Gujarat National Law University

International Relations
Continuous Evaluation: Sino Indian
Relations - Present and Future

Submitted by- Shashank Shekhar Singh (18B113)

Submitted to- Dr. Aruna Kumar Malik,

Assistant Professor of Law,
Gujarat National Law University

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 Table of contents

1. Introduction……………………………………………………………...3

2. Objectives………………………………………………………….….…3

3. Relations prior to the conflict……………………………………….….3

4. Current Scenario…………………………………………………..…….4

5. The Chinese gamble………………………………………………..…..5

6. The Stubborn Indians………………………………………………..….6

7. Asymmetry in power…………………………………………………….7

8. The Economic front………………………………………………….….8

9. What the Future Holds……………………………………………….…9

10. Problems that will persist…………………………………...………….12

Bibliography…………………………………………………………….16

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 1. Introduction

Ever since the independence of India we have had the pleasure of having two hostile powers as
our neighbours. China and Pakistan have waged wars against India on multiple occasions. There
have also been altercations regarding several issues from economic dominance to proxy warfare
as well as border issues. In the recent times while Pakistan has been left far behind India, China
has assumed the role of its main adversary, the very role that Pakistan had to give up due to the
absolute superiority of the Indian Armed forces over its own. This presents India with a unique
problem as China is not just an adversary but also an important trade partner and thus this issue
requires immediate attention of academicians from both countries, especially after the recent
deterioration of relation between the two giants. Research regarding this topic can and may affect
the future of relation between the countries.

2. Objectives

The objectives of this project are as follows:

1. To conduct research regarding the relations between India and China.
2. Create a project with up to date information regarding the relationships of both the
countries in view of the current conflict going on between them.
3. To predict a possible outcome resulting from the current deadlock.
4. To understand the complicated geo political condition in the sub-continent.
5. To peek into the future on the basis of available data and behaviour patterns of both
countries as well as the International community.

3. Relations prior to the conflict

India China have had a love hate relationship for quite some time. The earlier times were rather
turbulent for both the countries. From a war in 1962 to various skirmishes in 1967, 1983, 2013
and in 2017 the Chinese have always been passive aggressive towards India. But ever since 62 they
have managed to maintain somewhat cordial relations continuously for many decades. While there
have been confrontation at borders and at various international forums they have never been
enough to completely dismantle the relations between the countries. Even with the vast ideological
difference they have managed to respect each other cultures China however hasn’t been as

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considerate as India. There are also various disputes of concrete nature between the two countries
such as the Refuge to Dalai Lama, Border disagreements and Territorial claims but overall the two
countries have been maintained rather friendly relation for two countries that are so vastly
different.

4. Current Scenario

On 5 May 2020 the Chinese and Indian came face to face for the first time after the Chinese refusal
to let Indian troops patrol up to the Finger 8 a significant geographic feature along the disputed
border.1 The finger are a dominating feature of the Norther edge of the Pangong Tso Lake through
which the current LAC runs. Various clashes occurred between the two armies at different places2.
On June 15 such a clash led to causalities on both sides during the Galwan river valley clash3. There
have also been sporadic incidents of gunfire between the two armies4. After confrontations in
various areas such as Hot springs, Galwan valley and Northern Sikkim the Pangong Tso is turning
out to be one place where the Chinese have decided to stay. The Indian Army has secured various
peaks in this sector. On the other hand India has even banned several Chinese apps from play
store for alleged spying and data mining. This includes even famous apps such as PUBG and the
home of cringe that is Tiktok. No area is safe from offensive action this time and same is true for
the financial playground, however that has been discussed in detail further below.

Till date all military and diplomatic talks have failed and even Russia’s attempt to resolve the issue
has failed. Last time during the Doklam crisis there was a deadlock for 3 months however the
danger at that time was nowhere near to the present condition. Not only have both the countries
moved weaponry opposing each other’s borders but have also been carrying out exercises
regarding high altitude combat and civilian evacuation procedures. With the Galwan incident

1KIRAN SHARMA ‘India and China face off along disputed Himalayan border’ (Nikkie Asia, May 28, 2020)
<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-and-China-face-off-along-disputed-Himalayan-
border> accessed on 30TH September 2020.
2Agence France-Presse ‘Indian and Chinese soldiers injured in cross-border fistfight, says Delhi’ (The Guardian, Intl

11 May 2020) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-

border-fistfight-says-delhi accessed on 30 September 2020.
3Rahul Singh, ‘3 staggered clashes took place in Galwan Valley’ (Hindustan Times, New Delhi Jun 22, 2020)

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/3-staggered-clashes-took-place-in-galwan-valley/story-
P1tT2X2fWaJu7smOHXEE0I.html
4‘Three firing incidents between India and China in last 20 days in Eastern Ladakh’ (Economic Times, Delhi Sep 16,

2020) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/three-firing-incidents-between-india-and-china-in-last-
20-days-in-eastern-ladakh/articleshow/78145454.cms accessed on 30 September 2020.

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inflicting casualties on both sides for the first time in decades tensions are running high and the
preparation for war is being carried out by both sides.

5. The Chinese gamble

The Chinese tactic of ‘salami slicing’5 is not a new instance in the shared past of both the countries.
Time and again China has tried annexing Indian Territory little by little by making small incursions
on seemingly useless ground and then establishing an observation post there. This is the reason
that there were casualties and skirmishes between the two countries even after the 62 war. In 19676
and 19877 there was similar escalations between the two countries due to uncertain position of the
border. The Chinese have a notorious reputation for claiming the territories of other Nations. Be
it Taiwan, Bhutan, Nepal, Mongolia, Russia, India, Vietnam or the sea border with Philippines
among many others8. Time and again the Chinese have attempted or successfully ceased parts of
territory belonging to sovereign nations. None of these countries have taken serious regard of the
expansionism. The only instance of challenging this behaviour was observed in the South China
Sea where the US challenged and continues to tussle with China over the power at sea.

China is like any other bully. It’s used to you taking parts of territories, forcing agreements on
nations with a weaker military. There are several reasons for China's rather assertive behaviour in
2020. In the recent times China hasn't been the favourite country of the world. With the exposure
of Uighur genocide9, the spread of Coronavirus Covid-1910 and its crackdown on democratic
protests in Hong Kong, all these have generated a global feeling of angst towards it. Many
corporate giants have even decided to stop part of production in the country11. There has been
certain rise in anti-Chinese sentiment across the world not to mention the beginning of formation

5 https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-salami-slicing-overdrive-66048/
6 https://web.archive.org/web/20150923204622/https://www.claws.in/595/the-nathu-la-skirmish-when-chinese-
were-given-a-bloody-nose-sheru-thapliyal.html
7 Lintner, Bertil (2018), China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World, OUP India, ISBN 978-0-19-

909163-8.
8Briti Roy Barman, ‘China shares borders with 14 countries, has territorial dispute with all’ (OneIndia, New Delhi July

7, 2020) < https://www.oneindia.com/india/china-shares-borders-with-14-countries-has-territorial-dispute-with-all-

3115963.html> accessed on 1 October 2020.
9 Louis Charbonneau ‘Countries Blast China at UN Over Xinjiang Abuses’ <
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/30/countries-blast-china-un-over-xinjiang-abuses>
10 Steven Erlanger, ‘Global Backlash Builds Against China Over Coronavirus’ <
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/world/europe/backlash-china-coronavirus.html>
11 Kenneth Rapoza, ‘New Data Shows U.S. Companies Are Definitely Leaving China’ <
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/07/new-data-shows-us-companies-are-definitely-leaving-
china/#1725d02d40fe>.

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of a military alliance between Japan, the United States, India and Australia the so-called Quad
Nations. Even smaller countries such as Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam are rallying against
the Chinese attempt to establish dominance12.
Along with this the Chinese have been claiming territory in Russia, Nepal and the hot bed of
activity the South China Sea. Thus its escalation with India is an attempt to warn others of its
assertiveness and power. They started this snatch and grab of territory to not only gain some land
but also to teach India a lesson if it attempts to stop China. This in turn would show the world
that they must not take them lightly as a military power and it would bolster confidence in the
government back home. Now however the Chinese have run into a new stubborn enemy.

6. The Stubborn Indians

However this "brilliant" plan of theirs has run into some troubles. There is a saying in English 'If
you can make god bleed people cease to believe in him' that is applicable in the current scenario.
India a weaker nation just stood up to the wannabe world leader China and there is already
speculation if the Chinese have made a mistake going against this fiercely patriotic country13. While
these speculation were still rife, soon they gained a very big boost due to a particular incident: the
Galwan Clash. On the evening of June 15 the Chinese started a pre-planned brawl with plans to
escalate it further. They came prepared with street weapons and were in large numbers. The plan
was fool proof to catch the unsuspecting Indian soldiers of guard and inflict causalities with dirty
weapons. When the clash started the Chinese has outnumbered the Indians 3:114. However soon
the tides turned, with the Indians opening a can of whoop ass and sending the Chinese running
back into their territories. We lost 20 brave hearts that day but the Chinese never released their
casualties. Hours later US intelligence reported that the Chinses have lost 35 soldiers15. Other
sources hinted at a bigger number. While this seriously escalated the situation to an alarming level,
the Chinese side was much more worried. Indian troops had just inflicted more causalities on them
whilst being outnumbered. This set the world ablaze with the discussion shifting from, if China

12Shishir Gupta, ‘China on their radar, India, Japan, US, Australia to hold Quad meet on Oct 6’ (Hindustan Times,
NewDelhi)<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-japan-us-australia-to-hold-quad-meet-on-oct-6-
china-on-their-radar/story-LhL2r3vuaTl3ndBQ0vT6LP.html>
13 Michael Rubin, ‘A China-India Clash Would Be Xi Jinping's Grand Mistake’ <
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-india-clash-would-be-xi-jinpings-grand-mistake-157491>
14 (n 3).
15 ‘35 Chinese soldiers dead in Galwan Valley clash: US intelligence sources’ < https://www.wionews.com/india-

news/35-chinese-soldiers-dead-in-galwan-valley-clash-us-intelligence-sources-306447>

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has made a mistake to China has definitely made a mistake16. This not only acted as a reminder to
the Chinese to not underestimate the Indian forces but also ensured that the Indians went on the
offensive. After a preparation of few weeks the Indian Army started a campaign of capturing
important heights. On 29-30 August in what would be the first wave of the Indian offensive the
forces went ahead and captured Black Top hill a dominant peak in the southern region of Pangong
Lake. This peak lying in the Thakung sector gives excellent observation positions to India. Next
they captured the Reqin pass and its ridgeline lying next to the extremely crucial Chushul airstrip.
This airstrip is the lifeline of troops stationed in the area as it is the only way to ship in supplies
during the winter months. This move has secured the airstrip form any possible attack. Many other
heights were also occupied including Helmet top, Yellow bump etc. Indian forces are currently in
control of a significant part of the Kailash range crest line thus mirroring the Chinese snatch and
grab tactic. All this offensive action has put India in a position of advantage as in the event of a
war or a limited conflict these peaks would prove to be crucial.

7. Asymmetry in power

This doctrine17 has been discussed and upgrade upheld time and again among the geo strategic
experts. It calls for an economy / country such as India to exercise restraint when challenged by a
bigger economy / country such a China. China has five times bigger economy than India and much
more modernised military. While the Indian Army due to its experience, training and world-wide
acclaim as an elite fighting force can be considered on par with its more modern Chinese
counterpart, the Air force is not exactly a forte of India. On the other hand the naval forces of our
country are definitely outmatched by the size and modernity of the Chinese Navy. Under the
doctrine of 'asymmetry in power' geo-strategic experts would expect India to exercises restraint or
give in to the Chinese demands however India has shocked them with their firm standing against
the unprovoked Chinese aggression. This isn’t the first time for the Army to do such a thing. Back
in Kargil war even when the Pakistanis were in a highly advantageous position the Army managed
to dismantle them from the mountain tops successfully.

16 Arpan Rai, ‘Galwan clash ‘huge mistake’ by China, world already fighting Covid-19: Experts’ <
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/galwan-clash-huge-mistake-by-china-world-already-fighting-covid-
19-experts/story-Zhw1Hi0D18t24B3h86hCOP.html>
17https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/inductive-reasoning-information-symmetry-and-power-asymmetry-in-

organizations/41808 accessed on 2nd October 2020.

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On the other hand China is disadvantaged by the asymmetry of threat perceptions. Simply put,
India sees China as its primary threat while China sees India as a secondary challenge. Beijing’s
national security priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Such asymmetry of security
priorities means that India may not yet rival China in national power or in a conventional or nuclear
arms race, but its resolve and focus on China are significantly stronger than those of China.18

8. The Economic front

Along with the current border issues going on there has been a call by the Indian Prime Minister
to Boycott Chinese goods. The call for Aatmnirbhar Bharat has requested people to buy more
swadeshi goods. Economy has been the chink in India's armour against the Chinese. The Chinese
not only dominate us as a manufacturing hub of the world but even in bilateral trade they enjoy a
huge trade deficit on part of India. The table below summarizes the difference in the value of trade
between the 2 countries.

Year Chinese Share Indian Share Difference

2010 40.9 17.4 23.5

2011 50.5 16.7 33.8

2012 47.6 14.7 32.9

2013 48.4 16.4 32

2014 54.2 13.4 40.8

2015 58.2 9.5 48.7

2016 58.3 8.9 49.4

2017 68.0 12.4 55.6

2018 76.8 16.3 60.5

2019 74.9 17.9 57

18 Yun Sun, ‘CHINA’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF INDIA’ (War on the Rocks, 25 MARCH 2020) <
https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/> accessed on 4th October 2020.

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Source: wits.worldbank.org

As can be seen above China enjoys a huge profit in bilateral trade and the dependence of India on
the Chinese manufacturing industry is a very dangerous aspect for India as a friendly country could
be allowed to have such a dominance in trade but a country as hostile as China couldn’t be allowed
to have such a position in trade. This disadvantage coupled with the damage caused by
demonetisation then GST and then the lockdown has multiplied India's economic woes. While
there has been an attempt to revive the economy, the road ahead is still very difficult for India.
For these reasons leadership has asked the people to prefer buying Indian goods over foreign and
especially Chinese goods thus waging a kind of an economic war against the Chinese.

9. What the Future Holds

Right now the condition is rather volatile on the borders. India has demanded that the Chinese
restore the status quo back to the condition in March19. The Chinese being Chinese have decided
to pitch in and test India’s resolve. They have been lying and lying and lying in every flag meeting
and diplomatic meet between the 2 countries. They make promise of pulling the troops back and
then simply don’t. This has created an atmosphere of sheer distrust and right now there are two
ways this whole crisis may go:
1. War, War, War
This scenario is not totally impossible. There are critics out there that say that nuclear
armed nations don’t fight conventional wars anymore due to fear of nuclear escalation.
But a limited conflict is very much possible especially since China thinks that it can teach
a lesson to India without resorting to broad front tactics. A contained conflict in the
Pangong Tso area may very much unfold considering how all attempts at cooling down
the situation have failed. In such an event while China does enjoy a numerical and
technological superiority the battle would be very much a stalemate. There are several
reports that claim that India could draw or even win a conflict with China. These reports
focus on various aspects of Air, land and Sea power of these countries. They are as follows:

19SNEHESH ALEX PHILIP, ‘India wants LAC status quo maintained, China demands India should stop
construction activity, (The Print, Delhi 26 May, 2020) <https://theprint.in/defence/india-wants-lac-status-quo-
maintained-china-demands-india-should-stop-construction-activity/429424/> accessed on 4th October 2020.

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 a. Air Force: In the Himalayan theatre the Indian air force is in a strong position. India
has many airbases and helipads built close to the Chinese border something that China
sorely lacks. This results in a quicker and wider Indian response to a somewhat limited
and delayed attack by Chinese. Even numerically while China deploys 101 4th gen
aircrafts against India its counterpart has 122 4th gen fighters directed at it.20 This
coupled with the fact that the Tibetan region doesn’t allow China to operate aircraft
with complete payloads provides Indians with just the edge they need to destroy the
Chinese. Another fact of importance here is the observed inflexibility of the PLAAF
and its dependence on ground commands a weakness that India doesn’t share and
could be exploited by the IAF in war21

b. Navy: A naval war is not probable between the two countries. Indian Navy while does
lag behind the Chinese both in modernisation and in numbers is capable of holding its
own. India would not attack the Chinese because it doesn’t possess the naval power to
do so and China wouldn’t do the same either because of the distance between the two
countries.22 Here it is important to mention that any worthy assault can only come
from mainland China as majority of its fleet is situated there to counter the US its
overseas bases don’t enjoy the availability of modern and substantial ships. India and
China are situated at a staggering distance of 4000 nautical miles. Any Chinese
offensive this way would run out steam way before being effective not to mention the
capability of India to completely obliterate any navy sailing down the Malacca strait
due the straits narrow passage. Even if they make through the strait Indian Navy would
still enjoy the defender’s advantage. Not to mention the Indian submarines that would
be out on high seas picking off any easy targets from an incoming convoy.

c. Army: Once again here India enjoys the advantage of proximity to border. India has
about 2, 25,000 personnel stationed at its Chinese border23 and while the Chinese do
have numerical parity qualitatively they don’t match the Indian soldiers24. Since 62

20Frank O’Donnell and Alex Bollfrass, ‘The Strategic Postures of China and India a Visual Guide’; Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs.
21 (n 20).
22 James R. Holmes, ‘Who Will Win the Great China-India Naval War of 2020?’ (Foreign Policy, 7 August 2017) <

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/who-will-win-the-sino-indian-naval-war-of-2020/> accessed on 4th October

2020.
23 (n 20).
24 Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee and Joshua Fitt, ‘Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in

an Era of Strategic Competition with China’; Centre for New American security (23 October 2019).

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 Indians have had the experience of two wars and an ongoing insurgency, the Chinese
on the other hand last fought in Vietnam in 1967 where they lost.

While the above facts stand war may take any turn. However it is of general acceptance that once
the conflict does start both the countries would pounce on the opportunity to gain air superiority
as soon as possible. Attacking air force bases and airstrips would be the primary task given to the
opposing air force. After that any offensive action would be limited to current area of activity that
is the Pangong Tso area, the Chushul sector, the Galwan valley and possibly even in the Depsang
plains. Here infantry would prove to be the main offensive unit due the ruggedness of terrain but
the involvement of Armor can’t be ruled out. While China does have the availability of Light tanks
that operate on high altitudes India has roads to bring in the heavier T90s. Choppers would play a
crucial role in destroying enemy strong points where artillery can’t reach. Another important role
would be played by the C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft which could ferry troops very quickly
straight to the battlefield. The entry of Pakistan can’t be ruled out but the western command is
more than capable of handling them. However in such a case of two front war India’s objective
would be to quickly subdue Pakistan by destroying its war making capacity and then focus solely
on China. All in all it would be conflict in a limited area with quick gain or loss of territory
depending on which side attacks first.

2. Peace Prevails.

Another scenario could be that India and china de-escalate and resolve the crisis through
diplomatic means. India and China are also committed, following agreements at the highest
political levels, to not only co-operate on bilateral issues but also in regional and international
affairs. The relationship is strengthened due to close mutual engagement at various forums like
the Wuhan summit, Mamallapuram summit, BRICSsummit, etc. Such bilateral meet-ups do have
a positive effect. This could be an area to work through in order to allow a thaw in future
relations. Another way to improve future relations would be through economic considerations
for each other. The avenues for economic co-operation between the two countries are still
somewhat open. China is keen in investing in Indian markets however it can be said that this
option is no more available to the Chinese businesses as now India appears to have firmly
decided to get rid of Chinese economic influence once and for all. The cancelling of tenders with

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Chinese companies and automatic FDI ban by India25 are a depiction of this stance. On the
other hand India wants greater access to Chinese markets due to its yawning trade deficit.

The two governments should thus take more pre-emptive measures. For example, the two
governments should seek to maintain their planned cooperation on Covid-19,refrain from
encouraging boycott campaigns against one other; and, more importantly, not be derailed– by
the past clashes – from the projection of rising into global major powers.
The two nations need to get accustomed to a “new normal.” Here, “new normal “refers to living
with border standoffs and even violent clashes, which started with the Depsang Standoff in
2013. Nowadays, this “new normal” has become a reality on the western section of the Sino-
Indian Border, with an uptick in trespassing incidents and intrusions having occurred there in
2019. The two countries have to live with this “new normal” created by the high frequency of
border faceoff and even clashes. The main reason for it is that due to the rapid improvement of
frontier infrastructure and patrolling facilities, the advancement of the positioning and tracking
technologies, patrolling soldiers from both sides can now encounter each other more and more
frequently. The alarming tendency now is that face-offs and even clashes occur once the two
armed forces encounter each other along the LAC. As both sides now have more capacities and
resources in consolidating their control of their claimed territories near the LAC, they may not
stop plugging the holes, in line with their own but different understandings of the claimed LAC,
until these two finally realize their actual control of their claimed LAC from their maps onto the
ground.

More importantly, each faceoff or clash could gradually contribute to the building up of a high-
voltage wire (a kind of red line or bottom line) along the disputed LAC. It is safe to say the
clashing spots along the LAC could gradually be turned into “poles” for the high-voltage wire,
which would gradually frighten away the patrolling soldiers from trespassing it.Gradually, this
would lead to fewer new face-offs, hence making the LAC area more and more peaceful on the
ground. In the end, even without a verification of the LAC legally, both sides could obey it. In
this regard, viewing it from a positive aspect, a faceoff could even serve as a useful tool in
verifying LAC of each other.

25Prasid Banerjee, ‘Chinese funding in Indian firms hit by new FDI norms’ ( Hindustan Times, New Delhi; 16 August
2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/chinese-funding-in-indian-firms-hit-by-new-fdi-norms>

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 10. Problems that will persist

Even if the two countries manage to solve the current crisis one way or the other there are still
many problems that remain.

 China in 2013 announced a major strategic programme to create its own geo-strategic
cosmos known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This was done without consultation
with India and parts of it pass through territory of India illegally occupied by Pakistan. A
part of the BRI is CPEC. The CPEC involves a serious violation of India’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity and has been rejected by the Indians multiple times.

 India and China are pillars of an emerging world order. The two countries have also
entered into a large number of agreements and similarly the potential for co-operation
against terrorism is substantial but China consistently holds back due to its support for
Pakistan. Here China enjoys the fact that these Pakistani sponsored terrorists keep the
Indians busy but do not operate in China in any manner and so they do not interfere
with this. It uses this to push Indians down from assuming regional leadership of other
smaller democracies.

 China has shown an ambiguous stance in relation to Pakistan. For example, it reluctantly
agreed on the declaration of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist and on the grey-
listing of Pakistan by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It has decided to use
Pakistan as its instrument to undermine India just like the USA did during the times of
Cold war.

Of all these above mentioned problems the main reason for hostilities between the two is
Pakistan. China has decided to use Pakistan as a pawn in their bid to dominate India geo-
strategically26. The construction of CPEC, giving weapons to Pakistan, condoning terrorism are
all part of this. However they seem to be reminded of the history of India. USA once thought of
India as a danger however with the passage of time and due to Pakistan’s incompetence they

26 Sabrina Toppa, ‘Why Young Pakistanis Are Learning Chinese’ (The Atlantic; 14 November 2018) <
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/pakistan-china-cooperation-cpec/568750/> accessed
on 4 October 2020.

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came to realize India as an ally rather than enemy and now we have excellent relations with them
irrespective of the party in power. India also has excellent relations with Russia and they have
continued for quite a long time and yet we buy weapons from USA and Russia both. Even when
USA brought in a law to sanctions countries buying Russian weapons, India was given an
exception27. During the 62 war the Americans sent and entire aircraft carrier to help us against
the Chinese28 and in 1971 war with Pakistan the Russians sent their submarines to help us stop
the Americans from interfering29. All the while India never fully aligned to any of the blocs. What
i am getting at is that India is probably one of the most friendly and neutral countries in the
world. We avoid speaking on other countries' domestic issues and have never declared war or
conducted unfair offensive action against any weaker country. We have never even attempted to
annex territory of the nations we defeated in war. China could have had the friendship and a
close one at that, of one the friendliest nations in the world but it decided to go the other way
around. They would rather upset their second largest market than just abandon a failed country
like Pakistan. I don't know who is in charge of China's foreign policy but they should probably
take some time to think it over.

27 ‘US Congress Agrees To Exempt India From Russian Weapons Import Sanctions’ (Swarajya, New Delhi; 24 June
2018.
28 Colonel Anil Athale (retd), ‘The Untold Story: How Kennedy came to India's aid in 1962’ (reddif news; 4 December

2012)https://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-aid-in-
1962/20121204.htm accessed on 4th October 2020
29 Zorawar Daulet Singh, ‘Calling the U.S.’s bluff in 1971’ (The Hindu; 19 December 2019) <

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/calling-the-uss-bluff-in-1971/article30341831.ece> accessed on 4th

October 2020.

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 Bibliography

1. Websites

 rediff.com
 thehindu.com
 theatlantic.com
 hindustantimes.com
 foreignpolicy.com
 theprint.in
 wits.worldbank.org
 warontherocks.com
 wionews.com
 nationalinterest.org
 orfonline.org
 web.archive.org
 oneindia.com
 hrw.org
 nytimes.com
 forbes.com
 nikkei.com
 theguardian.com
 economictimes.indiatimes.com

2. Online Database

 wits.worldbank.org
 web.archive.org
 igi-global.com

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3. Reports
 ‘Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic
Competition with China’ by Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine
Lee and Joshua Fitt.
 ‘The Strategic Postures of China and India a Visual Guide’ by Frank
O’Donnell and Alex Bollfrass.

4. Books
 China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World by Lintner,
Bertil (2018).

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