Stat Con Oral Recits Module 1

 Statutory Construction is an art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of
ambiguity in its language. It draws warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text, conclusions which are in spirit, though not within the letter of the
text. Construction involves the exercise of the choice of the judiciary.

 Interpretation is the art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words, while
construction is the process of drawing warranted conclusions not always included in the direct
expressions, or determining the application of the words to facts in litigation. By application,
construction and interpretation are understood as having the same signification.

 Here are the cardinal rules of constructions:

1. To give effect, ascertain the intent of the law

2 .To ascertain legislative intent

3. The judiciary must interpret the law in accordance with the intent of the framers and the real
intent of the law itself

 Legislative intent refers to the spirit which give life to legislative enactment. It must be therefore
be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the
law.

Federation of Free Farmers v. CA, G.R. No. L-41161, Sept. 10, 1981

 The intent of Act No. 809 (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE RELATIONS AMONG PERSONS
ENGAGED IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY): The legislative intent is thus, to make the Act
operative irrespective of whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and
sugar planters.

 At issue: Section 1: ) there is nothing in said law that excludes the right of the parties to enter
into new contracts, and in said new contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing different
from that stipulated in Section 1 of the Act, provided that any increase in their share in the
proceeds of milling that the PLANTERS would get, 60% thereof must be paid by them to their
respective plantation laborers

Section 9 of Republic Act 809 uses the words "any increase in

participation granted the planters under this Act." Read literally, there
could be a little shade of plausibility in the posture of VICTORIAS and
PLANTERS that only any increase as a result of the application of
Section 1 of the Act is contemplated in its Section 9, and not increase
by virtue of a written milling contract executed after the effectivity of
 the Act, even if those who do so might constitute the majority of the
planters in the district.

. But, as We postulate in Talisay-Silay, any increase given to the planters

by any central after the passage of the Act cannot be viewed in any way
than that which has been induced or forced to be done on account of
the compulsive effect of the various related provisions of the Act.
Virtually, therefore, any such increase should be deemed as an
"increase . . . under this Act," since it is a result of its operation.   |||

 Case at bar: There is a presence of the milling agreement by the majority of the sugarcane
planters and thus stipulated a sharing different from that provided for by section 1

 The appellate court rendered judgment holding the planters of the

district and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. jointly and severally liable to the
said laborers for all said alleged unpaid amounts of shares

Legislative purpose Is the reasons why a particular statute was enacted by the legislature. In
construing a statute the following must be considered:

 1.) What to achieve?

 2.) What is its object?

 3.) Is it to prevent mischiefs?

 4.) Is it to create new rights?

Black’s Law Dictionary, by Henry Campbell Black, 6th Edition, p. 818—

 Interpretation. The art or process of discovering and ascertaining the meaning of a statute,
will, contract, or other written document. The discovery and representation of the true
meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. It is said to be either "legal," which rests on
the same authority as the law itself, or "doctrinal," which rests INTERPRETATION upon
its intrinsic reasonableness. Legal interpretation may be either "authentic," when it is
expressly provided by the legislator, or "usual," when it is derived from unwritten
practice. Doctrinal interpretation may turn on the meaning of words and sentences, when
it is called "grammatical," or on the intention of the legislator, when it is described as
"logical." When logical interpretation stretches the words of a statute to cover its obvious
meaning, it is called "extensive;" when, on the other hand, it avoids giving full meaning
to the words, in order not to go beyond the intention of the legislator, it is called
"restrictive."
 Construction distinguished. In the strict usage of this term, "construction" is a term of
wider scope than "interpretation;" for, while the latter is concerned only with ascertaining
the sense and meaning of the subjectmatter, the former may also be directed to explaining
the legal effects and consequences of the instrument in question. Hence interpretation
 precedes construction, but stops at the written text. Interpretation and construction of
written instruments are not the same. A rule of construction is one which either governs
the effect of an ascertained intention, or points out what the court should do in the
absence of express or implied intention, while a rule of interpretation is one which
governs the ascertainment of the meaning of the maker of the instrument.
 Close or strict interpretation (interpretatio restricta) is adopted if just reasons, connected
with the formation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their
narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called "literal."
 Extensive interpretation (interpretatio ex tens i va, called, also, "liberal interpretation")
adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word.
 Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio excedens) is that which substitutes a meaning
evidently beyond the true one. It is therefore not genuine interpretation
 Free or unrestricted interpretation (interpretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the general
principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle.
 Limited or restricted interpretation (interpretatio limitata) is when we are influenced by
other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones.
 Predestined interpretation (interpretatio predestinata) takes place if the interpreter,
laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived
views or desires. This includes artful interpretation (interpretatio vater), by which the
interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been
intended.
 In the civil law, authentic interpretation of laws is that given by the legislator himself,
which is obligatory 818 on the courts. Customary interpretation (also called "usual") is
that which arises from successive or concurrent decisions of the court on the same
subject-matter, having regard to the spirit of the law, jurisprudence, usages, and equity; as
distinguished from "authentic" interpretation, which is that given by the legislator
himself.

Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, Apr. 24, 2018

respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese
court.

the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties,
together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages.

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry

the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her

. Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified, Article 26 now states onfers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

Article 26.
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of anothe

The recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26 (2) is

extended only as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of
the latter's national laws. The provision was not intended to grant any
preferential right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended
merely to recognize the operation of foreign divorce on foreigners
whose national laws permit divorce   |||

Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, Apr. 16, 2013

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
“(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body,

The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July
21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were
made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the
representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress
gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation,
defeating the principle of balance.
Issues:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Rulings:

No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such,
it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1,

Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction

the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense.

Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Quo Warranto or writ of inquiry determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public
office he or she occupies

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s appointment as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC)

Respondent has not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten years, from 1986 to 2006

Respondent has not proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution.

Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official leave without pay, she was actually not
required to file any SALN.

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto
against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has
already been filed with the House of Representatives

. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected

impeachable official may be removed from office.

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto
action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision uses
the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed
as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of
effecting the removal. That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only
those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to be
taken as a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may” cannot also be
understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it would lead to the conclusion that other
lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not contemplated in the language of the Constitutional
provision

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers

the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under Section 17, Article XI of the
Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. Faithful compliance with the 7 requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more
exacting when the public official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.

Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code
of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a
person of proven integrity.

De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”
Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

The Supreme Court, composition--

1st par., Sec.1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Sec. 4(1), Art. Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

The Members of the Supreme Court,qualifications—

Sec. 7(1), Art. Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 7(3), Art. Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 7(2), Art. Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years
or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,

probity, and independence.

The Supreme Court, jurisdiction—

Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Sec. 5(2)(A), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses,

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed

, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection

There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. 
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Oposa v. Factoran Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.

Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. 

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10 2003

The power of judicial review extends to the rule making power of the Congress where
said rule contravenes the mandate of the Constitution. Pursuant to the mandate of
Section 3 (8) of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Rules). Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule provides that
―impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General‖ while
Section 17 Rule V states, ―Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.
A House Resolution was subsequently issued directing the Committee on Justice to
conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) by the Chief Justice. Then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first complaint), endorsed by some of the
members of the House of Representatives against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
(Davide, Jr.) and seven other associate justices, in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article
IX. The first complaint was dismissed for being insufficient in substance, hence, the
Committee Report was never sent to the House in plenary.
A second impeachment complaint (second complaint) signed by at least one third (1/3)
of the members of the House of Representatives was filed with the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives by Gilbert Teodoro et al., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry. Hence, the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Ernesto Francisco, Jr., et al. (Francisco) prays that the House of
Representatives be prevented from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment of the
second complaint to the Senate, that the House Rules be declared null and void for
being unconstitutional. Likewise, it prayed that the House Resolution infringes the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary. On the other hand, Respondent-members of the House of
Representatives claims that the second complaint will prosper since the term, ―initiate
is different from ―filing under Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule, hence, the first
complaint was not really ―filed.
Respondent-intervenors Senator Franklin Drilon (Drilon) and Atty. Jaime Soriano, et.
al. filed filed a Manifestation and Petitions for Intervention, respectively, asserting that
the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, a
co-equal and independent branch from performing its mandate of intiating
impeachment cases and that there is no justiciable issue and the matter in question is
not yet ripe for judicial determination. The Manifestations and Petitions for
Intervention were admitted by the Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings
2.) Whether or not the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the
12th Congress is constitutional
3.) Whether or not the second impeachment complaint may be validly filed

HELD:

This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Respondent-members of
the Congress‘ and intervenors Atty. Romulo Macalintal, et al.‘s reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited
to support the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases,” as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain
any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power
to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are
of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
While the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court
and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress is
Unconstitutional.
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term “initiate” does not
mean “to file;” that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean “to file. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term “cases” must be
distinguished from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides
that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. On the other hand, proceeding takes place not in
the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a
verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds
the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives
which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the
Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted
to the Senate. It is at this point that the House “initiates an impeachment case.” Thus,
the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1)
says “The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment
proceeding.” Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, “No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year,” it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it
is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has
absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would, by necessary
implication, have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which
state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3
of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.” Therefore, Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
The Second Impeachment Complaint is barred by Par .5 Section 3 Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.