Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509

(1986)

Acme Plywood is a corporation that can acquire real properties pursuant to its provisions of
the Articles of Incorporation. Acme Plywood and the Infiels, both members of the Dinagat
tribe, entered into a Contract of Sale wherein the latter sold their land to Acme way back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into
the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel. Since 1962 (can be considered as time
immemorial), Acme is in continuous, adverse, public possession of said land.

Acme then applied for the registration of the said land, which is considered to be a private
land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.

According to ACME, the law that will be applicable for the registration of the said land was
the 1935 Constitution, as the sale took place in 1962. However, petitioner, Director of Lands
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or
long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable
law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when
Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme

IAC: it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel,
from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, and were, by reason thereof,
entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title
judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-
interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said
lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its
Article XIV already referred to.

ISSUE: whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.

RULING:

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
It may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title
and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has
on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public'

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had
a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter,
in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it
did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to
which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands
of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came
into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper.

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must
be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience
to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 (1994)

Respondent spouses, who were then natural-born Filipino citizens, bought a land (91.77 sq.
m) from one Belen. Subsequently they filed an application for registration over the two
parcels of land but this time they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace
Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
The application was opposed by petitioner contesting the citizenship of the respondents; that
private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor;
that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the Regalian
doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only
when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on
the evidence.

RTC, CA: application granted; that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they
bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim
of ownership long before June 12, 1945. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title
to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have 

ISSUE: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired
by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

RULING:

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of
time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor.
Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof
by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be
registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced,
private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land
and introduced improvements thereon.

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked
to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945,
but even as early as 1937 to which respondent spouses acquired.

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Angelina Sarmiento, 209
SCRA 214 (1992)

Private respondent and the spouses Placer A. Velasco and Socorro Busuego filed an application for
the registration of title over Lot No. 1005 but private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador filed that
opposition, saying that the lot belongs to them.

RTC: granted the registration in favor of private respondents; that private respondents acquired the
lands from Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, and Macario Cruz, respectively; that the subject parcel of
land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Angelina Sarmiento as early as 1965, under
Tax Declaration No. 8388.

Director of Lands appealed to the decision of RTC;

IAC: dismissed the appeal; that while it may be true that the vendors of the portion of the land in
question to the herein applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been clearly established that
Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Sarmiento (sic) and also spouses Mariano
Castillo and Petronila Robes were in possession of the land in 1928 and 1948, respectively in
concept of owners, without anybody molesting them.

A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a certain
lands (sic) for more than thirty years, in the concept of owner, is entitled to a confirmation of his title
to said land. Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in concept of owner from her
predecessors-in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has the right over the property

RULING:

It is not disputed that private respondent seeks registration of the questioned lot on the basis of
paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. Specifically, under
paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notirious possession and occupation of an
agricultural land of the public domain; (b) such possession and occupation must be for a
least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such possession
and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with
the order. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.  It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood.

Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious. Under the law, the only kind of interruption
which does not affect the continuity of possession is that caused by war or force majeure.

Private respondent does not pretend to be the original possessor of the property in question. She
relies on the alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest. None of private respondent's
predecessors-in-interest declared for taxation purposes their alleged land holdings. Accordingly, they
had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the private respondent who declared them in one (1) tax
declaration. Predecessors-in-interest Santos were not presented by private respondent as witnesses
during the hearing of her application. There can be no question that they were the best witnesses to
identify the parcel they sold to the private respondent and prove the character of their possession.

While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS; DENIED THE APPLICATION.