gy Vol. 19 No. 15 December 15, 1996 Price. Rs. 15.00: fee A Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka, GUARDIAN ee JR JAYEWARDENE'S FINAL POLITICAL REFLECTIONS Oe Be: TIE) SARACHCHANDRA : A HERETICAL VIEW Douglas Amarasekara and Hemantha Warnakulasuriya FAO SUMMIT AND ASIAN FOOD SECURITY Gail Omvedt THE IDEAS MAGAZINECURRENT ICES PUBLICATIONS. BHUTAN NEPAL REFUGEE ISSUE A Report of a Fact Finding Mission to Nepal May 1-7, 1995 by Niaz Naik and Bradman Weerakoon. 1995, 19pp. Rs. 50.00 " THE BO-ATTE MASSACRE AND THE KEBETIGOLLAWA REFUGEE CAMP. 4 Report on the attack on Bo-Atte village in the North-Central Province on October 21, 1995 and other attacks in the Anuradhapura District. 1995. 32pp Rs. 50.00 CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS; DISPLACEMENT MIGRATION AND ACCOMMODATION. A Report by Devendra Raj Panday and Jeevan Thiagarajah. September 1996, 26p. 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Theva Rajan, 1995, 126pp. Rs. 150.00 WRITING SOCIAL SCIENCES: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO WRITING TRADITION, by Sasanka Perera, (Sinhala}. 1996. 74pp. Rs. 110.00 . ALL ORDERS TO: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8.CRISIS A British Minister Dr-Liam Fox told Parliament recently that Britain had offered to “play a taciitating role” in talks between Prosidant Chandrika Kumaratunga's ‘People’s Alliance’ (PA.| administration and. the -seressiorist Liberation Tigers (L.T.T-E Di.Fox who visited Sri Lanka in ‘September will probably mate another ‘i to Colombo soon. Meanvtile some tetited Ammeciean gonerale who have IEenched a private organisation to sell counter Insurgency exaertise were approached in connection with the Norih-and-East war, wiote the Sunday Times columnict Iqbal Athas. Since the ‘government strategy is to hammer the Tigers hard and force Prabhakaran to negotiate a political sertiement, these initiative must be taken ac a. now PA: initiative in ‘conflict resolution’. Piesident Kumaratunge’s visit to France where sha met Presictant Chirac, ig part of the diplometic arm of this strategy. Already, LTTE organisations In the West, European capitals in particuler, are finding the security agencies in those countries less tolerant than before. Diplometic pressuire on the LTTE absoad, military oiticel pressute at home Since ending the wer though @ negotiated settlement baced on devolution is the P.A‘a policy, successful exercise would mean a gradual reduction of the mounting defence vow,, what we ere watching then ie President Kumaratunga’s grand strategy. On the operational side, Frof. G.L.Pierie, Constitutional Affaire Minister, is the key figure, His task is to mobilise multi-party support ithe UNP most of all ) for the devolution package, The history of the ethnic problem, and particularly of all efforts ‘at # negotiated resolution, proves that Biportiean (SLFP-UNP) support for such ‘an exercise isa “must”. Right now, the Mervyn de Silva UNF, both leadership end mass bese, are convinced that the PA’e policy makers regard the conventional parliamentary “enemy” agreater threat than the separatist insurgent foe, the Te, Meanwhile, the PA has battles on several other fronts. L! Affaire Bandaranayska The menner tn which the all powerful RJ Presidency tioated two important institutions — the judiciary and the national prose provoked sustained Opposition protest. And rightly so. The Opposition was supperied by Human Aights groups, and many an infivential NGO. In that battle the legal profession, and some courageous journalists, played an Important role Gne such lawyer was MrR.K W.Goonesckers, Nov a President's Counsel, Lest week, MrGoaneaskers addrecsod a rine ‘Juige Bench of the Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioners who have ehallenged the appointment of Professor Shirani Bandaranayake as Judge of the Supreme Court. The Fespondents are. Prof.Shirani Bandaraneyake, Prof.G.L.Piaris, Minister of Justice and Constitutional aifaits, the Secretory to the President, McK Balapatapendi and the Attorney: ‘Generel. The curtain has gone up on & drama that is likely to be regarded by political analysis and future historians ‘as @ landmerk (egel battle, The Bench ‘consists of Justices Mark Fernando, DY.A.R.B.Amerasinghe, PRemanathen, S.W.B.Wadugodapitiva, Privantha Perera, A.S.Wijetunga and S Anandacocmaraswamy. McR.K.W.Gooneselera wae certainly conscious of the significance of the proceedings. “Iam conscious thet | em Supporting an unprecedented ‘application but! am also conscious that what § at stake is the independence of the judiciary 2s a practicel realty ‘The several petitioners stated thet the power of the Executive to appoint the first respondent under Article 107 I) of the Constitution wae not absolute and was cimed at ensuring the indepondence of the judiciary. Thet hed not been complied with in this instance. The said appointment was therelore arbitrary and capricious and vas a violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to practice their profession, righteously and freely, and also the tights to equality” (Daily News). Senior Counsel R:K.W.Goonesakera cited Justice Kuldip Singh iho had stated: “The Powers and functions of ‘the three wings of government had ‘been precisely defined and demarcated! ‘In the Constitution. The independence EVN CA GUARD Mal 19 Nous Price Rs-15.00 Pablished fortnighly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co.Ltd, No.246, Union Place, Colombe 02 TeVFax 447584 E-mail - guardian@srilanke:net DDosemberi3, 198 Euitor tu Chief: Mervyn de Silva Editor : Dayan Jayatilleka Cover Photography : Ravi Prasad Herat Printed by United Publishing House (Pvt) ltd CONTENTS ‘Mervyn de Silva KML, de Silva ‘Special Correspondent Doulas Amarasekara & ‘Hemianiha Wamakulasuriva Gail Omvedt in ee reer eeeerr of the judlclory is basic feature of the Cunstitution” —Mr.Goonesekera observed. “The judiciary is separate and the Executiva hes no concern with the day to ¢ay functions of the judiciary”. While no one would deny that the President has the absolute right to meke certain appolutments, the ‘government's ultimate judge and jury ‘are the people of this country, in the ‘ond, the electorate decides. Itis on that fact that President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s self assurence is ultimately based —— the 63% factor, 90 to say, as against the PA’s modest percentage of the national vote at the 1994 Farliamentaty election, two ‘months before the Praci¢ential contest. True, the PA knows that it must stand together or it will sik together. No party's fkely to. quit unless (e) the issue is of such. fundamontal Importance 19 its. own constituency ‘hat staying in tho PA wills acen as & ‘gross betrayal by ts trditional supnort- base of {b) it is convinced that membership in the PA has become 3 liability, Mearwhile we watch divisive tendencies, sudden sruptions of protest over PA dolicy pronouncements (01 ministorial decisions, Hore ioe clear: instance - Vasudeva Nanayakkara: “There are many government MP's who entertained suspicions ‘about the sale of the Steel Corporation, ‘These suspicions are compounded by the government's refusal to allow a debate called by me and some members of tite UNP and the TULF" ‘Jamil Reaction ‘The TULF saw the Attorney General last wok. A dslogation which included arty chief M.Sivasithamparam and MP's Neelan Tifuichelvem, Joseph Pararajasingham and .Thurarajasingham took up the question of detained Tamil youths. ‘Some have been detained tor five years without being charged, While the A.G there had been significant progress in clearing the backlog, a junit of his dept. ic spoading up inquiries. There has been unrest in the prisons and several hunger strikes. While the TULF the main Tamil parliamentarist party cortrois 8 votes, ‘the ENDLE, 2 former insurgent group, {s one of the larger Tamil Perties. The ENDLF hes held-talks with LTTE representatives, “at ah Undisclosed location® reported the ISLAND'S RSatyapalan,NE EIT TSE ae FROM ’77 TO THE LAST POLITICAL THOUGHTS shin 77 In July 1877 et the moment of his ‘triumph, JR was 71 years old, by far tha eldest Prime Minister in the ‘country’s history, seven yoars older than D.S.Senanayake had been in 1947, fifteen and sixteen years older than S.W.R D.Bendaranaike end Sir Johia Kotelawala in 1956 and 1952 respectively, twenty eight years older than Mrs Bandaranaike had been in 1960, and a full thirty yoare older then Dudley Senenayake in 1952. Despite his towering political presence as one of the outstanding politicians of the day, he had been the leeder of the party for only four years before and yet he fed them to an electoral victory ‘on a ecale that had eluded the Senanayakes, father and son, who ‘were presumed to have had much more ‘of the comman touch than he His winning the Prime Mivistership had been the culmination of @ career just short of four decades in poltics. His way to the top hed beon, to ue Bacon‘s words, a winding stair. While his poiticel opponents spoke of hin a3 @ Sri Lankan R.A Rutler, the enlightened Tory who never succeeded Jn gaining his party's nomination as Prime Minister of Britain despite being ‘eminontly suited for the post by virtue of ebilty, experience and senionty, JR‘S diaries had many references t0 an enlightened Tory of an earlier vintage, Benjeinin Disraeli vito hed become the leader of the Conservative Party of his day and given (t 8 new and more progressive image by moving it to the centre of the political spectrum and ‘2s3hing our to sections of the working class: Iti curprising that he did not think of that other - anc more appropriate ‘anelogy among British statesmenin the process of modemising the Tory party, Sir Robert Peel. J.R.Jeyawardene in fact, had little in common with tho flamboyant Disrasli in his personality or his vitriolic, he had much more in ‘common with Peel. They bath ensured the survival of their parties during decade'ef their colipse; and both did more than any other person within the fanks of their reepactive partios, n their day, to medemise its appeal, 10 keep Up its spirits, and offer those who preferred moderate to radical change, a consiructive political creed. ‘There was also one other point in the comperison with Pesl - the encouragement civen to youna men in the Cabinet: He had also hed the local ‘example of 0.8 Senanayaka in whom the younger and newer members of the firet Cabinet after independence had found en understanding leader, and one who gave them grecter opportunitioe for demonstrating their own skills as oltical leaders end as administrators than they may have had from a less - self-confident leader. J. Jayewardene, forinstance, never forgot the generous encouragement the elder Senanayake gave him formative years - of ‘which the choice of JR as the principal delegate fiom the country tothe peace conferance at San Francisco in 1951 was an exainple = in the cabinet, anc is memory of the example set by his old chiet, combined with his own aympothetic ond’ underetanding attitude to youthful Cabinet Minsters, ‘once he biinself was in a position of leadership in the later 1970s, to give ‘them opportunities for initiatives which ‘they may never have had under » more insecure leeder, Young men like Lalth Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake saw their careers flourish under his-benign tutelage, es did the ‘careers of clder man like R.Premadasa ‘and Rornie de Mel, al of whom were given 10 yaere or moro in the same Cabinet post, time enough to implement their plens. Unlike his K.M, de Silva immediate successor, JF was not 2 hands-on" head of goverment. He ptefarred to leave the initietive in the ‘making of decisions with this Cebinet Minicters, once he and the Cabinethad ‘given formal approval tor their policies and plans. It could be said of him, a Harold Wilson said of Peel, that his greatness ley in bridging two epochs ‘and carrying the traditions of his youth Into the patterns of the future, through those younger colleagues. The present leader of the UNP, Rani! Wickremesinghe, © kineman of Jayenardene's. vias clevated to the Cabinet in 1980. ‘The general election of 1977 was as much of a landmark in Sri Lenka’e recent history as that of 1956. In both inatanoos the outcome of the electoral struggle wes a change of regimes as much as a change of government. The 1977 election marked a setback for the populism of the SLFP as well as for Sri Lanka's traditional Marxist Movement, which began what was ‘certainly: a terminal decline. Because his victory in 1977 was beyond anything seen before, many in his party and in the country expected dramatic changes: Looking back ar the lesc time his party had been in government, 16 fron 1965 to 1970; he Felt thet ie was ‘doomed by its leader's lack of vision: for himself he decided on a leao of the imaginetion into seties of new policies that would modernise the ‘country in. every way, especially fis economy. His first period as head of ‘government (1977-82) was one of the mest constiuctive pheses ia the recent History of the island, with a succession of radical chenges of policy introduced in virwally every sphere of activity. That programme and its priorities had ‘bean decided upon in hie brief 3 year period as leader of the UNP before le Leceme head af goverment: the pace at whieh change was introdliced wasNR also determined by him. In the frst six ‘years as head of government as Prime Minister and executive President, he had 8 record of accomplishments that ‘nono of hie predecessors os head of governments could match: these Included the five principal dams on the Mahavel: and its tributaries, the new Parliament building at Kotte, the new administrative capital of the island, the. ‘fe-building and modernisation of the ort of Colombo and the international airport 2t Katunayake, and the transformation of the run-down Echelon barracks in the heart of Colombo into a site for high-rise buildings and five-star hotals. Nene of these would have been possible without the radical changes in the economy which he introduced in aceociation with his Finance Minister, Fonnie ce Mel Change Agent ‘These reforms zimed at reducing stato controls and restrictions in the Secnomy, and providing greater Incentives to private enterprise, a sat of reforms devised to liberalise the ‘aconomy, after aimest 20 years of a Sri Lankan version of India’s control Raj. Nevertheless the outcome of tha economic: reforms introduced in the late 1870s and continued thereafter was nota reduction-in the scope or scale of the government's role in the economy, but a deliberate and distinct shift in its priorities. Thus there wes a massive investment of manoy, men and Governmental energies on the accelerated development of the irrigation and power resources of the Mahaveliriver basin, the mast complex infigation enterprise in a country with a long history of fostering the development of irrigation as an essential feature of the state's responsibilities 10 the people. It would be true to say that without his historical vision and energetic ‘commitment the scale of the venture would have Deen smaller and the process cf implementation of the plano much slower. As it was JR set out to complete the construction of the rincinal dams of Mahaveli project in 6 years instead of 30, and very nearly euccoodod in kooping that colf imposed. deadline. The foundations tor the dams ‘at Koimale, Victoria and Maduru Oya ‘were laid in the eerly years of his first term as head of government, while ‘werk on Randenigala ard Rantambe began somewhat later. He had the satisfaction of seeing all of them ‘completad befora he laft office. To JR, the Mehavell programme was a revival and 1e-affirmation of Sri Lanka's time: honoured position as one of the great inrigation civiicatiors of Asia. In this ‘and in many other features of his political policies he regarded himself as the heir of 0 S.Senananyake Indoad the accomplishments of his ‘gavernments, especially in irrigation ‘and dam-building were much greater then D.S.Senanayake’s and bore ‘comparison with the achievements of the grectest Sinhalese rulers of tie Daast in their role of “compulsive dam: buliders*, to borrow a phrase which the Economist used with referenca to ‘JR and his principal minister in this ‘enterprise, Gamini Dissanayeke, One of his most significent achievements was to have handled the ‘transition from a controlled economy to 2 more open one with greater polticel stil than many other leaders, in similar circumstances, in other ports Of the world. By implementing the ‘major reforme simultaneotsly, in 1978, rather than in stages, he provaked anc easily overcome bureaucratic and trade tunion resistance and gave himsolt time to soften the impact of these reforms ‘on the poorer sections of the community, Whenever it was Necessary to do so, in the interest of social justice or plain good political sense, adjustments znd modificetions were made, to strengthen the social Safety net at the very time when the umber of pcoplo entitled to ite security wes, reduced by excluding those whose economic situation did ot warrant such support. Just when food subsidies were trimmed and transport subsidies eliminated, his government introduced a most imaginative and effective system of ‘ublic housing for the poor, in the rural areas particularly, end in the towns as well, under the dynamic leadarship of Paine Minister Premedasa. Thus JR's governments was one of the very fow which Introduced @ structural re- adjustment program and reaped political benefits and vindication rather than discomfiture or obloguy, During the whole perlod when he was head of government, JR did not have any ‘ivals within his party, no challengers to his authority within his government and, tl the lete-1980s, no ffoctive challenge from the opposition ‘ether. Thus, at most times, and on ‘Most. matters, and especially in the early phases of his administration, ho ‘wes able to set the priorities as well as the paca at which change would be 2dministered. On such occasions be acted with a speed and decisiveness which his critics asserted were those of an old man in hurry to introduce ‘changes he had been thinking af long before he essumed the leade’ship of his party. On other matters, the Management of the country’s ethnic conflict, for instance, he moved more Cautiously and more deliberately, and thero the pecs was set for him by Powertul political forces whose strength he undeisicod and pethaps feared as well, but even with regard to those fhe could act on occasions with remarkable decisiveness and ‘courage In introducing changes which noither an influontial ecction of his cabinet nor the people at large would ‘appreciate ~ such as the District Councils scheme of 1980-1, and the Provincial Councils established in 1987-88. He strove to control events and occasionally, as in the violent aftermath of the Indo-Sri Lanka treaty of July 1987, was nearly overwhelmed by the street demonstrations organised by the SLE in-association with the Janethe Vimuktni Peramuna. His courageous refusal to be intimidated by the violent public demonstrations ‘organised by this combination of forces provides a stark contrast ta Bonderaneite’s repudiation of his paci with Chelvanayatam when the opposition 10 it was a mere title compared to that organised by the SUFP and tts alles on this occasion. In 1977 his government made the establishment of a Presidenvial sysiem ‘one of its highest priorities. While this, system better ensured @ continuity of government policy which, he argued, was necessary for sustainec and consistent econemic development policy. it was in fact a hybrid. Presidential authority was grafted - 10 change the metaphor - on to a prime ministerial unk. The institutional Contd on vane 17 ee eeeA Special Correspondent THE XISSING OF DAYA PATHIRANA A 10th Anniversary Restropective of the JvP's First Political Assassination Daya Pathirana, the leader of the stridontly anti-JVP Independent ‘Students Union -ISU-of the University ‘of Colombo, 10 years ago, there was only one flaw in their otherwise flawless plan of action. The D day chosen for the abduction and murder, the 15thof December 1986 happened to be the Unduvap poys (full moon) day, At fist everything went off like clockwork: Pathirsna and fellow ISU activist P.V.Somasiti were abducted ‘and taken to a lonely stretch near the Brigada Lake; the torturing of the two students beganin earnest, Then came the unexpected: the arrival on the sverte of some Buddhist devotees on their way to a nearby templa. Prevented from completing their cruesome task of decapitating their two victims and disposing of the bodies, the IVP ‘aseassins ran away. Pathirana was dead - but thanks to this almost miraculous intervention, Somasiri, though severely injured, survived to-tll the tale, The End Zone ‘And What was that tale? A meeting of the Inter University Students Federation (IUSF ~ an umbrella crganisetion of ell major student Unions; at that time daminated by the IVP) wes held at the University of Kelaniya on the 13th of Decomber 1.986, Pathirana’s second in command, K.L,Dhermasiri ia law student) represented the ISU at this meating vayeratne and Dharme, tno well known VP student activists representing the University of Sri Jayawarcenapura, approached Dha-rtasiri and requested ja ciscussion with the ISU, As a result, 2 meeting with Pathirana was sSchedule¢ for the next day (Dec 14th) at 4 p.m. atthe University of Calombo. The discussion was held as planned ‘and a second round took place the next day [Dec 15th} at the same venue, As the evening approached, the two IVPors invited Pathirana to come with them (0 thelr focging at Pillyandala to continue the discussion further Pathirana and Somasiri (who also participated in thet day's discussion) agreed and all four proceeded 10 the 120 (Piliyandale) bus stop near the Police Park grounds, ‘As they were pacsing Hotel Shanthi Vihar, a white Hi Ace van stopped neat them and several persons got down braridishing pistols and saying “We are from the CID; get ia ail of you". By this time twibght was falling and being ‘a poya day the roads were desorted: Not sensing anything mare dangerous then an uncomfortable end probably € sleepless night in some police cell, - an experience to which they were no strangers - Pathirana and Somaciri dic not make an attempt to escap2 They wore bundled into the van fercibly. The IVP students were let out of the vehicle at two different places along the:way. The abductors. started assaulting Pathirena and Somasiti, Questioning them about the ISU and asking why they didn't join the JVP, By nowt was clear that tha abcuctors Were not CID officers but a gang of AVP ‘heavies’ ‘Tho journey ended in a lonaly wooded stretch near the Bolgoda leke. Three of the abductors dragged Pathirena awey while the remaining ones (including the driver of the ven} started working on Somasiri. Held prone on the ground, a knife-slicing his throat bit by bit, the agonised soraame of his leader end fiend ringing in his ers, Somasiri was ecked various questions, Particularly the whereabouts of the leading -actviets of both the ISU end the “Vikalpa Kandayama’. Somasiri Wes also told what the abductors intended to do with them once the ‘sessions of torture cum interiogation were over - he end Pathirana wero to bbe killed and their podies dumped in the crocodile infested Bolgods lake: ‘That was when fare intervened, There ras tho:courd of oars, the sounds of Many voices and then the licht of a torch; the screams of pain of the two victims had attracted the attention of a patty of pilgrims, Intetrupted in shalt gruesome endeavours, the abductors slashed a knife seveial times cross ‘Samasii’s throat and bolioving him to be dead, ran away. Somesiri escapee dasth - but Pathirara dicn’t, He was discovered 2 few vards away. strinped to his underpants, his Uhioat cut and the back of hs head bashed inaera rere reeeeee erence eee eee ee ST ‘Backdrop to the Killing: The University Student Movement in the ‘80s, Why did the JVP decide to kill Daya Pathirana? What did they hope to achieve through this brutal murder? What did they ectually achieve i.e. what were the results of ths act? What ‘vas its relevance co the macropoltical picture, and the way the country’s ‘extreme political cisis was played out? In order to énswer these-questicns it necessary to consider the history. of ISU, The ISU was formed in the early eighties in the Colombo Campus as an alternative to the JVP'e Student Union, the Samajavachi Sistya Sangamaya. Apert from being anti JVP, the ISU wes also firmly. anti UNP and anti SLFP. The ISU-was « hotch poich of various sirands of radicalism; it's leading members varied trom independent socialists to Trotekyites and confirmed Stalinists, from dogmatic Marxists to Fidelists/ Guovarists, ‘At one level, the ISU was an attempt at forming @ student organisation Unaffiliated to any ostablishod political Party end devoted exctusively to ‘student issues and interests. At ariuther level it was an attempt to form @ non-racist (evolutionary student ucleus which would one day ke a part of an. ‘internationalist revolutionary movement’. Therefore, from the inception two distinctly eontradictory impulses and characteristies were in ‘operation within the ISU: on the one hhand, the desire to be free ofall political Partios and organisations and on the thers the persistent search by some of the more ‘advanced’ elements for a ‘revolutionary alternative’ to existing left parties and organisations, With the ‘assumption of the leadership by Daye Pathirana, this second tendency bocams increasingly dominant. This process was accelerated by the beliat Of the leading cadres of the ISU that pré-revalutionary situation existed within the country following the closure of the parliamentary option for regime change with the fraudulent Referendum of 82. In their view therefore, the building of an armed revolutionary organisation was the most urgent task cn the agenda, Throughout 1982 and '83, diecussions were held with all existent various left parties end groups in search for an ‘organisation with ‘the correct political fine’. The two determinant factors in this regard were an internstionalist stand on the sthnic question end the {ejection of the parliamentary path es the main strategy of the revolution. The ISU's unofficiel affiliation with the "Vikalpa. Kandayama’ (VK.) was the result of this persistent search, ‘The inability of the non/ anti JVP left to seize the unique opportunity presented by Somasiri’s exposure of the real identity of Pathirana’s assassins, enabled the JVP to regain the lost initiative (both nationally and within the student movements) after an interval of a- mere few months. As the pollfcisation and radicalisation of the ISU intensified, so did its contradictions with the JVP. Aer the July 83 riots, the JVP took an increasingly racist stand, opposing any and all attempts at devolution and branding all anti-racist parties and ‘Groups (including the leftist ones) *Eelamists’. The ISU with it’s vocel opposition to the war and support for the Tamil stiuggle therefore headed the VP's list of onemios, within the student movemet ‘The JVP Onslaught On The Left By mid ‘85 this had led to. physical violence between the two groups, on Colombo campus. In mid. 1966, etter the Left's attondance at the Political Parties Conterence (PPC! -a roundtable fon the ethnic issue and devolution convened by the Jayewardane administration at the written ‘suggpetion of Vijaya Kumaratunga, the ‘IVP started its sustained campaign of Violence directed against the anti racist left. (A precursor of ths campaign was the violent disruption by JVP eotivists (of an important convention of the Joint ‘rade Union Action Committee, held in early 1986 at the Sucathadase Stadium.) A number of SLM? meetings as well as the residences of some of the left leaders (such as Vijay Kumaratunga), were bombed. In. the Universities, oitchea physical battles ‘were raging between the JVP and the anti racist left student groups: Nowhere was this more in evidence, than in the University of Colombo Where the struggle for supremacy between the ISU and the JUP waz at its peak. The JVP even abducted a militant ISU activiet, hold him septive for several hours in their stronghold the University of Sri Jayanardanapura and used torture to elicit information from him about the ISU and its leaders. The Psthirana assassination tock place in 1s context. In mid-“86 Pathirana started to dift awey from the VK, mainly because of his disagreement with the latter's support, (following the LTTE massacre of TELO in May'88 and converging ‘with the conclusions of the PPC), for an intermediate political solution for the ethnic problem shert of both secession and federalism, By ths time, of the 7 member unofficial leadership. of the ISU, two had'become inactive: threa stayed with the VK; Dharmasiri took an intermediate position while Pathirana recommenced ils search for 42 revalutionary croup which supported the Tamil national struggle unconditionelly, (He had become quits sympathetic to the ultra Trotskyite Komkaru Mawatha group and, in Northern politics, to the EROS rather than the EPRLF). However-all tive active members of the |SU leadorehia Were united In their implacable ‘opposition to the racist JVP and SLFP. and in their struggle against the repression by the UNP and the NIB/ CID, which at that time wae directed primarily at the three non JVP Southam rovolutionary groups: the Vikaipa Kandayama, the Samajawadhi Janethe Viyaperaya2 and the Nava Janatha Vimukths Porarnune®, It should be emphisised that from 1984, the JIVP wae providing the State with Information about these rival grouns in the same way it was sneaking tothe University authorities on the ISU. The universities were not only the JVP’s main support base; they were also Its most fertile recrutting ground. ‘Achieving total domination - actually a totalitarian monopoly - over the Univercities was therofore an important objective of the JVP. The ISU and Pathirana were perhaps the most ‘Scri0us obstacles to achieving this ‘goel. The removal of Pathirena and the dastruction of the ISU were Incieasingly considered by the JVP as necessary preconditions for its further growl), The JVP's plan wes simple ‘and deadly: Kill Pathirane and got rid of his body. Suspicion would naturally fall on tho UNP rogitre. Whilo the other leading cadres of the ISU (and the Viiwere fully occupied with blaming the state and trying to protect themselves from the stete repression, the JVP could take them out systematically, one by one. With each naw Killing the attention would be focused more and more on tha state, leaving the ISU and the VK wide open for the JYP’s Insidious cempaign of ‘oid blooded murder. By the time the ISU and VK realised that this was othing but a red herring and the real culprits were the JVP. it would he too late. That was the game-plan. ‘The Days After : The Road Not Taken Somashi’s survival made all these ‘earfully laid plans go awry. By tho ‘evening of November ‘6th (1986), the ISU was:aviare of the real identity of the killets. A meeting was held at the University of Colombo the same ‘evening and a decision wes taken to launch a massive propaganda battle against the JVP. It was also decided {o alert the other eft parties and orouns to thie new danger and bring them all together in an anti-JVP united front. The firstleaflet was fasued on the 17th (of December 1996 and 50,000 copies were distributed in Matera (where Pathirana’s funeral was held with K.LDharmesiti as the chief specker) and in Colombo. A second leaflet giving the complete details of the crime wes isousd on the 2nd of Januery 1987. A series of meatings of all enti racist left political parties, trade unions, and sectoral organisations were held to discuss the JVP threat and to formulate some kind of united action. Thaugh most of the participants privately agreed that the JVP was responsible for this crime, there was 3 curfous reluctance to say «his pubicly Many reasons were given. Some felt ‘that attacking the JVP directly would “holp the UNP by ‘diluting the anti UNP. struggle’. The treditional left parties (the CPSL and the LSSP) regarded the whole issue as. an internecine struggle ‘among various ulraleft student groups, ‘the JVP. they felt, could never become a istic et D It is of extreme political importance to stress that Chandrika Bandaranaike, Vijaya’s wife and the SLMP President, was not present on this momentous occasion a threat to them. The LSSP leader Dr.Colvin R. de Silva informed this ‘correspondent - at the time the ISU representative - who met him two days after Fathirana’s death that though the AVP may kill adical students but it will ever touch the traditional left. The implication was: this is your problem ot ours: a problem of the Junior League, not the Big Boys. The NSSP was rolustant to criticise the JVP because it had high Hopes of dislodging the JVP leadership and winning over the rank end file, in the not too distant future! Because of all these reasons the ISU's appeal for a concerted and united campaign against the JVP to stop it in its tracks, fall on deat ears. Orly a few who knew the JVP and Wijeweera intimately, Ike the former VP leader Nandana Marasinghe ot ‘Anuradhapura (who, loss than oro year later, became the secord victim of the VP) understood what the Pathirena kelling meant: that the JVP had become a Polpotist entity which presented a mortal danger to all left and democratic forces. But this correct assessment did not reach any receptive ears; this ‘writer recalls that Marasingha himsalf was reduced 10 watching the whole ‘charade from the back of the meeting hall, standing near a window. Somasini’s survival and the resuitent exposure of the real identity of Pathurana’s killers presented the anti racist and democratic eft with an ‘opportunity to strategically weaken the JVP through the launching of 3 massive politico - propaganda campaign. if th/s opportunity was seized, many of the subsequent tragedies, including the murder of Vijaya Kumaratunge could have been prevented. But this opportunity was lost; the only concrete result of the series of joint meetings was a statement (which the four leading left parties dide't sign, teputising that task tw their student oignisations| which didn't criticise the JVP by name, but referred 10 it in Aesopian language as ‘raciet faccist forces’ ‘This strategic error on the part of the left parties wes further compounded by the subject vis and lack of urity among the ant! IVP student olements. After its involvement in the Pathirana assassination became known, the leading JVP cadres went into hiding. As 9 result the IUSF which was hitherto dominated by the JVP bocamo Ioederless. This prasented another unique opportunity: # chance for the anti-JVP, anti racist student ‘organisations to capture powarin the (USF and thereby effectively ‘marginalize tho JVP within tho studont ‘movement. Several initial discussions wero held in Decomber 1986 end January 1987 at the office of the CPSL Students Union the Lanka Jathiko Shishya Sangamaya - ettended by the student organisetions of the four major left parties, the ISU, the Independent ‘Student Group of the University of ‘Moratuwa and ceveral anti JVP ctudent activists from other Universities. A statement was drafted signed by all participant organisations, condemning the JVP for essessineting Pathirena and assuming the leadership of the IUSF. However due to lack ofconsensus, this statement was never issued to the newspapers. No further ‘steps were teken 10 dsiodge the JVP ‘and take over the leadorchip of the JSF. The second battie against the VP teo was thus lect: ‘The period following the assassination of Pathirana was 9 "diabolically ‘confused era” (to barrow 2 phrase fram Pail Neruda), The inability of the nen! antl JVP lett to seize the unique ‘opportunity presented by Somasiri’s exposure of the teal identity of Pathirane’s assassins, enabled the JVP. to regain the lost initiative (both nationally and within the student ‘movernents) after an interval of a mere Tew months. Duting the ext year, while the non/anti JVP left wae debating whether ciitcising the JVP by name would help the UNP ot ‘whether the rank ard file of the JVP could be ‘wen over eventually’, the JVP busied itself with the serious business of planning and organising the ext stage of its bloody campaign of eliminating its rivals, This commencec with the attack en the LSSP headquarters in October 1987 and the killing of Nendana Marasinghe at the Sunday fair in Anuradhapura town in November 1887 - and continued till the miltary dateat of the JVP st the ‘end of '89, The assassination of Vijaya by the IVP in February 1988 effectively decapitated the United Socialist. Alliance. This wes ompounded by the killing of sevaral thousand left activists, also by the IVP. This bloodletting weakened the laft to’ such ¢ degree Uiat an independent pristence as a third formation, became practically impossible, The break-up ot tho USA and tho reversion to coelition politics on the part of its component fragments (with both the SLFP ard the LUNP) were the final outcomes of thase strategic errors made in the aftermath of the Pathirans acsessination. Tho Way Wo Were (And What Might Have Been} In the neve conjuncture which. ceme into being after the assassination of Pathirana, the now-JVP democratic left had two urgent tasks. to fulfil: tho formation of abroad united front which wae net only anti UNP and anti SLFP but also anti JVP;.and the launching of 4 politico-propaganda battle to defeat the Polpotlst JVP threat, (After all the JVP in all ie specches and publications mace amply clear that the physical destruction of the non-JVP. lef: was one of its primary goal and most immediate tasks.) The fulfilment of these twin tasks depended on tho ability of the left (o discard many of the old truisms and adopt 3 new. political thinking. This was what Vifaya was doing in tho last months of his tre, ‘Two wetetshed events should be Mentioned in this tegard. First was Vijaya's unexpected presence and his extremely explicit ant! JVP speech at the funeral af Nandana Marasinghe Anutadhapura in November 1987. With thie, Vijaya eloarly and definitively ‘assumec the leadership of the enti JVP struggle This solidified the fraternal relationship between Vijaya and the ISU, the seeds of which were sown in the immediate aftermath of the Pathirana assassination. AS the key witness to the identity of Psthirana’e assassins, protecting the life of ‘Somasiri from tho JUP bacame a major concem of the ISU. When the ISU ‘approached Vijaya with this problem, he offered to keep Somasiriin his own house for as long as it wes necessary. Used to nothing but cowaidico and ‘opportunism, lemme excuses and empty phrasomongaring fromleft leedors, thie ‘warm and fraternal response from Vijaya was like an unexpected breath Of fresh air - and gave some hope to the beleaguered ISU that all wes not lost. During the next ore yaar a close felationship based on mutual respect. ané admiration graw batwoon Viays and the 1SU. When the ISU invited Vijaya to address the 2nd Pothirane ‘commemeration mesting (held at the New Tewn Hall in Jarury 1988) Vijaya postponed a previously schodeled tip Zo the Micate-East (to flim “Saharawe ‘Sihinaya‘) in order to he there, On this Occasion 100, he made a cavastating indictment of the JVP. The second event vas the gathering 0 71 political parties, trede unions and sectoral organisations held at the New Tovin Hall on 26th Decombor 1987, and the founding of a new bloc, the December 26th Movernent, which was Vijava’s brainchild. This was something unprecedented in the history of the Lankan leit and would have been impossible if nat for the correct and dynamic leadership of Vijaya Kumaretunga. The uo important aspects of this gathering should ba emphasised: it deliberately. exciuced ‘and attacked tho SLFP. banishing it from the progressive fold and strategy nd it brought together ina single bloc, many left con-party organisations which the traditional left regarded either as upstarts or nonentities, Thus Vijaya's initiative succaeded in bridging the gep hetwean the established and new Left(s). For Vijaya it was the necessary first step in the path ho waa Getermined to teke towards the ‘reation of an ant fascist, anti-recist, anti-feudal, anti capitalist Third Force i.e. an anti IVP, enti SLEP, emi UN? Democratic Leit which could one day meke @ successful bid for goveinmertel power Mt is of extramo political Inportanee 10 Suess that Chandrika Bandaranaike, Vijaya’s wife end tho SLM President, was not present on this mamontous occosion at whiah Vijaya was declared and endorsed (by Dr.Colvin A. de Silve) as the Presidential candidate of the united Lett at the upcoming election. ‘The formation of the USA was to be the second step in this project. It is Necessary to mention here that Vijaya clearly indicated that he wanted to broaden the USA in the near future to inglude other lef: foomations including the Tamil Left, and not keep it as an exclusive club as the traditional left was wont to. [He had aleo informed the SLMF’s Central Committee of his Ccartituda that leading elements of the VK, ISU and the SJV. would join his party shortly, thereby strengthening im politically) This scenario was what the JVP cetested, polttcally and ideologically, more than anything else ‘Small wonder that Viiaya was killed by the JVP less than two months later. If the forming of @ broad front of all democratic left forces and. the launching of the enti JVP politico: propaganda stiuggle took place in the immaciete aftermatn of the Pathirana ‘assassination, many of the eventuel ‘tragedies would have been prevented, As it was, these twin developments came too late either to save Vijaya's fe or to save the independent left — Contd on vane 24Response to Prof. A.j.Gunawardana: 1S MAM AWM ONE OF THE Se PRINGS ON ANY SPACE o Douglas Amarasekara and Hemantha Warnakulasuriya. We have tead with interest the article years after Maname’ by Prot A,J.Gunawarcanz published:in the Lanke Guardian of October 31 and November 15. Prof.Gunawardana bogine hie article with some sarcactic remerks about our booklet “25 years after Maname’; but he has not replied ‘to a single one of oureriticisms Above alf, he has not béen able to quote @ ‘ginglo fine from Manamo that has anything of value to say; anything comparable, for example with the following == 41. Call-no man happy til he is dead. (From the Cedious ot Sophocles). 2. {twas my tongue, and not my mind that sivore. (From the Hyppolytus ‘oF Euripides) 9) To thine own self be trus ‘And it must follow as the night the doy. : ‘Thou canst not then be false to any Iman, (From Shakespeare's Hemet) 4, What's in a name? That which we fall. a 1030, By any other name would smell as ‘sweet. (From Shekespesre’s Romeo and Juliet) 6. The last temptation was the greatest treason, To do the right thing for the wrong reason (From T.S.Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral) ‘The reader can easily find literally hundreds of similer lines in any dictionary of quotations. Instead of these, we find in Maname typical fines like the following = 4, Q.Sun-God ané Moon = God, Lords Of the Sky. Give us all your blessing 2. Princose : Tho night is near lim tull of fear, My desrest dear. Bears are growling, Lions ate prowling, They're drawing neat ‘They'll scon be here. 3, At the crucial point of the play, when the Prince has just been killed Prineees > Why cid you kill my dear husband? tt was your fault fe wae your fault. Veddah King: He tried to kill me, £0 1 killed him, tt-was not my fault. It was not ‘ry, fault Compote this with the following, from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar: Brutus: If there be any in this assembly, ‘any dear friend of Caesar's, 10 him 1 say. that Brutus’s love for Caesar vias no less than his. f then that friend demond why Brutus rose against Gaeser, this is:my answer: It ‘wae not that | loved Caesar less, but that I loved Home more. Had you rather Caesar ‘was living and die all slaves, than that Ceeser viere dead, tolifeall free men? As Caesar Toved me, | weep for him. As he wee fortunate, | rajaice. at it. As he was valiant, ! honour him. But as he was ambitious, slew him, Who is hare so base, that he would be = slave? if any, epeak, for him have | offended. Wno is here 20 rude, that would not be @ Roman? if any. speak, for him have | offended. Who is here so vile, that will not love his county? If any, speak, for him have | offended. | pauce for a reply. Gitizens: None, Brutus. none. Brutus: Than none have [ affended. Suroly the vast difference chould be obvious to any intelligent person. Prot. Gunawardania goes on. “The first lgsues relates to the substance and quailty of the play itself. This nes been. cornprehensivaly doalt with over the years. However Regi Siriwardene's original review in the Deily News has, like the play itself, stood the test of ime, MrSiriwardena wrote in 1950: ‘Maname is not only unquestionably the finest thing on the Sinhalese stage, itigalgo one of the finest things Ihave seen on any stage’ It is absolutely untrue to-sey that Maname and Mi. Siriwerdena’s original reviow have stood the test of time, 08 's clearly shown by the following facts. 1. Mr Siriverdens himself, inan article published in the Deily News about 26 years oftar Manamo wrote ‘We mey have to revise our opinion about Maname. AFTER ALL, WHAT DOE! (This is exactly what we have been ‘asking from the very beginning!2. About 14 yoars after Manam: another well known critic, in. an article published in the Daily News, wrote: “The opposition to Maname sseme to be growing, We may lve 10 revise our ‘opinion abour it soms years from now’. 3, 28 yeare after Maname, Prof. Sarachchandra himself, reviewing another play, wrote in the Dally News: ‘Although most of the plays now done follow the conventions of the naturalistic theatre, the acting still bears the pernicious influence of stylisation, Lucien Bulathsinghala still declaims as-he does in the stylicad theatre, and Leonie Kotelawala walks about the stage in a poco thet could indicate that she hes a permanent back ache. IF ANY ONE TELL ME NOW ‘THAT | HAVE DONE MORE HARM TO THE SINHALA THEATRE THAN GOOD, TWILL NOT DENY IT’ (Ceylon Daily News, Nov 20, 1979 Page 10) 4. The Eneyclopaedia Britannica Contains articles of considerable length not only on English, French, other European and American Literatures, but also on Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, and other literatures: It also contains articles on individual writars - not only Sophocles, Shakespeare, Mitton, Voltaire, Shaw, Eliot and ‘others, but also on indian, Chinese, ard Japanese writers lke Kalidasa, Ju Fu, Li Po, Matsui Basho and others. Hoviever, the 1962 etiticn of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, publisited 6 years after Mename, does not contain. one single word either about Sinhalese Literature, including Manaime, or ebout the author of Maname, later editions contain a short reference to Sinhalese Literature and a few Sinhalese writers, included in @ long article on South East Asian Literature, But they do not contain seperate articles of considerable length, oither on Stahalese Witerature including Maname, or on the author of Manaine. Evidently, the editors of the Encyclepaodis Britannica do not regard Mename as ‘one of the finest thinge on any stage!! 5. The New Stendard Encyclopaed|a, 3 modern American publication, though smaller than the Britannica ‘contains excellant concise accounts Of various fields of knowledge. I alves accounts of the literature of ‘several languages, not only Exropean and Amarican, but also Indisn, Chinese, Jepanese, Persian, and even Ieelandio, ‘Tho 1981 edition, published 25 years after Manama, does nat contain ono single word ebout Sinhalese litereture including Maneme or about the author cof Maname, Evidently, the aditors of the New Stendard Encyclopaedia also do not regard Maname as ‘one of tho finest things on any stage’ ©. Time International, one of the most prestigious weekly journals, widely read all over the world, ‘recently publishied @ Golden Jubilee Issue anttled ‘Asa’, - A Compronensive Review (over 100 pages) of the lest 50 yeors of development in Asia, Including Politics, Economics, and Culture, The section on Culture includes feferences to the works of a.number of -Asian writers = indian, Chinese. Japanese etc, {including Yasunari Kawabata, the first Japenseo to be awarded a Nobel Prize for literature). However It does not contain an single word about Mename or its author, Evidently, the editors of Time International also do not regard Maname as ‘one of the finest things on any stage’ Inthe socend instalment of hie article, Prot.Gunawardena refers to the music. singing and dencing in Prof.Sarachchandra's plays, To us it Seems that the music, singing anc dancing are as primitive as the words. For example, in Manaine, all the characters go round and round in the seme circle for 2 hours on end, Is this really compsrable with the Bolshoi Ballet? We found it extremely boring. and almost intelerable to watch after the first ten or fifteen minutes, To us it Seems that Maname is not comparable with (3) Hamlet (words), (2) La Traviata (mucic ond song), of (9) Swan Leke (music and dancing), and a host of cimilar productions. It would seem that our opinion 1s shared by the editors of (1) The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2) The New Standard Encyclopaedia of America, (Gi Time international; so thet trom the world point of view, we do not seem 10 be ina “microscopic and nagligisle minority” as. Prof.Gunawardana imagines. Indeed it would seom that from the world point of view, its t admirers of Maname who ara in @ ‘micrescepic and negligible minarity't Maname rendered a useful service to Sinhalese Drama by reviving interest in it at atime when it was at a very low ebb For this we are grateful. But RoW we should try to tise above that level and develop more modern forme. There is dramatic tarentin our country, soms of it of very good quality, Young drematists like Sugatapala de Silva, Dharmasiri Wickrameratna, Henry Jayasena and others were just beginning to produce plays of some value. For example, in Sugathapala do Silva's “Thattu Geval”, a women has ‘come to hato her husband, She stands ‘ona balcony and watches him walking along 2 busy road, fer below, She turns ‘to a friend and says “There he goss! Do you know, I-eften siand of) this balcony and watch him walking along that road, énd 1 keep on hoping that hho will bo run over by 2 car, Do you think 1am a very bad weman? The friend replies "I don’t think of human beings as good or bad, I think of thom as just human beings”. There is depth 9 thought and feeling in those lines. They offer food for thought In Dharmasiri Wickrcmaratna’s ‘Ran Thodu*, the principal character is a woman whe has had an unfortunate sexual experience when young. But the Contd on page 23RURAL WOMEN AND FOOD SECURITY CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ASIA Gail Omvedt Concerned Asian Scholars.) (A respected sociologist, the writer has lived, taught and worked in India, mainly with oppressed caste and peasant moVements, for many years. She is a member of the editorial board of the Bulletin for This isu revel version uf Paper prepared for World Food SumltFor PAO /Regronal Office for Asta and the Pacijte Introduction = Food Secunity and Women The “four horsemen® of — the Apocalypse still rds in the world, and while farnine and huncer seem gente Compared to the modem insefnations ‘of war, death and plague, still their crust pangs ahd slow destruction effect far to many people in the world In st of considerable agricultural progress, in spite of foodarsin’ production per cepite ccntinuing to rise, ang in'sphe Of evorfiowing surpluses in come Fesions, too many people inthe worid go hungry and come continue to sterve to death. Increasingly we foal that this must not continue, that the lives: of imilions cf women and men shouldinot be cut short and sapped of vitality that childran should not go-cn-euffering And so the concer for Theres alse an increasing awereness that women ate not only maior victims of hunger and famine, but their eannaetion ‘with food is of vital importence. Wornen aie the investors of agriculture end are still disproportionstely involved, in agricultural production (ees Table 1) = ad:with iereasing market integration and migration for work, often becoming mote so. to the point viker imariy-souial scientisis now: speak of the “feminization of agriculture’ in imarly regions and countries. Wornen aro more likely than mon to be Eoncerned with: providing food and ution to thai familie. Women, particularly the rural women of dovoloping countries, aro vitally inked: to food security. But what is “fad security"? Haw in ‘poor countries do we reelly insure that ‘people will havs encugh to eat every, day, and not only, sufficient food but abundant, divarso and nutritious food? The ides that everyone has the nght te ent obundently ie etter all almosta revolutionary concept in human. history, which has seer all too short life spans and all too meny famines, and stil it is not quite accepted: still ‘we find that too many people identify {cod security for the poor of the thita world only: in torme of providing feodasains.. Clearly tod security should rrean more than simply the bare ‘minimiim -s9 some woul talk of “food sufficiency” (Goplan, 1996) or even *fond abundance” and only “food Security”. But tie question still femaing; but how much more and how. {SI 1 be achieved? (see teble 1) Food security can de cefined in terms ‘f procuction of enough food in ways ‘and areas that people have eocess to through control of ncome. property oF Power: It does not-mean producing {cod grains rether than “cash” crops; the distinction ic enyway 2 false one since people eat more tian arain and singe grein itsalt is normally growin for the market, It does not mean simply the ability to produce oneself (either at an individual or national eval) rather than acquiring from external sources - though the latter may be considered r glevant, This definition does nor projudge the question of “how much is enough” - because humen beings redstine their “noed" in the procace Of development, as we see in particular jn the developing countrios of Asie ‘which are eating at increzsinaly rich levels. A single tigleator 16 measure this concept of “(God security” would’be the Fumber of calories people eat on 2 regular bacis - on the grounde that it women, men and children are gating food in sufficient quantity in “normal” times and if they have some power in medern democratic society, the temporary crises that may hit them. (may lead to cutbacks bur not io huige! ‘and starvation. FOOD FIRST OR GROWTH FIRST How is food security ta be achisvad? For a long time there have been two contending trends in thinking about this, which we might call the “food first” model and the. “growth first” model. The food first mado! emphasises providing cheap 1009, basically foodgrains, arown locelly. by landholding farmers (hence it is Sometimes identified with subsistence roduction!; historicelly it has heen linked to statist development policiss that emphasised building up « heavy industijal base financed in pert by cheap latour and cheap foad; lew Prices for caricuitural products were iustified by the necessity of providing ‘cheap food for the poor through aublic‘Table I: Women and the Labour Force in Agricalture in Asia Counts Women's Share of % of Lsbour AdultLabourFerce Forse in Agricultare (1990) 1960. 1999 ‘Bangladesh a & 65 ‘Bhutan 39 3 Cambodia 4 Bm China 4 a 7D DPR Korea 5 oe India > 64 Indonesia B 3s tian sh 3 Taos 2 78 Malaysia oa Maldives ‘9 Mongolia ol 3 Myanmar oD Nepal | Pakistan oa 3 Philipines oa Republic fora 39 6k SriLenka 4 st 48 Thang a B64 Sourée iluman Developmene Report 1096, table 16 and 24, (Oxford University Press, 1996. GDP. Agreultare Population Worid 1970-80 3619 19 1986-50 Bl 28 7 1990.04 1g NA 15 ow and Middle income Countries 1970-80 Sa 2 22 1930-80 Sta 20 1990-98 19 1g 7 ast Asi and Pacific 1970-80 ie at 19 1980-90 79 44 16 1990-94 94 3 36 Ly South Asia 1970-80 Soe ole 24 1080-90 570 32 1990-94 BQ 27 Soureo : Workd Dovslorment Repors, 1993, Table Zand -Noxle development Renart 1986, able 11 Aarealiuse as% of GDP 1993 40 2 9 a 9 4 at @ 8 25 2 25 10 GDP per capita distribution systems Today, many of those using the discoutse of “100d first argue that state intervontion ia the primary means tor providing food to tho poor and thet a focus'on market [production and cash crops (especially for agriculture) endangers food security (for 2 current example with regard to India, see Swaminathan, 1996; for the growth first modal, see Rao, 1936) In contrast, the Growth first mode! ‘emphiasises the necessity tor economic. growth to provide people with the income to procure food and has been linked with dovolopmental policies Stressing technological advances in. agriculture end giving higher prices to farmers growing the food. These themes gained dominance in the 1980s with the liberalisation procase {often with significant state guidance), and have emphasiced market bacod growth and export-oriented industrslisation. Agricultural growth and exports, most often of fruits. vegetables and plantation ciops, but sometimes also of foodgrains. (for exainple the successful case of rice in Theiland and most raeenly Vietnam) have been stiessed in these policies a6 2 ata were aven cn poverty 2s such after 1992! Obvicusly, date for 1992 wore toa ‘premature te gauge the effecis of reforms which wore announced only in the middlo (of 1991 and did not began until ater, More ‘cont dits (comowhst tontative and bazod ‘on sinalet samples « #5 vere the 1982 ‘gures) - did In fact show a subsequent ‘ecline in rural poverty 1834-94. (Seo Eeonomis and Polical Woaldy, January 27, 1996, pp.184 and Swaminathan, 1986). At this point India continue to voprasant a case of Sow anc halting liberalisation, wit ‘economists and intellectuals an various sides af the pollical avides arguing about the significance of economic data In fact Indian hee een hot and heavy aczusationé not only adout incieasing Poverty, but about environmental destiustin {and loss of food secunty folowing “SAPS* and the incrsesed role of the markst, with very litle systematic reliance on date 10 bback them up. For the most recent exemple, 2 conference on “Tood security” held by an NGO in Deth saw se. proclsimed "excerts’ tanging from British) and American, intellectua's to India's Vandana Shiva arava that food security was being endangered allover the worl, and qJoting ane statistic from hieia to prove theif point. that food consumption had decined from 510 am per doy in 1991 10.466 in 1998 (Times: ‘July. 29, 1996); where thace figures came from cen orly be guessed, but thay contradict the UN data presented here, ‘There ars dete to the effect thet foodaran, availabilty (detined as production plus net imgorie minus govarnmant etocke| nad ‘decined temporarily in, 1992-3 and since many supporters ef the anc-onarzet position often seem to assume tnat the poor eat only "oodgrains” and that producing fut and vegetables etc. can only ae allen to ‘them, thie may be the ecures of the “experts” die warnings,A Selection of the Finest International Brands. neve SER — llaggs ‘CHEESE DIAPERS BREAKFAST CEREALS outer HUGGIES are ons Ouse PRUNES, ES poss DENTAL CARE Ardmona Palmolive ‘CANNED Frum PERSONAL CARE LURPAK BUTTER SOUPS AND PASTA cs Foops romato proves TOBLERONE poe MAMEE CHOCOLATES = INSTANTNOODLES FLA a HAIRCARE BERRI a Sole Agents M skaeed Silmavo Bondarancike Mawatha, P.O. Box 1970, Colombo 14. ‘Tok 529871-2, 522830, 522832, 522934, 522155, 522373. Telex: 21418 Tasstea CE, 21991 Selpro CE, 23426 Seliea CE. Cable: Tasstea. Teletax: (941) 522913, Quality and Variety withi— ee Contd on page 8 project. Hewaver the fact these two Gevelopments did take place. at all (andor the leedership of Vijaya and largely due to his initiative) did make a contribution to the eventual defeat of ‘the Polpotist IVP end the saving of the democratic system. Of the LTTE's onslaught on the Eelam Left, beginning with the abduction of Jaffna campus student leader Viitharen. also in 1986, hae to be noted here. Unlike in the South though, the Eelam left and democratic forces were - and have remainad - unable to prevail over ‘their’ IVP, the LTTE. The reasons tor this Necessitates a separate venture inte the realm of political sociology and comparative politics. It is especially vcien we remember what happened {and is happening in the Northand East that we can decidedly conchide that Pothirana’s death, Ike the death of Vijaya: and those of several thousand left activists including Pathirena’s successor as the lesdor of the ISU, K.L. Dhiarmasiri (who Was shot in the back ofthe head by a young JVP kille;, while ticing on the pillon of amotorbike early ‘one morning in Kotahena in late July 89) was rot in vain. Foomnot -A-small revolutionary group led by Dayen, ayaa, Inked to Padmanebhe's EPALE 2.SJV —led by Jyatlleka Siva, linked to ‘Maheswaran’s PLOTE. ‘StNLvP- an anti racist breakaway from the VP, alco Inked to Mahoowaron’s PLOTE, Contd From page 10 characteris treated with eympathy end ‘compassion. She Is not just a bad ‘woman. Henry Jayesons: produced some very good adaptations of intecnationally well known plays, fhotably “Anas Maliga”, an adaptation of Tennessee Williama “Gieas Menagerie”. Unfortunately Maname interrupted the development of these young writers, ‘We hope that Sinhalese Drama will now. ‘revive, Out Astronomers [and ericketers} have now caught up with the rest of the world. We since‘ely hope that our cLamatists also vil do the same in the ‘Not too distant future. To: culation Manager LANKA GUARDIAN 246, Union Place, Colombo 02, Sri Lanka, Local & Overseas Subscription Form Received with thanks from Mr!Mrs/Mi: Address Date Signature ‘Local Rates: Rs.375/- for | year (23 issues, no issue on April 15) Rs.200/- for 6 months (12 issues) AirMail Rates Canada & USA: US$ 65/- for 1 year USS 40/- for 6 months UK, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Netherlands, France, Japan, Holland, Philippines, Austria, Norway, Sweden, China, Ireland, Switzerland, Nigeria, Belgium. Denmark, Paris & London: ‘US$ 55/- for 1 year USS 35/- for 6 months Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Baharain, Arabian Gulf, Syria & Singapore. US$ 45/- for 1 year US$ 25/- for 6 months India, Pakistan: USS 40/- for 1 year US$ 25/- for 6 months,Will privatization mean PS UE ecu LAUREL) of my members be aly SMe Privatization will in no way dilute or a powers and rights of your union. British Airways was Privatize in |987,end the unions remain to protece worker interests just as before, Some of the world’ largest, mot powerful and vocal unions exit in the private sector For ‘example, the United Auto Workers (UAWY) represent over 100.000 workers at the three biggest American car companies, nore of which are state owned. In fact. there is ceverylikethood that working conditions will acuallyimprove in privatized companies, since thare will be tubstamtl invesonents made to upgrade fades and training You can look forward to representing a considerably more prosperous union. tes important to realize privatization is 2 means to an end, tsa means to improve our living standards foster ‘echnological progress, create employment and take cur nation into a more prosperous tomorrow, In order to achieve these aims, privatization has to be executed in the appropriate rranner. That isthe task of the Public Enterprise Reform Commission (PERC). Its mandste is to make privatization ‘work for Sri Lankans zodey and for generations to come. Every privatizationis a carefully centidered decision (hac akes invoaccount the interests of al sectors ofsociety, the general publi the state employees, the consumers, the suppiers,25 wel 2s che country’s overall eéonomic vision PERC's mission is to see that privatization works, In doing so, your interests are always being well looked after. With privatization everybody has a stake, PERC WATCHFUL IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC ENTERPRISE REFORM COMMISSION, ark Caor - 30 Fear No.4 PO. 20 Bak of Caen aa, ‘oun | Stan ‘Wephene 91S, Fac 1-241INTEREST FREE CREDIT? CONVENIENT REPAYMENT TERMS. LOWEST JOINING FEE? Yes. All and many more benefits are yours with the CEYBANK VISA CARD. Contact the Centre Manager, CEYBANK CARD CENTRE, Bank of Ceylon No. 4, BANK OF CEYLON MAWATHA, COLOMBO - 1 BE WISE. CARD - WISE BANK OF CEYLON Baukers to the Nation TELEPHONE: 447823 — Ex. 4180 & 4185