[1] remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from

the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
SECOND DIVISION that the same has not been resolved.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF G.R. No. 180206
BAGUIO CITY, represented by Same; Same; Same; Temporary Restraining Orders; The National Commission on
REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., Present: Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. QUISUMBING, J., action is for injunction.—As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP
MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES, Chairperson, may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
CITY BUILDINGS and CARPIO MORALES, prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction.
ARCHITECTURE office, represented TINGA, The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties
by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC VELASCO, JR., and to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action
ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, BRION, JJ. which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the
Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was
Petitioners. called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are
undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
- versus -
Promulgated: Same; Same; Same; No restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by
February 4, 2009 any inferior court against the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional in any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the interpretation of
Officer-National Commission on the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and other laws relating to
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.—In order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the
GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be
and LAZARO BAWAS, issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy
Respondents. arising from or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to
  ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
  Same; Same; Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8371); The
  exemption of Baguio City from the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
DECISION cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land
rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity.—Petitioners
argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily
Administrative Law; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (R.A. No. 8371);
the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, x x x The foregoing
Administrative Agencies; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its
is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process
and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city’s charter respect the validity of
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto; The these recognized land rights and titles.
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is vested with jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.—The NCIP is the primary Same; Same; Same; Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim.—Proclamation No. 15,
plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and wellbeing of indigenous however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’
cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their
ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate its families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion
mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of
jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all

Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People) Page 1 of 174

same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest
Reservation from sale or settlement.
Same; Same; Same; Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 563 (1989).—The
fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 563 (1989). The
declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into
private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional
competence to adjudicate forest lands.
TINGA, J.:
 
Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its
Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the Anti-Squatting Committee, represented by
Atty. Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office,
represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office,
represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero,
assail the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated
April 16, 2007, and its Resolution[2] dated September 11, 2007, which
affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners.
 
The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:
 
The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition
Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D.
Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures
constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.
and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol
Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City,
without the required building permits and in violation of
Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
 
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition
advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing
the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the
erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently,
Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas
(hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the
City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor,
Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office,
the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
Safety Division, among others, (collectively called
petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR),
Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as
Case No. 31-CAR-06.
 
In their petition, private respondents basically
claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand
are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying
and possessing openly and continuously since time
immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been
expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27,
1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the
coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus,
contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a
violation of their right of possession and ownership of
ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law,
perforce, must be restrained.
 
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing
Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two
(2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the
petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to
refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September
18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006;
Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order
No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series
of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days.
 
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed
Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the private
respondents application for preliminary injunction subject to
the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount
of P10,000.00.[3]
 
 
Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, [4] the Court of
Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed by private
respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated October
16[5] and 19, 2006,[6] and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,[7] granting
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The
appellate court also ruled that Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA).
 
Page 2 of 174
 Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide main actions for injunction such as the one filed by private
respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary
remedies to cases pending before it.
 
Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its
Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands
under the provisions of the IPRA.
Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the
protection of an injunctive writ because they encroached upon the Busol
Forest Reservation and built structures thereon without the requisite permit.
Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, [8]  had
already declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property. Even assuming that private respondents have a pending
application for ancestral land claim, their right is at best contingent and
cannot come under the protective mantle of injunction.
 
Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt
from ancestral claims as it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of
the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the citys main watershed.
 
Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued
pursuant to the police power of the local government.
 
In their Comment[9] dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend
the jurisdiction of the NCIP to take cognizance of and decide main actions for
injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue
such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also
contend that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor
does it state that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City.
As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native
to Baguio City, private respondents are treated as squatters despite the fact
that they hold native title to their ancestral land. The IPRA allegedly now
recognizes ancestral lands held by native title as never to have been public
lands.
 
Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is
subject to ancestral land claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 [10] dated April
27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly did not nullify
the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even
identified the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
This claim of ownership is an exception to the governments contention that
the whole area is a forest reservation.
 
Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to
order the demolition of certain structures is not absolute. Regard should be
taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be issued building permits
precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a
requirement for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building
Code.
Petitioners Reply to Comment[11] dated June 11, 2008 merely
reiterates their previous arguments.
 
We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIPs
jurisdiction.
 
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect
and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. [12] In order to fully effectuate
its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIPs
assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall
have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have
obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated
in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved. [13]
 
In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9,
2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the
NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes
involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought
before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through
its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all
cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:
 
(1)    Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional
Hearing Office (RHO):
 
a.       Cases involving disputes and controversies over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
Page 3 of 174
 b.      Cases involving violations of the requirement of
free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c.       Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs
involving violations of customary laws or desecration
of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d.      Actions for redemption/reconveyance under
Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e.       Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
 
(2)    Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
 
a.       Cases affecting property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of
land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that
have not been settled under customary laws; and
b.      Actions for damages arising out of any violation of
Republic Act No. 8371.
 
 
 
(3)    Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently
acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A.
8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1)
year from the date of registration.
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the
dispute in accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to
resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private
respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition[14] filed before the
NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled
in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol Forest
Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. Correctly
denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the
enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition
traced private respondents ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and
asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands.
The petition also alleged that private respondents claim over these lands had
been recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of
Molintas and Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest
Reservation.[15]
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
 
 
 
 
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically
determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,
[16]
 squarely qualify it as a dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP-RHO.
 
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states:
 
Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP
shall have the power and authority:
 
a)      To promulgate rules and regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as
those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this Act;
b)      To administer oaths, summon the parties to a
controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of such books,
papers, contracts, records, agreements, and other document
of similar nature as may be material to a just determination
of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in
pursuance of this Act;
c)      To hold any person in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and
 
d)      To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising
from any case pending before it which, if not restrained
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any
of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or
economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]
 
 
 
 
 
NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted
provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides:
Page 4 of 174
 Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order.A writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A.
[No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn
allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving
or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the
parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This
power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for
injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of
injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to
seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or irreparable
damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the
injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and
preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of
ICCs/IPs.
 
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the
IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be
issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any
case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the
 
 
interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral
domains.[17]
 
Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of
the IPRA, and necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78
thereof, which states:
 
SEC. 78. Special Provision.The City of Baguio shall
remain to be governed by its Charter and all lands
proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as
such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate
legislation: Provided,  That prior land rights and titles
recognized and/or acquired through any judicial,
administrative or other processes before the effectivity
of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part
of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.
[Emphasis supplied]
 
 
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own
charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be
deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights
recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA
demands that the citys charter respect the validity of these recognized land
rights and titles.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents
ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in
which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After
all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must
show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which
injunction is directed are violative of said right. [18]
 
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation
merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact,
Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from
sale or settlement. It provides:
 
Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen
hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest
Reservation to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for
the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber,
the protection of the water supply being of primary
importance and all other uses of the forest are to be
subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale
or settlement the following described parcels of the public
domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City
of Baguio, MountainProvince, Island of Luzon, to wit:
 
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was
declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of
Appeals.[19] The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such
precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not
endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
 
Page 5 of 174
 All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private
respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
 
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled, Elvin
Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor
of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People) Page 6 of 174

[2] September 21, 2010
EN BANC
  x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
   
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. 184869 DECISION
Represented by Officer-In-Charge
Dr. Rodrigo L. Malunhao,
Petitioner, Present: Courts; Jurisdiction; There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on
CORONA, C.J., the one hand that it has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an
CARPIO, assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the
same results, which is the dismissal of the action.—The RTC invoked two reasons
CARPIO MORALES, for dismissing CMU’s action. The first is that jurisdiction over the action to declare
VELASCO, JR.,* Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of
Malaybalay City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done
NACHURA,* in Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the assumption that the
Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has
- versus - BRION,* the right to dispose of the same for some purpose other than CMU’s use. There is
nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no
PERALTA,
jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has
BERSAMIN, jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results, which is the
dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two
DEL CASTILLO, incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the
ABAD, present petition was brought dismissed CMU’s appeal on some technical ground.

VILLARAMA, JR., Same; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Where an appeal from the Regional Trial
Court raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on
PEREZ, certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court.—Section 9(3) of the Judiciary
MENDOZA,* and Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final
judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal
SERENO,** JJ. from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for
review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this case is
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE whether or not CMU’s appeal from the RTC’s order of dismissal raises purely
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF questions of law.
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
Same; Same; Questions of Fact; Questions of Law; Whether the Regional Trial
RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON AND
Court (RTC) in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the Presidential
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Proclamation, resulting in the denial of petitioner’s right to be heard on the same, is
and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE a factual issue that was proper for the Court of Appeals to hear and ascertain from
NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION, the parties.—As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground
Respondents. Promulgated: that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU
  points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with

Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People) Page 7 of 174

CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case.
Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the
proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMU’s right to be heard on the same, is a
factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from
the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it
raised pure questions of law.
Public Lands; The lands by their character have become inalienable from the
moment President Garcia dedicated them for Central Mindanao University’s use in
scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture—they ceased to be
alienable public lands.—It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this
case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their
character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated
them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of
agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands.
Same; Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) (Republic Act No. 8371); National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) (R.A. No. 8371); Since ownership over
the subject lands had been vested in Central Mindanao University (CMU) as early
as 1958, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is
not in accord with the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA).—When Congress
enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it
provided in Section 56 that “property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested” upon its effectivity “shall be recognized and respected.” In
this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.
Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the
area is not in accord with the IPRA.
ABAD, J.: 
This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential
proclamation that takes property from a state university, over its objections,
for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered
educational institution owned and run by the State. [1] In 1958, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of
the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually,
CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the
government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled
lands to several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities. 
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670
hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples
and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. 
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against
respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of
the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop
the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared
unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the
act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive
Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The
Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMUs
application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et
al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion
to dismiss. 
On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction
incident, the RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et als motion for partial
reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the
RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a
valid State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State
and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19,
2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to the Court
of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.[2]
CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2)
whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. [3]
In a March 14, 2008 decision,[4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for
review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure
questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 310. The CA added that whether the trial court can decide the
merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and
the application for injunction is also a pure question of law.
 
Page 8 of 174
 CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal
but it denied the same,[5] prompting CMU to file the present petition for
review.
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in
dismissing its action for prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction
and at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and
constitutional;
2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the
ground that it raised purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for
review filed directly with this Court; and
3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and
constitutional.
The Courts Rulings
One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs
action. The first is that jurisdiction over the action to declare Presidential
Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay
City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done
in Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the assumption that the
Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation
310 was valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the
subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some purpose other
than CMUs use.
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one
hand that it has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an
assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with
the same results, which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue
of the propriety of the RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the
action is academic. The CA from which the present petition was brought
dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.
Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 [6] vests
in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the
RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises
purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review
on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this case is whether
or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely
questions of law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the
RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise
factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction
against the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized
the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this
proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced
in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts that were not in
issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by the
motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the
correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed
lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on
the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was
constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the
proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not
yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score. What NCIP, et
al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact
prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the
denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was
proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the
parties.Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground
that it raised pure questions of law.
Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 310 has been raised and amply argued before this Court, it
would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA
Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further
proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of constitutionality of the Proclamation in
question will come to this Court however the courts below decide
it. Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits,
now resolve the same.
 
The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from
CMU. In CMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB),[7] the DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking
both privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for
distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for this purpose
of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court nullified the DARAB action
considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long
term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. Said the
Court:
Page 9 of 174
 The construction given by the DARAB to Section
10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present
needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and
utilized by the university in carrying out its present
educational program with its present student population
and academic facility overlooking the very significant
factor of growth of the university in the years to come.
By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established
to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast
tract of agricultural land for future programs of
expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was
conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges
in America, a type of educational institution which
blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of
unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the
Mid-West. What we now know
as Michigan State University, Penn State University and  country.[8]
Illinois State University, started as small land grant
colleges, with meager funding to support their ever
increasing educational programs. They were given
extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be
developed to support their numerous expanding
activities in the fields of agricultural technology and
scientific research. Funds for the support of the
educational programs of land grant colleges came from
government appropriation, tuition and other student
fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from
miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit that
President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the
CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future
campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of
Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources
and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural
educational institution, to develop and train future
farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part
of the country.
xxxx
The education of the youth and agrarian reform
are admittedly among the highest priorities in the
government socio-economic programs. In this case,
neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must
still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao
outside the CMU land reservation which can be made
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants
here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP
beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land
which had been segregated for educational purposes for
distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross
misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction
granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching
significance as far as it concerns state colleges and
universities whose resources and research facilities
may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the
exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and
universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and
technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so
vital to the existence, growth and development of this
It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case,
attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by
their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia
dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the
field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands.
Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) or Republic Act 8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property
rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its
effectivity shall be recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over
the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently,
transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is
not in accord with the IPRA. 
Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of
several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities in the course of
the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs name. Indeed, eventually,
only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and
0-162. More than 300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession
of and subject to the claims of those tribes.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the
March 14, 2008 decision and September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential Proclamation
310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
SO ORDERED.
Page 10 of 174
[3]
EN BANC
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 181284
LO LOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR
MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL,
PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL,
BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK
BRAZIL, Petitioners  specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is
vs.
RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR.,
.DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ,
EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI,
MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA
ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ, JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S.
LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON,
ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABE RAS TURI,
LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION,
ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ,
ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L.
QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE
AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as represented by
attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents
RESOLUTION
Indigenous People; Indigenous Cultural Communities; Jurisdiction; The ponencia
has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act (IPRA),
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indi
genous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group.— The ponencia has held that pursuant to
Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between
or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the
real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the
ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power
to hear, try and decide the case. In exceptional cases under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if
the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP group.
Same; Same; Same; Limited Jurisdiction; Limited or special jurisdiction is that
which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under
limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.—Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general
jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter
does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited
jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction
expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity,
is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under
limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
Same; Same; Same; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; The National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66 of the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) that “no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws.”—As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision
under Section 66 of the IPRA that “no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws.”
Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the
general language or operation of the statute, and that what determines whether a
clause is a proviso is the legislative intent, the Court stated that said qualifying
provision requires the presence of two conditions before such claims and disputes
may be brought before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies provided under
customary laws, and the Certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.
The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties
to a case either (1) belong to different ICC/IP groups which are recognized to have
their own separate and distinct customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a
non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of
Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process
for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own
distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court
ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP’s quasi-
judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong
to the same ICC/IP group.
Page 11 of 174
Courts; Jurisdiction; Concurrent Jurisdiction; Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
is that which is “exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject
matter and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance
resort to either court indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each
authorized to  deal with the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect
of a certain subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts, they
are said to have concurrent jurisdiction.”—Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is
that which is “exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject
matter and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance
resort to either court indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each authorized
to deal with the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a certain
subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts, they are said to
have concurrent jurisdiction.” While courts of concurrent jurisdiction are courts of
equal dignity as to matters concurrently cognizable, neither having supervisory
power over process from the other, the rule is that the court which first takes
cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and power to afford complete
relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy without interference from
other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar actions are subsequently
instituted between the same parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same
questions. Such rule is referred to as the principle of priority or the rule of exclusive
concurrent jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to
abide by the priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such principle
to reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of concurrent jurisdiction,
especially to reduce the possibility that a case involving the same subject matter and
the same parties is simultaneously acted on in more than one court.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Primary
jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon
an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.—
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by
statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific
competence. Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by
which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, it
is apt to underscore the provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the
primary government agency responsible for the recognition of their ancestral domain
and rights thereto.
Indigenous People; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; Jurisdiction; No
less than the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 states that the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs
to promote and protect the rights and wellbeing of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral
domain as well as their rights thereto, with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
traditions and institutions.—The NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these cases even
if one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of
different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in said cases demand the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience,
and services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. No less
than the IPRA states that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for
the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and wellbeing of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral
domain as well as their rights thereto, with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions and institutions. At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that the NCIP’s
decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; As a matter of fair play and due process, such parties cannot be
compelled to comply with the two (2) conditions before such disputes may be
brought before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under
Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), since Indigenous
Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities (IPs/ICCs) are recognized to have their
own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.—It is
inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above stated contentious areas/issues,
and affecting the rights of parties who are non-IPs or those who belong to different
ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due process, however, such parties
cannot be compelled to comply with the two conditions before such disputes may be
brought before the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are
recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders. Hence, the Court cannot sustain the view that the NCIP shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs. Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and regulations issued
by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great respect, the Court cannot
ignore that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENR LRA-NCIP Administrative
Order provide for the proper forum where the contentious areas/issues involve lands
with prior and vested property rights.
Civil Law; Property; The “property rights” referred to in Section 56 of the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) belong to those acquired by individuals,
whether indigenous or nonindigenous peoples, as said provision makes no
distinction as to the ethnic origin of the ownership of these rights.—Note that the
“property rights” referred to in Section 56 of the IPRA belong to those acquired by
individuals, whether indigenous or nonindigenous peoples, as said provision makes
no distinction as to the ethnic origin of the ownership of these rights. Considering the
rule on statutory construction that courts should not distinguish where the law does
not do so, the IPRA thus recognizes and respects “vested rights” regardless of
whether they pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires that these “property
rights” already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity. On petitioners’ assertion that
Section 72 of the IPRA negates the ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction only over
Page 12 of 174
claims and disputes under Sections 52, 54, and 62 thereof, even if the parties
involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the Court finds the same as misplaced.
Indigenous People; Indigenous People’s Rights Act; Under Section 72 of the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), any person who commits violation of any of
the provisions of the IPRA may be punished either (1) in accordance with the
customary laws of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) concerned, provided that the penalty shall not be a cruel, degrading or
inhumane punishment, and that neither death penalty nor excessive fines shall be
imposed; or (2) upon conviction, by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months
but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less than one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or
both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.—Note that under
Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who commits violation of any of the provisions
of the IPRA may be punished either (1) in accordance with the customary laws of the
ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the penalty shall not be a cruel, degrading or
inhumane punishment, and that neither death penalty nor excessive fines shall be
imposed; or (2) upon conviction, by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not
more than 12 years, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00 nor more than
P500,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.
Again, it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for those
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its separate
and distinct customary laws, and to be punished in accordance therewith. The Court
thus rules that the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA
provisions only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction over such violations shall fall under the proper
Regional Trial Court.
Same; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; Jurisdiction; Even as Section
66 grants jurisdiction to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs), it is required that the opposing parties
are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and
customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP.—There is also
no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Court’s interpretation of the NCIP’s
jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA runs counter to its purpose to protect the
rights, customs, customary laws and cultural integrity of the ICCs/IPs. To stress,
even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who
have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and customary law before
bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. And, in some instances that the regular
courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the
governing law for such disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law
bestows on ICCs/IPs.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA),
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have limited
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous
Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities (IPs/ICCs) only when they arise between
or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.—On a final note, the Court
restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between
or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections
52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP
shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes arising from
the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued
CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non ICCs/IPs, or members of different
ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the
IPRA where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's en bane  Decision dated October
20, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision
dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it is the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not the regular courts, which
has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (JCCs) and Indigenous
Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.
Petitioners argue that the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, admits of exceptions and can
be relaxed in view of the special and unique circumstances obtaining this
case, i.e.,  the actual issue, as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a
conflicting claim over an ancestral domain. They seek to apply by analogy
the principles inlgrzacio v. CF! Bulacan,  1 Ferrer v. Villamor,2 Nonan v.
Plan,3among others, where it was held that the allegations of tenancy by the
defendant in its answer may be used in the determination of the jurisdiction
Page 13 of 174
of the court, and if indeed tenancy exists, the same should be lodged before
the Court of Industrial Relations (now the Department of Agrarian Reform
and Adjudication Board).
They also invoke Leoquinco v. Canada DryBottling Co.,  4 and Mindanao
Rapid Co. v. Omandam5  where it was ruled that if allegations of labor
disputes or employer-employee relations are alleged by defendants in their
answer and the same is shown to exist, the Industrial Court (now the
National Labor Relations Commission) takes cognizance of the case.
Petitioners also argue that the Court's interpretation of Section 666 of
Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of
1997," (JPRA)to the effect that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group, is contrary to law and the
Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC or IP group
is, and has been since time immemorial, governed by their own customary
laws, culture, traditions and governance systems, and has the right to
preserve and develop them as they may deem fit and necessary. Thus, each
ICC and IP group did not, and does not, need an act of Congress such as the
IPRA, to enforce their customary laws among themselves and their
respective communities, and more so in further developing them.
Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between
ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using customary laws, consistent with the State
policy under the Constitution and the IPRA to recognize, respect and protect
the customs, traditions and cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs.
They claim that cases of disputes between IPs within the same ICC/IP group
are always resolved completely and with finality in accordance with their
customary laws and practice, hence, the interpretation: that the NCIP shall
have jurisdiction in cases of disputes among IPs within the same ICC/IP
group is not only absurd but unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes
between different ICCs/IPs shall also (all within the jurisdiction of whatever
their customary laws and practice provide since Section 657 of the IPRA
does not so distinguish. They presume that after coexisting for centuries in
adjacent ancestral domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have developed their own
indigenous means of settling disputes between other ICCs/IPs.
With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IP
groups and between ICCs/IPs and non-IPs, petitioners theorize that they fall
under the jurisdiction of the NCIP pursuant to the provisions of the IPRA.
They cite the concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the
second and third parts of Section 66 of the law only provide for a condition
precedent that is merely procedural and does not limit the NCIP jurisdiction
over disputes involving the rights of ICC/IPs. They contend that such
interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
NCIP's jurisdiction under Sections 46(g),8 62,9 69,10 7011 and 7212 of the
IPRA.
Petitioners further point out that Section 72 of the IPRA permits the
imposition of penalties under customary law even to non-IPs, and does not
distinguish as to whom customary law may apply. According to them, any
natural or juridical person, IPs or not, found to have violated provisions of
then IPRA, particularly those identified in Section 72, may be dealt with by
imposing penalties found in the corresponding customary laws. They submit
that Section 72 does not require as a condition precedent familiarity of the
person to be penalized to the existing customary law of the affected
community nor does it require for the said customary law to have been
published to allow for its imposition to any person who committed the
violation. Thus, they assert that Section 72 negates the ruling that NCIP's
jurisdiction applies only to Sections 52, 54, 62 and 66, insofar as the dispute
involves opposing parties belonging to the same tribe.
Petitioners likewise aver that Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of the IPRA,
taken together and in harmony with each other, clearly show that conflicts
and disputes within and between ICCs/IPs are first under the jurisdiction of
whatever their customary law provides, but disputes that are not covered by
their customary laws, either between different ICCs/IPs or between an,
ICC/IP and a non-IP are also within the jurisdiction within the NCIP.
Petitioners invoke The City Government of Baguio
City v. Masweng13 and Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng14 to
support their theory that NCIP has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a
case involving a dispute or controversy over ancestral domains even if one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP group.
In essence, petitioners argue that (1) the IPRA was not enacted to protect an
IP from another IP whether from the same or different group, because they
have their own means of resolving a dispute arising between them, through
customary laws or compromises, as had been done for a very long time even
before the passage of the law; (2) the IPRA is meant to address the greater
prejudice that IPs experience from non-IPs or the majority group; and (3) the
limited interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA to its minute details without
looking into the intent of the law will result in an unimaginable situation where
the jurisdiction of the NCIP is only limited to those where both parties belong
to the same ICCs/IPs; and (4) the application. of the provisions of the IPRA,
as a national law and a landmark social justice legislation, is encompassing
and not limited to a particular' group,.i.e.,  ICCs/IPs.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that (1)
the NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the
principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing
Page 14 of 174
exemptions thereto; (2) the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA; (3) the IPRA is a social
legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or
fellow IPs but more from non-IPs; (4) the· IPRA created the NCIP as the
agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs;
(5) in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial
body with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of
IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims· and disputes
involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe; (7)
harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that
the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the
parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency
provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the State's
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights; (9) the NCIP has
the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of
justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights;
and (10) recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous
justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in the
enforcement of human rights.
While the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration fail to persuade, there is a need to clarify the
NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of
the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by
subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. 15 Suffice it also to state that the
Court is unanimous16 in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the
ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and
amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with
the ponencia  that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case:
Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria  and injunction,
respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the
jurisdiction of the R TC. As correctly pointed out by
the ponencia, ''jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action." It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the mission of
the parties or conferred by acquiescence of the court. 17
In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion also concurred with
the ponencia 's  conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
because (1) the CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order is
not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, (2) jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint; and (3) the
NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties are
members of the same ICC/IP group.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez agreed with
the ponencia  that jurisdiction over the original and amended
complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, correctly lies with the RTC,
based on the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen likewise voted to
dismiss the petition for review on certiorari,  and to affirm the assailed
decision and resolution of the CA. He concurred with the ponencia  in holding
that respondents' action, alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral
domain of an ICC/IP, does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP.
In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for
reconsideration to justify a reversal of its ruling that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of respondents' original and amended complaint based on the
allegations therein lies with the RTC.
The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the complex nature
of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as shown by the different but well reasoned
opinions of the Associate Justices concerned vis-a-vis the arguments in
petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
To recall, the ponencia  has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the
NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between or among
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the
real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the
ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the
power to hear, try and decide the case. In exceptional cases1 under Sections
52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such
Page 15 of 174
claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same
ICC/IP group.
Justice Velasco's position is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims
and. disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, regardless of whether or not they
belong to the same IP/IC group. According to him, all cases and disputes
where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP; all cases and disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are
covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the subject
matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs; and regular
courts have jurisdiction over cases and disputes as long as there are parties
who are non-ICCs/IPs.
For Justice Brion, the IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole
jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the rights of
non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, he stresses that the NCIP
maintains primary jurisdiction over: (1) adverse claims and border disputes
arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (2) cancellation of
fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs); and (3)
disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same
ICC/IP group.
Justice Perez opines that neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs. He adds that the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine
the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given
controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/ IP. He
concludes that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is
limited, and confined only to cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both
such parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
Justice Leonen is of the view that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to
disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IP group and come from the
same ethnolinguistic group. He states that the requirements for the proper
exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of
the IPRA, are as follows: (1) the claim or dispute must involve the rights of
ICCs/IPs; (2) both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP group; (3) these
parties must have exhausted remedies under their ICC/IP's customary laws;
and (4) compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under
customary laws must be evidenced by a certification issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute, to the
effect that the dispute has not been resolved.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
Meanwhile, in Lim v. Gamosa,  18 which was penned by Justice Perez, the
Court held that the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is at best concurrent with
that of the regular trial courts:
As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of
Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al. and similar cases where we made
an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the
parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding
exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a
grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit
conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is
concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's
general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within
the legal bounds of rights and remedies. 19
Guided by the foregoing ruling, the Court held in Begnaen v. Spouses
Caligtan20  that the NCIP-Regional Hearing Office (RHO), being the agency
that first took cognizance of petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction
over the same to the exclusion of the MCTC. In said case where both parties
are members of the same ICC and the subject of their dispute was an
ancestral land, petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's jurisdiction by
filing with the RHO his complaint against respondents for "Land Dispute and
Enforcement of Rights." When the RHO dismissed the complaint without
prejudice for his failure to first bring the matter for settlement before the
Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA, petitioner-appellant filed instead
a complaint for forcible entry before the MCTC. Aside from its ruling that the
NCIP has excluded the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the same subject
matter~ the Court said that petitioner is estopped from belatedly impugning
the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a complaint before it and
receiving an adverse ruling.
Based on the diverse views on the nature and scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs, the
recent jurisprudence21 on the matter, as well as petitioners' arguments in their
motions for reconsideration, the Court is confronted again with the issue of
whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are
ICCs/IPs, or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and
exclusive to the exclusion of said courts, on all matters involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs.
After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court
maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is
limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the
proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
Page 16 of 174
To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or by law. A court of general jurisdiction has the power or
authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function. 22 In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction,
or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly
delegated.23An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. 24 Limited or special
jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be
exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the
statute.25
As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying
provision under Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws." Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of
a proviso  is to limit or restrict the general language or operation of the
statute,26 and that what determines whether a clause is a proviso is the
legislative intent,27 the Court stated that said qualifying provision requires the
presence of two conditions before such claims and disputes may be brought
before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary
laws, and the Certification issued by the· Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved. The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied
with if the parties to a case either (1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups
which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary
laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither
bound by customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would .be
contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct
customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court
ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-
judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group.
That the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited can be further gathered
from Justice Perez' discussion in Lim  v. Gamosa,28 thus:
Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential
Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly
repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly," such an implied repeal is
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict
must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different
subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As
such, resolution of conflicts between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may
still fall within the general jurisdiction of regular courts dependent on the
allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the parties.
There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to
the NCIP in instances where, among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and
the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific wording of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-21 on the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-35 on the exclusive·
and original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a
clear and unequivocal expression of the will of the Congress, which is not
manifest from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate:
(1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to
describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs"and (2) contained a proviso requiring
certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under
customary laws.
We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances
the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of
ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include
the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.
In Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan,  29 the Court affirmed and emphasized I the
afore-quoted ruling in Lim v. Gamosa30where it struck down as void atj
administrative rule that expanded the jurisdiction of the NCIP beyond the
boundaries of the IPRA.
However, exception must be taken to the pronouncement
in Begnaen  v. Spouses Caligtan31 that "[a]t best, the limited jurisdiction of the
NCIP is concurrent .with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the
latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them
within the legal bounds of rights and remedies."
Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised by different
courts at the same time over the same subject matter and within the same
territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court
indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with
the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a certain
Page 17 of 174
subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts, they are
said to have concurrent jurisdiction. "32 While courts of concurrent jurisdiction
are courts of equal dignity as to matters concurrently cognizable, neither
having supervisory power over process from the other, 33 the rule is that the
court which first takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction
and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the
controversy without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in
which similar actions are subsequently instituted between the same parties
seeking similar remedies and involving the same questions. 34 Such rule is
referred to as the principle of priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to abide by
the priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such principle to
reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of concurrent jurisdiction,
especially to reduce the possibility that a case involving the same subject
matter and the same parties is simultaneously acted on in more than one
court. 35
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns
nothing therein that expressly or impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to
the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested
under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed under
Section 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54
thereof.
Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is
limited, but not concurrent with the regular courts, the Court will now expound
on the NCIP' s primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the
parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely:(I)
adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral
domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs, and (3)
disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same
ICC/IP.
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or
by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its
specific competence.36 Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are
the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-
judicial powers that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the
enabling act of such agency,37 it is apt to underscore the provisions of the
IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the primacy government agency
responsible for the recognition of their ancestral domain and rights thereto: 38
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain
Office (ADO) to deny application for CADTs, in relation to Section 62,
regarding the power of the NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse
claims:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process.  - The identification and delineation of
ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following
procedures:
xxxx
h) Endorsement to NCIP.  - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of
the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report
to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to
have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall teject any claim
that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further,  That in case of rejection, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable
to the NCIP: Provided,furthermore, That in cases where there are
conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral
domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.
XXXX
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts.  - In cases of conflicting interest, where
there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the
survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and
decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the
delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if thedispute is
between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of
their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further,  That any decision,
order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any
matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and
interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court
of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. 39
Page 18 of 174
2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for CALTs and
on the NCIP's power to grant meritorious claims and resolve conflicting
claims:
SECTION 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral
Lands,.  -
xxxx
e) Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of
ancestral land claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted
including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a
prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document
shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP
and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto
within fifteen (15) days from the date of such publication: Provided, That in
areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will
be a valid substitute: Provided,further,  That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not available;
f) Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
investigate and inspect each application, and if found to be meritorious, shall
cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains
Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing
the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case
of conflicting claims among individuals or indigenous corporate
claimants, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending
parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for the identification or
delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of
Lands shall represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and
g) The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each
and every application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in
turn, evaluate the report submitted. If the NCIP finds such claim
meritorious, it shall issue a certificate of ancestral land, declaring and
certifying the claim of each individual or corporate (family· or clan)
claimant over ancestral lands.40
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent claims over
ancestral domains and lands:
SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims.  -The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon
written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been
fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be
fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may
be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties
concerned.41
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has primary
jurisdiction over these cases even if one of the parties is a non! CC/IP, or
where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups.
Indeed, the questions involved in said cases demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and
services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 42 No
less than the IPRA states that the NCIP is the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well:-being of the ICCs/IPs
and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights
thereto, 43 with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and
institutions.44 At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that the NCIP's decision
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.45
Meanwhile, the fatal flaw in petitioners' insistence that the NCIP's quasi-
judicial jurisdiction is exclusive and original, can be gathered from records of
the Bicameral Conference Committee cited in Justice Brion's Separate
Opinion:
The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66
(then Section 71) of Senate Bill 1728 was originally worded exclusive and
original jurisdiction.  During the Bicameral Conference, the lower house
objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:
Sen. Juan Flavier: (Chairman of the Senate There is
Panel) exclusive original.
And so what do
you suggest?
……
Rep. Zapata (Chairman of the Chairman, may I
Panel for the House of butt in?
Representatives)
Page 19 of 174
 Sen. Flavier Yes, please. good.
Rep. Zapata This was Sen. Flavier But what he is
considered. The saymg is that ...
original, we were
Rep. Zapata But they may not
willing in the
have the facility
house. But the
"exclusive", we Rep. ___________ Senado na lang.
objected to the
Rep. Zapata Oo, iyong original
word "exclusive"
na lang.
because it would
only be the Sen. Flavier In other words,
commission that it's not only the
would exclude Commission
the court and the that can
Commission may originate it,
not be able to pwedeng
undertake all the magoriginate sa
review courts.
nationwide. And
so we remove Rep. Zapata Or else, we just
the word remove
"exclusive" so "exclusive
that they will original" so that
have original they will say, the
jurisdiction but National will have
with the removal jurisdiction over
of the word claims. So we
"exclusive" that remove both
would mean that "exclusive and
they may bring original".
the case to the Sen. Flavier So what version
ordinary courts you are batting
of justice. for, Mr.
Sen Flavier Without passing Chaorman?
through the Rep. Zapata Just to remove
commission? the word
Rep. Zapata Yes, Anyway, if "exclusive
they go to the original" The
regular courts, Commission wil
they will have to still have
litigate in court, jurisdiction only
because if its that, if the
(sic) exclusive, parties will opt
that would be to go to courts
nationwide. Here

Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People) Page 20 of 174

 there may be not a. Untitled lands being claimed by the ICCs/IPs to be part of their AD/AL
enough courts of which are covered by approved survey plans and also being claimed by the
the commision. DAR and/or the DENR.

Sen. Flavier So we ae going b. Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLO
to adopt the As),  Emancipation Patents (EPs  ), and Patents within Certificate of Ancestral
senate version Domain Title (CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)/Certificate of
minus the words Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).
"exclusive
original"?
c. Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR over
Rep. Zapata Yes, Mr. lands within Ancestral Land/Domain Claims such as, but not limited to,
Chairman, that's Community-Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated
my proposal Forest Management Agreement (IFMA),  Socialized Forest Management
Sen. Flavier No, problem. Agreement (SIFMA),  Protected Area Community""Based Resources
Okay, approved. Management Agreement (PACBRMA),  Forest Land Grazing Management
Agreement (FLGMA),  Co-Management Agreement, Certificate of
Rep. Zapata xxxx46 Stewardship Contract (CSC), Certificate of Forest Stewardship
Agreement (CFSA),  Wood Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land
The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" Use Permit (SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP),  Special Private
mean that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore Lease
Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires for the Agreement/Permit (FLAIFLP).
NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that it has exclusive
jurisdiction.47 d. Exploration Permit (EP),  Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA);  Mineral Agreement (either Production Sharing, Co-
Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-covered areas.
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of the IPRA
cannot be exclusive and original, is because of the so-called "Contentious e. Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared areas a
Areas/Issues" identified in the Joint Department of Agriculture-Land portion or the entirety of which is subsequently issued a CADT/CALT.
Registration Authority-Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DARDENR- LRA- f. Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of the
NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012. 48 Such contentious CADTs/CAL Ts but for any reason not segregated/excluded.
matters arose in the course of the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law,49 the IPRA, the Public Land Act, 50 and the Land g. Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise between and
Registration Act,51 as amended by the Property Registration Decree, 52 which amongst the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP as may be determined by the
created not only issues of overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR National/Regional/Provincial Joint Committees, as created under Section 19
and NCIP, but also operational issues and conflicting claims in the of the Joint Administrative Order.
implementation of their respective programs.
h. Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP in behalf of
Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order defines the ICCs/IPs over those identified titled areas found within the AD/AL.
those contentious areas/issues which are subject of operational issues and
conflicting claims between and among the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP, as
It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-stated contentious
follows:
areas/issues, and affecting the rights of parties who are non-IPs or those
who belong to different ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due
process, however, such parties cannot be compelled to comply with the two
conditions53 before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP under

Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People) Page 21 of 174

Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are recognized to have their own
separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. Hence,
the Court cannot sustain the view that the NCIP shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.
Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great respect, 54 the Court
cannot ignore that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENRLRA- NCIP
Administrative Order provide for the proper forum where the contentious
areas/issues involve lands with prior and vested property rights, thus:
Section 14. Exclusion/Segregation of Lands Covered by Judicially
Decreed Titles and Titles Administratively issued by DENR and DAR. In
the delineation and titling of ADs/ALs, the NCIP must exclude and segregate
all lands covered by titles. For this purpose, the registered owner of the land
may opt to submit to the NCIP a copy of the title of the property to facilitate
segregation or exclusion pursuant to existing guidelines and other pertinent
issuances .
The ICCs/IPs, however, are not precluded from questioning the validity of
these titles in a proper forum as hereunder enumerated:
1. DAR Secretary for registered EPs or CLOAs; and
2. Regional Trial Court for registered patents/judicially-decreed titles.
On the other hand, the DAR and DENR shall not process titles pursuant to
their mandate on lands certified by NCIP as ancestral domain or ancestral
lands except in areas with prior and vested rights. Provided, however, that
the certification by NCIP on lands as Ancestral Domains or Ancestral Lands
pursuant to Section 52(i) of IPRA presupposes that the provision of Section
13 hereof on the projection of survey plans and issuance of Certification of
Non-Overlap have already been complied with.
xxxx
Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties. Titled lands under the
Torrens System issued prior to IPRA are deemed vested rights pursuant to
the provision of Section 56 of IPRA. Accordingly, the DAR shall proceed with
the CARP coverage of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by
the Supreme Court without prejudice, however, to the rights of the ICCs/IPs
to question the validity of these titles before a court or body of competent
jurisdiction. 55
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
Note that the "property rights" referred to in Section 56 56 of the IPRA belong
to ·those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or nonindigenous
peoples, as said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origin of the
ownership of these rights. 57 Considering the rule on statutory construction
that courts should not distinguish where the law does not do so, the IPRA
thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they
pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires that these "property rights"
already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity. 58
On petitioners' assertion that Section 72 59 of the IPRA negates the ruling that
the NCIP has jurisdiction only over claims and disputes under Sections 52,
54, and 62 thereof, even if the parties involved do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, the Court finds the same as misplaced.
Note that under Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who commits violation of
any of the provisions of the IPRA may be punished either(1) in accordance.
with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the penalty
shall not be a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and that neither
death penalty nor excessive fines shall be imposed; or (2) upon conviction,
by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not more than 12 years, or a
fine of not less than ₱100,000.00 nor more than ₱500,000.00, or both such
fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.1a\^/phi1 Again, it
would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for those
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its
separate and distinct customary laws, and to be punished in accordance
therewith. The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction
over violations of IPRA provisions only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to
different ICC/IP group or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction
over such violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court.
Justice Brion has aptly discussed that even if Section 72 of the IPRA is a
special penal law that applies to all persons, including non-ICCs/IPs, the
NCIP jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights is limited to those committed
by and against members of the same ICC/IP group, thus:
Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person  who violates the Rights of
ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the customary laws of the
ICCs/IPs concerned .... without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP concerned
to avail of the protection of "existing laws .  . .[i]n which case,"  the penalty
shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of  the
court."
Page 22 of 174
"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while
"the court" refers to the regular courts as opposed to administrative bodies
like the NCIP.
Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national
laws  and file an action before the regular courts,  in which case, the penalty
shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective,
Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs.
The phrase "without prejudice," however, means without limiting the course
of action that one can take. Thus, a recourse under customary laws does not
take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing national
laws.  An express caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty
must not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death
penalty or excessive fines.
Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws,
then the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to punishment under customary laws.
The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two
important issues:  first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs
with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a
particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws
of another ICC/IP.
Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties .for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, must be published.
Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly
unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular courts have the power to penalize
non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling
would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.
Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another.
Otherwise, the former would be forced to observe a nonbinding customary
law.
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its
jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and against members of the
same ICC/IP.
This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights· of
ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
members of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the
regular courts. In this situation, the NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to
provide ICCs/IPs with "legal assistance in litigation involving community
interest."60
There is also no merit in petitioners' argument that the Court's interpretation
of the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA runs counter to its
purpose to protect the rights, customs, customary laws and cultural integrity
of the ICCs/IPs. To stress, even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that the
opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies
under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and
dispute to the NCIP.61 And, in some instances that the regular courts may
exercise jurisdiction over cases involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing
law for such disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law
bestows on ICCs/IPs.62
It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly
accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building
processes or mechanism under Section 1563 of the IPRA pertains only to
those customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as
may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally
recognized human rights. In this regard, it is fitting to quote the Separate
Opinion of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment
& Natural Resources64 on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and other
related provisions, like Section 15, of the IPRA:
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2,
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The
Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.  xxx
xxxx
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples,
specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one
of the parties to a dispute is a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when
the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of
customary law is not required.
Page 23 of 174
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of
customary law in disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all
parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of
customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the
application thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in
this jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is
sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of
evidence, and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover,
the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application
of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of
indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the
settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays  where majority of
the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.651avvphi1
Likewise, unavailing is petitioners' contention that unresolved claims and
disputes between different ICCs/IPs
groups, and those between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this regard, the Court shares the view of Justice
Perez:
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically
excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is
non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary
law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited
jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs
since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy
involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a·
court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and nonmembers of ICCs
ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine
the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who
are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating
application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the
ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the
rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given
controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP. 66
Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation" done in The
City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng 67 of the NCIP' s jurisdiction over
Human Rights Law (Rights of Indigenous People)
cases where one of the parties is not ICC/IPs, a careful review of that case
would show that the Court merely cited Sections 3(k), 68 3869 and 66 of the
IPRA and Section 570 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9,
2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the
NCIP, as bases of its ruling to the effect that disputes or controversies over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs are within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. However, the Court did not identify and
elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" on disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
ICCs/IPs. Hence, such description of the nature and scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the point, can only
be considered as an obiter dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion
with no binding force for purposes of res judicata and does not embody the
determination of the court.71
On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the
NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular
courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in
relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have
primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes arising from the
delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-
issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/ IPs, or
members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights
under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP
group.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 24 of 174
 marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
[1] application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Same; Same; If the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
  Code (RPC) is applied to B.P. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein, with
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN   G.R. No. 168852 more reason could the same principle be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
Petitioner,     shall be supplementary to said law.—Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, 451
SCRA 673 (2005), the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
    Present: Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
     
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
    YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
    Chairperson, suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of
- versus -   AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
    CHICO-NAZARIO, participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.
    NACHURA, and
Same; Same; Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
    REYES, JJ. violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through
another.—It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN     recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be
and JUANITA L. TAN,   Promulgated: committed by an offender through another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence against
Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
Respondents.*   September 30, 2008 children is committed through any of the following acts: x x x (h) Engaging in
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
x----------------------------------------------------------x or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
  This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: x x x

DECISION
Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262);
Conspiracy; Words and Phrases; “Violence against Women and Their Children,”
Defined; While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines
‘‘[v]iolence against women and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” While
the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The intent of the statute is the law.—It bears
mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit—
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The maxim “expressio unios est exclusio
alterius” is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction which should be applied
only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.—
Contrary to the RTC’s pronouncement, the maxim “expressio unios est exclusio
alterius” finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
“ancillary rule of statutory construction.” It is not of universal application. Neither is
it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 25 of 174

which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution[2] dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven)
were married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and
Kristen Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
[6]
 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC.She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004.
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice [9] granting petitioner's prayer
for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
[10]
 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents'
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution [12] dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule
of law expressio  unius est exclusio alterius.[13]
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be
applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
 
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY
BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for
the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorilyapplied to R.A.
No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her
to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case
is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws
as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.
Page 26 of 174
 
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992,
otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not
contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service
of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
[20]
In People v. Chowdury,  the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because
said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v.  People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas  Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Most recently, in Ladonga v.  People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23]
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
 
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence  Against  Women and Their Children. -
The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
 
x x x
 
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
Page 27 of 174
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:  
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would
following reliefs: be an exercise in superfluity.
   
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED
  and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, is concerned.
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x(Emphasis supplied)  
 
SO ORDERED.
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
 
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law[24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
 
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio  unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not
of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means
of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
 
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance
of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents
to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy
is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits
and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.
[26]
 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy
is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a
petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best
passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 28 of 174

[2]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182835               April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,  acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
Criminal Law; Violence against Women; Republic Act No. 9262; Section 3(a) of
R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person
against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship that
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to a woman.—Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had
a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: “SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this
Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. x x x x Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional
or psychological distress to a woman. Thus: “SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against
Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts: x x x x h. Engaging in
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: x x x x 5. Engaging in
any form of harassment or violence.”
Same; Same; Same; Elements of the Crime of Violence against Women.—The
elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The
offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Dating Relationship,” Defined; A “dating
relationship” includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over
time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.— Section 3(e)
provides that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Thus: (e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties
live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
social context is not a dating relationship.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Sexual Relations,” Defined; Sexual relations refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.—
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women x x x refers to any act
or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e)
above defines “dating relationship” while Section 3(f) defines “sexual relations.” The
latter “refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.” The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved
Same; Same; Same; Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts”
that constitutes violence against women—this means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough.—Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women. This
means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Evidence; Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC); The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.— Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule
5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is
raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit “A”, for the
first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to
the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence.
He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the
rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Page 29 of 174
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against
women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked
woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.)
9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province
of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile
phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former
girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked
body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who
is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the
said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish)
and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had
taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish
broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he
was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages
but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia
message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and
with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender’s
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her
face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B). 3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan.
He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous
pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging
shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede
ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to
the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the
cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages.
Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada,
Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested
him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and
several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station,
he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology,
testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He
said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a
picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture.
Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear
that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct
irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a
lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been
copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like
the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in
Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year.
He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They
met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time
(later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Page 30 of 174
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet
her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone.
When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his
cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police
station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him
to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text
messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish,
contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This
explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated
from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent
the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman
whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent
the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the
memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and
angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the
pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit
A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen.
Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3
and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while
recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were
tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered
in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her
testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne
out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1,
2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A.
9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a
decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA
denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25,
2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish
by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the
nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an
act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
Page 31 of 174
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally
or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime
of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that
accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides
that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to
him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make
love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the
offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the
noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly,
the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may
or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship
that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of
the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as
having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them
were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common
occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at
times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry
at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic
relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should
not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly
ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of
R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women
and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm
in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He
Page 32 of 174
claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the
obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the
picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that
Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She
said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she
deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from
the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such
memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew
that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep
it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see
anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based
on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth.
What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked
woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive
one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would
be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes
it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a
threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were
seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him
should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not
need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used,
which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s
testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text
messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with
whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such
numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated
cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to
Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an
unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the
same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone
number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and
neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things
on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late
since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and
every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
Page 33 of 174

[3]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182367               December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,  unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
Support; Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act (R.A. No. 9262); The
petitioner evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child—the object
of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women
and children who are victims of abuse or violence.—Dolina evidently filed the wrong
action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed
the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse
or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the
case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. Dolina of course
alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to
the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither
she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her
action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that
he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
Same; To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged;
Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.—To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim
that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he
had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The
child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Same; While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity
suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.—
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity
suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and
signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an
temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D.
Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O.
2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.)
9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-formacomplaint, Dolina added
a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed
child. She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which
listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to
order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such
amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was
essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman
and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature
appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is
a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and
give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been
living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order
against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no
prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting
him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such
support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its
April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for
compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied,
Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court.
Page 34 of 174
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly
dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application
for temporary support for her child.
The Court’s Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and
safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent
in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a
hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to
be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed
petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated
April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her
child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was
not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived
with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get
financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the
father. He of course vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish

the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is
Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had
not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to
him.7 The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support
follows as matter of obligation. 9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to
support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. 10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the
entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation
between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the
alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already
water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This
omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose
of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 35 of 174


[4]
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002]
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
Criminal Law; Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (R.A. No. 7877); Words and Phrases;
“Sexual Harassment,” Defined.—The above contentions of petitioner are not
meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides: “SEC. 3. Work, Education or
Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.—Work, education or trainingrelated
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work
or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. “(a) In a work-
related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: “(1) The
sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”
Same; Same; While the City Mayor has the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from the
City Health Officer in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office
carry good weight.—While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in
appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal
health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to
have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate
Juliet’s employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue
liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City
Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary between 1979 to
1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y
Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of
perverse behavior by petitioner.
Same; Same; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon,
the Tribunal, where no cogent reasons have been sufficiently shown to now hold
otherwise. —The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, no
cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The
assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an
opportunity that is denied the appellate court.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant
but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help
obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender.—
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary
damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral
damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to enable an
injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the
result of passion or undue prejudice, and it must always reasonably approximate
extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological
counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed
and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with
petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious
actions.
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health
Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment,
thusly:
That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of
RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of
Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by
express provision of RA 7975, committing the offense in relation to his official
Page 36 of 174
functions and taking advantage of his position, did there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors from Ms.
Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in
Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the office of
the accused, namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose
her body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the
accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of
Ms. Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting
sexual harassment.[1]
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged;
hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that
on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner
at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father and petitioner
were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health
Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would
still see if he might be able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to
the City Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a medical
group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into
putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be
considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she
and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her
that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if
she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started
putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or
not she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that
perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her
answers to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner
then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on
the various aspects of virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she would
tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch
her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a
research program. She was requested to be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by
at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When
she got to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some
hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. Not
finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research
undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would
include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about
it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at
Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner
stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be
scared.After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner
got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath,
and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner
then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner
told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She
felt assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her
pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her
panty until he reached her pubic hair.Surprised, she exclaimed hala ka! and
instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with
his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm
touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had
nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her
navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she
lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily
that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody
about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner
urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her
P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin
and the money he gave her but she did not give the rest of the story.  Her
mother scolded her for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In
the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the
money to petitioner but she was not able to see him until about one oclock in
the afternoon. She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused to
accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December
1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the
incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some
psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for
counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her sister,
came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be
emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr.
Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due to
post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on
28 November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see him in his
office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a
boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee
introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed her wish to join the City Health
Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy in his office, adding that
only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city personnel. On 01
Page 37 of 174
December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident happened, he was
in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City
Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to
return the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was scheduled to
leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his
plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for sexual harassment, as well
as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie
Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political harassment
directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision,
dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding
the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment
under Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO
JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and
punished under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act,
properly known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay
a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00)
Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00)
Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and to pay the cost of suit. [2]
In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of
the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of
law and presumption of innocence on account of the insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.[3]
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of
Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position
he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his
help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her
plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for
her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning
research project. It all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest
of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical
examination would be a part of a research, accused asked complainant if she
would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused assured
her that with her cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from
it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect,
and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At
this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the
complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon, but did not proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as
she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was
confused and at a loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00
oclock in the afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once
inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was a
vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered
nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the
latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more hospital.  In
her presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there was no
vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused
renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the
Family Planning Program where there would be physical
examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out
of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if
she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree
Page 38 of 174
because the research included hugging. He then assured her that he was
just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been
subjected to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed
her mind and agreed to the research, for she is now convinced that she
would be of help to the research and would gain knowledge from it. At this
point, accused asked her if she was a tomboy, she answered in the
negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he would first play
bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical examination). On the
understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where
the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But
accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for
him, as it was not good for people to see them riding in a car together.  She
walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as
instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her
and she was instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the car, he
called her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she was
not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held her pulse and told
her not to be scared. He informed her that he would go home for a while to
put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and
asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not able to do
so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused
directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins
on her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as
instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed
her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half of her
legs.But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and grabbed
her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the
situation, she raised her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka!
because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held her
abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of
endearment), and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the
traditional way of making the young respect their elders. He again told her to
raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether
she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her breast. He then
fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced
her bar while silently asking God what was happening to her and asking the
courage to resist accuseds physical advances. After a short while, she asked
him if there could be a right place for physical examination where there would
be many doctors. He just exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors!
Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to
kiss her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her
then to have them treated. Finally, she informed him that she would not
continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was
entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she
would not tell anybody about what happened. He then promised to give her
P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was about to open
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time,
complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag. [4]
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation
from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office
could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have
conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate
Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take
undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position
in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners
secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse
II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said
to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by
petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the
court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the
evidence adduced by the defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting
of the Awards Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna Maagad on
September 8, 1998.
First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness
Myrna Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were
signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting, Exh. 5, was
signed by Myrna Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents,
Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify that the officially designated secretary of the
Awards Committee was Teresita Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook
and how was she able to personally bring the same in court when she
testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she admitted during her
testimony that she retired from the government service on December 1,
1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be the custodian of the logbook
when she testified.
And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the
attendance of those who attended was individually handwritten by the
persons concerned who wrote and signed their names. But in the case of Dr.
Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-
Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that
the logbook was passed around to attending individuals inside the
conference room.[5]
Page 39 of 174
 Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed
conclusive upon, the tribunal,[6] no cogent reasons having been sufficiently
shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses
is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of being
able to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence on the
deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity that is denied the
appellate court.[7]
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and
exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable
levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are
awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help
obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an
offender. Its award must not appear to be the result of passion or undue
prejudice,[8] and it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury
and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological
counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically
disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant
experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet
Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to
P20,000.00 exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a
negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.[9]
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the
crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No.
7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with
imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is
AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages
are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended party,
Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of,
respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 40 of 174


[5]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.  MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing
that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion.—The first six assigned errors
raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the
principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the
trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the
outcome of the case
Same; Same; Same; Relationship; The key element in parricide is the relationship of
the offender with the victim.—The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the
absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Same; Same; Same; Admission; Exceptions; Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it, with exceptions.—Axiomatic is the
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only
when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake,
or (2) no admission was in fact made.
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; In criminal cases, self-defense
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.—When the accused
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person)
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS); The concept has been
recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense.—In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory
of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept
has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is
afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and
controlled over a period of time.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Battered Woman”, defined; In order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice.—A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered women exhibit common personality
traits.—Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Cycle of Violence”; Phases; Tension-Building
Phase; During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs—it could be
verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.—During the
tension-building phase,minor battering occurs—it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to
her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place. However, the techniques adopted by the woman
in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical
abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing
tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
Page 41 of 174
the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable
point, the violence “spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Acute Battering Incident; The acute battering
incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes,
death.—The acute battering incidentis said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time
of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition. At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost
always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience
that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out
of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tranquil Period; The final phase of
the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends—during this
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief.—The final phase of the cycle
of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil
period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising
never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince
herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for
his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically. The illusion of absolute inter dependency is
well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other—she for his nurturant behavior, he for
her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and
forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated.
Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; One who resorts to selfdefense must face a
real threat on one’s life, not merely imaginary. —Settled in our jurisprudence,
however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
and effect of self-defense: “Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not
incur any criminal liability: “1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third.
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlawful aggression; Unlawful aggression is the
most essential element of self-defense.— Unlawful aggression is the most essential
element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack—or an
imminent danger thereof—on the life or safety of a person Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; Same; Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.—
Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense—complete or incomplete —on the part of
the victim.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Passion and Obfuscation; Requisites; To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur.—In addition,
we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.—
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. In order to qualify an
act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the
killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the gravity of the resulting
offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for
acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which
allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is
not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-
husband at the time she shot him.
Page 42 of 174
 Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her
psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating
factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the
fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her
and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising
from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she
may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has
already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in
Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds
the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased
the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity.
Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out
of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of
the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous
rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
shedding of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel, [5] appellant pleaded not guilty during
her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and
convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions
version of the facts in this wise:
Page 43 of 174
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived
with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived
at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across
it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet.
Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to
which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time
Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented
house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend
and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her
pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant
likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for
a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with
her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her
children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the
foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant.
Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was
locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able
to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to
reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body
of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his
briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of
the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune.
Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead
body as that of [her] son.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the
foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1
Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his
side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only
had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end
without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench,
had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body
was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed
fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel,
Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at
the Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to
sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their
children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her
reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut
the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television.
According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged
appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck,
and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since
Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his
Page 44 of 174
wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to
drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with
the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by
shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and
shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom. [7] (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and
was working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben,
Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they
were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third
degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben
was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their
closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together
with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not
remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and
Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic
would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw
Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again
and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens
forgiveness.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben
and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc
City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already very
demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two
sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic
stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was
on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a
sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also
the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in
1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and
she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.
They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and
drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He
stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait
for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time,
the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers
and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the
evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly.
Outside their house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting
cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard
by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied
Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the
Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the
cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before
when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave
her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so
many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long
time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the
right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to
her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
Page 45 of 174
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to
her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change
and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she
would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their
reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben
and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he
saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold.
He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this
was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night
of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is
located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each
other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the
accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work
as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.
(Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they
were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters
from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13
or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in
him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble.
One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so
angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while
Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go
to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call
me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia
further testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one
time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast)
as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that
once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only
that morning.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her
house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. When they
got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was
drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.
Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please
note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep
in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come
home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at
10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy
in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said
Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in
he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window grill
and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came.
On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivics house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times
and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his
Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of
Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2
and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all
the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could
not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He
said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological
make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to
Page 46 of 174
his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront
the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that
they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night
it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said
that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone
passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for
Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher
under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun
away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash
him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that
two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged
her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as
such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination
of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986.
She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she
got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to
the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving
the skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that
based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did
not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17,
22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997,
22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last
trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review
and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared
for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated
20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty.
Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office,
wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
Page 47 of 174
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received
by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo  to take
the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel
Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined
that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a
lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court
partly granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the
case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified
before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and
was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has
an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts
in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the
U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the
Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She
is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68
countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity
cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology
(together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the
first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first
case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of
ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of
this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric
disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse
and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken
homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a
very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex
and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and
very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of
times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they
become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family
which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also,
they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of
modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked
the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change,
Page 48 of 174
the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake
of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some
leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to
fight back triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a
normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out. In an
abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long
lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on
the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which
she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time
she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at
the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since
passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow
of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight
(38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for
twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from
the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented
twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline),
on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a
doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr.
Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and
testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent
family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand
cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation.
As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita
Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal
abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such
that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said
that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may
induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming
brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Page 49 of 174
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating
or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that
time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-
world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an
individuals illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of
the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him
within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very
competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his
strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-
experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or
any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x
x because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview
he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-
experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically
that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when
the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he
interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore
x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave
credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased
while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when
Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this
Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the
time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in
the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the
experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
Page 50 of 174
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence.
Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then
presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to
this Court to form part of the records of the case. [12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this
Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic
Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating
with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a
drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila
and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt
to save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus
in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death. [13]
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether
appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether
treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if
not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by
this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge
gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the
outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of
discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would
reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will
now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on
record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page
discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges
conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence,
that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an
obviously hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court
on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial
and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much
less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with
Page 51 of 174
which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions
in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. [15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa
and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their
marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the
absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother
of appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been
married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies.
Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben. [18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a
showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2)
no admission was in fact made. [19] Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the
deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause
of Bens death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no
legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000
Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting
him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused
the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that
Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to
us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered
woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory
of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led
to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony
from appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither
the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her
children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the
flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law
are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any
reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability,
invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed
justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. [21] Well-settled is
the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a
stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the
battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the
concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-
defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. [23] By appreciating evidence
that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts
convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person
who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time. [24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-
esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex
Page 52 of 174
role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship
will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the
so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-
building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving
(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The
woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing
behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor.
All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the
batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to
abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate
him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse
worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing
tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive.
Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and
leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending
it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and
that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her
apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her
past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents
are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince
herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change
for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person
whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a
battered womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed
emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for
her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and
forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense
presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending
experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent
year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your
husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this
abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and
sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes
beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
Page 53 of 174
 A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate
each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was
convinced and after that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty
and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see
a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a
week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just
quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos
Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic
battery in this manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are
found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates
for the record.

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries? A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R)
lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr.
A Yes, sir. Lucero;
Q Who inflicted these injuries? 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital
area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr.
A Of course my husband.
Canora;
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A Yes, sir.
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma.
Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
xxxxxxxxx
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder.
[Court] /to the witness Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of
injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that
time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you
were the attending physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.

A Everytime he got drunk. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 54 of 174

 Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who A Yes, sir.
attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle
left axilla? Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court,
was the patient pregnant?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with
something rough substance if force is applied. A Yes, sir.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of
pregnancy was she?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an
inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is A Yes, sir.
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an
tenderness pain. examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which
complicates her pregnancy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q For how many days?
Q What did she tell you? A One day.
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of Q Where?
these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her
husband. A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa? xxxxxxxxx

A Yes, sir.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said
xxxxxxxxx that you were able to examine her personally on November 6,
1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
ATTY. TABUCANON: What is this all about?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same
incident happened? period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-
three (23) times.
A As per record, yes.
Q For what?
Q What was the date?
A Tension headache.
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
patient had hypertension?

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 55 of 174

 A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was
given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress
related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is
emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the
patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of
what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to
the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause
increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not
response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the
blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was
180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.  [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the
Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling
several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with
bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben. [35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been
asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared
that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel
did sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the
couple were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then
Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up
by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help --
this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa
home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt
her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing,
she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least
three other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling. [37] Marivic relates in
detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of
him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November
15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working
then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to
Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my
son, where was his father, then my second child said, he was
not home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him,
my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my
children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this
time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at
Bilwang?
Page 56 of 174
 A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to
sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was
again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so
I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted
because she had fears that the same thing will happen again
last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with
you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not
allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at
you? What else did he do if any?
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel
him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you
know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking
for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he
would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if
any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because
I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again.
Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, why
did you switch off the light when the children were there. At
that time I was also attending to my children who were doing
their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering
his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and
cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because
they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben
was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I
fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Page 57 of 174
 Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside? Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
going?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open
A Outside perhaps to drink more. the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have
the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time? about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill
A I packed all his clothes. me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet
and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
A I wanted him to leave us.
and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
reactions? same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about
to vomit.
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry
with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of COURT INTERPRETER:
the bedroom holding my neck.
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you? xxxxxxxxx
COURT INTERPRETER:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck) Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

A And he dragged me towards the door backward. A Outside.

ATTY. TABUCANON: Q In what part of the house?

Q Where did he bring you? A Dining.

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then Q Where were the children during that time?
he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so A My children were already asleep.
there will be nobody to nag me.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
Q What is there in the drawer? please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
A I was aware that it was a gun. look like?

COURT INTERPRETER: A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

(At this juncture the witness started crying). Q Is it a flexible blade?

ATTY. TABUCANON: A Its a cutter.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 58 of 174

 Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.  [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an
expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person.
She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen
hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the
court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife?
Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life
was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten
years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a
lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse
and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager
income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner
of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going
out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved
in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger
a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of
taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband
even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that
the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very
angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she
was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell
when it was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely
elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting
evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999,
where you talked to her about three hours, what was the most
relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened.
The most important information were escalating abuses that
she had experienced during her marital life.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you
already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have
substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I
can consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her
husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who
are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she
stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her
and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in
that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about
being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on
saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this
in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there
had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because
of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and
that is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
Page 59 of 174
 emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had
experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective
personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying
prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or
is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective
personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is
a person that I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from
her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo,
testified on his Psychiatric Report, [42] which was based on his interview and
examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three
years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was
fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and
was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same
time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed
toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it
was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically
abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was
progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to
anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking
[spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by
her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in
vain. Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help
of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the
Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused
woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind,
we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person
who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both
relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why
would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue
to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the
point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her
bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and
make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person
confronted with the so-called battered wife syndrome. [44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should
not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in
the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings
may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and
refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women. [45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her
research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United
States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in
which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon
the battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater
danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered
woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating
and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
Page 60 of 174
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered
woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and
guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she
has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their
children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. [49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He
had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having
evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of
the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about
forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on
the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness. [50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons
may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating
the development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the
victims ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the
University of Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a
situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to
that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said that
it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-
important. He referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he
truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individuals
set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders
that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow
responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he
is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape. [55] Battered women feel
unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not
only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because
she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. [57]
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific
evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had
suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with
the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient
evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed
to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how
the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly
described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single
incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior
to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively
minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation
from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to
her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her
and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to
reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-
being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless
and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as
preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the
essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses
for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely
theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman
usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings
inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others
testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of
actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences
and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which
they concluded that she had BWS.
Page 61 of 174
 We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the
records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. [59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further
that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at
the time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm
from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to
save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
[61]
 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect
of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. [63] It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. [64] In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon
him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great
probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm --
then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased
yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further
evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require
the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend
her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment. [65] Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering
episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence
of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS,
self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no
self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. [68] Thus,
Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any
other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it
proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate
her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal
case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not
been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra.
Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000,
opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and
natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity
to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly
experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological
paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part.  [70]
Page 62 of 174
 Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that
the effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious
maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering.
Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged
administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of
the victim and another one is the public and social support
available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she
will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications
in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr.
Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of
the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus
that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is
heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not
only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do
you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or
[a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called
delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and
the individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability,
higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably
in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the
individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months.
The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical
one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert
witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman
syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis,
and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations
were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her
will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 [74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and
considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. [78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to
kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had
kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
Page 63 of 174
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. [79] His
abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of
both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a
separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her,
she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of
fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried
open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon
and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there
was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have
recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony [80] that
with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming
brutality [or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control
re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she
suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is
beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been
what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her
from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same
set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature
and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident
occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed
by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn
child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her
part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons
by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk
to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. [81] In
order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must
be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court
imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying
circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been
found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the
back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked,
however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following
testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then
he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so
there will be nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open
the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have
the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
Page 64 of 174
 about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill
me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet
and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity
on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about
to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe
and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what
happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him,
the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck
or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with
him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also
because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun
and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of
treachery. There is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at
the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately
chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk
from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. [86] There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific
means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from
any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method
by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court
resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Page 65 of 174
 Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 [88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty
by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have
attended the commission of the offense. [90] Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that
which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be
within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just
and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or
six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in
its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for
and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding
the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind
an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate
and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide
is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense,
her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman

syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the
given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply
the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal
manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper
resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the
syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person.
Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general
and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such
learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can
only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot
make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only
Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 66 of 174


[7]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,  the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997
(R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the
“Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.—At the
outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act
of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at
least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony
with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional
Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law.”—Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all
kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961),
that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer. —Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20.
Opposition to petition. —(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued; (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-
party complaint.—We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that,
since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally,
a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of
action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view
of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of
a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.—That the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to
the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.
Page 67 of 174
Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is
due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered.—To obviate potential
dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary,
Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a
period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to
meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection,
petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It
bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women
and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and
Children.—As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before
judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent
protection shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid
only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a
statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant
to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the
Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state
criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone
ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole
objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted
ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an
injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.—It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection
against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made
its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment
or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities im posed.—Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is
instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause
of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.—The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”
Page 68 of 174
Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on
Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based
violence.”—According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against
women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.” Societal
norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers,
and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s companions
and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to
men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to
retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women to
retain power.
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women.—The enactment of R.A.
9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through
specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,”
“husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State
Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures
“to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes
or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
“(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private
affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges
Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of
R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.—The distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity
of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this
end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety
and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.—
The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies
equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.—There is nothing in the
definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.
Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing mental or emotional
anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).— VAWC may
likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567
SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that
they and their son (GoTan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.
Page 69 of 174
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection
order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs;
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or order
issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. “The
scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.” The
rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence
is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but
before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the
victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough
to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
victim of Violence Against Women and Children may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.—The grant of
a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be pre vented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out
that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five
(5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.
Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of
the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; “To be
heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings.—It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
“stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere
product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated.—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion
of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of
ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to the wife to claim
any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does
not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC. 11.
Reliefs available to the offended party.—The protection order shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the
respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has
gathered his things and escort him from the residence; x x x x Indubitably, petitioner
may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How
then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself,
as petitioner seems to suggest?
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer
the Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.—
Page 70 of 174
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or
any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained
by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family
Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties
to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by
which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection
order has been sought.
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and
ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”—Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the
other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.” As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision,
the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all
laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” We have held
that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court.—Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are
voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8
million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering
to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love
their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and
more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's
groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the
duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors
and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
Page 71 of 174
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No.
06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old
and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children,
namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old;
and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was
often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some
men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank
manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of
their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent
confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their
accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that
caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on
him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private
respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for
fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that
when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to
private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the
brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted
suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor.
Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then,
private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is
taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that
she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry
with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and
told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private
respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid
that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with
him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of
deep wells. He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings,
Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which
he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute
control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws
a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of
credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with
the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from
Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other
benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After
private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to
hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo,
Page 72 of 174
petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses
the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,
which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal
dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be
removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein)
to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police
officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent
will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from
Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all
her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and
shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may
be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through
other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother
and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the
like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified
TPO in the future.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and
a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms
and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel
all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to
surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children,
including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and
other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006
up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later
than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall
be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support
pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get
a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court
issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the
continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they
are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the
house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the
peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the
sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per
Page 73 of 174
 month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally
resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-
day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation,
and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to
a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject
only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other
personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus
Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and
equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City
Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal
dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and
her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and
make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00
for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic)
children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed
firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the
children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed
to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment
against her and their children, private respondent filed another
application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading,
Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private
respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men
allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy
resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner
allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed
a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known
as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days,
which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
Page 74 of 174
 2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and
her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva
Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona
and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of
the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a
month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to
September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to
August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the
amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate
No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should
the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in
the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located
in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-
168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B.
Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to
any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of
petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner
Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6,
2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the
TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated,
the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and
renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid
law."
Page 75 of 174
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue
in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied
in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON
THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING
TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW
DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A.
No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS
AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-
SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not
be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the
RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as
the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the
place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Page 76 of 174
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at
the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon
all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but
in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City,
which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women
and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition
to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein.
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the
other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief,
in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of
action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in
view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the
case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is
founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents
and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should
not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The
question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need
for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
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 (b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been
marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which
shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day
period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued.
(Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a
hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides
that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may
extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the
parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could
proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul
of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon
an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence,
the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its
normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before
judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more reason that
a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should not be
enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does
not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or
with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted
as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his
alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief
in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable
injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial
court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty
as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so
we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize
spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the
husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which
became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-
Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what
she called a "synthesized measure" 62 – an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure.
We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President.
Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
Page 78 of 174
concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against
women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic
violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the
wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to
place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being
abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims.
This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether
to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR
group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader
scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure.
Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect
women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have
not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the
scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in
their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or
not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially
in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always
feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came
up with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to
be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although
Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special
needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for
one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain
baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe
we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other
family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Page 79 of 174
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular
bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that
proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is
inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is
going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather
than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by
the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake.
At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan.
But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused.
As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to
seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular
measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of
the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in
this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative
to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However,
none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Page 80 of 174
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines
the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A.
9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and,
as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery
for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles
in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women.
With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a
form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights
issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the
crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context
of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate
VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and
its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western
societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority
of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even
kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Page 81 of 174
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even
the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the
late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed
the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that
of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became
the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to
beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull
her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict
upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person,
the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can
invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple
focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife
abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by
suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They
fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the
feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in
1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million
women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had
assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak
English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double
the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women
will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime...
Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are
severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve
sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only
the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps
because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who
find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose
that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male
partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against
Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN
General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have
been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The
UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.
Page 82 of 174
Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200 201
2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all
1,04 these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 832 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation
2
building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Incestuou Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8,
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
s Rape 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Attempted Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
Acts of
victims of violence.
Lascivious 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ness
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on
violence against women and children show that –
Physical 3,5 2,3 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,4 2,01 1,58
Injuries 53 35 92 05 07 98 8 8 x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first
Sexual semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which
Harassme 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63 represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
nt circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated
cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out
1,2 2,3 3,5 5,2 9,97 9,02 of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
RA 9262 218 924
69 87 99 85 4 1 violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and
more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213 intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners. 73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15 statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004
to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the
Concubin different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004, 74 thus:
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
age
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 -
2011*
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Abduction
/Kidnappin 16 34 23 28 18 25 22 Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center
g 29 (WCPC)

Unjust On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are
relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
6,2 5,3 4,8 5,7 6,9 9,4 15,1 12,9
Total
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 83 of 174
71 74 81 29 05 85 04 48
report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or
more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the
other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at
the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A.
9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of
animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as
violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while
there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads,
"but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace
to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by
law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing,
crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than
other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the
U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses.
He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of
the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for
Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict
themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn.
This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of
domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against
our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio
J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and
PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being
motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of
gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused
on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
83
contention,  therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-
male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm
shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of
the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
Page 84 of 174
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values
the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and
other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to
the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence
and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating
a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage
in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim
from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
Page 85 of 174
 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources
and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision
are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics
of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument
advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes
the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner
insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money
or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish"
are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-
Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of
POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in
a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support
of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by
the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to
issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
Page 86 of 174
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests,103among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court
shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately
on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of
being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only
two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed
a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him
five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing
that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each
time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now
be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in
the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of
the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Page 87 of 174
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of
encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the
case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in
a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the
petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial
power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and
such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. –
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs
shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an
ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect its personal service.
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women)
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the
Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire
into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a
preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend
assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that
they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal
are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Page 88 of 174
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in
mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 89 of 174

[1]
G.R. No. 169263               September 21, 2011
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner,  governments in undertaking urban development and housing programs and projects,
vs.
MELBA TAN TE, Respondent.
DECISION
Eminent Domain; Public Use; Socialized Housing; Words and Phrases; The concept
of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified
beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded
definition of “public use or purpose” in the context of the State’s exercise of the
power of eminent domain; The term “public use” has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage—to the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage.— Prefatorily, the concept of socialized housing, whereby
housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier
terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of “public use or
purpose” in the context of the State’s exercise of the power of eminent domain. Said
the Court in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987), citing the earlier case of
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983): The public use
requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be
for public use. There was a time where it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. x x x The constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation
of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term
“public use” has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of
the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992;
Republic Act No. 7279; Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive
and continuing urban development and housing program as well as access to land
and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens.—Congress passed R.A.
No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban development and
housing program as well as access to land and housing by the underprivileged and
Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor)
homeless citizens; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens
in urban areas by making available decent housing at affordable cost; optimize the
use and productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban dysfunctions which
affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the capability of local
among others. Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are mandated to
inventory all lands and improvements within their respective locality and identify
lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and as resettlement sites for
acquisition and disposition to qualified beneficiaries. Section 10 thereof authorizes
local government units to exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the
objectives of the law, but subject to the conditions stated therein and in Section 9.
Same; Expropriation; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; The present state of Rule
67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that
required before in response to a complaint for expropriation—the present rule
requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint; The
defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is
now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the
allegations in the complaint for eminent domain; Failure to file the answer does not
produce all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because
the defendant may still present evidence on just compensation.—The Supreme
Court, in its en banc Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, has
provided that the revisions made in the Rules of Court were to take effect on July 1,
1997. Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the
filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response
to a com plaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as
responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides: x x x The
defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is
now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the
allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. While the answer is bound by the
omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15, much leeway is nevertheless afforded
to the defendant because amendments may be made in the answer within 10 days
from its filing. Also, failure to file the answer does not produce all the disastrous
consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the defendant may still
present evidence on just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes which regulate procedure in the courts apply to actions
pending and undetermined at the time those statutes were passed.—At the inception
of the case at bar with the filing of the complaint on November 16, 2000, the
amended provisions of Rule 67 have already been long in force. Borre v. Court of
Appeals, 158 SCRA 560 (1988), teaches that statutes which regulate procedure in the
courts apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time those statutes were
passed. And in Laguio v. Gamet, 171 SCRA 392 (1989), it is said that new court
rules apply to proceedings which take place after the date of their effectivity.
Page 90 of 174
Same; Same; Same; Whether a property owner has observed the provisions of
Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation, and whether
he or she owns other properties than the one sought to be expropriated, and whether
he or she is actually a small property owner beyond the reach of the expropriator’s
eminent domain powers are issues in the nature of affirmative defenses which
require the presentation of evidence aliunde.—The trial court in this case should
have denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and required her to submit in its stead an
answer within the reglementary period. This, because whether petitioner has
observed the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to
expropriation, and whether respondent owns oth,er properties than the one sought to
be expropriated, and whether she is actually a small property owner beyond the reach
of petitioner’s eminent domain powers, are indeed issues in the nature of affirmative
defenses which require the presentation of evidence aliunde. Besides, Section 1, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court does not consider these matters grounds for a motion to
dismiss, and an action can be dismissed only on the grounds authorized by this
provision.
PERALTA, J.:
In this Petition for Review, 1 the City of Manila assails the April 29, 2005
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71894, as well as the
August 12, 2005 Resolution,3 in the said case denying reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed the June 13, 2001 Order 4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 24 issued in Civil Case No. 00-99264 – one for
expropriation filed by petitioner, the City of Manila. The said Order, in turn,
granted the motion to dismiss the complaint that was filed by respondent
Melba Tan Te, in lieu of an answer.
The facts follow.
On March 15, 1998, then Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved
Ordinance No. 7951 – an expropriation measure enacted on February 3,
1998 by the city council – authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or
expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and Governor
Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded
to bona fide residents therein. For this purpose, the mayor was also
empowered to access the city’s funds or utilize funding facilities of other
government agencies.5 In the aggregate, the covered property measures
1,425 square meters, and includes the 475-square-meter lot owned by
respondent Melba Tan Te.6
The records bear that respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of
Emerlinda Dimayuga Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by
a number of families whose leasehold rights had long expired even prior to
Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor)
said sale. In 1998, respondent had sought before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 15 the ejectment of these occupants from the premises.
The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite
opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent’s
instance.7 It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ of
execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an
expropriation case8 affecting the same property. Respondent had moved for
the dismissal of that first expropriation case for lack of cause of action, lack
of showing of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, and non-
compliance with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, otherwise
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.9 The trial court
found merit in the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 10
On November 16, 2000, petitioner11 filed this second Complaint12 for
expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. 13 This
time, it attached a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and alleged that pursuant
thereto, it had previously offered to purchase the subject property from
respondent for ₱824,330.00.14 The offer was contained in a letter sent to
respondent by the City Legal Officer on May 21, 1999, 15 but respondent
allegedly failed to retrieve it despite repeated notices, 16 thereby compelling
petitioner to institute the present expropriation proceedings after depositing in
trust with the Land Bank of the Philippines ₱1,000,000.00 cash, representing
the just compensation required by law to be paid to respondent. 17
Respondent did not file an answer and in lieu of that, she submitted a Motion
to Dismiss18 and raised the following grounds: that Ordinance No. 7951 was
an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking
private property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with
the requirements of Sections 9 19 and 1020 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she
qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of
R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.
Petitioner moved that it be allowed to enter the property, but before it could
be resolved, the trial court issued its June 13, 2001 Order 21 dismissing the
complaint. First, the trial court held that while petitioner had deposited with
the bank the alleged ₱1M cash in trust for respondent, petitioner
nevertheless did not submit any certification from the City Treasurer’s Office
of the amount needed to justly compensate respondent for her
property. Second, it emphasized that the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of
R.A. No. 7279 are mandatory in character, yet petitioner had failed to show
that it exacted compliance with them prior to the commencement of this
suit. Lastly, it conceded that respondent had no other real property except
the subject lot which, considering its total area, should well be considered a
small property exempted by law from expropriation. In view of the dismissal
of the complaint, petitioner’s motion to enter was rendered moot and
academic.22
Page 91 of 174
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, finding no
merit therein, dismissed the same.23Petitioner sought reconsideration,24 but it
was denied.25
In this Petition,26 petitioner posits that the trial court’s dismissal of its
complaint was premature, and it faults the Court of Appeals for having failed
to note that by such dismissal it has been denied an opportunity to show
previous compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No.
7279 as well as to establish that respondent actually owns other realty apart
from the subject property. Besides, continues petitioner, whether or not it had
truly complied with the requirements of the law is a matter which can be
determined only after a trial of the case on the merits and not, as what
happened in this case, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss. 27
Respondent, for her part, points out that Ordinance No. 7951 is an invalid
expropriation measure as it does not even contain an appropriation of funds
in its implementation. In this respect, respondent believes that the ₱1M cash
deposit certified by the bank seems to be incredible, since petitioner has not
shown any certification from the City Treasurer’s Office on the amount
necessary to implement the expropriation measure. More importantly, she
believes that the dismissal of the complaint must be sustained as it does not
allege previous compliance with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 and,
hence, it does not present a valid cause of action. 28 She theorizes that the
expropriation for socialized housing must abide by the priorities in land
acquisition and the available modes of land acquisition laid out in the law,
and that expropriation of privately-owned lands avails only as the last
resort.29 She also invokes the exemptions provided in the law. She professes
herself to be a small property owner under Section 3 (q), 30 and claims that
the subject property is the only piece of land she owns where she, as of yet,
has not been able to build her own home because it is still detained by illegal
occupants whom she had already successfully battled with in the ejectment
court.31
In its Reply, petitioner adopts a different and bolder theory. It claims that by
virtue of the vesture of eminent domain powers in it by its charter, it is
thereby not bound by the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No.
7279. It also asserts its right to immediately enter the subject property
because not only is its complaint supposedly sufficient in form and substance
but also because it has already deposited ₱1M cash with the bank in trust for
respondent. It reiterates that the dismissal of its complaint constitutes a
denial of due process because all the issues propounded by respondent,
initially in her motion to dismiss and all the way in the present appeal, must
be resolved in a full-blown trial.
Prefatorily, the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are
distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has
Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor)
already been included in the expanded definition of "public use or purpose" in
the context of the State’s exercise of the power of eminent domain. Said the
Court in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 32citing the earlier case of Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes:33
The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time where it was
felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. x x x The constitution in at least two cases,
to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation
of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has
been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. x x x
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and
which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need
to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to
the Philippines. We have never been a laissez-faire state. And the
necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often
found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost
housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. x x x The 1987 Constitution [provides]:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.
(Article II, Section 9)
Page 92 of 174
The State shall, by law and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program for urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. x xx In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Article XIII, Section 9)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of
housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot
be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who
need it, all at once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of
crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in
developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year
of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international
community on those problems." The General Assembly is seriously
concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local
levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the majority
of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in
developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute
terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p.
1043-4]
In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that "socialized housing"
falls within the confines of "public use."34
Congress passed R.A. No. 7279,35 to provide a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program as well as access to
land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the
conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas by
making available decent housing at affordable cost; optimize the use and
productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban dysfunctions which
affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the capability of local
governments in undertaking urban development and housing programs and
projects, among others.36 Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are
mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their respective
locality and identify lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and as
resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition to qualified
beneficiaries.37 Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to
exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law,
but subject to the conditions stated therein and in Section 9. 38
Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor)
It is precisely this aspect of the law which constitutes the core of the present
controversy, yet this case presents a serious procedural facet – overlooked
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals – which needs foremost
attention ahead of the issues propounded by the parties.
Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first,  the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an
order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second,  the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to
be expropriated.39
Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Under the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964, where the defendant in an
expropriation case conceded to the plaintiff’s right to expropriate (or where
the trial court affirms the existence of such right), the court-appointed
commissioners would then proceed to determine the just compensation to be
paid.40 Otherwise, where the defendant had objections to and defenses
against the expropriation of his property, he was required to file a single
motion to dismiss containing all such objections and defenses. 41
This motion to dismiss was not covered by Rule 15 which governed ordinary
motions, and was then the required responsive pleading, taking the place of
an answer, where the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the defendant’s property
could be put in issue.42 Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a
defense, such as that which would tend to show that the exercise of the
power to condemn was unauthorized, or that there was cause for not taking
defendant’s property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or that the
purpose for the taking was not public in character. With that, the hearing of
the motion and the presentation of evidence would follow. The rule is based
on fundamental constitutional provisions affecting the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, such as those that seek to protect the individual property
owner from the aggressions of the government. 43 However, the rule, which
was derived from the practice of most American states, proved indeed to be
a source of confusion because it likewise permitted the filing of another
motion to dismiss, such as that referred to in Rule 16, where the defendant
could raise, in addition, the preliminary objections authorized under it. 44
The Supreme Court, in its en banc Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated
April 8, 1997, has provided that the revisions made in the Rules of Court
were to take effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, with said amendments, the present
state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to
dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for
expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive
pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:
Page 93 of 174
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection or
defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may and serve a notice
or appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or
identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time
stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all
proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall
serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an
interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all
his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer
or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court,
in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made
not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the
issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously
appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the
compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the
distribution of the award.45
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of
his property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available
defenses against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. While
the answer is bound by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, 46 Rule 15,
much leeway is nevertheless afforded to the defendant because
amendments may be made in the answer within 10 days from its
filing.1âwphi1 Also, failure to file the answer does not produce all the
disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the
defendant may still present evidence on just compensation. 47
At the inception of the case at bar with the filing of the complaint on
November 16, 2000, the amended provisions of Rule 67 have already been
long in force. Borre v. Court of Appeals 48 teaches that statutes which regulate
procedure in the courts apply to actions pending and undetermined at the
time those statutes were passed. And in Laguio v. Gamet, 49 it is said that
new court rules apply to proceedings which take place after the date of their
effectivity.
In the case of Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, 50 a similar motion
to dismiss was filed by the private property owner, petitioner therein, in an
expropriation case filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC), alleging
Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor)
certain jurisdictional defects as well as issues on the impropriety of the
expropriation measure being imposed on the property. The trial court in that
case denied the motion inasmuch as the issues raised therein should be
dealt with during the trial proper. On petition for certiorari, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but declared that under
the amended provisions of Section 3, Rule 67, which were already in force at
about the time the motion to dismiss had been submitted for resolution, all
objections and defenses that could be availed of to defeat the expropriator’s
exercise of the power of eminent domain must be contained in an answer
and not in a motion to dismiss because these matters require the
presentation of evidence. Accordingly, while the Court in that case sustained
the setting aside of the motion to dismiss, it nevertheless characterized the
order of dismissal as a nullity. Hence, it referred the case back to the trial
court and required the NPC to submit its answer to the complaint within 10
days from the finality of the decision.
Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondent’s motion to
dismiss and required her to submit in its stead an answer within the
reglementary period. This, because whether petitioner has observed the
provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to
expropriation, and whether respondent owns other properties than the one
sought to be expropriated, and whether she is actually a small property
owner beyond the reach of petitioner’s eminent domain powers, are indeed
issues in the nature of affirmative defenses which require the presentation of
evidence aliunde.51 Besides, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does
not consider these matters grounds for a motion to dismiss, and an action
can be dismissed only on the grounds authorized by this provision. 52
The Court declared in Robern Development Corporation, thus:
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as
grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the disputed land for another
public purpose or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-way in the
complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those
specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an
action can be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this provision.
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative defenses that
should be alleged in an answer, since they require presentation of
evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that "if a defendant has any
objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or
defense to the taking of his property," he should include them in his answer.
Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and
hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the Complaint on such grounds as
claimed by the petitioner. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss
Page 94 of 174
constitutes a denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it
appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the
case on the merits.

Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case arose, we
believe that in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be
given an opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for expropriation in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.x x
x53

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24 in Civil Case No. 00-99264 dated June 13,
2001, as well as the April 29, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71894 affirming said order, and the August 12, 2005 Resolution
therein which denied reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. Respondent is
DIRECTED to file her Answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from the
finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law (Rights of Urban Poor) Page 95 of 174

[2]
CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners,  expressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to further burden private respondent
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA WONG, represented by her
Administrator, ATTY. REYNALDO B. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
Compromise Agreements; Judgments; Words and Phrases; Compromise, Defined; A
judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement
entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order to
terminate a litigation already instituted.—A compromise is a bilateral act or
transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil
Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of the Code, as “a contract whereby the parties by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.” Thus, a judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a
compromise agreement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal
concessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted
Same; Same; Where it appears that nowhere in the judgment did it appear, nor can
it be inferred therefrom, that the court’s disposition took into account any agreement
or concessions made by the parties, the judgment is not based on a compromise
agreement but a decision rendered entirely on the merits.—In the present suit, the
assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on a compromise agreement, is
undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the merits. Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, the dispositive portion of the decision is very explicit in exclusively
adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment. Nowhere did it appear nor can it
be inferred therefrom that respondent court’s disposition took into account any
agreement or concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgment on a
compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedly embodying
the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothing but admissions made
by the parties intended to clarify the applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact the
said admissions are expressly laid out in Section 28(c)(8) of RA 7279 and thus could
not have been the subject of any compromise agreement as the same are already
provided in the law.
Squatting; Statutes; R.A. 7279; Although private individuals are not prohibited from
taking part in the relocation of squatters, there is nothing in the law either that
compels them to undertake such task on a mandatory basis.—Anent petitioners’
claim that private respondent must also share the responsibility of relocating
petitioners, the same is also without any basis. The aforecited provision is very
explicit that the task of relocating the homeless and the underprivileged shall be the
responsibility of the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of the other government agencies. Although private
individuals are not prohibited from taking part in the relocation, there is nothing in
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
the law either that compels them to undertake such task on a mandatory basis,
otherwise, such obligation should have been included in the provision, either
with their relocation is unwarranted.
Same; Social Justice; The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged—at best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.—Equally
unpersuasive is petitioners’ plea for social justice. In previous cases, this Court has
emphasized that “never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor,
or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served,
for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.” In the same vein, it has
been held that “the policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the
poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.”
Same; Same; Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider
that very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right.—In
closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made in the case
of Martires vs. Court of Appeals: “While we sympathize with the millions of our
people who are unable to afford the basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts
of a decent home, this sympathy cannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal
offense. Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider that
very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. This is what
the petitioner wants us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjust plea because the
rule of law rings louder in our ears.”
FRANCISCO, J.:
In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7279
otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992",
envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the
metropolis. Nevertheless, the courts continue to be swamped with cases
arising from disputes in the proper implementation of the aforementioned
legislation, particularly on matters involving the eviction, demolition and
resettlement of squatters. The present suit is among such cases.
The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated September 20, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33761 entitled "Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla and
Virginia Wong, represented by her Administrator, Atty. Reynaldo B.
Page 96 of 174
Hernandez". Petitioners claim that the assailed decision was based on an
unauthorized compromise agreement to which they never consented nor had
any knowledge thereof.
Material hereto are the following antecedents:
Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented by her Administrator and
Attorney-in fact, Reynaldo B. Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case
No. 38-5830) against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have been
illegally occupying private respondents' 405 square meter lot located in
Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51589 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Although petitioners do not claim ownership over the subject premises, they
however disputed private respondents' claim of ownership and alleged that
they have been in possession of the property in question since 1972 by virtue
of the tolerance and permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez.
On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 38, ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the
disputed premises.1
Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto.2
Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed a
petition for review, but the petition was dismissed outright for failure to state
the material dates to show that the petition was filed on time and for not
being accompanied by certified true copies of the disputed decision. 3
No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence, the judgment became
final. This prompted private respondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court in
its order dated March 25, 1994,4 taking into account that the judgment has
already become final and executory.
In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgment and their consequent
eviction, petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City, Branch 216,5 alleging that herein private respondent must first comply
with the mandatory requirements of Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279 regarding
eviction and demolition by court order.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
In its order dated April 5, 1994, 6 the lower court denied the prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order as the act sought to be enjoined was pursuant
to a lawful order of the court.
Thereafter, petitioners again sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via
Petition for Certiorari  with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order, claiming that the latter order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion for being arbitrary, unjust and oppressive, and reiterating that they
cannot be evicted unless there is compliance with Section 28(c) of R.A.
7279.7
On April 28, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to the
petition and granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction, enjoining
the ejection of petitioners until further orders from the court. 8
On July 18, 1994, counsel for private respondent filed a Motion To Lift
And/Or Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, contending among others that the
Urban Poor Affairs Office [People's Bureau] has already been notified, as
mandated by RA 7279, and that more than 45 days had already lapsed since
the notice was made in April, 1994. Thus, private respondent has
substantially complied with the requirements of RA 7279 and therefore the
enforcement of the final judgment and ejectment of petitioners is in
order.9 Objecting to private respondent's motion, petitioners argued that RA
7279 requires not only the 45-day notice, but also the relocation of petitioners
and the grant of financial assistance to them prior to their relocation.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that there is no extreme urgency for
petitioners' eviction on account of private respondent's affluence. 10
The case was subsequently set for hearing and oral argument, after which,
respondent court rendered the assailed decision on September 20, 1994
ordering as follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to RA 7279, the People's Bureau is hereby
ordered to relocate the herein petitioners from subject lot of private
respondent not later than October 30, 1994. Should the relocation of
petitioners be not finished on or before October 30, 1994, the
People's Bureau shall pay petitioners a daily allowance of P145.00
for every day of delay of relocation but in no case shall such
allowance last for more than sixty (60) days.
Petitioners are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question
not later than October 30, 1994, on which date the private
respondent shall have the right to take over possession thereof and,
if necessary, to ask for a writ of execution for the implementation of
this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
Page 97 of 174
 SO ORDERED. 11
On October 25, 1994, a new counsel entered his appearance for petitioners
and filed a motion to set aside the aforequoted decision. 12 As initially
mentioned, petitioners assert that the assailed decision was rendered based
on a compromise agreement to which they never gave their consent nor
authorized their former counsel to enter into, and for which reason said
former counsel has withdrawn his appearance as counsel of record.
Petitioners contend that the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals was
indeed based on a compromise agreement which is evident from the
following portions of the decision:
xxx xxx xxx
When the case was called for hearing on September 14, 1994, as
scheduled, both parties were represented. Atty. Rogelio Directo
stood up for the People's Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office). And
the parties, including the said representative of the People's Bureau,
agreed that petitioners herein are all qualified to avail of the
protection and benefits under RA 7279 and through counsel,
manifested their willingness and readiness to be relocated in
accordance with said law. It was likewise agreed by all concerned
that should petitioners be not relocated within the period of 45 days,
from September 15 to October 30, 1994, the People's Bureau shall
pay them an allowance of P145.00, equivalent to the minimum wage,
per day of delay of relocation, until their actual transfer to the
relocation site to be designated for them. It is understood, however,
that the daily allowance for petitioners shall be for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days, starting October 31, 1994. In other words,
should the delay of relocation of petitioners be for more than sixty
(60) days, they shall only be entitled to the daily allowance of
P145.00 per day of delay of relocation for not more than sixty (60)
days.
It was likewise agreed that on October 31, 1994, whether petitioners
shall have been relocated or not, the private respondent shall then
be entitled to the execution and implementation of this judgment, and
to cause the ejectment of petitioners from subject property litigated
upon. (Emphasis supplied).13
In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Decision 14and reiterated that the assailed
decision dated September 20, 1994 was a decision based on the merits and
not upon a compromise agreement.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners adamantly argue that the decision of respondent court dated
September 20, 1994 was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement,
sans their knowledge, consent and authority. Additionally, petitioners
interpose the following issues: 1) whether there can be eviction and
demolition without actual relocation; 2) can the petitioners be considered as
homeless and underprivileged?; and 3) whose duty is it to relocate them?
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged
as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of the
Code as "a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced". 15 Thus, a
judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise
agreement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal
concessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted. 16
In the present suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on
a compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the
merits. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the dispositive portion of the
decision is very explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for
the judgment. Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom that
respondent court's disposition took into account any agreement or
concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgment on a
compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedly
embodying the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothing
but admissions made by the parties intended to clarify the applicable
provisions of RA 7279. In fact the said admissions are expressly laid out in
Section 28(c) (8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of any
compromise agreement as the same are already provided in the law.
Further negating petitioners' contention are the following ratiocinations made
by respondent court in denying the Motion to Set Aside Decision, with which
we are in complete accord:
After a careful study, We find movant's stance barren of merit. Our
Decision promulgated on September 20, 1994 in this case was not
rendered as a Judgment by Compromise. It resolved the petition on
the merits, after the lawyers of the parties and the representative of
the Urban Poor Affairs Office agreed on the applicability of Rep. Act
No. 7279 to petitioner's situation. As a result of such development of
the case, Our judgment granted petitioners more than what they
have came here for. All they prayed for was to hold in abeyance
execution of subject final and executory Decision of the Quezon
Metropolitan Trial Court, ordering their ejectment; until after the
Page 98 of 174
 expiration of forty-five (45) days from date of notice of their ejectment
to the Urban Poor Affairs Office. But the judgment in question has
recognized not only petitioner's right not to be ejected sans the 45-
day notice to the Urban Poor Affairs Office, but also the right to a
daily allowance of P145.00 for each day of delay or relocation, for a
period of not more than sixty (60) days, should there be a delay in
their relocation, as mandated by law.17
Finally, in a desperate move to prolong the execution of the decision ordering
their eviction, petitioners invoke the principle of social justice and plead that
as underprivileged and homeless citizen, their eviction and demolition of their
homes cannot be effected unless there is adequate relocation. Moreover,
petitioners maintain that private respondent is also duty bound to share in the
task of relocating them.
The contentions are without merit. It is beyond dispute that the ejectment suit
against petitioners has already been resolved with finality way back on
February 16, 1994 when the petitioners' appeal was dismissed outright by
the Court of Appeals and they did not interpose any further appeal therefrom.
The subsequent proceedings merely sought to enforce the decision ordering
their ejectment from the disputed premises, which petitioners however,
repeatedly tried to thwart by invoking non-compliance with Section 28(c) of
RA 7279. Thus, upon compliance by private respondent with the
requirements of the aforesaid law, particularly on the notice to the People's
Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office) and the expiration of 45 days from said
notice, petitioners' right to remain in the subject lot ceased. Resultingly,
petitioners' eviction must now proceed in accordance with Section 28(c) (8),
to wit:
. . . Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition
pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit
concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of
other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of
notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not
be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount
equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty
(60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local
government unit concerned.
Anent petitioners' claim that private respondent must also share the
responsibility of relocating petitioners, the same is also without any basis.
The aforecited provision is very explicit that the task of relocating the
homeless and the underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local
government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
assistance of the other government agencies. Although private individuals
are not prohibited from taking part in the relocation, there is nothing in the
law either that compels them to undertake such task on a mandatory basis,
otherwise, such obligation should have been included in the provision, either
expressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to further burden private
respondent with their relocation is unwarranted.
Equally unpersuasive is petitioners' plea for social justice. In previous cases,
this Court has emphasized that "never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law." 18 In the same vein, it has been held that "the policy of
social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it
certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege." 19
Further militating against petitioners' appeal for compassion is the fact that
only recently, President Ramos himself, in the exercise of his veto power,
vetoed a congress-approved measure 20 intended to extend the moratorium
on the demolition of squatter colonies throughout the country. The
President's action was intended to curtail the negative influences to general
growth and development in urban areas brought about by the problem of
squatting and to prevent the legitimate landowners from being unduly
deprived of the immediate use of their properties.
In closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made in
the case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals 21 :
While we sympathize with the millions of our people who are unable
to afford the basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts of a
decent home, this sympathy cannot extend to squatting, which is a
criminal offense. Social justice cannot condone the violation of law
nor does it consider that very wrong to be a justification for priority in
the enjoyment of a right. This is what the petitioner wants us to grant
him. But we cannot heed his unjust plea because the rule of law
rings louder in our ears.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[14]
Page 99 of 174
 Republic of the Philippines Filipino experience of the martial law
Supreme Court regime; The Amparo Rule was
Manila intended to address the intractable
  problem of “extralegal killings” and
EN BANC “enforced disappearances”;
  “Extralegal killings” are “killings
  committed without due process of
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF judicial proceedings,” while enforced
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF disappearances” are “attended by
THE PHILIPPINES, the following char acteristics: an
Petitioners, arrest, detention or abduction of a
  person by a government official or
  organized groups or private
  individuals acting with the direct or
  indirect acquiescence of the
  government; the refusal of the State
  to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
- versus - the person concerned or a refusal to
  acknowledge the deprivation of
  liberty which places such persons
  outside the protection of law.”— On
  October 24, 2007, the Court
  promulgated the Amparo Rule “in
  light of the prevalence of extralegal
RAYMOND MANALO and killing and enforced disappearances.”
REYNALDO MANALO, It was an exercise for the first time of
Respondents. the Court’s expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - people’s constitutional rights, which
------------------------- made its maiden appearance in the
- -x 1987 Constitution in response to the
  Filipino experience of the martial law
DECISION regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable
Writ of Amparo; Supreme Court; problem of “extralegal killings” and
Words and Phrases; “Extralegal “enforced disappearances,” its
Killings” and “Enforced coverage, in its present form, is
Disappearances,” Defined; The confined to these two instances or to
promulgation of the Amparo Rule threats thereof. “Extralegal killings”
was an exercise for the first time of are “killings committed without due
the Supreme Court’s expanded power process of law, i.e., without legal
to promulgate rules to protect our safeguards or judicial proceedings.”
people’s constitutional rights, which On the other hand, “enforced
made its maiden appearance in the disappearances” are “attended by the
1987 Constitution in response to the following characteristics: an arrest,
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
detention or abduction of a person by
a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.”
Same; Words and Phrases; The writ
of Amparo originated in Mexico and
“Amparo” literally means
“protection” in Spanish.— The writ
of Amparo originated in Mexico.
“Amparo” literally means
“protection” in Spanish. In 1837, de
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America
became available in Mexico and
stirred great interest. Its description of
the practice of judicial review in the
U.S. appealed to many Mexican
jurists. One of them, Manuel
Crescencio Rejón, drafted a personal freedom, equivalent to the
constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan, which granted judges
the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and
legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz.: The federal
courts shall protect any inhabitant of
the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to
him by this Constitution and by laws
enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or
state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in
the specific case in litigation, making
no general declaration concerning the
statute or regulation that motivated
the violation.
Same; Purposes of the Writ of
Amparo; In Latin American
countries, except Cuba, the writ of
Amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human
rights abuses especially committed in
countries under military juntas.—The
writ of amparo then spread
throughout the Western Hemisphere,
gradually evolving into various
forms, in response to the particular
needs of each country. It became, in
the words of a justice of the Mexican
Federal Supreme Court, one piece of
Mexico’s self-attributed “task of
conveying to the world’s legal
heritage that institution which, as a
shield of human dignity, her own
painful history conceived.” What
began as a protection against acts or
omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later
evolved for several purposes: (1)
amparo libertad for the protection of
habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra
leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3)
amparo casacion for the judicial
review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4)
amparo administrativo for the judicial
review of administrative actions; and
(5) amparo agrario for the protection
of peasants’ rights derived from the
agrarian reform process. In Latin
American countries, except Cuba, the
writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries
under military juntas. In general,
these countries adopted an
allencompassing writ to protect the
whole gamut of constitutional rights,
Page 100 of 174
including socio-economic rights.
Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have
chosen to limit the protection of the
writ of amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.
Same; Grave Abuse Clause; Habeas
Corpus; While constitutional rights
can be protected under the Grave
Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition for habeas corpus under Rule
102, these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances—the
swiftness required to resolve a
petition for a writ of amparo through
summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs under the Amparo
Rule offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof;
The writ of amparo serves both
preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances
— preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and,
curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield
leads to subsequent investigation and
action.—While constitutional rights
can be protected under the Grave
Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition for habeas corpus under Rule
102, these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. However,
with the swiftness required to resolve
a petition for a writ of Amparo
through summary proceedings and
the availability of appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs under the
Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions
—borne out of the Latin American
and Philippine experience of human
rights abuses—offers a better remedy
to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof.
The remedy provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. The writ of Amparo
serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in
that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these
offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long
run, the goal of both the preventive
and curative roles is to deter the
further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Same; Evidence; With the secret
nature of an enforced disappearance
and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically
holds that much of the information
and evidence of the ordeal will come
from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend
on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements.
—In Ortiz v. Guatemala, Case
10.526, Report No. 31/96,
InterAm.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95
Doc. 7 rev. at 332 (1997), a case
decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding
that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz
was abducted and tortured by agents
of the Guatemalan government. In
this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped
and tortured in early November 1989.
The Commission’s findings of fact
were mostly based on the consistent
and credible statements, written and
oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding
her ordeal. These statements were
supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when
she was being driven out of the
military installation where she was
detained. She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings
showed that the 111 circular second
degree burns on her back and
abrasions on her cheek coincided
with her account of cigarette burning
and torture she suffered while in
detention. With the secret nature of
an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds
that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend
on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements.
Their statements can be corroborated
by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can
identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation
of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.
Same; Right to Security; Searches
and Seizures; The right to security or
the right to security of person finds a
textual hook in Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, and at the
core of this guarantee is the immunity
of one’s person, including the
extensions of his/her person—houses,
papers, and effects—against
government intrusion.—Let us put
this right to security under the lens to
determine if it has indeed been
violated as respondents assert. The
right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual
hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution which provides,
viz.: Sec. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the
judge. . . At the core of this guarantee
is the immunity of one’s person,
including the extensions of his/her
person—houses, papers, and effects
—against government intrusion.
Section 2 not only limits the state’s
power over a person’s home and
possessions, but more importantly,
protects the privacy and sanctity of
Page 101 of 174
the person himself. The purpose of
this provision was enunciated by the
Court in People v. CFI of Rizal,
Branch IX, Quezon City, 101 SCRA
86 (1980), viz.: The purpose of the
constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private
security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of
the home by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction
and to give remedy against such
usurpation when attempted. (Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right
to privacy is an essential condition to
the dignity and happiness and to the
peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or
of persons and correspondence.
(Tañada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental
right against unreasonable searches
and seizures must be deemed absolute
as nothing is closer to a man’s soul
than the serenity of his privacy and
the assurance of his personal security.
Any interference allowable can only
be for the best causes and reasons.
Same; Due Process Clause; While
the right to life under Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution
gurantees essentially the right to be
alive, the right to security of person
is a guarantee of the secure quality of
this life; In a broad sense, the right to
security of person “emanates in a
person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation,
including the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
existing, and it is invaded not only by
a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual.”— While
the right to life under Article III,
Section 1 guarantees essentially the
right to be alive—upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned—the right to security
of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz.: “The life to
which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler. Rather,
it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and
property. . . pervades the whole
history of man. It touches every
aspect of man’s existence.” In a broad
sense, the right to security of person
“emanates in a person’s legal and
uninterrupted en joyment of his life,
his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of
life while existing, and it is invaded
not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life
according to the nature, temperament,
and lawful desires of the individual.”
Same; Right to Security;
Permutations of the Right to Security;
A closer look at the right to security
of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this
right: First, the right to security of
person is “freedom from fear,”
Second, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security,
and, Third, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of protection of
one’s rights by the government.—A
closer look at the right to security of
person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this
right. First, the right to security of
person is “freedom from fear.” In its
“whereas” clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that “a world in
which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration
of the common people.” (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate
that “freedom from fear” is not only
an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international
human right. It is the “right to
security of person” as the word
“security” itself means “freedom
from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz.: Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person.
(emphasis supplied) Second, the right
to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the
1987 Constitution guarantees that, as
a general rule, one’s body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in
the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute
more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities,
and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases,
the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical
injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to
the bodily integrity or security of a
person. Third, the right to security of
person is a guarantee of protection of
one’s rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this
right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article
III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right
to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that
the State “guarantees full respect for
human rights” under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government
does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In
the Amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the “right to
security” is actually the “freedom
from threat”—“freedom from fear”
is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong.—In the context of
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,
“freedom from fear” is the right and
any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong.
Page 102 of 174
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.
Fear caused by the same stimulus can
range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently.
The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation
of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the Amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the “right to
security” is actually the “freedom
from threat.” Viewed in this light, the
“threatened with violation” Clause in
the latter part of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.
Same; Same; There need not
necessarily be a depravation of
liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked.—This third
sense of the right to security of
person as a guarantee of government
protection has been interpreted by the
United Nations’ Human Rights
Committee in not a few cases
involving Article 9 of the ICCPR.
While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right
to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to
security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty.
In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty
for the right to security of person to
be invoked.
Same; Production Orders; Searches
and Seizures; The production order
under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for
law enforcement under Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution—
this Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the
unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the
people such as respondents; The
amparo production order may be
likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.—In the case at bar,
however, petitioners point out that
other than the bare, selfserving and
vague allegations made by respondent
Raymond Manalo in his unverified
declaration and affidavit, the
documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned
generally by name, with no other
supporting details. They also argue
that the relevancy of the documents to
be produced must be apparent, but
this is not true in the present case as
the involvement of petitioners in the
abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners’ arguments do not hold
water. The production order under the
Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the
unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the
people such as respondents. Instead,
the Amparo production order may be
likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Same; The writ of amparo is a tool
that gives voice to preys of silent
guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.—In blatant violation of our
hard-won guarantees to life, liberty
and security, these rights are snuffed
out from victims of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. The
writ of amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
 
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced
disappearances are separated
from the rest of the world behind
secret walls, they are not
separated from the constitutional
protection of their basic
rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in
its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty
and security in the first petition for
a writ of amparo filed before this
Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to
Section 19[1] of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, seeking to
reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the
Decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
AMPARO No. 00001, entitled
Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo
Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition
for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)[2] filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein
petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to
stop herein petitioners (therein
respondents) and/or their officers
and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners
also sought ancillary remedies,
Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable
reliefs under Article VIII, Section
5(5)[3] of the 1987 Constitution and
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered
the Secretary of the Department
of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting
in their stead, including but not
limited to the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) to submit their
Comment; and (2) enjoined them
from causing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or
depriving them of their right to life,
liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III,
Section 1[4] of the 1987
Constitution.[5]
While the August 23,
2007 Petition was pending, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation
and Omnibus Motion to Treat
Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit
Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant
Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 103 of 174

prayed that: (1) the petition be summary hearing those already five days from
considered a Petition for the Writ on the petition on file herein; notice of this
of Amparo under Sec. 26[6]of on November 8, decision.
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court 2007 at 2:00 2.      To confirm
issue the writ commanding therein p.m. and decide in writing the The compliance
respondents to make a verified the petition in present with this decision
return within the period provided accordance with places of shall be made
by law and containing the specific the Rule on the official under the
matter required by law; (3) they be Writ of Amparo.[9] assignment of signature and
granted the interim reliefs allowed On December 26, 2007, M/Sgt oath of
by the Amparo Rule and all other the Court of Appeals rendered a Hilario aka Ro respondent AFP
reliefs prayed for in the petition decision in favor of therein llie Castillo Chief of Staff or
but not covered by petitioners (herein respondents), and Donald his duly
the Amparo  Rule; (4) the Court, the dispositive portion of which Caigas within authorized deputy,
after hearing, render judgment as reads, viz: five days from the latters
required in Sec. 18[7] of notice of this authority to be
ACCORDINGLY,
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other decision. express and made
the PRIVILEGE OF
just and equitable reliefs.[8] apparent on the
THE WRIT OF
3.      To cause to face of the sworn
AMPARO is GRAN
On October 25, 2007, the Court be produced compliance with
TED.
resolved to treat the August 23, to this Court this directive.
2007 Petition as a petition under all medical
The
the Amparo Rule and further reports, SO ORDERED.[10]
respondents SECR
resolved, viz: records and Hence, this appeal. In
ETARY OF
charts, reports resolving this appeal, we first
WHEREFORE, NATIONAL
of any unfurl the facts as alleged by
let a WRIT OF DEFENSE and AF
treatment herein respondents:
AMPARO be P CHIEF OF
given or
issued to STAFF are hereby
recommended Respondent Raymond Manalo
respondents REQUIRED:
and recounted that about one or two
requiring them to
medicines weeks before February 14, 2006,
file with the CA 1.      To furnish to
prescribed, if several uniformed and armed
(Court of the petitioners
any, to the soldiers and members of the
Appeals) a and to this
petitioners, to CAFGU summoned to a meeting
verified written Court within
include a list all the residents of
return within five five days from
of medical their barangay in San Idelfonso,
(5) working days notice of this
and (sic) Bulacan. Respondents were not
from service of decision all
personnel able to attend as they were not
the writ. We official and
(military and informed of the gathering, but
REMAND the unofficial
civilian) who Raymond saw some of the
petition to the CA reports of the
attended to soldiers when he passed by
and designate the investigation
them from the barangay hall.[11]
Division of undertaken in
February 14,
Associate Justice connection
2006 until On February 14, 2006, Raymond
Lucas P. with their
August 12, was sleeping in their house in
Bersamin to case, except
2007 within Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
conduct the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 104 of 174

Bulacan. At past noon, several
armed soldiers wearing white
shirts, fatigue pants and army
boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he
was Bestre, but his mother, Ester
Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed
soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the
stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of
his house, and forced to the
ground face down. He was kicked
on the hip, ordered to stand and
face up to the light, then forcibly
brought near the road. He told his
mother to follow him, but three
soldiers stopped her and told her
to stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take
him, Raymond recognized
brothers Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la
Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all
acted as lookout. They were all
members of the CAFGU and
residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also
recognized brothers Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza,
also members of the
CAFGU. While he was being
forcibly taken, he also saw outside
of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo
Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa,
with some soldiers and armed
men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a
white L300 van. Once inside, he
was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of
the soldiers who took him. Later,
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario
alias Rollie Castillo, whom he
estimated was about 40 years of
age or older. The leader of the
team who entered his house and
abducted him was Ganata. He
was tall, thin, curly-haired and a
bit old. Another one of his
abductors was George who was
tall, thin, white-skinned and about
30 years old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a
stop. A person was brought inside
the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were
beaten up.On the road, he
recognized the voice of the person
beside him as his brother
Reynaldos. The van stopped
several times until they finally
arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a
different room. With the doors of
their rooms left open, Raymond
saw several soldiers continuously
hitting his brother Reynaldo on the
head and other parts of his body
with the butt of their guns for
about 15 minutes. After which,
Reynaldo was brought to his
(Raymonds) room and it was his
(Raymonds) turn to be beaten up
in the other room. The soldiers
asked him if he was a member of
the New Peoples Army. Each time
he said he was not, he was hit
with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades
were, how many soldiers he had
killed, and how many NPA
members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit
him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds
interrogators appeared to be high
officials as the soldiers who beat
him up would salute them, call
them sir, and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds
when interrogated by the high
officials, but he saw their faces
when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on. He noticed
that the uniform of the high
officials was different from those
of the other soldiers. One of those
officials was tall and thin, wore
white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat
boots. He spoke in Tagalog and
knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case
filed in connection with the
respondents abduction.[16] While
these officials interrogated him,
Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had
left, the soldier guards beat him
up. When the guards got drunk,
they also manhandled
respondents. During this time,
Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten
food.[17]
On the third week of respondents
detention, two men arrived while
Raymond was sleeping and beat
him up. They doused him with
urine and hot water, hit his
stomach with a piece of wood,
slapped his forehead twice with a .
45 pistol, punched him on the
mouth, and burnt some parts of
his body with a burning
wood. When he could no longer
endure the torture and could
hardly breathe, they
stopped. They then subjected
Reynaldo to the same ordeal in
another room. Before their
torturers left, they warned
Raymond that they would come
back the next day and kill him.[18]
The following night, Raymond
attempted to escape. He waited
for the guards to get drunk, then
made noise with the chains put on
him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came
to check on him, he managed to
free his hand from the chains and
jumped through the window. He
passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a
fishpond where he used stones to
break his chains. After walking
through a forested area, he came
near a river and an Iglesia ni
Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the
laundry, asked where he was and
the road to Gapan. He was told
that he was in Fort Magsaysay.
[19]
 He reached the highway, but
some soldiers spotted him, forcing
him to run away. The soldiers
chased him and caught up with
him. They brought him to another
place near the entrance of what
he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He
was boxed repeatedly, kicked,
and hit with chains until his back
bled. They poured gasoline on
him. Then a so-called Mam or
Madam suddenly called, saying
that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers
ceased the torture and he was
returned
inside Fort Magsaysay where
Reynaldo was detained.[20]
Page 105 of 174
For some weeks, the respondents respondents and gave them respondents. He began by asking kayo. Sabihin sa
had a respite from all the medicines, including orasol, if respondents felt well already, to magulang at
torture. Their wounds were amoxicillin and mefenamic which Raymond replied in the lahat sa bahay
treated. When the wounds were acid. They brought with them the affirmative. He asked Raymond if na huwag
almost healed, the torture results of respondents urine test he knew him. Raymond lied that paloko
resumed, particularly when and advised them to drink plenty he did not. He then asked doon. Tulungan
respondents guards got drunk.[21] of water and take their Raymond if he would be scared if kami na
medicine. The two ladies returned he were made to face Gen. kausapin si
Raymond recalled that sometime a few more times. Thereafter, Palparan. Raymond responded Bestre na
in April until May 2006, he was medicines were sent through the that he would not be because he sumuko na sa
detained in a room enclosed by master of the DTU, Master Del did not believe that Gen. Palparan gobyerno.[28]
steel bars. He stayed all the time Rosario alias Carinyoso at was an evil man.[27] Respondents agreed to
in that small room measuring 1 x 2 Puti. Respondents were kept in do as Gen. Palparan told them as
meters, and did everything there, the DTU for about two Raymond narrated his they felt they could not do
including urinating, removing his weeks. While there, he met a conversation with Gen. Palparan otherwise. At about 3:00 in the
bowels, bathing, eating and soldier named Efren who said that in his affidavit, viz: morning, Hilario, Efren and the
sleeping. He counted that Gen. Palparan ordered him to formers men - the same group
Tinanong ako ni
eighteen people[22] had been monitor and take care of them.[25] that abducted them - brought
Gen. Palparan,
detained in that bartolina, them to their parents
Ngayon na
including his brother Reynaldo One day, Rizal Hilario fetched house. Raymond was shown to
kaharap mo na
and himself.[23] respondents in a Revo his parents while Reynaldo stayed
ako, di ka ba
vehicle. They, along with Efren in the Revo because he still could
natatakot sa
For about three and a half and several other armed men not walk. In the presence of
akin?
months, the respondents were wearing fatigue suits, went to a Hilario and other soldiers,
detained in Fort Magsaysay. They detachment in Pinaud, San Raymond relayed to his parents
Sumagot akong, what Gen. Palparan told him. As
were kept in a small house with Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents
Siyempre po, they were afraid, Raymonds
two rooms and a kitchen. One were detained for one or two
natatakot din parents acceded. Hilario
room was made into weeks in a big two-storey
the bartolina. The house was near house. Hilario and Efren stayed threatened Raymonds parents
with them. While there, Raymond Sabi ni Gen. that if they continued to join
the firing range, helipad and
was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26] Palparan: Sige, human rights rallies, they would
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
bibigyan ko kayo never see their children
marched by their house. They
ng isang again. The respondents were then
were also sometimes detained in From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren
pagkakataon na brought back to Sapang.[29]
what he only knew as the DTU.[24] brought respondents to Sapang,
mabuhay, bastat
San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
sundin nyo ang When respondents
At the DTU, a male doctor came Revo. They were detained in a big
lahat ng arrived back in Sapang, Gen.
to examine respondents. He unfinished house inside the
sasabihin ko Palparan was about to leave. He
checked their body and eyes, took compound of Kapitan for about
sabihin mo sa was talking with the four masters
their urine samples and marked three months. When they arrived
magulang mo who were there: Arman, Ganata,
them. When asked how they were in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked
huwag pumunta Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When
feeling, they replied that they had to them. They were brought out of
sa mga rali, sa Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
a hard time urinating, their the house to a basketball court in
hearing, sa called for him. He was in a big
stomachs were aching, and they the center of the compound and
Karapatan at sa white vehicle. Raymond stood
felt other pains in their body. The made to sit. Gen. Palparan was
Human Right outside the vehicle as Gen.
next day, two ladies in white already waiting, seated. He was
dahil niloloko Palparan told him to gain back his
arrived. They also examined about two arms length away from
lang

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 106 of 174

strength and be healthy and to
take the medicine he left for him
and Reynaldo. He said the
medicine was expensive at
Php35.00 each, and would make
them strong. He also said that
they should prove that they are on
the side of the military and warned
that they would not be given
another chance.[31] During his
testimony, Raymond identified
Gen. Palparan by his picture.[32]
One of the soldiers named Arman
made Raymond take the medicine
left by Gen. Palparan. The
medicine, named Alive, was green
and yellow. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each given a box
of this medicine and instructed to
take one capsule a day. Arman
checked if they were getting their
dose of the medicine. The Alive
made them sleep each time they
took it, and they felt heavy upon
waking up.[33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived
again. He took Reynaldo and left
Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce
himself as Oscar, a military
trainee from Sariaya, Quezon,
assigned in Bulacan. While there,
he saw again Ganata, one of the
men who abducted him from his
house, and got acquainted with
other military men and civilians.[34]
After about three months in
Sapang, Raymond was brought
to Camp Tecson under the
24th Infantry Battalion. He was
fetched by three unidentified men
in a big white vehicle. Efren went
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
with them. Raymond was then
blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride,
his blindfold was removed. Chains
were put on him and he was kept
in the barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains
were removed and he was
ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned
that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many
soldiers, hundreds of them were
training. He was also ordered to
clean inside the barracks. In one
of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from
Laguna. She told him that she
was a student of the University of
the Philippines and was abducted
in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been
subjected to severe torture and
raped. She was crying and
longing to go home and be with
her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she
was made to do the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also
brought to Camp Tecson. Two
days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeo and
Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen
and Manuel were put in the room
with Allan whose name they later
came to know as Donald Caigas,
called master or commander by
his men in the 24th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo
were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo
were threatened, and Reynaldo
was beaten up. In the daytime,
their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They
were threatened that if they camp. They were all made to
escaped, their families would all clean, cook, and help in raising
be killed.[37] livestock.[39]
On or about October 6, 2006, Raymond recalled that when
Hilario arrived Operation Lubog was launched,
in Camp Tecson. He told the Caigas and some other soldiers
detainees that they should be brought him and Manuel with
thankful they were still alive and them to take and kill all
should continue along their sympathizers of the NPA. They
renewed life. Before the hearing of were brought to Barangay Bayan-
November 6 or 8, 2006, bayanan, Bataan where he
respondents were brought to their witnessed the killing of an old man
parents to instruct them not to doing kaingin. The soldiers said
attend the hearing. However, their he was killed because he had a
parents had already left son who was a member of the
for Manila. Respondents were NPA and he coddled NPA
brought back members in his house.[40]Another
to Camp Tecson. They stayed in time, in another Operation Lubog,
that camp from September 2006 Raymond was brought to
to November 2006, and Raymond Barangay Orion in a house where
was instructed to continue using NPA men stayed. When they
the name Oscar and holding arrived, only the old man of the
himself out as a military house who was sick was
trainee. He got acquainted with there. They spared him and killed
soldiers of the 24th Infantry only his son right before
Battalion whose names and Raymonds eyes.[41]
descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.[38] From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo,
Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were
On November 22, 2006, transferred to Zambales, in a
respondents, along with Sherlyn, safehouse near the sea. Caigas
Karen, and Manuel, were and some of his men stayed with
transferred to a camp of the them. A retired army soldier was
24th Infantry Battalion in in charge of the house. Like in
Limay, Bataan. There were many Limay, the five detainees were
huts in the camp. They stayed in made to do errands and
that camp until May 8, chores. They stayed in Zambales
2007. Some soldiers of the from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June
battalion stayed with them. While 2007.[42]
there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as Mar and Billy In June 2007, Caigas brought the
beat him up and hit him in the five back to the camp in
stomach with their guns. Sherlyn Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and
and Karen also suffered Manuel were tasked to bring food
enormous torture in the to detainees brought to the
Page 107 of 174
camp. Raymond narrated what he Makalipas ang isa sa Bataan. Iyong sundalo kung
witnessed and experienced in the o dalawang lingo, gabi, inilabas sila papatayin kami o
camp, viz: may dinukot sila na at hindi ko na sila hindi.
dalawang Ita. Itinali nakita.
Isang gabi,
sila sa labas ng Tinanggal ang
sinabihan kami ni
kubo, piniringan, xxx xxx xxx aming
Donald (Caigas) na
ikinadena at labis kadena. Kinausap
matulog na
na Ikinadena kami kami ni
kami. Nakita ko si
binugbog. Nakita ng 3 araw. Sa Donald. Tinanong
Donald na inaayos
kong nakatakas ikatlong araw, kami kung ano
ang kanyang baril,
ang isa sa kanila at nilabas ni Lat si ang sabi ni
at nilagyan ng
binaril siya ng Manuel dahil Manuel sa
silenser. Sabi ni
sundalo ngunit kakausapin daw amin. Sabi ni
Donald na kung
hindi siya siya ni Gen. Donald huwag na
mayroon man
tinamaan. Iyong Palparan. Nakapir raw naming
kaming makita o
gabi nakita kong ing si Manuel, hanapin ang
marinig, walang
pinatay nila iyong wala siyang suot dalawang babae
nangyari. Kinauma
isang Ita malapit sa pang-itaas, at si Manuel, dahil
gahan, nakita
Post 3; sinilaban pinosasan. Nilaka magkakasama na
naming ang
ang bangkay at san ng mga yung tatlo. Sabi
bangkay ng isa sa
ibinaon ito. sundalo ang pa ni Donald na
mga bihag na
tunog na galing kami ni Reynaldo
dinala sa
Pagkalipas ng sa istiryo ng ay magbagong
kampo. Mayroong
halos 1 buwan, 2 sasakyan. Di buhay at ituloy
binuhos sa
pang bangkay ang nagtagal, narinig namin ni
kanyang katawan
dinala sa ko ang hiyaw o Reynaldo ang
at itoy
kampo. Ibinaba ungol ni trabaho. Sa gabi,
sinunog. Masansa
ang mga bangkay Manuel. Sumilip hindi na kami
ng ang amoy.
mula sa pick up ako sa isang kinakadena.[43]
trak, dinala ang haligi ng kamalig On or about June 13,
Makaraan ang
mga bangkay sa at nakita kong 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo
isang lingo,
labas ng sinisilaban si were brought to Pangasinan,
dalawang bangkay
bakod. Kinaumaga Manuel. ostensibly to raise poultry for
and ibinaba ng
han nakita kong Donald (Caigas).Caigas told
mga unipormadong
mayroong Kinaumagahan, respondents to also farm his land,
sundalo mula sa 6
sinilaban, at naka-kadena pa in exchange for which, he would
x 6 na trak at
napakamasangsan kami. Tinanggal take care of the food of their
dinala sa loob ng
g ang amoy. ang mga kadena family. They were also told that
kampo. May
mga 3 o 4 na they could farm a small plot
naiwang mga
May nakilala rin araw adjoining his land and sell their
bakas ng dugo
akong 1 retiradong pagkalipas. Sinab produce. They were no longer put
habang hinihila nila
koronel at 1 i sa amin na kaya in chains and were instructed to
ang mga
kasama kami nakakadena use the names Rommel (for
bangkay. Naamoy
niya. Pinakain ko ay dahil Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo)
ko iyon nang
sila. Sabi nila sa pinagdedesisyuna and represent themselves as
nililinis ang bakas.
akin na dinukot sila n pa ng mga cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 108 of 174

Respondents started to plan their related to matters they witnessed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tec Reynaldo Manalo
escape. They could see the together.Reynaldo added that son where Reynaldo saw the sign were not at any
highway from where they when they were taken from their board, Welcome to Camp Tecson. time arrested,
[46]
stayed. They helped farm house on February 14, 2006, he forcibly abducted,
adjoining lands for which they saw the faces of his abductors detained, held
were paid Php200.00 or before he was blindfolded with his Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., incommunicado,
Php400.00 and they saved their shirt. He also named the soldiers corroborated the accounts of disappeared or
earnings. When they had saved he got acquainted with in the 18 respondents Raymond and under the custody
Php1,000.00 each, Raymond months he was detained. When Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino by the
asked a neighbor how he could Raymond attempted to escape specialized in forensic medicine military. This is a
get a cellular phone as he wanted from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo and was connected with the settled issue laid
to exchange text messages with a was severely beaten up and told Medical Action Group, an to rest in
girl who lived nearby. A phone that they were indeed members of organization handling cases of the habeas
was pawned to him, but he kept it the NPA because Raymond human rights violations, corpus case filed
first and did not use it. They escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, particularly cases where torture in their behalf by
earned some more until they had Reynaldo was hit on the back and was involved. He was requested petitioners
saved Php1,400.00 between punched in the face until he could by an NGO to conduct medical parents before
them. no longer bear the pain. examinations on the respondents the Court of
after their escape. He first asked Appeals in C.A.-
There were four houses in the At one point during their detention, them about their ordeal, then G.R. SP No.
compound. Raymond and when Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded with the physical 94431 against
Reynaldo were housed in one of were in Sapang, Reynaldo was examination. His findings showed M/Sgt. Rizal
them while their guards lived in separated from Raymond and that the scars borne by Hilario aka Rollie
the other three.Caigas entrusted brought to Pinaud by Rizal respondents were consistent with Castillo, as head
respondents to Nonong, the head Hilario. He was kept in the house their account of physical injuries of the 24th Infantry
of the guards. Respondents house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a inflicted upon them. The Battalion; Maj.
did not have electricity. They used mountainous area. He was examination was conducted Gen. Jovito
a lamp. There was no television, instructed to use the name Rodel on August 15, 2007, two days Palparan, as
but they had a radio. In the and to represent himself as a after respondents escape, and the Commander of
evening of August 13, 2007, military trainee from Meycauayan, results thereof were reduced into the 7th Infantry
Nonong and his cohorts had a Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario writing. Dr. Molino took Division in Luzon;
drinking session. At about 1:00 brought along Reynaldo in his photographs of the scars. He Lt. Gen.
a.m., Raymond turned up the trips. One time, he was brought to testified that he followed the Hermogenes
volume of the radio. When none of a market in San Jose, del Monte, Istanbul Protocol in conducting the Esperon, in his
the guards awoke and took notice, Bulacan and made to wait in the examination.[47] capacity as the
Raymond and Reynaldo vehicle while Hilario was Commanding
proceeded towards the highway, buying. He was also brought to Petitioners dispute respondents General of the
leaving behind their sleeping Tondo, Manila where Hilario account of their alleged abduction Philippine Army,
guards and barking dogs. They delivered boxes of Alive in and torture. In compliance with and members of
boarded a bus bound different houses. In these trips, the October 25, 2007 Resolution the Citizens
for Manila and were thus freed Hilario drove a black and red of the Court, they filed a Return of Armed Forces
from captivity.[45] vehicle.Reynaldo was blindfolded the Writ of Amparo admitting the Geographical Unit
while still in Bulacan, but allowed abduction but denying any (CAFGU),
Reynaldo also executed an to remove the blindfold once involvement therein, viz: namely: Michael
affidavit affirming the contents of outside the province. In one of dela Cruz, Puti
13. Petitioners dela Cruz,
Raymonds affidavit insofar as they their trips, they passed
Raymond and

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 109 of 174

 Madning dela M/Sgt. Rizal way of such
Cruz, Pula dela Hilario aka Rollie micromanage compliance
Cruz, Randy Castillo for lack of the AFP Likewise, in a
Mendoza and evidence operations. Th Memorandum
Rudy establishing his e principal Directive also
Mendoza. The involvement in responsibility dated October
respondents any capacity in of the 31, 2007, I
therein submitted the Secretary of have issued a
a return of the writ disappearance of National policy
On July 4, 2006, the Manalo Defense is directive
the Court of brothers, although focused in addressed to
Appeals dropped it held that the providing the Chief of
as party remaining strategic Staff, AFP
respondents Lt. respondents were policy that the AFP
Gen. illegally detaining direction to should adopt
Hermogenes C. the Manalo the the following
Esperon, Jr., then brothers and Department rules of action
Commanding ordered them to (bureaus and in the event
General of the release the latter. agencies) the Writ
[48]
Philippine Army, including the of Amparo is
and on Armed Forces issued by a
September 19, Attached to the Return of of competent
2006, Maj. (sic) the Writ was the affidavit of the Philippine court against
Jovito S. therein respondent (herein s; any members
Palparan, then petitioner) Secretary of National   of the AFP:
Commanding Defense, which attested that he 8.     In
General, assumed office only on August 8, connection (1)  to verify
7th Infantry 2007 and was thus unaware of with the Writ the
Division, the Manalo brothers alleged of Amparo iss identity of
Philippine Army, abduction. He also claimed that: ued by the the
stationed at Fort Honorable aggrieve
Magsaysay, 7.     The Supreme d party;
Palayan City, Secretary of Court in this
Nueva Ecija, National case, I have (2)  to recover
upon a finding Defense does directed the and
that no evidence not engage in Chief of Staff, preserve
was introduced to actual military AFP to evidence
establish their directional institute related to
personal operations, immediate the death
involvement in the neither does action in or
taking of the he undertake compliance disappea
Manalo command with Section rance of
brothers. In a directions of 9(d) of the
Decision dated the AFP units the Amparo R person
June 27, 2007, it in the field, ule and to identified
exonerated nor in any submit report in the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 110 of 174

 petition disappea circumstances of the alleged
which rance; the alleged disappearance of
may aid disappearance the persons in
in the (5)   to identify and the recent whose favor the
prosecuti and reappearance of Writ of Amparo
on of the apprehen the petitioners. has been sought
person or d the for as soon as the
persons person or 3.2. I have caused same has been
responsi persons the immediate furnished Higher
ble; involved investigation and headquarters.
in the submission of the
(3)   to identify death or result thereof to 3.4. A parallel
witnesse disappea Higher investigation has
s and rance; headquarters been directed to
obtain and and/or direct the the same units
statemen immediate relative to another
ts from (6)   to bring conduct of the Petition for the
them the investigation on Writ of Amparo
concerni suspecte the matter by the (G.R. No. 179994)
ng the d concerned unit/s, filed at the
death or offenders dispatching Radio instance of
disappea before a Message on relatives of a
rance; compete November 05, certain Cadapan
nt court. 2007, addressed and Empeo
(4)   to [49]
to the pending before
determin   Commanding the Supreme
e the Therein respondent AFP General, Court.
cause, Chief of Staff also submitted his Philippine Army
manner, own affidavit, attached to the (Info: 3.5. On the part of
location Return of the Writ, attesting that COMNOLCOM, the Armed Forces,
and time he received the above directive of CG, 71D PA and this respondent
of death therein respondent Secretary of CO 24 IB PA). A will exert earnest
or National Defense and that acting Copy of the Radio efforts to establish
disappea on this directive, he did the Message is the surrounding
rance as following: attached as circumstances of
well as ANNEX 3 of this the
3.1. As currently
any Affidavit. disappearances of
designated Chief
pattern the petitioners and
of Staff, Armed
or 3.3. We undertake to bring those
Forces of the
practice to provide result of responsible,
Philippines (AFP),
that may the investigations including any
I have caused to
have conducted or to be military personnel
be issued directive
brought conducted by the if shown to have
to the units of the
about the concerned unit participated or had
AFP for the
death or relative to the complicity in the
purpose of
circumstances of commission of the
establishing the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 111 of 174

 complained acts, Merino in the Empeo and determine: (1) the veracity of the
to the bar of 24th IB in Merino.[51] abduction of Raymond and
justice, when Limay, Bataan;   Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged
warranted by the It was explained in the Return of elements of the CAFGU
findings and the 12) After going to the Writ that for lack of sufficient auxiliaries; and (2) the
competent the 24th IB in time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen administrative liability of said
evidence that may Limay, Bataan, Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez
be gathered in the we made further Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, testified that this particular
process.[50] inquiries with the and other persons implicated by investigation was initiated not by a
Also attached to the Philippine therein petitioners could not be complaint as was the usual
Return of the Writ was the affidavit National Police, secured in time for the procedure, but because the
of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF Limay, Bataan re submission of the Return and Commanding General saw news
(GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. garding the would be subsequently submitted. about the abduction of the Manalo
[52]
179994, another amparo case in alleged brothers on the television, and he
this Court, involving Cadapan, detentions or was concerned about what was
Empeo and Merino, which averred deaths and were Herein petitioners presented a happening within his territorial
among others, viz: informed that lone witness in the summary jurisdiction.[58]
none was hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U.
10) Upon reading reported to their Jimenez, Provost Marshall, Jimenez summoned all six
the allegations in good office; 7th Infantry Division, Philippine implicated persons for the
the Petition Army, based purpose of having them execute
implicating the 13) I also directed in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, sworn statements and conducting
24th Infantry Company Nueva Ecija. The territorial an investigation on May 29, 2006.
[59]
Batallion Commander jurisdiction of this Division covers  The investigation started
detachment as 1st Lt. Romeo Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, at 8:00 in the morning and
detention area, I Publico to inquire Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a finished at 10:00 in the evening.
immediately went into the alleged portion of Pangasinan.[53] The [60]
 The investigating officer,
to the 24thIB beachhouse in 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad,
detachment in Iba, Zambales 7th Infantry Division.[54] took the individual sworn
Limay, Bataan also alleged to be statements of all six persons on
and found no a detention place On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. that day. There were no other
untoward where Sherlyn Jimenez was directed by the sworn statements taken, not even
incidents in the Cadapan, Karen Commanding General of the of the Manalo family, nor were
area nor any Empeo and 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. there other witnesses summoned
detainees by the Manuel Merino Jovito Palaran,[55]through his and investigated[61] as according
name of Sherlyn were detained. As Assistant Chief of Staff,[56] to to Jimenez, the directive to him
Cadapan, Karen per the inquiry, investigate the alleged abduction was only to investigate the six
Empeo and however, no such of the respondents by CAFGU persons.[62]
Manuel Merino beachhouse was auxiliaries under his unit, namely:
being held used as a CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Jimenez was beside Lingad when
captive; detention place Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA the latter took the statements.
[63]
found to have Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula;  The six persons were not
11) There was been used by CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA known to Jimenez as it was in fact
neither any armed men to Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; his first time to meet them.
[64]
reports of any detain Cadapan, and a civilian named Rudy  During the entire time that he
death of Manuel Mendoza. He was directed to was beside Lingad, a subordinate

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 112 of 174

of his in the Office of the Provost Bulacan on 14 some neighbor Ildefonso,
Marshall, Jimenez did not February 2006 by thereat. He claims Bulacan and a
propound a single question to the unidentified that on 15 CAA member
six persons.[65] armed men and February 2006, based at Biak na
thereafter were he was being Bato Detachment,
Jimenez testified that all six forcibly informed by Brgy. San Miguel,
statements were taken on May 29, disappeared. Afte Kagawad Pablo Bulacan. He
2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and r the said Umayan about claims that
Rudy Mendoza had to come back incident, relatives the abduction of Raymond and
the next day to sign their of the victims filed the brothers Reynaldo Manalo
statements as the printing of their a case for Raymond and being his
statements was interrupted by a Abduction in the Reynaldo neighbors are
power failure. Jimenez testified civil court against Manalo. As to the active
that the two signed on May 30, the herein allegation that he members/sympat
2006, but the jurats of their suspects: Michael was one of the hizers of the
statements indicated that they dela Cruz, suspects, he CPP/NPA and he
were signed on May 29, 2006. Madning dela claims that they also knows their
[66]
 When the Sworn Statements Cruz, Puti Dela only implicated elder Rolando
were turned over to Jimenez, he Cruz, Pula Dela him because he Manalo @ KA
personally wrote his investigation Cruz, Randy was a CAFGU BESTRE of being
report. He began writing it in the Mendoza and and that they an NPA Leader
afternoon of May 30, 2006 and Rudy Mendoza as claimed that operating in their
finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He alleged members those who province. That at
then gave his report to the Office of the Citizen abducted the the time of the
of the Chief of Personnel.[68] Armed Forces Manalo brothers alleged abduction
Geographical Unit are members of of the two (2)
As petitioners largely rely on (CAFGU). the Military and brothers and for
Jimenezs Investigation Report CAFGU. Subject accusing him to
dated June 1, 2006 for their a) Sworn vehemently be one of the
evidence, the report is herein statement of CAA denied any suspects, he
substantially quoted: Maximo F. dela participation or claims that on
Cruz, involvement on February 14,
III. BACKGROUND OF THE aka Pula dated 29 the abduction of 2006, he was one
CASE May 2006 in said victims. of those working
(Exhibit B) states at the concrete
4. This pertains to that he was at b) Sworn chapel being
the abduction of Sitio Mozon, statement of CAA constructed
RAYMOND Brgy. Bohol na Roman dela Cruz nearby his
MANALO and Mangga, San y Faustino Aka residence. He
REYNALDO Ildefonso, Puti dtd 29 May claims further that
MANALO who Bulacan doing the 2006 in (Exhibit he just came only
were forcibly concrete building C) states that he to know about the
taken from their of a church is a resident of incident on other
respective homes located nearby Sitio Muzon, day (15 Feb 06)
in Brgy. Buhol na his residence, Brgy. Buhol na when he was
Mangga, San together with Mangga, San being informed by
Ildefonso,

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 113 of 174

 Kagawad Pablo one of the E) states that he execution (killing)
Kunanan. That accused, he is a resident of done by their
subject CAA claims that on 14 Brgy. Marungko, brother @ KA
vehemently February 2006, Angat, Bestre Rolando
denied any he was at Brgy. Bulacan.He Manalo who is an
participation Magmarate, San claims that NPA leader. He
about the incident Miguel, Bulacan Raymond and claims further that
and claimed that in the house of Reynaldo Manalo it was their
they only his aunt and he are familiar to him brother @ KA
implicated him learned only being his BESTRE who
because he is a about the incident barriomate when killed his father
member of the when he arrived he was still and he was living
CAFGU. home in their unmarried and he witness to that
place. He claims knew them since incident. Subject
c) Sworn further that the childhood. Being civilian
Statement of CAA only reason why one of the vehemently
Randy Mendoza y they implicated accused, he denied any
Lingas dated 29 him was due to claims that on 14 involvement on
May 2006 in the fact that his February 2006, the abduction of
(Exhibit O) states mother has filed a he was at his the Manalo
that he is a criminal charge residence in Brgy. brothers.
resident of Brgy. against their Marungko, Angat,
Buhol na brother Rolando Bulacan. He e) Sworn
Mangga, San Manalo @ KA claims that he statement of Ex-
Ildefonso, BESTRE who is was being CAA Marcelo dala
Bulacan and a an NPA informed only Cruz dated 29
member of Commander who about the incident May 2006 in
CAFGU based killed his father lately and he was (Exhibit F) states
at Biak na Bato and for that not aware of any that he is a
Detachment. That reason they reason why the resident of Sitio
being a neighbor, implicated him in two (2) brothers Muzon, Brgy.
he was very much support of their were being Buhol na
aware about the brother. Subject abducted by Mangga, San
background of the CAA vehemently alleged members Ildefonso,
two (2) brothers denied any of the military and Bulacan, a farmer
Raymond and involvement on CAFGU. The only and a former CAA
Reynaldo as the abduction of reason he knows based at Biak na
active supporters said Manalo why they Bato, San Miguel,
of the CPP NPA brothers. implicated him Bulacan. He
in their Brgy. and was because claims that
he also knew their d) Sworn there are those Raymond and
elder brother Statement of people who are Reynaldo Manalo
KUMANDER Rudy Mendoza y angry with their are familiar to him
BESTRE TN: Lingasa family particularly being their barrio
Rolando dated May 29, victims of mate. He claims
Manalo. Being 2006 in (Exhibit summary further that they

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 114 of 174

 are active is a resident of which is the Mangga, San
supporters of Sitio Muzon, abduction of Ildefonso,
CPP/NPA and Brgy. Buhol na Raymond and Bulacan, is
that their brother Mangga, San Reynaldo Manalo unsubstantiated. 
Rolando Manalo Ildefonso, when one of the Their alleged
@ KA BESTRE is Bulacan, the Brgy. Kagawad in involvement
an NPA Chief of Brgy. the person of theretofore to that
leader. Being one Tanod and a Pablo Cunanan incident is
of the accused, CAFGU member informed him considered
he claims that based at Biak na about the doubtful, hence,
on 14 February Bato Detachment, matter. He claims no basis to indict
2006, he was in San Miguel, further that he is them as charged
his residence at Bulacan. He truly innocent of in this
Sitio Muzon, claims that he the allegation investigation.
Brgy. Buhol na knew very well against him as
Mangga, San the brothers being one of the Though there are
Ildefonso, Raymond and abductors and he previous grudges
Bulacan. That he Reynaldo Manalo considers between each
vehemently in their barangay everything families (sic) in
denied any for having been fabricated in order the past to quote:
participation of the Tanod Chief to destroy his the killing of the
the alleged for twenty (20) name that father of Randy
abduction of the years.He alleged remains loyal to and Rudy
two (2) brothers further that they his service to the Mendoza by @
and learned only are active government as a KA BESTRE TN:
about the incident supporters or CAA member. Rolando Manalo,
when rumors sympathizers of this will not suffice
reached him by the CPP/NPA and IV. DISCUSSION to establish a fact
his barrio whose elder that they were the
mates. He claims brother Rolando 5. Based on the ones who did the
that his Manalo @ KA foregoing abduction as a
implication is BESTRE is an statements of form of
merely fabricated NPA leader respondents in revenge. As it
because of his operating within this particular was also stated in
relationship to the area. Being case, the proof of the testimony of
Roman and one of the linking them to other accused
Maximo who are accused, he the alleged claiming that the
his brothers. claims that on 14 abduction and Manalos are
Feb 2006 he was disappearance of active
f) Sworn helping in the Raymond and sympathizers/sup
statement of construction of Reynaldo Manalo porters of the
Michael dela Cruz their concrete that transpired CPP/NPA, this
y Faustino chapel in their on 14 February would not also
dated 29 May place and he 2006 at Sitio mean, however,
2006 in (Exhibit learned only Muzon, Brgy. that in the first
G) states that he about the incident Buhol na place, they were

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 115 of 174

 in connivance concluded that TED, FILE WITH THE
with the they are innocent CONTRADICTED COURT; (B)
abductors. Being of the charge. , AND CONFIRM IN
their neighbors OBVIOUSLY WRITING THE
and as members VI.              RECO SCRIPTED, PRESENT
of CAFGUs, they MMENDA REHEARSED PLACES OF
ought to be TIONS AND SELF- OFFICIAL
vigilant in SERVING ASSIGNMENT
protecting their 7. That CAAs AFFIDAVIT/TEST OF M/SGT.
village from any Michael F. dela IMONY OF HILARIO aka
intervention by Cruz, Maximo F. HEREIN ROLLIE
the leftist group, Dela Cruz, RESPONDENT CASTILLO AND
hence inside their Roman dela Cruz, RAYMOND DONALD
village, they were Randy Mendoza, MANALO. CAIGAS; AND
fully aware of the and two (2)   (C) CAUSE TO
activities of civilians Maximo BE PRODUCED
II.
Raymond and F. Dela Cruz and TO THE COURT
Reynaldo Manalo Rudy L. Mendoza   OF APPEALS
in so far as their be exonerated THE COURT OF ALL MEDICAL
connection with from the case. APPEALS REPORTS,
the CPP/NPA is SERIOUSLY RECORDS AND
concerned. 8. Upon approval, AND CHARTS, AND
this case can be GRIEVOUSLY REPORTS OF
V.                 CON dropped and ERRED IN ANY
CLUSION closed.[69] REQUIRING TREATMENT
In this appeal under Rule RESPONDENTS GIVEN OR
6. Premises 45, petitioners question the (HEREIN RECOMMENDED
considered appellate courts assessment of PETITIONERS) AND MEDICINES
surrounding this the foregoing evidence and assail TO: (A) FURNISH PRESCRIBED, IF
case shows that the December 26, 2007 Decision TO THE ANY, TO THE
the alleged on the following grounds, viz: MANALO MANALO
charges of BROTHER(S) BROTHERS, TO
abduction I. AND TO THE INCLUDE A LIST
committed by the   COURT OF OF MEDICAL
above named THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL PERSONNEL
respondents has APPEALS OFFICIAL AND (MILITARY AND
not been SERIOUSLY UNOFFICIAL CIVILIAN) WHO
established in this AND REPORTS OF ATTENDED TO
investigation. Hen GRIEVOUSLY THE THEM FROM
ce, it lacks merit ERRED IN INVESTIGATION FEBRUARY 14,
to indict them for BELIEVING AND UNDERTAKEN 2006 UNTIL
any administrative GIVING FULL IN CONNECTION AUGUST 12,
punishment FAITH AND WITH THEIR 2007.[70]
and/or criminal CREDIT TO THE CASE, EXCEPT
 
liability. It is INCREDIBLE, THOSE
therefore UNCORROBORA ALREADY IN

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The case at bar is the first these two instances or to threats exercise and enforce the constitution by
decision on the application of the thereof. Extralegal killings are preservation of protecting individual rights in
Rule on the Writ killings committed without due those rights particular cases, but prevents
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us process of law, i.e., without legal granted to him by them from using this power to
hearken to its beginning. safeguards or judicial this Constitution make law for the entire nation.[82]
proceedings.[75] On the other and by laws
The adoption of the Amparo Rule hand, enforced disappearances enacted pursuant The writ of amparo then spread
surfaced as a recurring are attended by the following hereto, against throughout the Western
proposition in the characteristics: an arrest, attacks by the Hemisphere, gradually evolving
recommendations that resulted detention or abduction of a person Legislative and into various forms, in response to
from a two-day National by a government official or Executive powers the particular needs of each
Consultative Summit on organized groups or private of the federal or country.[83] It became, in the words
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced individuals acting with the direct or state of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Disappearances sponsored by the indirect acquiescence of the governments, Supreme Court, one piece
Court on July 16-17, government; the refusal of the limiting of Mexicos self-attributed task of
2007. The Summit was envisioned State to disclose the fate or themselves to conveying to the worlds legal
to provide a broad and fact-based whereabouts of the person granting heritage that institution which, as
perspective on the issue of concerned or a refusal to protection in the a shield of human dignity, her own
extrajudicial killings and enforced acknowledge the deprivation of specific case in painful history conceived.[84]What
disappearances,[71] hence liberty which places such persons litigation, making began as a protection against acts
representatives from all sides of outside the protection of law.[76] no general or omissions of public authorities
the political and social spectrum, declaration in violation of constitutional rights
as well as all the stakeholders in The writ of amparo originated concerning the later evolved for several purposes:
the justice system[72] participated in Mexico. Amparo literally means statute or (1) amparo libertad for the
in mapping out ways to resolve protection in Spanish.[77] In 1837, regulation that protection of personal freedom,
the crisis. de Tocquevilles Democracy in motivated the equivalent to the habeas
Americabecame available violation.[80] corpus writ; (2) amparo contra
On October 24, 2007, the Court in Mexico and stirred great Since then, the protection leyes for the judicial review of the
promulgated the Amparo Rule in interest. Its description of the has been an important part of constitutionality of statutes;
light of the prevalence of practice of judicial review in Mexican constitutionalism.[81] If, (3) amparo casacion for the
extralegal killing and enforced the U.S. appealed to many after hearing, the judge judicial review of the
disappearances.[73] It was an Mexican jurists.[78] One of determines that a constitutional constitutionality and legality of a
exercise for the first time of the them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, right of the petitioner is being judicial decision; (4) amparo
Courts expanded power to drafted a constitutional provision violated, he orders the official, or administrativo for the judicial
promulgate rules to protect our for his native state, Yucatan, the officials superiors, to cease review of administrative actions;
peoples constitutional rights, [79]
 which granted judges the the violation and to take the and (5) amparo agrario for the
which made its maiden power to protect all persons in the necessary measures to restore protection of peasants rights
appearance in the 1987 enjoyment of their constitutional the petitioner to the full enjoyment derived from the agrarian reform
Constitution in response to the and legal rights. This idea was of the right in process.[85]
Filipino experience of the martial incorporated into the national question. Amparo thus combines
law regime.[74] As the AmparoRule constitution in 1847, viz: the principles of judicial review In Latin American countries,
was intended to address the derived from the U.S. with the except Cuba, the writ
The federal
intractable problem of extralegal limitations on judicial power of amparo has been
courts shall
killings and enforced characteristic of the civil law constitutionally adopted to protect
protect any
disappearances, its coverage, in tradition which prevails against human rights abuses
inhabitant of the
its present form, is confined to in Mexico. It enables courts to especially committed in countries
Republic in the

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under military juntas. In general, injunction or prohibition under punishment of perpetrators as it The Court of
these countries adopted an all- Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and will inevitably yield leads to Appeals seriously
encompassing writ to protect the a petition for habeas corpus under subsequent investigation and and grievously
whole gamut of constitutional Rule 102,[90] these remedies may action. In the long run, the goal of erred in believing
rights, including socio-economic not be adequate to address the both the preventive and curative and giving full
rights.[86] Other countries pestering problem of extralegal roles is to deter the further faith and credit to
like Colombia, Chile, Germany an killings and enforced commission of extralegal killings the incredible
d Spain, however, have chosen to disappearances. However, with and enforced disappearances. uncorroborated,
limit the protection of the writ the swiftness required to resolve a contradicted, and
of amparo only to some petition for a writ In the case at bar, respondents obviously
constitutional guarantees or of amparo through summary initially filed an action for scripted,
fundamental rights.[87] proceedings and the availability of Prohibition, Injunction, and rehearsed and
appropriate interim and Temporary Restraining Order[92] to self-serving
In the Philippines, while the 1987 permanent reliefs under stop petitioners and/or their affidavit/testimony
Constitution does not explicitly the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ officers and agents from depriving of herein
provide for the writ of amparo, of the common law and civil law the respondents of their right to respondent
several of the traditions - borne out of the Latin liberty and other basic rights on Raymond
above amparo protections are American and Philippine August 23, 2007,[93] prior to the Manalo.[94]
guaranteed by our charter. The experience of human rights promulgation of  
second paragraph of Article VIII, abuses - offers a better remedy to the Amparo  Rule. They also In delving into the
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, extralegal killings and enforced sought ancillary remedies veracity of the evidence, we need
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides disappearances and threats including Protective Custody to mine and refine the ore of
for the judicial power to determine thereof. The remedy provides Orders, Appointment of petitioners cause of action, to
whether or not there has been a rapid judicial relief as it partakes Commissioner, Inspection and determine whether the evidence
grave abuse of discretion of a summary proceeding that Access Orders and other legal presented is metal-strong to
amounting to lack or excess of requires only substantial evidence and equitable remedies under satisfy the degree of proof
jurisdiction on the part of any to make the appropriate reliefs Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the required.
branch or instrumentality of the available to the petitioner; it is not 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Government. The Clause accords an action to determine criminal Section 6 of the Rules of Section 1 of the Rule on
a similar general protection to guilt requiring proof beyond Court. When the Amparo Rule the Writ of Amparo provides for
human rights extended by reasonable doubt, or liability for came into effect on October 24, the following causes of action, viz:
the amparo contra leyes, amparo damages requiring preponderance 2007, they moved to have their
casacion, and amparo of evidence, or administrative petition treated as Section
administrativo. Amparo libertad is responsibility requiring substantial an amparo petition as it would be 1. Petition. The
comparable to the remedy evidence that will require full and more effective and suitable to the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus found in several exhaustive proceedings.[91] circumstances of the Manalo of amparo is a
provisions of the 1987 brothers enforced remedy available
Constitution.[88] The Clause is an The writ of amparo serves both disappearance. The Court granted to any person
offspring of the U.S. common law preventive and curative roles in their motion. whose right to
tradition of judicial review, which addressing the problem of life, liberty and
finds its roots in the 1803 case extralegal killings and enforced With this backdrop, we now come security is
of Marbury v. Madison.[89] disappearances. It is preventive in to the arguments of the violated or
that it breaks the expectation of petitioner. Petitioners first threatened with
While constitutional rights can be impunity in the commission of argument in disputing the violation by an
protected under the Grave Abuse these offenses; it is curative in Decision of the Court of Appeals unlawful act or
Clause through remedies of that it facilitates the subsequent states, viz: omission of a

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 118 of 174

 public official or rwise, the tanggalin ang mga kadena. Mendoza, also
[99]
employee, or of a privilege shall  Tinanong ko sa isang kapit- CAFGU members,
private individual be denied. bahay kung paano ako served as lookouts
or entity. (emphases makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi during the
  supplied) ko gusto kong i-text ang isang abduction. Raymo
The writ shall   babae na nakatira sa malapit na nd was sure that
cover extralegal Substantial evidence has been lugar.[100] three of the six
killings defined as such relevant evidence military men were
and enforced as a reasonable mind might We affirm the factual findings of Ganata, who
disappearances accept as adequate to support a the appellate court, largely based headed the
or threats conclusion.[95] on respondent Raymond Manalos abducting team,
thereof. affidavit and testimony, viz: Hilario, who drove
(emphasis After careful perusal of the the van, and
the abduction was
supplied) evidence presented, we affirm the George. Subseque
perpetrated by
  findings of the Court of Appeals nt incidents of their
armed men who
that respondents were abducted long captivity, as
were sufficiently
Sections 17 and 18, on the other from their houses in Sito Muzon, narrated by the
identified by the
hand, provide for the degree of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San petitioners,
petitioners (herein
proof required, viz: Ildefonso, Bulacan on February validated their
respondents) to be
14, 2006 and were continuously assertion of the
Sec. 17. Burden military personnel
detained until they escaped participation of the
of Proof and and CAFGU
on August 13, 2007. The elements of the
Standard of auxiliaries. Raymo
abduction, detention, torture, and 7th Infantry
Diligence nd recalled that the
escape of the respondents were Division, Philippine
Required. The six armed men
narrated by respondent Raymond Army, and their
parties shall who barged into
Manalo in a clear and convincing CAFGU auxiliaries.
establish their his house through
manner. His account is dotted
claims the rear door were
with countless candid details of We are convinced,
by substantial military men based
respondents harrowing too, that the reason
evidence. on their attire of
experience and tenacious will to for the abduction
fatigue pants and
  escape, captured through his was the suspicion
army boots, and
xxx xxx xxx different senses and etched in his that the petitioners
the CAFGU
Sec. memory. A few examples are the were either
auxiliaries, namely:
18. Judgment. If following: Sumilip ako sa isang members or
Michael de la Cruz,
the allegations in haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sympathizers of
Madning de la
the petition are sinisilaban si Manuel. the NPA,
[96] Cruz, Puti de la
proven by  (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo considering that
Cruz and Pula de
substantial ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng the abductors were
la Cruz, all
evidence, the sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko looking for Ka
members of the
court ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Bestre, who turned
[97] CAFGU and
shall grant the  May naiwang mga bakas ng out to be Rolando,
residents of
privilege of the dugo habang hinihila nila ang the brother of
Muzon, San
writ and such mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon petitioners.
Ildefonso, Bulacan,
reliefs as may be nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil
and the brothers
proper and ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan The efforts exerted
Randy Mendoza
appropriate; othe ginamit ko ang bato para by the Military
and Rudy

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 Command to look (Gen. Palparan) convincing board a Revo and
into the abduction met them in person evidence to conveyed them to
were, at best, in a safehouse in establish that a detachment in
merely Bulacan and told M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario Pinaud, San
superficial. The them what he had anything to do Ildefonso, Bulacan
investigation of the wanted them and with the abduction where they were
Provost Marshall of their parents to do or the detained for at
the 7th Infantry or not to be detention. Hilarios least a week in a
Division focused doing. Gen. involvement could house of strong
on the one-sided Palparans direct not, indeed, be materials (Exhibit
version of the and personal role then established D, rollo, p. 205)
CAFGU auxiliaries in the abduction after Evangeline and then Hilario
involved. This one- might not have Francisco, who (along with Efren)
sidedness might be been shown but his allegedly saw brought them to
due to the fact that knowledge of the Hilario drive the Sapang, San
the Provost dire situation of the van in which the Miguel, Bulacan on
Marshall could petitioners during petitioners were board the Revo, to
delve only into the their long captivity boarded and an unfinished
participation of at the hands of ferried following house inside the
military personnel, military personnel the abduction, did compound
but even then the under his not testify. (See the of Kapitan where
Provost Marshall command bespoke decision of the they were kept for
should have of his indubitable habeas more or less three
refrained from command policy proceedings months. (Exhibit
outrightly that unavoidably at rollo, p. 52) D, rollo, p. 205) It
exculpating the encouraged and was there where
CAFGU auxiliaries not merely However, in this the petitioners
he perfunctorily tolerated the case, Raymond came face to face
investigated abduction of attested that Hilario with Gen.
civilians without drove the white L- Palparan. Hilario
Gen. Palparans due process of law 300 van in which and Efren also
participation in the and without the petitioners brought the
abduction was also probable cause. were brought away petitioners one
established. At the from their houses early morning to
very least, he was In on February 14, the house of the
aware of the the habeas  procee 2006. Raymond petitioners parents,
petitioners captivity dings, the Court, also attested that where only
at the hands of through the Former Hilario participated Raymond was
men in uniform Special Sixth in subsequent presented to the
assigned to his Division (Justices incidents during parents to relay the
command. In fact, Buzon, chairman; the captivity of the message from
he or any other Santiago-Lagman, petitioners, one of Gen. Palparan not
officer tendered no Sr., member; and which was when to join anymore
controversion to Romilla-Lontok, Jr., Hilario fetched rallies. On that
the firm claim of member/ponente.) them from Fort occasion, Hilario
Raymond that he found no clear and Magsaysay on warned the parents

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 120 of 174

 that they would not Caigas, among In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case were detained. Where powerful
again see their others, was decided by the Inter-American military officers are implicated, the
sons should they similarly Commission on Human Rights, hesitation of witnesses to surface
join any rallies to established. the Commission considered and testify against them comes as
denounce human similar evidence, among others, no surprise.
rights violations. xxx xxx xxx in finding that complainant Sister
(Exhibit D, rollo, Diana Ortiz was abducted and We now come to the right
pp. 205- As to the CAFGU tortured by agents of the of the respondents to the privilege
206) Hilario was auxiliaries, Guatemalan government.In this of the writ of amparo. There is no
also among four the habeas Court case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped quarrel that the enforced
Master Sergeants found them and tortured in early November disappearance of both
(the others being personally involved 1989. The Commissions findings respondents Raymond and
Arman, Ganata in the of fact were mostly based on the Reynaldo Manalo has now
and Cabalse) with abduction. We also consistent and credible passed as they have escaped
whom Gen. do, for, indeed, the statements, written and oral, from captivity and surfaced. But
Palparan evidence of their made by Sister Ortiz regarding while respondents admit that they
conversed on the participation is her ordeal.[106] These statements are no longer in detention and are
occasion when overwhelming.[101] were supported by her recognition physically free, they assert that
Gen. Palparan We reject the claim of petitioners of portions of the route they took they are not free in every sense of
required Raymond that respondent Raymond when she was being driven out of the word[109] as their movements
to take the Manalos statements were not the military installation where she continue to be restricted for fear
medicines for his corroborated by other was detained.[107] She was also that people they have named in
health. (Exhibit independent and credible pieces examined by a medical doctor their Judicial Affidavits and
D, rollo, p. of evidence.[102] Raymonds whose findings showed that the testified against (in the case of
206) There were affidavit and testimony were 111 circular second degree burns Raymond) are still at large and
other occasions corroborated by the affidavit of on her back and abrasions on her have not been held accountable
when the respondent Reynaldo cheek coincided with her account in any way. These people are
petitioners saw that Manalo. The testimony and of cigarette burning and torture directly connected to the Armed
Hilario had a direct medical reports prepared by she suffered while in detention.[108] Forces of the Philippines and are,
hand in their forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and thus, in a position to threaten
torture. the pictures of the scars left by With the secret nature of an respondents rights to life,
the physical injuries inflicted on enforced disappearance and the liberty and security.
[110]
It is clear, respondents,[103] also corroborate torture perpetrated on the victim  (emphasis supplied)
therefore, that the respondents accounts of the during detention, it logically holds Respondents claim that they are
participation of torture they endured while in that much of the information and under threat of being once
Hilario in the detention. Respondent Raymond evidence of the ordeal will come again abducted, kept captive or
abduction and Manalos familiarity with the from the victims themselves, and even killed, which constitute a
forced facilities in Fort Magsaysay such the veracity of their account will direct violation of their right to
disappearance of as the DTU, as shown in his depend on their credibility and security of person.[111]
the petitioners was testimony and confirmed by Lt. candidness in their written and/or
established. The Col. Jimenez to be the Division oral statements. Their statements Elaborating on the right
participation of Training Unit,[104] firms up can be corroborated by other to security, in
other military respondents story that they were evidence such as physical general, respondents point out
personnel like detained for some time in said evidence left by the torture they that this right is often associated
Arman, Ganata, military facility. suffered or landmarks they can with liberty; it is also seen as an
Cabalse and identify in the places where they expansion of rights based on the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 121 of 174

prohibition against torture and respondents assert. The right guarantee against unreasonable
cruel and unusual to securityor the right to unreasonable searches and
punishment. Conceding that there security of person finds a textual searches and seizures must be
is no right to security expressly hook in Article III, Section 2 of the seizures is deemed absolute
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution which to prevent as nothing is
1987 Constitution, they submit provides, viz: violations of closer to a mans
that their rights to be kept free private security in soul than the
Sec. 2. The right
from torture and person and serenity of his
of the people to
from incommunicado detention property and privacy and the
be secure in
and solitary detention unlawful invasion assurance of his
their persons,
places[112] fall under the general of the security of personal
houses, papers
coverage of the right to security of the home by security. Any
and effects
person under the writ of officers of the law interference
against
Amparo. They submit that the acting under allowable can only
unreasonable
Court ought to give an expansive legislative or be for the best
searches and
recognition of the right to security judicial sanction causes and
seizures of
of person in view of the State and to give remedy reasons.[119] 
whatever nature
Policy under Article II of the 1987 against such (emphases
and for any
Constitution which enunciates usurpation when supplied)
purpose shall
that, The State values the dignity attempted. While the right to life
be inviolable,
of every human person and (Adams v. New under Article III, Section
and no search
guarantees full respect for human York, 1[120] guarantees essentially the
warrant or
rights. Finally, to justify a liberal 192 U.S. 858; right to be alive[121] - upon which
warrant of arrest
interpretation of the right to Alvero v. Dizon, 76 the enjoyment of all other rights is
shall issue except
security of person, respondents Phil. 637 [1946]). preconditioned - the right to
upon probable
cite the teaching in Moncupa v. The right to privacy security of person is a guarantee
cause to be
Enrile[113] that the right to liberty is an essential of the secure quality of this
determined
may be made more meaningful condition to the life, viz: The life to which each
personally by the
only if there is no undue restraint dignity and person has a right is not a life
judge
by the State on the exercise of happiness and to lived in fear that his person and
At the core of this
that liberty[114] such as a the peace and property may be unreasonably
guarantee is the immunity of ones
requirement to report under security of every violated by a powerful
person, including the extensions
unreasonable restrictions that individual, ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with
of his/her person houses, papers,
amounted to a deprivation of whether it be of the assurance that the
and effects against government
liberty[115] or being put under home or of government he established and
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits
monitoring and surveillance.[116] persons and consented to, will protect the
the states power over a persons
correspondence. security of his person and
home and possessions, but more
In sum, respondents assert that (Taada and property. The ideal of security in
importantly, protects the privacy
their cause of action consists in Carreon, Political life and property pervades the
and sanctity of the person
the threat to their right to life Law of the whole history of man. It touches
himself.[117] The purpose of this
and liberty, and a violation of Philippines, Vol. 2, every aspect of mans existence.
provision was enunciated by the [122]
their right to security. 139 [1962]). The  In a broad sense, the right to
Court in People v. CFI of Rizal,
constitutional security of person emanates in a
Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
Let us put this right to security inviolability of this persons legal and uninterrupted
under the lens to determine if it great fundamental enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
The purpose of the
has indeed been violated as right against body, his health, and his
constitutional

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 122 of 174

reputation. It includes the right to 1. Everyone has mentioned in the earlier part of the intimidation, or
exist, and the right to enjoyment the right to liberty provision.[127] any other means
of life while existing, and it is and security of which vitiate the
invaded not only by a deprivation person. No one Second, the right to free will shall be
of life but also of those things shall be subjected security of person is a guarantee used against him
which are necessary to the to arbitrary arrest of bodily and psychological (any person
enjoyment of life according to the or detention. No integrity or security. Article III, under
nature, temperament, and lawful one shall be Section II of the 1987 Constitution investigation for
desires of the individual.[123] deprived of his guarantees that, as a general rule, the commission of
liberty except on ones body cannot be searched or an
A closer look at the right to such grounds and invaded without a search warrant. offense). Secret
security of person would yield in accordance [128]
 Physical injuries inflicted in the detention places,
various permutations of the with such context of extralegal killings and solitary, incommu
exercise of this right. procedure as are enforced disappearances nicado or other
established by constitute more than a search or similar forms of
First, the right to security of law. (emphasis invasion of the body. It may detention are
person is freedom from fear. In supplied) constitute dismemberment, prohibited.
its whereas clauses, The Philippines is a physical disabilities, and painful  
the Universal Declaration of signatory to both the UDHR and physical intrusion. As the degree of Parenthetically, under this
Human Rights (UDHR) the ICCPR. physical injury increases, the provision, threat and intimidation
enunciates that a world in which danger to life itself that vitiate the free will - although
human beings shall enjoy In the context of Section 1 escalates. Notably, in criminal law, not involving invasion of bodily
freedom of speech and belief of the Amparo Rule, freedom from physical injuries constitute a crime integrity - nevertheless constitute a
and freedom from fear and want fear is the right and any threat to against persons because they are violation of the right to security in
has been proclaimed as the the rights to life, liberty or an affront to the bodily integrity or the sense of freedom from threat
highest aspiration of the common security is the actionable security of a person.[129] as afore-discussed.
people. (emphasis supplied) wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
Some scholars postulate reaction; threat is a stimulus, Physical torture, force, and Article III, Section 12
that freedom from fear is not only a cause of action. Fear caused by violence are a severe invasion of guarantees freedom from
an aspirational principle, but the same stimulus can range from bodily integrity. When employed dehumanizing abuses of persons
essentially an individual being baseless to well-founded as to vitiate the free will such as to under investigation for the
international human right.[124] It is people react differently. The force the victim to admit, reveal or commission of an offense.Victims
the right to security of person as degree of fear can vary from one fabricate incriminating of enforced disappearances who
the word security itself means person to another with the variation information, it constitutes an are not even under such
freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of of the prolificacy of their invasion of both bodily and investigation should all the more be
the UDHR provides, viz: imagination, strength of character psychological integrity as the protected from these degradations.
or past experience with the dignity of the human person
Everyone has the right to stimulus. Thus, in includes the exercise of free An overture to an
life, liberty and security the amparo context, it is more will. Article III, Section 12 of the interpretation of the right to
of person.[126] (emphasis correct to say that the right to 1987 Constitution more security of person as a right
supplied) security is actually the freedom specifically proscribes bodily and against torture was made by the
In furtherance of this right from threat. Viewed in this light, psychological invasion, viz: European Court of Human Rights
declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) the threatened with violation (ECHR) in the recent case
of the International Covenant on Clause in the latter part of Section (2) No torture, of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this
Civil and Political 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of force, violence, case, the claimant, who was
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for violation of the right to security threat or lawfully detained, alleged that the
the right to security of person, viz:

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 123 of 174

state authorities had physically his security in and security of (The duty to
abused him in prison, thereby custody or to person.[132] investigate) must
violating his right to security of comply with the Third, the right to be undertaken in
person. Article 5(1) of the procedural security of person is a a serious
European Convention on Human obligation under guarantee of protection of ones manner and not
Rights provides, viz: Everyone Art.3 to conduct rights by the government. In the as a mere
has the right to liberty an effective context of the writ of amparo, this formality
and security of person. No one investigation into right is built into the guarantees preordained to
shall be deprived of his liberty his allegations. of the right to life and be
[131]
save in the following cases and in  (emphasis liberty under Article III, Section 1 ineffective. An
accordance with a procedure supplied) of the 1987 Constitution and the investigation must
prescribed by law ... (emphases   right to security of person (as have an objective
supplied) Article 3, on the other freedom from threat and and be assumed
hand, provides that (n)o one shall The U.N. Committee on the guarantee of bodily and by the State as
be subjected to torture or to Elimination of Discrimination psychological integrity) under its own legal
inhuman or degrading treatment against Women has also made a Article III, Section 2. The right to duty, not as a
or punishment. Although the statement that the protection of security of person in this third step taken by
application failed on the facts as the bodily integrity of women may sense is a corollary of the policy private interests
the alleged ill-treatment was found also be related to the right to that the State guarantees full that depends
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily security and liberty, viz: respect for human rights under upon the
on the concept of security in Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 initiative of the
holding, viz: gender-based Constitution.[133] As the victim or his
violence which government is the chief guarantor family or upon
...the impairs or nullifies of order and security, the their offer of
applicant did not the enjoyment by Constitutional guarantee of the proof, without an
bring his women of human rights to life, liberty and security of effective search
allegations to the rights and person is rendered ineffective if for the truth by
attention of fundamental government does not afford the government.
[135]
domestic freedoms under protection to these rights
authorities at the general especially when they are under  
time when they international law or threat. Protection includes This third sense of the
could reasonably under specific conducting effective right to security of person as a
have been human rights investigations, organization of the guarantee of government
expected to take conventions is government apparatus to extend protection has been interpreted by
measures in order discrimination protection to victims of extralegal the United Nations Human Rights
to ensure within the meaning killings or enforced Committee[136] in not a few cases
his security and of article 1 of the disappearances (or threats involving Article 9[137] of the
to investigate the Convention (on the thereof) and/or their families, and ICCPR. While the right to security
circumstances in Elimination of All bringing offenders to the bar of of person appears in conjunction
question. Forms of justice. The Inter-American Court with the right to liberty under
  Discrimination of Human Rights stressed the Article 9, the Committee has ruled
xxx xxx xxx Against Women). importance of investigation in that the right to security of
  These rights and the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, person can exist independently
[134]
... the freedoms  viz: of the right to liberty. In other
authorities failed include . . . the words, there need not necessarily
to ensure right to liberty be a deprivation of liberty for the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 124 of 174

 [144]
right to security of person to be in separate and appropriate  involving an assassination
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. clauses in the measures to attempt on the chairman of an
Colombia,[138] a case involving Covenant. protect them. An opposition alliance.
death threats to a religion teacher Although in the interpretation of
at a secondary school Covenant the article 9 which Similarly, the European Court of
in Leticia, Colombia, whose social only reference to would allow a Human Rights (ECHR) has
views differed from those of the the right of State party to interpreted the right to security
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the security of ignore threats to not only as prohibiting the State
Committee held, viz: person is to be the personal from arbitrarily depriving liberty,
found in article security of non- but imposing a positive duty on
The first 9, there is no detained the State to afford protection of
sentence of evidence that it persons within the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR
article 9 does not was intended to its jurisdiction interpreted the right to security of
stand as a narrow the would render person under Article 5(1) of the
separate concept of the totally European Convention of Human
paragraph. Its right to security ineffective the Rights in the leading case on
location as a part only to guarantees of disappearance of persons, Kurt
of paragraph one situations of the Covenant. v. Turkey.[146] In this case,
[139]
could lead to the formal  (emphasis the claimants son had been
view that the right deprivation of supplied) arrested by state authorities and
to security arises liberty. At the The Paez ruling was had not been seen since. The
only in the context same time, reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia, familys requests for information
[140]
of arrest and States parties  which involved a political and investigation regarding his
detention. have undertaken activist and prisoner of whereabouts proved futile. The
The travaux to guarantee the conscience who continued to be claimant suggested that this was
prparatoires indic rights enshrined intimidated, harassed, and a violation of her sons right to
ate that the in the restricted in his movements security of person. The ECHR
discussions of the Covenant. It following his release from ruled, viz:
first sentence did cannot be the detention. In a catena of cases,
... any
indeed focus on case that, as a the ruling of the Committee was
deprivation of
matters dealt with matter of law, of a similar import: Bahamonde
liberty must not
in the other States can v. Equatorial Guinea,
[141] only have been
provisions of ignore known  involving discrimination,
effected in
article 9. The threats to the life intimidation and persecution of
conformity with
Universal of persons opponents of the ruling party in
the substantive
Declaration of under their that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,
[142] and procedural
Human Rights, jurisdiction, just  involving the abduction of the
rules of national
in article 3, because that he complainants husband who was a
law but must
refers to the or she is not supporter of democratic reform in
equally be in
right to life, the arrested or Zaire; Dias v. Angola,
[143] keeping with the
right to liberty otherwise  involving the murder of
very purpose of
and the right to detained. States the complainants partner and the
Article 5, namely
security of the parties are harassment he (complainant)
to protect the
person. These under an suffered because of his
individual from
elements have obligation to investigation of the murder;
arbitrariness...
been dealt with take reasonable and Chongwe v. Zambia,
Having assumed

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 125 of 174

 control over that Raymonds narration, he was stared them in the eye while they failure of military elements to
individual it is tortured and poured with gasoline were in detention. With their provide protection to respondents
incumbent on the after he was caught the first time escape, this continuing threat to by themselves perpetrating the
authorities to he attempted to escape their life is apparent, moreso now abduction, detention, and torture,
account for his or from Fort Magsaysay. A call from that they have surfaced and they also miserably failed in
her a certain Mam, who wanted to implicated specific officers in the conducting an effective
whereabouts. For see him before he was killed, military not only in their own investigation of respondents
this spared him. abduction and torture, but also in abduction as revealed by the
reason, Article 5 those of other persons known to testimony and investigation report
must be seen as This time, respondents have have disappeared such as of petitioners own witness, Lt.
requiring the finally escaped. The condition of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost
authorities to the threat to be killed has come to and Manuel Merino, among Marshall of the 7th Infantry
take effective pass. It should be stressed that others. Division.
measures to they are now free from captivity
safeguard not because they were released Understandably, since their The one-day investigation
against the risk by virtue of a lawful order or escape, respondents have been conducted by Jimenez was very
of voluntarily freed by their under concealment and protection limited, superficial, and one-
disappearance abductors. It ought to be recalled by private citizens because of the sided. He merely relied on the
and to conduct a that towards the end of their threat to their life, liberty and Sworn Statements of the six
prompt effective ordeal, sometime in June 2007 security. The threat vitiates their implicated members of the
investigation when respondents were detained free will as they are forced to limit CAFGU and civilians whom he
into an arguable in a camp in Limay, Bataan, their movements or activities. met in the investigation for the
claim that a respondents captors even told [149]
 Precisely because first time. He was present at the
person has been them that they were still deciding respondents are being shielded investigation when his
taken into whether they should be from the perpetrators of their subordinate Lingad was taking
custody and has executed. Respondent Raymond abduction, they cannot be the sworn statements, but he did
not been seen Manalo attested in his expected to show evidence of not propound a single question to
since.[147]  affidavit, viz: overt acts of threat such as face- ascertain the veracity of their
(emphasis to-face intimidation or written statements or their credibility. He
Kinaumagahan,
supplied) threats to their life, liberty and did not call for other witnesses to
naka-kadena pa
Applying the foregoing security. Nonetheless, the test the alibis given by the six
kami. Tinanggal
concept of the right to security of circumstances of respondents implicated persons nor for the
ang mga kadena
person to the case at bar, we now abduction, detention, torture and family or neighbors of the
mga 3 o 4 na
determine whether there is a escape reasonably support a respondents.
araw
continuing violation of conclusion that there is an
pagkalipas. Sinab
respondents right to security. apparent threat that they will In his affidavit, petitioner
i sa amin na kaya
again be abducted, tortured, and Secretary of National Defense
kami nakakadena
First, the violation of the right this time, even executed. These attested that in a Memorandum
ay dahil
to security as freedom from constitute threats to their liberty, Directive dated October 31, 2007,
pinagdedesisyuna
threat to respondents life, security, and life, actionable he issued a policy directive
n pa ng mga
liberty and security. through a petition for a writ addressed to the AFP Chief of
sundalo kung
of amparo. Staff, that the AFP should adopt
papatayin kami o
While respondents were detained, rules of action in the event the
hindi.[148]
they were threatened that if they Next, the violation of the right writ of amparo is issued by a
 
escaped, their families, including to security as protection by the competent court against any
The possibility of
them, would be killed. In government. Apart from the members of the AFP, which
respondents being executed

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 126 of 174

should essentially include In sum, we conclude that by respondents partakes of the intrusion of the government, not a
verification of the identity of the respondents right to security as characteristics of a search protection of the government from
aggrieved party; recovery and freedom from threat is violated by warrant. Thus, they claim that the the demand of the people such as
preservation of relevant evidence; the apparent threat to their life, requisites for the issuance of a respondents.
identification of witnesses and liberty and security of search warrant must be complied
securing statements from them; person. Their right to security as a with prior to the grant of the Instead, the amparo production
determination of the cause, guarantee of protection by the production order, namely: (1) the order may be likened to the
manner, location and time of government is likewise violated by application must be under oath or production of documents or things
death or disappearance; the ineffective investigation and affirmation; (2) the search warrant under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
identification and apprehension of protection on the part of the must particularly describe the Rules of Civil Procedure which
the person or persons involved in military. place to be searched and the provides in relevant part, viz:
the death or disappearance; and things to be seized; (3) there
bringing of the suspected Finally, we come to exists probable cause with one Section 1. Motion
offenders before a competent the reliefs granted by the Court of specific offense; and (4) the for production or
court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Appeals, which petitioners probable cause must be inspection order.
Staff also submitted his own question. personally determined by the
affidavit attesting that he received judge after examination under   Upon motion of
the above directive of respondent First, that petitioners furnish oath or affirmation of the any party showing
Secretary of National Defense respondents all official and complainant and the witnesses he good cause
and that acting on this directive, unofficial reports of the may produce.[152] In the case at therefor, the court
he immediately caused to be investigation undertaken in bar, however, petitioners point out in which an action
issued a directive to the units of connection with their case, except that other than the bare, self- is pending may (a)
the AFP for the purpose of those already in file with the court. serving and vague allegations order any party to
establishing the circumstances of made by respondent Raymond produce and permit
the alleged disappearance and Second, that petitioners confirm Manalo in his unverified the inspection and
the recent reappearance of the in writing the present places of declaration and affidavit, the copying or
respondents, and undertook to official assignment of M/Sgt. documents respondents seek to photographing, by
provide results of the Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and be produced are only mentioned or on behalf of the
investigations to respondents. Donald Caigas. generally by name, with no other moving party, of
[151]
 To this day, however, almost a supporting details. They also any designated
year after the policy directive was Third, that petitioners cause to be argue that the relevancy of the documents,
issued by petitioner Secretary of produced to the Court of Appeals documents to be produced must papers, books of
National Defense on October 31, all medical reports, records and be apparent, but this is not true in accounts, letters,
2007, respondents have not been charts, and reports of any the present case as the photographs,
furnished the results of the treatment given or involvement of petitioners in the objects or tangible
investigation which they now seek recommended and medicines abduction has not been shown. things, not
through the instant petition for a prescribed, if any, to the Manalo privileged, which
writ of amparo. brothers, to include a list of Petitioners arguments do not hold constitute or
medical personnel (military and water. The production order under contain evidence
Under these circumstances, there civilian) who attended to the Amparo Rule should not be material to any
is substantial evidence to warrant them from February 14, 2006 until confused with a search warrant for matter involved in
the conclusion that there is a August 12, 2007. law enforcement under Article III, the action and
violation of respondents right to Section 2 of the 1987 which are in his
security as a guarantee of With respect to the first and Constitution. This Constitutional possession,
protection by the government. second reliefs, petitioners argue provision is a protection of the custody or control
that the production order sought people from the unreasonable  

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 127 of 174

In Material Distributors (Phil.)
Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the
respondent judge, under authority
of Rule 27, issued a subpoena
duces tecum for the production
and inspection of among others,
the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The
company questioned the issuance
of the subpoena on the ground
that it violated the search and
seizure clause. The Court struck
down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil
procedure that cannot be
identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited
by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit,
petitioner AFP Chief of Staff
himself undertook to provide
results of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by
the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as
soon as the same has been
furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and
third reliefs, petitioners assert
that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, as well as the
submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in
the resolution of the petition for a
writ of amparo. They add that it
will unnecessarily compromise
and jeopardize the exercise of
official functions and duties of
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
military officers and even
unwittingly and unnecessarily
expose them to threat of personal
injury or even death. SO ORDERED.
On the contrary, the disclosure of
the present places of assignment
of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom
respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind
their abduction and detention, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their
areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would
also help ensure that these
military officers can be served with
notices and court processes in
relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the
respondents rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant
in securing information to create
the medical history of respondents
and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable
and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-
won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed
out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ
of amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition
is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
Page 128 of 174
 ultimate facts determinable from the supporting of habeasaffidavits data.—Section that 6detailof thethe Rule on
[2] circumstances of how and to what extent a threat following
to or violation
materialofallegations
the rights of to ultimate
life, fact
  liberty and security of the aggrieved party wasoforhabeas is being data:
committed.
“(a) The personal
The issuance circumstanc
EN of the writ of amparo in the present case is(b) anchored
The manner on the thefactual
right toallegations
privacy is violate
BAN RESOLUTION
heretofore quoted, that are essentially repeated in rightparagraph
to life, liberty
54 of the or petition.
security of the aggrieve
C taken by the petitioner to secure the data or in
  Same; If the petitioners wish to seek redressregisters and hold the alleged
or databases, theperpetrators
government office,
Forum Shopping; Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more or inincontrol
the realm of the of ordinary criminal if kn
data or information,
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORAdegrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy
may include the updating, rectification,of the writ of suppre
TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS amparo.—Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied
information or files kept by the respondent. with the In
case, it may also constitute direct contempt.—
MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would
a prayer justify
for the
an issuance
order of
enjoining a writ
the ofact comp
shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that posereliefs a continuing
as are just threat
andto the persons of
equitable.”
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
Petitioners, related and focused on the disputed land. Thus,Same; if the petitioners
Allegationswish obviously
to seeklackredress
what the Ru
shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or
  and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, a minimum, the remedy
thus rendering
may lie more the inpetition
order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in
the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather obviously
than on the lackuse whatof the
the extraordinary
Rule on Writ of Hab
- versus - another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping
remedy of the writ of amparo. rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifi
trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
  unjustified or unlawful violation of the right
and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate Same;violation of theof rule
The writ againstparticularly,
amparo, it is a should
libertynotor issuesecurity. when The applied
petitionforlikewise
as has
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute
substitute for the appealdirectorcontempt.”
certiorari process, any or when it will inordinately interfere
need for information under the control o
ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Additionally, the required verification and certification of nonforum shopping
with these processes—the situation is obtaining in hasthealready
presentset case.—Separately
forth as integralfrom annexes. T
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners these—Ivan Tapuz—did
considerations, not sign,
we cannot fail in
but consider too at this point the based
indicators, clear
issuance of the writ, on the insufficien
NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity asviolation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Sectionand 3, Rule
patent46;toSection
us, that1,the
Rule 65; all in present recourse via the remedy of the writ of
petitioners’ information, has not also been shown. In sum,
Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court.
amparoOfis those
a mere who signed, only
subterfuge five the assailed orders that the petitioners sought
to negate
NATIONAL POLICE stationed habeas data is nothing more than the “fishin
(5) exhibited their postal identification cards with
andthe Notary
failed to Public.
nullify before the appellate courtcourse because
in BoracayIsland, represented by the of of the use
drafting theofRule
an improper
on habeas data
remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners’ misrepresentations
purpose of a writ of habeas data pointed is not. In t
PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE Writ of Amparo; The Writ of Amparo, Explained.—
out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; petitionand fromissuance
for the the recourse
of the itself
writ of to habeas d
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
th
CEBU 18 DIVISION, SPOUSES the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of BRION, J.:
GREGORIO SANSON & that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as Before us of for the
of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that amparo—
Respondents. an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the determination of sufficiency of
extraordinary though they may be—will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ form and substance (pursuant
writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the
to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65
appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the of the Revised Rules of Court;
processes—the situation obtaining in the present Sections case. While 1 and we say 5 ofallthethese,
Rule we
Writ of Amparo—in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides on the forWrit
rulesof  onAmparo;
the institution
[1]
 andof
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands—requires that every petition for the
separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filedSections criminal1 actions,and 6 ofand
the for
Rule the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ on of theamparo
Writ ofwith Habeasa subsequently
Data [2])
filed criminal
Same; The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfiedand civil
with the action.
prima facieThese rules wereis adopted the petition to promote an orderly
for certiorari and
procedure for dealing with
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detailpetitions for the issuance for of
the the writ
issuance of amparo
of thewhen writs the
parties resort to other parallel
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to recourses. of amparo and habeas data
life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.— filed by the above-named
Writ of Habeas Data; Section 6 of the Rule of thepetitioners Writ of Habeas against Data requiresthe the
shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for
Honorable Judge Elmo delthe issuance of a writ

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 129 of 174

 Rosario [in his capacity as numbering about 120. The The MCTC, after due collaborated the
presiding judge of RTC Br. private respondents alleged in proceedings, rendered on 2 claim of the
5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la their complaint that: (1) they January 2007 a decision[5] in plaintiffs that after
Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff are the registered owners the private respondents they acquired the
of the RTC], the Philippine under TCT No. 35813 of a favor. It found prior land in question
National Police stationed 1.0093-hectare parcel of land possession the key issue in on May 27, 1993
in Boracay Island, located forcible entry cases - in the through a Deed of
represented by the PNP at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag,  private respondents favor, Sale (Annex A,
Station Commander, the Boracay, thus: Affidavit of
Honorable Court of Appeals in Malay, Aklan (the disputed The key Gregorio Sanson,
Cebu, 18th Division, and the land); (2) they were the that could unravel p. 276, rec.), they
spouses disputed lands prior the answer to this caused the
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. possessors when the question lies in construction of
Lourdes T. Sanson, petitioners armed with bolos the Amended the perimeter
respondents. and carrying suspected Commissioners fence sometime
  firearms and together with Report and in 1993 (Affidavit
The petition and its unidentified persons Sketch found on of
annexes disclose the numbering 120 - entered the pages 245 to 248 Gregorio Sanson,
following material disputed land by force and of the records and pp. 271-275,
antecedents: intimidation, without the the evidence the rec.).
  private respondents parties have  
The private permission and against the submitted. It is From the
respondents spouses objections of the private shown in the foregoing
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. respondents security men, Amended established facts,
Lourdes and built thereon a nipa and Commissioners it could be safely
T. Sanson (the private bamboo structure. Report and inferred that the
respondents), filed with the   Sketch that the plaintiffs were in
Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial In their land in question is actual physical
Court of Buruanga- Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, enclosed by a possession of the
Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a the petitioners denied the concrete and whole lot in
complaint[3] dated 24 April material allegations of the cyclone wire question since
2006 for forcible entry and complaint. They essentially perimeter fence in 1993 when it was
damages with a prayer for the claimed that: (1) they are the pink and green interrupted by the
issuance of a writ of actual and prior possessors of highlighter as defendants (sic)
preliminary mandatory the disputed land; (2) on the shown in the when on January
injunction against the contrary, the private Sketch Plan (p. 4, 2005 claiming
petitioners respondents are the intruders; 248). Said to (sic) the Heirs
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, and (3) the private perimeter fence of
Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, respondents certificate of title was constructed Antonio Tapuz en
Liberty M. to the disputed property is by the plaintiffs 14 tered a portion of
Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Ma spurious. They asked for the years ago. The the land in
driaga, Everly Tapuz Madriag dismissal of the complaint and foregoing findings question with
a, Excel Tapuz, interposed a counterclaim for of the view of inhabiting
Ivan Tapuz and damages. Commissioner in the same and
Marian Timbas (the petitioner   his report and building
s) and other John Does sketch structures therein

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 130 of 174

 prompting plaintiff 120 persons by prior to January 4, analogy the ruling
Gregorio Sanson  force and 2005, they were of the Honorable
to confront them intimidation already Supreme Court in
before BSPU, forcibly entered occupants of the the case of
Police Chief the premises property, being Molina, et al. vs.
Inspector Jack along the road indigenous De Bacud, 19
L. Wanky and Bar and built settlers of the SCRA 956, if the
angay Captain a nipa and same, under land were in the
Glenn Sacapao.  bamboo structure claim of possession of
As a result of their (Annex E, ownership by plaintiffs from
confrontation, the Complaint, p. 11) open continuous, 1993 to April 19,
parties signed an inside the lot in adverse 2006, defendants
Agreement question which possession to the claims to an older
(Annex D, incident was exclusion of other possession must
Complaint p. 20) promptly reported (sic). (Paragraph be rejected as
wherein they to the proper 4, Answer, p. 25). untenable
agreed to vacate authorities as   because
the disputed shown by The possession as a
portion of the land plaintiffs contention is fact cannot be
in question and Certification untenable. As recognized at the
agreed not to (Annex F, adverted earlier, same time in two
build any Complaint, p. 12) the land in different
structures of the entry in the question is personalities.
thereon. police blotter and enclosed by a  
  on same date perimeter fence Defendan
The April 19, 2006, constructed by ts likewise
foregoing is the the plaintiffs filed the plaintiffs contend that it
prevailing a complaint with sometime in 1993 was the plaintiffs
situation of the the Office of as noted by the who forcibly
parties after the the Lupong Taga Commissioner in entered the land
incident of pamayapa of Bar his Report and in question
January 4, 2005 angay Balabag, B reflected in his on April 18,
when the plaintiff oracay Island, Sketch, thus, it is 2006 at
posted security Malay, Aklan but safe to conclude about 3:00
guards, however, no settlement was that the plaintiffs oclock in the
sometime on or reached as where (sic) in afternoon as
about 6:30 A.M. shown in their actual physical shown in their
of April 19, 2006, Certificate to File possession of the Certification
the defendants Action (Annex G, land in question (Annex D,
some with bolos Complaint, p. 13); from 1993 up to Defendants
and one carrying hence the present April 19, 2006 Position Paper, p.
a sack suspected action. when they were 135, rec.).
to contain   ousted therefrom   
firearms with Defendan by the defendants The
other John Does ts (sic) contend in by means of contention is
numbering about their answer that force.Applying by untenable for

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 131 of 174

 being inconsistent armed men that these moved to reconsider the
with their threatened to structures are issuance of the writ; the
allegations made drive our said built and (sic) private respondents, on the
to the neighbors away situated outside other hand, filed a motion for
commissioner from their homes the premises of demolition.
who constituted but they refused the land in  
(sic) the land in to leave and question, The respondent
question that they resisted the accordingly, they Judge subsequently denied
built structures on intruding armed are irrelevant to the petitioners Motion for
the land in men. the instant case Reconsideration and to Defer
question only   and cannot be Enforcement of Preliminary
on April 19, From the considered as Mandatory Injunction in an
2006 (Par. D.4, foregoing, it could evidence of their Order dated 17 May 2007[8].
Commissioners be safely inferred actual possession  
Amended Report, that no incident of of the land in Meanwhile, the
pp. 246 to 247), forcible entry question prior to petitioners opposed the
after there (sic) happened April 19, 2006[6]. motion for demolition.[9] The
entry thereto on on April 18, The petitioners respondent Judge
even date. 2006 but it was appealed the MCTC decision nevertheless issued via a
  only on April 19, to the Regional Trial Court Special Order[10] a writ of
Likewise, 2006when the (RTC, Branch 6 demolition to be implemented
said contention is defendants of Kalibo, Aklan) then fifteen (15) days after the
contradicted by overpowered by presided over by Sheriffs written notice to the
the categorical their numbers the Judge Niovady M. Marin petitioners to voluntarily
statements of security guards (Judge Marin). demolish their house/s to
defendants posted by the   allow the private respondents
witnesses, plaintiffs prior to On appeal, Judge to effectively take actual
Rowena Onag, A the controversy. Marin granted the private possession of the land.
polsida Umambon   respondents motion for the  
g, Ariel Gac, Likewise, issuance of a writ of The petitioners
Darwin Alvarez defendants (sic) preliminary mandatory thereafter filed on 2 August
and Edgardo Pina alleged burnt and injunction through an Order 2007 with the Court of
randa, in their other structures dated 26 February 2007, with Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition
Joint Affidavit (pp. depicted in their the issuance conditioned on for Review[11] (under Rule 42
143- 144, rec.) pictures attached the private respondents of the 1997 Rules of Civil
[sic] categorically as annexes to posting of a bond. The Procedure) of the Permanent
stated that on or their position writ[7] authorizing the Mandatory Injunction and
about April 19, paper were not immediate implementation of Order of Demolition of the
2006, a group of noted and the MCTC decision was RTC of  Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil
armed men reflected in the actually issued by respondent Case No. 7990.
entered the amended report Judge Elmo F. del Rosario  
property of our and sketch (the respondent Judge) on 12 Meanwhile,
said neighbors submitted by the March 2007 after the private respondent Sheriff Nelson
and built plastic Commissioner, respondents had complied R. dela Cruz issued the
roofed hence, it could be with the imposed Notice to Vacate and for
tents. These safely inferred condition. The petitioners

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 132 of 174

 Demolition on 19 March 2008. dispute]. They reducing them the private
[12]
were not in to ashes. [...] respondents Sans
  uniform. They onshave under
It was against this fired their   their employ
factual backdrop that the shotguns at the 32. These acts of armed men and
petitioners filed the present defendants. Later TERRORISM and they are
petition last 29 April the following day (heinous crime) influential with the
2008. The petition contains at 2:00 a.m. two of ARSON were police authorities
and prays for three remedies, houses of the reported by one owing to their
namely: a petition for certiorari defendants were of the HEIRS OF financial and
under Rule 65 of the Revised burned to ashes. ANTONIO political clout.
Rules of Court; the issuance TAPUZ [...]. The  
of a writ of habeas data under   35. The
terrorists trained
the Rule on the Writ of 30. These armed their shotguns actual prior
Habeas Data; and finally, the men [without and fired at occupancy, as
issuance of the writ uniforms] minors namely well as the
of amparo under the Rule on removed the IVAN GAJISAN ownership of the
the Writ of Amparo. barbed wire fence and MICHAEL lot in dispute by
  put up by MAGBANUA, defendants and
To support the defendants to who resisted the atrocities of
petition and the remedies protect their their the terrorists
prayed for, the petitioners property from intrusion.Their [introduced into
present factual positions intruders. Two of act is a blatant the property in
diametrically opposed to the armed men violation of the dispute by the
the MCTCsfindings and legal trained their law penalizing plaintiffs] are
reasons. Most importantly, the shotguns at the Acts of Violence attested by
petitioners maintain their defendants who against women witnesses who
claims of prior possession of resisted their and children, are persons not
the disputed land and intrusion. One of which is related to the
of intrusioninto this land by them aggravated by defendants are
the private respondents. The who was identifie the use of high- therefore
material factual allegations of d as SAMUEL powered disinterested
the petition bases as well of LONGNO y weapons. witnesses in the
the petition for the issuance of GEGANSO, 19 case namely:
the writ of amparo read: years old, single,   Rowena Onag, A
29. On April 29, and a resident polsida Umambon
2006 at [] g, Ariel Gac,
of Binun-an, Bata
about 9:20 d, Iloilo, fired Darwin Alvarez
 
a.m. armed twice. and Edgardo Pen
men sporting 34. That arada. Likewise,
12 gauge shot   the threats to the the affidavit
guns intruded life and security of of Nemia T.
into the property 31. The armed the poor indigent Carmen is
of the men torched two and unlettered submitted to
defendants [the houses of the petitioners prove that the
land in defendants continue because plaintiffs resorted

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 133 of 174

 to atrocious acts
through hired
men in their bid to
unjustly evict the
defendants.[13]
The petitioners posit as well that
the MCTC has no jurisdiction over
the complaint for forcible entry
that the private respondents filed
below.Citing Section 33 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that
the forcible entry case in fact
involves issues of title to or
possession of real property or an
interest therein, with the assessed
value of the property involved
exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the
case should be originally
cognizable by the
RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners
reason out that the RTC - to
where the MCTC decision was
appealed equally has no
jurisdiction to rule on the case on
appeal and could not have validly
issued the assailed orders.
 
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for
certiorari and issuance of a writ
of habeas data fatally defective,
both in substance and in
form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo,
on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to
content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
We conclude, based on the
outlined material antecedents that
led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of
time. It is not lost on us that the
petitioners have a pending petition
with the Court of Appeals (the CA
petition) for the review of the
same RTC orders now assailed in
the present petition, although the
petitioners never disclosed in the
body of the present petition the
exact status of their pending CA
petition. The CA petition, however,
was filed with the Court of
Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed
orders (or at the very least, the
latest of the interrelated assailed
orders) were received on 1
August 2007 at the latest. The
present petition, on the other
hand, was filed on April 29,
2008 or more than eight months
from the time the CA petition was
filed. Thus, the present petition is
separated in point of time from the
assumed receipt of the assailed
RTC orders by at least eight (8)
months, i.e., beyond
the reglementary period of sixty
(60) days[15] from receipt of the
assailed order or orders or from
notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for
reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the
petitioners counsel stated in his
attached Certificate of Compliance
with Circular #1-88 of the
Supreme Court[16] (Certificate of
Compliance) that in the meantime
the RTC and the Sheriff issued a
NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR  
DEMOLITION not served to
counsel but to the petitioners who By the petitioners own
sent photo copy of the same admissions, they filed a petition
NOTICE to their counsel on April with the Court of Appeals
18, 2008 by LBC. To guard (docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
against any insidious argument 02859) for the review of the orders
that the present petition is timely now also assailed in this petition,
filed because of this Notice to but brought the present recourse
Vacate, we feel it best to declare to us, allegedly because the CA
now that the counting of the 60- did not act on the petition up to
day reglementary period under this date and for the
Rule 65 cannot start from the April petitioner (sic)  to seek relief in the
18, 2008 date cited by the CA would be a waste of time and
petitioners counsel. The Notice to would render the case moot and
Vacate and for Demolition is not academic since the CA refused to
an order that exists independently resolve pending urgent motions
from the RTC orders assailed in and the Sheriff is determined to
this petition and in the previously enforce a writ of demolition
filed CA petition. It is merely a despite the defect of LACK OF
notice, made in compliance with JURISDICTION.[18]
one of the assailed orders, and is  
thus an administrative
enforcement medium that has no Interestingly, the petitioners
life of its own separately from the counsel - while making this claim
assailed order on which it is in the body of the petition - at the
based. It cannot therefore be the same time represented in his
appropriate subject of an Certificate of Compliance[19] that:
independent petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 in the context of x x x
this case. The April 18, 2008 date
cannot likewise be the material
date for Rule 65 purposes as the (e) the petitioners
above-mentioned Notice to went up to the
Vacate is not even directly Court of Appeals
assailed in this petition, as the to question the
petitions Prayer patently shows.[17] WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Based on the same copy of the
material antecedents, we find too petition is
that the petitioners have been attached (sic);
guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this
Court and, at the very least, of (f) the CA
forum shopping. initially issued a
Page 134 of 174
 resolution that the CA did not act on the   In any event, we find the present
denying the petition up to this date  while petition for certiorari, on its face
PETITION stating the real Court of Appeals To restate the prevailing rules, and on the basis of the supporting
because it held action in the Certification of forum shopping is the institution of attachments, to be devoid of
that the ORDER Compliance -- the intent to hide two or more actions or merit. The MCTC correctly
TO VACATE the real state of the remedies the proceedings involving the same assumed jurisdiction over the
AND FOR petitioners sought below in order parties for the same cause of private respondents complaint,
DEMOLITION OF to mislead us into action on the action, either simultaneously or which specifically alleged a cause
THE HOMES OF RTC orders without frontally successively, on the supposition for forcible entry and not as
PETITIONERS is considering the action that the that one or the other court would petitioners may have misread
not capable of Court of Appeals had already make a favorable or misappreciated a case
being the undertaken. disposition.Forum shopping may involving title to or possession of
subject of a be resorted to by any party realty or an interest therein. Under
PETITION FOR   against whom an adverse Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
RELIEF, copy of judgment or order has been Reorganization Act, as amended
At the very least, the petitioners issued in one forum, in an attempt
the resolution of are obviously seeking to obtain by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
the CA is to seek a favorable opinion in exclusive jurisdiction over forcible
from us, via the present petition, another, other than by appeal or a
attached the same relief that it could not entry and unlawful detainer cases
hereto; (undersco special civil action for lies with the Metropolitan Trial
wait for from the Court of Appeals certiorari. Forum shopping trifles
ring supplied) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
with the courts, abuses their Municipal Circuit Trial
  petitioners act of seeking against processes, degrades the
the same parties the nullification Courts. These first-level courts
administration of justice and have had jurisdiction over these
(g) Petitioners of the same RTC orders before congest court dockets. Willful and
filed a motion for the appellate court and before cases
deliberate violation of the rule called accion interdictal even
reconsideration us at the same time,  although against it is a ground for summary
on August 7, made through different mediums before the R.A. 7691 amendment,
dismissal of the case; it may also based on the issue of
2007 but up to that are both improperly used, constitute direct contempt.[20]
this date the constitutes willful and deliberate pure physicalpossession (as
same had not forum shopping that can   opposed to the right of
been resolved sufficiently serve as basis for the possession). This jurisdiction is
copy of the MR is summary dismissal of the petition Additionally, the required regardless of the assessed value
attached (sic). under the combined application of verification and certification of of the property involved; the law
the fourth and penultimate non-forum shopping is defective established no distinctions based
  paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; as one (1) of the seven (7) on the assessed value of the
Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule petitioners - Ivan Tapuz- did not property forced into or unlawfully
x x x sign, in violation of Sections 4 and detained. Separately
65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised
Rules of Court. That a wrong 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; from accion  interdictalare accion 
 
remedy may have been used with Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation publiciana for the recovery of the
The difference between the above the Court of Appeals and possibly with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules right of possession as a plenary
representations on what with us will not save the petitioner of Court. Of those who signed, action,
transpired at the appellate court from a forum-shopping violation only five (5) exhibited their postal and accion  reivindicacion for the
level is replete with significance where there is identity of parties, identification cards with the Notary recovery of ownership.
[21]
regarding the petitioners involving the same assailed Public.  Apparently, these latter actions
intentions. We discern -- from the interlocutory orders, with the are the ones the petitioners refer
petitioners act of misrepresenting   to when they cite Section 33, par.
recourses existing side by side at
in the body of their petition the same time. 3, in relation with Section 19, par.

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 135 of 174

2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Rules. What it is not, is a writ to threatened with responsible for
Act of 1980, as amended by protect concerns that are purely violation by an the threat, act or
Republic Act No. 7691, in which property or commercial. Neither unlawful act or omission; and
jurisdiction may either be with the is it a writ that we shall issue on omission of the
first-level courts or the regional amorphous and uncertain respondent, and  
trial courts, depending on the grounds. Consequently, the Rule how such threat (f) The
assessed value of the realty on the Writ of Amparo in line with or violation is relief prayed for.
subject of the litigation. As the the extraordinary character of the committed with
complaint at the MCTC was writ and the reasonable certainty the attendant  
patently for forcible entry, that that its issuance demands circumstances
court committed no jurisdictional requires that every petition for the detailed in The
error correctible by certiorari issuance of the Pwrit must be supporting petition may
under the present petition. supported by justifying allegations affidavits; include a general
of fact, to wit: prayer for other
    just and
  equitable reliefs.
In sum, the petition for (d) The [22]
certiorari should be dismissed (a) The p investigation
for the cited formal ersonal conducted, if  
deficiencies, for violation of the circumstances of any, specifying
non-forum shopping rule, for the petitioner; the names, The writ shall issue if the Court is
having been filed out of time, personal preliminarily satisfied with
and for substantive   circumstances, the prima facie existence of the
deficiencies. and addresses ultimate facts determinable from
(b) The the supporting affidavits that detail
name and of the
  investigating the circumstances of how and to
personal what extent a threat to or violation
  circumstances of authority or
individuals, as of the rights to life, liberty and
the respondent security of the aggrieved party
The Writ of Amparo responsible for well as the
manner and was or is being committed.
  the threat, act or
omission, or, if conduct of the
The issuance of the writ
the name is investigation,
To start off with the of amparo in the present case is
unknown or together with
basics, the writ of amparo was anchored on the factual
uncertain, the any report;
originally conceived as a response allegations heretofore quoted,
to the extraordinary rise in the respondent may  
[23]
 that are essentially repeated in
number of killings and enforced be described by paragraph 54 of the
disappearances, and to the an assumed (e) The petition. These allegations are
perceived lack of available and appellation; actions and supported by the following
effective remedies to address recourses taken documents:
these extraordinary concerns. It is   by the petitioner
intended to address violations of to determine the (a) Joint Affidavit
(c) The dated 23 May
or threats to the rights to life, right to life, fate or
liberty or security, as an whereabouts of 2006 of Rowena
liberty and B. Onag, Apolsida 
extraordinary and independent security of the the aggrieved
remedy beyond those available party and the Umambong,
aggrieved party Ariel Gac, Darwin
under the prevailing Rules, or as a violated or identity of the
remedy supplemental to these person Alvarez

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 136 of 174

 and EdgardoPinar garding the and unsworn - is the overriding petitioners factual claims. These
anda, supporting incident of involvement of property issues as findings are significantly complete
the factual petitioners the petition traces its roots to and detailed, as they were made
positions of the intrusion into the questions of physical possession under a full-blown judicial process,
petitioners, id., disputed land; of the property disputed by the i.e., after examination and
petitioners prior private parties. If at all, issues evaluation of the contending
possession,   relating to the right to life or to parties positions, evidence and
private (e) Certification liberty can hardly be discerned arguments and based on the
respondents dated 27 April except to the extent that the report of a court-appointed
intrusion and the 2006 issued by occurrence of past violence has commissioner.
illegal acts Police Officer been alleged. The right to
committed by the security, on the other hand, is  
Allan R. Otis,
private narrating the alleged only to the extent of the We preliminarily examine these
respondents and altercation threats and harassments implied conflicting factual positions under
their security between from the presence of armed men the backdrop of a dispute (with
guards on 19 the Tapuz family bare to the waist and the alleged incidents giving rise to allegations
April 2006; and the security pointing and firing of of violence or threat thereof) that
guards of the weapons. Notably, none of the was brought to and ruled upon
(b) Unsubscribed supporting affidavits
Affidavit private by the MCTC; subsequently
respondents, compellingly show that the brought to the RTC  on an appeal
of Nemia Carmen threat to the rights to life,
y Tapuz, alleging including the gun- that is still pending; still much later
poking and liberty and security of the brought to the appellate
the illegal acts petitioners is imminent or is
(firing of guns, shooting incident court without conclusive results;
involving one of continuing. and then brought to us on
etc.) committed
by a security the security   interlocutory incidents involving a
guard against guards; plea for the issuance of the writ
minors A closer look at the statements of amparo that, if decided as the
  shows that at least two of them petitioners advocate, may render
descendants of
Antonio Tapuz; (f) Certification issued by the statements the pending RTC appeal moot.
Police Officer of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
  Melanie Tapuz are practically  
Christopher R.
Mendoza, identical and unsworn. The Under these legal and factual
(c) Unsubscribed Certification by Police Officer
Affidavit of narrating that a situations, we are far from
house owned Jackson Jauod, on the other satisfied with the prima
Melanie Tapuz y  hand, simply narrates what had
Samindao, by Josiel Tapuz, facie existence of the ultimate
Jr., rented by a been reported by one facts that would justify the
essentially Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and
corroborating Ne certain issuance of a writ
Jorge Buenavent even mentions that the burning of of amparo. Rather than acts of
mias affidavit; two residential houses was
e, terrorism that pose a continuing
  was accidentally accidental. threat to the persons  of the
burned by a fire.   petitioners, the violent incidents
(d) Certification alleged appear to us to be
dated 23 April   As against these allegations are purely property-related and
2006 issued by the cited MCTC factual findings in focused on the disputed
Police Officer On the whole, what is clear from
these statements - both sworn its decision in the forcible entry land. Thus, if the petitioners wish
Jackson Jauod re case which rejected all the to seek redress and hold the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 137 of 174

alleged perpetrators criminally sure, when recourses in the is intended to protect - is secure the data
accountable, the remedy may lie ordinary course of law fail immediately in danger or or information;
more in the realm of ordinary because of deficient legal threatened, or that the danger or
criminal prosecution rather than representation or the use of threat is continuing. We see no
on the use of the extraordinary improper remedial measures, legal bar, however, to an (d) The location
remedy of the writ of amparo. neither the writ of certiorarinor that application for the issuance of the of the files,
of amparo - extraordinary though writ, in a proper case, by motion in registers or
  they may be - will suffice to serve a pending case on appeal or on databases, the
as a curative substitute. The writ certiorari, applying by analogy the government
Nor do we believe it appropriate at office, and the
this time to disturb the MCTC of amparo, particularly, should not provisions on the co-existence of
issue when applied for as a the writ with a separately filed person in
findings, as our action may carry charge, in
the unintended effect, not only of substitute for the appeal or criminal case.
certiorari process, or when it will possession or in
reversing the MCTC ruling   control of the
independently of the appeal to the inordinately interfere with these
processes the situation obtaining data or
RTC that is now in place, but also The Writ of Habeas Data information, if
of nullifying the ongoing appeal in the present case.
  known;
process. Such effect, though  
unintended, will obviously wreak Section 6 of the Rule on
havoc on the orderly While we say all these, we note the Writ of Habeas Data requires (e)
administration of justice, an too that the Rule on the Writ the following material allegations The reliefs  praye
overriding goal that the Rule on of Amparo provides for rules on of ultimate facts in a petition for d for, which may
the Writ of Amparo does not the institution of separate actions, the issuance of a writ of habeas include the
intend to weaken or negate. [24]
 for the effect of earlier-filed data: updating,
criminal actions,[25] and for the   rectification,
Separately from these consolidation of petitions for the suppression or
considerations, we cannot fail but issuance of a writ of amparo with (a) The personal destruction of the
consider too at this point the a subsequently filed criminal and circumstances of database or
indicators, clear and patent to us, civil action.[26] These rules were the petitioner and information or
that the petitioners present adopted to promote an orderly the respondent; files kept by the
recourse via the remedy of the procedure for dealing with respondent.
writ of amparo is a mere petitions for the issuance of the (b) The manner
subterfuge to negate the assailed writ of amparo when the parties the right to  
orders that the petitioners sought resort to other parallel recourses. privacy is
and failed to nullify before the In case of threats,
violated or the relief may
appellate court because of the use Where, as in this case, there is an threatened and
of an improper remedial ongoing civil process dealing include a prayer
how it affects for an order
measure. We discern this from the directly with the right to life,
petitioners misrepresentations the possessory dispute and the enjoining the act
liberty or complained of;
pointed out above; from their reported acts of violence and security of the
obvious act of forum shopping; harassment, we see no point in and
aggrieved party;
and from the recourse itself to the separately and directly intervening  
extraordinary remedies of the through a writ of amparo in the
writs of certiorari absence of any clear prima (c) The actions (f) Such other
and amparo based on grounds facie showing that the right to life, and recourses relevant reliefs as are just and
that are far from forthright and liberty or security taken by the equitable.
sufficiently compelling. To be the personal concern that the writ petitioner to
 

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 138 of 174

 Support for the habeas and likewise the substance patent from its
data aspect of the present petition investigation body and attachments.
only alleges that: report if an  
investigation was SO ORDERED.
  conducted by the
1. [ ] PNP.
Similarly, a  
petition for a
WRIT OF These allegations
HABEAS DATA is obviously lack what the Rule on
prayed for so that Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
the PNP may minimum, thus rendering the
release the report petition fatally
on the burning of deficient. Specifically, we see no
the homes of the concrete allegations of unjustified
petitioners and or unlawful violation of the right to
the acts of privacy related to the right to life,
violence liberty or security. The petition
employed against likewise has not alleged, much
them by the less demonstrated, any need for
private information under the control of
respondents, police authorities other than those
furnishing the it has already set forth as integral
Court and the annexes. The necessity or
petitioners with justification for the issuance of the
copy of the same; writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure
  information, has not also been
[] shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data
  is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court - in the
66. course of drafting the Rule on
Petitioners apply habeas data - had in mind in
for a WRIT OF defining what the purpose of a
HABEAS DATA writ of habeas data is not. In these
commanding the lights, the outright denial of the
Philippine petition for the issuance of the writ
National Police of habeas data is fully in order.
[PNP] to produce
the police report  
pertaining to the WHEREFORE,
burning of the premises considered, we
houses of the hereby DISMISS the present
petitioners in the petition OUTRIGHT for
land in dispute deficiencies of form and

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 139 of 174

 x--------------------------------------------
[3] IN THE MATTER OF THE ---------------------------------------------
PETITION FOR THE WRIT ------ x
EN BANC OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT DECISION
OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF Writ of Amparo; Doctrine of
MELISSA C. ROXAS, Command Responsibility; The
  doctrine of command responsibility is
  a rule of substantive law that
  establishes liability and by this
MELISSA C. ROXAS, account, cannot be a proper legal
Petitioner, basis to implead a party-respondent
  in an amparo petition; The doctrine
  is used to pinpoint liability.—It must
  be stated at the outset that the use by
  the petitioner of the doctrine of
-versus- command responsibility as the
  justification in impleading the public
  respondents in her amparo petition, is
  legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
  The doctrine of command
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, responsibility is a rule of substantive
GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. law that establishes liability and, by
VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. this account, cannot be a proper legal
JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. basis to implead a party-respondent in
DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. an amparo petition. The case of Rub
LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. rico v. Arroyo (613 SCRA 233
GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, [2010]), which was the first to
PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO examine command responsibility in
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN the context of an amparo proceeding,
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE observed that the doctrine is used to
NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, pinpoint liability.
Respondents.
  Same; Same; The doctrine is more
aptly invoked in a fullblown criminal
or administrative case rather than in
a summary amparo proceeding; The
writ of amparo is a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives
that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations
or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.—Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
an imputation of individual liability,
it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case
rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. The obvious reason lies
in the nature of the writ itself:  The
writ of amparo is a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats
of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security.
While the principal objective of its
proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or
threats thereof had transpired—the
writ does not, by so doing, fix
liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under
the applicable substantive law.
Same; Same; The inapplicability of
the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the
petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence;
Commanders may be impleaded—
not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at
least accountability.—It must be
clarified, however, that the
inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the
Page 140 of 174
petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be
impleaded—not actually on the basis
of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis
(606 SCRA 598 [2009]), the distinct,
but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were
given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo
proceeding.
 Same; Same; In Amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances
as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or
non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators; Direct
evidence of identity when obtainable
must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity.—In Amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or
non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity, because the
former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. An
amparo court cannot simply leave to
remote and hazy inference what it
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
could otherwise clearly and directly
ascertain.
Same; Same; An order directing the
public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner
is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability.—To the
mind of this Court, the prayer of the
petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail
regardless of whether there is
sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the
abduction of the petitioner. In the first
place, an order directing the public
respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already
equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order
itself is a substantial relief that can
only be granted once the liability of
the public respondents has been fixed
in a full and exhaustive proceeding.
As already discussed above, matters
of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding.
Same; Same; Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule, which defines the scope and
extent of the writ, clearly excludes the
protection of property rights.—But
perhaps the more fundamental
reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a
person’s right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under
the general rubric of property rights
—which are no longer protected by
the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule, which defines the
scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property
rights.
Same; Same; Inspection Order; An
inspection order is an interim relief
designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in
an amparo petition, in order to aid
the court before making a decision.—
An inspection order is an interim
relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in
an amparo petition, in order to aid the
court before making a decision. A
basic requirement before an amparo
court may grant an inspection order is
that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the
order. While the Amparo Rule does
not require that the place to be
inspected be identified with clarity
and precision, it is, nevertheless, a
minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting
allegations of a party be sufficient in
itself, so as to make a prima facie
case. This, as was shown above,
petitioner failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; An inspection
order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful.—Since the
very estimates and observations of
the petitioner are not strong enough to
make out a prima facie case that she
was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an
inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection
order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful.
Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of
habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals.
The writ operates to protect a
person’s right to control information
regarding himself, particularly in the
instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.—The writ of habeas data was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable
requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.
This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do.
PEREZ, J.:
 
 
At bench is a Petition For Review
on Certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated 26 August 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a
petition that was commenced
jointly under the Rules on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
and Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule). In its decision, the
Court of Appeals extended to the
petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the
privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data but
denied the latters prayers for an
inspection order, production order
Page 141 of 174
and return of specified personal merit. Although [5] RESOLUT
belongings. The fallo of the there is no Republic of the Philippines
decision reads: evidence that
  Respondents are Supreme Court Judges; Writ of Amparo; Had the respondent
WHEREF responsible for Manila Writ of Amparo more closely, he would have
ORE, the Petition the abduction, only applies to “extralegal killings and enfor
is PARTIALLY detention or   not to concerns that are purely property and
MERITORIOUS.  torture of the   the complainant that the respondent judge e
This Court hereby Petitioner, said THIRD Tanmalack’s favor. Had he read Section 1 o
grants Petitioner Respondents DIVISION closely, the respondent judge would have re
the privilege of pursuant to their  
only applies to “extralegal killings and enfo
the Writ of legally mandated
Amparo and duties are,   The present case involves concerns that are p
Habeas Data. nonetheless, —concerns that we have previously ruled are n
RUBEN N. SALCEDO,
  ordered to
Complainant, Same; Administrative Complaints; Only judic
According continue/complet
gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate
ly, Respondents e the investigation
are enjoined to of this incident administratively sanctioned—errors committ
refrain from with the end in adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
distributing or view of should instead be assailed through judicia
  respondent judge pertain to the exercise of h
causing the prosecuting those
distribution to the who are   policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, a
public of any responsible. Resp official capacity are not subject to disciplin
records in ondents are also   liability—civil, criminal, or administrative—f
whatever form, ordered to erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
reports, provide protection  
dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or de
documents or to the Petitioner -       versus - administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule
similar papers and her family
exercise of his adjudicative functions cann
relative to while in the  
proceedings, but should instead be assailed thr
Petitioners Philippines
Melissa C. Roxas, against any and  
Same; Same; Disciplinary proceedings agains
and/or Melissa all forms of or substitute judicial remedies, whether ord
 
Roxas; alleged harassment,
their administrative liability arising from jud
ties to the CPP- intimidation and  
NPA or coercion as may available remedies have been settled.—The
pertinently related be relevant to the JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the
to the complained grant of these recourse for the complainant should have
Respondent. judgment or order of the respondent judge, to
incident. Petitione reliefs.[3]
rs prayers for an   Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
inspection order, 412 SCRA 573 (2003), we reiterated that di
production order x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
not complement, supplement, or substitute
and for the return   extraordinary; an inquiry into their administ
of the specified may be made only after other available remedi
personal
belongings are Same; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judg
denied for lack of respondent judge and a lawyer of a party are

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 142 of 174

 not justify or prove that the former acted withlegal bias principles
and partiality— and be aware of well-settled  authoritative doctrines. He owes to the  
can never be presumed and must be provedpublic with andcleartoand this convincing
Court the duty evidence;
to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep
The complaint arose from a  
Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred abreastsimply
of lawsbecause
and prevailing
the judgment
jurisprudence.
is Judges must not only render just, correct,
verified handwritten petition for the
adverse to a party.—We note, too, that although andtheimpartial
respondent decisions,
judge resolutions,
erred in issuingand orders, but must do so in a manner free of any The complainant forthwith
Writ of Habeas Corpus and the
the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, suspicion
that there as is to
notheir
evidence
fairness,
on record
impartiality,
that andWrit integrity, for good judges
of Amparo (the are men
petition) filedwho reported the incident to the nearby
supports the complainant’s allegation that the issuance
have mastery was tainted
of the withprinciples
manifestof law
biasand who discharge their duties
by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against in accordance police station. The police promptly
and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance ofwith the law.
law.We Thementioned
fact that the all these
respondent
to emphasize theto the respondent
Police judge of
Officers the need
Policeto be responded and arrested
judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the more
Masonic
judicious fraternity
and circumspect
does not justify
in theorissuance of extraordinary
Precinct writs such
No. 3, Agora, as the Writ
Lapasan, Tanmalack and brought him in for
prove that the former acted with bias and partiality.
of Amparo. Bias and partiality can never be Cagayan de Oro City, and questioning. That same afternoon
presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable Inspector Wylen Rojo. The at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack,
Same; Administrative represented by his sister, Jocelyn
error may be inferred from respondent judge’s issuance of the Writ ofComplaints;
Amparo, there Whenis the complainant
complainant reliesallegedon mere
that he conjectures
is a
and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim,
co-owner the administrative
of a parcel complaint
of landmust Tanmalack Tan, filed the
no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The
be dismissed for lack of merit.—We also reiterate that
(disputed in an administrative
property) coveredproceeding,
by petition[1] on his behalf while
complainant’s allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and Tanmalack was detained by the
convincing proof that will overcome the presumptionthe complainant that the has respondent
the burden judge of proving Original Certificateinofthe
the allegations Title No. O- by
complaint
substantial evidence. We cannot give credence740 to and registered
charges based oninmere
the name of or
suspicion police for employing self-help in
dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor. Likewise, bad preventing squatters from putting
speculation. Hence, when the complainant Patricio
relies on mere Salcedo. The
conjectures and disputed
suppositions,
faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. up improvements in their titled
and fails to substantiate property is about 126,112 square
To hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he erred his claim,
in his as in this case,
judgment the administrative
meters wide and is situated in
complaint must be
property.
dismissed for lack of merit.
has never been the intent of the law; reasonable competence and good faith judgments,  
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.  
not complete infallibility, are what the law requires.
  Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-
BRION, J.:
Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-
Requerme narrated the
known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the  law.— On January 23, 2008 at circumstances surrounding the
case is the complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against the respondent around 2:30 p.m., while the filing of the petition and how it
judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known   rules constitutes gross complainant (together with his came to be referred to the
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his respondent judges sala, as
We pass upon the verified Letter-
acquaintance with laws and procedural rules.Complaint,
They must know nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was
datedthe Augustlaw and apply 29, it follows:
properly in good faith. They are likewise 2008, expected to by
keep abreast supervising an on-going
filed Ruben N. ofSalcedo
prevailing
jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints theJudgenoble Gil
office construction over the disputed  
(complainant), charging
property, Tanmalack and heavily
and great privilege vested in him. We find that G. the respondent
Bollozos judge’s error
(respondent does not
judge), 1.                  In
armed men arrived and forced
rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law Presiding
that is defined Judge, Regional Trial
by jurisprudence. We take themselves inside the fenced the late afternoon
Court,theBranch
judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued 21, Cagayan
Writ of Amparo on January de 23, of January 23,
premises of the disputed
2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been Oroeffective
City, with Gravethree
for barely Misconduct
months (The 2008, a query
property. The complainant averred
Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effectiveand Ignorance
on October 24, of the At
2007). Lawthatintime,
the the
that Tanmalack and his was received by
respondent judge cannot be said to have been handling
fully educated of SPEC.
and informed PROC. on theNo.novel companions harassed and the Office
aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated,2008-009, entitled Jose regarding the
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that threatened to kill and to harm him
Tanmalack, Jr., represented by procedure in filing
time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent and his workers; that Tanmalack
Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police a petition for a
disregard would constitute gross ignorance of Officers
the law. of Police Precinct No. 3, uttered defamatory statements
and accused him of land- Writ of
Same; Same; Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Agora,
Judicial Lapasan,
Conduct,Cagayana judge must De Oro
be “the Amparo. We gave
grabbing; and that Tanmalack and
City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo. the information
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.”— his companions occupied the
however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01  of the Code of Judicial property and destroyed building that the
materials such as G.I. sheets, established
Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and
THE FACTUAL procedure is to
independence.” A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just aBACKGROUND
cursory acquaintance lumber and other construction
materials. assign cases to
with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 143 of 174

 the different 3.                  That the Administrative insisting to refer
branches by I clarified from Officer Mary Lyn the case
raffling or in Judge Lucagbo Charisse immediately to a
urgent cases, by the procedure to Lagamon; judge since it is
a special raffle be adopted under already 5:00 P.M.
upon proper the Rule on the 7.                  That and considering
motions. But Writ of Amparo thinking I was no the novelty,
since the office (A.M. No. 07-9- longer around as urgency and
has not received 12-SC); the personnel to importance of the
any case of that whom I left the case, and fearing
nature yet, and as 4.                  That information that I that no judge will
the schedule of the issue if any was going to the be left to act on
raffling will still be judge can sala of 1st Vice the petition if they
in the afternoon of immediately act Executive Judge still discuss what
the next day, it on the petition Nery was not able to do, Mr.
will be referred to was not clearly to inform the Exclamador, with
the Executive stated in the Rule Admin. Officer of the concurrence
Judge for but if the case will my whereabouts, of Admin. Officer
instruction and or be referred to her Mr. Exclamador Lagamon,
appropriate as the 2nd Vice was instructed by referred the case
action; Executive Judge, her to refer the to you since your
she will be willing case to you sala was the
2.                  That to look at the [referring to the nearest to our
since the petition; respondent office, it being
Executive Judge judge]; adjacent to your
was on leave, I 5.                  That
when I went back 8.                  That court;
went to consult
the 1st Vice at the Office at a upon learning of 10.              That
Executive Judge little past 5:00 the fact, I there is nobody
Evelyn Gamotin P.M. already, immediately from this Office
Nery. Since direct from the called Mr. who brought the
Judge Nery was chamber of Judge Exclamador and handwritten
busy at that time, Lucagbo, I found Ms. Lagamon to petition to Judge
I went to see out that a Petition explain why they Lucagbo nor was
2nd Vice Executive for Writ of referred the case there any
Judge Ma. Anita Amparo was filed to your sala instruction from
Esguerra- at around 4:45 without any her to any of the
Lucagbo; P.M. as stamped instruction from personnel to have
in the petition; me; the petition
6.                  That 9.                  That conform to a form
since I was out of they said that acceptable to the
the office, the they are of the court, such fact
Docket Clerk in honest belief that was confirmed by
charge, Mr. Rudy I was no longer Judge Lucagbo;
Exclamador, refer around; that the 11.              That
red the case to lawyer was the office only

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 144 of 174

 acted what it   partiality, nor writ and the
deemed best did he said Sec. 3
under the In his complaint, the complainant consider that further states
circumstances questions the issuance of the Writ the petitioners that it can be
and was not of Amparo which he claims had counsel is a filed on any
motivated by any been unusually issued with fraternal day and at
ill motive or haste. The complainant claims brother any time;
malice.[2] that the handwritten petition did (Mason);
not give any ground to warrant the  
  issuance of the Writ of Amparo;  
that the respondent judge acted (d)   [T]he person
  with grave abuse of discretion, (b)   [A]lthough who filed the
bias, and obvious partiality, and in the petition is petition is the
Based on the petition and for the sister of Mr.
answers to the clarificatory grave disregard of the Rules and
the rule of law when he acted issuance of Tanmalack
questions propounded to both writ of who was
Tanmalacks representative and upon and granted the letter-
petition for the issuance of the amparo and detained at
counsel, the respondent judge writ of habeas the Agora
immediately issued a Writ Writ of Amparo. The complainant
also alleges that the respondent corpus, he Police
of Amparo dated January 23, deemed it Station,
2008,  directing the police officers judge accommodated the
issuance of the Writ more in Cagayan de
of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. consonance Oro City; that
Wylen Rojo x x x to release of Amparo because he and Atty.
Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) with the [Rule the issuance
immediately upon receipt of [the] on the Writ of of the writ
writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. are members of the Masonic
fraternity. Amparo]; was a matter
today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, of great
Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis     urgency
V. Ku. The respondent judge also because the
directed the police officers to file The respondent judge (c)    [I]t was not
improper alleged illegal
their verified return to the petition filed his Comment dated March deprivation of
within five (5) working days, 30, 2009, in compliance with the even if the x x
x petition was liberty was
together with supporting affidavits, directive of the Office of the Court made in the
in conformity with Section 9 of the Administrator (OCA). In his not raffled,
and was late afternoon
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. defense, he alleged: of January
immediately
    assigned to 23, 2008,
his sala by which was a
  (a)    [W]hen he the Office of Friday, and
received the the Clerk of that if the
Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ petition from Court would
of Amparo was served upon Court, since
the Office of Par. 2, Sec. 3 not act on the
SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP the Clerk of petition, the
Chief Investigator. At six oclock in of A.M. No.
Court, he had 07-9-12-SC detainee
the evening of that same day, the no option but would
police released Tanmalack to the states that
to exercise any judge of a certainly
custody of Atty. Francis Ku. his judicial spend the
Regional Trial
duty without Court (RTC) night in jail;
 
any bias or can issue a

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 145 of 174

  (f)     [A]lthough wanted to afternoon
the Amparo fence the of
(e)    [T]he rules area and January
petition, mandate that put up 23, 2008
although in a judge shall improvem in order
handwritten immediately ents by to air his
form, is not order the constructi complaint
improper issuance of ng , the
because the writ if on shanties intruders
Section 5 of its face it thereon; came and
the SC ought to introduce
Circular (on issue, he   d
the Writ of propounded themselv
Amparo) only 2)      That
clarificatory when es as the
requires that questions on owners of
the same be petitioner
the petitioners Mr. the
signed and representativ property;
verified; that Tanmalac
e and their k
he found the counsel, thus,  
petition prevented
the following the 4)      That
sufficient in information
form and in intrusion when
were elicited: it resulted Police
substance;
  to heated Officer
  argument Rojo
1)      That the s and (Rojo)
property altercatio heard the
of ns which version of
petitioner prompted these
s family, him to go intruders
which is to the and
under police despite
their station to the
possessio report the protestati
n and incident ons of
Tanmalac and be petitioner
k blottered; and his
registered relatives,
under   the police
TCT No. 3)      That did not
T- when Mr. anymore
1627491, Tanmalac allow Mr.
was k arrived Tanmalac
intruded at the k to leave
by some police the police
persons station in station;
who the late and,

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 146 of 174

  directed to file a property; the have arrived into an
verified return conflict agreement that the
5)      That pursuant to the rules; between the writ be considered
petitioner during the summary petitioner and permanent.]
s counsel hearing of the petition the other
called up on 25 January 2008, it persons is on  
Rojo to was only Rojo who a property
secure  
appeared, the alleged dispute, of
the complainants which it was  
immediat (Salcedo, Lumbay petitioner who
e release and Roa) who caused is in THE REPORT OF THE
of his the detention of the possession; OCA
client petitioner were and
from  
absent; P/Insp. Rojo,
police when asked by the  
 
custody Court, gave the
but to no 3)      That he
following answers: The OCA informed the
avail; denied that
Court that the case was already
  he had
ripe for resolution in a Report
  arrested the
dated April 8, 2010, signed by
1)      That he petitioner and
(g)    [A]fter he Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
would no neither did he
assiduously evaluated Marquez and Deputy Court
longer file his detain him but
the aforestated facts, Administrator Raul Bautista
Answer only he could
as well as the Villanueva. The Report likewise
(which should not release
allegations in the presented a brief factual
be a verified the petitioner
petition, respondent background of the case.
return) on the because of
Judge, in the exercise complaint the complaint  
of his judicial function, considering and for further
found that the same that the evaluation. The OCA recommended that the
warranted the petitioner was administrative complaint against
issuance of the writ; already   the respondent judge be
the arrest of Mr. released; dismissed for lack of merit. The
Tanmalack was (i)      [H]e noted that the
recommendation was based on an
unlawful because   police blotter did not
evaluation which reads:
Rojo was not present state that petitioner
in the area where the 2)      That he brought heavily armed  
alleged incident confirmed men with him when
that it was the he allegedly harassed EVALUA
happened, so that the
petitioner who the complainant. TION: The
statements of the
came first to complaint is
complainants  
the police bereft of merit.
(Salcedo, Lumbay
and Roa) would be station to [(j) That in the summary  
hearsay; complain, hearing on January
followed by 25, 2008, the The
(h)    [I]n the Writ of the person petitioner as well as petition for a writ
Amparo the who wanted the respondent Rojo of amparo is a
respondents were to fence the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 147 of 174

 remedy available Amparo (SC A.M. Judges act was We concur with the
to any person No. 07-9-12- tainted with grave OCAs recommendation that the 
whose right to life, SC). Also, the abuse of administrative complaint
liberty and petition was discretion and against the respondent judge
security is properly filed with authority, bias be dismissed for lack of merit.
violated or the Regional Trial and partiality, and
threatened with Court where the grave disregard of  
violation by an act or omission the rules,  
unlawful act or was committed or deserves scant
omission of a where any of its consideration. At the outset, we agree
public official or elements with the complainant that the
employee, as in occurred.   respondent judge erred in issuing
the instant case, This the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalacks
or of a private   favor. Had he read Section 1 of
Office agrees with
individual or Respond respondent the Rule on the Writ
entity. Whereas in ent Judge, in Judges of Amparo more closely, the
other jurisdictions whose sala the observation that respondent judge would have
the writ covers said petition was Rojos declaration realized that the writ, in its present
only actual assigned is not anymore to form, only applies to extralegal
violations, the deemed to have contest the killings and enforced
Philippine version complied with his petition and that disappearances or threats thereof.
is more protective oath and judicial he (Rojo) did not
[3]
 The present case involves
of the right to life, duty when he arrest nor detain concerns that are purely property
liberty and ordered the petitioner, but and commercial in nature
security because issuance of the admitted that he concerns that we have previously
it covers both writ of amparo could not release ruled are not covered by the Writ
actual upon the latter for of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del
and threatened vi determination that further evaluation Rosario,[5] we held:
olations of such the right to liberty because of the
rights. of Mr. Tanmalack complaint is an To start
was being admission that he off with the
 
violated or deprived [or basics, the writ of
Nowhere threatened to be threatened to amparo was
in the records of violated. These is deprive] Jose [Dy originally
the instant no showing that Tanmalack] of his conceived as a
complaint that the respondent liberty. response to the
issuance of the Judge, in granting extraordinary rise
writ of amparo the petition for a   in the number of
was attended by writ of amparo killings and
  enforced
irregularities. The was motivated by
detainees sister bad faith, OUR RULING disappearances,
who filed the ignominy or ill will, and to the
petition is allowed thus, herein   perceived lack of
under Section complainants available and
  effective
2(b) of the Rule allegation that
on the Writ of respondent remedies to
 

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 148 of 174

 address these [7] appeal cannot assign such errors as
extraordinary are designed to have the judgment
concerns. It is EN BANC modified. All that said appellee can
intended to   do is to make a counter-assignment of
address violations GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of errors
Staff, or to argue on issues raised at
of or threats to Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. the
GEN.trial only for the purpose of
the rights to life, VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General,sustaining the judgment in his favor,
liberty or security, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH evenA.on grounds not included in the
as an VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7 decision of the court a quo or raised
extraordinary and Division, Philippine Army, in the appellant’s assignment of
independent Petitioners, errors or arguments.
remedy beyond    
those available   Same; Same; Since respondents did
under the   not avail of any remedy against the
prevailing Rules,   adverse judgment, the appellate
or as a remedy - versus - court’s decision is, insofar as it
supplemental to   concerns them, now beyond the ambit
these   of review.—To the appellate court,
Rules. What it is   the evidence adduced in the present
not, is a writ to   case failed to measure up to that
protect CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA standard—substantial evidence which
concerns that MEDINA, a reasonable mind might accept as
are purely Respondents. adequate to support a conclusion.
property or   Since respondents did not avail of any
commercial. Neit   remedy against the adverse judgment,
her is it a writ the appellate court’s decision is,
that we shall x------------------------ insofar as it concerns them, now
issue on ------------------------- beyond the ambit of review
amorphous and - -x
uncertain   Administrative Law; Public Officers;
grounds. Conseq DECISION Writ of Amparo; The failure to
uently, the Rule establish that the public official
on the Writ of Civil Procedure; Appeals; Effects of
observed extraordinary diligence in
Amparo in line Failure to Appeal; A party who did
the performance of duty does not
with the not appeal cannot assign such errors
result in the automatic grant of the
extraordinary as are designed to have the judgment
privilege of the amparo writ. It does
character of the modified. All that said appellee can
not relieve the peti tioner from
writ and the do is to make a counter-assignment
establishing his or her claim by
reasonable of errors or to argue on issues raised
substantial evidence. The omission or
certainty that its at the trial only for the purpose of
inaction on the part of the public
issuance sustaining the judgment in his favor,
official provides, however, some
demands requires even on grounds not included in the
basis for the petitioner to move and
that every petition decision of the court a quo or raised
for the court to grant certain interim
for the issuance in the appellant’s assignment of
reliefs.—The failure to establish that
of the writ must errors or arguments. —The
the public official observed
be supported by entrenched procedural rule in this
extraordinary diligence in the
jurisdiction is that a party who did not

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 149 of 174

performance of duty does not result in Gil Villalobos[4] (Sgt. Villalobos) as
the automatic grant of the privilege of therein additional respondents.
the amparo writ. It does not relieve  
the petitioner from establishing his or In the Amended Petition, Cleofas
her claim by substantial evidence. and Marciana (respondents)
The omission or inaction on the part alleged that on September 17,
of the public official provides, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their
however, some basis for the petitioner respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
to move and for the court to grant and Heherson Medina were
certain interim reliefs. catching frogs outside their home
in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno,
Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00
CARPIO MORALES, J.: a.m. of the next day, September
  18, 2006, Nicolas wives Lourdez
On December 28, 2007, and Rosalie Sanchez, who were
respondent Cleofas Sanchez then at home, heard gunshots and
(Cleofas) filed before this Court a saw armed men in soldiers
petition docketed as G.R. No. uniforms passing by; that at
180839 for issuance of a Writ around 4:00 a.m. of the same day,
of Amparo with Motion for Lourdez and Rosalie went out to
Production and Inspection check on Nicolas and Heherson
directed against Gen. but only saw their caps,
Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. slippers, pana and airgun for
Esperon), the then Chief of Staff catching frogs, as well as
of the Armed Forces of the bloodstains; and that they
Philippines (AFP). immediately reported the matter to
  the barangay officials.
On January 2, 2008, the  
Court[1] resolved to issue a Writ Respondents narrated that they,
of Amparo and ordered Gen. together with other family
Esperon to make a verified return members, proceeded
of the writ before Court of Appeals on September 19, 2006 to the
Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who Capas Station of the Philippine
was ordered to hear and decide National Police
the case which was eventually (PNP). Accompanied by officials
redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. of the National Commission on
00010 WR/A. Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),[5] they
  also tried to search for Nicolas
Cleofas amended her and Heherson at the Camp
petition[2] on January 14, 2008 to Detachment of the 71st Infantry
include herein co-respondent Batallion of the Philippine Army
Marciana Medina (Marciana) as (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San
therein additional petitioner, and Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of
to implead other military the Bravo Company of the Armys
officers[3] including Lt. Ali 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but
to no avail.
 
Furthermore, respondents
alleged that Josephine Galang
Victoria, also known as Antonina
Galang (Josephine), niece of a
neighbor, later informed them that
she had seen two men inside
Camp Servillano Aquino of the
Northern Luzon Command
(Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac
City on September 21, 2006,
whom Josephine later identified
as Nicolas and Heherson (the
victims) after respondents had
shown her their photographs; and
that Josephine informed them that
she saw the victims again on
September 24, 2006 and
November 1, 2006,[6] this time at
the Camp of the Bravo Company
of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion
inside Hacienda Luisita, where
she had occasion to talk to Lt.
Sumangil and Sgt.
Villalobos. Respondents filed a
case on December 21, 2006
before the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), which
endorsed[7] the same to the
Ombudsman for appropriate
action.
 
Contending that the
victims life, liberty and security
had been and continued to be
violated on account of their forced
disappearance, respondents
prayed for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo, the production of the
victims bodies during the hearing
on the Writ, the inspection of
certain military camps,[8] the
issuance of temporary and
permanent protection orders, and
the rendition of judgment under
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.[9]
 
Meanwhile, a
consolidated Return of the Writ,
[10]
 verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt.
Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj.
Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen.
Gomez) as Commander of the
Armys 7th Infantry Division, and Lt.
Col. Victor Bayani (Lt. Col.
Bayani) as Camp Commander of
Camp Servillano Aquino of the
Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed
with the appellate court on
January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano),
Commanding General of the
Army, filed a Return of the Writ
upon his return from an official trip
abroad.
 
In their Return, the
military officers denied having
custody of the victims. They
posited that the proper remedy of
respondents was to file a petition
for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, since the
petitions ultimate objective was
the production of the bodies of the
victims, as they were allegedly
abducted and illegally detained by
military personnel;[11] that the
petition failed to indicate the
matters required by paragraphs
(c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, such
that the allegations were
incomplete to constitute a cause
of action, aside from being based
on mere hearsay evidence, and
are, at best, speculative; that
respondents failed to present the
affidavits of some other competent
Page 150 of 174
persons which would clearly
validate their claim that the
military violated the victims right to
life, liberty or security by
abducting or detaining them; and
that the petition did not allege any
specific action or inaction
attributable to the military officers
with respect to their duties; or
allege that respondents took any
action by filing a formal complaint
or visiting the military camps
adverted to in order to verify
Josephines claim that she saw the
victims on two different occasions
inside the camps, or that they took
efforts to follow up on the PNP
Capas Stations further action on
their complaint.[12]
 
Denying he violated the
victims right to life, liberty and
security, Gen. Esperon specifically
asserted that, in compliance with
the Defense Secretarys directive
in relation to cases of Writ
of Amparo against the AFP, he
issued directives to the Nolcom
Commander and the Armys
Commanding General to
investigate and establish the
circumstances surrounding
reported disappearances of
victims insofar as the claim on the
possible involvement of the
military units was concerned; and
undertook to bring any military
personnel involved, when
warranted by the evidence, to the
bar of justice.[13]
 
Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise
denied having custody or
knowledge of the whereabouts of
the victims, stating that it was not
army policy to abduct civilians in
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
his area of responsibility,[14] and
that he was away on official
business at the time of the alleged
disappearance of the victims.[15]
 
Lt. Col. Bayani attested
that he was designated Camp
Commander only on September 1,
2007 and thus had no personal
knowledge about the victims
alleged disappearance or
abduction on September 18,
2006; that he was informed by his
immediate predecessor that no
individuals were detained in the
camp as it did not even have
detention facilities; and that in
compliance with Gen. Esperons
directive, their command was
conducting further investigation to
verify the allegations in the
petition.[16]
 
Lt. Sumangil denied
having spoken to Josephine inside
the camp on September 24, 2006,
on which date civilians were not
allowed to enter except on official
missions or when duly authorized
to conduct transactions inside the
camp. He thus concluded that
Josephine lied in claiming to have
seen the two victims inside the
Camp of the Bravo Company of
the 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Hacienda Luisita on September
24, 2006 or at any time
thereafter. He instead recounted
that on September 24, 2006, he
spoke for the first and only time,
but only at the gate of the camp,
with a person who identified
herself as Antonina Galang, who
informed him about the
disappearance of the victims since
September 18, 2006. Warning him
that these men were members of from merely mentioning that she
the New Peoples Army (NPA), saw Nicolas and Heherson on
she advised him not to entertain board an army truck near the
any queries or complaints relative Nolcom gate and, days later,
to their alleged disappearance.[17] inside the kitchen of the
  71st Infantry Battalion Camp inside
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Hacienda Luisita and while
Sumangils disclaimer about logging outside said camp,
having any of the victims in his Josephine had stated nothing
custody or meeting anyone more to ascertain the veracity of
named Josephine Victoria, or the places where she allegedly
about the latter having entered the saw Nicolas and Heherson.[18]
camps kitchen to drink water.  
  On whether the
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that impleaded military officers were
upon his return from his official either directly or indirectly
functions overseas, he connected with the disappearance
immediately inquired on the of the victims, the appellate court,
actions taken on the case.He after hearing, absolved, by the
averred that he had never assailed Decision of September
participated directly or indirectly; 17, 2008,[19] Gen. Esperon, Lt.
or consented, permitted or Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez,
sanctioned any illegal or and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of
illegitimate military operations. He evidence linking them to the
declared that it had always been disappearances, and further ruled
his policy to respect human rights as follows:
and uphold the rule of law, and to  
bring those who violated the law All said,
before the court of justice. this Court is
  convinced
In opposing the request that petitioners
for issuance of inspection and have not
production orders, the military adequately and
officers posited that apart from convincingly
compromising national security established any
should entry into these military direct or indirect
camps/bases be allowed, these link between
orders partook of the nature of a respondents
search warrant, such that the individual military
requisites for the issuance thereof officers and the
must be complied with prior to disappearances
their issuance. They went on to of Nicolas and
argue that such request relied Heherson. Neithe
solely on bare, self-serving and r did the
vague allegations contained in concerned
Josephines affidavit, for aside Philippine Army
Page 151 of 174
 Units have respondents and the Philippine Villanueva[25](petitioners) filed the
exerted fully their individual military Army, 7th Infantry present petition for review of the
efforts to officers to the Division in Fort appellate courts assailed
investigate and disappearance of Magsaysay issuances, faulting it for
unearth the truth Nicolas and to conduct their . . . NOT
and bring the Heherson, respective CATEGORICALL
culprits before the nonetheless, the investigation of all Y DENYING THE
bar of justice. fact remains that angles pertaining PRIVILEGE OF
  the two men are to the THE WRIT OF
The still missing. disappearances AMPARO PURS
concerned Hence, We find it of Nicolas and UANT TO
Philippine Army equitable to grant Heherson and to SECTION 18 OF
units (such as the petitioners some immediately file THE RULE ON
Northern reliefs in the charges against THE WRIT OF
Command and interest of human those found AMPARO DESPI
the 7th Infantry rights and justice guilty and submit TE ITS FINDING
Division, which as follows: their written report THAT
had jurisdiction   to this Court RESPONDENTS
over the place of 1. Inspect within three (3) FAILED TO
disappearance of ions of the months from PROVE THEIR
Nicolas and following camps: notice. ALLEGATIONS
Heherson, should Camp Servillano   IN THEIR
exert Aquino, San SO PETITION FOR
extraordinary Miguel, Tarlac ORDERED.[20] (un AMPARO BY
diligence to follow City, any military derscoring SUBSTANTIAL
all possible leads camp of the supplied) EVIDENCE. . . .
to solve the 7th Infantry   [AND] . . . DIREC
disappearances Division located in   TING
of Nicolas and Aqua Farm, The military officers filed a PETITIONERS
Heherson. The Hacienda Luisita, Motion for Partial Reconsideration TO:
Philippine Army Tarlac City, within (Motion), arguing in the main that  
should be reasonable since respondents failed to prove (
reminded of its working hours of the allegations in their petition by A
constitutional any day except substantial evidence, the ) 
mandate as the when the military appellate court should not have A
protector of the camp is on red granted those reliefs.[21] L
people and the alert status.   L
State.   The appellate court O
  2. Thorou denied the Motion by the W
RELIEFS gh and Impartial assailed Resolution of March 3,
  Investigation for 2009.[22] R
While as the appropriate   E
We stated Investigating Unit Taking up the cudgels for S
hereinbefore that of the Philippine the military, Gen. Alexander Yano, P
[23]
We could not find Army at Camp  Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado, O
[24]
any link between Servillano Aquino  and Maj. Gen. Ralph N

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 152 of 174

 D M IT R
E M A M
N A R ,
T N Y H
S D C A
T , A C
O P M I
I H P E
N IL O N
S I F D
P P T A
E P H L
C I E U
T  N 7 I
TH
C E   S
A A I IT
M R N A
P M F ,
S Y A T
E , N A
R S T R
V A R L
IL N Y A
L M D C
A I I C
N G V IT
O U I Y
A E S ;
Q L, I A
U T O N
I A N D
N R L .
O L O  
, A C (
N C A B
O C T ) 
R IT E C
T Y D O
H A I N
L N N D
U D A U
Z A Q C
O N U T
N Y A T
C M F H
O IL A O

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 153 of 174

 R [1] must meet the threshold requirement
O that their right to life, liberty and
U EN BANC security is violated or threatened with
G   an unlawful act or omission.—To
H P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE
thus be covered by the privilege of
A OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO the writs, respondents must meet the
N BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE
threshold requirement that their right
D MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTOto life, liberty and security is violated
I PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN,or threatened with an unlawful act or
M ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR.
omission. Evidently, the present
P ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO
controversy arose out of a property
A ESGUERRA, TISOY, and JOHN DOES, dispute between the Provincial
R Petitioners, Government and respondents. Absent
TI any considerable nexus between the
A acts complained of and its effect on
L respondents’ right to life, liberty and
I security, the Court will not delve on
N the propriety of petitioners’ entry into
V   the property.
E - versus -
S Same; Same; Absent any evidence or
TI even an allegation in the petition that
G   there is undue and continuing
A DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and on their liberty and/or that
restraint
TI FERDINAND T. CRUZ, there exists threat or intimidation
O Respondents. that destroys the efficacy of their
N    right to be secure in their persons,
O X----------------------- the issuance of the writ cannot be
F ------------------------- justified.—Although respondents’
T --x release from confinement does not
H   necessarily hinder supplication for the
E DECISION writ of amparo, absent any evidence
D or even an allegation in the petition
I Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas
that there is undue and continuing
S Data; The coverage of the writs is
restraint on their liberty, and/or that
A limited to the protection of rights to
there exists threat or intimidation that
P life, liberty and security; The writs
destroys the efficacy of their right to
P cover not only actual but also threats
be secure in their persons, the
E of unlawful acts or omissions.—The
issuance of the writ cannot be
A coverage of the writs is limited to the
justified.
R protection of rights to life, liberty and
A security. And the writs cover not only
Same; Same; Petitions for writs of
N actual but also threats of unlawful
amparo and habeas data are
C acts or omissions.
extraordinary remedies which cannot
E be used as tools to stall the execution
O  Same; Same; To be covered by the
of a final and executory decision in a
privilege of the writs, respondent

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 154 of 174

property dispute.— It need not be The factual antecedents. and executory judgment against premises subject
underlined that respondents’ petitions   them. matter of this
for writs of amparo and habeas data Respondent Amanda Cruz   case with
are extraordinary remedies which (Amanda) who, along with her By Order of July 19, 2005, the immediate
cannot be used as tools to stall the husband Francisco G. Cruz RTC, finding merit in the Spouses dispatch.
execution of a final and executory (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel Cruzes allegation that subsequent Accordingly, REM
decision in a property dispute. of land situated at Barrio events changed the situation of AND the
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), the parties to justify a suspension determination of
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or refused to vacate the property, of the execution of the final and the issues raised
the proceedings conducted thereafter despite demands by the lessor executory judgment, issued a by the petitioners
is a defense that may be set up by Provincial Government of Bulacan permanent writ of injunction, the on the issued writ
respondents during trial and not (the Province) which intended to dispositive portion of which reads: of demolition to
before a petition for writs of amparo utilize it for local projects.   the MTC of
and habeas data.—At all events,   WHEREFORE, Bulacan, Bulacan.
respondents’ filing of the petitions for The Province thus filed a the foregoing SO ORDERED.
[4]
writs of amparo and habeas data complaint for unlawful detainer petitioners Motion  (Emphasis in
should have been barred, for criminal against the Spouses Cruz before for the
proceedings against them had the then Municipal Trial Court Reconsideration original; undersco
commenced after they were arrested (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan. of the Order ring supplied)
in flagrante delicto and proceeded   dated August 10,  
against in accordance with Section 6, By Decision of September 5, 2004 is  
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 1997, the MTC rendered judgment hereby GRANTE Finding that the fallo of the RTC
Validity of the arrest or the against the Spouses Cruz, which D. Order dated July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a
proceedings conducted thereafter is a judgment, following its affirmance August 10, 2004 suspensive condition for the lifting
defense that may be set up by by the RTC, became final and is of the permanent injunction, the
respondents during trial and not executory. hereby RECONSI determination of the boundaries of
before a petition for writs of amparo   DERED and SET the property, the Province
and habeas data. The reliefs afforded The finality of the decision in the ASIDE. Further, returned the issue for the
by the writs may, however, be made ejectment case notwithstanding, the verified consideration of the MTC. In a
available to the aggrieved party by the spouses Cruz refused to petition dated Geodetic Engineers Report
motion in the criminal proceedings. vacate the property. They November 05, submitted to the MTC on August
thereupon filed cases against the 2002 are 31, 2007, the metes and bounds
CARPIO MORALES, J. Province[2] and the judges who hereby REINSTA of the property were indicated.
  presided over the case.[3] Those TED and MADE  
  cases were PERMANENT unt The MTC, by Order of January 2,
Petitioners[1], employees and dismissed except  their petition for il the MTC- 2008, approved the Report and
members of the local police force annulment of judgment lodged Bulacan, Bulacan ruled that the permanent
of the City Government of before Branch 18 of the RTC of finally resolves injunction which the RTC issued is
Malolos, challenge the March 28, Malolos, and a civil the pending ineffective. On motion of the
2008 Decision of the Regional case for injunction 833-M-2004 l motions of Province, the MTC, by Order of
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, odged before Branch 10 of the petitioners with January 21, 2008, thus issued a
Branch 10 in a petition for same RTC Malolos. the same Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
issuance of writs The Spouses Cruz sought in the determines the On receiving notice of the
of amparo and habeas case for injunction the issuance of metes and January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the
data instituted by respondents. a permanent writ of injunction to bounds of 400 sq. Spouses Cruz filed a motion
  prevent the execution of the final meters leased before Branch 10 of the RTC for

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 155 of 174

the issuance of a temporary raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC before this Court by the media then
restraining order (TRO) which it Malolos. for alleged present, but at
set for hearing on January 25,   violation by the 8:00 a.m. to late
2008 on which date, however, the Respondents averred that despite respondents of in the afternoon of
demolition had, earlier in the day, the Permanent Injunction, the Preliminary February 21,
been implemented. Such petitioners unlawfully entered the Injunction Order 2008, zoomed in
notwithstanding, the RTC issued a property with the use of heavy dated July 16, on the petitioners,
TRO.[5] The Spouses Cruz, along equipment, tore down the barbed 2005 [sic] in Sp. subjecting them
with their sons-respondents Nixon wire fences and tents,[6] and Civil Action No. to bodily harm,
and Ferdinand, thereupon entered arrested them when they resisted 833-M-2002, mental torture,
the property, placed several petitioners entry; and that as early hearings were degradation, and
container vans and purportedly as in the evening of February 20, held on January the debasement
represented themselves as 2008, members of the Philippine 25, 2008, of a human being,
owners of the property which was National Police had already February 12 and reminiscent of the
for lease. camped in front of the property. 19, 2008, where martial law police
    the respondents brutality, sending
On February 21, 2008, petitioners On the basis of prayed for an chill in any
Police Superintendent Felixberto respondents allegations in their April 22, 2008 ordinary citizen,[8]
Castillo et al., who were deployed petition and the supporting continuance,  
by the City Mayor in compliance affidavits, the RTC, by Order of however, in the  
with a memorandum issued by March 4, 2008, issued writs pitch darkness of rendered judgment, by Decision of
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza of amparo and habeas data.[7] February 20, March 28, 2008, in favor of
instructing him to protect, secure   2008, police respondents, disposing as follows:
and maintain the possession of The RTC, crediting officers, some  
the property,entered the respondents version in this wise: personnel from WHEREFORE,
property.   the Engineering premises
  Petitioners have department, and considered, the
Amanda and her co-respondents shown by some civilians Commitment
refused to turn over the property, preponderant proceeded Orders and
however. Insisting that the RTC evidence that the purposely to the waivers in Crim.
July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent facts and Pinoy Compound, Cases Nos. 08-
Injunction enjoined the Province circumstances of converged therein 77 for Direct
from repossessing it, they shoved the alleged and with assault; Crim.
petitioners, forcing the latter to offenses continuing threats Case No. 08-
arrest them and cause their examined into on of bodily harm 77 for Other
indictment for direct assault, Writs of Amparo and danger and Forms of
trespassing and other forms of and Habeas Data stone-throwing of Trespass; and
light threats. that there have the roofs of the Crim. Case No.
  been an on-going homes thereat 08-78 for Light
Respondents later filed on March hearings on the from voices Threats are
3, 2008 a Respectful Motion- verified Petition around its hereby DECLAR
Petition for Writ of Amparo and for Contempt, premises, on a ED illegal, null
Habeas Data, docketed docketed as pretext of an and void, as
as Special Civil Action No. 53- Special ordinary police petitioners were
M-2008, which was coincidentally Proceedings No. operation when deprived of their
306-M-2006, enterviewed [sic] substantial rights,

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 156 of 174

 induced by been issued as petition for a writ or entity engaged
duress or a well- (1) the petition in of amparo is a in the gathering,
founded fear of [sic] insufficient in remedy available collecting or
personal violence. substance as the to any person storing of data
Accordingly, the same involves whose right to or
commitment property rights; life, liberty and information rega
orders and and (2) criminal security is rding the person,
waivers are cases had violated or family, home and
hereby SET already been filed threatened with correspondence
ASIDE. The and pending with violation by an of the aggrieved
temporary release the Municipal unlawful act or party. (Emphasis
of the petitioners Trial Court in omission of a and underscoring
is Cities, Branch 1, public official or supplied)
declared ABSOL City of employee, or of a  
UTE. Malolos. (Undersc private individual  
  oring supplied) or entity. The writ From the above-quoted
Without any   shall cover provisions, the coverage of the
pronouncement   extralegal killings writs is limited to the protection of
as to costs. The petition is impressed with and enforced rights to life,
SO ORDERED. merit. disappearances liberty and security. And the
[9]
 (Emphasis in   or threats thereof. writs cover not only actual but also
the The Court is, under the (Emphasis and threats of unlawful acts or
original; undersco Constitution, empowered to underscoring omissions.
ring supplied) promulgate rules for the protection supplied)  
  and enforcement of constitutional   Secretary of National Defense v.
  rights.[13] In view of the   Manalo[14] teaches:
Hence, the present petition for heightening prevalence of Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ  
review on certiorari, pursuant to extrajudicial killings and enforced of Habeas Data provides: As the Amparo
Section 19[10] of The Rule on the disappearances, the Rule on the   Rule was
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12- Writ of Amparo was issued and Section intended to
SC),[11] which is essentially took effect on October 24, 2007 1. Habeas Data. address the
reproduced in the Rule on the Writ which coincided with the The writ of intractable
of Habeas Data  (A.M. No. 08-1- celebration of United Nations Day habeas data is a problem of
16-SC).[12] and affirmed the Courts remedy available extralegal killings
  commitment towards to any person and enforced
In the main, petitioners fault the internationalization of human whose right to disappearances,
RTC for rights. More than three months privacy in life, its coverage, in its
  later or on February 2, 2008, the liberty or present form, is
giving due course Rule on the Writ of Habeas security is confined to these
and issuing writs Data was promulgated. violated or two instances or
of amparo and   threatened by an to threats
habeas data Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ unlawful act or thereof. Extralega
when from the of Amparo provides: omission of a l killings are
allegations of the   public official or killings committed
petition, the same Section employee or of a without due
ought not to have 1. Petition. The private individual process of law,

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 157 of 174

 i.e., without legal unlawful act or omission. under the determinable from
safeguards or Evidently, the present controversy prevailing Rules, the supporting
judicial arose out of a property dispute or as a remedy affidavits that
proceedings. On between the Provincial supplemental to detail the
the other hand, Government and these circumstances of
enforced respondents. Absent any Rules. What it is how and to what
disappearances considerable nexus between the not, is a writ to extent a threat to
are attended by acts complained of and its effect protect or violation of the
the following on respondents right to life, liberty concerns that rights to life,
characteristics: an and security, the Court will not are purely liberty and
arrest, detention delve on the propriety of property or security of the
or abduction of a petitioners entry into the property. commercial. Neit aggrieved party
person by a   her is it a writ was or is being
government Apropos is the Courts ruling that we shall committed.[17] (Em
official or in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16] issue on phasis and italics
organized groups   amorphous and in the original,
or private To start off with uncertain citation omitted)
individuals acting the basics, the grounds. Conseq  
with the direct or writ of amparo uently, the Rule  
indirect was originally on the Writ of Tapuz also arose out of a property
acquiescence of conceived as a Amparo in line dispute, albeit between private
the government; response to the with the individuals, with the petitioners
the refusal of the extraordinary rise extraordinary therein branding as acts of
State to disclose in the number of character of the terrorism the therein respondents
the fate or killings and writ and the alleged entry into the disputed
whereabouts of enforced reasonable land with armed men in tow. The
the person disappearances, certainty that its Court therein held:
concerned or a and to the issuance  
refusal to perceived lack of demands requires On the
acknowledge the available and that every petition whole, what is
deprivation of effective for the issuance clear from these
liberty which remedies to of the writ must statements both
places such address these be supported by sworn and
persons outside extraordinary justifying unsworn is the
the protection of concerns. It is allegations of fact, overriding
law.[15] (Underscor intended to wit: involvement of
ing supplied, to address   property issues
citations omitted) violations of or xxxx as the petition
  threats to the   traces its roots to
  rights to life, The writ shall questions of
To thus be covered by the liberty or security, issue if the Court physical
privilege of the writs, respondents as an is preliminarily possession of the
must meet the threshold extraordinary and satisfied with the property disputed
requirement that their right independent prima facie by the private
to life, liberty and security is remedy beyond existence of the parties. If at all,
violated or threatened with an those available ultimate facts issues relating to

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 158 of 174

 the right to life or contempt of court, there and then INJUNCTION at data, or on February 22, 2008,
to liberty can willfully, forcibly and feloniously RTC ORDERS petitioners even instituted a
hardly be with the use of force and DATED February petition for habeas corpus which
discerned except intimidation entered and forcibly, 12, 17 at 19 was considered moot and
to the extent that physically manhandled the 2008) upang academic by Branch 14 of the
the occurrence of petitioners (respondents) and ipaglaban ang Malolos RTC and was accordingly
past violence has arrested the herein petitioners dignidad ng denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
been alleged. The (respondents)[19] will not suffice to kautusan ng  
right to security, prove entitlement to the remedy of korte, ipaglaban More. Respondent Amanda and
on the other the writ of amparo. No undue ang prinsipyo ng one of her sons, Francisco Jr.,
hand, is alleged confinement or detention was SELF-HELP at likewise filed a petition for writs
only to the extent present.In fact, respondents were batas ukol sa of amparo and habeas
of the treats and even able to post bail for the PROPERTY data before the Sandiganbayan,
harassments offenses a day after their arrest.[20] RIGHTS, Wala they alleging the commission of
implied from the   kaming continuing threats by petitioners
presence of Although respondents release nagawa ipagtang after the issuance of the writs by
armed men bare from confinement does not gol ang aming the RTC, which petition
to the waist and necessarily hinder supplication for karapatan sa lupa was dismissed for insufficiency
the alleged the writ of amparo, absent any na 45 years and forum shopping.
pointing and firing evidence or even an allegation in naming IN  
of the petition that there is undue POSSESSION. ( It thus appears that respondents
weapons. Notabl and continuing restraint on their Underscoring are not without recourse and have
y, none of the liberty, and/or that there exists supplied) in fact taken full advantage of the
supporting threat or intimidation that destroys   legal system with the filing of civil,
affidavits the efficacy of their right to be   criminal and administrative
compellingly secure in their persons, the Oddly, respondents also seek the charges.[23]
show that the issuance of the writ cannot be issuance of a writ of habeas  
threat to the justified. data when it is not even alleged It need not be underlined
rights to life,   that petitioners are gathering, that respondents petitions for writs
liberty and That respondents are merely collecting or storing data or of amparo and habeas data are
security of the seeking the protection of their information regarding their person, extraordinary remedies which
petitioners is property rights is gathered from family, home and cannot be used as tools to stall
imminent or their Joint Affidavit, viz: correspondence. the execution of a final and
continuing.[18] (E     executory decision in a property
mphasis in the xxxx As for respondents assertion of dispute.
original; undersco   past incidents[21] wherein the  
ring supplied) 11. Kami ay Province allegedly violated the AT ALL EVENTS, respondents
  humarang at Permanent Injunction order, these filing of the petitions for writs
  humiga sa harap incidents were already raised in of amparo and habeas
It bears emphasis that ng mga heavy the injunction proceedings on data should have been barred, for
respondents petition did not show equipment na account of which respondents criminal proceedings against them
any actual violation, imminent or hawak hawak ang filed a case for criminal contempt had commenced after they were
continuing threat to their life, nasabing against petitioners.[22] arrested in flagrante delicto and
liberty and security. Bare kautusan ng RTC   proceeded against in accordance
allegations that petitioners in Branch 10 Before the filing of the petition for with Section 6, Rule 112[24]of the
unison, conspiracy and in (PERMANENT writs of amparo and habeas Rules of Court. Validity of the

Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data) Page 159 of 174

arrest or the proceedings
conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not
before a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data. The
reliefs afforded by the writs may,
however, be made available to the
aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal proceedings.[25]
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The challenged
March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10
of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos is DECLARED NULL
AND VOID, and its March 28,
2008 Decision
is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Special Civil Action No.
53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
 
SO ORDERED.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
[3] Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector,
Republic of the Philippines under the guise of a quest for
SUPREME COURT information or data allegedly in
Manila possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of
habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on
EN BANC
the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of
G.R. No. 184769               habeas data is a remedy available to
October 5, 2010 any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, threatened by an unlawful act or
ALEXANDER S. omission of a public official or
DEYTO and RUBEN A. employee or of a private individual or
SAPITULA, Petitioners,  entity engaged in the gathering,
vs. collecting or storing of data or
ROSARIO GOPEZ information regarding the person,
LIM, Respondent. family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
DECISION underscoring supplied) The habeas
data rule, in general, is designed to
Writ of Habeas Data; Right to protect by means of judicial
Privacy; Labor Law; Transfers; An complaint the image, privacy, honor,
employee’s plea that she be spared information, and freedom of
from complying with her employer’s information of an individual. It is
Memorandum directing her meant to provide a forum to enforce
reassignment under the guise of a one’s right to the truth and to
quest for information or data informational privacy, thus
allegedly in possession of petitioners, safeguarding the constitutional
does not fall within the province of a guarantees of a person’s right to life,
writ of habeas data; The habeas data liberty and security against abuse in
rule, in general, is designed to this age of information technology.
protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, Same; Same; Same; Like the writ of
information, and freedom of amparo, habeas data was conceived
information of an individual—it is as a response, given the lack of
meant to provide a forum to enforce effective and available remedies, to
one’s right to the truth and to address the extraordinary rise in the
informational privacy, thus number of killings and enforced
safeguarding the constitutional disappearances—its intent is to
guarantees of a person’s right to life, address violations of or threats to the
liberty and security against abuse in rights to life, liberty or security as a
this age of information technology.— remedy independently from those
Respondent’s plea that she be spared provided under prevailing Rules; The
from complying with MERALCO’s writs of amparo and habeas data will
Page 160 of 174
NOT issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful— employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the
due process clause of the
Constitution.—It bears reiteration that
like the writ of amparo, habeas data
was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is
to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as
a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628
(2009), underscores the emphasis laid
down in Tapuz v. del Rosario, 554
SCRA 768 (2008), that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT
issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the
due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer—a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment —
are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters
Same; Same; Same; To argue that the
employer’s refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received
on the threats to the employee’s
safety amounts to a violation of her
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
right to privacy is at best speculative.
—In another vein, there is no showing
from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis
the right to life, liberty or security. To
argue that petitioners’ refusal to
disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at
best speculative. Respondent in fact
trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted
portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
“highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.”
And she even suspects that her
transfer to another place of work
“betray[s] the real intent of
management]” and could be a
“punitive move.” Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again
confronted with an opportunity to
define the evolving metes and
bounds of the writ of habeas data.
May an employee invoke the
remedies available under such
writ where an employer decides to
transfer her workplace on the
basis of copies of an anonymous
letter posted therein ─ imputing to
her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which
imputation it investigated but fails
to inform her of the details
thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also
known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous
letter was posted at the door of
the Metering Office of the
Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan
Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent.
The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN
LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG
MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN
AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON
ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA
MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG
UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also
inserted in the lockers of
MERALCO linesmen. Informed
about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine
National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4,
2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto,
Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Staffing, directed the
transfer of respondent
MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk,"
effective July 18, 2008 in light of
the receipt of "… reports that there
were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her]
safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10,
2008 addressed to petitioner
Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President
and Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Administration,
appealed her transfer and
requested for a dialogue so she
could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming
that the "punitive" nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of
due process. Citing the grueling
travel from her residence in
Pampanga to Alabang and back
entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), respondent expressed her
thoughts on the alleged threats to
her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been
better . . . if you could have
intimated to me the nature of the
alleged accusations and threats
so that at least I could have found
out if these are credible or even
serious. But as you stated, these
came from unknown individuals
and the way they were handled,
it appears that the veracity of
these accusations and threats to
be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful
to
or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of
argument only, that the alleged
threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my
Page 161 of 174
transfer to an unfamiliar place and
environment which will make me a
"sitting duck" so to speak, seems
to betray the real intent of
management which is contrary to
its expressed concern on my
security and safety . . . Thus, it
made me think twice on the
rationale for management’s
initiated transfer. Reflecting
further, it appears to me
that instead of the management
supposedly extending favor to me,
the net result and effect of
management action would be a
punitive one.4 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for
the deferment of the
implementation of her transfer
pending resolution of the issues
she raised.
No response to her request
having been received, respondent
filed a petition5 for the issuance of
a writ of habeas data against
petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-
2008.
By respondent’s allegation,
petitioners’ unlawful act and
omission consisting of their
continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or
information about the alleged
report which MERALCO
purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and
security amount to a violation of
her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by
habeas data. Respondent thus
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a
written return containing the
following:
a) a full disclosure of the
data or information about
respondent in relation to
the report purportedly
received by petitioners on
the alleged threat to her
safety and security; the
nature of such data and
the purpose for its
collection;
b) the measures taken by
petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such
data or information; and
c) the currency and
accuracy of such data or
information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her
transfer to the MERALCO
Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008,
Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC
directed petitioners to file their
verified written return. And by
Order of September 5, 2008, the
trial court granted respondent’s
application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the
dismissal of the petition and recall
of the TRO on the grounds that,
inter alia, resort to a petition for
writ of habeas data was not in
order; and the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case which
properly belongs to the National
Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22,
2008, the trial court granted the
prayers of respondent including
the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from
implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the
disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by
declaring that, inter alia, recourse
to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-
legal killings and political activists
but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life
and security are jeopardized by
petitioners’ refusal to provide her
with information or data on the
reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for
review under Rule 45 of 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data9 contending that 1) the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case
and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
prerogative as employer to
transfer the place of work of its
employees, and 2) the issuance of
the writ is outside the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas
Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over what they
contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that "although
ingeniously crafted as a petition
for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the
transfer of her place of work by
her employer"11 and the terms and
conditions of her
employment which arise from an
employer-employee relationship
over which the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of
the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the
RTC had no authority to restrain
the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring
respondent’s place of work which
is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-
Circular No. 79-200312 expressly
prohibits the issuance of TROs or
injunctive writs in labor-related
cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data directs the issuance of the
writ only against public officials or
employees, or private individuals
or entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or
home; and that MERALCO (or its
officers) is clearly not engaged in
such activities.
The petition is impressed with
merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be
spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the
Page 162 of 174
Alabang Sector, under the guise
of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The
writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person
whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing
of data or informationregarding
the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general,
is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an
individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a
person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age
of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ
of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
disappearances. Its intent is to individuals in her earlier-quoted
address violations of or threats to portion of her July 10, 2008 letter
the rights to life, liberty or security as "highly suspicious, doubtful or
as a remedy independently from are just mere jokes if they existed
those provided under prevailing at all."18 And she even suspects
Rules.13 that her transfer to another place
of work "betray[s] the real intent of
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the management]" and could be a
emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. "punitive move." Her posture
del Rosario15 that the writs of unwittingly concedes that the
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue is labor-related.
issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when WHEREFORE, the petition is
the grounds invoked in support of GRANTED. The assailed
the petitions therefor are vague or September 22, 2008 Decision of
doubtful.16 Employment the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP.
constitutes a property right under Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby
the context of the due process REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP.
clause of the Constitution.17 It is Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
evident that respondent’s accordingly, DISMISSED.
reservations on the real reasons
for her transfer - a legitimate No costs.
concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment - SO ORDERED
are what prompted her to adopt
the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over
such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no
showing from the facts presented
that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation
of respondent’s right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life,
liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners’ refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is
at best speculative. Respondent in
fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown
Page 163 of 174

[23] family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. It is an
Republic of the Philippines independent and summary remedy
SUPREME COURT designed to protect the image,
Manila privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to
THIRD DIVISION
enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to
G.R. No. 202666               protect a person’s right to control
September 29, 2014 information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and such information is being collected
SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID through unlawful means in order to
SUZARA, Petitioners,  achieve unlawful ends.
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, Same; Same; Same; The existence of
MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, a person’s right to informational
and JOHN DOES, Respondents. privacy and a showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or
DECISION threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data the victim are indispensable before
Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of the privilege of the writ may be
Habeas Data; The writ of habeas extended.—In developing the writ of
data is a remedy available to any habeas data, the Court aimed to
person whose right to privacy in life, protect an individual’s right to
liberty or security is violated or informational privacy, among others.
threatened by an unlawful act or A comparative law scholar has, in
omission of a public official or fact, defined habeas data as “a
employee, or of a private individual procedure designed to safeguard
or entity engaged in the gathering, individual freedom from abuse in the
collecting or storing of data or information age.” The writ, however,
information regarding the person, will not issue on the basis merely of
family, home and correspondence of an alleged unauthorized access to
the aggrieved party.—The writ of information about a person.
habeas data is a remedy available to Availment of the writ requires the
any person whose right to privacy in existence of a nexus between the right
life, liberty or security is violated or to privacy on the one hand, and the
threatened by an unlawful act or right to life, liberty or security on the
omission of a public official or other. Thus, the existence of a
employee, or of a private individual person’s right to informational
or entity engaged in the gathering, privacy and a showing, at least by
collecting or storing of data or substantial evidence, of an actual or
information regarding the person, threatened violation of the right to
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before
the privilege of the writ may be
extended.
Same; Same; Same; Informational
Privacy; The writ of habeas data can
be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy.—Had the
framers of the Rule intended to
narrow the operation of the writ only
to cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been
made. Habeas data, to stress, was
designed “to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the
information age.” As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by
the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court, after explaining that
the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that: The writ of habeas
data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the
right to informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of such
right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or
in control of respondents. (emphasis
ours) Clearly then, the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the
Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of
data.—Nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of
habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her
family.—The provision, when taken
in its proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection against
unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need
not be in the business of collecting or
Page 164 of 174
storing data. To “engage” in
something is different from
undertaking a business endeavour. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for
any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such
will not prevent the writ from getting
to said person or entity.
Same; Same; Same; The Court saw
the pressing need to provide for
judicial remedies that would allow a
summary hearing of the unlawful use
of data or information and to remedy
possible violations of the right to
privacy.—The Court saw the pressing
need to provide for judicial remedies
that would allow a summary hearing
of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy. In
the same vein, the South African
High Court, in its Decision in the
landmark case, H v. W, promulgated
on January 30, 2013, recognized that
“[t]he law has to take into account the
changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or
else it will lose credibility in the eyes
of the people. x x x It is imperative
that the courts respond appropriately
to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom.” Consistent with
this, the Court, by developing what
may be viewed as the Philippine
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
model of the writ of habeas data, in
effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not
necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities,
including those that occur in OSNs.
Same; Same; Same; Online Social
Networks; The purpose of an Online
Social Networks (OSN) is precisely to
give users the ability to interact and
to stay connected to other members
of the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of
statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services
provided by the site.—Briefly, the
purpose of an OSN is precisely to
give users the ability to interact and
to stay connected to other members of
the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of
statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services
provided by the site. It is akin to
having a room filled with millions of
personal bulletin boards or “walls,”
the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his
or her bulletin board, a user/owner
can post anything –– from text, to
pictures, to music and videos ––
access to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some
or all of the other users to see his or
her posts. Since gaining popularity,
the OSN phenomenon has paved the
way to the creation of various social
networking sites, including the one
involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook),
which, according to its developers,
people use “to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s
going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Facebook; Facebook connections are
established through the process of
“friending” another user.—
Facebook connections are established
through the process of “friending”
another user. By sending a “friend
request,” the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they
can view any and all “Public” and
“Friends Only” posts of the other.
Once the request is accepted, the link
is established and both users are
permitted to view the other user’s
“Public” or “Friends Only” posts,
among others. “Friending,” therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain
one-to-one relationships with other
users, whereby the user gives his or
her “Facebook friend” access to his or
her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Informational Privacy; Before one
can have an expectation of privacy in
his or her Online Social Networks
(OSN) activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility.—Before one can
have an expectation of privacy in his
or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case
the children of petitioners, manifest
the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility. And this
intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of
the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Considering that the default setting
for Facebook posts is “Public,” it
can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph.—Considering that the
default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such
were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez,
214 F. Supp. 2d, is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph
on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that
would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Messages sent to the public at large
in the chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance
of privacy.— Also, United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that
“[t]he more open the method of
Page 165 of 174
transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent
to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses
any semblance of privacy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Setting a post’s or profile detail’s
privacy to “Friends” is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content.
—That the photos are viewable by
“friends only” does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners’ contention. In
this regard, the cyber community is
agreed that the digital images under
this setting still remain to be outside
the confines of the zones of privacy
in view of the following: (1)
Facebook “allows the world to be
more open and connected by giving
its users the tools to interact and share
in any conceivable way”; (2) A good
number of Facebook users “befriend”
other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of “Friends”
one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and (4) A user’s Facebook friend can
“share” the former’s post, or “tag”
others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being
visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a
post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user
who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter
is Facebook friends or not with the
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
former. Also, when the post is shared
or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who
was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at
“Friends.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
There can be no quibbling that the
images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the
minors enrolled in a conservative
institution.—In sum, there can be no
quibbling that the images in question,
or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence,
other than bare assertions that they
utilized Facebook’s privacy settings
to make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without proof
that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy,
they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect
to the photographs in question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As
a cyberspace community member,
one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy.—It has been
said that “the best filter is the one
between your children’s ears.” This
means that self-regulation on the part
of OSN users and internet consumers
in general is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations. As
a cyberspace community member,
one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy. It is in this
regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail. Responsible
social networking or observance of
the “netiquettes” on the part of
teenagers has been the concern of
many due to the widespread notion
that teenagers can sometimes go too
far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to
conduct themselves sensibly in a
public forum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Considering the complexity of the
cyber world and its pervasiveness, as
well as the dangers that these
children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace,
the participation of the parents in
disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these
institutions and organizations.—
Considering the complexity of the
cyber world and its pervasiveness, as
well as the dangers that these children
are wittingly or unwittingly exposed
to in view of their unsupervised
activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in
disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these
institutions and organizations. In fact,
it is believed that “to limit such risks,
there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It
is, thus, incumbent upon internet
users to exercise due diligence in
their online dealings and activities
and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights.—It is, thus,
incumbent upon internet users to
exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not
be negligent in protecting their rights.
Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as
here, requires that claimants
themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the
matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep the information private,
and to keep track of changes in the
available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because
Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site’s layout
often.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy
is never absolute, since
participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus
each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment
process in which he balances the
desire for privacy with the desire
for disclosure and communication
of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and
social norms set by the society in
which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and
Freedom (1967)
Page 166 of 174
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC,1 otherwise known as the
"Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data." Petitioners herein assail
the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB, which dismissed their
habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and
Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne),
both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high
school students at St. Theresa's
College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by
Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on
her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza
T. Escudero (Escudero), a
computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at
STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked
her students if they knew who the
girls in the photos are. In turn,
they readily identified Julia,
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers,
Escudero’s students logged in to
their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed
her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia
and Julienne drinking hard liquor
and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
along the streets of Cebu wearing
articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres. What is more,
Escudero’s students claimed that
there were times when access to
or the availability of the identified
students’ photos was not confined
to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but
were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero
reported the matter and, through
one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC
found the identified students to
have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s
Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school
campus;
2. Engaging in immoral,
indecent, obscene or lewd
acts;
3. Smoking and drinking
alcoholicbeverages in
public places;
4. Apparel that exposes
the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates
unhealthy behaviour;
depicts obscenity;
contains sexually
suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading
pictures on the Internet
that entail ample body
exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne,
Angela, and the other students in
the pictures in question, reported,
as required, to the office of Sr.
Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr.
Purisima), STC’s high school
principal and ICM6 Directress.
They claimed that during the
meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda
Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more,
Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as
part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the
commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on
March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother,
Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and
Damages before the RTC of Cebu
City against STC, et al., docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 7In
it, Tan prayed that defendants
therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that
precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner
Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares),
the mother of Julia, joined the fray
as an intervenor. On March 28,
2012, defendants inCivil Case No.
CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed
copies of the photographs in issue
as annexes. That same day, the
RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) allowing
the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the
TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred
the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation
rites, arguing that, on the date of
the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance
ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before
the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB8 on the basis of the
following considerations:
1. The photos of their
children in their
undergarments (e.g., bra)
were taken for posterity
before they changed into
their swimsuits on the
Page 167 of 174
 occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of
their children’s Facebook
accounts was set at
"Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy
which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being
involved in the field of
education, knew or ought
to have known of laws
that safeguard the right to
privacy. Corollarily,
respondents knew or
ought to have known that
the girls, whose privacy
has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse,
after viewing the photos,
the minors were called
"immoral" and were
punished outright;
4. The photos accessed
belong to the girls and,
thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their
consent. Escudero,
however, violated their
rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and
by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’
children were intruded
upon;
5. The intrusion into the
Facebook accounts, as
well as the copying of
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
information, data, and
digital images happened
at STC’s Computer
Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital
images that were
extracted were boldly
broadcasted by
respondents through their
memorandum submitted
to the RTC in connection
with Civil Case No. CEB-
38594. To petitioners, the
interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of
their children’s privacy
and, thus, prayed that: (a)
a writ of habeas databe
issued; (b) respondents
be ordered to surrender
and deposit with the court
all soft and printed copies
of the subjectdata before
or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered
declaring all information,
data, and digital images
accessed, saved or
stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained
inviolation of the
children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the RTC,
through an Order dated July 5,
2012, issued the writ of habeas
data. Through the same Order,
herein respondents were directed
to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting
affidavits, within five (5) working
days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied
with the RTC’s directive and filed
their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the
denial of the petition, viz: (a)
petitioners are not the proper
parties to file the petition; (b)
petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is
not one where a writ of habeas
data may issue;and (d) there can
be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC
rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision
pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, the Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must
observe the aforestated
confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed
to prove the existence of an actual
or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data. Moreover,
the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on
Facebook without restrictions as
to who may view them, lost their
privacy in some way. Besides, the
RTC noted, STC gathered the
photographs through legal means
and for a legal purpose, that is,
the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome,
petitioners now come before this
Court pursuant to Section 19 of
the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out
inthis case is whether or not a writ
of habeas datashould be issued
given the factual milieu. Crucial in
resolving the controversy,
however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed
an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the
availability of the Writ of Habeas
Data
The writ of habeas datais a
remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the
Page 168 of 174
person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved
party.11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas
data, the Court aimed to protect
an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar
has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information
age."13 The writ, however, will not
issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to
information about a to a point, is, nonetheless,
person.Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the
other.14 Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual
or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may
be extended.15
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
Without an actionable entitlement
in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper.
Viewed from the perspective of
the case at bar,this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of
an online social network (OSN)––
(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap
created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in
OSNs leavesan indelible trace in
the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-
users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must
first resolve the procedural issues
in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not
only confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’
submission, the Writ of Habeas
Datawas not enacted solely for
the purpose of complementing the
Writ of Amparoin cases of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any
aggrieved party may file a petition
for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may
be filed by:
(a) Any member of the
immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely:
the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant,
descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil
degreeof consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule
intended to narrow the operation
of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas
data situations, would not have
been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was
designed "to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability
to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule
preparedby the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of
Habeas Data complements the
Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however,
can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to
informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of
such right can include the
updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in
possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Datamay also be
availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the
gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information
Respondents’ contention that the
habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party, while valid
erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule
would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the businessof
gathering, storing, and collecting
of data. As provided under
Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The
writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened
Page 169 of 174
by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (emphasis
Ours)
The provision, when taken in its
proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions
of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing
data about the aggrieved party
and his or her correspondences,
or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in
the business of collecting or
storing data.
To "engage" in something is
different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage"
means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not
necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing
said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking
carries the element of regularity,
as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason
or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
To agree with respondents’ above
argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose
business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of
the writ asan instrument designed
to protect a right which is easily
violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information
and communications
technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural
aspect of the case, We now
proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy
on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational
Privacy
The concept of privacyhas,
through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements
having an influential part therein.
This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy,20 where
he explained the three strands of
the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational
privacy;21(2) informational privacy;
and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case
at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the
right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous
avenues for information gathering
and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each system’s inherent
vulnerability to attacks and
intrusions, there is more reason
that every individual’s right to
control said flow of information
should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a
reasonable expectation of privacy
in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy
and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this
[Social Networking] environment,
privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol
better known as wishful
thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the
Court saw the pressing need to
provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of
the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy
possible violations of the right to
privacy.25 In the same vein, the
South African High Court, in its
Decision in the landmark case, H
v. W,26promulgated on January30,
2013, recognized that "[t]he law
has to take into account the
changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or
else it will lose credibility in the
eyes of the people. x x x It is
imperative that the courts respond
appropriately to changing times,
acting cautiously and with
wisdom." Consistent with this, the
Court, by developing what may be
viewed as the Philippine model of
the writ of habeas data, in effect,
recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation
of informational privacy is not
necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities,
including those that occur in
OSNs.
The question now though is up to
whatextent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same
time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which
would have otherwise remained
personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a
response to the clamor for privacy
in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is
precisely to give users the ability
to interact and to stay connected
to other members of the same or
different social media platform
through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services
provided by the site. It is akin to
having a room filled with millions
of personal bulletin boards or
"walls," the contents of which are
under the control of each and
every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post
anything––from text, to pictures,
to music and videos––access to
which would depend on whether
he or she allows one, some or all
Page 170 of 174
of the other users to see his or her
posts. Since gaining popularity,
the OSN phenomenon has paved
the way to the creation of various
social networking sites,
includingthe one involved in the
case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to
its developers, people use "to stay
connected with friends and family,
to discover what’s going on in the
world, and to share and express
what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are
established through the process of
"friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the
user invites another to connect
their accounts so that they can
view any and all "Public" and
"Friends Only" posts of the
other.Once the request is
accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to
view the other user’s "Public" or
"Friends Only" posts, among
others. "Friending," therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain
one-to-one relationships with
other users, whereby the user
gives his or her "Facebook friend"
access to his or her profile and
shares certain information to the
latter.29
To address concerns about
privacy,30 but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile31 as
well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized
this ability of the users to
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
"customize their privacy settings,"
but did so with this caveat:
"Facebook states in its policies
that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings
are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user
canregulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or
her personal bulletin or "wall,"
except for the user’sprofile picture
and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default
setting; every Facebook
user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends -
only the user’s Facebook
friends and their friends
can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the
user’s Facebook friends
can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is
made visible only to
particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital
image can be viewed only
by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools,
available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his
or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point
of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to
make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to "when and to what
extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] – and to put others in
the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the
selected setting will be based on
one’s desire to interact with
others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate
the spreading of his or her
personal information. Needless to
say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer
Facebook users can view that
user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’
daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings,
respondents’ contention that there
is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in
context, be correct. However,
such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy
tools that many OSN users are
said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to
whomthey grant access to their
profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean
thatany Facebook user
automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his
or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her
OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners,manifest the
intention to keepcertain posts
private, through the employment
of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the
manifestation,in cyber world, of
the user’s invocation of his or her
right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who
opts to make use of a privacy tool
to grant or deny access to his or
her post orprofile detail should not
be denied the informational
privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said
choice.38Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless
exercise, such that if, for instance,
a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its
privacy level at "Only Me" or a
custom list so that only the user or
a chosen few can view it, said
photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never
chose to limit the photo’s visibility
and accessibility. Such position, if
adopted, will not only strip these
privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very
intention of the user to keep said
photo or information within the
confines of his or her private
space.
Page 171 of 174
We must now determine the
extent that the images in question
were visible to other Facebook
users and whether the disclosure
was confidential in nature. In other
words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that
the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were
uploaded to Facebook so that the
images will be protected against
unauthorized access and
disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their
thesis about their children’s
privacy right being violated, insist
that Escudero intruded upon their
children’s Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies ofthe pictures
and showed said photos to Tigol.
To them, this was a breach of the
minors’ privacy since their
Facebook accounts, allegedly,
were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with
a password.39 Ultimately, they
posit that their children’s
disclosure was only limited since
their profiles were not open to
public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who
are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred
from accessing said post without
their knowledge and consent.
Aspetitioner’s children testified, it
was Angelawho uploaded the
subjectphotos which were only
viewable by the five of
them,40 although who these five
are do not appear on the records.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
Escudero, on the other hand,
stated in her affidavit41 that "my
students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres.
This student [sic] of mine informed
me that these are senior high
school [students] of STC, who are
their friends in [F]acebook. x x x
They then said [that] there are still
many other photos posted on the
Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these
students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told
me that there had been times
when these photos were ‘public’
i.e., not confined to their friends in
Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give
muchweight to the minors’
testimonies for one key reason:
failure to question the students’
act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the
five of them. Without any evidence
to corroborate their statement that
the images were visible only to the
five of them, and without their
challenging Escudero’s claim that
the other students were able to
view the photos, their statements
are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of
petitioners disputed Escudero’s
sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook
"friends," showed her the photos
using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able
to viewthe allegedly private posts
were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students,43 and that it
is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in
reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the
public at large.
Considering that the default
setting for Facebook posts
is"Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If suchwere the case,
they cannot invoke the protection
attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-
Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a
photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under
circumstances suchas here,
where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled
access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
Also, United States v.
Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more
open the method of transmission
is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages
sent to the public at large inthe
chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by
"friends only" does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners’ contention.
In this regard, the cyber
community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in
view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the
world to be more open
and connected by giving
its users the tools to
interact and share in any
conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of
Facebook users
"befriend" other users
who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of
"Friends" one user has,
usually by the hundreds;
and
(4) A user’s Facebook
friend can "share"49 the
former’s post, or
"tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the
former, despite its being
visible only tohis or her
own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point
that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source
of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own
Page 172 of 174
Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which
was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100
Facebook friends and B has 200.
A and B are not Facebook friends.
If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B
in A’s post, which is set at
"Friends," the initial audience of
100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s
100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or
the public, depending upon B’s
privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is
effectively expanded––and to a
very large extent.
This, along with its other features
and uses, is confirmation of
Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather
than seclusion or privacy, as it
encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the
"democratization of fame."51Thus,
it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at
"Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to
be "very private," contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
As applied, even assuming that
the photos in issue are visible only
to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent
STC can hardly be taken to task
for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures
to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted.
They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies
with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of
privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to
prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In
fact, what petitioners attributed to
respondents as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the
actuality that respondents
appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to
the trial court in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.52 These are not
tantamount to a violation of the
minor’s informational privacy
rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling
that the images in question, or to
be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect,
if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled
in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of
any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to
make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case
within the ambit of their protected
zone of privacy, they cannot now
insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect
to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the
access tothe pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact
list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through
the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more
manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best
filter is the one between your
children’s ears."53 This means that
self-regulation on the part of OSN
users and internet consumers
ingeneral is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights
violations.54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her
own privacy.55 It is in this regard
that many OSN users, especially
minors, fail.Responsible social
networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of
teenagers has been the concern
of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers
can sometimes go too far since
they generally lack the people
skills or general wisdom to
conduct themselves sensibly in a
public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware
of this and incorporating lessons
on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students
on proper online conduct may be
mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC
but a number of schools and
organizations have already
deemed it important to include
digital literacy and good cyber
citizenshipin their respective
programs and curricula in view of
the risks that the children are
exposed to every time they
participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore,
considering the complexity of the
cyber world and its
pervasiveness,as well as the
dangers that these children are
wittingly or unwittingly exposed to
in view of their unsupervised
activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in
disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these
institutions and organizations. In
fact, it is believed that "to limit
such risks, there’s no substitute
for parental involvement and
supervision."59
Page 173 of 174
As such, STC cannot be faulted
for being steadfast in its duty of
teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings
and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student
Handbook, absenta showing that,
in the process, it violated the
students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the
risks that they expose themselves
to whenever they engage
incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly,
they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to
exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing
to give up. Internet consumers
ought to be aware that, by
entering or uploading any kind of
data or information online, they
are automatically and inevitably
making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which
is outside the ambit of their
control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by
them can be opened, read, or
copied by third parties who may or
may not be allowed access to
such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet
users to exercise due diligence in
their online dealings and activities
and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants
Human Rights Law (Writ of Habeas Data)
themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated.
These are indispensable. We
cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did
nothing to place the matter within
the confines of their private zone.
OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to
keep the information private, and
to keep track of changes in the
available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the
site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC
and its officials did not violate the
minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the
findings and case disposition of
the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court
need not belabor the other
assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated July
27, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in
SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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