VOL.
269, MARCH 3, 159
1997
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997. *
TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN,
respondents-appellees.
Land Registration; Actions; A land registration proceeding is
“in rem,” and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon
and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its
branches.—A land registration proceeding is “in rem,” and,
therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the Government and its branches,
irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the
filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an
answer to said application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law.
Same; Same; A decree of registration that has become final
shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually
contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be
liti-gated or decided in the land registration proceedings.—A decree
of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not
only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the
then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then
Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished
member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head
Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court
and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that
decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It
is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon
the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to
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once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case
of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees
which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry
thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action
would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens
System.
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
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Cacho vs. Court of
Appeals
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; The execution of public
documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled
to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and
controvert the same.—The execution of public documents, as in the
case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of
regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same.
Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary
and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely
casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more
reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of
Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the
Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering
officer being of itself a performance of duty by a public official.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Godolfredo D. Cabildo attorney in fact of petitioner.
MELO, J.:
The late Doña Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of
two parcels of land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro
Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military
Reservation No. 43, known as “Camp Overton.”
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 &
6909 and were jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge
on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this
Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United States (28 Phil.
616 [1914], the trial court made the following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the
applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The
title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor,
executed and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the
husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting
this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be
presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object
of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that the applicant present the
corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30,
1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
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The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is
the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90
acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto
Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance
from his uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the
balance by his own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by
the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of
thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size
of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very
much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a
parcel of land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho
is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased
Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of
expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and
had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of
the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking
the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with
the points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs
of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the
Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of
the said deed and the new plan.
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 ANNOTATED
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son
and sole heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho, filed a petition
for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under
Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic
of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the
City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence
filed by the Republic and the NSC, the lower court dismissed
the petition because it found the evidence inadequate to show
the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The same
order stated further that the proper remedy was for the
reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases
Nos. 6908 and 6909, Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969,
respectively, were already issued. The same trial court
specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been
issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs. U.S.,
supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon some
conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court
to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court (docketed as Teofilo
Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495)
but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering
the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one
for re-issuance of decrees under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25
SCRA 316 (1968), and the lower court findings that the decrees had
in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a
motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the
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issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their
opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to
accept the amended petition subject to the private respondents being
given the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses.
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand but
opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the parties.
     (p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard
it as one for re-issuance of the decrees.
In their “Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition” to the
amended petition, respondents Republic of the Philippines and
NSC raised the defenses that the petition suffered from
jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party
in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria
Cacho was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of
land; that no decrees covering the properties were ever issued
in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance of the
decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan,
Branch 1) rendered its decision decreeing the reconstitution
and re-issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969. The
pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for
the issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959
were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively,
and that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment
that had already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited
pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final
and conclusive.
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through
its then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy
Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of
Registration, all certified that according to the Record Book of
Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was
issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued
in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits “C,” “D,” “E” and “M”).
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC
Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this
Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the
original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and properly
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ANNOTATED
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
done based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have
been issued and recorded in LRC’s Record Book of Decrees; that the
plan and technical description of the lots involved were found to be
correct, approved by the LRC and transmitted to this Court. (Exh.
“M”).
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos.
43 and 63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos.
10364 and 18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A.
Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and
validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition,
(Exh. “M”), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded
the fact and date of issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in
GLRO Rec. Nos. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the plans and
corresponding technical descriptions of the lots involved in the
aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. “T”).
4|Page
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors’
counsel, Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of
Ordinary Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries
showing that Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case
No. 6908 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case
No. 6909. (Exhs. “T,” “P” and “19”).
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the
existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and
indubitably by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and
therefore, said amended petition has to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. 1.The amended petition is hereby granted and approved.
Declaring Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as
reconstituted.
2. 2.Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration
Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869
existing at the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration
Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon payment by the
petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court
of Appeals.
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel
Corporation in their joint brief assigned the following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho’s amended
petition for reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly
issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that—
1. I.The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmi-ties;
2. II.The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of
the United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC
Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved pending
compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions
albeit, as of date, no competent evidence exists showing
compliance with the imposed conditions and/or the
rendition of a “final judg-ment” and/or the issuance of
decrees pursuant thereto;
3. III.The petition is barred by laches; and
4. IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person
and/or a party who does not have a lawful interest in the
case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial
court erred:
1. 1.In giving due course to “Teofilo Cacho’s” petition for
reconstitution of titles when the same is already barred
by laches.
2. 2.In granting the amended petition for reconstitution
when there is no proof that Teofilo Cacho actually
exists and is a real party in interest.
3. 3.In granting the amended petition for reconstitution
even in the absence of sufficient proof to the effect
that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969
were indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
5|Page
4. 4.In reopening the case despite the finality of the order
dated 16 April 1979 dismissing the original petition
for reconstitution of title.
5. 5.In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land
already owned by appellant City of Iligan pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October
1965) which ownership was af-
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
firmed by the Supreme Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan
versus Director of Lands, et al., 158 SCRA 158].
     (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings
below and brushed aside respondents’ claim of jurisdictional
infirmities. It also acknowledged the issuance and existence of
the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree
Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and
GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915,
respectively, according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary
Land Registration Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the
Supreme Court), submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2,
1978, in compliance with an order at the lower court, confirming that
the plan and technical description of the land involving both Lots 1
and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed properties, and that all
the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were regularly done based
on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for re-
issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice, for
the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government
of the United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28
Phil. 617, regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in
part and granted in part the application for adjudication and
registration of the two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee’s
predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases was reserved
pending compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, “x x x before admitting this parcel to
registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . . be
presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object
of Case No. 6908” (28 Phil. 629).
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
2.) Re: case No. 6909, “the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in
Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87
hectares x x x (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the
applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land
occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern
part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her
application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is
denied.” (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of December, the court was at
Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of
fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with
previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative
Señor Vidal. Having arrived late, Señor Vidal did not assist in the
ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking
the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog” (28 Phil. 630); “And it is
6|Page
ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points
mentioned. . .” (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to
in the Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting
Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and the plan
submitted by Demetria Cacho in Case No. 6909 are the same as to
the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to the date of approval,
which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court decision
in Cacho vs. US “ordered that the new survey be made in accordance
with the points mentioned”; that applicant Demetria Cacho is owner
only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased
Datto Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the land
solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if
it was made, must have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued
in GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the
absence of the “new survey” on which to base the area and technical
description of the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered
property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the
title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however,
may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property
and the title thereto, by reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to
act earlier;
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
1. b.that they were misled by appellee’s inaction into
believing that appellee would not assert the right on
which he bases his suit;
 2. c.the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would
accrue to them in the event that relief is accorded to
the appellee or that the suit is not held barred; and
3. d.that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of
the property covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands
which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands,
under the principle that all “lands belong to the Crown which have
not been granted by (the King), or in his name, or by the kings who
preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence
and that he is a real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real
party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he
must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, he
filed the present petition because allegedly, the Court of
Appeals decided questions of substance in a way not in accord
with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a
reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913
and July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance
with conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively
presumed to have been complied with before the original decrees
were issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and
standing doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316,
when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions
of this Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total
7|Page
absence of proof to establish the requisite elements for its
application.
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
“Regalian doctrine” to dispense with proof of the essential elements
of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial
responsibility to uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens
system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted
proof on the identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to
be swayed by wild and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties
having filed their respective memoranda, we shall now resolve
the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is “in rem,” and, therefore,
the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the Government and its branches,
irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of
the filing of the application for registration or have appeared
and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are
considered as notified by the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final
shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually
contested and determined but also upon all matters that might
be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings.
With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration
Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished
member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head
Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower
court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no
doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the
case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees
attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof.
To allow the final decrees to once again be subject to the
conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs.
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which
cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry
thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action
would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens
System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards
requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho
vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res
judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of
such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land
Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon
presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the
judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality
without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record
No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale
from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon
which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in
8|Page
GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per
decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by
this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No.
18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for
the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained
by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the
fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed
that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and
these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being
in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a
requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also
effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the
issuance of a decree. The reason therefor may be gleaned
from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil
actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings,
the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After
the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which
the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission. . .
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final decision in land
registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the
statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda.
De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of
petitioner and his being a real party in interest, records show
that petitioner has sufficiently established his existence and
identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria
Cacho, the property in question were adjudicated in favor of
petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the
Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in
the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before
Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate
General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty.
Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case.
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Cacho vs. Court of Appeals
9|Page
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the
Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of
regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the
same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the
contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner
by merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity
without presenting preponderant evidence to controvert such
presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the
case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines
in Chicago, the act of the administering officer being of itself a
performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the
Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed
at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide,
Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—An attorney who discovers the futility of his
client’s application for land registration because the land
applied for is forest land must inform his client that he has
withdrawn the application. (Santos vs. Panganiban, Jr., 120
SCRA 799 [1983])
The torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible,
should not be used a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 113 [1991])
 A decision of the land registration court, ordering the
confirmation and registration of title, being the result of a pro-
173

VOL. 269, MARCH 3, 173

1997
MSCI-NACUSIP Local
Chapter vs. National Wages
and Productivity Commission
ceeding in rem, binds the whole world. (Meneses vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995])

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