G.R. No.

L-45938 February 26, 1938

Gaudencio Gregorio vs Eleuterio de Jesus

Facts
- Respondent Eleuterio de Jesus was elected as municipal mayor of Malabon, Rizal. One
of the required qualifications for the said position, according to section 2174 of the
Administration Code, the candidate should, at the time of the election, know how to
read and write Spanish, English, or the local dialect intelligently.
- A petition for quo warranto seeking to annul the election of the respondent Eleuterio de
Jesus as municipal mayor of Malabon, Rizal was filed.
- It was alleged that at the time of the election, he was not eligible because he did not
know how to write intelligently either in Spanish, English, or Tagalog.
- Respondent denied the petition and claimed that he knows how to read and write,
clearly and intelligently, in Tagalog.

Issue/s
- Whether or not respondent possess the required qualification as municipal mayor of
Malabon, Rizal.

Ruling
- YES. Respondent knew how to write in Tagalog intelligently and the petition was
dismissed by the court.
- To write intelligently can mean no other than that a person should know how to write as
to be understood or should know how to put his ideas in written words so that he be
understood.
- Respondent has given evidence that he knew how to write in Tagalog intelligently. The
forgoing evidence was enough to show that the respondent knew how to write in
Tagalog intelligently.
G.R. No. L-8221 January 31, 1956
Eduardo Manlapat vs Simeon Salazar

Facts
- Three co-owners of a fishpond were taking turns in leasing it to the same person,
Bernardo Enriquez.
- The last lease was signed in 1931 and was to last until June 1, 1967.
- Esperanza Guillen, the widow of Bernardo Enriquez, subleased the fishpond to
Defendant Simeon Salazar, which was to commence from May 31, 1964 and last until
May 31, 1967.
- In 1957, the co-owners of the fishpond were already dead and their only heir, Plaintiff
Eduardo Manlapat, brought the present action in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
against the sublease Simeon Salazar to recover possession of the fishpond.
- Plaintiff alleged that the sublease to the defendant, as well as the leases executed by
the plaintiff’s predecessors in interest, was void for the lack of consent from the lessors.
- Under the old and new Civil Code, it would still be valid even though entered into
without the consent of lessors since there was no prohibition against it in the contract
of lease.
- The court decided that those contracts were valid and dismissed plaintiff’s action with
costs.
- The present appeal involves only the sublease to the appellee, with the appellant
contending that the lower court erred in declaring the same valid and binding.

Issue/s
- Whether or not the sublease was null and void.

Ruling
- NO. The Court decided to affirm the decision of the lower court. The contract is a valid
sublease and the court did not err in considering it as such and in declaring it valid, there
being nothing against it in the original contract of lease.
- To determine whether a given contract constitutes an assignment of lease and not a
mere sublease, the test is whether the lessee has by said contract made an absolute
transfer of his interests as such lessee dissociating himself from the original contract of
 lease, his personality disappears and there remain only in the juridical relation two
persons, the lessor and the assignee, who is converted into a lessee
- The same test is applied, at common law, where the transfer of a leasehold by the
lessee is deemed an assignment of lease only if he cedes his entire interest in the estate;
whereas, if he retains a reversionary interest, however small, the transfer is deemed a
mere sublease. (32 Am. Jur. 290; 51 C.J. S. 553.) So, if the lessee underlets for a period
less than the entire term or reserves for himself a reversionary interest in the term, the
transaction is a subletting. (51 C.J. S. 555.)
- After an examination of the terms of the document executed by Esperanza Guillen in
favor of the Appellee that the said document is one of sublease. The original lease was
to last “until June 1, 1967.” On the other hand, the sublease is to last only until May 31
of that year. Thus, the sublease is for a shorter period than the original lease. A
reservation of even so short a period as the last day of the term is enough to make the
transfer a sublease (35 C.J. 990; Davis vs. Morris, 36 NY 569.)
- The sublessor has not transferred her interest for the entire period of the original lease,
and this may well be due to a desire to repossess the fishpond earlier so that she could
prepare it for delivery to the owner.