laepublic of tbe bilippines

upreme QCourt
manila

FIRST DIVISION
CHARLIE LIM (represented by G.R. No. 183589
his heirs) and LILIA
1
SALANGUIT, Present:
Petitioners,
SERENO,

C.J.,
-versus- Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ.

SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and Promulgated:

JUN 2 5
f
GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON,
Z01'i
x------ -------------------------- -·----
Respondents - ------"--r-----::=-
.
DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

2
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
3
Resolution of the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84284 dated
'December 28, 2007 and July 3, 2008, respectively, affirming with
4
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu,
5
Batangas. The case arose from an action for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, filed by herein respondents before the court a quo
involving the subject land located at Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu,
Batangas, with an area of 9,478 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate ofTitle (TCT) No. TP-1792. 6

The following undisputed findings of facts, as found by the trial court,

are stated in the opinion of the CA:

4
Also spelled as Salanquit or Salangit in some parts of the records.
Rollo, pp. 55-72. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Lucenito
N. Tagle and Agustin S. Dizon concurring. Id. at
ld. at 73-75. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Magdangal M. 225-
De Leon and Pampio A. Abarintos concurring. 235.
Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Elihu A. Ybanez.
Records, pp. 1-14.
6
Id. at 15.

di'
Decision 1 G.R. No.
183589
As synthesized from the admissions made by the parties in their
respective pleadings, the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced
during the proceedings[,] it appears that sometime in 1970, one
Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa, Nasugbu, Batangas with an area
9,[478] sq. meters. After the death of Tomas Fernandez, his son
Felicisimo pursued the application and on 25 April 1984, the survey
plan under Psu No. 04- 008565 was approved by the Bureau of Lands.

In 1985, the spouses Isaac and Concepcion Ronulo asked the

assistance of the Office of the President and requested investigation of
their claim that a parcel of land containing 1,000 square meters which
they have been occupying since the 1950s was included in the approved
survey plan PSU-04-008565 in the name of Tomas Fernandez.

The Office of the President referred the matter to the Bureau of

Lands which in turn referred the same to the DENR-Region IVB for
appropriate action.

On October 9, 1995, Regional Director Antonio Prinsipe of DENR

Provisional Region IV-A issued an Order in DENR Case No. IV-5516,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered and

finding the protest of Spouses Isaac and Concepcion
Ronulo to be meritorious, the plan PSU-04-008565
approved in the name of Tomas Fernandez is hereby, as
it is, ordered CANCELLED and whatever amount paid
on account thereof forfeited in favor of the Government.
Consequently, the aforementioned spouses Ronulo are
hereby advised to cause the survey and to file the
appropriate public land application over the land actually
possessed and occupied by them. (Exh. A-2).”

The above order was appealed by Felicisimo Fernandez to the

Office of the DENR Secretary and was docketed therein as DENR Case
No. 5101.

On 20 October 1995, the already widowed Concepcion Ronulo

executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the parcel of land
subject of DENR Case No. IV-5516 in favor of herein defendant Lim
who will “file the appropriate public land application (Exh. A-3).” On
the same date, the children of Concepcion Ronulo executed an
affidavit of conformity to the waiver, conveyance and transfer of the
property subject of DENR Case No. IV-5516 in favor of Charlie Lim
(Exh. A-4).

In the meantime, herein plaintiffs Spouses Danilo Ligon and

Generosa Vitug-Ligon purchased the subject property from Felicisimo
Fernandez and introduced improvements thereon, including a beach house.
On 31 October 1995, TCT No. TP-1792 (Exh. A-1) of the Registry of
Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas was issued in the name of the spouses Ligon
based on Free Patent No. (IV03A) issued on 11 December 1986 and
an analogous Original Certificate of Title No. OP-1808 (Exh. B) dated
16 December 1993, both in the name of Felicisimo Fernandez.

On 09 September 1996, defendant Lim filed a complaint for

forcible entry against the petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas involving the subject property. The case was
docketed
as Civil Case No. 1275. On May 26, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment (Exh. A-5) in favor of private respondent and ordered
petitioners to vacate the subject land. The trial court based its decision on
the alleged finality of the Order dated 09 October 1995 issued by
Regional Director Prinsipe in DENR Case No. IV-5516.

Plaintiffs appealed the adverse decision to the Regional Trial Court

of Nasugbu, Batangas but the same was affirmed in a decision dated 12
January 1998 (Exh. A-6).

On 20 July 1998, plaintiffs appealed the RTC decision to the

Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review. In a decision (Exh. A-7)
dated 20 January 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
review.

On 28 May 1999, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (Exh.

A-8) in DENR Case No. 5102 reversing the order of Regional Director
Prinsipe in DENR Case No. IV-5516 dated 09 October 1995,
dismissing the protest of the Ronulos, and ordering that TCT No. TP-
1792 in the name of plaintiffs “shall remain undisturbed.”

On 14 July 1999, the Ronulos filed a motion for reconsideration of

the above decision. In an order (Exh. A-9) dated 21 December 1999, the
DENR Secretary denied the motion for reconsideration.

On 16 January 2000, the Ronulos filed a second motion for

reconsideration of the decision of the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No.
5102.

Meanwhile, as a result of the finality of the judgment in the

ejectment case, plaintiffs were evicted from the subject property. On 01
March 2000, they filed the instant suit before this Court, a complaint against
defendant Lim and his representative, Lilia Salanguit, for Quieting of
Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with prayer for a TRO and
Preliminary Injunction, to restore them to their possession of the subject
property and to enjoin herein defendant Lim from demolishing their beach
house.

On 10 April 2000, this Court denied plaintiffs’ application for

injunctive relief as a result of which plaintiffs’ beach house was
demolished by the Branch Sheriff on the motion of defendants.

On 16 April 2000, plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint for

additional damages as a result of the demolition of their beach house
worth about P7 million. Defendants did not answer the supplemental
complaint despite being ordered to do so.

During the pre-trial on 08 August 2000, the parties agreed to hold

hearings on 25 September, 06 October and 20 October 2000. However, the
first two hearing dates were cancelled at the instance of the defendants.
During the scheduled hearing on 20 October 2000, defendant and counsel
did not appear. Instead, Judge Antonio de Sagun, then the Honorable
Presiding Judge informed plaintiffs that herein defendant Lim filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the denial of the
second motion for reconsideration in DENR Case No. 5102 was appealed
to the Office of the President. In his motion, defendant alleged that trial
should be suspended pending “final adjudication of the case (DENR Case
No. 5102) before the Office of the President where the issue of validity of
plaintiff’s title is squarely involved.

In an Order dated 13 November 2000, this Court granted the

 motion to suspend proceedings. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by then Presiding Judge Antonio
de Sagun in an order dated 10 January 2001.

On February 19, 2001, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Certiorari

before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63441, assailing the
suspension of proceedings ordered by this Honorable Court which, after
due proceedings, was granted and the Order dated November 13, 2000
issued by this Court suspending the proceedings of this case reversed and
set aside in a Decision of the said appellate court dated March 6, 2002.

No motion for reconsideration or any appellate recourse to the

Supreme Court having been interposed by defendants, plaintiffs on June 7,
2002, moved to set this case for further proceedings. This Court granted
the motion and this case was set for trial on August 30, 2002 at 8:30 a.m.

On August 30, 2002, in view of the absence of the defendants and

their counsel despite due notice, evidence for plaintiffs was presented ex-
parte with plaintiff Danilo Ligon taking the witness stand. After
plaintiff’s direct examination, this Court ordered a resetting of the case
for cross- examination by defendants on November 18, 2002 at 8:30
a.m. Counsel and his witness plaintiff Danilo Ligon were present during
the November 18, 2002 scheduled trial in which defendants were
properly notified. Defendants and counsel were absent prompting this
Honorable Court, upon plaintiff’s motion to consider the cross-
examination of plaintiff Danilo Ligon by defendants as waived; the
continued absence of the defendants as indicative of lack of interest to
further defend this case; Grant plaintiff’s motion for ten (10) days
within which to file Formal Offer of Evidence and thirty (30) days
from November 18, 2002, within which to file their Memorandum.
After which, this case will be deemed submitted for decision.7

In its decision dated February 3, 2004, the RTC ruled, viz.:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered
for the plaintiffs as follows:

1. Confirming the ownership of the plaintiffs and right of

possession over the property;

2. Ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs the sum of

P6,000,000.00 for indecent haste in causing the demolition of plaintiffs’
house;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of

P50,000.00 a month as monthly rental for the duration of the period they
are deprived thereof commencing the month of November 1999;

4. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of

P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; and

5. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of

P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

7 Rollo, pp. 225-229. Emphasis supplied.

8 Id. at 235.
 Petitioners appealed the RTC decision with the CA alleging that the
lower court erred in deciding the case based on the ex-parte evidence
presented by respondents, in ruling that Felicisimo was the original owner of
the questioned property, in ruling that the Order of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director
was a collateral attack against TCT No. TP-1792 of the Spouses Ligon, in
ruling that the Spouses acquired the subject property in good faith, in not
giving weight and credit to the Resolution of the Office of the President
(OP) dated March 24, 2004, in ordering Lim and Salanguit to pay a monthly
rental of P50,000.00 for the duration of the period that the Spouses Ligon
have been deprived of their property, and in ordering Lim and Salanguit to
pay the Spouses Ligon attorney’s fees.

In its assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the awards of P6,000,000.00 as
indemnity and P50,000.00 representing the monthly rental for the
subject property to the plaintiffs-appellees are DELETED for lack of
factual basis. Costs against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 while respondents filed their

Opposition To Motion For Reconsideration11 in compliance with the
directive of the appellate court. In a Resolution dated July 3, 2008, the CA
denied reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
IN LINE WITH [THE] PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA OF A
DECISION OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY SUCH AS THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT?

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT

OF APPEALS RENDERED AN UNJUST JUDGMENT IN DEPRIVING
THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY BASED ON TECHNICALITY?

WHETHER OR NOT THE FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE

EJECTMENT CASE SERVED AS RES JUDICATA WITH RESPECT
TO THE ISSUE OF PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SPOUSES
RONULOS (THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE
PETITIONERS)?

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THE

9 Id. at 71.
10
Id. at 83-87.
11 CA rollo, pp. 236-252.
 AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS FEES?12

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, petitioner Lim contends that when the OP reinstated
the October 9, 1995 Order of DENR Regional Director Antonio G. Principe
in its Resolution13 dated March 24, 2004, such disposition served to put an
end to the administrative proceedings. The petition thus states:
In a nutshell, the proceedings in the administrative case which
went on to become a judicial case is the proper forum to determine the
issue of ownership over the parcel of land subject matter of this case.
Basically, this case lodged before the DENR Provincial Region IV-A is
an initiatory move by the government for the reversion/cancellation of
the title of the respondents herein, which title was derived from the
fraudulent and irregular survey of the lot in question and the grant of the
land patent application of Felicisimo Fernandez. In other words, if this
case before the Court of Appeals where this issue was raised affirms
with finality the Resolution of the Office of the President (Annex “C”),
this will have the effect of cancelling the title of the respondents and
shall pave the way to the institution of the application by the Ronulos
(or the herein petitioners as their successors-in-interest) of a public land
patent in their favor.14

Petitioner Lim further argues that the subject Resolution of the OP

should have operated as a bar to the furtherance of these proceedings as to
“the issue” judicially determined by the OP. According to petitioner Lim,
had the CA taken into account the administrative proceedings before the
DENR and the Resolution of the OP, it would have come up with a
determination that fraud was perpetrated by the respondents. The findings of
the DENR Regional Executive Director, as affirmed in the subject resolution
of the OP, should operate as res judicata that will have the effect of
cancelling the title of respondents.

We do not agree.

For a judgment to constitute res judicata, the following requisites

must concur:
x x x (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered
it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment
was based on the merits; and (d) between the first and the second actions,
there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action.

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment.

Bar by prior judgment exists “when, as between the first case

where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.”

12 Rollo, p. 41.
13
Id. at 76-82.
14 Id. at 44.
 On the other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds
application “when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction.” This principle only needs identity of parties and
issues to apply.15

Neither bar by prior judgment nor conclusiveness of judgment applies

to the case at bar. While there is identity of parties and subject matter
between the instant case and the matter before the DENR and later the OP,
the causes of action are not the same. The present case arose from a case for
quieting of title16 where the plaintiff must show or prove legal or equitable
title to or interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. Without proof of such legal or equitable title, or
interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.17 The administrative
proceedings before the DENR and now the OP, on the other hand, were
instituted on behalf of the Director of Lands, in order to investigate any
allegation of irregularity in securing a patent and the corresponding title to a
public land under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, viz.:
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be
considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or
permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement
therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession,
title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from
time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue
to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the
purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby
empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad
faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of
essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land
shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully
issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or
shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent
questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation
may issue without further proceedings.

Given the lack of identity of the issue involved in the instant case vis-
à-vis the issue in the administrative proceedings before the DENR and the
OP, there can also be no bar by conclusiveness of judgment.

To be sure, even if there was an identity of the issues involved, there

15 Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014, pp. 6-7.
Citations omitted.
16 Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.
17 Mananquil v. Moico, G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012 , 686 SCRA 123, 124.
still would have been no bar by prior judgment or conclusiveness of
judgment since the March 24, 2004 Resolution of the OP has not reached
finality – it being the subject of an appeal by respondents Spouses Ligon
under CA-G.R. SP No. 85011. Furthermore, in terms of subject matter, the
property involved in the administrative proceedings is a 1,000-square meter
tract of land over which petitioners’ alleged right of possession could ripen
into ownership. On the other hand, the instant case involves the issue of the
ownership or the validity of the title of respondents over the entire 9,478-
square meter tract of land where petitioners claim to have enjoyed open,
continuous exclusive and notorious possession for more than thirty years
over a 1,000-square meter portion thereof.

On the second issue that the lower court and the CA rendered an
unjust judgment depriving petitioners of their ownership over the subject
property on the basis of technicality, we cannot as well agree.

Petitioner Lim proffers the following excuses for his failure to comply
with the resolutions and other directives of the court a quo: that his counsel
withdrew his appearance while the case was pending before the RTC; that his
representative, Salanguit, had a sudden death, causing him to lose track and
control of the proceedings; that he was not aware of the ex-parte presentation
of evidence by respondent Danilo Ligon; and, that the court a quo waived for
him his right to present evidence due to lack of interest. It is central to
petitioner Lim’s argument that he was deprived of his right to due process
and lost his right to property without being fully afforded an
opportunity to interpose his defense – part of which is the March 24, 2004
Resolution of the OP which would have been highly persuasive in
determining the issues of ownership and possession in this case. Petitioner
Lim therefore pleads that this Court afford him the amplest opportunity to
present evidence and disregard technicalities in the broader interest of justice.

We hold that the RTC did not err when it ruled and based its decision
on the ex-parte evidence of respondents spouses. Petitioners were absent,
despite due notice, during the ex-parte presentation of evidence of
respondents. Petitioners were likewise absent during cross-examination
despite proper notice. When respondents filed their Formal Offer of
Evidence and Memorandum, petitioners did not file any opposition or
comment despite receipt of the documents.

To be sure, petitioner Lim cannot attribute all blame on the gross

negligence of his previous counsels. He cannot bank on such
negligence, including the sudden death of his representative Salanguit who
used to coordinate with his counsels, with impunity. Petitioner Lim’s own
equally gross and contributory negligence in this case is glaring and
inexcusable that it constrains us from re-opening the case. This was aptly
described by the RTC in its Resolution18 dated December 10, 2003 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to the Order considering the case
submitted for decision, viz.:

18 Records, pp. 652-659.

 The reasons advanced by the defendants are flimsy and bereft of
merit. x x x.

x x x defendants’ counsel was duly notified beforehand of the

scheduled hearing on August 30, 2002, but for unknown reasons,
defendants and counsel failed to appear. Suffice it to say that this Court
even became lenient to them when it set another hearing on November 18,
2002, for them to exercise their so-called right to cross-examine plaintiffs’
witness. But then again, records will show that despite receipt of Order
dated August 30, 2002, wherein the Court directed plaintiff Ligon to be
present on November 18, 2002 for cross-examination, both defendants and
counsel did not show up without giving any reason for their absence.

xxxx

Defendants cannot rightfully claim of losing track and control of

the proceedings had in this case since they can easily verify the records
regarding the status of the case, especially that they admitted that they
have differences with their counsel. They should have taken account of
the length of time that already elapsed since the August 30, 2002
hearing. They could have done so with facility. The fact that they did
not is clear that they slept unreasonably on their right.

Stress should be made that plaintiff even furnished them with

a copy of the Formal Offer of Evidence and Memorandum filed to
this Court as early as November 26, 2002 and December 18, 2002,
respectively, yet not even a comment or opposition evinced reply from
the defendants. This matter is too important to be completely disregarded.

xxxx

If the defendants were, using their own terms, not allowed to

cross- examine would be denied due process, then, they have nobody
but themselves to blame. They failed to comply with the basic
rudiments of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants cannot take
advantage of their own faux pas and invoke the principle of liberality. If
they come to Court for leniency, they must do so with clean hands.
Since they sought relief with “dirty hands”, their plea must be denied. x
x x.19

Likewise, the CA properly concluded that:

x x x there is no truth to the defendants-appellants’ claim that they
were denied due process when the trial court allowed the plaintiffs-
appellees to present their evidence ex-parte. The trial court gave them all
the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff-appellee Danilo Ligon but
they failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. Hence, they have nobody
to blame but themselves.20

As to the third issue, petitioner Lim argues that the finality of the
judgment in the ejectment case serves as res judicata with respect to the
issue of prior possession of the Spouses Ronulos – the predecessors-in-
interest of the petitioners. In the ejectment case filed by petitioner Lim
against the same respondents in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Nasugbu, Batangas in Civil Case No. 1275, the MTC ruled on May 26, 1997

19
Id. at 656-658.
20 Rollo, p. 63.
that prior possession was established in favor of the Ronulo spouses. When
the respondents Ligon Spouses appealed, the RTC affirmed the decision of
the MTC. The CA also dismissed the appeal of respondent spouses. On
appeal to this Court docketed as G.R. No. 139856, a Resolution dated
October 13, 1999 was issued denying the appeal with finality. Hence,
petitioner Lim now contends that the finality of the ejectment case
“determining the issues of possession and prior possession serves as [res
judicata] between the parties x x x inasmuch as the case herein involves the
same parties, same issues and same property therein.”21

An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover

physical possession or possession de facto and not possession de jure. The
use of summary procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
the property and not to determine the actual title to an estate.22 If at all,
inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by
the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its
determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.23

The following discussion in the case of Spouses Diu v. Ibajan24 is

instructive:
Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real
property are incidentally discussed. (Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303.)
In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of Rule
70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides: “Evidence of title, when admissible. -
Evidence of title to the land or building may be received solely for the
purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention.”) except to resolve the question of possession.
(Tiu v. CA, 37 SCRA 99; Calupitan v. Aglahi, 65 Phil. 575; Pitargue v.
Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5.) Thus, all that the court may do, is to make an initial
determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve
who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the latter.
But such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality.
Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a
binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the
issue of ownership. x x x.25

Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:

SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not
conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. – The judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.

xxxx

21 Id. at 50.
22 A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 833, 842 (1998).
Citations omitted.
23 Id. Citations omitted.
24
379 Phil. 482 (2000).
25 Id. at 491. Emphasis supplied.
 The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment
case, however, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which
was established in favor of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest in the
ejectment case pertained merely to possession de facto, and not possession
de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect
to who has title to the land in question. The final judgment shall not also be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties
upon a different cause of action not involving possession.26 As what took
place in the case at bar, the final judgment was not bar to this subsequent
action to quiet respondents’ title in order to settle ownership over the 9,478-
square meter property.

Finally, on the fourth assignment of error, petitioner Lim raises the

issue as to whether the CA erred in affirming the ownership of the
respondents. This part of the petition, however, discusses no other
additional ground for assailing the validity of the decision of the CA in
affirming respondents’ title to the property. Failing to adduce evidence to
overturn the ruling of both the court a quo and the appellate court, we affirm
the indefeasibility of respondents’ title over the 9,478-square meter property.

We do not agree, however, with the ruling of the appellate court that a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.27 A free patent
obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Hence, the one-year
prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State
from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such means.28

On the issue of moral damages, we agree with petitioner Lim that

there is no basis for the award of moral damages of P1,000,000.00. Lim
caused the demolition of the beach house of respondents pursuant to a writ
of execution issued by the MTC of Nasugbu, Batangas in the ejectment case
– the same judgment which was affirmed by the RTC, the CA and this
Court. As Lim states in this petition, it will become an absurdity if he
will be
penalized and required to pay moral damages over a property the rightful
possession of which has been awarded to them29 in the ejectment case.

Lastly, we sustain the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of

P50,000.00 which the appellate court found to be reasonable considering the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and

26 Id., citing Sps. Medina v. Hon. Valdellon, 159 Phil. 878 (1975); Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
39430, December 3, 1990, 191 SCRA 795, 802; Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10
1994, 237 SCRA 565.
27 Rollo, p. 66.
28 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 663 (2002).
29 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
30 Id. at 71.
 ..
Decision 12 G.R. No. 183589

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84284 dated

December 28, 2007 and July 3, 2008, respectively, are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of 1,000,000.00 as moral damages is
deleted for lack of factual basis. However, the award by the Court of
Appeals of the amount of 50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees in favor of
the herein respondents is hereby REITERATED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to

costs. SO ORDERED.

Associate JusJR

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

J. D O
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice