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    Sri Lanka Guardian
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    JUNE 1 1995

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    June 1 1995

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    Sri Lanka Guardian
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    LANKA GUARDIAN Vol. 18 No.2 June 1, 1995 Price Rs.10.00 Registered at GPO, Si Lanka QD/SYNEWSIS4 EELAM WAR III DEATH OF A MONK —Mervyn de Silva THE ILL-PREPARED PRESIDENT — Nirupama Subramanian BROKEN PROMISES, LOST FAITH — V. Prabhakaran RUSSIAN SAMS DELHI’S OFFER FLASHBACK 1985: BATTLES BEFORE PEACE ACCORD —K.M. De Silva PEACE ZONE AND SRI LANKAN POLICY — Humayun Kabir AUSTRALIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN — Gareth Evans FARMERS UNDER I.M.F ATTACK — Kalinga Seneviratne IS DEVOLUTION A SOLUTION? — Dayalal Abeysekera WITH THE BEST COMPLIMENTS OF ELEPHANT HOUSE SUPERMARKET QUALITY AT AFFORDABLE PRICES NO. 1 JUSTICE AKBAR MAWATHA COLOMBO 2. TRENDS LTTE infiltrates city Police suspect that the LTTE has Inilrated numbers of informants and acilvists, including suicide bo- ‘bers, into Colombo, One suspe- ted female soy was aresied on May 18 at Sri Saranankara Road, ‘on the southem outskirts of the cy. She was found to be a rative of Mancathiva, in Jatioa Don't sell arms, EU told The European Parimament in a recent respiuiion urged member states of ha European Union not fo sell arms lo the LTTE. The Euro- pean Perfament also called on SAARC counties and other nations of the Indian oceen region to bring pressure on the LTTE to return to the negoiiation table. SUBSCRIPTION RATES Air Mail Canadla/U.S.A. USS 65/ ‘or 1 year US$ 45/ for 6 months U.K., Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Netherlands, France, Japan, Holland, Phillippines, Austria, Norway, Sweden, China, Ireland, Switzerland, Nigeria, Belgium, Denmark, Paris, Landon, US$ 55/ for 1 year USS 39/ for 6 months Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Baharin, Arabian Gull, Syria, Singapore. USS 45/ for 1 year USS 25/ for 6 months India, Pakistan. US$ 40/ for 1 year USS 22/ for 6 months Local Rs. 250/-for 1 year Rs. 150/-for 6 months The Union was urged to support the peace efforts of the Sr Lanka govemment. The resclition deplo- ‘ed the LTTE’S unlaterel breach of the ceasefire. Awer Council? Moves to set up a war council which woul inclide Qppastion Leader Franil Wickremesinghe, instead of tne extsting Naticnal So- curity Councl, is being resisted by powerful persons in the gove- ‘mort, according ioastoryin"The Island”. The war council idea Is being pushed bya former AlrForce thie, according to this newspaper which has recently had differences with the goverment jn war news repating. Editor in court “Sunday Times" editor Sinha Ra- tnatunga has bean chaiged by the Atlonay General with crminaldela: ‘mation of President Chandiika Ba- ndaranaike Kumaratunga, The edt tor has boen noticed to appoar in court on June 13. First on the hit list President Chandiha Bandara rnaiko Kumaratinga told India To- day during her recent bref visit to Delhi inat site was 01 the (op of the LTTE’ hit list. Tho president also sadthat LTTE leader VelupillaiPra- bhakaranhadeatierdecidedincold bleod to kil former indian Prime Minister Ray Gena, The Indian press took note that this was the irsttime ihe Sa Lanka government had _catogerically blamed the LTTE for Rajiv Gandhi's murder. Meanwhile, India Today in an ‘ecftorial said that there should be no hrestation (by Incia) in. providing ‘material and other help to Si Lanka tocombatthe LTTE. Feferring ote recen! missile atack on the Sh La- ‘nkan aircraft the edtional saict “These missiles in tho hand of tho Tami Tigers is not only a threat to Sa Lankan miltary air operatiors butmayalsoendengercivilairiraffic in Si Lanka and even in Tarnil Nadu”, Subsidies only for the needy Donor rations at the Aid Group ‘meeting in Paris told Sri Lanka that subsides should be targetted oniy lotheneedy. Specificreference wes made to the whoet flour subsidy; bread is avilable in Sri Lanka forthe, richand the pooralikeat te subsic sad rate of Rs. 3.50 per loaf Following the Aid Group advice the government isto re-think subsi- ‘gy schemes to nelp only the poor. GUARDIAN Vol.18 No.2 June, 1995 Frice Rs. 10.00 Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd, No. 248, Union Place: Gdarbo -2, Edo: Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447504 Printed by Ananda Press 82/5 Sir Fainajothi Saravanamutty Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephone: 495075 CONTENTS News Becky ourd 2 Prathakarars Irtevew 4 Keshmie 6 Inala-SriLarka From Medion o Intervariion (2) 7 ‘Avstraia ane tha Indian Gcean Region " Farmers Vs Sivetural ‘Adjustnent 13 Peoole, Powerand Poliics (3) 17 Tho India Factor Siilania’s Forogn Poicy 6) 19 NEWS BACKGROUND THE LTTE’S TOTAL WAR Mervyn de Silva lthough she launched an atlack (on some newspaper groups, was an Unusually subdued and serious President Chandrika who addrassad the lerge ca: thering at the inaugural meeting of the National Media Centre. The kiling of the much respected Dimbulagala monk, had sunned the nation. For all his sezmingly eccentric Ways, the venerable monk was a symbol. He was more than a colourful character. He was "he trontier monk in an undecared war. The boundary be- twoon tho separate “EELAM" that the beralicn Tige’s'foughttocarve out fram Sri Lankan tertitory, ard the land over which Colombo's witran, wasthe central issue. ina way, the question had become frontpage news because Dr. Jayelath Ja- ‘yawerdena IMP had raisedit inthe House, Explaining the matter, he IGP Frenkde Silva sald that thespecal securilyhadirot been withdravin,*itwae replaced in acco. ‘dance with a Defence Minisiry policy directive. This drective related to the pro: Vision of security to individvalsand institu tions hitherto supplied by the Sri Lanka army The security duties were to be undertaken by the Police in order that ammypersonnelbe released forthirosse- nilal combat cities While the explanation seems quite rea sonable, itledto a bill dispute between the P.A. government and tho UNP-led ‘opposition — a strking sign of how the vwar in the north-and-sast has resulted in ‘another kind of civil warn the South, the traditional UNP-SLEP battle. This bate iso longer confined to Parliament. It is everywhere and anywhere — in village of municipal councl, on all types of publ platform, and on noarly avery public queston, ‘That many-sided war in the South has become mote incessant and much bioa- der alter tho last parliamentary elections. Most of the time, the UNP had a strong president and 2 socurs, it rot ovorwhs- 2 [ming majority in the house. And it gove- ted the country for 17 years. it was only with the advent of the Wijetunca Preside- ‘ney haithingsstartedlochangs. Thetime. had come for change, anew adrinisira- tion, It wes made possible once alliercely divided SLFP, afamily-basedparty where the bitter family infighting nao caused serious rifts, discovered a new leader, albeit enoter member of the family but ‘a nowfaco", a person wih a clean slate, known to be a dynamicleader Thus, tha ‘Chandrika revolution". ‘The parious ccndition of “the estabi- shment” parly was dramaticed by the decision of Prasident Wietunga to retire from poliics. This gave way to an open fight for leadership between the acting leader, Mr. Ranil Wickrermasinghe, and the new challenger, Mr. Gamini Diseana- yke — who had joined Mr. Laith Athula- thmudaliin forming the O.U.NF, en anti Premadasa front. Despita the usual ru- mours, there was litle doubt thal the former National Security Ministar who pe- rsonally led the Vadamaarachl operation, Was assassinated by the movernent that held him guity. If there were any lingering coubls, the assassination of Mr. Gamini Dissanaya- ke, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's trustediiend,clsa- ted these doubls several weeks before tho November residential polls, The now UNP leader was kiled in precsely the mannerin which Mr. Ganchi wesassassi ated — a woman suicds-bomber at an election meeting, vis. Gamini Dissanayke was hardly a serious rival to Mre. Kumaratunga, the widow of superstar Vijay Kumaratunga ‘whose courageous stance on the “Natio nial Question’ hadwonthousands of Tarril ‘acimirers andangeredtheultra nationalist Sinhala movements. Itisinsuchabackground thatthedaring assassination of Mr. Vilay Kumaratunga, a presicential candidate, has tobe placed bystuden's ofsouthern ornational plites in tho past hioon yeare, yearain which the LTTE’ cramatic inteneentons have been a majorsheping force of SriLanka's contamperary history And in ths, the orinant personally es baen Veluotiel Prathakaran — cacond in importance oniyto PresicentJ, R. Javawardene. And yotitwas Prashekaran who made our the van. 1st 1960 cover. The LLG. had to choose between President JR. and sue premo Pradhakaran. The “past” volod strongly for JR, the past and the future uggostad tho LTTE leader. Hecortinues tomake history, Miltary missions have visited Russ: Ukreine, China, Czechoslovakia ete. The defence vate, poor Pref. Pieris edits, wil soar, He had already reduced it trom 27 billion to 24.7 bilion rupees. He nove fears itwillexceed 30 tilion rupees (600milion dollers) two hundred end fity milion less than what the donor consortium pledged in Paris for 1888. He prorises nct io print money orgo to the Central Bank. So what wil he do? No Sarta Claus is likely to knock on his door New taxes, sub- sidy cuts, a viage freeze or sell off State corporations i foreigninvesiorsurider tie PERC scheme, Inthe meantime, anti-lroratt guns have been installed in vital areas of the cly, says the ST. in its frontpage lead story, ‘The patiiamentary complex, the Presi ents offical residence, Sapugaskanda and Kolonnava cil refineries, The HINDU reported that the LTTE had been sho: Pping for microight aircraft, and had ought six in France. The buyer was a ‘spars fim. The shor take-off andlanding could provelethalforsvicicebambing, the report said, Meanwhile the PA. — UNP. “war ‘once a low-intonsity corflict shows all signs of @ “no holds barred” battle that is likely to increase in intensity in the coming months. And that of course, suits the LTTE strategists perfectly, Back to the Battlefield {As Sri Lankan jets pound Jaffna peninsula, the wheel has turned full eicte in relations between the Government and the LTTE, with Colombo seeking Intemational help to fight the Tigers Nirupama Subramanian “or Chandika Kumaratunga, the ‘transtion from a dedicate peacerra- kerte a determined fightorhas boon swift and decisive, but certainly not painiess For a leader who got elected on ¢ one. point agenda to bring peace back to Sifftorn S1i Lanke, this must have been a terrible disappointment. Tougher sills the prospect of doing battle witha foe that ‘saemsto aut-gunand autsthink her armad forces by a considerable margin, balling up a fith of her armed forces in isolated ‘carrisons and much emboldened afier Killing atleast 200 0! them n usta fortnight cf onesided fightin, The Srl Lankan Presidentfound herself li-propared to wage war as tho LTTE unleashed tne deadly surface-te-airmissi Is on Aprii29, In a desperate image-boo- sting effort, she authorised her ai force's tiny jet force on May 10 to tomb Jafina peninsuia despite the risk ol civilian casu- ss, Even Sii Lenkens, long used to the falure of peace negotalions, were taken aback by the quickness with which the process cisintegraied this time round. Despite the Government's persistence over a regoliated seltiement iothe ethnic crisis, twas clear that without the parc pation of the intiansigent Tigess, such a ‘settlement waulé bein vain, LTTE supre- mo V, Prabhakeran, on his par, clans thathostillias were renewed because the: Goverment falled to live up to ils prom ses to the Tamis, prmavil the liting of the economic embargo imposed by the previous goverment (c@0 interview). “This Government has beon trapped by the public promises it made. But itis now time fora clear rethink on howto provent the country from being diviced,” says Kingsley De Silve, biographer of former president J.R. Jayewardene. As the Go- ‘vernmen! prepares for war withthe Tigers, Kumratunga is baing asked to separaie the LTTE ffom the espitalions of the Tamils in oder to eave Sri Lanka'sterita- fal integrity. For the Government to make any hea- way politically, t must dealwith tha LITE rmlirly, and combine it with the annou- neemant of its poltical package,” says. Sunil Eastan, pollical enalyst with the Colombo-based Institute of Ethnic Stu- digs. According to him, a package which devolves substantial poworsto the othnic ‘minovitias may even bring the LTTE back to the negotiation table. That such a pa- ‘ckage is in the offing was hinted at when the Government annouced it was having talks with ether Tamil groups and parties. But divisions within the Government ‘over the poliical peckege have to be sorted out irst. The point of disagreement: the proposed meigerof tie northern with the eastem province, both Tami majorty ‘areas with pockets of Musfims ang Sinh ese. In fact, the DUNF. one of the cons tuents of the People's Alliance Gove- rmmont, has openly citicised such @ ‘move, arguing iat it would mean giving ‘up contrl of one-third of Sri Lanka’s land area an two-thirds of is coastline. inthis ease, Sinhalese iro may wallbe aroused. And it fe clear that the LTTE wouldn't be complaining, “What the Tigers would like rght naw ie a Sinhalese backlachthat ‘would once again corvince ail Tami that the LTTE is thair only lifeline," says EPRLF spokesmen. Ketheeswaran. At the end of the dey, even i Kumaratungo does manage to carry Sinhalese opinicn, there are more serious obstacles to such ‘g process. irs, it will be near on impossible to Implernentitin the nor, where a majority cf the Tamils live. At prasent, the region Is vitally a quas-state under the LTTE's control. Second, the LTTE could easily Jeopardse the process in otter parts of the country 100, especally in the east Prabhakaran’s outfit nas demonstrated time and agains ruthless ability o dispo- se of leaders who have ried to sideline it — former president Premadasa, Rajiv Gandhi and K Padmenabha of he EPRLF, forinslance. ‘The only hope thet any peace process sans the LTTE has of success is it the SriLankan security forcesareable tobeat the Tigersin theirown territory. Rightnow, that looks like « very tall order. Ifthe attack on the gunboats in Trineo- male harbour on Aptil 19 demonstrated the efficiency of te Black Sea Tigers, he rmiscile atlack on the Avro plane carying men and supptesto the northern base of Paleli demolished the myth that the ‘countty’s ar force was invulnerable. Inits belated rush to overcome a shortage of men and material, the Government has embarked on @ major driva to fil the shrinking ranks of the 100,000-sirong army and fo ecquire miltery equipmant overseas. What the miltary might stl be short on, however, ere inspiting loado- ‘ship, siralegy and motivation. Unfortunately, the present set-up has ‘evoked only dread and despeir. Amy Commander Gerry Siva is on record sa- ying € miitary solution to the elhnic crisis is “not possible”. Though the sialement islargely rue, coming from the army chief ithas had a demoralsng effect. "If that Is indged the cese, the man on the front wants fo know what he is doing there,” remarked a brigadier. In te coming days, morale will play en ‘important role for the army. Holed up in the Pooneryn camp in Jafina are ever 4,500 soldiers, dependent for their su- plies on air force vanspot planes. In Palali there ere anolhor 16,000 man in a similar predicament. With the air force viruelly neulralisedatterthe missile attack andthenavyapprehensiveaboutenteing thearea, the woopsare completely bottled Up, After squeezing the amyss supplies, the LITE may wel launch an offensive the camps. LTTE has lo weigh long-term Implications | such @ move sinceit would invite opprebrium from the international ‘community. One thing that Is clear ts while the Governments peace agenda promptod the armed forces to goon a vitual hiatus, the LTTE used the timo to build ite strength. is successful sirkes in the east bear testimony to this — the LTTE hac been more or less flushed outof the area iy 1999 but it Used tie three months of Ceasefire to make inrcads into the area onceagein. After ie renewalof hostililes, al its ambushes have ocurred in this province. However, itis the LTTE’s possession of missiles — said to be Russian-made ‘SA‘7 missiles cbiained from Ukraine — that has really got the Government iwo- ried and strengthened the boief that the ctisis cart be resolved by Sil Lanka elon, The recent meeting between Kumaratu- ge end Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in New Dolhi during the SAARC summit fuelled speculation on India's po- ssibla invovoment.Itis befeved thet Ku- maratunge raised the Issue of “commen threat" to both countries from the LTTE. Indeed, there Is 2 growing feeling that India could offer valuable assistance 10 the Govemment, “india cand alottohelp ‘ur couniry, without stepping into Si La- ‘kan terntory. Forinstance, patraling the waters to ensure that the LTTE does not get its supply of weapons," says Air Vice Marshal Hairy Gooneilleke, former air forea chief. Even die-hard India-bashors, lke Dinesh Gunawardene, president of tha Sinhala nationalist Mahajana Ekeath Petuming, feel Si Lanka needs inda's help. “It 6 no longer just a Sri Lankan {ssue. The problem concernsihe bounda- ties of India as wal,” he cays. Butitis unikely that Incia will be drawn into the confit — considering the IPF ‘exoerience, and with the upcoming gene- ral elections and assembly elections in ‘Temil Nadu — even though renewed fignting may step up LITE actviy in he slate. External Afairs Minister Prana Mukherjee, in fact, has categorically deniad that Si Lanka asked India for military help and termed it an “internal ispute.” The Indian Government, howe~ Ver, may be forced fo change its mind if Sri Lanka wore offered essislance by a thd country, say, Pakistan, But with nointernational help immeciae {ely forthcoming, the pressure is on the Government to get its act together and formulate a consensual package for poa- e.Faiingwhich, he alernaiivelsancther org dravin out battle in which the LTTE bas been fist off the biocks, 4 “We have lost faith’ ‘Anandhi Surya Prakasen of the BBC wes in Jaffna within 48 hours of the LTTE's ‘renewal of hostities. LTTE supremo Va- Wupilal Prabhekaran, who rarely granis inleviews to the press, agreed 10 meet ineratone ofhis camps. In miltary fatigue witha black cord holding acyanice capsu- Je around nls neck, and surounded by ‘bodyguards, he remained uniazedby pe~ ssisient questioning on why the LTTE decided to unilaterally withdraw froma the peace process. The exclusive interview, in Tarnil, wes recoided cn tape. Excerpts: Q. Why did you decide to withdraw ‘trom the peace negotiations at a time when there was hope that peace wil be rastorad in the north? ‘A. We mace this painful decision at a time when our peoele had lest all hope. Inthe beginning, we enterainad the hope that the Tamil national question viould be resolved through poltical negotiations, The Tami people have been subjectad to enormous suffering as a corisequence of the economic embargo, fishing bans and the blockade on traffcimposedby tie previous gevernmont. We requested no: thing other than theremmovalofinesebans, Instead of viewing thes issues as pro- blems of the Tamil people, the Gove- rament took them as spectfic demands of the LTTE, Furthermore, wo were told that any attempt to resolve them wouldspark ff miliary reporoussions. Wopointed out thatthe continuation oftheneace negotia- tions vould serve no purpose if the pio- blers of our people were not resolved ‘The Governmentassured us thatit would remove the bans, Wo extended our dea: dineby tnre weeks, Butthe Government delayed the implementation of is deci- ions. It is because of this that we and ‘our people have lost fait in Crandrika’s Government @. Why did youcecide todiscontinue the peace negotiations even though President Kumaratunge lifted the eeo- nomic embargo and offered several concessions? A. Giving pledges and implementing those pledges are two different things. it is true thal President Chandrika gave ue — V. Prabhakaran Pledges. But she hasnottaken constnueti ‘ve measuies to implement them, @. Shouldn't you have been « bit pa: tient since the delay could have been caused by administrative hurdles? A. We reached the brink of tolerance. ‘The Government dragoedits feet iormore than sx months. If there was a genuine will, the Government would have lited the bansand proceeded with theimplementa- tion within 24 hours. @. What do you feel about the dec sion to relmpose these bans? ‘A. it nes made one thing very clear: as faras the Tanillissue is concerned, here is nofundamenialdifierencokotween the present Government end the UNP regi- mo. @. Several forsign governments haye condemned you for terminating the peace negotiations, A. Weare fully aware that the intematio- nal community is geruinely concemed abou the Tamilissueand vianisapoliical setlement, Some foreign counties have chasento condemntheLTTE onthobacie of the onesided story provided by the Government before studying the issue in depth. @ Chandrika has made It clear that sho is determined to pursue the peace process wlth or without the coopera- n of the LTTE, A. Itt’ practicable to achieve peace without the cooperation of the LTTE, lot hercontinue her effort, @__Theinternational Secretariat ofthe LTTE in London issued 2 statoment recently that the Tigers have not closed the doorsforpeaco. What eteps do youexpectthe Governmentto take? A. Ourdcorsforpeace are stil open, We are dissatisfied and dsilusioned with the Government approach but we haventtlost hops. If the Goveinment makes favoura- ble decisions on the issues wo raicod, wo will be prepared locease allhostiities and reium to tho peace process. On the prow! 1@ President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, wes lected in November wih a larga majority parly by promisingto bring poaccto tho country. Shes now blterly contemplating theruins otherquest, Notonly havatharebel Tamil Tigers rejected her peace feelers, butthe miltary advantage has swung in the Tr gore’ favour. ‘The government was rattled by the sinking of Mo naval gunboats which marked the resumption of the civil war on ‘pill 19in; but is teacticn ten days later totheshocting down of tworrlitary arcraft ‘over Jatina, where the Tigers are strong, vas moro tke panic. Regular fichistothe aimy's isoiled bases in Tige:-controlled ‘areas have not been resumed. Now that thea force heslostits confidence, aTiger Onslaught on the base of Poonareen, close to Jaffna, may be imminent. Since the 190,000trong secur forces appear to be incapable of inficting decisive defeat on a rebel farce aterth of their size, the goverment has tumec ‘abroad for help. The defance altaches of ffiendly counties in the region have been Invited to Colorribo for talks andthe gove- foment has reversed its ban on erms purchases. Itis planning to buy warships, airerait and armoured vehicles irom a ‘number of countries, amiong them Israel, China and Russia. But even with new equipment, the go- ‘vernmentis ot confidentthatitcandefeat the Tigers clone, Iipaniculaly wenisindia to hep cut tha Tig2rs' lfe-ine to Tamil Nad, India's couthorn stato, Supplias of weepons. fuelandoheressentasarestil smuggled across the Palk Strat to Jatina Wourdled Tigers ere locked after in privax ‘ehospitals in Tamil Nadu. Tigerunifomms ‘aro mado in tho state. In addtion to cu- pressing such services, Si Lanka would ike Inela to share intelligerca witht, and foagree toa joint naval petrolot the strat. What India is prepared to offer, howe- yer, is rather different, Both counties folse to disclose the substance o} ciscu- seions held during wo visits to Dethi by Mrs Kumaretunga: one Just before the peace effort collapsed, the otharalterthe Tigers fredtheirant:-circraft missiles. But, according to unconfirmed reports, the Indian prime mister, Narssirha Rao, faised the possistily of a joint raid by Sri Larkanand lidiancommandostocaature the Tiger leader, Velupilai Prabhakaran. Jn an election year, arresting the man suspected of arranging the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, Mr Rac's predecessor, would help Mrfiao. SnatshingMr Prabha: karan tromhisiuraehidecut vouldalaca te Raji loyalists in Congrose and unde (cut MrReo'srrain val, Aqjun Singh, wiio locks to Rajiv's widow, Sonia, for support But beyond serding a snatch squad, the signs ara that India willnat hap. Once ‘chlytoo eagerto getinvelvedin SriLanks, itis now wary of getting sucked back into the mess. Athough a stike against Mr Prabhakeranirselfrmightprove popular, coordinated action against the Tigors would be deeply resented in Tamil Nadu, Where the main Tanil paries sympathise = either openty or covertly — with the Tigers. And memores are stil fresh of 1987-90, when a 100,000-streng Indian peacekeeping force cccuped the north ‘and east of the island, but alled to tame the Tigers and sutlered many casualties. Now, wih the Tigers posing a more se flous tweat than ever, the government in Colombo Icoks Ikely to be lelt to is own devices, —Feanomiet LTTE missiles may be of Russian origin Dinesh Kumar indian defence and security agencies fare trying to trace the type, source and Gfigin of the surlace-b-air missiles (GAMs) used by LITE miltants in Si Lanka recenty since this could have a direct bearing on the Indian securlly sce~ ‘The LTTE ied brought down two Avro aircrafi belonging 'o the S1i Lankan Air force in the Jaffna peninsula with hea {seeking SAMs on two conseculve days last weekend, The issue was also discu- sed by leaders of SAARC, excepting the SriLankan Prime Minister who had retu- ‘med eaflsr on. Although no consensus bad emetgedrom the discussions, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao had while ‘Geseribing the veaponsystemes “fighto- fing” observed that it was an Issue of *Serious concern”, lnformed sources sey that this incident hasacdadanewdimensontothesecurity ‘scera‘io since this is the frst ime that heat-seeking missles nave been usedby 2 militant of guerila grcup against fying aircraft in the sub-continent. inthis region only Afghan mujahideens have so far Used such missfes. But then, the hi- ahly-capable heai-seeking Stinger missi- Tes had coon cuppliae by US govarrmant agencies 19 the mujahideens fo fight the farmed forces of the former Soviel Union in Afghanistan, Presentindizationsarethat the missiles the LTTE used are of Russian origin and have provably been procured from ‘Afghan mujahideen groups. There has alsobeen sometalko!theLTTE procuring these missilesthrough urofficialchannels from Usraine. inital reports, for examole, hhad eaid that Sri Lankahad been warmed by te Ukrainian government some months ago that an llagal arms shipment was heading towards the island nation. Interestingly, folowing thistip off SriLanka had alerted indian sccurity agencies thi- ‘nking that ihe consignmenk was intended foruse-againis India ratherthan Si Lanka liself which was then engaged in peace talks with the LTTE, ut wnat would aso be of relevance to Indian securty agencies is the typo of middlemen (eny) sourcing offunds, and the routs iaxen by ine rTE Incaring nis lothalricelo eystom to Sx ank insu. gent grouesin ihe nonieeast,notebl ihe National Socialist Counell cf Nageland (NSCN), is known to have established in Fiematonal arms bazers SOue) East Asia as had even Purjab milians. There fave been unconfimed reports of the LTE establshing coniacis wih Puna iltante Canada ae aleowith tho Poo. ples War Group (PW) Although ro militant crinsurgent group in India has til now used surface-io-alr mssilas, an Amy patrol had recovered a ussian made SA-7 (Siralla) dose to tho Line of Contiol in Kashimirs Kupwara order district in Apil 1994. The SA-7 compares similarly in capablliyand peto- mance to the type ol SAM used by the LTTE. "Any such weapon eystam should be a cause of concern. = Times of Incia 5 CONFLICT Kashmir once more dn the age of identity, armed conflicts have a spill-over effect. Identity does nob respect borders. Tt was the flow of rofugeos to Tamilnadu that gave Delhi the right to be ‘concerned and then involved, The state of Tamilnadu itself was earved out after a re-drawing of borders because Pandit Nehra, confronted by tthe force of linguistic nationalism and the threat of suicide by Pottu Sri Ramclu, tho respected friend of Mahatma Gandhi, was forced to intervene to prevent a national tragedy. In Sri Lanka, language was tthe root cause of conflict. Religion rather than language is the souree of the region’s generic conilict — Kashmir, British India became two states under the supervision of the departing cclonial power. Here isa comment on the current conflict from the LONDON TIME: Kashmir Flames ‘No solution in sight as Delhi drifts and Pakistan meddles Chrar--Sratit, a sleepy village in Ka- shmir wes the scence of fierce fichting between Indian troops ardarmedisarric mmiliants. What is striking is not that there should be fres and bloocisheld in an obscure hamlet, Kashmir and its civitans have suflered more than thelr falr share of both in the course of an intense civil war now in its sixth year, The arresting feature of the baitla was thatit was fought inside Irdan-administered temtory, against Indan solders by Pakistani gunmen, ‘As our Scuth Asia correspondent re- ports rom Kashmir, morethan 60 Mujahi- din are entrenched in a Musim shrine in the vilage. The shrine was occupied by them — and immediaiely encicied by Indian treops — some months ago yet only now has it emerged boyand dispute that the majoriy of the occupiers ara nat local Kashrilis but heavily armedinilra- {orsfromPakisian. This withave the effect ‘ef boosting tho consistont indian claim that separatist violence in tha disputed prov. nog is “sponsored by iis neighbour, and cof weakening the consistent Pakistani protesietion that is involvement in Ke shmir comes orly in the form of moral supporto thearea's beleaguered people. 6 The unmasking of Pakistani fighters at Char--Starifwill surely make Incia/sinte- mationel diplomatic offensive on the Ka- shri issue less ciffcult to conduct than ithas boon forsoretime. Delhiwould err, however, ifit were to attbuteallviclonco, and al calls for Kashmir self-daterm ins tion, to the machinations of te boneymen, in Pakistan. Thereiscompeling evlence that many Kashmise are now unprepared to accept ther present polifical status as citizens of the indian republic. insofar as ‘many ale unprepared also to accept the accession of thir dspured province to Pakistan, tho only lasting way to end the conflict would be to search for solutions that would accomadale the Kashmid quest lor self-goverrment The batle of Chrai-i-Sharif could resutt in yet another postpenament of provincial élections in Kashrir by the Indian Gove- rmment. But these elections are likely. if ever held, to be tie source of even more confic! vidually every Kashi politcal ‘erganisation hac refused to participate arguing instead for 2 referendum on the nature of Kashmirs poltical association (erather wise) with Inc. But the foree of Indian public opinion, as it now stands, makes it inconceivable that the Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, Would even begin to addrase tho qusstion of Kashmiri selfletermination: to do so ‘would be tartamount pottical suicide and would play diecty into the hands of the Hindu nationalist opposition Bharatiya Ja- nata Party. Equally, the fragilly of the Government in islamabadhas meantihal Benazir Bhutto has had to be more shell on Kashmir than is haloful for the people Who live under Indian administration ‘There is mounting evidence also, that Miss Bhullo has litle control over those Pakistani egencies— such asthesrister Inter-Services Intelgence — which aid, abet and supply radical anred Islamic groups in Kashmir, As events at Chari-Shari now demo- Nstrate, such support is not confined to money end material. The Indian Gove- rementis entitled todeliverashaiprebuke to Miss Bhutto and to call on Pakisian to stanch the flow of infitrators into Indian-a- ministered Kashrir. Vet Dolhi must not regard the crisis in Kashmir as a smpio ‘Case of infitration rom across the border, the roots of Kashmrin disaifeciion sil le finniy in Indian sot, PART2 War Amidst Peace Talks K. M. de Silva he increase in the number of ‘spokesmen for the Tami minorty had some preciGanle consequences, beginning ‘raturalyencugh with astriggieamong ham {for dominence, anda quest forthe positon f sole spokesmen. The TULF, the most ‘moderato of the Tamil groups, found itself ‘edged out of any posiion of influence. Instead the lead wert at various stages to cer groups, with a bowiklerng range of ‘acronyms, People'sLiberation Army cf Tami Edam (PLOTS); the Tami Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and Eeam Peope's Rovolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLE) all ofwhonwereassisduously culivatedbythe Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Prime Miriter offs. Botter known by i acronym RAV Itwas the Indian equivalent of the CIA. RAW provided Tami groups Iocated in India with arms and training with the knowledge, not under the aegis, ofthe Indian governmant, Tae TELO group was spedal favorite of the RAW. The LTTE eve- niuallypushedzhead oa postion o!domina- noo latgoly because of i's strong and expa- ‘nding base in Jalfra, The three leacers of the strongest ofthese groups, Prabhakaran, Uma Maheawaren, and Sr Sabarainar, ere soon engaged In a biter and increas ‘gly violant rivalry ferthe pestiono’ princpal spokesmen ofthe’ Tamilcause. Prabhakaren eventually wen the day. But that is another sory. ‘Two sels oltalks between representatives ofthe Si Lanka governmant andthe various Tamil. gioups, claiming to speak on behalf of ther ethnic group took place in July and ‘August 1985 al Thimpu, tho capital of Bhu- tan, These talks dd not yield any postive results, but Bhardaf ised the opportunity they provided lo continue negotiations wih the Sx Lankan delegation in New Delhi, Those taks ware more fruit The new ‘agenda for etic recondliation which eme- ‘ged from them yielded a framework for a realise devolution of power in Sri Lanka intended to meetsomeo' the princpal Tani demands Che of ihe most significant feetures ofthis matculously crafied agreement wasthal the tit of devolution was to be a province, no longer a district. Secondy, the powers to be devolved on these provincial unis were Thewiters Prfes Unversty, sortlicteryatibe Peredeniye ‘much wider than those offered eatlier by the Sri Lanka goverament in decuscions with Indian mecietors and Tamil representatives. The complex new structures agreed upon ‘consttuted a major conceasion on tho part (of the Sit Lankan government to the Ge ‘mands of the Tamils of the novth end sas ‘of he island, The draft accord which came to be known in official circles as the Dan ‘Accord of August 1985 was basod on the consersusreached onthial occasion and the TULF's views were part of that consensus Inialed on 30 August his draft accerdbaca ime the basis ol all ulure negotations be tween the two governments on Sri Lanka's ‘elhnis problems concerning the Tamil mio fy. ‘The actual sianing of the accord which Bhandari hoped would crown his mediatory elforts confronted @ mejor obstecle in the reluctance if not relusal of the other Tami {@rcups who ware reprasontad af Thimpulto {ve thelr consent cit. The longer hey held Gui the more ciffcultitbecame fo: he TULF to publidy commit iol to an agreomentin the formulation of which they had been co- resulted and to which they had given their ‘concurencain Delhi. In December 1805 the TULF withckew its, ssuppatt or the Deh Accord under pressure fiom thoirmors aggrossive vals, in paricu- Jar, the LUTTE. By the tine Bharidalet office Jn early 1986 only the two governments femnainied committed fo the agreement rox. ‘che and inalled in Delhi Meanwhile spcradic outbursts of ethnic \islence, especaily in the north and oasi of the Island, and dashes between the security forces end Tamil guerrilas and terorsts ‘grouse disturbed the peace ct tha isan. Greatly inpioved relallons between the wo counties did notextandicany sercuselfors fon the part of the Indian goverment to prevent indian teritory being used by Tarr fliaras and terrvie's for ataake on 2 fie fy neighbor, much lessto close down the training facities ard camps. Raiv Gandri, ‘20 much loss depandent on tha southam Indian poitical base than his mother, and intent on taking a more even-handed Approach than cho ict tne problems posed by Sii_Lanke's ethnic conflicts, found his options more lirited than he would have hed them fo be. The constant lay in tho elinic politics of Tami Nadu, The Tamil uerritas and torrosis groups costinued to have training facillles end bases there. “The Tamil separatist groups in Sri Lanka all ad their supporters among the pdlitcal partios of Tamil Nadu, the govomnmart and ‘Opposition panies alike, each of wliom was determined to. demonstrate that its commi- ‘mont to tho Sri Larkan Tamil cause wes slioiges then the other's. In locking Lierise~ ives into the police of Sri Lankan Tamil separatist agiction, thoy were also drawn into the flece factonalism thet was part of the Si Lankan Tamil paiifeal scene. Nora ifthe Tamil Nadu pottical patios couldkeep the peace among the rval Si Lenkan Tami {graups whose Intamecine warfare atten ook ‘more Tamil ives than theirfrequent clashes wih the Si Lenkantotces. Temil Naduconti- ued to serve thiee purposes: as a s2- rictuary, as @ base for Fairing and supely of sims; and as a souroa of funds. Thenks to the euppot they hed in and from Tamil Nadu the Tarilseparatist groups, and espo- cial the LTTE and isally the EHOS group, hhad become a formidablo guerilla Torco, much stronger Man thelr indian mentors thought they would ever be. ‘The LTTE was algo holped by a decision taken by the Sri Lanke governimentin July, 1985, es part of an understanding reached with India, that its focos in tho Jatiaa poni- ‘sula would be Kept within tielrbasracks or ‘camps. Originally this erangement was to Taatfor wo months, butitwas lateroxtended, In response to Indian pressure, for three months. The LTTE took advantage of this temineal the roads leadng out of he camps ‘and proceeded thereatter iobaricade them, These makeshit barricades wereconverted into concrete bunkers, The result was that the LTTE established ellectve control over tho town of Jafina not tre Jafiraperineula Iisa, since the Si Lenkearmysmmovernents weieseriousyhampered thereaiterdy these barricades. Tho units of tho Sri Lark army stationed in the fort of uatfra could only be supped by ait “The LTTE wos embcldened by this shit {in te miltary Delence to emtark on a vigo- rovs campaignagainsitheSi Lankan forces, and allacks on softer targels as well as a ruthless program ct eliminating is Tami rivals. They eoldom directed their attacks ‘against the secuily forcesinopencontronia~ tions, Whey they id so thelr attacks were generally easily repuises. But one o} the ‘Consequences of such confrontations was that quite offen civiians were kiled, cithor ‘caugilin the crosssire or — on occasion — by Solciers on the rampage seekng to ave- fnge the ‘ose of thelr comrades in land-mine blasts. The LTTE, for its part, Legen to 7 choose easter and softer targets suchas an atzck on the city of Anurachapara in May 1985 in which 150 civilians were killed, or ‘more frequently thereater on Sinhalesepea- Sanis in the remoter areas of the norh-oa- ‘ral and caster regions, Thess attacks became a mglor pollical embarrassment to the govamment ‘Tho intamecins warlere between the so- paalist orcups reacted its peak belwsen September 1925and April 1036,0n 1Septo- mer 1695 the LTTE assassinated WoTULF stalvarts — two former WP's — who had, tnlike the bulk ofthe colleagues, contrued ‘olive in Jaffna, K wes a move designed '0 Compal the TULF in Macras and elsewhere to too the line, thati to aay, to rerain from sighing the Dalnl Accord, ‘The SriLarka govermmentbecan iodiven an increasingproperton of ts annvalbucgot tothe expansion and equipping of iis aimed foices. Along with itthere was an escalation ofrriliary action egainet te Tantl separatist ups in the noah end east of the Island The Sri Lankan armed forces ware now betterequirpedand better tained tianbelo- e.Much ctinetranng wesdon nPaksian, while small groupe of leraelis and Brieh mervenaries horied the skills of special ccunter-lerrs|untsintheamyandipolce, ‘As clashes hetwoon the securty forces ard the Tami separats! aclists beceine more frequent and casualies increased number India’s modiatory 1010 gave way to @ return to the: Indira Gandhi policy cf a diplomaic cfersive against Si Lanka: thus @ prosagands campaign was launched tough is embassies and High Commi- sions abroad, accusing the gavemment of human rights violetions. Si) Larkan ard Indian gpiomats clasied at the UN in New York and Geneva, all gait of ai policy of *moral” sarctions aimed at persuading S11 Lanka to retimto the bargaining table. The Indian Embassy in Washingtonandthe igh Conimissions in Otiawva and Lordon, the meantime, continued tobe cantorsof support forTamilsepatatst groups operating those count Had the Indian goverment been mare onsiive to the Sii Lankan government's dificulies, and made seme tnambiguous and noticeable effortto sloptheuseo! nian teritory by the LITE and ctheis for thelr military ecivties, here mayhavebem grea ter gollical eupport witiin Sri Lanka for a resumption of negotiations wih the Tani groups, or greater reatiiness fo ion military aciien agains! tho LTTE The Sri Lankan ‘govetrmient had treated the Delhi Accord inialled on 20 April 1685 as an important step forwerd in reaching a setlement with the Tamil minoity, and descrined it as “a bla basis for negotiation and setle- ‘Neither the TULF orthe other Tamil groups hhac responded postive to the proposals in the Delhi Accord, It tock sevaral ments of negotiations with tiem by indian officals before teindian goverment could send an offial delegation to Sri Lanka for further discussions on possible adjustments and mocifications ofthe Delhi Accord, By thetima the delogation arved in SriLanka Bhandari had let office. The deleqaton was led by & Ministarof Stalenatinthe Cabinet, P. Chide- ‘mbaramn a young [40 yeas atthe te) Tamil \WwhoaspredioaCongress-basedleaderstip of Tami) Nac, ard Natwar Singh, Rajiv Gendhi’s Winister of State for Extemel Aais. The delegaticn arrived in Colombo ‘0n@0 April 1986andhold veryintensivetalis: overthenex five days. Thelrartivaloinced wih the LTTE's massacre of the TELO les ersand the killing of Si Sabaranam in the course ct this clash, For the fist time since Indian mediation boganin lato 1983 tho principal negotiators forthe Indian goverment were poliletans ‘and not bureaucrats or diplomats. On tha departure of the Chidambaram del ‘on 4 May it was announced that “ Lanka govemment had agrood to male fu- ‘ther concessions beyond the tems of the ‘Delh Accord" The decisions raachedon his ‘cceaion were publishod on 4 May 1906, Bhanda's successors Foreign Secreta 1 AP. Yenicleswaran had much less port wity Rlajv Ganchi than had Bhardan, and greater sympattyforihe SriLarka Tami case. He placedhis rustia the TULF andvitua lly pushed them inio taking the laadin nago- tiatons wit the Sri Lanka government, The TULF lacdare living in oxla in Macrae, were ‘pol unviling to play the role that Venkato- ‘swaran had devse¢ for them bit they were terrified at the prospect of eniaganizing te Moe aggiessive Tamil groups. Venkate- swvaran Called representatives! thesa later fgrcups to Delhi and persuaded them to let the TULF take the lead in the discussion with the Sri Larkan government ec heldin Colombe later in te yeer Veniateswarenhit upon the idea of giving the Dathi Accord great accaptabiliy fo tho Tamils by using the Indian state sysiem as ‘a model (or Sti Lania’s devolutionary sche. ‘mos. He bolioyod that this subte but none theless signlicant transtonmalicn o! te de- volition packaga nagolisted by Bhandar ‘would appeel io the TULF because i used the indian ‘ederal system as 2 model, while itwould be accoptable to Presidant Jayewa. ene nd his advisers because tie cena ‘goveinment inna was much more powe: ‘Mul than in most federations, Besides there ‘als sulficient ambiguty in the refinemento! the Dehi Accord mace by Verkateswaran to allow for bargaining and dive and take, and for more compromise. Bythe time the TULF arrived in Colombo for-negotations with the Sri Lanka gove- ‘mmentin June 1996, President Jayewarde- ‘ne had embarked on 2 new initative, the Poltical Parties Conference (PPC) at which theDelhiAccordandthechangesinitagrend toby the two goverment Apmi 1985, would badiscussed. Once again heprincipal oppo: sttion pert, the SLFP refused 1 jain the ‘conference, but seven other pares, Incu-

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