Dance's Mind-Body Problem

Author(s): Anna Pakes

Source: Dance Research: The Journal of the Society for Dance Research, Vol. 24, No. 2
(Winter, 2006), pp. 87-104
Published by: Edinburgh University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40004106 .
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Dance's Mind-Body Problem

ANNA PAKES

In section 621 of the Philosophical Ludwig Wittgenstein considers the

Investigations,
following: 'when "I raise my arm",' notes, 'my arm goes up. And the problem
he
arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact
that I raise my arm?' (Wittgenstein 1958, 161). A dancer might have a number
of answershere, as might a viewer of dance performance. Generally,the dancer's
gesture of raising her arm is not just movement, but an intended action: it is not
mere reflex or nervous tick but consciously willed and controlled; it is governed
by a decision to move on the part of the dancer and in some cases also by a
decision on the part of the choreographer that this action be performed. These
purposes shape the quality and significance of the movement as well as causing
it to happen. So if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I
raise my arm, I am left with these intentions.1A dancer might want to add that
the remainder also includes her phenomenal experience of the movement: the
sensation of the muscles tightening in the shoulder as the arm lifts, the feeling
of tension between the arm reaching up and the legs rooted in the ground, the
sense that the surrounding air offers resistance to the gesture. There is a whole
complex of kinaesthetic sensations associated with the action of raising her arm,
and the dancer aware of her performance is very conscious of these sensations:
they contribute to the richness of her experience and, arguably,to the particular
quality of the action as perceived by the audience. They too make the gesture of
raising one's arm more than just a movement of the arm upwards.
Of course, Wittgenstein is not suggesting that it is actually possible to isolate
intention and phenomenal awareness from physical movement. His question is
an analytic one designed to elucidate the character of a human action as opposed
to a mere physical occurrence. In the process, it highlights issues key to contem-
porary debates in analytic philosophy about the mind-body problem and thus
offers a route in to the core topics of this article. The dancer's hypothetical
answer to Wittgenstein'squestion suggeststhat dance centrally involves (or seems
to involve) ideas and intentions causing or being embodied in physical move-
ment; it points also to how dance's value depends (or seems to depend) partly on
the phenomenal experiences of dancers, choreographers and viewers. Yet what
are ideas, intentions and phenomenal experience, what kind of reality do they
have, and how do they relate to the world of physical and physiological fact?
These aspects of the mind-body problem - the issues of mental causation and
88 ANNA PAKES

phenomenal consciousness - have received renewed attention in recent analytic

philosophy of mind, as materialist and physicalist views have grown in popu-
larity. If mental causation and phenomenal consciousness are indeed funda-
mental to dance, debates about these issues in general have implications for, and
potential to illuminate, our art form, as this article will seek to show.2
The relevance of the mind-body problem to dance is sometimes obscured
by mistaken assumptions about the nature of that problem and the way it is
currently being tackled by analytic philosophy. Within dance circles, there is a
tendency to think that even to refer to the mind-body relation as a 'problem' is
to get off on the wrong foot by assuming that mind and body are separate
entities. The term 'Cartesian dualism' is frequently invoked, often applied
pejoratively,and the philosophical position it denotes assumed to be antithetical
to dance's essence. What we should do, according to some, is to focus on the
integration of mind and body central to the dancer's lived experience or evident
in dance works.3The 'problem', in this view, is one created by philosophers
labouring fruitlessly under Cartesian illusions; it dissolves when we adjust our
thinking to the terms and experiences of a long-neglected and undervalued art
form.
There are two key difficulties with this received view of the mind-body
problem. Firstly, it misrepresents Descartes' work and the problematic with
which he was engaged.4 There is not space to develop this argument here,
but despite the unsatisfactoriness of the Cartesian solution it is important to
recognise it as a genuine attempt to tackle a perennial metaphysical issue: how
to explain the existence of consciousness and its relationship to the material
world of merely physical objects and of fundamental particles that science tells
us compose the world. In other words, how can an apparently immaterial thing
like a thought or decision cause me to raise my arm? How and why do I have
conscious awareness of the gesture 'from the inside', when this hardly seems
necessary for the physical movement as such to be effected? These are questions
raised, not dissolved, by dance experience. The second difficulty with the
received view is that it fails to recognise the focus and thrust of the last fifty years
of debate on the mind-body issue. Since the 1950s, the majorityview in analytic
philosophy of mind has been not dualist but materialist or physicalist: where
Descartes posited the existence of two fundamentally different substances -
consciousness and matter - most contemporary analytic philosophers claim that
there is only one, developing various strategies to explain how consciousness
reduces to, or depends upon, its material base. The notion that the physical is
all there is, and that consciousness must therefore be explicable - if it exists at
all - in physical terms, is the current orthodoxy. In David Lewis's words, it is
'non-negotiable' (Heil 2004, 5 1).5If physicalism is the new orthodoxy in the
philosophy of the mind-body problem, then it seems appropriate that its tenets
be examined in any contemporary engagement with that problem and its
implications for dance.
To place emphasis on the physical might initially seem more accom-
modating of dance than the dualist framework,given that dance is an art of the
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 89

body, founded on human physicality.So surely highlighting the physical basis of

all experience both reiterates an insight already available to those involved in
dance and opens a route to a kind of philosophy sympathetic to a long ignored
art? But the term 'physical'has a very different scope and resonance in analytic
philosophy to those it has in the dance sphere. Physicalism argues not that all
mental phenomena are embodied or incarnate, but that they are - or should
be - explicable in the terms of physical science.6 As a metaphysical doctrine,
Physicalismclaims that the physical sciences should be ultimate arbiters of what
there is. Its arguments are built around a crucial premise, that physics is itself
causally closed or complete, in other words that 'all physical effects are fully
determined by law by prior physical occurrences' (Papineau 2001, 8).7From a
dance perspective, in other words, the movement of the dancer's body - like my
-
raising my arm is a physiological event determined by other physiological
or neurological occurrences - the firing of neurons in a certain pattern, say -
which themselves may be caused by other physical stimuli. Whilst we may talk in
terms of creative freedom, artistic intention, aesthetic response, meaning and
embodied thinking, therefore, these are ultimately ways of speaking about brain
-
processes and messages passing across the nervous system. The mind including
-
its capacities for rational thought, emotion and bodily sensation is nothing
more than the brain (or brain and nervous system combined) or nothing more
than a functional system whose operations are ultimately determined by the
brain'sphysical structure.8
Recent work in the cognitive and neuro-science of dance encourages this
kind of physicalist perspective.9Ivar Hagendoorn (2004), for example, claims
that our responses to dance performance like 'all our actions, perceptions and
feelings are mediated and controlled by the brain' (79). His 2004 article explores
how brain structures 'may combine to ultimately give rise to the sensations we
experience when watching a dance performance' (ibid.);elsewhere, he seeks to
elucidate the 'processesthrough which a brain comes up with a [. . .] movement'
(2003, 222). Other projects such as the Choreography and Cognition
research led by
Scott deLahunta, Wayne McGregor and Rosaleen McCarthy; Daniel Glaser's
Dancers'Brainsresearch, and the Australian UnspokenKnowledges project work
along similar to
lines, seeking explain in terms of brain structures and processes
how dance movement is generated, perceived and interpreted.10These are
largely experimental scientific rather than philosophical research projects, but
they are compatible with the spirit of philosophical physicalism in treating the
investigationof mind and mental phenomena as a properly empirical enterprise
- a series of questions to be answered by empirical scientific enquiry rather than
metaphysical argument.
On one level, such physicalist premises seem unproblematic: to a certain
extent they - along with a deep-rooted respect for the scientific project - have
permeated the contemporary mindset to the point where the words 'mind' and
'brain' are often used interchangeably and where it is assumed that the most
fundamental explanation of phenomena will be one in physical scientific terms.
It is also undoubtedly true that scientific investigation has yielded some interest-
90 ANNA PAKES

ing findings about the neural structuresinvolved in dance perception and action,
giving weight to arguments for the explanatory power of such enquiry.There is
a parallel tendency in some philosophy of mind which considers the causal
closure of physics to be a principle whose truth has been amply demonstrated
empirically Papineau (2001), for example, sees 'no virtue in philosophers
refusing to accept a premise that, by any normal inductive standards,has been
fully established over a century of empirical research' (33), while Crane (2001)
notes how '[f]or some philosophers, to deny the completeness of physics is to be
somewhat in the position of Cardinal Bellarmino refusingto look down Galileo's
telescope: it is a plain refusal to countenance the known scientific facts' (65).
Nonetheless, as Crane points out, it is not clear that physicalism'sbasic premise
is a scientific fact so much as 'a philosophical principle invented to fit what
physical science has discovered into a particular metaphysical vision of things'
(ibid.). It is, after all, difficult to see how one could provide empirical proof
for the claim that 'all physical effects are fully determined by law by prior
physical occurrences', since this is arguably an assumption on which empirical
investigation itself rests.
Rather than develop these ideas here, however, this article will focus on
how a physicalism has difficulty accounting for fundamental aspects of dance,
specifically mental causation and phenomenal consciousness. How can we
understand dance art unless we can explain how intentions, decisions and desires
to move in particularways can result in visible movement? In other words, dance
-
depends or seems to depend - on various kinds of mental event having physical
effects, but it is not immediately clear how this is possible if physicalism'sprin-
ciple of causal closure holds. What is more, the significance and value of dance
seem to rest at least partly on the phenomenal experiences of dancers and
audiences: on the way it feels to perform or witness a leap, lunge or fall to the
floor, on what it is like to confront the physical presence of dancers or audience
members, or follow a phrase or movement from its initiation to completion.
Again, these phenomenal experiences are difficult to accommodate within a
physicalist picture centred on the neurological substrate of experience not its
qualitative features. Recognising this suggests that, although we (as dancers,
dance audiences and human beings) may want to accept our basic materiality,
we also intuitivelyview mind and aspects of consciousness as fundamental to our
experience; physicalism fits the first but not the second of these intuitions,
arguably more easily accommodated by a Cartesian framework (see Haldane
2000, 303). This in itself, of course, does not demonstrate that physicalism is
wrong, or prove Descartes right; nor will this paper attempt to argue either case.
The aim is rather to outline some of the arguments around the problems of
mental causation and phenomenal consciousness, in the process bringing home
the nature and philosophical pertinence to dance of these key aspects of the
mind-body problematic.
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 91

MENTALCAUSATION
Imagine a dancer improvising on stage. She begins in silence and stillness, but
gradually, in response to murmurings on the sound-score, starts to move in a
slow,controlled way. She initiates movement in the extremities of the fingers and
feet, a series of impulses that pass through the limbs and joints to the body's core.
As her centre engages, she moves more quickly and travels more expansively,
her gesturesbecoming more complex and ambitious - until a moment when she
feels herself falling into a familiar pattern in which she merely reiterates a
sequence that seems to come automatically.The dancer makes the decision to
fracturethis sequence, break its apparentlyorganic flow by unexpectedly leading
movement from the elbow in a new direction. Realising also that her dynamic
has become monotonous in a series of flurries of movement of about the
same duration, she makes the effort to sustain certain phrases for longer and,
ultimately,calm everything down to return to the virtual stillnessfrom which she
began.
This description - in a language that a dancer use might herself to charac-
terise her experience - evokes something of the complex thought processes
involved in improvisation. The improvising dancer relies on technique and
familiarity with particular ways of moving born of extensive training, but also
engages in decision-making in the moment of performing: environmental
stimuli, consciousness of the evolving movement material and her own creative
ideas may all affect what she elects to do next.11The same seems true also of
dancers performing set material, who shape that dance through their decisions
to interpret it in a particular way. It also seems clear that choreographers'
intentions help determine the nature, if not the meaning, of their artistic work.
Indeed, audience members' appreciation of dance partly depends on the
assumption that they are watching mindful human beings engaged in intentional
action, which in turn embodies (at least to some extent) the choreographic vision
of the artist responsible for the work. Throughout dance, then, the assumption
- -
operates that mental phenomena thoughts, ideas, decisions are able to
influence or cause the physical events visible on stage. Indeed, this is an
assumption that pervades everyday life and seems, from a folk psychological
point of view, to be crucial to our sense of ourselves as human beings.12And yet
mental causation is difficult to account for at the metaphysical level, for both
dualistsand physicalists.As already suggested, the problem arisesfor physicalism
because mental causation appears to be ruled out by its core premise, 'all
physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical occurrences'. This
seems to exclude the possibility that anything beyond the physical can have a
causal role. So how is it possible to square our intuition that - in dance, as in
other spheres of life - ideas, thoughts and intentions do cause action with the
principle of causal closure or completeness?
Reductive physicalism offers a straightforwardanswer, identifying mental
events with the brain processes.13If the mind is nothing more than the brain,
then mental events are neural events: their physical nature means they can cause
92 ANNA PAKES

physical occurrences without violating the principle of causal closure. If, for
example, the sensation of pain (a mental phenomenon in the sense that it is a
subjective experience of consciousness) is nothing over and above the firing of
Carbon-fibres in the brain of the subject, then because this is a physical event
there is no logical difficultyin the way of explaining how that event causes pain-
related behaviour like wincing, rubbing one's head or taking an aspirin (though
it might be a complex and laborious process to trace this chain of causally related
physical events). The same principle also applies to the mental phenomena
associated with dance, similarly reducible to happenings in the brain/nervous
system, according to the terms of identity theory. If understanding another's
movement is nothing more than the firing of mirror neurons in the pre-motor
cortex, then there is no logical stumbling block to explaining how that occur-
rence can cause someone to get up and dance themselves.14There may be differ-
ent ways of referring to these neural events: everyday language abounds in
'sensations statements' with a very different flavour and meaning to the 'brain-
process statements' of the neuroscientist;but, according to the identity theorist,
the two kinds of statement still refer to the same thing - the physical event - and
not to some ghostly mental phenomenon distinct from it.15
Brain-mind identity theory thus solves the problem of mental causation, but
has come under sustained attack since its development in the 1950s, proving
particularlyvulnerable to Hilary Putnam's (1980) charge that it denies multiple
realisability If conscious experiences such as sensations of pain, or kinaesthetic
awareness of one's movements, are strictly identical with specific (human)brain
processes, then this seems to rule out the possibility that non-human creatures
with other brain structurescan also feel pain or feel themselves move. This seems
to build too strong (and species chauvinist)an assumption into identity theory for
it to be acceptable. Philosophers have wanted to leave open the possibility that it
is not simply creatures with the same physico-chemical make-up as ourselves
who have conscious experiences and sensations. This means recognising that
types of mental state like pain or kinaesthetic awareness can be realised by other
brain processes in other physical structures, and a modification of the identity
theory is thus necessary to accommodate this insight.16
But another difficulty also arises which perhaps bears more directly on
dance concerns. This is to do with whether or not reductionistviews which seek
to explain mental in terms of physical phenomena actually fulfil their own brief.
It is worth noting that the point of such theories is not to eliminate the mental
from the philosophical picture entirely, but to provide an explanation which
renders it intelligible, in this case, in physicalist terms. In this sense, the terms
'reduction' and 'reductionist' do not carry pejorative overtones, but identify an
approach which clarifies apparently complex phenomena by explaining them
fully in the terms of another theory.17The question then becomes whether
aspects of dance experience can be explained - indeed, rendered more intel-
-
ligible by accounts based on physicalistpremises. We might replace or seek to
reduce our ordinary, folk psychological explanations of dance behaviour to
explanations based on the findings and terms of physical or neuro-science. But
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 93

do such accounts offer genuine explanations that enhance our dance knowledge?
This is not a question that can be briefly answered in any comprehensive
way. Some might argue that we are already proposing a helpful clarification in
merely asserting that intentions, creative intuitions and viewers' responses to
dance performance are nothing more than brain processes of one sort or
another; this dissolves the 'mystery' of consciousness and brings it within the
grasp of science to investigate. But then how illuminating are neuroscientific
accounts of art phenomena? Again, this is too broad a question to be tackled
here, however a specific example may help illustrate a potential problem more
clearly. Hagendoorn (2005) draws on work in experimental psychology to
speculate about the effects on dance perception of an apparently innate human
preference for horizontal over oblique lines. He argues that this preference
affects how dance movement is appreciated and how artistsselect movement, in
that it is reflected in the shapes and figures they favour. Hagendoorn suggests
that the enduring appeal of classicalballet follows from this technique's tendency
to align the body along the preferred horizontal and vertical planes. The
neurological explanation given for the preference is that the human brain more
easily detects such lines: 'the most likely hypothesis is that more orientation
detectors in the primary visual cortex are selective for horizontal and vertical
than for oblique lines' (2).
Leaving aside the general plausibility of the theory, does the latter
hypothesis actually help to explain the preference? Or does it just describe the
tendency in other terms? On what grounds should we prefer this explanation
over other (say,dance historical)types of explanation?18We might if we learned
something about why more orientation detectors select in this way, but this
discussion at least does not explore in detail what neurological function is served
by this state of affairsor whether it has a role in evolutionary development. Even
if it did, the lack of reference in the account to art historical considerationsseems
problematic. The neural structures specified might be responsible for mere
aesthetic preference, but they seem unable to account for why and to what effect
such lines predominate in particular works or types of art but not others. After
all, not all pictures look like Mondrians. Nor does this explanation seem very
helpful in understanding how we respond to, say, a Mondrian as an artwork,
rather than as a mere aesthetic object: there is no reference, for example, to the
meanings such lines might convey in specific art situations.19The neuroscientist
might reasonably point out that empirical investigation of such issues is in its
infancy and that it will take time for scientific explanations to develop to reflect
the full complexity of such phenomena. The fact that existing explanations
may be unsatisfactory does not in itself refute the premises of the scientific or
physicalistproject. Yet examples like the one considered might also raise doubts
as to whether phenomena such as artistic understanding and meaning are of an
order that could ever be explained in the way reductive physicalism proposes.
One response that the defender of a physicalist approach might offer here
would be to step back from reductionism and adopt a more functionalist
perspective on mental phenomena: briefly,to argue that mental state types are
94 ANNA PAKES

not to be identified with neurophysiological types but with functional states (i.e.
states defined by their position within a causal network of sensory inputs,
behavioural outputs and other mental states). Many varieties of functionalism
thus characterise the mental as dependent upon but irreducible to its physical
substrate. For example, one could claim that our responses to another's move-
ment do depend on the firings of mirror neurons, but our experience is not
reducible to this neural event: rather,that experience is a functional state with a
particular character based on the inputs (e.g. the perception of another person
dancing), dispositions to act (in this case, to dance oneself) and other mental
states with which it is associated (such as desire or habitual enjoyment of
dancing).20According to a functionalist perspective, there are different levels of
description of mental phenomena, whereby the higher level propertiesof artistic
activity revealed in, say,art historical analysis cannot be collapsed into the lower
level properties specified by neuroscientific accounts. Although this kind of
view allows greater scope for doing justice to intuitions about the richness and
complexity of conscious life, it again confronts the problem of mental causation.
It has difficulty accounting for how mental properties irreducible to physical
properties can be causally efficacious: if they are, then this still seems to violate
the principle of causal closure; if they have no causal role (but rather it is the
physical properties on which they depend which participate in the causal
network), then they appear merely superfluous.21Many functionalist and non-
reductive physicalist views avoid some of the difficulties of reductionism, but
seem to lose its advantages in resolving the problem of mental causation (Crane
2001,59-62).
This by no means presents a decisive refutation of physicalism and is not
intended to suggest a preference for dualist accounts of mental interaction:
although dualism does (likefunctionalism)allow more room for the mental in its
metaphysicalpicture, and does posit the causal efficacy of mental phenomena, it
struggles to explain how two fundamentally different substances or sorts of
properties (mental and physical)can interact with one another. But the consider-
ations outlined are some of the issues that need to be tackled if physicalism is to
accommodate mental causation within its metaphysicalpicture;these arguments
and the centrality of mental causation to dance should give pause for thought to
those tempted to accept a physicalist view. This is an aspect of the mind-body
problem which does not dissolve despite the increasing proliferation and, in
some cases, plausibilityof neurological explanations of dance activity and experi-
ence. Interestingly, even those projects focused on uncovering neuroscientific
facts about dance, and framed by a predominantly physicalist metaphysics, still
seem to assume mental causation. Both the Choreography and Cognition project
and Hagendoorn's work are interested in how neurological findings might be
creatively exploited by dance artists.This implies that it is possible intentionally
to manipulate the brain structuresand processes discovered.22How could it be
unless it is true that thoughts, ideas and the mental more generally can effect
physical results?
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 95

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The discussion above raised the question of how effective reductive physicalist
accounts are as explanations of dance phenomena. There is also a question mark
over the completeness of those accounts: do they identify all or even the key
aspects of what goes on in dance? They do seem to leave one crucial dimension
out of the picture, namely the lived experience or what it is actually like to per-
form, create and witness dance. Their focus is on the conditions of experience,
not the experience itself. A description of the physiology and neuro-physiology
of a dancer raising her arm will not help us appreciate the complex of
kinaestheticsensations she feels, or other aspects of her phenomenal experience.
Similarly,characterisingpain as the firing of G-fibres may describe in objective
terms what happens in the brain when we have a headache, but it does not seem
to touch the subjective experience of what it is actually like to be in pain. This
is the problem of qualia or phenomenal consciousness which creates difficulties
for any attempts to treat consciousness in purely physicalist terms. A neuro-
physiological account of what is going on in the brain will outline physical
structures and processes that are objectively observable, but seems necessarily
to treat the qualitative dimension as superfluous and dispensable despite its
importance to our conscious lives: 'the subjective character of experience [...] is
not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the
mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence' (Nagel 1974,
436). And yet phenomenal consciousness seems crucial to why we value dance,
whether we are performing ourselves or watching others perform.23
When I watch a dancer on stage, for example, I am interested in her
contribution to the work as a whole and to the ideas and meanings the work
conveys. But my enjoyment of the dance, and my interest in it, also lies in the
phenomenal qualities of my experience in the theatre: the vivid brightness or
soothing colours of the lighting, the exhilaration felt at the speed and agility of
the dancer, the satisfactiongenerated by the performer'sprecise timing and the
choreographer'scareful structuring.It is possible that these aesthetic experiences
derive neurologically from brain structures and processes which favour peak-
shift effects, grouping of related features, isolation of particular visual clues
and the contrast of segregated features (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999,
Hagendoorn 2003 and 2004), but arguablyrecognising and understanding all of
this will not help us grasp what watching dance is actually like. The philosophical
problem arises here not merely because our intuitions tell us that conscious
experience is too rich to be reflected in the existing language of the neuro-
physical; and not simply because we are amazed at the idea that the wet grey
matter inside my skull can generate such sensations. The philosophical issue is
over whether there are logical difficulties in the way of ever providing a
physicalistexplanation for qualia and over whether or not there are good reasons
to think that phenomenal awareness is indeed essential to consciousness and, by
extension, dance.
A number of philosophical arguments have been constructed around
96 ANNA PAKES

thought experiments which confront these issues. FrankJackson has famously

developed the 'knowledge argument' (1982 and 1986) which tests the limits of
what can be known about experience through the physical sciences. He imagines
a scientist called Mary who is confined from birth to a black-and-white room
and educated through black-and-white books, taped lectures and programmes
shown on a black-and-white television. Being a student of some talent, Mary
manages to learn all the physical facts there are about colour vision: what neural
and physiological structures enable it, how it works, what functions its serves.
The question is whether, in the process, Mary learns all there is to know about
seeing colour or whether, on finally leaving the room and seeing red, blue and
green for the first time, she discovers anything new.Jackson argues that she does
acquire new knowledge because she suddenly understands what it is like to see
colour, something that the science of colour vision, however comprehensive,
cannot teach her. And arguably, Mary does not just learn a new ability or
confirm empirically something she was previously only able to imagine: in
experiencing herself, she gains knowledge about the mental lives of others, a fact
quite distinct from all the physical facts that she had hitherto acquired (Jackson
1986).
This thought experiment's implications can be developed in the dance
context. I could - in principle at least - learn all the physical facts there are to
know about dancing: the complex functioning of the human anatomy in the
wide range of movements available in dance; the physiological principles which
allow variations in gesture, dynamic and texture; all the fine-grained neural
structureswhich control and process movement. Yet arguably,I would still learn
something new on participating in a dance class - or performing on stage - for
the first time, since I would understand something of what it is like to perform
dance movement in the space. With this understanding also comes some insight
into the experience of other dancers which - despite my extensive physical
scientific knowledge - was not available to me before.24One might construct
similar thought experiments around the experience of watching dance on stage
or creating choreography.In each case, the qualitative feel of these activities for
those engaged in them does not seem to be captured by any amount of physical
scientific understanding of the structures and processes involved. I could know
that motion perception is predictive, comprehending the elaborate visual and
neural processes that enable the brain to keep up with a perceived moving target;
I might also know of the existence and function of mirror neurons and their
importance in my response to another's dance.25But none of this knowledge
on its own will enable me to reconstruct - or even truly grasp - the actual
experience of watching a dancer in performance.
Philosophical opinion remains divided over how damaging Jackson's
knowledge argument is for physicalismand, in particular,for physicalistattempts
to account for consciousness. To some extent, its purchase depends on whether
or not it accurately identifies and challenges the core premises of the physicalist
position. Crane (2001, 93-9) argues that it does not, since the argument assumes
physicalism to hold that all knowledge is physical. In Crane's view, one can be
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 97

a physicalist without adopting this view: the principle of the causal closure or
completeness of physics is what is crucial, and this does not necessarily imply
physics' completeness in other respects or its explanatory adequacy. But even if
we focus on causal closure, it seems, qualia are necessarily relegated to the status
of epiphenomena, that is mental occurrences which simply do not enter into the
causal network:if lived experience were to have physical effects then it would, by
the principle of causal closure, have to be itself in some way physical. Although
some physicalists may be happy to accept qualia as mere by-products of a
physical process, it does not really square with our intuitions: that it's the feeling
of itchinesswhich leads me to scratch, for example, or the experience of pain that
makes me reach for the aspirin bottle. We might similarlywant to claim that the
exhilaration experienced watching a dancer leap across the stage is what causes
me to cheer and applaud her virtuosity; or that my awareness of how my arm
feels in that particularposition affects how I make the transition to a subsequent
gesture.
Intuitions alone, however, cannot show where physicalism goes wrong
although they may help inspire or test relevant arguments. Although Jackson's
knowledge argument may not be decisive, other challenges to physicalism have
been launched which also hinge on the issue of phenomenal consciousness. One
of these involves a different thought experiment to Jackson's, but still designed
to test the limits of conceptions of the mind-body relation. As with Jackson's
black-and-white-room, the primary target is physicalist theory, in this case
specificallynonreductive varieties thereof.
Imagine someone who is alike me in every physical respect, whose body
looks and functions in an identical way, who responds to various stimuli with the
same behaviour and whose brain and nervous system are identically structured
and engage in exactly the same processes as mine. The only difference is that this
creature - call it a zombie-me - doesn't have subjective conscious experience.
Zombie-me is not to be confused with your average, common-or-garden zombie
of the Dawnof theDeadVariety,which looks and behaves differentlyto an ordinary
human being. Zombie-me looks, acts and reacts in exactly the same way as I do.
But she (if we can even call her a 'she') does not have the visual experience of
seeing colours, although her brain functions in the same way as mine when I look
at a bowl of brightly coloured fruit. She is not kinaestheticallyaware of her own
movement, although she can dance the same phrases as me and improvise
effectively,or at least without an audience being able to tell purely by looking that
we are different. She can attend a dance performance, seem engrossed in the
action on stage, her body going through the same patterns of behaviour as mine
when I sit in an auditorium. And yet, we cannot call her movement a response
to how it feels to watch the show, because she doesn't feel anything. When she
gasps, this is not an expression of her wonder at the performer's virtuosity
because she doesn't have the subjective experience of amazement, even though
a brain scan would reveal that the same neurons fire in the same pattern as in my
brain in a similar situation.
Philosophers such as Kirk (1974; 2003, 85-97) and Chalmers (1996) have
98 ANNA PAKES

asked whether it is really possible to imagine such zombies existing,whether they

are conceivable or whether the mere idea of a zombie is self-contradictory.If
zombies are conceivable, then this suggests that they are logically possible: that
is, there is no logical or conceptual difficulty that prevents us from imagining
them, even though there may be insuperable practical stumbling blocks to them
ever coming into existence.26Chalmers suggests that, if zombies are conceivable,
then this shows that the mental is not entailed by the physical in the way that
physicalists suggest, because an entity could have all the physical structuresin
place that, in my case, produce consciousness, but fail to do so in the case of
zombie-me. So if zombies are conceivable, then physicalism must be wrong.27
According to Crane (2001), this argument has an advantage over the knowledge
argument because it treats physicalism as a purely metaphysical rather than an
epistemological theory (i.e. it takes physicalism to be a claim about what there is,
not about what can be known about the world and how). There has, however,
been extensive debate, particularlyover the premise that what is conceivable is
possible, which plays a key role in the argument (Crane 2001, 100-1; Kirk 2003,
89-90), as well as over the question of whether zombies are indeed conceivable
(Kirk 2003, 90-4).
But the zombie thought experiment can also be elaborated to test our
intuitions about what is crucial to dance. Imagine a group of dancer-zombies
who all perform and behave exactly like human dancers, showing the same
virtuosity,expressiveness, kinaesthetic sensitivity and performance presence, at
least as far as the viewer who does not know that they are zombies is concerned.
Now consider whether it matters to the audience when they discover that these
performers have no inner awareness of their actions, no felt sensations or
phenomenal consciousness of their dance at all. Does this make a difference to
our appreciation of what they are doing? What the audience sees is perceptibly
identical with what a group of human dancers might perform. Yet knowing that
these 'performers'feel nothing does seem to matter in quite a profound way. In
a recent discussion of what spectators see when they watch a dancer's moving
body, Francis Sparshott (2004) suggests that this includes the 'flesh', or 'actual
material stuff in motion', the body as 'articulated mechanical system' and the
'organic body, moving as a living thing controlled by its nervous system' (280).
But crucially, the audience also sees 'the gesturing human, its movement not
merely vital but essentially meaningful as expressions of a conscious, perceptive,
motivated being' (ibid.).28Sparshott notes how the performer also bears identity
markers (age, gender, ethnicity) and refers to a particular social reality and
culturalcontext, which may in turn endow it with a special symbolic significance.
These further layers are, however, dependent on the fundamental humanity of
the performer, or on our awareness, first and foremost, of the dancer as a
conscious being consciously in control of her action.
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 99

CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this article, the hypothetical dancer's answer to Witt-
genstein's question about raising his arm suggested mental causation and
phenomenal consciousness as important features of dance, which make it more
than just movement. If they are indeed fundamental, then they must be central
also to any attempt to come to terms with dance philosophically. A position
which eliminates either from the picture is unlikely to be able to offer a satis-
factory account. Of course, most physicalistswould not go so far,29but this article
has aimed to show how even less extreme physicalist positions encounter
difficulties in tackling these aspects of the mind-body problem, and hence in
accounting for crucial dimensions of dance activity. This is not to say that a
physicalistperspective can never overcome these difficulties,but it does indicate
problems that need to be addressed and the appropriateness of a cautious
approach to physicalist 'solutions' to the mind-body issue within dance.
Although some, such as Kim (2001), are sceptical that the mind-body
problem can ever be resolved, possible solutions are still proposed and debated
within philosophy of mind, each having the potential to illuminate aspects of
such 'hard' questions if not to provide definitive answers.30And each may thus
also have interesting implications for how we think about dance as an art form
that crucially involves both matter and consciousness. The detailed discussion of
these issues in the specialist language of analytic philosophy of mind may seem
to take us a long way from dance; but this article has tried to indicate some of the
ways in which it bears directly on crucial aspects of the art form. Exploring the
relevance of mind-body philosophy helps grasp what is going on in dance
situations, whilst examining concrete dance experience helps ground abstract
philosophical reasoning and conclusions. Hopefully, this brief foray into the
territory has helped to demonstrate this and to show that the mind-body
problem really is a problem for dance and not just for the philosophers.31

NOTES
1. These issues, including the distinctionbetween action and mere movement have been
extensivelydiscussedin the existing philosophicalliteratureon dance: see in particular
McFee (1992, 49-66), Carr (1987) and Beardsley(1982).
2. Wittgensteinhimself is not often invoked in the contemporaryliteratureon the mind-
body issue and his own philosophicalconcerns had a somewhatdifferentfocus, itselfthe
topic for anotherarticlesince thereis insufficientspace to explorehis perspectiveproperly
here. Indeed, Haldane (2003)notes: 'the decline of interestin Wittgenstein'swork,and in
that of others influencedby him, is itself a mark of the naturalistic-cum-scientificturn'
(303), the contemporary trend which is the focus of this paper. Existing analytic
philosophicalwork on dance which adopts a Wittgensteinianapproachalso tends not to
engage with the metaphysicalissues identifiedas a contemporaryphysicalistmight see
them. Although Best (1974), Carr (1987) and McFee (1992) all question '[w]hat is the
connectionbetween an intangiblething like an emotional state, and a physicalthing like
a human movement'(Best 1974, 2), they treat that connection as fundamentallylogical
ratherthan causal and do not discussin detail the relationshipbetween brain statesand
mentalstates.To a certainextent, then, existingphilosophyof dance refusesto accept the
100 ANNA PAKES

premisesof contemporarydebatesand thereforedoes not enter into them, perhapspartly

because of its Wittgensteinianleanings.
3. See, for example, Fraleigh(2004, 8-9) who suggeststhat certainforms of dance practice
heal the manifold divisions (between culture/nature, masculine/feminine, as well as
mind/body) spawned by Cartesian dualism. Similarly,Briginshaw(2001) suggeststhat
by reinstatingand revaluingthe body, dance challengesDescartes'dualismwhich 'sees
the mind and body as separateentitieswhere the body materiallyoccupies space and is
a container for the conscious mind' (140). Like Fraleigh, Briginshaw associates the
mind/body divide she claims is institutedby Descartes with other, problematicbinary
divisionsbetween, for example, self and world, masculineand feminine.Neither theorist
examinesthe natureof Descartes'problematic,the detail of his argumentor the context
in which it is formulated.
4. Fora recent discussionof Descarteswhich challengesreceivedviewswithinphilosophyof
his work'sthrustand significance,see Bakerand Morris(1996).
5. Although the terms 'materialism'and 'physicalism'are often used interchangeably,they
designate distinct positions. Materialismis the metaphysicaldoctrine that everything
in the world is composed of matter (particlessuch as atoms or electrons, say), where
physicalismarguesthat the question of what there is should be delegatedto the physical
sciences;since science has revealedthe existence of non-materialentities such as forces
and waves, this is not equivalentto claimingthat everythingis material.In theory,then,
physicalismis metaphysicallyopen-ended since it treatsthe questionof what existsas an
empiricalone to be resolvedby physicalscience (see Crane 2001, 46-7). The rest of this
article will focus on physicalismrather than materialism,since it is currentlythe more
widely held, and plausible,view.
6. 'Physical science' would typically include the different branches of physics, but also
chemistry,molecular biology and other sciences reducible to physics in practice or
principle(whichis usuallyseen to excludehuman scienceslike psychologyand sociology).
Proponentsof physicalismare not always clear about the scope of 'physicalscience' or
how it shouldbe denned:see Crane in Guttenplan(1994, 479-80) and Crane and Mellor
(1990).
7. In Papmeaus view (2001), physicalism only came to prominence as a philosophical
positionnotjust when physicalscienceestablishedits dominancein the knowledgesphere,
but when this crucial premise became availableto philosophersin the 1950s. On the
philosophicalsignificanceof physicalism's core premise,see also Crane 2001, 43-8.
8. This is a very broad characterisationof the implicationsof physicalism,which does not
properlyreflect the distinctionsbetween differentvarietiesthereof. There is an attempt
in what follows to develop some relevant distinctions- between identity theory and
functionalism,for example - but the discussiontends to remain general on the grounds
that physicalism'sbasic thrustand problemsneed to be understoodbeforesuch subtleties
can be grasped.
9. This is despite the fact that cognitive science as a discipline is usually regarded as
conceptuallyunderpinnednot by physicalismper se but by functionalism(whichstrictly
speaking is compatible with dualism as well as physicalism).Often, however,the way
cognitiveand neuro scientificwork is popularisedreinforcesa reductivephysicalistview.
What is more, many of the philosophicalissuesidentifiedin what followscan be raisedin
respectof functionalismas well as (reductive)physicalism.
10. See the following websites for further information and links to associated publica-
tions: Choreographyand Cognition, http://www.choreocog.net;Daniel Glaser'spages,
http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/dglaser/science.shtml;and the Unspoken Knowledgespages,
http://www.ausdance.org.au/unspoken.
11. See the essaysby Susan Fosterand Kent de Spain in Cooper-Albright(2003) for more
developedaccountsof the experienceof improvisation.De Spain in particular,pp. 33-6,
exploresthe differentways in which intentionbecomes embodied in physicalmovement
and identifies various kinds of intention, from direct to indirect to 'intending the
unintended' or 'allowing' (34). From the perspective of this article, each implies the
possibility of mental causation and emphasises the thinking that dancers do. This
DANCE'S MIND-BODYPROBLEM 101

discussionof mental causationbegins with improvisationbecause it vividlyillustratesthe

thoughtfulnessof dance (see also Sheets-Johnstone1981), not because it has priorityin
this regard over other dance practices: thoughtfulnessis also characteristicof the
performanceand creationof choreographedwork,as Garr 1987 and McFee 1992 argue
in depth.
12. 'Folk psychology' is a term widely employed in philosophy of mind to refer to the
conceptual framework,or set of practices, conventionally'used by ordinarypeople to
understand,explain and predict their own and other people's behaviour and mental
states'(Eckhardtin Guttenplan1994, 300). See Ghurchland(1981)andJacksonand Pettit
(1990)for opposingviews on whetherfolkpsychologyis, or articulates,an explanationof
behaviourat a fundamentallevel.
13. See, for example, Place (1956), Feigl (1958) and Smart (1959). Armstrong (1968) and
Lewis (1983)both presentviews which tackledifficultiespresentin identitytheory'searly
formulation.
14. The BBG 2 series The Dancer'sBody,presented by Deborah Bull and broadcast in
September 2002, presented research attributingthe desire to dance to these kinds of
neural processes. See http://www.deborahbull.comfor further information and press
reviewsof the series.
15. Fordiscussionof how the languageof introspectivereportshas a differentlogic from that
of materialprocesses,see Smart's(1959)seminalstatementof brain-mindidentitytheory.
16. Where type identity theories hold that types of mental state are identicalwith types of
physicalstate (forexample, that pain for all individuals/creaturesin all cases is identical
with G-fibrefiringfor all individuals/creaturesin all cases),token identitytheoriesavoid
the difficultyhighlightedby Putnam. Token identitytheory arguesnot that mental state
types are identicalwith physicalstate types, but only that every individualmental event
(token)is identicalwith an individualphysicalevent (whichcould be a token of a variety
of differenttypes).As Kirknotes, Donald Davidson'sanomalousmonism (Davidson1970)
presents a good example of a token identity theory, although whether or not this (or
indeed other tokenidentitytheories)can satisfactorilyaccountfor mental causationis still
a topic for debate (2003, 56-69). Similarly,there is ongoing debate about whether
functionalism- another alternativeto type identity theory - resolves the problem of
mental causation;see pp. 9-10 below for a brief discussionof functionalism.
17. Thus Crane (2001)arguesfor an understandingof reductionismas explanatoryas well as
ontologicaland comments:'[t]hereis a generalfeelingin currentphilosophyof mind that
reductionismis a Bad Thing, and it is more reasonableto be an anti-reductionist,even
once the distinctionbetween reductionand eliminationis made. Insofaras reductionis
understoodas explanatoryreduction- where this is conceivedof as a kind of explanation
- then this must be a mistake.Genuine explanationsare advancesin our knowledge,and
faced with the possibilityof advancingour knowledgeit would be irrationalto reject it
merelyon the groundsthat it is 'reductive'.(Or rather,it makeslittle sense to do so, since
'reduction'is just a name for this sort of advancementof our knowledge(55).)
18. Contrast, for example, analysis which relates the aesthetic principles of ballet to the
artistictraditionof classicism,e.g. Macaulay(1987) and (1997), or Volinskyin Copeland
and Cohen, eds. (1983)who explainsballetsaspirationto verticalityin both socio-cultural
and evolutionaryterms.
19. The distinctionbetween aestheticand artisticmodes of appreciationis clearlydrawnby
Best (2004) and McFee (2005). Both emphasise how the particular artistic context,
surroundingconventionsand traditionsdeterminethe meaning of given dance works.
20. See Lycan and Block in Guttenplan(1994, 317-32) and Kirk (2003, 121-35) for further
introductorydiscussionof functionalistpositions.
21. Papineau (2001, 10) thus claims that functionalism is 'a closet version of epi-
phenomenalism',that is, the doctrine that mental phenomena exist but are causally
impotent,mere by-productsof physicalprocessesoverwhich they have no influence.The
extent to which different varieties of functionalism and non-reductive physicalism
accommodatementalcausationis stilla stillcontestedtopic:see, for example,Kim (1993),
Jackson(1996),Thomasson (1998) and Clarke(1999).
102 ANNA PAKES

22. The Unspoken Knowledgesprojectgoes even further:furtheringthe 'basicunderstandingof

the complex thought-processesand strategiesdeployedby choreographers'is expectedto
'enrich and enhance choreographicinvention', revivifyinga stagnant dance economy
(http://www.ausdance.org.au/unspoken/background.html).
23. The popularityof phenomenological descriptivetechniques in the dance studies held
supportsthis observation,insofaras they are intendednot to analysedance objectivelybut
to offer 'a firstperson account of the world [and dance] as it is lived' (Sheets-Johnstone
1981, 402). See also Sheets-Johnstone(1979) and (1984), Fraleigh(1987) and Thomas
(1995, 170-5).
24. There are, of course, limits on how much it is possible to understandwhat particular
movements or movement sequences feel like to perform, for someone who has not
performedor does not have the capacityto performa givendance (seeBest 1978, 141-52;
Smyth 1984; and McFee 1992, 264-72; a contrasting perspective on kinaesthetic
empathy,drawingon cognitivescience, is presentedby Montero 2006). Nonetheless,any
embodiedexperienceof dance arguablygivesinsightinto movementof an orderdifferent
to knowledgeof its physiologicaland neurologicalcharacter.
25. Both the predictive nature of motor perception and the role of mirror neurons are
discussedin detail in Hagendoorn (2004).
26. Contrastthe idea of a zombie, for example,with the evidentlycontradictorynotion of a
round squarewhich is both logicallyand empiricallyimpossible.
27. The zombie argumentseemsto havemost purchaseon nonreductiveformsof physicalism
which claim that the mental depends or superveneson (ratherthan being identicalwith)
the physical in some way. Such nonreductive approaches have developed partly in
response to the charge of writers such as Nagel (1974) that physicalismsimply leaves
consciousnessout of the picture:the nonreductivistrecognisesthe existenceof conscious-
ness but arguesthat it is a necessaryconsequenceof the physicalstructure.But, according
to the zombie argument,consciousnesscannot be necessarilyentailedby the physicalin
this way if zombies are a logical possibility.
28. McFee (1992) and Carr (1987; 1997)argue along similarlines.
29. Theoristswho would include Churchland(1988) and Dennett (1991).
30. David Chalmers has famously labelled the task of explaining consciousness'the hard
problem',which sits alongsideother,less intractableissues that make up the mind-body
problematic:see Shear,ed. (1997).
31. Thanks to Bonnie Rowell and the anonymous reviewers for DanceResearch for their
insightfulcomments on earlierdraftsof this article.A shortenedversion of this material
was presented at the Dance Research Conference organisedby the Society for Dance
Research at Middlesex Universityon 25 March 2006. I am gratefulto the conference
organisersand audiencefor the opportunityto discussthese ideas.

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