to the police where his companions were hiding. Barte stopped the jeep and ordered his
men to return to Sitio Talipapa but, while the driver was steering the jeep back, Tetet pulled a hand
grenade clutched at the bandolier of Abordo, jumped out of the jeep and, from the ground, turned
on his captors by moving to pull the safety pin off of the grenade. Sensing that they were in danger,
Dangupon fired upon Tetet, hitting him four times in the body. The first group brought Tetet to the
San Sebastian District Hospital for treatment but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Levitico B. Salcedo of the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro dismissed petitioner’s complaint against all
respondents for lack of probable cause. The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on record
shows that the shooting of Tetet by Dangupon "was done either in an act of self-defense, defense of
a stranger, and in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office." T he Provincial
Prosecutor ruled that Villar, Acaylar,Lara, and Balicol could not be faulted for Tetet’s death as they
were left behind in Sitio Talipapa unaware of what transpired at the Viga River. As to the alleged
maltreatment of Tetet after his arrest, the Provincial Prosecutor found that these respondents were
not specifically pointed out as the same persons who mauled the former. He added that Hermoso
was, in fact, the one who grabbed/collared Tetet during his apprehension. The Provincial
Prosecutor similarly absolved Fortuno and Abordo since they were found to have only been in
passive stance. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for review to the DOJ.
 The DOJ dismissed petitioner’s appeal and thereby, affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s
ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that respondents conspired to kill/murder Tetet. In
particular, it was not established that Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were with Tetet at the time
he was gunned down and, as such, they could not have had any knowledge, much more any
responsibility, for what transpired at the Viga River. Neither were Barte, Fortuno, and Abordo
found to have conspired with Dangupon to kill Tetet since their presence at the time Tetet was shot
does not support a conclusion that they had a common design or purpose in killing him. 24 With
respect to Dangupon, the DOJ held that no criminal responsibility may be attached to him since his
act was made in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office under Article 11(5) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Lastly, the DOJ stated that petitioner’s suppositions and conjectures
that respondents salvaged his son are insufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in
respondents’ favor. Unperturbed, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling. It found no evidence to show that Tetet was
deliberately executed by respondents.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in
upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against respondents.

RULING: The petition is partly granted. It is observed that the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling, as
affirmed on appeal by the DOJ and, in turn, upheld on certiorari by the CA, may be dissected into
three separate disquisitions: first , the lack of probable cause on the part of Dangupon, who was
exculpated of the murder charge against him on account of his interposition of the justifying
circumstances of self-defense/defense of a stranger and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a
right of an office; second , the lack of probable cause on the part of Fortuno and Abordo who,
despite their presence during the killing of Tetet, were found to have no direct participation or have
not acted in conspiracy with Dangupon in Tetet’s killing; and third , the lack of probable cause on
the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol in view of their absence during the said incident.

A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose
of filing an information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies
beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a
public prosecutor’s resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of
probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.

Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements
of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle
that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal
offense.

“Existence of probable cause on the part of Dangupon”.- It must be noted that Dangupon’s theories
of self-defense/defense of a stranger and performance of an official duty are not clear and
convincing enough to exculpate him at this stage of the proceedings considering that: (a)
petitioner’s version of the facts was corroborated by witnesses who stated, that they saw Tetet
raise his hands as a sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed persons(hence, the presence of
unlawful aggression on the part of Tetet and the lack of any sufficient provocation on the part of
Dangupon,4the actual motive of Tetet’s companions, and the lawfulness of the act are put into
question);(b) it was determined that Tetet was handcuffed when he was boarded on the military
jeep (hence, the supposition that Tetet was actually restrained of his movement begs the questions
as to how he could have, in this state, possibly stole the grenade from Abordo); and (c) petitioner’s
evidence show that Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, the shots causing
which having been fired at a close distance (hence, the reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel Tetet’s supposed unlawful aggression, and whether the injury committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right also
put into question).

Therefore, due to the ostensible presence of the crime charged and considering that
Dangupon’s theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful performance of one’s duty and
the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the circumstances, not compelling enough to
over come a finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the case against Dangupon. Consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling with respect to
the latter is in order.

Existence of probable cause on the part of Fortuno and Abordo.- the Court also finds that grave
abuse of discretion tainted the dismissal of the charges of murder against Fortuno and Abordo. It is
of judicial notice that extralegal killings are ordinarily executed in a clandestine manner, and, as
such, its commission is largely concealed from the public view of any witnesses. In the present case,
there exists probable cause against Fortuno and Abordo by the circumstances on record which, if
threaded together, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that they were also
probably guilty of the crime charged. These circumstances are: (a) Fortuno and Abordo were with
Dangupon during the time the latter killed Tetet in an undisclosed place along the Viga River;
(b)Tetet was apprehended, taken into custody and boarded on a military jeep by the group of
armed elements of which Fortuno and Abordo belonged to; (c), Tetet was handcuffed when he was
boarded on the military jeep and, in effect, restrained of his movement when he supposedly stole
the grenade from Abordo; and (d), Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot
wounds,57 and that the shots causing the same were fired at a close distance.

Lack of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol. The Court, however,
maintains a contrary view with respect to the determination of lack of probable cause on the part of
Villar, Lara, Acaylar and Balicol. Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned
respondents – as opposed to Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo – directly participated in the killing of
Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by the DOJ, Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet
at the time he was shot; thus, they could not have been responsible for his killing. 

Peo vs. Borje, G.R. No. 170046   December 10, 2014

 G.R. No. 170046               December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., BURT B. FAVORITO, FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q. QUARTO, AGERICO C.
PALAYPAY, NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO C. PLANTA, LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY,
NORMA A. VILLARMINO, RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ, MELISSA
T. ESPINA, VIOLETA R. TADEO, JESSICA J. CATIBAYAN, VIOLETA C. AMAR, RON ALDO G.
SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE, ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A.
BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C. FULLIDO, NO NETTE H. FULLIDO,
VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V. EDEM, .AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR., JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.

FACTS: On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of (DPWH), Simeon Datumanong, issued Department
Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a committee for the purpose of investigating alleged
anomalies and illegal disbursements in connection with the repair of DPWH-owned motor vehicles
and equipment. It was discovered that during the period of March 2001 to December 2001, the
emergency repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles, approved and paid for by the
government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about (₱139,000,000.00).

 Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH and member of the
committee, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for violation of Section
3(e)(g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended, in relation to Sections 20 and 9 of the General
and Special Provisions, respectively, of the General Appropriations Act, Memorandum of the
Secretary on the Guidelines on Purchases of Spare Parts and Repair of Vehicles dated July 19, 1997,
Department Order No. 33, Series of1988 of RA 6770, as amended by RA No. 3018, COA Circular 85-
55 A, Seriesof 1985, COA Circular 76-412, Series of 1976 on splitting of RSE, PO, vouchers and
payrolls, against the several officials/employees of the DPWH, including respondents herein. The
Special Prosecution Officer, Humphrey T. Monteroso, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman, filed an Information 6 with the Sandiganbayan an information accusing
the respondents herein of the crime of Plunder defined and penalized under RA No. 7080.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the Ombudsman’s
finding of probable cause questioning the authority of the Sandiganbayan to act on respondents’
motions, arguing that the same had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents and, hence, it had no authority to hear and decide their motions. Petitioner also alleged
that it successfully established probable cause justifying the issuance by the respondent court of a
warrant of arrest.

Sandiganbayan upheld its authority to act on respondents’ motions for their filing of the
same may be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and dismissing the
case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate charges against the accused-respondents. It ruled that as the records reveal, not all
elements of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50 million. It further denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE
PROSECUTION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE.

RULING: Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman is an executive, not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that respondent
Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and determination of probable cause in
their preliminary investigation. Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly dismissed
the case for the evidence clearly shows the absence of certain elements of the crime. They maintain
that while investigating officers have a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable
cause, which deserves respect from the courts, the acts of the Ombudsman in disregarding essential
pieces of evidence are tantamount to an abuse of discretion authorizing the dismissal by the court
of the case.

We rule in favor of petitioner. There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. On the one hand, executive determination of probable cause ascertains
whether a criminal case must be filed in court. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and should be held
for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause ascertains whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence presented, there is necessity in placing the accused under
custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated. Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable
cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.

It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable
cause which would warrant the filing of an information against respondents. Moreover, the fact that
the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman differs from the findings of Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the
Internal Audit Service of the DPWH, who conducted the initial investigation, falls short of being
capricious or arbitrary. It has consistently been held that there is grave abuse of discretion where
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Ombudsman in this case, however,
was merely performing his duty as mandated by the Constitution and by law .
Hasegawa vs. Giron, G.R. No. 184536 August 14, 2013
G.R. No. 184536               August 14, 2013
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEILA F. GIRON, Respondent.

FACTS: On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention against petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged that she and her
officemate, Leonarda Marcos filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants
International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal salary
deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent
averred that since the filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse
by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate
complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said
cases are pending before the (MeTC) of Pasay City.Respondent recalled she received a call from an
alleged messenger of her counsel who requested for a meeting at Harrison Plaza Mall in Manila. She
asked Marcos to accompany her. While they were on their way to Harrison Plaza Mall, they noticed
a black Pajero car parked in front of the Package B Building inside the Light Rail Transit Authority
compound, the place where both of them work. When they reached the mall, they went inside the
SM Department Store to buy a few things. They then noticed two men following them. Respondent
immediately called a close friend and reported the incident. Thereafter, respondent and Marcos
went out of the department store and stood near the food stalls to make another phone call.
Respondent suddenly felt a man’s gun being pushed against the right side of her body. Respondent
and Marcos were taken at gunpoint and pushed inside a black Pajero. While inside the vehicle, they
were blindfolded and gagged. They were taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors into
withdrawing the case against petitioner. When her blindfold was loosened, respondent was able to
take a good look at her surroundings. She noticed that the car was parked in a warehouse with
concrete walls and high roof. Before respondent and Marcos were released, they were once again
threatened by a man who said: "pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa, may paglalagyan na kayo,
walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin kayo." They
were released at around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006 and dropped off in Susana Heights in
Muntinlupa.

Petitioner, Affidavit, denied the accusation of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
against him. Petitioner categorically stated that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping; that he
was neither the "brains" nor a "participant" in the alleged crimes; that he did not know the alleged
kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside one of the vehicles talking with one of the
abductors at the place alleged by Marcos. Petitioner asserted that respondent and Marcos are
extorting money from him because the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to settle
the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.

Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos eventually dismissed the complaint for
lack of probable cause.Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing
her complaint claiming that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the
dismissal of the case against petitioner despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of
probable cause. Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the DOJ, she filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. The CA granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the
DOJ and ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against
petitioner.The CA found that "the Secretary of Justice arrogated upon himself the functions of the
judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for pieces of evidence that were understandably not
there yet, being suited to a trial proper.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN

REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS IN
THE INSTANT CASE.

RULING: The rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the
DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the
DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause.

The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends
on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary
investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable
cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. In sum, the prosecutor’s
findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are
patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. The Court finds such reason for
judicial review here present. The Court sustains the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the
Secretary of the DOJ. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. All elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention sufficiently averred in
the complaint-affidavit were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have
been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that
she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They
were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction
is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts
complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her
findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial
where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence.
The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out
conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation
of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a party’s defense or
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level. By taking into consideration the defenses raised
by petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case.

People vs. Yecyec, G.R. No. 183551 November 12, 2014

G.R. No. 183551               November 12, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC, ROGELIO BINAS, ISIDRO VICTA, IRENEO VINA, RUDY GO, JUANITO
TUQUIB, ROMEO BUSTILLO, FELIX OBALLAS, CASTEO ESCLAMADO, RICARDO LUMACTUD,
LEOPOLDO PELIGRO, PATERNO NANOLAN, CARLITO SOLATORIO, MEDARDO ABATON, FEDIL
RABANES, FELIX HINGKING, BENJAMIN TOTO, EUFROCINO YBANEZ, FELOMINO OBSIOMA,
LORETO PEROCHO, MARANIE UNGON, NOYNOY ANGCORAN, ROLANDO YUZON, NESTOR CHAVEZ,
LEONARDO PREJAN, PRIMO LIBOT, NEMESIO ABELLA, IRENEO LICUT, PROCESO GOLDE, EPIFANIO
LABRADOR, and BRANCH 11, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon), Respondents.

FACTS: Calixto B. Sison was the supervisor of Pioneer’s rubber processing plant, who was tasked,
with the acquisition of rubber coagulum and rubber cup lumps in Talakag, Bukidnon. On August 19,
2002, Sison bought for Pioneer a total of 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps from its various suppliers
in Talakag, Bukidnon. Out of the total 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps he bought, some 1,500 kilos
were purchased from Julieto Edon, caretaker of the plantation of Albert Poño. Considering that
Pioneer did not have any storage facility in Talakag, Bukidnon, Sison placed the newly-purchased
rubber cup lumps inside the fenced premises which he rented out as his residence. Sison was
approached by Avelino Sechico, chairman of the FARBECO Multi-purpose Cooperative.
Accompanying Sechico were two police officers and several members of FARBECO. When asked
about their purpose, Sison was informed they wanted to verify if the rubber cup lumps/coagulum
he had bought earlier were the same as those that were earlier stolen from FARBECO. The group
informed Sison that six (6) tons of the rubber lumps/coagulum that Edon sold to him were the ones
earlier stolen from FABRECO. As Sison was unsure if Sechico’s claims were true, he informed
Sechico and his companions that he would cover up the rubber cup lumps first with canvass and
confer with Poño to verify if the rubber cup lumps he bought from Edon really came from the Poño
plantation.

On August 30, 2002, however, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sison was surprised
when respondent Rodolfo Yecyec, manager of FARBECO, arrived at his place on board a "weapons
carrier truck." Yecyec, together with co-respondents herein and several John Does totaling thirty-
five (35) men, demanded that Sison give them the rubber lumps/coagulum he bought from Edon.
Sison refused to accede to their demands. In response, Yecyec suddenly yelled at Sison "by hook or
by crook kuhaon gyud namo ang mga rubber. Yecyec then ordered his men (co-respondents) to
seize the rubber cup lumps inside Sison’s house. Sison warned Yecyec and his men not to enter his
residence and added that he would ask a police officer and a barangay kagawad to witness the
incident. Sison then left to fetch the police and barangay officials. Immediately after Sison left,
Yecyec, together with his men proceeded to destroy the fence of Sison’s residence to gain entrance
to the premises. As they were unable to completely destroy the fence, Yecyec climbed over the
enclosure to gain entrance to Sison’s residence. About eleven (11) of Yecyec’s men followed him.
Once inside the fenced premises, Yecyec and his companions took the rubber cup lumps and loaded
them on to their truck. Two of Yecyec’s men were armed during the incident.
 Before Yecyec and his men could completely load all the rubber cup lumps inside the truck,
Sison arrived together with police officer Billy Dahug and barangay kagawad Marc Gumilac. Startled
when the police officer Dahug blew his whistle, Yecyec and his men hastily left the premises on
board their truck, leaving the left portion of the fence destroyed.

Sison, thus filed an affidavit-complaint 6 against the respondents before (PNP) of Talakag, Bukidnon.
Acting favorably on the complaint, the Chief Police of the PNP of Talakag, Bukidnon, filed a criminal
complaint7 against the private respondents for Robbery with Intimidation of Persons before the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)of Talakag-Baungon-Malitbog, Bukidnon. After conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC found probable cause to hold respondents liable for
Robbery with Intimidation of Persons.

While affirming the finding of probable cause by the investigating judge for the unlawful
taking, the Provincial Prosecutor found that the respondents should only be liable for the lower
offense of Theft. Ruling further that no evidence was adduced to show that respondents had
employed violence and intimidation in the taking of the rubber cup lumps from the house of the
complainant. Thereafter, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, charging the respondents with the crime of Theft. The RTC arrived at
the conclusion that the evidence on record failed to establish probable cause absent two (2) of the
essential elements of the crime of Theft and dismissed the case. The CA issued the assailed decision
affirming the dismissal of the charges against the respondents. Echoing the findings of the RTC that
no probable cause exists to hold the respondents liable for the crime of Theft, the appellate court
opined that the respondents lacked the intent to gain since the taking was done in broad daylight
and under an avowed claim of ownership.

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing the information against the
respondents for the crime of Theft for want of probable cause.

RULING: To determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have
committed the crime as defined by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an
executive function. The public prosecutor, who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law
and, thus, should be held for trial, has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor, that is, whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon.

The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from
the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The
judicial determination of probable cause, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is a necessity to place the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor
committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is
limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrant should be
issued against the accused. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the
respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. 30 Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support finding
of probable cause against the respondents, albeit with the RTC and the CA having varying opinions
as to the application and interpretation of such basis. Hence, as the Information was valid on its face
and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial
Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned the finding of probable cause against
the respondents. It was clearly premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to make a
determinative finding prior to the parties' presentation of their respective evidence that the
respondents lacked the intent to gain and acted in good faith considering that they merely sought to
recover the rubber cup lumps that they believed to be theirs. It has long been settled that the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits

Law Firm vs. Fria, G.R. No. 183014 August 7, 2013

G.R. No. 183014               August 7, 2013

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING
PARTNER, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, PETITIONER, 
vs.
ATTY. JOSEJINA C. FRIA, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: On July 31, 2006, an Information was filed against respondent Atty. Josejina C. Fria (Atty.
Fria), Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, charging
her for the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code

The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in a Civil Case instituted before
Branch 203. On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, prompting the
defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and
consequently ordered that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the foregoing judgment. Due to
the denial of the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the July 29, 2005 judgment became final
and executory. The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been following up on the
issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria
vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ. In her Counter-Affidavit
dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution was not addressed to her but
to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen, who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the presiding
judge would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she maintained that she
need not sign the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order stating that
he himself shall sign and issue the same. On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a
Memorandum recommending, that Atty. Fria be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The
corresponding Information was thereafter filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 80 (MTC), Atty. Fria filed a Motion for Determination of Probable Cause which The Law
Firm opposed on the ground that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not empower trial courts to
review the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause and that such rules only give the trial court judge
the duty to determine whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.

In an Omnibus Order, the MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of
probable cause. It found that aside from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law Firm
failed to prove the existence of the other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. The MTC
ruled further that the second element of the crime, i.e., that there is a judgment, decision, or order
of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities,
unlikely existed since the Court already declared as null and void the entire proceedings in Civil
Case No. 03-110 due to lack of jurisdiction. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the latter’s part since its dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of
probable cause was "in full accord with the law, facts, and jurisprudence."

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC’s dismissal of the case for Open
Disobedience against Atty. Fria, i.e., Criminal Case No. 46400, for lack of probable cause.

RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power to
immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is
clear. In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed
that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely
than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same,
the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful
cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional
evidence.1In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with
his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of
arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case
he doubts the existence of probable cause.

Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead to the conclusion that the MTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause.
The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of
the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the
offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk of
Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting.

The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision,
or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal
formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been
regarded as null and void due to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Since it is
explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope of a superior authority’s
jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of the crime of Open
Disobedience does not exist. Lest it be misunderstood, a court – or any of its officers for that matter
– which has no jurisdiction over a particular case has no authority to act at all therein. In this light,
it cannot be argued that Atty. Fria had already committed the crime based on the premise that the
Court’s pronouncement as to Branch 203’s lack of jurisdiction came only after the fact. The third
element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute
the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist.
Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or,
conversely, disobey. Besides, as the MTC correctly observed, there lies ample legal justifications
that prevented Atty. Fria from immediately issuing a writ of execution.

Hilbero vs. Morales, January 11, 2017 G.R. No. 198760

G.R. No. 198760
ATTY. ALLAN S. HILBERO, Petitioner, 
vs.
FLORENCIO A. MORALES, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: On June 16, 2007, Demetrio and his wife, Estela S. Hilbero ,had just attended the Saturday
evening anticipated mass at the Calarnba Catholic Church. Spouses Demetrio and Estela then
proceeded to Demetrio's law office located along Gen. Lim St., Barangay 5, Calamba City, arriving at
said office around 7:45 p.m. Estela alighted first from their car and immediately went inside the
office, while Demetrio went to a nearby store to buy cigarettes. When Demetrio was about to enter
the gate of his office, two armed men on-board a motorcycle suddenly appeared and shot Demetrio
several times. The gunmen escaped towards the adjacent Mabini Street. Three spent shells and one
deformed slug of a .45 caliber pistol were recovered from the crime scene. A cartographic sketch of
one of Demetrio' s assailants was made based on the descriptions given by eyewitnesses to the
shooting incident. Demetrio's relatives also informed police investigators that Demetrio was heard
having a heated argument on the telephone with an unknown caller inside his office at around
12:30 p.m. on June 16, 2007. Demetrio seemed bothered and anxious after said telephone
conversation. On December 26, 2007, P/Supt. Mariano Nachor Manaog, Jr. of the Laguna Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team (CIDT-Laguna) forwarded to the Calamba City Prosecution Office
(CCPO) the records of the investigation relative to Demetrio' s killing.  The CCPO docketed the
preliminary investigation of Demetrio's killing as LS. No. 1428-07.

The ORSP-Laguna stated that there was well-founded belief that Primo Lopez and Lorenzo
Pamplona were responsible for the murder of Demetrio and ordered that an information for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of night time, be filed against them. In the same Resolution, the ORSP-Laguna directed
that the case against Sandy Pamplona and respondent be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
An Information for murder against Primo and Lorenzo was filed before the (RTC) of Calamba City
on May 15, 2008, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15782-2008-C. Petitioner challenged before the
DOJ the Resolution dated May 6, 2008 of the ORSP-Laguna in LS. No. 1428-07 insofar as it found no
sufficient evidence to indict Sandy and respondent (Florencio) for the murder of Demetrio. Primo
and Lorenzo likewise assailed before the DOJ the same Resolution of the ORSP-Laguna for finding
that there was probable cause to charge them for the murder of Demetrio.

The DOJ, through Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, issued a Resolution, which (a) granted the
appeal of Primo and Lorenzo and denied the appeal of petitioner; (b) reversed and set aside the
Resolution dated May 6, 2008 of the ORSP-Laguna in I.S. No. 1428-07; and (c) directed the ORSP-
Laguna to withdraw the Information against Primo and Lorenzo filed with the R TC and inform the
DOJ of the action taken.  Petitioner filed with the DOJ a Motion for Declaration of Nullity of the DOJ
Resolution, or In the Alternative, For its Reconsideration. 9 Petitioner alleged in his Motion that
neither he nor his counsel were furnished a copy of DOJ Secretary Gonzalez's Resolution dated
March 18, 2009; petitioner only learned three days earlier that the CCPO had long received a copy
of said Resolution (apparently forwarded by the ORSP-Laguna); and petitioner merely photocopied
the copy of said Resolution of the CCPO. According to petitioner, there was a clandestine and
deliberate design by some operators at the DOJ to conceal from petitioner the issuance of DOJ
Secretary Gonzalez's Resolution dated March 18, 2009, which invalidated the said Resolution.

The DOJ, Acting Secretary Agnes VST De Vanadera, granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and set aside DOJ Secretary Gonzalez's Resolution. Acting DOJ Secretary De
Vanadera held that petitioner and/or his counsel were indeed not furnished with a copy of DOJ
Secretary Gonzalez's Resolution dated March 18, 2009, which amounts to a denial of petitioner's
right to file a motion for reconsideration. Nevertheless, Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera deemed
it best to disregard the procedural issue, and dwell on the actual merits of the case, ruling further
that the DOJ resolution [dated March 18, 2009] dwelt on the evaluation and interpretation of the
probative value of the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo Leyva even if such matter is not within the
ambit of the prosecution's duty of finding probable cause. The matter is certainly evidentiary in
nature and is best addressed to the trial court whose proximate contact with witnesses places it in a
more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony.

As regards Sandy Pamplona and [respondent] Florencio Morales, Jr. who were earlier
cleared by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor of Region IV for insufficiency of evidence,
Acting Secretary Agnes VST De Vanadera found probable cause to indict them for murder. It is
incontrovertible that a crime has been committed and the only question that remains unanswered
would be the identity of the perpetrators.  As between the self-serving testimony of the accused
[(Primo, Lorenzo, Sandy, and respondent )], and the positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses, the latter deserves greater credence.

In compliance with Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera's Resolution Assistant City

Prosecutor Joyce B. Martinez-Barut filed before the RTC a Motion to Admit Amended
Information13 in Criminal Case No. 15782-2008-C. The RTC admitted the Amended Information and
ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest against Primo, Lorenzo, Sandy, and
respondent(Florencio). Respondent assailed Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera' s directly before
the Court of Appeals via  a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals ruled in respondent's favor on the substantive issues, finding grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Acting DOJ Secretary De
Vanadera in her issuance of the Resolution dated September 30, 2009 considering that there was
not enough evidence to establish that respondent conspired with Primo, Lorenzo, and Sandy to kill
Demetrio.

ISSUES: : WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE THRU
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ AND THE PANEL OF PROSECUTORS CORRECTLY RULED
AND DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED IN EXCESS OR WANT OF
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR WANT OF EVIDENCE AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT FLORENCIO MORALES, JR. (damu issue diri guys pero amo ni ang sa probable
cause)

RULING: Respondent failed to establish that Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in finding probable cause to charge
him for the murder of Demetrio. A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause - that is, one
made for the purpose of filing an information in court - is essentially an executive function and,
therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.  It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion
transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. 
In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutor's resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable
cause. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 
Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera, in her Resolution dated September 30, 2009, found
probable cause to charge respondent for the murder of Demetrio based on eyewitness Reynaldo's
credible narration of the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Demetrio and his positive
identification of the culprits. Aside from respondent's general and sweeping allegations, there was
no basis for concluding that Secretary De Vanadera issued her Resolution dated September 30,
2009 capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically, by reason of passion and hostility, as to
constitute abuse of discretion; and that such abuse of discretion was so patent and gross that it was
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent had already discussed and argued
extensively his defenses to the charge of murder, which, as Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera
correctly ruled, should be properly threshed out and ventilated in the course of the trial of Criminal
Case No. 15782-2008-C before the RTC. Thus, the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera in her Resolution dated September 30, 2009, absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Shu vs. Dee, G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014
G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014
RAY SHU, Petitioner, 
vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN
SO,Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint before the
National Bureau of Investigation charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real
estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Both deeds of real estate
mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on
behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of
Metrobank. Respondents Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage
as witnesses; respondents Ramon S. Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized the deeds of
real estate mortgage signed by the petitioner in his own behalf and for the corporation,
respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the other hand, appeared in the deeds
of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan,
Metro Manila.2 Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A
Apparel Corporation’s loan.

The NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging the respondents of
the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. The NBI supported the complaint with
the Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 issued by its Questioned Documents Division. The
questioned documents report states that the signatures of the petitioner which appear on the
questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.The
respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process
during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the
standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison. An examination of the signatures of
the petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobank’s possession revealed that his
signatures in the questioned deeds are genuine. The respondents also argued that the examination
of the documents was conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate
mortgage.

The city prosecutor found no probable cause against the respondents and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents
report is not conclusive evidence that the respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves
that the sample signatures which were submitted solely by the petitioner are different from the
signatures appearing on the questioned deeds. The pieces of evidence presented before the city
prosecutor, which were not made available to the NBI and which the petitioner does not dispute
prove that the same person executed the questioned deeds. 7 The city prosecutor found that the
similarities in the sample signatures submitted by the respondents and the signatures on the two
deeds of real estate mortgage are so striking that even a layman could see that they were written by
one and the same person. The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She ruled that the city
prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI questioned documents
experts. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof of irregularity in
the performance of the experts’ duties. According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the
disclaimer of the petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of
the proceeds of the loan, all tended to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. The
complainant’s evidence is more credible and suffices to establish probable cause for falsification, as
against the respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting documents. The Secretary of Justice
denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration prompting them to file a petition for certiorari
with the CA. 

The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due process in the proceedings
before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice. In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents
were not furnished a copy of the complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to
present countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the
petitioner. In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished
with the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to file their
answer nor to comment. The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally
involved in the investigation of the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor,
were convinced that the evidence were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges against the
respondents. The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came from the NBI chiefs and the
Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate the case. The CA affirmed the findings of the
city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to examine the documents submitted by the parties,
including the respondents’ evidence which the NBI did not consider. The CA denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that they had been
denied due process in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice despite their active
participation in the proceedings through the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the investigating NBI agent and
the city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides which of the
conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be given weight. (Damu pagid
issues diri pero amo lang ni ang sa probable cause guys)

RULING: We find the petition meritorious. The respondents were not denied their right to due
process We find no merit in the respondent’s claim that they were denied due process when they
were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s appeal. The
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration.In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the
respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution.
Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents
availed of.

The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion Probable cause pertains to
facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof.It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of
probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. In determining these
elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie
case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. The elements of falsification of
public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) he committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) the falsification was committed in a
public, official or commercial document. In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of
the Secretary of Justice are more in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable
cause than the findings of the city prosecutor. Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the
Secretary of Justice did not just merely give credence to the questioned documents report and the
petitioner’s self-serving allegations.1âwphi1 The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the
parties’ submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the
petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of
the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. Also, the finding in the assailed
resolution that the ‘credit line’ of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient consideration for him
to have executed the deeds is gratuitous and conjectural."

The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should
be threshed out in a full-blown trial. In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned
documents report issued by the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted by the
respondents showed that even a layman could see the striking similarities of the alleged signatures
of the petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the documents submitted by the respondents. He
also concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the respondents-notaries public Miranda and
Magpantay that the passport used in notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled. In
arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the respondents’
defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a party’s defense and
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 34 The allegations adduced by the prosecution will
be put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or
disproved.35 The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties’ evidence.36 Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical
knowledge.

Tan vs. Matsuura, G.R. No. 179003 January 9, 2013

G.R. No. 179003               January 9, 2013

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 195816
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
JULIE O. CUA, Respondent.

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Antonio L. Tan, Jr. On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Makati City a Complaint-Affidavit charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty.
Carolina Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua of the crime of falsification. Matsuura vehemently denied
Tan’s charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a scheme resorted to by Tan
following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution in a
complaint for estafa against Tan. Tanjutco argued that Tan’s admission of having pre-signed the
subject deed only proved that he had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura.
She also argued that Tan failed to present any proof of her participation in the deed’s falsification,
and explained that she had not yet known Matsuura at the time of the supposed notarization. For
her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who represented
himself as Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan
presented his community tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was
sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have conducted her duty in utmost good faith,
with duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied
having any business or interest whatsoever with the law offices of Tanjutco.

The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause against
Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the subject deed, and
further noted that "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the effect of a
binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown." The
complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to overturn the presumption of
regularity attached to the notary public’s performance of her official duty. Any irregularity
attending the execution of the deed of trust required more than mere denial from Tan. Tan’s motion
for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).

Then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a resolution denying the petition. .

He ruled that no evidence was presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the
witnesses’ signatures appearing on the subject deed were merely inserted therein by the
respondents. Tan’s bare averments were insufficient to show the actual participation of the
respondents in the alleged falsification. Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, and was granted by
then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez. In finding probable cause to indict the
respondents for the crime of falsification, the DOJ noted that a copy of the deed of trust attached by
Matsuura and Tanjutco to Matsuura’s Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate dispute
before the SEC was not yet notarized. Furthermore, the print and font of the deed’s entries on its
covered shares and date remarkably differed from the other portions of the document.

The respondents moved for reconsideration and then DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L.
Pineda, issued a resolution affirming the presence of probable cause against Matsuura and
Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information. He ruled that Cua had
exercised due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the person who appeared before her a
proof of his identification.  Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for certiorari. The
DOJ’s review of its resolution on Cua’s case continued with Tan’s filing of a motion for partial
reconsideration. The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions.
The CA held that given the elements of the crime, the actual participation of respondents Matsuura
and Tanjutco was not sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not sufficiently
shown. Tan’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUES: (a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it,
assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and

(b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there exists no probable
cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of falsification.

RULING: Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause is
essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice. However, equally settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of
prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave
abuse of discretion. Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA,
the appellate court’s exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent course
to take after the Secretary had successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the
OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such circumstance was not
indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justice’s
appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of
discretion attended the discharge of his functions. There is no probable cause for falsification
against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua.The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion when the latter ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against
the respondents. The Court affirms the CA’s finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Justice in reversing the rulings of the OCP that favored Matsuura and Tanjutco.
 The Secretary of Justice directed the filing in court of two informations against Matsuura
and Tanjutco: one information for the crime of falsification under Article 172 (2), in relation to
Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a violation of Article 171 (2) of the
RPC. Logically, affidavits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must at least
show these elements of the crime and the particular participation of each of the respondents in its
commission. Otherwise, there would be no basis for a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. Probable cause can only
find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the
person being charged warrants a prosecution. Upon the Court’s review, we affirm the ruling that
Tan had failed to adequately show during the preliminary investigation all the aforementioned
elements of the offense. Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged
unauthorized insertions in the subject document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco
should be held liable therefor. To warrant an indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show
during the preliminary investigation that the persons to be charged are responsible for the acts that
define the crime. Contrary to this, however, there were no sufficient allegations and evidence
presented on the specific acts attributed to Matsuura and Tanjutco that would show their
respective actual participation in the alleged alteration or intercalation. It is then the Court’s view
that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the subject Deed of Trust, with the intention of giving
effect thereto. Even granting that there were insertions in the deed after it was signed by the
petitioner, no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had changed the meaning of
the document, or that their details differed from those intended by the petitioner at the time that he
signed it. The petitioner’s bare allegation that "the change was without his consent and
authority" does not equate with the necessary allegation that the insertions were false or had
changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a violation of Article 172 (2), in relation to
Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the alteration or intercalation has
changed the meaning of the document. Neither was there sufficient evidence to support the element
of damage that was purportedly suffered by Tan by reason of the alleged falsification. As correctly
observed by the OCP:

By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can be safely
inferred that the document speaks for itself. Whether or not the same document is notarized, the
Deed has the effect of a binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been
sufficiently shown. The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge
because the Secretary of Justice directed the filing of the first information for an alleged falsification
of a private document. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice’s finding of
probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco was based solely on surmises and conjectures,
wholly unsupported by legal and factual bases. The CA then correctly nullified, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, the resolutions that were assailed before it. There is grave abuse of
discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification.
Delos Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013
G.R. No. 178947               June 26, 2013
VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and
WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 179079
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.

FACTS: In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio, the majority stockholder of (HS Equities)
and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the
authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China). After some
discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of
US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park. In this relation, Dio claimed that
Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of
the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on
investment. Desmond even presented a Business Plan."Thus, on January 18, 2002, a Subscription
Agreement was executed by Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as
representative of HS Equities.

While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS Equities was
expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription and Shareholders
Agreement dated March 12, 2002, stating that there shall be "a nominee of the Subscriber to be
elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, who may not be removed by the Board of Directors
without the affirmative vote of the Subscriber."  Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member of
SBMEI’s Board of Directors and further appointed as its Treasurer. In June 2002, Dio, this time on
behalf of Westdale, invested another US$1,000,000.00 16 in a separate business venture, called the
Miracle Beach Hotel Project, which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond
adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment would be used to settle SBMEI’s
₱40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro Investment Corporation and for the construction of
48 lodging units/cabanas.17 However, when the corresponding subscription agreement was
presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a clause stating that the "funds in the
Subscription Bank Account" were also to be used for the "funding of Ocean Adventure’s Negative
Cash Flow not exceeding US$200,000.00." This was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent
of Westdale’s investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription
agreement. Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations,
SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was
incurring losses amounting to ₱62,595,216.00. She likewise claimed to have discovered false
entries in the company’s books and financial statements – specifically, its overvaluation of the
marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV China’s investment– which
prompted her to call for an audit investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her
knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements from Westdale’s special account,
meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures, and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the
operating expenses of Ocean Adventure. When Desmond refused to execute an undertaking to
return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the release of the
remaining funds in the aforesaid special account. Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and
Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed, , two (2) criminal complaints (subject criminal complaints) for estafa
(a) through false pretenses under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code  (RPC); and (b) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or conversion under Article
315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor’s Office, docketed
as IS Nos. 04-M-992 and 04-M-993.

After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution 30 dated August
26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes, to wit:

The foregoing clearly applies in the instant two (2) cases as borne out by the following facts, to with
[sic]: (1) Desmond, as the Chairman and Chief Executive Office of SBMEI and in order to persuade
Dio to invest, represented that he possessed the necessary influence, expertise and resources (in
terms of credit and property) for the project knowing the same to be false as he never had the
capital for the project as borne out by his correspondences with Dio; and (2) Dio fell for these
misrepresentations and the lure of profit offered by Desmond, thereby being induced to invest the
amounts of $1,150,000.00 and $1,000,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of her company.

The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the
crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present. Consequently, the RTC
denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold departure order against Desmond and ordered
the dismissal of the cases against him. The CA upheld the RTC’s authority to dismiss a criminal case
if in the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the
evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause.  It explained that such dismissal is an
exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. On this score, the CA evaluated the evidence presented and agreed with the
RTC’s conclusions that there was no sufficient basis showing that Desmond committed estafa by
means of false pretenses. Neither was it established that the money sourced from petitioner Dio
was converted by respondent Desmond for some other purpose other than that for which it was
intended. 
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when it dismissed the subject informations for lack of probable cause.

RULING: The petitions are meritorious. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or
judicial. The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a
criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the
evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the
filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes
a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh
in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.

While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited

purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. In this regard, so as not to transgress the public
prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows
that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed
to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.55

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his
primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if
he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he
doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s
immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable
cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts – namely, (a)
whether or not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean
Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the
Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted. As
such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)
(a) and 315(1) (b) of the RPC had already been established, thereby rendering the RTC’s immediate
dismissal of the case highly improper.
 In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly established in this
case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case
Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where
the parties could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective
claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes
therein.

Salappudin vs. CA, G.R. No. 184681 February 25, 2013

G.R. No. 184681               February 25, 2013

GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, and NOR-RHAMA J. INDANAN, Respondents.

FACTS: The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the
adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
lobby of the House of Representatives in the Batasan  Complex, Quezon City. The blast led to the
death of Representative Wahab Akbar and several other persons. The post-blast investigation
revealed that the explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that was
parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby. Acting on a confidential information that
the person who parked the motorcycle near the South Wing lobby of the HOR was staying with
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and learning that one ASG member, Abu Jandal alias  "Bong," has
standing warrants of arrest for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, police officers raided an
alleged ASG safehouse located at Blk. 4, Lot 23, Anahaw St., Parkwood Hills, Payatas, Quezon City
(Parkwood). During the course of the operation, a firefight ensued killing three persons.
Meanwhile, Caidar Aunal , Ikram Indama and Adham Kusain were arrested and then brought to
Camp Crame in Quezon City and one of the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S.
Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin.

A day after the raid, Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. He stated that he is from Tipo-
Tipo, Basilan and came to Manila in March 2005, staying when he first arrived in Manila in the
house of Salapuddin, his father’s friend. Salapuddin paid for one year of his college education and
helped him be employed as a building attendant at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He
explained that he was in the house at Parkwood Hills because Redwan asked him to get the
payment for his black XRM Honda motorcycle that Redwan took from his house on November 2,
2007. He claimed that Redwan did not disclose the purpose for which the motorcycle will be used
and it was only after the raid that he learned that his motorcycle was the very same motorcycle
used during the bombing at the Batasan  Complex. On the same day, November 16, 2007, Ikram
executed the first of his several affidavits. He stated that he is a driver working for Salapuddin and
was staying in a house at 48-A Greenbucks, owned by Salapuddin, from June 2004 until he went
home to Isabela City, Basilan in June 2007. 20 He maintained that he returned to Manila on October
16, 2007. He stressed that before returning to Manila, or on October 9, 2007, his cousin Redwan
talked to him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means of a bomb to be
planted on a motorcycle. He was not, however, informed of the reason for the mission or the
identity of the person who gave the order. He stated that those who took part in the planning of the
bombing included: Redwan and his wife Saing; Jang, who was a cousin and member of the staff of
Congressman Mujiv Hataman; Bong, who made the bomb; Aunal; and Kusain. On October 20, 2007,
he and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Manila only on November 5, 2007. He narrated
that at 3:30 p.m. of November 13, 2007, he went to the Batasan  premises on board a black Honda
XRM with the bomb and parked it near the entrance of the South Wing lobby, at a spot reserved by
Jang.Later that day, he heard the bomb explode and received a text message from Jang confirming
that it was the bomb he brought that exploded. He explained that it was Jang who set off the bomb
by calling the cellphone attached to the bomb inside the motorcycle. On the basis of the sworn
statements, a request for the conduct of inquest proceedings relative to the participation or
involvement of Aunal, Ikram, Kusain, and Jang was made.

On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn
statement denying any knowledge of the Batasan  bombing, asserting that his name was being used
by the media only because of his relationship with the persons arrested in connection with the
incident: Ikram was his former driver; 26 Aunal, his former brother-in-law, being a brother of his ex-
wife whom he divorced under Muslim laws; and Kusain who once sought his assistance for
employment. He clarified that he knew Redwan and Saing Indama only because they were members
of the Moro National Liberation Front but denied knowing Bong. He stated that the individuals thus
mentioned rarely visited him, and before the incident, he spoke only to Ikram, who was then
working in his water refilling station in Basilan, when the latter asked permission to leave for
Manila to look for better employment.27 He explained that his house at Greenbucks is usually used
by his constituents, including Kusain and Ikram, as a temporary residence or shelter whenever they
are in Manila. Ikram later on made several amendments to his affidaits and the  prosecution  later
on  included  Salapuddin  in  the  complaint  for  murder  and  multiple frustrated  murder  based  on
the  affidavits  of  Ikram.  Salapuddin submitted his counter-affidavit where he reiterated the
statements he made in his November 17, 2007 affidavit and assailed Ikram’s attempt to implicate
him as Ikram’s desperate act of selfredemption after owning up to the crime. Nevertheless,
Prosecutor Zuño approved the Department of Justice (DOJ) Investigating Panel’s Supplemental
Resolution, recommending the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982,
pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri,
PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin. Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review with the
Office of the Secretary of Justice, and the latter issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the
Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the
Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel.
Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolution. The CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice stating that the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin
lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.”
 Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing on the appellate court the
commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions of Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal
obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse, without the effective assistance of a
competent independent counsel of their choice, and were in fact recanted. The Court, in a minute
resolution, denied the petition on September 29, 2010. Hence, on December 1, 2010, Salapuddin
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and reinstated the petition.

RULING: Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.
RULING: No. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He
may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by
private persons. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie  case.

The prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the
review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors. Decisions or
resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors;
and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Indeed, probable cause requires
less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion and
must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the records, however, show
that the only  direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every
conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is
not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the
commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be
considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet.

This Court, has previously stressed that mere association with the principals by direct
participation, without more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not
prove conspiracy.  Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on
his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly
stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of
the act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove
conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of
conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations speciously sustained because
"it cannot be mere coincidence." Indeed, the Secretary of Justice has decided in accordance with the
dictates of our jurisprudence in overturning the investigating prosecutors and ordering
Salapuddin’s exclusion from the Information. The Secretary cannot plausibly be found culpable of
grave abuse of his discretion. The appellate court has committed a reversible error in holding
otherwise.
 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. In this case, the
presence of accused-appellant, all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis,
indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the victims. In this case, on the other hand, no
evidence or testimony, not even Ikram’s, suggests the presence of Salapuddin during the blast that
killed Congressman Akbar and injured several others. He cannot, therefore, be properly accused of
exerting an "overt act" by extending "assistance" to whoever was responsible for the commission of
the felony. Furthermore, the very cases the appellate court cited provide that while conspiracy can
be proven by circumstantial evidence, the series of evidence presented to establish an accused’s
participation in the conspiracy must be consistent and should lead to no other conclusion but his
participation in the crime as a conspirator. After all, the conspiracy itself must be proved as
positively as the commission of the felony itself, for it is a "facile device by which an accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold."

Maza vs. Turla, February 15, 2017 G.R. No. 187094

G.R. No. 187094
LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AND RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners 
vs.
HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Palayan City,
Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge Provincial Prosecutor,
ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, and EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ, in their capacity as
members of the panel of investigating prosecutors, and RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, Respondents

FACTS: Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Satumino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casifio, and Rafael V. Mariano are
former members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented Gabriela Women's Party,
Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna Party-List, while Rafael represented Anakpawis
Party-List. In three letters all dated December 14, 2006, Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo
Oeputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection Team, referred to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against
petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners,
who were allegedly responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo
Felipe. His findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the
killing of the supporters of (AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela. Carlito Bayudang and
Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a
certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. Inspector Palomo recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted and that an Information for each count of murder be filed
against the 19 individuals.
 Investigating Prosecutor Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr. issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to
testify at the hearings scheduled, petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash
Complaint/Subpoena and to Expu[ng]e Supporting Affidavits. They argue that the Provincial
Prosecutor had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation since no valid complaint
was filed against them. They also claimed that, "the preliminary investigation conducted was highly
irregular, and that the subpoena issued against [them] was patently defective amounting to a denial
of their rights to due process." On July 13, 2007, the panel of investigating prosecutors, denied
petitioners' motion and ordered the submission of their counter-affidavits.Petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.18 They also filed a (1) Motion to conduct Clarificatory Hearing and to
Allow [them] to Submit Written Memorandum, 19 and a (2) Joint Supplemental Counter-Affidavit on
Common Legal Grounds in Support of their Prayer to Dismiss the Case, 20 both dated August 21,
2007.

The panel later on issued an Order21 again denying the motion. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration,22 which was denied by the panel.The panel of prosecutors issued on a Joint
Resolution, reviewed and approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F.
Florendo.The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang and Jimmy
Peralta, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19
suspects. However, the panel considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness.
The panel recommended that the corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining
suspects.25 On the same day, two (2) Informations 26 for murder were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information 27 for
kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case). Petitioners filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright on the
Guimba case. This was opposed by the panel of investigating prosecutors and Prosecutor
Florendo.28 After the hearing on the motion and submission of the parties' memoranda, Judge
Napoleon R. Sta. Romana issued an Order29 dated August 5, 2008, dismissing the case for lack of
probable cause.

On April 21, 2008, petitioners also filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright on the Palayan cases. They requested the court to
move forward with the presented evidence and decide if there were probable cause and,
consequently, dismiss the case outright if there were none. The panel of investigating prosecutors
and Prosecutor Florendo opposed the motion. Petitioners filed their Reply. On April 25, 2008 and
May 12, 2008, the motion was heard by the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch
40.35Thereafter, both parties submitted their respective memoranda. On July 18, 2008, Presiding
Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an Order 37 on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla
held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in
[the Palayan] cases"

Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration praying for the outright dismissal of the
Palayan cases against them for lack of probable cause, the Motion was later on denied by Judge
Turla. Hence, on, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Judge Evelyn A.
Turla, Prosecutors Floro F. Florendo, Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Edison V. Rafanan, and Eddie C.
Gutierrez, and Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (respondents).Petitioners claim that they "have
no plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." They also contend that
"[r]espondents' actions will certainly cause grave and irreparable damage to [their] constitutional
rights unless injunctive relief is afforded them through the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order[. ]"

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ACTION IN REMANDING THE CASES FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A RECOGNITION OF THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PURPOSES OF FILING
APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL INFORMATION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF ADMISSIBILITY OR INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IS

PROPERLY ADDRESSED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND NOT DURING THE
EARLY STAGE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

RULING: - The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another
preliminary investigation is improper. Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along with
the Informations are sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she
finds the evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional evidence. Thus,
according to petitioners, Judge Turla's action in remanding the case to the prosecutors for further
preliminary investigation lacks legal basis. Petitioners' contention has merit. The trial court judge's
determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation of the prosecutor's
resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause by the trial court judge
is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an
executive function.Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary
investigation was "incomplete"79 and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured
up to [the] standard,"80 she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of
determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation.

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation. In a

preliminary investigation. the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.To emphasize, "a preliminary
investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a trial on the merits." 84 Since "it cannot be
expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already
presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused," 85 the admissibility or
inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan
City, are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 for
further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

ABS-CBN vs. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956March 11, 2015

G.R. No. 195956               March 11, 2015

ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR., MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE DELA
PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, Respondents.
FACTS: On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent
GMA-7 for (alleged) act of copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual
Property Code (RA   8293,   as   amended), because the respondent aired footage of the arrival and
homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN
stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petition will contribute news and content that
it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's news and video material, and Reuters will
ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country.

The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received the live
feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired the video
from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its news staff was not aware that there was (a
news embargo) agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent alleged that it was not also
aware that it aired petitioner's footage. Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued
resolution on 3 December 2004 which found probable cause to indict Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas. The respondents appealed the Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good
faith may be raised as a defense in the case. Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued
a resolution on 29 June 2010 which reversed Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause
to charge Dela Peña-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement). The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision on 9 November 2010, which granted the Petition for Certiorari to reverse and
set aside DOJ Sec. Alberto Agra's resolution and a prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court stated that the petitioner has
copyright of its news coverage, but respondents’ act of airing five (5) seconds of the homecoming
footage without notice of the “No Access Philippines” restriction of the live Reuter's video feed, was
undeniably attended by good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the
Intellectual Property Code.

ISSUES : Whether or not there is probable cause to find respondents to be held liable criminally for
the case of copyright infringement under the Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293, as amended

RULING: Petition is partially granted Probable cause pertains to "such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof." Preliminary investigation is the inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
probable cause. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure
that the courts are not clogged with weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a
person from the travails of a needless prosecution.

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to
continue with the criminal proceedings against Grace Dela PeñaReyes and John Oliver Manalastas
due to copyright infringement. The other respondents, Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr.,
Marissa L. Flores, and Jessica A. Soho were held not liable for the (criminal) act of copyright
infringement. The Court held that their mere membership in GMA7's Board of Directors does not
mean that they have knowledge, approval, or participation in the criminal act of copyright
infringement., as there is a need for their direct/active participation in such act. Also, there was lack
of proof that they actively participated or exercised moral ascendancy over Manalastas and Dela
Cruz-Pena. Contrary to GMA’s contention, the Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere act of
rebroadcast of ABS-CBN’s news footage (arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA
from Iraq last 22 July 2004) for 2 mins and 40 secs. without the latter's authority creates probable
cause to find GMA's news personnel Manalastas and Dela Peña-Reyes criminally liable for violating
provisions of Intellectual Property Code (Section   216217   of   RA   8293,   as   amended) that
imposes strict liability for copyright infringement, since they have not been diligent in their
functions to prevent that footage from being aired on television.

They knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in their
broadcast – which is why they allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN’s logo and
reporter. The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was stated in the present case. Acts
mala in se requires presence of criminal intent and the person's knowledge of the nature of his/her
act, while in acts mala prohibita, presence of criminal intent and the person's knowledge is not
necessary. The Court also stated that Philippine laws on copyright infringement does not require
criminal intent (mens rea) and does not support good faith as a defense. Thus, the act of
infringement and not the intent is the one that causes the damage. It held that ABS-CBN's video
footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works and cinematographic works and
works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual
recordings.” It also stated that news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court differentiated
idea and expression – idea meant as “a form, the look or appearance of a thing” while expression is
its reality or the “external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that
others can understand.”

Thus, the Supreme Court stated that “only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not
the idea itself”, citing the US Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99). In the
present case, expression applies to the event captured and presented in a specific medium via
cinematography or processes analogous to it. The Court also gave the four-fold test under the Fair
Use Doctrine (stated in section 185 of RA 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, as amended) to
determine fair use: a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Fair use,
which is an exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the
Supreme Court as privilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
copyright owner's consent or by copying the material's theme or idea rather than its expression. It
also said that determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better
left to the trial court where the proceedings are currently pending.

Balaois vs. CA, G.R. No. 182130 June 19, 2013

G.R. No. 182130               June 19, 2013

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY
M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
 x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 182132
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS KRISTINE
BALOIS ALBERTO, Petitioners, 
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL
CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, Respondents.

(Guys mejo lengthy ang facts kay three separate incidents of rape and abduction ang involved diri
hah So you can skip most of the facts and go straight to the resolution of the complaints)

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that at around midnight of December 28, 2001, respondent Gil Anthony
Calianga (Gil) called petitioner Iris Kristine Alberto (Iris), then sixteen (16) years old, informing
her that he was at their garage with some food and drinks. For fear of being scolded, Iris refused to
see Gil. But due to his insistence, Iris finally went out to meet Gil and thereafter, took the food and
drinks which he brought. While they were talking, Iris felt weak and dizzy and, tried to return to her
room. Gil assisted Iris and when they reached the room, he laid her on the bed. Gil started kissing
Iris which prompted her to scream. Consequently, Gil covered Iris’ mouth with a pillow and soon
after, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Before leaving, Gil warned Iris not to tell
anyone about what happened or else he would kill her.

As for the second set of incidents, petitioners claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil called Iris,
then seventeen (17) years old, telling her that he would pick her up for them to go to church in
order to play volleyball. They met at about 5:30 in the afternoon in South Green Heights and
proceeded to Camella to meet Gil’s sister, respondent Jessebel Calianga and her friend, respondent
Grace Evangelista (Grace). Iris thought they would be going to church for volleyball practice; but
instead, Gil, while poking a knife at Iris’ side, told her that they were headed to a different
destination. They reached a McDonald’s restaurant located in San Pedro, Laguna where they
transferred to a car driven by Grace’s common law husband. They then returned to Camella and
stayed with a relative of Grace where they had dinner. When they finished their dinner, Atty. Reyna
called again and told Iris not to go out as her relatives were around the area, on board several cars.
Iris pleaded Gil to let her go, but her pleas were ignored. A little later, Jessebel and Grace led Gil and
Iris to a tree house where Gil forced her to enter a room. Left with no option, Iris entered the room
where Gil, holding her at knifepoint, succeeded in once again having sexual intercourse with her.

In view of the incidents that transpired, Benjamin filed a criminal complaint for Rape,
Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. Finally, as for the third set of incidents, petitioners
asserted that, Iris was abducted in front of Assumption College. Gil conspired with Atty. Reyna and
respondent Arturo Calianga to take Iris in order to prevent her from appearing at the preliminary
investigation. In the afternoon of the same day, Iris’ family brought Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER) agents to Arturo’s house. Upon their arrival, Grace told them that Gil
left with some clothes and that he and Iris eloped and would proceed to Cagayan de Oro City. Soon
after the abduction on June 23, 2003, Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo started their psychological
manipulation of Iris. On June 27, 2003, Gil, with the help of two men, brought Iris to Cagayan de Oro
City and there, held her captive in a small room with a small mat, near a pigpen. Gil raped her
almost every day even during her menstrual period and would beat her up whenever she resisted.
Also, Gil often told Iris that he would have her entire family killed by his Moslem relatives.
Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati. the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed the charges against Gil, Atty.
Reyna, Jessebel and Grace for Rape and Serious Illegal Detention for insufficiency of evidence.
However, having found that he had sexual intercourse with a minor, Gil was charged for Child
Abuse. Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against Gil.

The three (3) criminal complaints filed by Iris and Benjamin against respondents were disposed as
follows:

First Complaint -, State Prosecutor II Lilian Doris S. Alejo) of the Muntinlupa Pros.
Office dismissed the charges for Serious Illegal Detention and Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel
and Grace for insufficiency of evidence. Pros. Alejo found that the pieces of evidence showed that Gil
and Iris were sweethearts and the sexual intercourse that transpired between them was
consensual. Likewise, she observed that the story narrated by Iris was farfetched and, to a certain
degree, unacceptable and unimaginable, intimating that it was unbelievable that Iris would still go
to volleyball practice with Gil after the first rape he allegedly committed against her. Nonetheless,
Pros. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against Gil for having sexual
intercourse with Iris on December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2003 by taking advantage of her minority
and his moral influence as a pastor of their church.

Second Complaint-, , 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar of the Makati Pros.
Office issued a Resolution ,equally dismissing the charges for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for lack of
merit and/or insufficiency of evidence. Anent the Kidnapping charge, Pros. Salazar found that no
evidence was submitted which would prove that Iris was forcibly taken away and deprived of her
liberty. Similarly, he observed that there was no evidence or any particular allegation of facts in the
complaint-affidavit constituting the acts which were claimed as coercive. In the same vein, he found
no evidence or any sufficient allegation to support the charge of Obstruction of Justice.

Third, Complaint - State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim of the DOJ Task Force issued a
Resolution dated November 8, 2004, also dismissing the third case for Forcible Abduction with
Rape and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.

Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the DOJ.
The DOJ Secretary resolved the consolidated petitions, finding probable cause to charge: (a) Gil for
Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of the December 28, 2001
incidents; (b) Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one (1) count each of Serious Illegal Detention
and Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of the April 23 to 24, 2002
incidents; and (c) Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible Abduction with
Rape on account of the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents. On February 5, 2007, two (2)
separate criminal Informations were filed for Forcible Abduction with Rape against Gil, Arturo, and
Atty. Reyna, and for Serious Illegal Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel, and Grace.
For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

The CA gave due course to respondents’ petition for certiorari and rendered its Decision
which revoked the DOJ Resolutions. It ruled that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
reversing the resolutions of no less than three (3) investigative bodies which all found lack of
probable cause and in disregarding the overwhelming, credible and convincing evidence which
negated the charges filed against respondents. Of particular note to the CA were the inconsistent
and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the existence of love letters and text messages of love
and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence that would show that Atty. Reyna,
Arturo, Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally detain Iris.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the DOJ Resolutions based on grave abuse of
discretion.

RULING: The petitions are partly meritorious. It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded
from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the
Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime
alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe
that the respondents were guilty thereof. On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the
Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for
certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial
officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds:

First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for
the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo.

Under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of Rape are: (a)
that the offender is a man; (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (c) that
such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. The Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary, as the elements of rape, more likely than not, appear to
be present.The first and second elements of the crime are beyond dispute as Gil does not deny
having carnal knowledge with Iris. Anent the third element of force and intimidation, Iris’s version
of the facts, as well as Gil’s sole reliance on the sweetheart defense, leads the Court to believe that
the said element, in all reasonable likelihood, appears to be present, considering that: (a) mere
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; 77 (b) the sweetheart theory does not,
by and of itself, negate the commission of rape; 78 and (c) the fact that Iris was a minor during the
foregoing incidents casts serious doubt on the efficacy of the consent purportedly given by
her,79especially in view of Gil’s esteemed position of being a priest of the same congregation of
which Iris belongs to.

- The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause
for Rape against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23 to November 9, 2003
incidents are concerned. Iris categorically declared in open court that she was raped by Atty. Reyna
and Arturo during the aforesaid five month period. It is a standing rule that due to the nature of the
commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. Applying the same, the Court deems it prudent to test the
credibility of Iris’s testimony during trial, in which her demeanor and deportment would be
properly observable, and likewise be subject to cross-examination. On the contrary, there appears
to be no ample justification to support the finding of probable cause against Atty. Reyna and Arturo,
with respect to the rape incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, as well as against
Jessebel and Grace for all three (3) incidents. The DOJ Secretary indicted Atty. Reyna, Arturo,
Jessebel and Grace for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet, other than his general
imputation thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any rational explanation for his finding of
conspiracy against the aforementioned respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be proved as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. It can be inferred from and
established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests. In this case, the Amended Resolution is bereft
of any showing as to how the particular acts of the foregoing respondents figured into the common
design of raping Iris and as such, the Court finds no reason to charge them for the same. Therefore,
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the following respects, the Court upholds the DOJ Secretary’s
finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape against Gil for all three (3) rape incidents and
against Atty. Reyna and Arturo for the incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003. While the Court
also finds that probable cause exists for the crime of Child Abuse against Gil for the same rape
incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 in view of the substantial identity of its
elements89with that of Rape, he cannot be charged for both. Records disclose that there are standing
charges against Gil for Child Abuse in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549, 90 respectively on
account of the same occurrences. Thus, so as not to violate his right against double jeopardy, the
Court finds it proper to dismiss the charges of Rape against Gil with respect to the December 28,
2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents considering the subsisting charges of Child Abuse.

Notably, Gil, as well as Atty. Reyna and Arturo, cannot be charged for Child Abuse with
respect to the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents since Iris had ceased to be a minor by that
time. Likewise, Atty. Reyna and Arturo cannot be indicted for Child Abuse in connection with the
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents as there appears to be no sufficient bases to
support the DOJ Secretary’s finding of conspiracy.

Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in finding that
probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.

The DOJ Secretary charges all the respondents for Serious Illegal Detention for the incidents
of April 23 to 24, 2002 and June 23 until November 9, 2003. Related to this, records show that Iris
retracted her previous testimony wherein she stated that she voluntarily went with Gil.  She also
stated that she was abducted on June 23, 2003 and brought to various places, such as Cagayan De
Oro, Taytay and San Pedro, within a period of five (5) months. Aside from Iris’s bare allegations,
records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding that Iris was illegally detained or restrained
of her movement. On the contrary, based on Pros. Lim’s Resolution dated November 8, 2004,
several disinterested witnesses had testified to the fact that Iris was seen freely roaming in public
with Gil, negating the quintessential element of deprivation of liberty. The Court equally observes
that the inherent inconsistencies in Iris’s statements are too dire to ignore even only at the
prosecutor’s level. Anent the April 23, 2002 incidents, the Court finds it contrary to both reason and
logic that Gil would stop-over at a McDonald’s restaurant, a place widely open to the public eye, in
the process of kidnapping Iris. Similarly, with respect to the June 23, 2003 incidents, if Iris was
indeed abducted and detained during that time, then it is highly incredible that she would be
voluntarily let go by her captors in order to attend a habeas corpus hearing before justices of the
CA.

It is well to note that while the Court had given substantial weight to Iris’s uncorroborated
testimony to sustain the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape, the same
treatment cannot be applied to the crime of Serious Illegal Detention. Comparing the two, Rape is
an offense of secrecy97 which, more often than not, happens in a private setting involving only the
accused and the victim; likewise, the degree of humiliation and disgrace befalling a rape victim who
decides to come forward must be taken into consideration. 98 For these reasons, the testimony of the
latter, even if uncorroborated, can lead to a conviction. On the other hand, in Serious Illegal
Detention, the victim is usually taken from one place and transferred to another – which is in fact
what has been alleged in this case - making the commission of the offense susceptible to public
view. Unfortunately, petitioners never presented any evidence to show that Iris was restrained of
her liberty at any point in time during the period of her alleged captivity. All told, given the clear
absence of probable cause for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention, the Court finds that the DOJ
Secretary gravely abused his discretion in charging respondents for the same.

Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the
crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during
the period of her captivity from June 23 to November 9, 2003 thus, denying the element of
abduction. More importantly, even if it is assumed that there was some form of abduction, it has not
been shown – nor even sufficiently alleged – that the taking was done with lewd designs. Lust or
lewd design is an element that characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or
criminal intent of the offender.1âwphi1 As such, the said element must be always present in order
that they may be so considered as a crime of chastity in contemplation of law.