Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG
HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein
petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as
sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City.
Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose,
was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy
of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such
instructions in school by petitioner.   In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December
1

24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro,
City Judge of Iloilo.  Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16)
2

years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong.  Their 3

marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by
Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976.  4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of
Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the
following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and
that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral
values, of the school."  5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976.   Executive Labor Arbiter 6

Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case
was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting
evidence. Affidavits   were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner,
7

"defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured
a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation."   More 8

specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua
in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked
and the other slightly open.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal
hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the
clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that —

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent
pointed out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years
her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship
existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed
written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances
under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the
school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no
direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed
during these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and
conclude what transpired and took place during these times. . . .  9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.  10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial
of due process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor
arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical
conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her
student.11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor
Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific
findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the
student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and
Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them that they
were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

xxx xxx xxx

Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion
of the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and
a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and with the door open.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by

immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such
gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to
support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the
sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn
Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application for
clearance in search of evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and
dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. . . . 
12
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977,
reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however,
awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance.  13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the
Philippines.   After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through
14

Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed
decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to
work until the date of her actual reinstatement.  15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would
think that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a
resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration   of 16

herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto,   reconsidered and modified the aforesaid
17

decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate
the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6)
months salary.  18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his
manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went
further to view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate
task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be held paramount in
the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the
judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher
whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned
ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was
considered by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school
teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself
beyond reproach and above suspicion;  19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid
resolution of public respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim

to the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore,
illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the
hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee
Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without presenting the affiants as
witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious

misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any
of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code
which will justify the termination of her employment.  20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree.
There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other
documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously
because she was convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were
also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the
teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's
actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and
confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues
that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school
campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such
authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly
violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official
or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student."  21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there
is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful
marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua
This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for
clearance was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of
appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for clearance
weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged
immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified
conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the present application
for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh
and abrasive? 22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of
the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to
prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student
constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each
particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of
conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what
is before us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual
conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound
thereby.23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully
observed by him in his original decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records
referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper
dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at
his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question
 unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of
the day during off school hours when appellant and her student were found together
in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready
answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was
the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is
the complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and
her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts complained of
invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary
action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more,
the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were
prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee
are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in
dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral
acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously
doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the
contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior
and undisclosed motives known only to itself.  24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence
to show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he
concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times."   In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission
25

observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct
evidence to support such claim,   a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.
26

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned
resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the
reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed
resolution in this wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing
immoral acts inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that
such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classrom after regular
class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof
which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place
during those times of the day. . . .  27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If
the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends
substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But,
definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with
immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern
cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is
being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at
odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the
Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing
an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as
unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and
private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to
the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc.
is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any
deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of
service.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals  its decision are as follows:
1

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
 But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into
by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.  Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
5

disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
 If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116542 July 30, 1996

THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL A. MENESES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

What species of dishonesty would constitute a ground for termination? Is a provision in the
employee's handbook stating that "any form of dishonesty" shall constitute "serious
offense(s) calling for termination" valid and binding upon the respondent NLRC?

These questions are answered by this Court in resolving the instant petition
for certiorari which seeks a partial reversal of the Decision  of the respondent National Labor
1

Relations Commission  promulgated on April 19, 1994 insofar as it directs reinstatement of

2

private respondent to his former position.

The Antecedent Facts

The undisputed facts, as summarized in the Labor Arbiter's decision, are as follows:

Complainant is a regular rank and file employee of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corp. Ltd., with office address at Royal Match Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila. He started working with the said bank in July 1986 as a clerk until his
dismissal on February 17, 1993.
It appears that on February 3, 1993, complainant called the bank to inform the latter
that he had an upset stomach and would not be able to report for work. His superior,
however, requested him to report for work because the department he was then in
was undermanned but complainant insisted that it was impossible for him to report
for work, hence, he was allowed to go on sick leave on that day.

Later on that day, the bank called complainant at his given Tel. No. 521-17-54 in
order to obtain vital information from him, but the bank was informed by the
answering party at the phone number given by complainant that complainant had left
early that morning.

When complainant reported for work the following day, February 4, 1993, he was
asked by his superior to explain why he was not at his residence on February 3,
1993 when he was on sick leave because of an upset stomach.

Complainant explained that he indeed suffered from an upset stomach and that he
even consulted Dr. Arthur Logos at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and
the reason why he could not be reached by telephone was because he had not been
staying at his given residence for over a week.

On February 4, 1993 the bank called up Dr. Logos to verify the truth of complainant's
statement but the doctor denied that he examined or attended to complainant on
February 3, 1993 and the last time complainant consulted him was in December
1992. For this reason, the bank directed complainant to explain his acts of
dishonesty because allegedly he was not honest in telling the bank that he had an
upset stomach on February 3, 1993, and that he consulted Dr. Logos on that day.

In his written statement, by way of answer to the memorandum, complainant insisted

that he had diarrhea on February 3, 1993 and attached a certification from his aunt
where he stayed from the evening of February 2, 1993 and the whole day of
February 3, 1993 as well as a certification from his uncle named Andre R. Lozano
attesting to the conversation between complainant and Melvin Morales regarding the
whereabouts of complainant on that day. Complainant further admitted that his
statement about his not staying at his house for one week and his consulting a doctor
was incorrect, but that the said statement was not given with malicious intention or
deceit or meant to commit fraud against the bank, its operations, customers and
employees. The said statement according to him was impulsive reaction as a result
of his emotional stress he had been going through because of his marital problems.
He pleaded for leniency such that instead of termination, he be given a lighter
penalty.

However, on February 16, 1993, the bank came out with a memorandum from the
Vice-President, Human Resources Department terminating his services effective
March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the union of the rank and file employees of the bank and the
company and the bank's Code of Conduct.

The following day, February 17, 1993, the bank sent complainant another
memorandum directing him to settle his outstanding loan amounting to PH
P179,834.00, net of a month's salary the bank was paying him in lieu of notice not
later than June 16, 1993. The import of the said letter was while the effectivity of the
said termination is March 16, 1993, the company opted to pay him in lieu of the
 notice from February 17, 1993 up to March 16, 1993 his pay without having to report
for work.

Noting that the bank's Employee Handbook made "any form of dishonesty" a cause for termination,
the labor arbiter  ruled said ground to be overly broad, and stated that "(f)or us to agree that any form
3

of dishonesty committed by an employee of the bank is a ground for dismissal, is to say the least
stretching the import of the aforecited rule too far. "The arbiter instead held that the offenses of
dishonesty contemplated by the aforementioned rule which would warrant termination of services
are those involving deceit and resulting in loss of trust and confidence. The arbiter further found that
the private respondent's proffered excuse, assuming it to be false, did not result in any damage to
the bank, and therefore the bank had no reason to lose its trust and confidence in the private
respondent on account of such manner of dishonesty. Additionally, the labor arbiter did not find in
the record any proof that private respondent was not really suffering from diarrhea as claimed.

Thus, in her decision dated August 13, 1993, the arbiter declared the termination illegal and ordered
petitioner bank to reinstate private respondent to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and with backwages.

On appeal, the respondent Commission sustained the arbiter's findings and ruled that —

. . . For while there is a semblance of truth to the charge of respondent (herein

petitioner bank) that complainant (private respondent) had been dishonest as to his
whereabouts on February 3, 1993, such act dishonesty cannot be considered so
serious (as) to warrant complainant's outright dismissal. The dishonesty that
complainant had committed cannot be considered depraved. It was a simple kind of
dishonesty that was committed not in connection with his job. . .

Brushing aside petitioner bank's argument about strained relations, the NLRC reasoned that the
private respondent's falsehoods were not of such nature as to have actually caused animosity
between the private respondent and the petitioner bank, and even if there was any such strained
relations, ". . . it was not of so serious a nature or of such a degree as to justify his termination . . ."
Thus, the NLRC ordered petitioner "to reinstate complainant to his former position but without
backwages", considering that private respondent was not entirely faultless" since "he committed a
certain degree of dishonesty in lying."

Now before this Court, petitioner argues  that the dismissal is reasonable and valid "pursuant to its
4

Employee Handbook, specifically, Appendix A thereto which provides for serious offenses calling for
termination . . . ".

The Issue

Petitioner raises the following reason to warrant this review:

Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it unilaterally curtailed
and restricted petitioner's inherent and inalienable prerogative to set and impose
reasonable disciplinary rules and regulations.

In short, the issue, as summed up by the Solicitor General, is whether or not the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondent's act of making a false statement as to the
real reason for his absence on February 3, 1993 did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant
his termination from service.
 The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with rules
contained in its employee's handbook titled Working Together, Appendix A  of which reads
5

as follows:

Appendix A

Serious Offenses
Calling For
Termination — Any form of dishonesty, like but not limited to
the following:

— fraud

— making false or artificial entries in the books or

records of the Bank

— failing to turn over money entrusted by a client for

the Bank within a specified time

— theft of bank property

— using company funds/assets for any unofficial

purpose.

— Any violation of the Bank's Code of Conduct which has penal

consequences under relevant local laws.

— Deliberately inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury upon a co-

employee on Bank premises, or in case it is committed elsewhere, for
reasons which are work related.

— Sabotage or causing damage to work or equipment of the Bank, or

any underhanded interference in Bank operations.

— Any other serious offense analogous to the above.

While the foregoing text makes "any form of dishonesty. . ." a "serious offense calling for
termination," such general statement must however be understood in the context of the
enumeration of offenses, all of which are directly related to the function of the petitioner as a
banking institution. It is unarguable that private respondent's false information concerning his
whereabouts on February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the bank;
neither is it a failure to turn over clients' funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything
"analogous" as to constitute a serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Like petitioner bank, this Court will not countenance nor tolerate ANY form of dishonesty. But
at the same time, we cannot permit the imposition of the maximum penalty authorized by our
labor laws for JUST ANY act of dishonesty, in the same manner that death, which is now
 reinstated as the supreme sanction under the penal laws of our country, is not to be imposed
for just any killing. The penalty imposed must be commensurate to the depravity of the
malfeasance, violation or crime being punished. A grave injustice is committed in the name
of justice when the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed.

In the context of the instant case, dismissal is the most severe penalty that an employer can
impose on an employee. It goes without saying that care must be taken, and due regard
given to an employee's circumstances, in the application of such punishment. Moreover,
private respondent's acts of dishonesty — his first offense in his seven years of employment,
as noted by the respondent NLRC — did not show deceit nor constitute fraud and did not
result in actual prejudice to petitioner. Certainly, such peremptory dismissal is far too harsh,
too severe, excessive and unreasonable under the circumstances.

Besides, by ordering private respondent's reinstatement without granting backwages, the

NLRC effectively penalized him by disallowing compensation for the three years counted
from the time he received notice of his dismissal on February 23, 1993.

Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, "an employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be
a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This is
merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in
favor of the working class, and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor. 6

Petitioner further contends that the NLRC arbitrarily imposed its value judgment and standard on
petitioner's disciplinary rules, thereby unilaterally restricting the Bank's power and prerogative to
discipline its employees according to reasonable rules and regulations. We do not agree. Precisely,
the employer's prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an employee's services may not be
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner as to erode or render meaningless the constitutional
guarantees of security of tenure and due process.  Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural,
7

require strict compliance before an employee may be dismissed.  Clearly, it is the NLRC's right and
8

duty to review employers' exercise of their prerogative to dismiss so as to prevent abuse and
arbitrariness.

Petitioner points to GTE Directories Corporation vs. Sanchez  as authority for its contention that,
9

since the disciplinary rule cited in its Handbook has not been declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, "the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril." This is absurd. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General: 10

. . . , the cited GTE case is not applicable to the present case because of an entirely
different factual setting. This case merely involves a simple reportorial requirement
which the workers had deliberately and unjustifiably ignored. Besides, the
management imposed the penalty of dismissal only after the workers failed to comply
with (the) requirement for the sixth time and after the workers were already meted
out the less severe penalty of suspension.

In the case at bar, it would have been different if private respondent had also been
suspended first and despite that, he still continued to defy the disciplinary rule.
Meneses, indeed, was a "first offender" which is consistent at this point to his being
human, who occasionally commits mistakes just like anybody else.

Indeed, upholding petitioner's argument (that the NLRC cannot review petitioner's disciplinary rules)
would mean upsetting the entire labor arbitral machinery, for it would result in depriving the labor
arbiter and the NLRC of their jurisdiction to determine the justness of a cause for dismissal as
granted by Arts. 217 and 218 of the Labor Code.

This petition is an unwarranted attack against workers' right to security of tenure. It must be, as it is
hereby, demolished at first sight.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, there being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent NLRC.

SO ORDERED:

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 128959 September 30, 2005

CIRIACO ‘BOY’ GUINGGUING, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

The liberty of the press is indeed essential. Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must
begin by subduing the freeness of speech.
- Benjamin Franklin1

The right of free expression stands as a hallmark of the modern democratic and humane state. 2 Not
only does it assure a person’s right to say freely what is thought freely, it likewise evinces the polity’s
freedom from psychological insecurity. This fundamental liberty is translated into the constitutional
guarantee that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press,3 contained in the Bill of Rights,4 which itself obtains a position of primacy in our fundamental
law.5

Criminal libel laws present a special problem. At face value, they might strike as laws passed that
abridge the freedom of speech, expression, or the press. Whatever seeming conflict between these
two precepts has long been judicially resolved with the doctrine that libelous speech does not fall
within the ambit of constitutional protection. Nonetheless, in ascertaining what class of materials may
be considered as libelous, the freedom of expression clause, its purposes as well as the evils it
guards against, warrant primordial consideration and application.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Decision6 and the Resolution7 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 29 July 1996 and 3
October 1996, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413. The CA affirmed with modification 8 the
decision9 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 of Cebu City, finding Ciriaco "Boy"
Guingguing (petitioner) and Segundo Lim (Lim) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.
This petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner alone, hence the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim
had already become final and executory.

The antecedent facts follow.

This case originated from a criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba (complainant)
against Lim and petitioner under Criminal Case No. CBU-26582. Complainant was a broadcast
journalist who handled two programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX. The radio stations were
based in Cebu City but the programs were aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. 10

On 13 October 1991, Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against
complainant as well as photographs11 of the latter being arrested. These were published by means of
a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and
published by petitioner. The Sunday Post was circulated in the province of Bohol, as well as in the
Visayas and Mindanao.12 The full text of the advertisement which was the basis of the
information13 for libel reads:

REQUEST FOR PUBLIC SERVICE

ATTN: RADIOMAN CHOY TORRALBA, STATION DYFX, CEBU CITY

TEXT: IN THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC SERVICE, PLEASE DO ENLIGHTEN ME REGARDING THE

DISPOSITION OF THE FOLLOWING WHICH APPEAR HEREUNDER. THE CASES WERE
FOUND IN THE BLOTTER OF THE CEBU CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. PLEASE DO TELL ME
THE STATUS OF THOSE CASES, WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARCHIVED
AND/OR PENDING.

Name: CIRSE ‘CHOY’ TORRALBA

CRIM. CASE NO. R-43035

FOR: MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

DATE FILED: MAY 10, 1979

COMPLAINANTS: DR. JOVENAL ALMENDRAS

ADDRESS: ALMENDRAS ST., MABOLO, CEBU CITY

MR. VICTORIANO VELOSO

ADDRESS: 117 HIPODROMO, MABOLO, CEBU CITY

DISPOSITION: PENDING ARREST

CRIM. CASE NO. 17984-R

FOR : ESTAFA

DATE FILED: July 12, 1982

COMPLAINANTS: MR. PIO Y. GO AND

MRS. ROSALITA R. ROLDAN

ADDRESS: c/o 2nd Floor Martinez Bldg.

(ALPHA MKTG., INC.),

Jones Ave., Cebu City

DISPOSITION: PENDING ARREST

CRIM. CASE NO. 14843-R

FOR: SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

DATED FILED: APRIL 28, 1980

COMPLAINANTS:

ADDRESS:

DISPOSITION: PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED

DATED: APRIL 14, 1991

NOT TOO LONG AGO, I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING NEWSPAPER CLIPPING COURTESY OF
A CEBU CITY CONCERNED CITIZEN. THE CAPTION STORY BELOW TELLS ALL. IF YOU
KNOW WHO THE BUSINESSMAN ALLUDED TO IN THE CAPTION, PLEASE DO TELL ME.
[Thereafter followed by a picture of a person with face blotted out being arrested and an inset picture
of the same person with face likewise blotted out, being detained, these pictures being followed by
the caption, which states]:

‘ESTAFA CASE. Members of Cebu City Police Intelligence group under Lt. Col. Eduardo Ricardo
arrested last night a businessman (extreme left) for his alleged involvement in estafa case filed by
APOCEMCO. Left photo a member of the team serves the warrant of arrest order issued by CEBU
RTC Judge German Lee.

ANOTHER CLIPPING WHICH IDENTIFIED BUSINESSMAN CHOY TORRALBA TO HAVE BEEN

SERVED A WARRANT OF ARREST IN A (P)LUSH UPTOWN HOTEL IN CEBU CITY BY
OPERATIVES OF THE CEBU CITY POLICE. NOW TELL ME, IS IT YOU THE SAME CHOY
TORRALBA REFERRED TO IN THE CAPTION STORY. IF INDEED YOU ARE THE ONE AND THE
SAME WHO APPEARED IN THE PICTURE BELOW, PLEASE TO (sic) INFORM ME.:

[Thereafter followed by another picture, this time, the face of the person being arrested is clearly
shown to be that of Cirse Choy Torralba, followed by this caption.]

SERENE EVENING: The otherwise serene evening enjoyed by businessman Choy Torralba (left) in
a plush uptown Hotel was disturbed by operatives (right) of the Cebu City Police under P/Lt/Col.
Eduardo Ricardo just to serve on the former a warrant of arrest issued by Cebu RTC Judge German
Lee relative to the suit filed by Apocemco against the businessman (PR)

THANK YOU, AND MY BEST REGARDS.

PAID SPACE BY: (sgd.) SEGUNDO LIM 14

Asserting inter alia that he had been acquitted and the case/s referred to had already been settled,
complainant sought Lim and petitioner’s conviction for libel. At the same time, he asked for moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees because the publication allegedly
placed him in public contempt and ridicule. It was claimed that the publication was also designed to
degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. 15

Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against him
and his family over the airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for paid
advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks, 16 as a measure of self-defense. Lim also
argued that complainant, as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a position
almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the
thrust of public scrutiny.17

After trial, the lower court concluded that the publication complained of was indeed
libelous.18 Declaring that malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was
present in the case because every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of
the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof. 19 The lower court gave no credence to
Lim and petitioner’s argument that the publication was resorted to in self-defense.

The trial court likewise disregarded the insulative effects of complainant’s status as a mediaman to
the prosecution of the criminal libel charge. The publication of a calumny even against public officers
or candidates for public office, according to the trial court, is an offense most dangerous to the
people. It deserves punishment because the latter may be deceived thereby and reject the best and
deserving citizens to their great injury.20 It further held that a private reputation is as constitutionally
protected as the enjoyment of life, liberty and property such that anybody who attacks a person’s
reputation by slanderous words or libelous publications is obliged to make full compensation for the
damage done.21

On appeal, the CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the RTC’s finding of guilt. The CA
likewise held that self-defense was unavailing as a justification since the defendant should not go
beyond explaining what was previously said of him. The appellate court asserted that the purpose of
self-defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it
does not license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he
received. Once the defendant hits back with equal or more scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his
defense, the retaliation becomes an independent act for which he may be liable. 22 For this reason,
the CA refused to sanction the invocation of self-defense.

Petitioner now comes before this Court praying for the reversal of the judgment against him.
Petitioner contends inter alia that as editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the
fourth estate, the lower courts’ finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.23 Petitioner likewise faults the lower courts’
failure to appreciate their invocation of self-defense.

For resolution of this Court, therefore, is the fundamental question of whether the publication subject
matter of the instant case is indeed libelous. While the findings and conclusions of the lower courts
are rigid in their application of the strict letter of the law, the issue seems more complex than it
appears at first blush. The Court is compelled to delve deeper into the issue considering that libel
principles formulated at one time or another have waxed and waned through the years, in the
constant ebb and flow of judicial review.24 A change in the factual milieu of a case is apt to evoke a
change in the judgment applicable. Viewed in this context, the petition has merit and the judgment
appealed from must be reversed.

Criminal Libel vis-à-vis the

Guarantee of Free Speech

Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.25 Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of
malice.26

Originally, the truth of a defamatory imputation was not considered a defense in the prosecution for
libel. In the landmark opinion of England's Star Chamber in the Libelis Famosis case in 1603, two
major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks were established: first, that libel against
a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second, that it is
immaterial that the libel be true. 27 These propositions were due to the fact that the law of defamatory
libel was developed under the common law to help government protect itself from criticism and to
provide an outlet for individuals to defend their honor and reputation so they would not resort to
taking the law into their own hands.28

Our understanding of criminal libel changed in 1735 with the trial and acquittal of John Peter Zenger
for seditious libel in the then English colony of New York. Zenger, the publisher of the New-York
Weekly Journal, had been charged with seditious libel, for his paper’s consistent attacks against
Colonel William Cosby, the Royal Governor of New York. In his defense, Zenger’s counsel, Andrew
Hamilton, argued that the criticisms against Governor Cosby were "the right of every free-born
subject to make when the matters so published can be supported with truth." 29 The jury, by acquitting
Zenger, acknowledged albeit unofficially the defense of truth in a libel action. The Zenger case also
laid to rest the idea that public officials were immune from criticism. 30

The Zenger case is crucial, not only to the evolution of the doctrine of criminal libel, but also to the
emergence of the American democratic ideal. It has been characterized as the first landmark in the
tradition of a free press, then a somewhat radical notion that eventually evolved into the First
Amendment31 in the American Bill of Rights and also proved an essential weapon in the war of words
that led into the American War for Independence. 32

Yet even in the young American state, the government paid less than ideal fealty to the proposition
that Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of speech. The notorious Alien and Sedition
Acts of 179833 made it a crime for any person who, by writing, speaking or printing, should threaten
an officer of the government with damage to his character, person, or estate. The law was passed at
the insistence of President John Adams, whose Federalist Party had held a majority in Congress,
and who had faced persistent criticism from political opponents belonging to the Jeffersonian
Republican Party. As a result, at least twenty-five people, mostly Jeffersonian Republican editors,
were arrested under the law. The Acts were never challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, but
they were not subsequently renewed upon their expiration. 34

The massive unpopularity of the Alien and Sedition Acts contributed to the electoral defeat of
President Adams in 1800. In his stead was elected Thomas Jefferson, a man who once famously
opined, "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." 35

There is an important observation to be made about the quality of the American press during the
time of Jefferson, one that is crucial to the contemporaneous understanding of the "freedom of
expression" clause at the time of its inception. The tenor of the public debate during that era was
hardly polite. About the impending election of Jefferson, the New England Courant predicted that
"murder, robbery, rape and adultery and incest will be openly taught and practiced, the air will be
rent with cries of distress, the soil soaked with blood and the nation black with crimes." 36 After
Jefferson was elected, rumors spread about his dalliances with his slave, Sally Hemmings, adding
more fodder to his critics. The thirteen-year old William Cullen Bryant, who would grow up to become
a prominent poet and abolitionist, published the following doggerel: "Thy country’s ruin and thy
country’s shame!/ Go wretch! Resign the Presidential chair/Disclose thy secret measures foul and
fair…/ Go scan, philosophist, thy [Sally’s] charms/And sink supinely in her sable arms." 37

Any comprehensive history of the American media during the first few decades of the existence of
the United States would reveal a similar preference in the media for such "mad-dog
rhetoric."38 These observations are important in light of the misconception that freedom of expression
extends only to polite, temperate, or reasoned expression. The assailed decision of the RTC betrays
such a perception, when it opined that the subject advertisement was libelous "because by the
language used, it had passed from the bounds of playful gist, and intensive criticism into the region
of scurrilous calumniation and intemperate personalities." 39 Evidently, the First Amendment was
designed to protect expression even at its most rambunctious and vitriolic form as it had prevalently
taken during the time the clause was enacted.

Nonetheless, juristic enforcement of the guarantee of freedom of expression was not demonstrably
prominent in the United States during most of the 1800s. Notably, the prevalent philosophy then was
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the different federal states. 40 When the US Supreme Court was
confronted with substantial First Amendment issues in the late 1800s and early 1900s, it responded
by repeatedly declining to protect free speech.41 The subsequent enactment of the due process
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment eventually allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to accept,
in Gitlow v. New York42 that the First Amendment was protected from impairment by the States, thus
allowing for a more vigorous enforcement of the freedom of expression clause in the twentieth
century.43

The most important American ruling on libel, arguably from which modern libel law
emerged44 was New York Times v. Sullivan,45 penned by the liberal lion Justice William Brennan, Jr.
In ascertaining whether the New York Times was liable for damages in a libel action, the U.S.
Supreme Court had acknowledged that the writing in question, an advertisement published in the
paper46 extolling the virtues of the civil rights movement, had contained several factual inaccuracies
in describing actions taken by Montgomery, Alabama officials on civil rights protesters. 47 The Court
even concluded that at most, there was a finding against the New York Times of negligence in failing
to discover the misstatements against the news stories in the newspaper’s own files. 48

Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely assessed the import of the First Amendment
freedoms in the prosecution of criminal libel. Famously, the precedent was established that a public
official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice, which was
defined as "with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true."49 By this standard, it was concluded that factual errors aside, actual
malice was not proven to sustain the convictions for libel. Moreover, leeway was allowed even if the
challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made. 50

Shortly after New York Times was promulgated, its principles were extended by the U.S. Supreme
Court to criminal libel actions in Garrison v. Louisiana.51 The decision, also penned by Justice
Brennan, commented on the marked decline in the common resort to criminal libel actions:

Where criticism of public officials is concerned, we see no merit in the argument that criminal libel
statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by civil libel laws, and therefore should not be
subject to the same limitations. At common law, truth was no defense to criminal libel. Although the
victim of a true but defamatory publication might not have been unjustly damaged in reputation by
the libel, the speaker was still punishable since the remedy was designed to avert the possibility that
the utterance would provoke an enraged victim to a breach of peace . . .

[However], preference for the civil remedy, which enabled the frustrated victim to trade chivalrous
satisfaction for damages, has substantially eroded the breach of peace justification for criminal libel
laws. In fact, in earlier, more violent times, the civil remedy had virtually pre-empted the field of
defamation; except as a weapon against seditious libel, the criminal prosecution fell into virtual
desuetude.52

Then, the Court proceeded to consider whether the historical limitation of the defense of truth in
criminal libel to utterances published "with good motives and for justifiable ends:" 53

. . . The "good motives" restriction incorporated in many state constitutions and statutes to reflect
Alexander Hamilton’s unsuccessfully urged formula in People v. Croswell, liberalized the common-
law rule denying any defense for truth. . . . In any event, where the criticism is of public officials
and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the
larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. . . .

Moreover, even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which
secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any
except the knowing or reckless falsehood. Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the
speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did
speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth. . . .54

Lest the impression be laid that criminal libel law was rendered extinct in regards to public officials,
the Court made this important qualification in Garrison:

The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the constitutional
question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right
of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today,
there were those unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless
falsehood as an effective political tool to unseat the public servant or even topple an
administration. That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it
under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once
with odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which
economic, social, or political change is to be effected. 55

Another ruling crucial to the evolution of our understanding was Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,56 which expanded the actual malice test to cover not just public officials, but also public
figures. The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, stated that:

[D]ifferentiation between ‘public figures’ and ‘public officials’ and adoption of separate standards of
proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increasingly in this country, the
distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred. . . . [I]t is plain that although they
are not subject to the restraints of the political process, ‘public figures’, like ‘public officials’, often
play an influential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these ‘public figures’ have as ready
access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter
criticism of their views and activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the
conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their
involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public officials." The fact
that they are not amenable to the restraints of the political process only underscores the legitimate
and substantial nature of the interest, since it means that public opinion may be the only instrument
by which society can attempt to influence their conduct. 57

The public figure concept was later qualified in the case of Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,58 which held that a
private person should be able to recover damages without meeting the New York
Times standard.59 In doing so, the US Supreme Court recognized the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation. 60

The prominent American legal commentator, Cass Sunstein, has summarized the current American
trend in libel law as follows:

[C]onsider the law of libel. Here we have an explicit system of free speech tiers. To simplify a
complex body of law: In the highest, most-speech protective tier is libelous speech directed against a
"public figure". Government can allow libel plaintiffs to recover damages as a result of such speech if
and only if the speaker had "actual malice"–that is, the speaker must have known that the speech
was false, or he must have been recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity. This standard means that
the speaker is protected against libel suits unless he knew that he was lying or he was truly foolish to
think that he was telling the truth. A person counts as a public figure (1) if he is a "public official" in
the sense that he works for the government, (2) if, while not employed by government, he otherwise
has pervasive fame or notoriety in the community, or (3) if he has thrust himself into some particular
controversy in order to influence its resolution. Thus, for example, Jerry Falwell is a public figure
and, as a famous case holds, he is barred from recovering against a magazine that portrays him as
having had sex with his mother. Movie stars and famous athletes also qualify as public figures. False
speech directed against public figures is thus protected from libel actions except in quite extreme
circumstances.61

It may also be noted that this heightened degree of protection afforded to free expression to
comment on public figures or matters against criminal prosecution for libel has also gained a
foothold in Europe. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers."62 The European Court of Human Rights applied this
provision in Lingens v. Austria,63 in ruling that the Republic of Austria was liable to pay monetary
damages "as just satisfaction" to a journalist who was found guilty for defamation under the Austrian
Criminal Code.64 The European Court noted:

[Article 10] is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are
the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
‘democratic society’. . . . These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is
concerned. Whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the ‘protection of the
reputation of others’, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political
issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of
imparting such information and ideas: the public also has the right to receive them. . . . 65

The international trend in diminishing the scope, if not the viability, of criminal libel prosecutions is
clear. Most pertinently, it is also evident in our own acceptance in this jurisdiction of the principles
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases such as New York Times and Garrison.

Particularly, this Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the
prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC,66 the Court
cited New York Times in noting that "[w]e have adopted the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 67 The Court was even
more explicit in its affirmation of New York Times in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals.68 Speaking
through Justice Mendoza:

For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice
— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has
cited with approval in several of its own decisions.[ 69] This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case,
the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not.70

The Court has likewise extended the "actual malice" rule to apply not only to public officials, but also
to public

figures. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong,71 the Court cited with approval the following
definition of a public figure propounded by an American textbook on torts:
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living,
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or
any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous
inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a
personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at
a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. 72

Ayer did not involve a prosecution for libel, but a complaint for injunction on the filming of a
dramatized account of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Nonetheless, its definition of a public figure is
important to this case, as it clearly establishes that even non-governmental officials are considered
public figures. In fact, the definition propounded in Ayer was expressly applied by the Court in Borjal
v. Court of Appeals73 in ascertaining whether the complainant therein was a public figure, thus
warranting the application of the actual malice test. 74

We considered the following proposition as settled in this jurisdiction: that in order to justify a
conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt
that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. As applied to the
present petition, there are two main determinants: whether complainant is a public figure, and
assuming that he is, whether the publication of the subject advertisement was made with actual
malice. Sadly, the RTC and the CA failed to duly consider both propositions.

Complainant Is a Public Figure

There should be little controversy in holding that complainant is a public figure. He is a broadcast
journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao.
Measured against the definition provided in Ayer, complainant would definitely qualify as a public
figure. Complainant even asserted before the trial court that his broadcast was listened to widely,
hence, his notoriety is unquestionable.

Complainant’s standing as a public figure is further militated by the contextual circumstances of the
case. The newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is particularly in circulation in the areas where
complainant’s broadcasts were aired. Certainly, it cannot be denied that the target audience of the
newspaper were the same persons who may have listened regularly to the complainant’s broadcast.
Even if the sphere of complainant’s renown is limited in geography, it is in the same plane as the
circulation of the offending newspaper. The extent of complainant’s ability to influence hearts and
minds through his broadcasts need not be established, only that he has such capacity and
willingness to exert an influence. Complainant’s volition to practice the radio broadcasting profession
necessarily thrusts him in the public sphere.

Actual Malice Not Proven

As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter published the
article subject matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have established beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was false or
nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true.
It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then
no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual
connotation will receive full constitutional protection. 75 An examination of the records of this case
showed that the précis of information contained in the questioned publication were actually true.
Thus, complainant himself testified:

Q But is it true that these cases published in Exhibit "F-1" are actually existing or previous cases?

A At the time of the publication those cases were terminated, long terminated.

Q But is it true that in fact, there was a criminal case No. R-43035 for Malicious Mischief filed May
10, 1979 against you?

FISCAL ROCAMORA:

Your Honor, I believe the witness did not understand the question.

COURT: (to Stenographer)

Read back the question.

Q Is it true that in fact, there was a criminal case No. R-43035 for Malicious Mischief filed May 10,
1979, against you?

A I really do not know about that accusation.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. FLORIDO:

Q When you came across the publication, did you check if in fact there was a case docketed with
that number against you? Did you check?

A I did not.

Q: Now, is it true that there was a criminal case against you for Estafa docketed as criminal case No.
17984-R filed July 21, 1982 where the complaints were Pio Go and Mrs. Rosalita Roldan?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it true that there was also a criminal case filed against you numbered 14843-R for Serious
Physical Injuries, date filed April 28, 1980 which in this publication appears provisionally dismissed
April 14, 1991?

A: That case, I do not have any idea about it.

Q: Did you inquire from the appropriate Court when you received a copy of this to find out if it is true
that these cases were filed against you?
A: As far as I know, in fact, I never received any subpoena or anything about this case.

Q: Yes, but did you upon receipt of Exhibit "F-1", did you inquire from the Court whether it is true that
these cases had been recorded as filed against you?

A: Well, as far as I know like the Estafa case, I was already long been acquitted in that case.

Q: You did not answer the question. Will you please answer.

COURT: (to witness)

Q: The question is, did you inquire from the Court concerned whether that case exist?

A: Yes.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. FLORIDO:

Q: And you discovered that they were true that this was provisionally dismissed with reference to
14843-R for Serious Physical Injuries. You made inquiries?

A: Yes.

Q: And you also know that Dr. Jovenal Almendras your godfather in the wedding had also filed a
case of Malicious Mischief against you?

A: I know but that was in the past.

Q: Yes, I know that that was in the past, but that is true?

A: Yes.

Q: So, there is nothing false so far as Exhibit "F-1"?

A: There is no question about that but that is malicious.

Q: Let me see. On the lefthand side of the bottom it says. "Not too long ago, I received the following
newspaper clippings courtesy of the Cebu City concerned citizens. The caption story below tells all.
If you know who the businessman alluded to in the caption. Please do tells me and then, there is a
photograph a reprint from Sun Star publication. Do you confirm that? 76

xxx

Q: But is it true that you were arrested per this photograph and I quote. "In a plush uptown hotel was
disturbed by operatives (right) of the Cebu City Police under Police Lieutenant Col. Eduardo Ricardo
just to serve on the former a warrant of arrest issued by the Cebu RTC Judge German Lee relative
to the suit filed by Apocemco against a businessman". Is it true that you were arrested?
A: Yes.

Q: So this photograph is genuine photograph?

A: Yes.

Q: And you claimed that you have a good reputation and that good reputation had been soiled by the
accused in this case. Let me ask you concerning your reputation then. Is it not a fact that aside from
this record of criminal cases appearing in Exhibit "F-1", you have also been at one time or another
been accused of several other criminal cases both in and out of the City of Cebu?

A: Yes, before, 10 years, 15 years ago.

Q: And in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities alone in Cebu City, you have the following per certificate
which we marked as Exhibit "2". Criminal Case Nos. 14843-R for Serious Physical Injuries, Torralba
Cirse "Choy"; 17984-R, for Estafa; Torralba Cirse R. R-43035 for Malicious Mischief. You will confirm
that the same Cirse Torralba and/or Choy Torralba and/or Cirse R. Torralba mentioned in this
certificate refer to your person?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, aside from these criminal cases in the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, in Cebu City, you
also have 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu per
certificate that I marked as Exhibit "3". Is that correct?

A: Yes, but all those cases have already been either acquitted or dismissed. I will present the
certification.

Q: Specifically, these cases has something to do with your character. Let me count 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
cases for Estafa, the 6th case for issuance of a bouncing check, the 7th case is a case for issuance
of a bouncing check; and the 9th is also for issuance of a bouncing check. You will confirm that?

....

COURT: (to witness)

Q: What happened to those cases?

A: I was acquitted your Honor. I was acquitted in all those cases, some are dismissed, and
fortunately, your Honor, I do not have any conviction. 77

From the foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in the
Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the complainant had
indeed been filed. It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that these matters may have
been divulged, yet such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy complainant could
invoke, since the pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public record.

The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of complainant to which his
listening public has a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which
he himself claimed was imbued with public character since it deals with "corruptions in government,
corruptions by public officials, irregularities in government in comrades." 78 By entering into this line of
work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a
stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for
their conduct.

In convicting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that "every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown…". We hold that this
provision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the
constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Court’s precedents upholding the standard of
actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not
libelous. The provision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense "good intention and
justifiable motive." The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on
public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as "justifiable motive," if not "good intention."

It cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the Bill of Rights is accompanied by excessive
color or innuendo. Certainly, persons in possession of truthful facts are not obliged to present the
same in bland fashion. These true facts may be utilized to convince the listener/reader against a
particular position, or to even dissuade one against accepting the credibility of a public figure. Dry
facts, by themselves, are hardly stirring. It is the commentary thereupon that usually animates the
discourse which is encouraged by the Constitution as integral to the democratic way of life. This is
replete in many components of our daily life, such as political addresses, televised debates, and
even commercial advertisements.

As adverted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but
even expression in its most unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a necessary qualification
to any absolutist interpretation of the free speech clause, if only because it prevents the proliferation
of untruths which if unrefuted,

would gain an undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to safeguard against fears that
the public debate might be muted due to the reckless enforcement of libel laws, truth has been
sanctioned as a defense, much more in the case when the statements in question address public
issues or involve public figures.

In ascertaining the degree of falsity that would constitute actual malice, the Court, citing New York
Times, has even gone so far as acknowledging:

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly
free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of
language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by
giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical
agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held —

A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to
court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper
respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous
statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin
of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine
requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the
absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement. 79

To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by
this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in
said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the character of their radio
commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives
and for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of
constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal is mandated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1996 and 3 October 1996,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they affect
petitioner. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, promulgated on 17 May 1994, as
regards petitioner is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
charge of libel therein. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Published under the pseudonym "Silence Dogood" in the New England Courant (July 2 to 9,
1722 edition).

2
As a matter of fact, the principle is enshrined in Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

3
See Section 4, Article III, Constitution.

4
Article III, Constitution.

5
See People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA 142, 168; Teves
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, 17 December 2004, 447 SCRA 309,
335, J. Tinga, dissenting.

Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, concurred in by Associate Justices

6

Emeterio C. Cui and Jose C. De La Rama.

7
Rollo, p. 27.

8
The Court of Appeals lowered the penalty imposed to TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of arresto mayor, as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE
(21) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum.

9
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused SEGUNDO LIM and BOY ‘BG’ GUINGGING,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals of the crime of libel as charged in the
information, defined and penalized in Art. 353 in relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term of, ranging from, One (1)
year, Eight (8) months and Twenty-one (21) days as minimum to, Two (2) years, Eleven (11)
months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum; to indemnify the
complainant, damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED."

10
RTC Records, p. 178.
 The two photographs were reprinted from the Sun Star Daily and the Freeman, newspapers
11

of general circulation in Visayas and Mindanao.

12
Rollo, p. 15.

13
"That on or about the 13th day of October, 1991, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to besmirch,
dishonor or discredit the person of one Cirse ‘Choy’ Torralba and to place him in public
contempt and ridicule, did then and there write and publish or cause to be written and
published on the Sunday Post, a newspaper of wide circulation in the provinces of Cebu and
Bohol on its issue on October 13, 1991, specifically on page 8 thereof, the context of which is
hereunder reproduced verbatim, as follows:

....

to the damage and prejudice of the said Cirse "Choy" Torralba."

CIRIACO 'BOY' GUINGGUING v. CA, GR NO. 128959, 2005-09-30

Facts:
criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba (complainant) against Lim and
petitioner
CIRIACO 'BOY' GUINGGUING... petitioner

13 October 1991, Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against
complainant as well as photographs[11] of the latter being arrested.
one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post... irculated in the province of
Bohol, as well as in the Visayas and Mindanao.
There should be little controversy in holding that complainant is a public figure.
broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas
and Mindanao... newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is particularly in circulation in the
areas where complainant's broadcasts were aired
Issues:
Petitioner contends inter alia that as editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member
of the fourth estate, the lower courts' finding of guilt against him constitutes an...
infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.[23] Petitioner
likewise faults the lower courts' failure to appreciate their invocation of self-defense.
s the fundamental question of whether the publication subject matter of the instant case is
indeed libelous.
whether complainant is a public figure, and assuming that he is, whether the publication of
the... subject advertisement was made with actual malice. Sadly, the RTC and the CA failed
to duly consider both propositions
Ruling:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision[6] and the Resolution[7] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 29 July 1996 and 3 October
1996, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413. The CA affirmed with modification[8] the
decision[9] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 of Cebu City, finding
Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing (petitioner) and Segundo Lim (Lim)... guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of libel. This petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner alone, hence the
verdict of guilt with respect to Lim had already become final and executory.
After trial, the lower court concluded that the publication complained of was indeed libelous.
[18] Declaring that malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was
present in the case because every defamatory publication prima... facie implies malice on
the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof.[19] The lower court
gave no credence to Lim and petitioner's argument that the publication was resorted to in
self-defense.
On appeal, the CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the RTC's finding of guilt.
The CA likewise held that self-defense was unavailing as a justification since the defendant
should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him. The appellate court
asserted... that the purpose of self-defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the
effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the defendant to utter blow-for-
blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Once the defendant hits back with
equal or more... scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his defense, the retaliation becomes an
independent act for which he may be liable.[22] For this reason, the CA refused to sanction
the invocation of self-defense
To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be
deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the
information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the...
character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having
been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question falls
squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article
III, and... thus, acquittal is mandated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1996 and 3 October 1996, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 are REVERSED  and  SET ASIDE  insofar  as ... they  affect
petitioner. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, promulgated on 17 May
1994, as regards petitioner is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the charge of libel therein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
The right of free expression stands as a hallmark of the modern democratic and humane
state.[2] Not only does it assure a person's right to say freely what is thought freely, it
likewise evinces the polity's freedom from psychological insecurity. This... fundamental
liberty is translated into the constitutional guarantee that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press,[3] contained in the Bill of Rights,[4]
which itself obtains a position of... primacy in our fundamental law.
libelous... speech does not fall within the ambit of constitutional protection
Declaring that malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was
present in the case because every defamatory publication prima... facie implies malice on
the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof.
criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person,... or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.[25] Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary
man... it is immaterial that the libel be true
In any event, where... the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business,
the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.
Moreover, even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which
secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any
except the knowing or reckless falsehood.
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the constitutional
question.
At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today, there were those unscrupulous
enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective
political tool to unseat... the public servant or even topple an administration. That speech is
used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle
of the Constitution.
Government can allow libel plaintiffs to recover... damages as a result of such speech if and
only if the speaker had "actual malice"
"public official"... he works for the government... he otherwise has... pervasive fame or
notoriety in the community... he has thrust himself into some particular controversy in order
to influence its resolution... defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates
to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made
with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with... reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not... public figure... a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.'... in
order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established
beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with actual
malice
Court's precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication
that a... statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous... l... eeway, accepting as a
defense "good intention and justifiable motive."... degree of falsity that would constitute
actual malice
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even
falsity alone does not prove actual malice.
press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language... liability for defamation of a public official or public
figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the
person making the libelous statement

Labor Law Case Digest: HSBC v. NLRC, et al [G.R.

No. 116542. July 30, 1996]
HSBC v. NLRC [G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996]

Facts:

Complainant is a regular rank and file employee of  HSBC in Makati City. It appears that on
February 3, 1993, complainant called the bank to inform the latter that he had an upset
stomach and would not be able to report for work. His superior, however, requested him to
report for work because the department he was then in was undermanned but complainant
insisted that it was impossible for him to report for work, hence, he was allowed to go on
sick leave on that day.

On February 4, 1993 the bank called up Dr. Logos to verify the truth of complainants
statement but the doctor denied that he examined or attended to complainant on February
3, 1993 and the last time complainant consulted him was in December 1992. For this
reason, the bank directed complainant to explain his acts of dishonesty because allegedly
he was not honest in telling the bank that he had an upset stomach on February 3, 1993,
and that he consulted Dr. Logos on that day.

Complainant, in his written statement, further admitted that his statement about his not
staying at his house for one week and his consulting a doctor was incorrect, but that the
same was not given with malicious intention or deceit or meant to commit fraud against the
bank, its operations, customers and employees. 

However, on February 16, 1993, the bank came out with a memorandum terminating his
services effective March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the union of the rank and file employees of the bank and
the company and the banks Code of Conduct.

Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with rules
contained in its employees handbook stating that any form of dishonesty shall constitute
serious offenses calling for termination.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not private respondents act of making a false statement as to the real
reason for his absence on did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant his
termination from service.

(2) Whether or not NLRC arbitrarily imposed its value judgment and standard on
 petitioners disciplinary rules, thereby unilaterally restricting the Banks power and
prerogative to discipline its employees according to reasonable rules and regulations

Held:

(1) YES. It is unarguable that private respondents false information concerning his
whereabouts on February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the
bank; neither is it a failure to turn over clients funds, or theft or use of company assets,
or anything analogous as to constitute a serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of
dismissal.
Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a
serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.
(2)  NO. It is the NLRC's right and duty to review employers exercise of their prerogative to
dismiss so as to prevent abuse and arbitrariness as granted under Arts. 217 and 218 of
the Labor Code. The employers prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an
employees services may not be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner as to
erode or render meaningless the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due
process. Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural, require strict compliance
before an employee may be dismissed.

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao – Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 119190

16 January 1997
TOPIC: Persons, Persons and Family Relations, Family Code,
Psychological Incapacity, Legal Medicine

FACTS:

On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they
slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual
intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations. She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin.
Her husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual,

and that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to
reconcile with her husband.

The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his

wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to be
impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still be
reconciled. He admitted that they have not had intercourse since their
marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him. He added
that his wife filed this case against him because she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:

Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is

equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly
demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that

the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
However, neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party,  the question of who refuses
to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

Landmark Case: CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549
August 30, 1990 (Case Digest)
A truly remarkable case wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of “love”.  The setting of the case
was in  when marriage between minors was still legal, way before the Family Code. In this case, a 30
year old teacher had married her student which prompted the school to terminate her. And against all
odds the Supreme Court Ruled in favor of her, hence, creating this Landmark Case. “truism that the
heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.”

CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
Digested Case

A Landmark Case

FACTS:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique
situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was
fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for
terminating her services.

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School
in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was
terminated of his employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School
Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.

ISSUE:

Was her dismissal valid?

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in
the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

RULING:
 
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady teacher] took
advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two eventually fell in love, despite
the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the
heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and
universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances
of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary
social mores.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged
violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly
failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.